From 9408f8d2ee75d4a406bf981b4d9c01c48901d6fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: William Pierce <19642016+pierwill@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 22:34:54 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] Consistently use the term "third-party"

---
 basics_dev/coding-style.md            | 2 +-
 common-tasks/software-update-dom0.md  | 2 +-
 common-tasks/software-update-vm.md    | 4 ++--
 configuration/network-printer.md      | 4 ++--
 customization/dispvm-customization.md | 2 +-
 debugging/profiling.md                | 2 +-
 security/security-guidelines.md       | 2 +-
 services/dom0-secure-updates.md       | 2 +-
 system/security-critical-code.md      | 4 ++--
 9 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/basics_dev/coding-style.md b/basics_dev/coding-style.md
index c7a18b80..35477e43 100644
--- a/basics_dev/coding-style.md
+++ b/basics_dev/coding-style.md
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ File naming conventions
 **File naming in Windows systems:**
 
 -   All base qubes-related files in `C:\Program Files\Invisible Things Lab\Qubes\` (Exceptionally spaces are allowed here to adhere to Windows naming conventions)
--   Other, 3rd party files, not Qubes-specific, such as e.g. Xen PV drivers might be in different vendor subdirs, e.g. `C:\Program Files\Xen PV Drivers`
+-   Other, third-party files, not Qubes-specific, such as e.g. Xen PV drivers might be in different vendor subdirs, e.g. `C:\Program Files\Xen PV Drivers`
 
 General programming style guidelines
 ------------------------------------
diff --git a/common-tasks/software-update-dom0.md b/common-tasks/software-update-dom0.md
index 74d14336..1c59390f 100644
--- a/common-tasks/software-update-dom0.md
+++ b/common-tasks/software-update-dom0.md
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Updating software in dom0
 Why would one want to update software in dom0?
 ----------------------------------------------
 
-Normally, there should be few reasons for updating software in dom0. This is because there is no networking in dom0, which means that even if some bugs are discovered e.g. in the dom0 Desktop Manager, this really is not a problem for Qubes, because none of the 3rd party software running in dom0 is accessible from VMs or the network in any way. Some exceptions to this include: Qubes GUI daemon, Xen store daemon, and disk back-ends. (We plan move the disk backends to an untrusted domain in Qubes 2.0.) Of course, we believe this software is reasonably secure, and we hope it will not need patching.
+Normally, there should be few reasons for updating software in dom0. This is because there is no networking in dom0, which means that even if some bugs are discovered e.g. in the dom0 Desktop Manager, this really is not a problem for Qubes, because none of the third-party software running in dom0 is accessible from VMs or the network in any way. Some exceptions to this include: Qubes GUI daemon, Xen store daemon, and disk back-ends. (We plan move the disk backends to an untrusted domain in Qubes 2.0.) Of course, we believe this software is reasonably secure, and we hope it will not need patching.
 
 However, we anticipate some other situations in which updating dom0 software might be necessary or desirable:
 
diff --git a/common-tasks/software-update-vm.md b/common-tasks/software-update-vm.md
index b205980a..1e06b2c4 100644
--- a/common-tasks/software-update-vm.md
+++ b/common-tasks/software-update-vm.md
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ There are several ways to deal with this problem:
 
 Some popular questions:
 
--   So, why should we actually trust Fedora repos -- it also contains large amount of 3rd party software that might buggy, right?
+-   So, why should we actually trust Fedora repos -- it also contains large amount of third-party software that might buggy, right?
 
 As long as template's compromise is considered, it doesn't really matter whether /usr/bin/firefox is buggy and can be exploited, or not. What matters is whether its *installation* scripts (such as %post in the rpm.spec) are benign or not. Template VM should be used only for installation of packages, and nothing more, so it should never get a chance to actually run the /usr/bin/firefox and got infected from it, in case it was compromised. Also, some of your more trusted AppVMs, would have networking restrictions enforced by the [firewall VM](/doc/firewall/), and again they should not fear this proverbial /usr/bin/firefox being potentially buggy and easy to compromise.
 
