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2
about/code-of-conduct.md
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@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Examples of unacceptable behavior by participants include:
- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or electronic address, without explicit permission
- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
(Please also see our [mailing list discussion guidelines](https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/#discussion-list-guidelines).)
(Please also see our [mailing list discussion guidelines](/mailing-lists/#discussion-list-guidelines).)
## Our Responsibilities

23
about/faq.md
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@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ At the same time, due to the smart use of Xen shared memory, our GUI implementat
### Why passwordless sudo?
Please refer to [this page](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/vm-sudo/).
Please refer to [this page](/doc/vm-sudo/).
### How should I report documentation issues?
@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ Qubes assumes that the user who controls Dom0 controls the whole system.
It is very difficult to **securely** implement multi-user support.
See [here](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/899f6f3efc4d9a06) for details.
However, in Qubes 4.x we will be implementing management functionality. See [Admin API](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/) and [Core Stack](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/10/03/core3/) for more details.
However, in Qubes 4.x we will be implementing management functionality. See [Admin API](/news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/) and [Core Stack](/news/2017/10/03/core3/) for more details.
### What are the system requirements for Qubes OS?
@ -345,14 +345,14 @@ Another solution would be to set the pci_strictreset option in dom0:
- In Qubes R4.x, when attaching the PCI device to the VM (where `<BDF>` can be obtained from running [qvm-pci](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-pci/)):
qvm-pci attach -persistent -option no-strict-reset=true usbVM dom0:<BDF>
qvm-pci attach --persistent --option no-strict-reset=true usbVM dom0:<BDF>
- In Qubes R3.x, by modifying the VM's properties:
qvm-prefs usbVM -s pci_strictreset false
These options allow the VM to ignore the error and the VM will start.
Please review the note on [this page](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/Dom0Tools/QvmPrefs/) and be aware of the potential risk.
Please review the notes on [this page](/doc/Dom0Tools/QvmPrefs/) and [here](/doc/assigning-devices/) and be aware of the potential risks.
### I assigned a PCI device to a qube, then unassigned it/shut down the qube. Why isn't the device available in dom0?
@ -371,6 +371,8 @@ or
MOD=`modprobe -R $MODALIAS | head -n 1`
echo 0000:<BDF> > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/$MOD/bind
See also [here](/doc/assigning-devices/).
### How do I install Flash in a Debian qube?
The Debian way is to install the flashplugin-nonfree package.
@ -413,7 +415,7 @@ For Fedora:
The recommended approach is to pass only the specific partition you intend to use from [`sys-usb`](/doc/usb/) to another qube via [qvm-block](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-block/). They will show up in the destination qube as `/dev/xvd*` and must be mounted manually. Another approach is to attach the entire USB drive to your destination qube. However, this could theoretically lead to an attack because it forces the destination qube to parse the device's partition table. If you believe your device is safe, you may proceed to attach it.
In Qubes 4.0, this is accomplished with the widget located in the tool tray (default top right corner, look for an icon with a yellow square). From the top part of the list, click on the drive you want to attach, then select the qube to attach it to. Although you can also attach the entire USB device to a qube by selecting it from the bottom part of the list, in general this approach should not be used because you are exposing the target qube to unnecessary additional attack surface.
In Qubes 4.0, this is accomplished with the Devices Widget located in the tool tray (default top right corner, look for an icon with a yellow square). From the top part of the list, click on the drive you want to attach, then select the qube to attach it to. Although you can also attach the entire USB device to a qube by selecting it from the bottom part of the list, in general this approach should not be used because you are exposing the target qube to unnecessary additional attack surface.
In Qubes 3.2, you can use the Qubes VM Manager. Simply insert your USB drive, right-click on the desired qube in the Qubes VM Manager list, click Attach/detach block devices, and select your desired action and device.
@ -429,7 +431,7 @@ The encrypted partitions are identified and the user is prompted for password on
A fully encrypted drive does not appear in Nautilus.
The work round is to manually decrypt and mount the drive:
The workaround is to manually decrypt and mount the drive:
1. attach usb device to qube - it should be attached as /dev/xvdi or similar.
2. sudo cryptsetup open /dev/xvdi bk --type luks
@ -459,6 +461,15 @@ If it seems like the issue described in [this thread](https://github.com/QubesOS
Please report (via the mailing lists) if you experience this issue, and whether disabling the compositor fixes it for you or not.
### My HVM in Qubes R4.0 won't let me start/install an OS
I see a screen popup with SeaBios and 4 lines, last one being `Probing EDD (edd=off to disable!... ok`.
From a `dom0` prompt, enter:
qvm-prefs <HVMname> kernel ""
----------
## Developers

8
basics_dev/coding-style.md
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@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ General programming style guidelines
}
~~~
- Do **not** use comments to disable code fragments. In a production code there should really be no commented or disabled code fragments. If you really, really have a good reason to retain some fragment of unused code, use \#if or \#ifdef to disable it, e.g.:
- Do **not** use comments to disable code fragments. In production code there should really be no commented or disabled code fragments. If you really, really have a good reason to retain some fragment of unused code, use \#if or \#ifdef to disable it, e.g.:
~~~
#if 0
@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ Source Code management (Git) guidelines
- This creates natural boundaries between different code blocks, enforcing proper interfaces, and easing independent development to be conducted on various code parts at the same time, without the fear of running into conflicts.
- By maintaining relatively small git repositories, it is easy for new developers to understand the code and contribute new patches, without the need to understand all the other code.
- Code repositories represent also licensing boundaries. So, e.g. because `core-agent-linux` and `core-agent-windows` are maintained in two different repositories, it is possible to have the latter under a proprietary, non-GPL license, while keeping the former fully open source.
- We have drastically changes the layout and naming of the code repositories shortly after Qubes OS R2 Beta 2 release. For details on the current code layout, please read [this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2013/03/21/introducing-qubes-odyssey-framework.html).
- We have drastically changed the layout and naming of the code repositories shortly after Qubes OS R2 Beta 2 release. For details on the current code layout, please read [this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2013/03/21/introducing-qubes-odyssey-framework.html).
Commit message guidelines
-------------------------
@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ Security coding guidelines
height = untrusted_conf.height;
~~~
- Use another variables, without the `untrusted_` prefix to hold the sanitized values, as shown above.
- Use others variables, without the `untrusted_` prefix to hold the sanitized values, as shown above.
Python-specific guidelines
--------------------------
@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ C and C++ specific guidelines
- Do not place code in `*.h` files.
- Use `const` whenever possible, e.g. in function arguments passed via pointers.
- Do not mix procedural and objective code together -- if you write in C++, use classes and objects.
- Think about classes hierarchy, before start implementing specific methods.
- Think about classes hierarchy, before starting to implement specific methods.
Bash-specific guidelines
------------------------

262
basics_dev/gsoc.md
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@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Before the summer starts, there are some preparatory tasks which are highly enco
### Student proposal guidelines
A project proposal is what you will be judged upon. Write a clear proposal on what you plan to do, the scope of your project, and why we should choose you to do it. Proposals are the basis of the GSoC projects and therefore one of the most important things to do well. The proposal is not only the basis of our decision of which student to choose, it has also an effect on Google's decision as to how many student slots are assigned to Qubes.
A project proposal is what you will be judged upon. Write a clear proposal on what you plan to do, the scope of your project, and why we should choose you to do it. Proposals are the basis of the GSoC projects and therefore one of the most important things to do well. The proposal is not only the basis of our decision of which student to choose, it has also an effect on Google's decision as to how many student slots are assigned to Qubes.
Below is the application template:
@ -86,50 +86,12 @@ These project ideas were contributed by our developers and may be incomplete. If
**Expected results**: What is the expected result in the timeframe given
**Knowledge prerequisite**: Pre-requisites for working on the project. What coding language and knowledge is needed?
**Knowledge prerequisite**: Pre-requisites for working on the project. What coding language and knowledge is needed?
If applicable, links to more information or discussions
**Mentor**: Name and email address.
```
### Qubes MIME handlers
**Project**: Qubes MIME handlers
**Brief explanation**: [#441](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/441) (including remembering decision whether some file
should be opened in DispVM or locally)
**Expected results**:
- Design mechanism for recognising which files should be opened locally and which in Disposable VM. This mechanism should:
- Respect default action like "by default open files in Disposable VM" (this
may be about files downloaded from the internet, transferred from
other VM etc).
