From 2d07f7831c9be109f3dbc42165b3e38038f9bee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew David Wong Date: Sat, 12 Nov 2016 12:39:24 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] Change "/doc/qubes-firewall/" to "/doc/firewall/" --- building/development-workflow.md | 2 +- common-tasks/software-update-vm.md | 4 ++-- doc.md | 2 +- managing-os/templates/fedora-minimal.md | 2 +- security/data-leaks.md | 2 +- security/{qubes-firewall.md => firewall.md} | 7 ++++--- 6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) rename security/{qubes-firewall.md => firewall.md} (99%) diff --git a/building/development-workflow.md b/building/development-workflow.md index b1599dd6..4ddce81f 100644 --- a/building/development-workflow.md +++ b/building/development-workflow.md @@ -541,6 +541,6 @@ Usage: add this line to `/etc/apt/sources.list` on test machine (adjust host and deb http://local-test.lan/linux-deb/r3.1 jessie-unstable main ~~~ -[port-forwarding]: /doc/qubes-firewall/#port-forwarding-to-a-qube-from-the-outside-world +[port-forwarding]: /doc/firewall/#port-forwarding-to-a-qube-from-the-outside-world [linux-yum]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-yum [linux-deb]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-deb diff --git a/common-tasks/software-update-vm.md b/common-tasks/software-update-vm.md index 44f125fa..c4402eeb 100644 --- a/common-tasks/software-update-vm.md +++ b/common-tasks/software-update-vm.md @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ As the template VM is used for creating filesystems for other AppVMs, where you There are several ways to deal with this problem: -- Only install packages from trusted sources -- e.g. from the pre-configured Fedora repositories. All those packages are signed by Fedora, and as we expect that at least the package's installation scripts are not malicious. This is enforced by default (at the [firewall VM level](/doc/qubes-firewall/)), by not allowing any networking connectivity in the default template VM, except for access to the Fedora repos. +- Only install packages from trusted sources -- e.g. from the pre-configured Fedora repositories. All those packages are signed by Fedora, and as we expect that at least the package's installation scripts are not malicious. This is enforced by default (at the [firewall VM level](/doc/firewall/)), by not allowing any networking connectivity in the default template VM, except for access to the Fedora repos. - Use *standalone VMs* (see below) for installation of untrusted software packages. @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Some popular questions: - So, why should we actually trust Fedora repos -- it also contains large amount of 3rd party software that might buggy, right? -As long as template's compromise is considered, it doesn't really matter whether /usr/bin/firefox is buggy and can be exploited, or not. What matters is whether its *installation* scripts (such as %post in the rpm.spec) are benign or not. Template VM should be used only for installation of packages, and nothing more, so it should never get a chance to actually run the /usr/bin/firefox and got infected from it, in case it was compromised. Also, some of your more trusted AppVMs, would have networking restrictions enforced by the [firewall VM](/doc/qubes-firewall/), and again they should not fear this proverbial /usr/bin/firefox being potentially buggy and easy to compromise. +As long as template's compromise is considered, it doesn't really matter whether /usr/bin/firefox is buggy and can be exploited, or not. What matters is whether its *installation* scripts (such as %post in the rpm.spec) are benign or not. Template VM should be used only for installation of packages, and nothing more, so it should never get a chance to actually run the /usr/bin/firefox and got infected from it, in case it was compromised. Also, some of your more trusted AppVMs, would have networking restrictions enforced by the [firewall VM](/doc/firewall/), and again they should not fear this proverbial /usr/bin/firefox being potentially buggy and easy to compromise. - But why trusting Fedora? diff --git a/doc.md b/doc.md index 4c358762..61690762 100644 --- a/doc.md +++ b/doc.md @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ Security Guides * [Qubes OS Project Security Information](/security/) * [Security Guidelines](/doc/security-guidelines/) - * [Understanding Qubes Firewall](/doc/qubes-firewall/) + * [Understanding Qubes Firewall](/doc/firewall/) * [Understanding and Preventing Data Leaks](/doc/data-leaks/) * [Installing Anti Evil Maid](/doc/anti-evil-maid/) * [Using Multi-factor Authentication with Qubes](/doc/multifactor-authentication/) diff --git a/managing-os/templates/fedora-minimal.md b/managing-os/templates/fedora-minimal.md index 6b58adeb..e220e5ab 100644 --- a/managing-os/templates/fedora-minimal.md +++ b/managing-os/templates/fedora-minimal.md @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ As expected, the required packages are to be installed in the running template w Use case | Description | Required steps --- | --- | --- **Standard utilities** | If you need the commonly used utilities | Install the following packages: `pciutils` `vim-minimal` `less` `psmisc` `gnome-keyring` -**FirewallVM** | You can use the minimal template as a [FirewallVM](/doc/qubes-firewall/), such as the basis template for `sys-firewall` | No extra packages are needed for the template to work as a firewall. +**FirewallVM** | You can use the minimal template as a [FirewallVM](/doc/firewall/), such as the basis template for `sys-firewall` | No extra packages are needed for the template to work as a firewall. **NetVM** | You can use this template as the basis for a NetVM such as `sys-net` | Install the following packages: `NetworkManager` `NetworkManager-wifi` `network-manager-applet` `wireless-tools` `dbus-x11 dejavu-sans-fonts` `tinyproxy`. **NetVM (extra firmware)** | If your network devices need extra packages for the template to work as a network VM | Use the `lspci` command to identify the devices, then run `dnf search firmware` (replace `firmware` with the appropriate device identifier) to find the needed packages and then install them. **Network utilities** | If you need utilities for debugging and analyzing network connections | Install the following packages: `tcpdump` `telnet` `nmap` `nmap-ncat` diff --git a/security/data-leaks.md b/security/data-leaks.md index efd9513b..3fafeab5 100644 --- a/security/data-leaks.md +++ b/security/data-leaks.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Understanding and Preventing Data Leaks The Role of the Firewall ------------------------ -**[Firewalling in Qubes](/doc/qubes-firewall/) is not intended to be a leak-prevention mechanism.** +**[Firewalling in Qubes](/doc/firewall/) is not intended to be a leak-prevention mechanism.** There are several reasons for this, which will be explained below. However, the main reason is that Qubes cannot prevent an attacker who has compromised one AppVM (with restrictive firewall rules) from leaking data via cooperative covert channels through a different AppVM (with sufficiently nonrestrictive firewall rules, if any) which the attacker has also compromised. diff --git a/security/qubes-firewall.md b/security/firewall.md similarity index 99% rename from security/qubes-firewall.md rename to security/firewall.md index 64c848e0..23c925cc 100644 --- a/security/qubes-firewall.md +++ b/security/firewall.md @@ -1,9 +1,10 @@ --- layout: doc -title: Qubes Firewall -permalink: /doc/qubes-firewall/ +title: The Qubes Firewall +permalink: /doc/firewall/ redirect_from: -- /en/doc/qubes-firewall/ +- /doc/firewall/ +- /en/doc/firewall/ - /doc/QubesFirewall/ - /wiki/QubesFirewall/ ---