diff --git a/about/faq.md b/about/faq.md
index 3afde8b2..e46a80bc 100644
--- a/about/faq.md
+++ b/about/faq.md
@@ -582,3 +582,10 @@ Arguably secure boot reliance on UEFI integrity is not the best design.
 The relevant binaries (shim.efi, xen.efi, kernel / initramfs) are not signed by the Qubes Team and secure boot has not been tested.
 Intel TXT (used in [Anti Evil Maid](/doc/anti-evil-maid/)) at least tries to avoid or limit trust in BIOS.
 See the Heads project [[1]](https://trmm.net/Heads) [[2]](http://osresearch.net/) for a better-designed non-UEFI-based secure boot scheme with very good support for Qubes.
+
+### Is there a way to automate tasks like with Continuous Integration / DevOps?
+
+Yes. Since Qubes 3.1 there is [Salt / SaltStack](/doc/salt/) support by Qubes Team.
+Also there is an [external project for Qubes 3.x that uses ansible](https://github.com/Rudd-O/ansible-qubes) . 
+With it "you can completely script the setup and maintenance of an entire network of Qubes OS machines". Though note, that this stuff is NOT from Qubes Team and managing Dom0 from qube in Qubes 3.x is against Qubes security model (you have been warned).
+