- Allow setting persistent flag for a file that should be opened in specific
way ("locally"); this flag should local to the VM - it shouldn't be possible
to preserve (or even fabricate) the flag while transferring the file from/to
VM.
- See linked ticket for simple ideas.
- Implement generic file handler to apply this mechanism; it should work
regardless of file type, and if file is chosen to be opened locally, normal
(XDG) rules of choosing application should apply.
- Setting/unsetting the flag should be easy - like if once file is chosen to
be opened locally, it should remember that decision.
- Preferably use generic mechanism to integrate it into file managers (XDG
standards). If not possible - integrate with Nautilus and Dolphin.
- Optionally implement the same for Windows.
- Document the mechanism (how the flag is stored, how mechanism is plugged
into file managers etc).
- Write unit tests and integration tests.
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- XDG standards
- Bash or Python scripting
- Basic knowledge of configuration/extension for file managers
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Template manager, new template distribution mechanism
**Project**: Template manager, new template distribution mechanism
@ -166,7 +128,7 @@ would override all the user changes there). More details:
[#1705](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1705) for some idea
(this one lack integrity verification, but similar service could
be developed with that added)
- If new "package" format is developed, add support for it into
- If new "package" format is developed, add support for it into
[linux-template-builder](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-template-builder).
- Document the mechanism.
- Write unit tests and integration tests.
@ -181,6 +143,84 @@ would override all the user changes there). More details:
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Easy inter-VM networking configuration
**Project**: Easy inter-VM networking configuration
**Brief explanation**: Utility to easily configure selected VMs to be reachable (by network) from other VMs or outside network. Currently such configuration require adding iptables rules in multiple VMs manually. For exposing VM to outside network, it may be good to adopt qrexec-based TCP forwarding ([#2148](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2148)).
**Expected results**:
- support firewall rules for inter-VM traffic in qubes-firewall - both VM side (qubes-firewall service) and dom0 configuration side (relevant Admin API calls)
- mechanism for configuring firewall in target VM, especially INPUT iptables chain - currently it is hardcoded to drop new incoming connections
- convenient tool (or modification to existing tool) for controlling above mechanisms
- integration the above with existing GUI tools (especially VM settings)
Relevant links:
- [Qubes networking and firewall documentation](/doc/firewall/)
- [qubes-firewall service code](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-agent-linux/blob/master/qubesagent/firewall.py)
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- iptables
- basics of nft
- python3
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Mechanism for maintaining in-VM configuration
**Project**: Mechanism for maintaining in-VM configuration
**Brief explanation**: Large number of VMs is hard to maintain. Templates helps with keeping them updated, but many applications have configuration in user home directory, which is not synchronized.
**Expected results**:
- Design a mechanism how to _safely_ synchronize application configuration living in user home directory (`~/.config`, some other "dotfiles"). Mechanism should be resistant against malicious VM forcing its configuration on other VMs. Some approach could be a strict control which VM can send what changes (whitelist approach, not blacklist).
- Implementation of the above mechanism.
- Documentation how to configure it securely.
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- shell and/or python scripting
- Qubes OS qrexec services
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/), [Wojtek Porczyk](/team/).
### Wayland support in GUI agent and/or GUI daemon
**Project**: Wayland support in GUI agent and/or GUI daemon
**Brief explanation**: Currently both GUI agent (VM side of the GUI virtualization) and GUI daemon (dom0 side of GUI virtualization) support X11 protocol only. It may be useful to add support for Wayland there. Note that those are in fact two independent projects:
1. GUI agent - make it work as Wayland compositor, instead of extracting window's composition buffers using custom X11 driver
2. GUI daemon - act as Wayland application, showing windows retrieved from VMs, keeping zero-copy display path (window content is directly mapped from application running in VM, not copied)
**Expected results**:
Choose either of GUI agent, GUI daemon. Both are of similar complexity and each separately looks like a good task for GSoC time period.
- design relevant GUI agent/daemon changes, the GUI protocol should not be affected
- consider window decoration handling - VM should have no way of spoofing those, so it must be enforced by GUI daemon (either client-side - by GUI daemon itself, or server-side, based on hints given by GUI daemon)
- implement relevant GUI agent/daemon changes
- implement tests for new GUI handling, similar to existing tests for X11 based GUI
Relevant links:
- [Low level GUI documentation](/doc/gui/)
- [qubes-gui-agent-linux](https://github.com/qubesos/qubes-gui-agent-linux)
- [qubes-gui-daemon](https://github.com/qubesos/qubes-gui-daemon)
- [Use Wayland instead of X11 to increase performance](https://github.com/qubesos/qubes-issues/issues/3366)
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- Wayland architecture
- basics of X11 (for understanding existing code)
- C language
- using shared memory (synchronization methods etc)
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/).
### Qubes Live USB
**Project**: Revive Qubes Live USB, integrate it with installer
@ -231,40 +271,11 @@ details: [#1552](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1552),
**Mentor**: [Thomas Leonard](mailto:talex5@gmail.com), [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### IPv6 support
**Project**: IPv6 support
**Brief explanation**: Add support for native IPv6 in Qubes VMs. This should
include IPv6 routing (+NAT...), IPv6-aware firewall, DNS configuration, dealing
with IPv6 being available or not in directly connected network. See
[#718](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/718) for more details.
**Expected results**:
- Add IPv6 handling to network configuration scripts in VMs
- Add support for IPv6 in Qubes firewall (including CLI/GUI tools to configure it)
- Design and implement simple mechanism to propagate information about IPv6
being available at all (if necessary). This should be aware of ProxyVMs
potentially adding/removing IPv6 support - like VPN, Tor etc.
- Add unit tests and integration tests for both configuration scripts and UI
enhancements.
- Update documentation.
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- network protocols, especially IPv6, TCP, DNS, DHCPv6, ICMPv6 (including
autoconfiguration)
- ip(6)tables, nftables, NAT
- Python and Bash scripting
- network configuration on Linux: ip tool, configuration files on Debian and
Fedora, NetworkManager
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Thunderbird, Firefox and Chrome extensions
**Project**: additional Thunderbird, Firefox and Chrome extensions
**Brief explanation**:
**Brief explanation**:
* browser/mail: open link in vm
* browser/mail: open link in dispvm
@ -315,31 +326,7 @@ immune to altering past entries. See
- systemd
- Python/Bash scripting
**Mentor**: Inquire on [qubes-devel][ml-devel].
### GUI improvements
**Project**: GUI improvements
**Brief explanation**:
* GUI for enabling USB keyboard: [#2329](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2329)
* GUI for enabling USB passthrough: [#2328](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2328)
* GUI interface for /etc/qubes/guid.conf: [#2304](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2304)
* Improving inter-VM file copy / move UX master ticket: [#1839](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1839)
* and comprehensive list of GUI issues: [#1117](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1117)
**Expected results**:
- Add/enhance GUI tools to configure/do things mentioned in description above.
Reasonable subset of those things is acceptable.
- Write tests for added elements.
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- Python, PyGTK
**Mentor**: Inquire on [qubes-devel][ml-devel].
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Xen GPU pass-through for Intel integrated GPUs
**Project**: Xen GPU pass-through for Intel integrated GPUs (largely independent of Qubes)
@ -379,7 +366,7 @@ details in [#2618](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2618).
**Brief explanation**: [T509](https://phabricator.whonix.org/T509)
**Expected results**:
**Expected results**:
- Work at upstream Tor: An older version of https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TransparentProxy page was the origin of Whonix. Update that page for nftables / IPv6 support without mentioning Whonix. Then discuss that on the tor-talk mailing list for wider input. - https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21397
- implement corridor feature request add IPv6 support / port to nftables - https://github.com/rustybird/corridor/issues/39
@ -387,7 +374,11 @@ details in [#2618](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2618).
