Git-Mirrors/qubes-doc
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc.git synced 2025-07-27 00:35:57 -04:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity

exchanged webarchive links, minor wording

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
qubedmaiska 2025-07-01 03:17:45 -04:00
parent 823c5f34ba
commit 4554eef362
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 204BCE0FD52C0501
5 changed files with 6 additions and 6 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

2
developer/releases/4_0/release-notes.md
View file

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ title: Qubes R4.0 release notes
New features since 3.2
----------------------
* Core management scripts rewrite with better structure and extensibility, [API documentation](https://web.archive.org/web/20230128102821/https://dev.qubes-os.org/projects/qubes-core-admin/en/latest/)
* Core management scripts rewrite with better structure and extensibility, [current API documentation](https://dev.qubes-os.org/projects/core-admin/en/latest/) and the documentation API index as a [webarchive](https://web.archive.org/web/20230128102821/https://dev.qubes-os.org/projects/qubes-core-admin/en/latest/)
* [Admin API](/news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/) allowing strictly controlled managing from non-dom0
* All `qvm-*` command-line tools rewritten, some options have changed
* Renaming VM directly is prohibited, there is GUI to clone under new name and remove old VM

4
user/downloading-installing-upgrading/install-security.md
View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
---
---
lang: en
layout: doc
permalink: /doc/install-security/
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Cons:
(If the drive is mounted to a compromised machine, the ISO could be maliciously altered after it has been written to the drive.)
* Untrustworthy firmware.
(Firmware can be malicious even if the drive is new.
Plugging a drive with rewritable firmware into a compromised machine can also [compromise the drive](https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/briefings.html#badusb-on-accessories-that-turn-evil).
Plugging a drive with rewritable firmware into a compromised machine can also [compromise the drive](https://web.archive.org/web/20160304013434/https://srlabs.de/badusb/).
Installing from a compromised drive could compromise even a brand new Qubes installation.)
### Optical discs

2
user/hardware/certified-hardware/nitropc-pro.md
View file

@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ The NitroPC Pro also comes with a "Dasharo Entry Subscription," which includes t
- Accesses to the latest firmware releases
- Exclusive newsletter
- Special firmware updates, including early access to updates enhancing privacy, security, performance, and compatibility
- Early access to new firmware releases for [newly-supported desktop platforms](https://docs.dasharo.com/variants/overview/#desktop) (please see the [roadmap](https://github.com/Dasharo/presentations/blob/main/archive/dug_2/dug2_dasharo_roadmap.md#dasharo-desktop-roadmap))
- Early access to new firmware releases for [newly-supported desktop platforms](https://docs.dasharo.com/variants/overview/#desktop) (please see the [roadmap](https://github.com/Dasharo/presentations/blob/8f360b3e82108d1e85585c1c324a28a08dd276a5/dug2_dasharo_roadmap.md))
- Access to the Dasharo Premier Support invite-only live chat channel on the Matrix network, allowing direct access to the Dasharo Team and fellow subscribers with personalized and priority assistance
- Insider's view and influence on the Dasharo feature roadmap for a real impact on Dasharo development
- [Dasharo Tools Suite Entry Subscription](https://docs.dasharo.com/osf-trivia-list/dts/#what-is-dasharo-tools-suite-supporters-entrance) keys

2
user/security-in-qubes/anti-evil-maid.md
View file

@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Security Considerations
However, in its default configuration, installing and using AEM requires attaching a USB drive (i.e., [mass storage device](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USB_mass_storage_device_class)) directly to dom0.
(The other option is to install AEM to an internal disk.
However, this carries significant security implications, as explained [here](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/09/07/anti-evil-maid.html).) This presents us with a classic security trade-off: each Qubes user must make a choice between protecting dom0 from a potentially malicious USB drive, on the one hand, and protecting the system from Evil Maid attacks, on the other hand.
Given the practical feasibility of attacks like [BadUSB](https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/briefings.html#badusb-on-accessories-that-turn-evil) and revelations regarding pervasive government hardware backdoors, this is no longer a straightforward decision.
Given the practical feasibility of attacks like [BadUSB](https://web.archive.org/web/20160304013434/https://srlabs.de/badusb/) and revelations regarding pervasive government hardware backdoors, this is no longer a straightforward decision.
New, factory-sealed USB drives cannot simply be assumed to be "clean" (e.g., to have non-malicious microcontroller firmware).
Therefore, it is up to each individual Qubes user to evaluate the relative risk of each attack vector against his or her security model.

2
user/templates/fedora/fedora-upgrade.md
View file

@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ The same general procedure may be used to upgrade any template based on the stan
If this attempt is successful, proceed to step 4.
- `dnf` may complain: `At least X MB more space needed on the / filesystem.`
- `dnf` may error with the text: `At least X MB more space needed on the / filesystem.`
In this case, one option is to [resize the template's disk image](/doc/resize-disk-image/) before reattempting the upgrade process.
(See [Additional Information](#additional-information) below for other options.)