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Adapt security warning from qubes-app-linux-input-proxy

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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc/pull/310
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Andrew David Wong 2017-03-16 20:00:31 -07:00
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1 changed files with 30 additions and 25 deletions
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common-tasks/usb.md
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@ -128,21 +128,34 @@ directly to dom0.
7. Run the command `grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg` in dom0. 7. Run the command `grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg` in dom0.
8. Reboot. 8. Reboot.
Security Warning about USB Input Devices
----------------------------------------
**Important security warning. Please read this section carefully!**
If you connect USB input devices (keyboard and mouse) to a VM, that VM will effectively have control over your system.
Because of this, the benefits of using a USB qube are much smaller than using a fully untrusted USB qube.
In addition to having control over your system, such VM can also sniff all the input your enter there (for example, passwords in the case of a USB keyboard).
There is no simple way to protect against sniffing, but you can make it harder to exploit control over input devices.
If you have only a USB mouse connected to a USB qube, but the keyboard is connected directly to dom0 (using a PS/2 connector, for example), you simply need to lock the screen when you are away from your computer.
You must do this every time you leave your computer unattended, even if there no risk of anyone else having direct physical access to your computer.
This is because you are guarding the system not only against anyone with local access, but also against possible actions from a potentially compromised USB qube.
If your keyboard is also connected to a USB qube, things are much harder.
Locking the screen (with a traditional password) does not solve the problem, because the USB qube can simply sniff this password and later easily unlock the screen.
One possibility is to set up the screen locker to require an additional step to unlock (i.e., two-factor authentication).
One way to achieve this is to use a [YubiKey], or some other hardware token, or even to manually enter a one-time password.
How to use a USB keyboard How to use a USB keyboard
------------------------- -------------------------
In order to use a USB keyboard, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then **Caution:** Please carefully read the [Security Warning about USB Input Devices] before proceeding.
give that qube permission to pass keyboard input to dom0. Note that allowing
keyboard access from a USB qube gives it great power. In short:
* It will see whatever you type on that keyboard (including passwords). In order to use a USB keyboard, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then give that qube permission to pass keyboard input to dom0.
* It will be able to inject keystrokes, which basically means that it will be Edit the `qubes.InputKeyboard` policy file in dom0, which is located here:
able to enter any command. For example, if some malware catches your
screenlocker password, it will be able to unlock the screen when you are not
present. (For more details, see [here][input-proxy].)
If you are sure you wish to proceed, then you must edit the
`qubes.InputKeyboard` policy file in dom0, which is located here:
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.InputKeyboard /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.InputKeyboard
@ -157,19 +170,10 @@ You can now use your USB keyboard.
How to use a USB mouse How to use a USB mouse
---------------------- ----------------------
In order to use a USB mouse, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then **Caution:** Please carefully read the [Security Warning about USB Input Devices] before proceeding.
give that qube permission to pass mouse input to dom0. Note that allowing
mouse access from a USB qube gives it great power. In short:
* It will be able to change any global and per-domain setting available within GUI In order to use a USB mouse, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then give that qube permission to pass mouse input to dom0.
* It will be able to attach untrusted devices to domains that should not Edit the `qubes.InputMouse` policy file in dom0, which is located here:
have device access
* It will be able to enable networking in network-disconnected domains
* It will be able to initiate file transfer between domains.
(For more details, see [here][input-proxy].)
If you are sure you wish to proceed, then you must edit the
`qubes.InputMouse` policy file in dom0, which is located here:
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.InputMouse /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.InputMouse
@ -362,7 +366,8 @@ This feature is not yet available in Qubes Manager however, if you would like to
[AEM]: /doc/anti-evil-maid/ [AEM]: /doc/anti-evil-maid/
[1618]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1618 [1618]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1618
[create a USB qube]: #creating-and-using-a-usb-qube [create a USB qube]: #creating-and-using-a-usb-qube
[input-proxy]: https://github.com/qubesos/qubes-app-linux-input-proxy
[usb-challenges]: http://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/05/31/usb-security-challenges.html [usb-challenges]: http://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/05/31/usb-security-challenges.html
[project-page]: https://www.qubes-os.org/gsoc/ [project-page]: /gsoc/
[gsoc-page]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6239659689508864/ [gsoc-page]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6239659689508864/
[YubiKey]: /doc/YubiKey/
[Security Warning about USB Input Devices]: #security-warning-about-usb-input-devices