- make connections to IPv6 Tor relays work
- make connections to IPv6 destinations work
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- nftables
- iptables
- IPv6
**Mentor**: [Patrick Schleizer](/team/)
@ -413,8 +404,8 @@ details in [#2618](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2618).
**Mentor**: [Rafał Wojdyła](/team/)
### Gui agent for Windows 8/10
**Project**: Gui agent for Windows 8/10
### GUI agent for Windows 8/10
**Project**: GUI agent for Windows 8/10
**Brief explanation**: Add support for Windows 8+ to the Qubes GUI agent and video driver. Starting from Windows 8, Microsoft requires all video drivers to conform to the WDDM display driver model which is incompatible with the current Qubes video driver. Unfortunately the WDDM model is much more complex than the old XPDM one and officially *requires* a physical GPU device (which may be emulated). Some progress has been made to create a full WDDM driver that *doesn't* require a GPU device, but the driver isn't working correctly yet. Alternatively, WDDM model supports display-only drivers which are much simpler but don't have access to system video memory and rendering surfaces (a key feature that would simplify seamless GUI mode). [#1861](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1861)
@ -424,27 +415,7 @@ details in [#2618](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2618).
**Mentor**: [Rafał Wojdyła](/team/)
### Make Anti Evil Maid resistant against shoulder surfing and video surveillance
**Project**: Observing the user during early boot should not be sufficient to defeat the protection offered by Anti Evil Maid.
**Brief explanation**:
1. Implement optional support for time-based one-time-password seed secrets. Instead of verifying a static text or picture (which the attacker can record and replay later on a compromised system), the user would verify an ephemeral six-digit code displayed on another device, e.g. a smartphone running any Google Authenticator compatible code generator app.
2. Implement optional support for storing a passphrase-encrypted LUKS disk decryption key on a secondary AEM device. The attacker would then have to seize this device in order to decrypt the user's data; just recording the passphrase as it is entered would no longer be enough.
**Expected results**: AEM package updates implementing both features, with fallback support in case the user does not have their smartphone or secondary AEM device at hand. Good UX and documentation for enrolling or upgrading users.
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- Bash scripting
- The AEM threat model
- GRUB2, dracut, systemd, LUKS
**Mentor**: [Rusty Bird](mailto:rustybird@openmailbox.org)
### GNOME support in dom0
### GNOME support in dom0 / GUI VM
**Project**: GNOME support in dom0
@ -480,6 +451,18 @@ details in [#2618](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2618).
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Generalize the Qubes PDF Converter to other types of files
**Project**: Qubes Converters
**Brief explanation**: One of the pioneering ideas of Qubes is to use disposable virtual machines to convert untrustworthy files (such as documents given to journalists by unknown and potentially malicious whistleblowers) into trusthworhty files. See [Joanna's blog on the Qubes PDF Convert](http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/converting-untrusted-pdfs-into-trusted.html) for details of the idea. Joanna has implemented a prototype for PDF documents. The goal of this project would be to generalize beyond the simple prototype to accommodate a wide variety of file formats, including Word documents, audio files, video files, spreadsheets, and so on. The converters should prioritise safety over faithful conversion. For example the Qubes PDF converter typically leads to lower quality PDFs (e.g. cut and paste is no longer possible), because this makes the conversion process safer.
**Expected results**: We expect that in the timeframe, it will be possible to implement many converters for many file formats. However, if any unexpected difficulties arise, we would prioritise a small number of safe and high quality converters over a large number of unsafe or unuseful converters.
**Knowledge prerequisite**: Most of the coding will probably be implemented as shell scripts to interface with pre-existing converts (such as ImageMagick in the Qubes PDF converter). However, shell scripts are not safe for processing untrusted data, so any extra processing will need to be implemented in another language -- probably Python.
**Mentors**: Andrew Clausen and Jean-Philippe Ouellet
### Mitigate focus-stealing attacks
**Project**: Mitigate focus-stealing attacks
@ -489,14 +472,14 @@ details in [#2618](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2618).
**Knoledge prerequisite**: X APIs, Qubes GUI protocol, familiarity with the targeted window manager.
**Mentor**:
**Mentor**: Inquire on [qubes-devel][ml-devel].
### Progress towards reproducible builds
**Project**: Progress towards reproducible builds
**Brief explanation**: A long-term goal is to be able to build the entire OS and installation media in a completely bit-wise deterministic manner, but there are many baby steps to be taken along that path. See:
- "[Security challenges for the Qubes build process](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/05/30/build-security/)"
- "[Security challenges for the Qubes build process](/news/2016/05/30/build-security/)"
- [This mailing list post](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/gq-wb9wTQV8/mdliS4P2BQAJ)
- and [reproducible-builds.org](https://reproducible-builds.org/)
@ -504,9 +487,9 @@ for more information and qubes-specific background.
**Expected results**: Significant progress towards making the Qubes build process deterministic. This would likely involve cooperation with and hacking on several upstream build tools to eliminate sources of variability.
**Knoledge prerequisite**: qubes-builder [[1]](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-builder/) [[2]](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-builder-details/) [[3]](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/tree/master/doc), and efficient at introspecting complex systems: comfortable with tracing and debugging tools, ability to quickly identify and locate issues within a large codebase (upstream build tools), etc.
**Knoledge prerequisite**: qubes-builder [[1]](/doc/qubes-builder/) [[2]](/doc/qubes-builder-details/) [[3]](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/tree/master/doc), and efficient at introspecting complex systems: comfortable with tracing and debugging tools, ability to quickly identify and locate issues within a large codebase (upstream build tools), etc.
**Mentor**:
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Android development in Qubes
@ -521,19 +504,8 @@ Details, reference: [#2233](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2233)
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
**Mentor**:
**Mentor**: Inquire on [qubes-devel][ml-devel].
### Generalize the Qubes PDF Converter to other types of files
**Project**: Qubes Converters
**Brief explanation**: One of the pioneering ideas of Qubes is to use disposable virtual machines to convert untrustworthy files (such as documents given to journalists by unknown and potentially malicious whistleblowers) into trusthworhty files. See [Joanna's blog on the Qubes PDF Convert](http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/converting-untrusted-pdfs-into-trusted.html) for details of the idea. Joanna has implemented a prototype for PDF documents. The goal of this project would be to generalize beyond the simple prototype to accommodate a wide variety of file formats, including Word documents, audio files, video files, spreadsheets, and so on. The converters should prioritise safety over faithful conversion. For example the Qubes PDF converter typically leads to lower quality PDFs (e.g. cut and paste is no longer possible), because this makes the conversion process safer.
**Expected results**: We expect that in the timeframe, it will be possible to implement many converters for many file formats. However, if any unexpected difficulties arise, we would prioritise a small number of safe and high quality converters over a large number of unsafe or unuseful converters.
**Knowledge prerequisite**: Most of the coding will probably be implemented as shell scripts to interface with pre-existing converts (such as ImageMagick in the Qubes PDF converter). However, shell scripts are not safe for processing untrusted data, so any extra processing will need to be implemented in another language -- probably Python.
**Mentors**: Andrew Clausen and Jean-Philippe Ouellet
----
We adapted some of the language here about GSoC from the [KDE GSoC page](https://community.kde.org/GSoC).
@ -541,17 +513,17 @@ We adapted some of the language here about GSoC from the [KDE GSoC page](https:/
[2017-archive]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/archive/2017/organizations/5074771758809088/
[gsoc-qubes]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6239659689508864/
[gsoc]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/
[team]: https://www.qubes-os.org/team/
[team]: /team/
[gsoc-faq]: https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/faq
[contributing]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/contributing/#contributing-code
[patches]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/source-code/#how-to-send-patches
[code-signing]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/code-signing/
[ml-devel]: https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
[contributing]: /doc/contributing/#contributing-code
[patches]: /doc/source-code/#how-to-send-patches
[code-signing]: /doc/code-signing/
[ml-devel]: /mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
[gsoc-participate]: https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/
[gsoc-student]: https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/resources/manual#student_manual
[how-to-gsoc]: http://teom.org/blog/kde/how-to-write-a-kick-ass-proposal-for-google-summer-of-code/
[gsoc-submit]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/
[mailing-lists]: https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/
[mailing-lists]: /mailing-lists/
[qubes-issues]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues
[qubes-issues-suggested]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aopen%20label%3A%22P%3A%20minor%22%20label%3A%22help%20wanted%22
[qubes-builder]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-builder/
[qubes-builder]: /doc/qubes-builder/

2
basics_dev/style-guide.md
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@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Currently, all the icons on the Qubes-OS.org website are generated using [FontAw
## Logos
The following is a collection of various sizes & versions of the Qubes logo used both in the OS itself and on our website. All of these files are licensed GPLv2 and the source can be [downloaded here](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-artwork).