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ qvm-create <vmname> --template <templatename> --label <label>
 Temporarily allowing networking for software installation
 ---------------------------------------------------------
 
-Some 3rd party applications cannot be installed using the standard yum repositories, and need to be manually downloaded and installed. When the installation requires internet connection to access 3rd party repositories, it will naturally fail when run in a Template VM because the default firewall rules for templates only allow connections to standard yum repositories. So it is necessary to modify firewall rules to allow less restrictive internet access for the time of the installation, if one really wants to install those applications into a template. As soon as software installation is completed, firewall rules should be returned back to the default state. The user should decided by themselves whether such 3rd party applications should be equally trusted as the ones that come from the standard Fedora signed repositories and whether their installation will not compromise the default Template VM, and potentially consider installing them into a separate template or a standalone VM (in which case the problem of limited networking access doesn't apply by default), as described above.
+Some third-party applications cannot be installed using the standard yum repositories, and need to be manually downloaded and installed. When the installation requires internet connection to access third-party repositories, it will naturally fail when run in a Template VM because the default firewall rules for templates only allow connections to standard yum repositories. So it is necessary to modify firewall rules to allow less restrictive internet access for the time of the installation, if one really wants to install those applications into a template. As soon as software installation is completed, firewall rules should be returned back to the default state. The user should decided by themselves whether such third-party applications should be equally trusted as the ones that come from the standard Fedora signed repositories and whether their installation will not compromise the default Template VM, and potentially consider installing them into a separate template or a standalone VM (in which case the problem of limited networking access doesn't apply by default), as described above.
 
 Updates proxy
 -------------
diff --git a/configuration/network-printer.md b/configuration/network-printer.md
index 26bd4879..6cb9a0cd 100644
--- a/configuration/network-printer.md
+++ b/configuration/network-printer.md
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ Alternatively one can add a printer in a standalone VM, but this would limit the
 Security considerations for network printers and drivers
 --------------------------------------------------------
 
-Some printers require 3rd party drivers, typically downloadable from the vendor's website. Such drivers are typically distributed in a form of ready to install RPM packages. However, they are often unsigned, and additionally the downloads are available via HTTP connections only. As a result, installation of such 3rd party RPMs in a default template VM exposes a risk of compromise of this template VM, which, in turn, leads automatically to compromise of all the AppVMs based on the template. (Again, it's not buggy or malicious drivers that we fear here, but rather malicious installation scripts for those drivers).
+Some printers require third-party drivers, typically downloadable from the vendor's website. Such drivers are typically distributed in a form of ready to install RPM packages. However, they are often unsigned, and additionally the downloads are available via HTTP connections only. As a result, installation of such third-party RPMs in a default template VM exposes a risk of compromise of this template VM, which, in turn, leads automatically to compromise of all the AppVMs based on the template. (Again, it's not buggy or malicious drivers that we fear here, but rather malicious installation scripts for those drivers).
 
-In order to mitigate this risk, one might consider creating a custom template (i.e. clone the original template) and then install the 3rd party, unverified drivers there. Such template might then be made the default template for [Disposable VM creation](/doc/dispvm/), which should allow one to print any document by right-clicking on it, choosing "Open in Disposable VM" and print from there. This would allow to print documents from more trusted AppVMs (based on a trusted default template, that is not poisoned by 3rd party printer drivers).
+In order to mitigate this risk, one might consider creating a custom template (i.e. clone the original template) and then install the third-party, unverified drivers there. Such template might then be made the default template for [Disposable VM creation](/doc/dispvm/), which should allow one to print any document by right-clicking on it, choosing "Open in Disposable VM" and print from there. This would allow to print documents from more trusted AppVMs (based on a trusted default template, that is not poisoned by third-party printer drivers).
 
