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Add privacy FAQs

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Andrew David Wong 2020-09-03 17:10:20 -05:00
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introduction/faq.md
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@ -65,8 +65,26 @@ Common attack vectors like network cards and USB controllers are isolated in the
Integrated [file] and [clipboard] copy and paste operations make it easy to work across various qubes without compromising security. Integrated [file] and [clipboard] copy and paste operations make it easy to work across various qubes without compromising security.
The innovative [Template] system separates software installation from software use, allowing qubes to share a root filesystem without sacrificing security (and saving disk space, to boot). The innovative [Template] system separates software installation from software use, allowing qubes to share a root filesystem without sacrificing security (and saving disk space, to boot).
Qubes even allows you to sanitize PDFs and images in a few clicks. Qubes even allows you to sanitize PDFs and images in a few clicks.
Users concerned about privacy will appreciate the [integration of Whonix][Qubes-Whonix] with Qubes, which makes it easy to use [Tor] securely, while those concerned about physical hardware attacks will benefit from [Anti Evil Maid]. Those concerned about physical hardware attacks will benefit from [Anti Evil Maid].
### How does Qubes OS provide privacy?
Users concerned about privacy will appreciate the integration of [Whonix][Qubes-Whonix] into Qubes, which makes it easy to use [Tor] securely.
### What about privacy in non-Whonix qubes?
Non-[Whonix][Qubes-Whonix] qubes do not claim to provide any special privacy (as opposed to security) properties.
This includes [DisposableVMs][disposable].
Privacy is far more difficult than is commonly understood.
In addition to the [web browser](https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/), there is also [VM fingerprinting](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/VM_Fingerprinting) and [advanced deanonymization attacks](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Advanced_Deanonymization_Attacks) that most users have never considered (and this is just to mention a few examples).
The Whonix Project specializes in [protecting against these risks](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Protocol-Leak-Protection_and_Fingerprinting-Protection).
In order to achieve the same results in non-Whonix qubes (including DisposableVMs), one would have to reinvent Whonix.
Such duplication of effort makes no sense when Whonix already exists and is already integrated into Qubes OS.
When you need privacy, use Whonix.
When you use a non-Whonix qube, do not expect it.
### How does Qubes OS compare to using a "live CD" OS? ### How does Qubes OS compare to using a "live CD" OS?