The following is a collection of various sizes and versions of the Qubes logo used both in the OS itself and on our website. All of these files are licensed GPLv2 and the source can be [downloaded here](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-artwork).
<div class="styleguide">
{% for logo in site.data.styleguide.logos %}

6
basics_dev/usability-ux.md
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@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ In making software easy to use, it is crucial to be mindful of [cognitive load](
## Easy to Understand
There will always be the need to communicate things to users. In these cases, an interface should aim to make this information easy to understand. The following are simple guides to help achieve this - none these are absolute maxims!
There will always be the need to communicate things to users. In these cases, an interface should aim to make this information easy to understand. The following are simple guides to help achieve this - none of these are absolute maxims!
<div class="focus">
<i class="fa fa-times"></i> <strong>Avoid Acronyms</strong>
@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ Technical words are usually more accurate, but they often *only* make sense to t
- `savefile`
- `qrexec-daemon`
These are all terms that have at some point showed up in users' notification messages. Each term is very specific, but requires the user to understand virtualization to interpet.
These are all terms that have at some point showed up in users' notification messages. Each term is very specific, but requires the user to understand virtualization to interpret.
<div class="focus">
<i class="fa fa-check"></i> <strong> Use Common Concepts</strong>
@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ There are many cases where a user wants to perform an action on more than one fi
3. Select proper file
4. Complete task on file
That subtle act of clicking through a file system can prove to be significant if a user needs to open more than a couples files in the same directory. We can alleviate some of the work by changing the process:
That subtle act of clicking through a file system can prove to be significant if a user needs to open more than a couple files in the same directory. We can alleviate some of the work by changing the process:
1. Click on `Open File` from a menu or button
2. Remember last open folder/file system

2
basics_user/contributing.md
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@ -75,6 +75,6 @@ be grateful to [receive your patch][patch].
[Facebook]: https://www.facebook.com/QubesOS
[GitHub issues]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues
[qubes-devel]: /mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
[Community-Developed Feature Tracker]: https://www.qubes-os.org/qubes-issues/
[Community-Developed Feature Tracker]: /qubes-issues/
[Qubes download mirror]: /downloads/mirrors/

47
basics_user/doc-guidelines.md
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@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ documentation change will be reviewed before it's published to the web. This
allows us to maintain quality control and protect our users.
As mentioned above, we keep all the documentation in a dedicated [Git
repository][qubes-doc] hosted on [GitHub]. Thanks to GitHub's interface, you can
repository][qubes-doc] hosted on [GitHub]. Thanks to the GitHub's interface, you can
edit the documentation even if you don't know Git at all! The only thing you
need is a GitHub account, which is free.
@ -105,6 +105,18 @@ pull request, we'll post a comment explaining why we can't.
![done](/attachment/wiki/doc-edit/10-done.png)
How to add images
-----------------
To add an image to a page, use the following syntax in the main document:
```
![Image Title](/attachment/wiki/page-title/image-filename.png)
```
Then, submit your image(s) in a separate pull request to the [qubes-attachment](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-attachment) repository using the same path and filename.
Version-specific Documentation
------------------------------
@ -146,25 +158,25 @@ Style Guidelines
Markdown Conventions
--------------------
All the documentation is written in Markdown for maximum accessibility. When
making contributions, please try to observe the following style conventions:
All the documentation is written in Markdown for maximum accessibility.
When making contributions, please try to observe the following style conventions:
* Use spaces instead of tabs.
* Insert a newline at the end of each sentence.
* Rationale: This practice is most appropriate for source that consists
primarily of natural language text. It results in the most useful diffs
and facilitates translation into other languages while mostly preserving
source readability.
* If appropriate, make numerals in numbered lists match between Markdown
source and HTML output.
* Rationale: In the event that a user is required to read the Markdown source
directly, this will make it easier to follow, e.g., numbered steps in a set
of instructions.
* In order to enable offline browsing, use relative paths (e.g., `/doc/doc-guidelines/` instead of `https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/doc-guidelines/`, except when the source text will be reproduced outside of the Qubes website repo.
Examples of exceptions:
* [QSBs] (intended to be read as plain text)
* [News] posts (plain text is reproduced on the [mailing lists])
* URLs that appear inside code blocks (e.g., in comments and document templates)
* Files like `README.md` and `CONTRIBUTING.md`
* Insert a newline at, and only at, the end of each sentence, except when the text will be reproduced outside of the Qubes website repo (see previous item for examples).
* Rationale: This practice results in one sentence per line, which is most appropriate for source that consists primarily of natural language text.
It results in the most useful diffs and facilitates translation into other languages while mostly preserving source readability.
* If appropriate, make numerals in numbered lists match between Markdown source and HTML output.
* Rationale: In the event that a user is required to read the Markdown source directly, this will make it easier to follow, e.g., numbered steps in a set of instructions.
* Use hanging indentations
where appropriate.
* Use underline headings (`=====` and `-----`) if possible. If this is not
possible, use Atx-style headings on both the left and right sides
(`### H3 ###`).
* Use underline headings (`=====` and `-----`) if possible.
If this is not possible, use Atx-style headings on both the left and right sides (`### H3 ###`).
* Use `[reference-style][ref]` links.
`[ref]: https://daringfireball.net/projects/markdown/syntax#link`
@ -188,5 +200,8 @@ Please try to write good commit messages, according to the
[gh-pull]: https://help.github.com/articles/using-pull-requests/
[GitHub]: https://github.com/
[mailing lists]: /mailing-lists/
[QSBs]: /security/bulletins/
[News]: /news/
[md]: https://daringfireball.net/projects/markdown/
[git-commit]: /doc/coding-style/#commit-message-guidelines

2
basics_user/getting-started.md
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@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Qubes VM Manager and Command Line Tools
All aspects of the Qubes system can be controlled using command line tools run under a dom0 console.
To open a console window in dom0, either go to Start-\>System Tools-\>Konsole or press Alt-F2 and type `konsole`.
Various command line tools are described as part of this guide, and the whole reference can be found [here](/doc/dom0-tools/).
Various command line tools are described as part of this guide, and the whole reference can be found [here](/doc/tools/).
![r2b1-dom0-konsole.png](/attachment/wiki/GettingStarted/r2b1-dom0-konsole.png)

103
basics_user/reporting-bugs.md
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@ -16,71 +16,65 @@ redirect_from:
Reporting Bugs
==============
One of the most important ways in which you can [contribute to the Qubes OS Project] is by reporting any bugs you have found.
Please note that there is a separate process for [reporting security issues](/security/).
One of the most important ways in which you can [contribute to the Qubes OS Project] is by reporting any bugs you have found.
Before you submit a report
--------------------------
Important
---------
Before you submit a bug report, please take a moment to:
* Check whether your issue has already been reported.
* Determine which venue is most appropriate for it.
* Read the [documentation] to see whether what you've found is really a bug.
* Search through the existing [Qubes issues][qubes-issues] by typing your key
words in the **Filters** box. Make sure to check both currently open issues,
as well as issues that are already closed. If you find an issue that seems to
be similar to yours, read through it. If this issue is the same as yours, you
can comment with additional information to help the maintainer debug it.
Adding a comment will subscribe you to email notifications, which can be
helpful in getting important updates regarding the issue. If you don't have
anything to add but still want to receive email updates, you can click the
"watch" button at the bottom of the comments.
* Search through our [mailing list] archives by visiting the Google Groups web
interfaces for both [qubes-users] and [qubes-devel].