 However, one should be aware that most (all?) network printing protocols are insecure, unencrypted protocols. This means, that an attacker who is able to sniff the local network, or who is controlling the (normally untrusted) Qubes NetVM, will likely to be able to see the documents being printed. This is a limitation of today's printers and printing protocols, something that cannot be solved by Qubes or any other OS.
 
diff --git a/customization/dispvm-customization.md b/customization/dispvm-customization.md
index 5c068348..5d047a6a 100644
--- a/customization/dispvm-customization.md
+++ b/customization/dispvm-customization.md
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Disposable VM Customization
 Changing the DVM Template
 -------------------------
 
-You may want to use a non-default template the [DVM Template](/doc/glossary/#dvm-template). One example is to use a less-trusted template with some less trusted, 3rd party, often unsigned, applications installed, such as e.g. 3rd part printer drivers.
+You may want to use a non-default template the [DVM Template](/doc/glossary/#dvm-template). One example is to use a less-trusted template with some less trusted, third-party, often unsigned, applications installed, such as e.g. third-party printer drivers.
 
 In order to regenerate the Disposable VM "snapshot" (called 'savefile' on Qubes) one can use the following command in Dom0:
 
diff --git a/debugging/profiling.md b/debugging/profiling.md
index fd8dfeec..2fad769c 100644
--- a/debugging/profiling.md
+++ b/debugging/profiling.md
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ mkdir -p ~/profiling
 qvm-run -p qubes-dev 'cat ~/profiling/Upload.sh' > ~/profiling/Upload.sh
 ~~~
 
--   WARNING: this will obviously be running third party code which is not signed by ITL nor Fedora. You have been warned.
+-   WARNING: this will obviously be running third-party code which is not signed by ITL nor Fedora. You have been warned.
 
 Workflow
 --------
diff --git a/security/security-guidelines.md b/security/security-guidelines.md
index 125ba46b..cf712f13 100644
--- a/security/security-guidelines.md
+++ b/security/security-guidelines.md
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ As explained [here](/getting-started/#appvms-qubes-and-templatevms), dom0 should
 1.  Secure isolation among domUs (i.e., AppVMs, StandaloneVMs, HVMs, etc.) is the *raison d'être* of Qubes. This is the primary reason that we recommend the delegation of all user activities to some number of AppVMs. In the event that any given VM is compromised, only that particular VM is compromised. (TemplateVMs are the exception to this. If a TemplateVM were compromised, then every AppVM based on it might also be compromised. Even in this case, however, the entire system would not necessarily have been compromised, since StandaloneVM(s), HVM(s), and/or multiple TemplateVMs might be in use.) By contrast, if dom0 were ever compromised, the entire system would thereby be compromised.
 2.  Due to the absence of convenience mechanisms in dom0 such as the inter-VM clipboard and inter-VM file copying, it is significantly less convenient to attempt to use dom0 for user operations (e.g., password management) in conjunction with AppVMs than it is to use another dedicated AppVM (e.g., a "vault" VM).
 3.  Dom0 has access to every VM's data in the form of its private image file, including untrusted (e.g., red-bordered) VMs. If the user were to make a mistake (or be tricked into making one) and thereby inadvertently access untrusted files from dom0, those files could exploit the application which accessed them (e.g., a file manager) and gain control over dom0 and, therefore, the entire system. Even simply displaying the data in a [terminal emulator](http://securityvulns.com/docs4128.html) can be dangerous. For example, some file managers (such as the Thunar File Manager, which is pre-installed by default in the Xfce4 version of dom0) list loop devices used by running VMs. When one of these devices is selected in the file manager, the loop device is mounted to dom0, effectively [transferring the contents](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/_tkjmBa9m9w/9BbKh94PVtcJ) of the home directory of a (by definition less trusted) AppVM to dom0.
