From 2d3bfcb39f4a553b4baf49d7c0c71544a76c3189 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: qubedmaiska Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 13:29:16 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] small formatting fixes in markdown --- developer/services/dom0-secure-updates.md | 2 +- user/security-in-qubes/firewall.md | 2 +- user/templates/fedora/fedora-upgrade.md | 6 +----- user/troubleshooting/gui-troubleshooting.md | 4 +--- user/troubleshooting/hvm-troubleshooting.md | 2 +- 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/developer/services/dom0-secure-updates.md b/developer/services/dom0-secure-updates.md index ad922a88..2a5b7d52 100644 --- a/developer/services/dom0-secure-updates.md +++ b/developer/services/dom0-secure-updates.md @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Keeping Dom0 not connected to any network makes it hard, however, to provide upd The update process is initiated by [qubes-dom0-update script](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-admin-linux/blob/release2/dom0-updates/qubes-dom0-update), running in Dom0. -Updates (`*.rpm` files) are checked and downloaded by UpdateVM, which by default is the same as the firewall VM, but can be configured to be any other, network-connected VM. This is done by [qubes-download-dom0-updates.sh script](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-agent-linux/blob/release2/misc/qubes-download-dom0-updates.sh) (this script is executed using qrexec by the previously mentioned qubes-dom0-update). Note that we assume that this script might get compromised and fetch maliciously compromised downloads -- this is not a problem as Dom0 verifies digital signatures on updates later. The downloaded rpm files are placed in a ~~~/var/lib/qubes/dom0-updates~~~ directory on UpdateVM filesystem (again, they might get compromised while being kept there, still this isn't a problem). This directory is passed to yum using the ~~~--installroot=~~~ option. +Updates (`*.rpm` files) are checked and downloaded by UpdateVM, which by default is the same as the firewall VM, but can be configured to be any other, network-connected VM. This is done by [qubes-download-dom0-updates.sh script](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-agent-linux/blob/release2/misc/qubes-download-dom0-updates.sh) (this script is executed using qrexec by the previously mentioned qubes-dom0-update). Note that we assume that this script might get compromised and fetch maliciously compromised downloads -- this is not a problem as Dom0 verifies digital signatures on updates later. The downloaded rpm files are placed in a `/var/lib/qubes/dom0-updates` directory on UpdateVM filesystem (again, they might get compromised while being kept there, still this isn't a problem). This directory is passed to yum using the `--installroot=` option. Once updates are downloaded, the update script that runs in UpdateVM requests an RPM service [qubes.ReceiveUpdates](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-admin-linux/blob/release2/dom0-updates/qubes.ReceiveUpdates) to be executed in Dom0. This service is implemented by [qubes-receive-updates script](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-admin-linux/blob/release2/dom0-updates/qubes-receive-updates) running in Dom0. The Dom0's qubes-dom0-update script (which originally initiated the whole update process) waits until qubes-receive-updates finished. diff --git a/user/security-in-qubes/firewall.md b/user/security-in-qubes/firewall.md index 558a34aa..9c915752 100644 --- a/user/security-in-qubes/firewall.md +++ b/user/security-in-qubes/firewall.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ title: Firewall Introduction ---------------------------------- This page explains use of the firewall in Qubes 4.2, using `nftables`. -In Qubes 4.1, all firewall components used `iptables`. For details of that usage see [here](../firewall_4.1/) +In Qubes 4.1, all firewall components used `iptables`. For details of that usage see [here](../firewall_4.1/). Understanding firewalling in Qubes diff --git a/user/templates/fedora/fedora-upgrade.md b/user/templates/fedora/fedora-upgrade.md index 2d5dad90..b4096367 100644 --- a/user/templates/fedora/fedora-upgrade.md +++ b/user/templates/fedora/fedora-upgrade.md @@ -121,11 +121,7 @@ The same general procedure may be used to upgrade any template based on the stan If this attempt is successful, proceed to step 4. - * `dnf` may complain: - - ` - At least X MB more space needed on the / filesystem. - ` + * `dnf` may complain: `At least X MB more space needed on the / filesystem.` In this case, one option is to [resize the template's disk image](/doc/resize-disk-image/) before reattempting the upgrade process. (See [Additional Information](#additional-information) below for other options.) diff --git a/user/troubleshooting/gui-troubleshooting.md b/user/troubleshooting/gui-troubleshooting.md index a2761396..d08d482f 100644 --- a/user/troubleshooting/gui-troubleshooting.md +++ b/user/troubleshooting/gui-troubleshooting.md @@ -26,9 +26,7 @@ Similarly, while working, the XScreenSaver dialog may pop up (indicating the scr If you are experiencing the any of the above symptoms, try disabling the window compositor: -` - Q → System Tools → Window Manager Tweaks → Compositor → uncheck “Enable display compositing” -` +`Q → System Tools → Window Manager Tweaks → Compositor → uncheck “Enable display compositing”` ## Post installation, screen goes black and freezes following LUKS decryption diff --git a/user/troubleshooting/hvm-troubleshooting.md b/user/troubleshooting/hvm-troubleshooting.md index 98f87a9e..070c37ec 100644 --- a/user/troubleshooting/hvm-troubleshooting.md +++ b/user/troubleshooting/hvm-troubleshooting.md @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ qvm-prefs kernel "" ## HVM crashes when booting from ISO -If your HVM crashes when trying to boot an ISO, first ensure that ` qvm-prefs kernel` is empty, as shown above. +If your HVM crashes when trying to boot an ISO, first ensure that `qvm-prefs kernel` is empty, as shown above. If this doesn't help, then disable memory balancing and set the minimum memory to 2GB. You can disable memory-balancing in the settings, under the “Advanced” tab.