- **To disclose a security issue confidentially, please see the [Security] page.**
- **In all other cases, please do not email individual developers about bugs.**
- **Please note that many issues can be resolved by reading the [documentation].**
Where to submit your report
---------------------------
Our [GitHub issues][qubes-issues] tracker is not intended for personal,
localized troubleshooting questions, such as problems that affect only a
specific laptop model. Those questions are more likely to be answered in
[qubes-users], which receives much more traffic. Instead, GitHub issues are
meant to track more general bugs and enhancements that affect a broad range of
Qubes users.
How to copy information out of Dom0
-----------------------------------
See [Copying from (and to) dom0](/doc/copy-from-dom0/).
How to submit a report on the mailing lists
-------------------------------------------
Please see the [mailing list guidelines][mailing list].
All issues pertaining to the Qubes OS Project (including auxiliary infrastructure such as the [website]) are tracked in [qubes-issues], our GitHub issues tracker.
However, [qubes-issues] is not intended for personal, localized troubleshooting questions, such as problems that affect only a specific laptop model.
Those questions should instead be asked in [qubes-users], where they are more likely to be answered.
Instead, [qubes-issues] is meant for tracking more general bugs and enhancements that affect a broad range of Qubes users.
Please see the sections [How to submit a report on GitHub] and [How to submit a report on the mailing lists] below for more information.
How to submit a report on GitHub
--------------------------------
We track all bugs in the [qubes-issues] tracker on GitHub.
**Before you submit an issue in [qubes-issues], please check to see whether it has already been reported.**
Search through the existing issues by typing your key words in the **Filters** box.
Make sure to check both currently open issues, as well as issues that are already closed.
If you find an issue that seems to be similar to yours, read through it.
If this issue is the same as yours, you can comment with additional information to help the maintainer debug it.
Adding a comment will subscribe you to email notifications, which can be helpful in getting important updates regarding the issue.
If you don't have anything to add but still want to receive email updates, you can click the "watch" button at the bottom of the comments.
When you file a new issue, you should be sure to include the version of Qubes
your'e using, as well as versions of related software packages. If your issue is
related to hardware, provide as many details as possible about the hardware,
which could include using command-line tools such as `lspci`.
When you file a new issue, you should be sure to include the version of Qubes you're using, as well as versions of related software packages.
If your issue is related to hardware, provide as many details as possible about the hardware, which could include using command-line tools such as `lspci`.
If you're reporting a bug in a package that is in a [testing] repository, please reference the appropriate issue in the [updates-status] repository.
Project maintainers really appreciate thorough explanations.
It usually helps them address the problem more quickly, so everyone wins!
Project maintainers really appreciate thorough explanations. It usually
helps them address the problem more quickly, so everyone wins!
Once your issue is addressed, your GitHub issue may be closed.
After that, the package containing the fix will move to the appropriate [testing] repository, then to the appropriate stable repository.
If you so choose, you can test the fix while it's in the [testing] repository, or you can wait for it to land in the stable repository.
If, after testing the fix, you find that it does not really fix your bug, please leave a comment on your issue explaining the situation.
When you do, we will receive a notification and respond on your issue or reopen it (or both).
Please **do not** create a duplicate issue or attempt to contact the developers individually about your problem.
How to submit a report on the mailing lists
-------------------------------------------
Before submitting a report on the mailing lists, please check to see whether your issue has already been reported by searching through the archives.
You can do this by visiting the Google Groups web interfaces for both [qubes-users] and [qubes-devel].
Please see the [Mailing Lists] page for further information.
How to copy information out of dom0
-----------------------------------
Copying information out of dom0 can be useful when reporting bugs.
See [Copying from (and to) dom0] for more information.
Testing new releases and updates
@ -96,12 +90,17 @@ Please see our guidelines on [how to contribute code].
[contribute to the Qubes OS Project]: /doc/contributing/
[Security]: /security/
[documentation]: /doc/
[website]: /
[qubes-issues]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues
[mailing list]: https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/
[qubes-users]: https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-users
[qubes-devel]: https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel
[Mailing List]: /mailing-lists/
[qubes-users]: /mailing-lists/#qubes-users
[qubes-devel]: /mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
[How to submit a report on GitHub]: #how-to-submit-a-report-on-github
[How to submit a report on the mailing lists]: #how-to-submit-a-report-on-the-mailing-lists
[testing]: /doc/testing/
[updates-status]: https://github.com/QubesOS/updates-status/issues
[Copying from (and to) dom0]: /doc/copy-from-dom0/
[how to contribute code]: /doc/contributing/#contributing-code

13
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@ -77,13 +77,13 @@ redirect_from:
<br>
<br>
## 4: Downloading and verifying the "Qubes Automated Build System"
## 4: Downloading and verifying the integrity of the "Qubes Automated Build System"
* Import the Qubes master key
gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-keys 0xDDFA1A3E36879494
* Verify its fingerprint, set as 'trusted'. [This is described here](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/VerifyingSignatures).
* Verify its fingerprint, set as 'trusted'. [This is described here](/doc/VerifyingSignatures).
* Download the Qubes developers' keys.
@ -98,9 +98,10 @@ redirect_from:
* Copy your gpg keyrings to your local copy of the repository. (Otherwise you will be asked to download the keys again.)
# Assuming qubes-builder is in your home directory
cp .gnupg/pubring.gpg qubes-builder/keyrings/git/
cp .gnupg/trustdb.gpg qubes-builder/keyrings/git/
# Execute the following commands in your home directory.
# It is assumed that the path to the repository is '~/qubes-builder'.
mkdir -p qubes-builder/keyrings/git
cp -t qubes-builder/keyrings/git/ .gnupg/pubring.gpg .gnupg/trustdb.gpg
* Verify the integrity of the downloaded repository. The last line should read `gpg: Good signature from`...
@ -361,7 +362,7 @@ redirect_from:
The `qubes-mgmt-salt` repo is not currently forked under the marmarek user on
GitHub, to whom the above instructions set the `GIT_PREFIX`. As Archlinux is
not yet supported by mgmt-salt, simply leave it out of the build (when building
the Archlinux template on it's own) by appending the following to your `override.conf` file:
the Archlinux template on its own) by appending the following to your `override.conf` file:
`BUILDER_PLUGINS := $(filter-out mgmt-salt,$(BUILDER_PLUGINS))`

2
building/development-workflow.md
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@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ Remember to also import gpg public key using `rpm --import`.
### Deb packages - Apt repo
Steps are mostly the same as in case of yum repo. Only details differs:
Steps are mostly the same as in the case of yum repo. The only details that differ:
- use [linux-deb] instead of [linux-yum] as a base - both in source and target VM
- use different `update_repo.sh` script in source VM (below)

4
building/qubes-builder-details.md
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@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ Variables for Windows build:
- `WIN_SIGN_CMD` Command used to sign resulting binaries. Note that default value is *sign.bat*. If you don't want to sign binaries, specify some placeholder here (eg. *true*). Check existing components (eg. vmm-xen-windows-pvdrivers) for example scripts. This command will be run with certain environment variables:
- `CERT_FILENAME` Path to key file (pfx format)
- `CERT_PASSWORD` Key password
- `CERT_PUBLIC_FILENAME` Certificate path in case of self-signed cert
- `CERT_CROSS_CERT_FILENAME` Certificate path in case of correct autheticode cert
- `CERT_PUBLIC_FILENAME` Certificate path in the case of self-signed cert
- `CERT_CROSS_CERT_FILENAME` Certificate path in the case of correct autheticode cert
- `SIGNTOOL` Path to signtool
- `WIN_PACKAGE_CMD` Command used to produce installation package (msi or msm). Default value is *wix.bat*, similar to above - use *true* if you don't want this command.
- `WIN_OUTPUT_HEADERS` Directory (relative to `WIN_SOURCE_SUBDIRS` element) with public headers of the package - for use in other components.