-4.  There is a (hopefully small, but always non-zero) chance that any given program is malicious. Even packages by third party developers you trust might have been modified and then signed by an attacker who managed to get that developer's private key(s). For this reason, it is very important that as few programs as possible be run in dom0 in as restricted a manner as possible. For example, although GnuPG is used in dom0 for verifying updates received from the firewallvm, it does not follow that GnuPG should be used for regular user operations (e.g., key management) in dom0. This is because only a single GnuPG operation, the "verify signature" operation  (which is believed to be the most bulletproof operation in GnuPG), is used by default in dom0. No other key management operations (e.g., importing unverified keys) or any other data parsing takes place in dom0 by default.
+4.  There is a (hopefully small, but always non-zero) chance that any given program is malicious. Even packages by third-party developers you trust might have been modified and then signed by an attacker who managed to get that developer's private key(s). For this reason, it is very important that as few programs as possible be run in dom0 in as restricted a manner as possible. For example, although GnuPG is used in dom0 for verifying updates received from the firewallvm, it does not follow that GnuPG should be used for regular user operations (e.g., key management) in dom0. This is because only a single GnuPG operation, the "verify signature" operation  (which is believed to be the most bulletproof operation in GnuPG), is used by default in dom0. No other key management operations (e.g., importing unverified keys) or any other data parsing takes place in dom0 by default.
 5.  Any VM can be shut down in order to make it even more difficult for an adversary to access, and shutting down one VM does not restrict the user of other VMs. By contrast, one cannot shut down dom0 and use other VMs at the same time.
 6.  As far as we are aware, there are no special mechanisms in Xen which make dom0 more protected than any other VM, so there is no inherent security advantage to performing any user operations in dom0.
 
diff --git a/services/dom0-secure-updates.md b/services/dom0-secure-updates.md
index 28179c7c..afb7fa56 100644
--- a/services/dom0-secure-updates.md
+++ b/services/dom0-secure-updates.md
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Qubes Dom0 secure update procedure
 Reasons for Dom0 updates
 ------------------------
 
-Normally there should be few reasons for updating software in Dom0. This is because there is no networking in Dom0, which means that even if some bugs will be discovered e.g. in the Dom0 Desktop Manager, this really is not a problem for Qubes, because all the 3rd party software running in Dom0 is not accessible from VMs or network in any way. Some exceptions to the above include: Qubes GUI daemon, Xen store daemon, and disk back-ends (we plan to move the disk backends to untrusted domain in Qubes 2.0). Of course we believe this software is reasonably secure and we hope it will not need patching.
+Normally there should be few reasons for updating software in Dom0. This is because there is no networking in Dom0, which means that even if some bugs will be discovered e.g. in the Dom0 Desktop Manager, this really is not a problem for Qubes, because all the third-party software running in Dom0 is not accessible from VMs or network in any way. Some exceptions to the above include: Qubes GUI daemon, Xen store daemon, and disk back-ends (we plan to move the disk backends to untrusted domain in Qubes 2.0). Of course we believe this software is reasonably secure and we hope it will not need patching.
 
 However, we anticipate some other situations when updating Dom0 software might be required:
 
diff --git a/system/security-critical-code.md b/system/security-critical-code.md
index 7fd9a5d2..0a3137f3 100644
--- a/system/security-critical-code.md
+++ b/system/security-critical-code.md
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ Below is a code produced by the Qubes project that is security-critical.
 -   select Qubes RPC servers that run in Dom0: qubes.ReceiveUpdates and qubes.SyncAppMenus
 -   The qubes.Filecopy RPC server that runs in a VM -- this one is critical because it might allow one VM to compromise another one if user allows file copy operation to be performed between them
 
-Security-Critical 3rd-Party Components
---------------------------------------
+Security-Critical Third-Party Components
+----------------------------------------
 
 These are the components that we haven't written or designed ourselves, yet we still rely on them. At the current project stage, we cannot afford to spend time to thoroughly review and audit them, so we just more or less "blindly" trust they are secure.