2
building/qubes-builder.md
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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ redirect_from:
- /wiki/QubesBuilder/
---
**Note: The build system has been improved since this how-to was last updated. The [Archlinux template building instructions](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/building-archlinux-template/) contain more up-to-date and detailed information on how to use the build system.**
**Note: The build system has been improved since this how-to was last updated. The [Archlinux template building instructions](/doc/building-archlinux-template/) contain more up-to-date and detailed information on how to use the build system.**
Building Qubes from scratch
===========================

184
common-tasks/backup-restore.md
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@ -11,96 +11,218 @@ redirect_from:
Qubes Backup, Restoration, and Migration
========================================
**Caution:** The Qubes backup system currently relies on a [weak key derivation scheme](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/971). It is *strongly recommended* that users select a *high-entropy* passphrase for use with Qubes backups.
**Caution:** The Qubes R3.2 backup system currently relies on a [weak key derivation scheme](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/971).
Although resolved in R4.0 and higher with the switch to scrypt, it is *strongly recommended* that users select a *high-entropy* passphrase for use with Qubes backups.
With Qubes, it's easy to back up and restore your whole system, as well as to migrate between two physical machines.
As of Qubes R2B3, these functions are integrated into the Qubes VM Manager GUI. There are also two command-line tools available which perform the same functions: [qvm-backup](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup/) and [qvm-backup-restore](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup-restore/).
As of Qubes R2B3, these functions are integrated into the Qubes VM Manager GUI.
There are also two command-line tools available which perform the same functions: [qvm-backup](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup/) and [qvm-backup-restore](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup-restore/).
Creating a Backup
Creating a Backup (R4.0 and later)
-----------------
1. In **Qubes VM Manager**, click **System** on the menu bar, then click **Backup VMs** in the drop-down list. This brings up the **Qubes Backup VMs** window.
1. Go to **Applications menu -> System Tools -> Backup Qubes**.
This brings up the **Qubes Backup VMs** window.
2. Move the VMs that you want to back up to the right-hand **Selected** column. VMs in the left-hand **Available** column will not be backed up.
2. Move the VMs that you want to back up to the right-hand **Selected** column.
VMs in the left-hand **Available** column will not be backed up.
**Note:** A VM must be shut down in order to be backed up. Currently running VMs appear in red.
You may choose whether to compress backups by checking or unchecking the **Compress the backup** box.
Normally this should be left on unless you have a specific reason otherwise.
Once you have selected all desired VMs, click **Next**.
3. Select the destination for the backup:
If you wish to send your backup to a (currently running) VM, select the VM in the drop-down box next to **Target AppVM**.
If you wish to send your backup to a [USB mass storage device](/doc/usb/), you can use the directory selection widget to mount a connected device (under "Other locations" item on the left); or first mount the device in a VM, then select the mount point inside that VM as the backup destination.
You must also specify a directory on the device or in the VM, or a command to be executed in the VM as a destination for your backup.
For example, if you wish to send your backup to the `~/backups` folder in the target VM, you would simply browse to it using the convenient directory selection dialog (`...`) at the right.
This destination directory must already exist.
If it does not exist, you must create it manually prior to backing up.
By specifying the appropriate directory as the destination in a VM, it is possible to send the backup directly to, e.g., a USB mass storage device attached to the VM.
Likewise, it is possible to enter any command as a backup target by specifying the command as the destination in the VM.
This can be used to send your backup directly to, e.g., a remote server using SSH.
**Note:** The supplied passphrase is used for **both** encryption/decryption and integrity verification.
At this point, you may also choose whether to save your settings by checking or unchecking the **Save settings as default backup profile** box.
**Warning: Saving the settings will result in your backup passphrase being saved in plaintext in dom0, so consider your threat model before checking this box.**
4. You will now see the summary of VMs to be backed up.
If there are any issues preventing the backup, they will be listed here and the **Next** button grayed out.
5. When you are ready, click **Next**.
Qubes will proceed to create your backup.
Once the progress bar has completed, you may click **Finish**.
Creating a Backup (R3.2 and earlier)
-----------------
1. In **Qubes VM Manager**, click **System** on the menu bar, then click **Backup VMs** in the drop-down list.
This brings up the **Qubes Backup VMs** window.
2. Move the VMs that you want to back up to the right-hand **Selected** column.
VMs in the left-hand **Available** column will not be backed up.
**Note:** A VM must be shut down in order to be backed up.
Currently running VMs appear in red.
Once you have selected all desired VMs, click **Next**.
3. Select the destination for the backup:
If you wish to send your backup to a (currently running) VM, select the VM in the drop-down box next to **Target AppVM**.
If you wish to send your backup to a [USB mass storage device](/doc/stick-mounting/), first mount the device in a VM, then select the mount point inside that VM as the backup destination.
If you wish to send your backup to a [USB mass storage device](/doc/usb/), you can use the directory selection widget to mount a connected device (under "Other locations" item on the left); or first mount the device in a VM, then select the mount point inside that VM as the backup destination.
You must also specify a directory on the device or in the VM, or a command to be executed in the VM as a destination for your backup. For example, if you wish to send your backup to the `~/backups` folder in the target VM, you would simply type `backups` in this field. This destination directory must already exist. If it does not exist, you must create it manually prior to backing up.
You must also specify a directory on the device or in the VM, or a command to be executed in the VM as a destination for your backup.
For example, if you wish to send your backup to the `~/backups` folder in the target VM, you would simply browse to it using the convenient directory selection dialog (`...`) at the right.
If it does not exist, you must create it manually prior to backing up.
By specifying the appropriate directory as the destination in a VM, it is possible to send the backup directly to, e.g., a USB mass storage device attached to the VM. Likewise, it is possible to enter any command as a backup target by specifying the command as the destination in the VM. This can be used to send your backup directly to, e.g., a remote server using SSH.
By specifying the appropriate directory as the destination in a VM, it is possible to send the backup directly to, e.g., a USB mass storage device attached to the VM.
Likewise, it is possible to enter any command as a backup target by specifying the command as the destination in the VM.
This can be used to send your backup directly to, e.g., a remote server using SSH.
At this point, you must also choose whether to encrypt your backup by checking or unchecking the **Encrypt backup** box.
**Note:** It is strongly recommended that you opt to encrypt all backups which will be sent to untrusted destinations!
**Note:** The supplied passphrase is used for **both** encryption/decryption and integrity verification. If you decide not to encrypt your backup (by unchecking the **Encrypt backup** box), the passphrase you supply will be used **only** for integrity verification. If you supply a passphrase but do not check the **Encrypt backup** box, your backup will **not** be encrypted!
**Note:** The supplied passphrase is used for **both** encryption/decryption and integrity verification.
If you decide not to encrypt your backup (by unchecking the **Encrypt backup** box), the passphrase you supply will be used **only** for integrity verification.
If you supply a passphrase but do not check the **Encrypt backup** box, your backup will **not** be encrypted!
4. When you are ready, click **Next**. Qubes will proceed to create your backup. Once the progress bar has completed, you may click **Finish**.
4. You will now see the summary of VMs to be backed up.
If there are any issues preventing the backup, they will be listed here and the **Next** button grayed out.
5. When you are ready, click **Next**.
Qubes will proceed to create your backup.
Once the progress bar has completed, you may click **Finish**.
Restoring from a Backup
Restoring from a Backup (R4.0 and later)
-----------------------
1. In **Qubes VM Manager**, click **System** on the menu bar, then click **Restore VMs from backup** in the drop-down list. This brings up the **Qubes Restore VMs** window.
1. Go to **Applications menu -> System Tools -> Restore Backup**.
This brings up the **Qubes Restore VMs** window.
2. Select the source location of the backup to be restored:
- If your backup is located on a [USB mass storage device](/doc/stick-mounting/), select the device in the drop-down box next to **Device**.
- If your backup is located on a [USB mass storage device](/doc/usb/), attach it first to another VM or select `sys-usb` in the next item.
- If your backup is located in a (currently running) VM, select the VM in the drop-down box next to **AppVM**.
You must also specify the directory in which the backup resides (or a command to be executed in a VM). If you followed the instructions in the previous section, "Creating a Backup," then your backup is most likely in the location you chose as the destination in step 3. For example, if you had chosen the `~/backups` directory of a VM as your destination in step 3, you would now select the same VM and again type `backups` into the **Backup directory** field.
**Note:** After you have typed the directory location of the backup in the **Backup directory** field, click the ellipsis button `...` to the right of the field.
You must also specify the directory and filename of the backup (or a command to be executed in a VM) in the **Backup file** field.
If you followed the instructions in the previous section, "Creating a Backup," then your backup is most likely in the location you chose as the destination in step 3.
For example, if you had chosen the `~/backups` directory of a VM as your destination in step 3, you would now select the same VM and again browse to (using `...`) the `backups` folder.
Once you've located the backup file, double-click it or select it and hit **OK**.
3. There are three options you may select when restoring from a backup:
1. **ignore missing**: If any of the VMs in your backup depended upon a NetVM, ProxyVM, or TemplateVM that is not present in (i.e., "missing from") the current system, checking this box will ignore the fact that they are missing and restore the VMs anyway.
2. **ignore username mismatch**: This option applies only to the restoration of dom0's home directory. If your backup was created on a Qubes system which had a different dom0 username than the dom0 username of the current system, then checking this box will ignore the mismatch between the two usernames and proceed to restore the home directory anyway.
3. **skip dom0**: If this box is checked, dom0's home directory will not be restored from your backup.
1. **ignore missing templates and net VMs**: If any of the VMs in your backup depended upon a NetVM or TemplateVM that is not present in (i.e., "missing from") the current system, checking this box will ignore the fact that they are missing and restore the VMs anyway and set them to use the default NetVM and system default template.
2. **ignore username mismatch**: This option applies only to the restoration of dom0's home directory.
If your backup was created on a Qubes system which had a different dom0 username than the dom0 username of the current system, then checking this box will ignore the mismatch between the two usernames and proceed to restore the home directory anyway.
3. **Verify backup integrity, do not restore the data**: This will scan the backup file for corrupted data.
However, it does not currently detect if it is missing data as long as it is a correctly structured, non-corrupted backup file.
See [issue #3498](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3498) for more details.
4. If your backup is encrypted, you must check the **Encrypted backup** box. If a passphrase was supplied during the creation of your backup (regardless of whether it is encrypted), then you must supply it here.
4. If your backup is encrypted, you must check the **Encrypted backup** box.
If a passphrase was supplied during the creation of your backup (regardless of whether it is encrypted), then you must supply it here.
**Note:** The passphrase which was supplied when the backup was created was used for **both** encryption/decryption and integrity verification. If the backup was not encrypted, the supplied passphrase is used only for integrity verification.
**Note:** The passphrase which was supplied when the backup was created was used for **both** encryption/decryption and integrity verification.
If the backup was not encrypted, the supplied passphrase is used only for integrity verification.
All backups made from a Qubes R4.0 system will be encrypted.
**Note:** A VM cannot be restored from a backup if a VM with the same name already exists on the current system. You must first remove or change the name of any VM with the same name in order to restore such a VM.
5. You will now see the summary of VMs to be restored.
If there are any issues preventing the restore, they will be listed here and the **Next** button grayed out.
5. When you are ready, click **Next**. Qubes will proceed to restore from your backup. Once the progress bar has completed, you may click **Finish**.
6. When you are ready, click **Next**.
Qubes will proceed to restore from your backup.
Once the progress bar has completed, you may click **Finish**.
Restoring from a Backup (R3.2 and earlier)
-----------------------
1. In **Qubes VM Manager**, click **System** on the menu bar, then click **Restore VMs from backup** in the drop-down list.
This brings up the **Qubes Restore VMs** window.
2. Select the source location of the backup to be restored:
- If your backup is located on a [USB mass storage device](/doc/usb/), attach it first to another VM or select `sys-usb` in the next item.
- If your backup is located in a (currently running) VM, select the VM in the drop-down box next to **AppVM**.
You must also specify the directory and filename of the backup (or a command to be executed in a VM) in the **Backup file** field.
If you followed the instructions in the previous section, "Creating a Backup," then your backup is most likely in the location you chose as the destination in step 3.
For example, if you had chosen the `~/backups` directory of a VM as your destination in step 3, you would now select the same VM and again browse to (using `...`) the `backups` folder.
Once you've located the backup file, double-click or select it and hit **OK**.
3. There are three options you may select when restoring from a backup:
1. **ignore missing**: If any of the VMs in your backup depended upon a NetVM, ProxyVM, or TemplateVM that is not present in (i.e., "missing from") the current system, checking this box will ignore the fact that they are missing and restore the VMs anyway and set them to use the default NetVM and system default template.
2. **ignore username mismatch**: This option applies only to the restoration of dom0's home directory.
If your backup was created on a Qubes system which had a different dom0 username than the dom0 username of the current system, then checking this box will ignore the mismatch between the two usernames and proceed to restore the home directory anyway.
3. **Verify backup integrity, do not restore the data**: This will scan the backup file for corrupted data.
However, it does not currently detect if it is missing data as long as it is a correctly structured, non-corrupted backup file. See [issue #3498](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3498) for more details.
4. If your backup is encrypted, you must check the **Encrypted backup** box.
If a passphrase was supplied during the creation of your backup (regardless of whether it is encrypted), then you must supply it here.
**Note:** The passphrase which was supplied when the backup was created was used for **both** encryption/decryption and integrity verification.
If the backup was not encrypted, the supplied passphrase is used only for integrity verification.
**Note:** A VM cannot be restored from a backup if a VM with the same name already exists on the current system.
You must first remove or change the name of any VM with the same name in order to restore such a VM.
5. You will now see the summary of VMs to be restored.
If there are any issues preventing the restore, they will be listed here and the **Next** button grayed out.
6. When you are ready, click **Next**.
Qubes will proceed to restore from your backup.
Once the progress bar has completed, you may click **Finish**.
Emergency Backup Recovery without Qubes
---------------------------------------
The Qubes backup system has been designed with emergency disaster recovery in mind. No special Qubes-specific tools are required to access data backed up by Qubes. In the event a Qubes system is unavailable, you can access your data on any GNU/Linux system with the following procedure.
The Qubes backup system has been designed with emergency disaster recovery in mind.
No special Qubes-specific tools are required to access data backed up by Qubes.
In the event a Qubes system is unavailable, you can access your data on any GNU/Linux system with the following procedure.
For emergency restore of backup created on Qubes R2 or newer take a look [here](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v3/). For backups created on earlier Qubes version, take a look [here](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v2/).
Refer to the following for emergency restore of a backup created on:
* [Qubes R4 or newer](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v4/)
* [Qubes R3](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v3/)
* [Qubes R2 or older](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v2/)
Migrating Between Two Physical Machines
---------------------------------------
In order to migrate your Qubes system from one physical machine to another, simply follow the backup procedure on the old machine, [install Qubes](/downloads/) on the new machine, and follow the restoration procedure on the new machine. All of your settings and data will be preserved!
In order to migrate your Qubes system from one physical machine to another, simply follow the backup procedure on the old machine, [install Qubes](/downloads/) on the new machine, and follow the restoration procedure on the new machine.
All of your settings and data will be preserved!
Choosing a Backup Passphrase
----------------------------
Here are some things to consider when selecting a passphrase for your backups:
* If you plan to store the backup for a long time or on third-party servers, you should make sure to use a very long, high-entropy passphrase. (Depending on the decryption passphrase you use for your system drive, this may necessitate selecting a stronger passphrase. If your system drive decryption passphrase is already sufficiently strong, it may not.)
* An adversary who has access to your backups may try to substitute one backup for another. For example, when you attempt to retrieve a recent backup, the adversary may instead give you a very old backup containing a compromised VM. If you're concerned about this type of attack, you may wish to use a different passphrase for each backup, e.g., by appending a number or date to the passphrase.
* If you're forced to enter your system drive decryption passphrase in plain view of others (where it can be shoulder-surfed), then you may want to use a different passphrase for your backups (even if your system drive decryption passphrase is already maximally strong). On the othe hand, if you're careful to avoid shoulder-surfing and/or have a passphrase that's difficult to detect via shoulder-surfing, then this may not be a problem for you.
* If you plan to store the backup for a long time or on third-party servers, you should make sure to use a very long, high-entropy passphrase.
(Depending on the decryption passphrase you use for your system drive, this may necessitate selecting a stronger passphrase.
If your system drive decryption passphrase is already sufficiently strong, it may not.)
* An adversary who has access to your backups may try to substitute one backup for another.
For example, when you attempt to retrieve a recent backup, the adversary may instead give you a very old backup containing a compromised VM.
If you're concerned about this type of attack, you may wish to use a different passphrase for each backup, e.g., by appending a number or date to the passphrase.
* If you're forced to enter your system drive decryption passphrase in plain view of others (where it can be shoulder-surfed), then you may want to use a different passphrase for your backups (even if your system drive decryption passphrase is already maximally strong).
On the other hand, if you're careful to avoid shoulder-surfing and/or have a passphrase that's difficult to detect via shoulder-surfing, then this may not be a problem for you.
Notes
-----
* The Qubes backup system relies on `openssl enc`, which is known to use a very weak key derivation scheme. The Qubes backup system also uses the same passphrase for authentication and for encryption, which is problematic from a security perspective. Users are advised to use a very high entropy passphrase for Qubes backups. For a full discussion, see [this ticket](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/971) and [this thread](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/CZ7WRwLXcnk/u_rZPoVxL5IJ).
* The Qubes R3.2 and earlier backup system relies on `openssl enc`, which is known to use a very weak key derivation scheme.
The Qubes backup system also uses the same passphrase for authentication and for encryption, which is problematic from a security perspective.
Users are advised to use a very high entropy passphrase for Qubes backups.
For a full discussion, see [this ticket](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/971) and [this thread](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/CZ7WRwLXcnk/u_rZPoVxL5IJ).
* For the technical details of the backup system, please refer to [this thread](https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-devel/TQr_QcXIVww/discussion).
* If working with symlinks, note the issues described in [this thread](https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/EITd1kBHD30/discussion).

70
common-tasks/dispvm.md
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@ -11,16 +11,56 @@ redirect_from:
Disposable VMs (DispVMs)
========================
A Disposable VM (DispVM) is a lightweight VM that can be created quickly and will disappear when closed.
Disposable VMs are usually created in order to host a single application, like a viewer, editor, or web browser.
Changes made to a file opened in a Disposable VM are passed back to the originating VM.
This means that you can safely work with untrusted files without risk of compromising your other VMs.
DispVMs can be created either directly from Dom0 or from within AppVMs.
Once a DispVM has been created it will appear in Qubes VM Manager with the name "dispX".
A Disposable VM (DispVM) is a lightweight VM that can be created quickly and will disappear when closed.
Disposable VMs are usually created in order to host a single application, like a viewer, editor, or web browser.
From inside an AppVM, choosing the `Open in Disposable VM` option on a file will launch a DispVM for just that file.
Changes made to a file opened in a DispVM are passed back to the originating VM.
This means that you can safely work with untrusted files without risk of compromising your other VMs.
DispVMs can be launched either directly from Dom0's Start Menu or terminal window, or from within AppVMs.
While running, DispVMs will appear in Qubes VM Manager with the name `disp####`.
See [this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2010/06/01/disposable-vms.html) for more on why one would want to use a Disposable VM.
Disposable VMs and Networking
Disposable VMs and Networking (R4.0 and later)
-----------------------------
Similarly to how AppVMs are based on their underlying [TemplateVM](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/glossary/#templatevm), DispVMs are based on their underlying [DVM Template](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/glossary/#dvm-template).
R4.0 introduces the concept of multiple DVM Templates, whereas R3.2 was limited to only one.
On a fresh installation of Qubes, the default DVM Template is called `fedora-XX-dvm` (where `XX` is the Fedora version of the default TemplateVM).
If you have included the Whonix option in your install, there will also be a `whonix-ws-dvm` DVM Template available for your use.
You can set any AppVM to have the ability to act as a DVM Template with:
qvm-prefs <vmname> template_for_dispvms true
The default system wide DVM Template can be changed with `qubes-prefs default_dispvm`.
By combining the two, choosing `Open in Disposable VM` from inside an AppVM will open the document in a DispVM based on the default DVM Template you specified.
You can change this behaviour for individual VMs: in the Application Menu, open Qube Settings for the VM in question and go to the "Advanced" tab.
Here you can edit the "Default DispVM" setting to specify which DVM Template will be used to launch DispVMs from that VM.
This can also be changed from the command line with:
qvm-prefs <vmname> default_dispvm <dvmtemplatename>
For example, `anon-whonix` has been set to use `whonix-ws-dvm` as its `default_dispvm`, instead of the system default.
You can even set an AppVM that has also been configured as a DVM Template to use itself, so DispVMs launched from within the AppVM/DVM Template would inherit the same settings.
NetVM and firewall rules for DVM Templates can be set as they can for a normal VM.
By default a DispVM will inherit the NetVM and firewall settings of the DVM Template on which it is based.
This is a change in behaviour from R3.2, where DispVMs would inherit the settings of the AppVM from which they were launched.
Therefore, launching a DispVM from an AppVM will result in it using the network/firewall settings of the DVM Template on which it is based.
For example, if an AppVM uses sys-net as its NetVM, but the default system DispVM uses sys-whonix, any DispVM launched from this AppVM will have sys-whonix as its NetVM.
**Warning:** The opposite is also true. This means if you have changed anon-whonix's `default_dispvm` to use the system default, and the system default DispVM uses sys-net, launching a DispVM from inside anon-whonix will result in the DispVM using sys-net.
A Disposable VM launched from the Start Menu inherits the NetVM and firewall settings of the DVM Template on which it is based.
Note that changing the "NetVM" setting for the system default DVM Template *does* affect the NetVM of DispVMs launched from the Start Menu.
Different DVM Templates with individual NetVM settings can be added to the Start Menu.
Disposable VMs and Networking (R3.2 and earlier)
-----------------------------
NetVM and firewall rules for Disposable VMs can be set as they can for a normal VM.
@ -29,7 +69,7 @@ Thus if an AppVM uses sys-net as its NetVM, any DispVM launched from this AppVM
You can change this behaviour for individual VMs: in Qubes VM Manager open VM Settings for the VM in question and go to the "Advanced" tab.
Here you can edit the "NetVM for DispVM" setting to change the NetVM of any DispVM launched from that VM.
A Disposable VM launched from the Start Menu inherits the NetVM of the [DVM Template](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/glossary/#dvm-template).
A Disposable VM launched from the Start Menu inherits the NetVM of the [DVM Template](/doc/glossary/#dvm-template).
By default the DVM template is called `fedora-XX-dvm` (where `XX` is the Fedora version of the default TemplateVM).
As an "internal" VM it is hidden in Qubes VM Manager, but can be shown by selecting "Show/Hide internal VMs".
Note that changing the "NetVM for DispVM" setting for the DVM Template does *not* affect the NetVM of DispVMs launched from the Start Menu; only changing the DVM Template's own NetVM does.
@ -49,7 +89,7 @@ Opening a fresh web browser instance in a new Disposable VM
-----------------------------------------------------------
Sometimes it is desirable to open an instance of Firefox within a new fresh Disposable VM.
This can be done easily using the Start Menu: just go to Start -\> System Tools -\> DispVM:Firefox web browser.
This can be done easily using the Start Menu: just go to **Application Menu -\> DisposableVM -\> DispVM:Firefox web browser**.
Wait a few seconds until a web browser starts.
Once you close the viewing application the whole Disposable VM will be destroyed.
@ -75,7 +115,7 @@ Sometimes it can be useful to start an arbitrary program in a DispVM. This can b
[user@vault ~]$ qvm-run '$dispvm' xterm
~~~
The created Disposable VM can be accessed via other tools (such as `qvm-copy-to-vm`) using its "dispX" name as shown in the Qubes Manager or `qvm-ls`.
The created Disposable VM can be accessed via other tools (such as `qvm-copy-to-vm`) using its `disp####` name as shown in the Qubes Manager or `qvm-ls`.
Starting an arbitrary application in a Disposable VM via command line (from Dom0)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -83,6 +123,12 @@ Starting an arbitrary application in a Disposable VM via command line (from Dom0
The Start Menu has shortcuts for opening a terminal and a web browser in dedicated DispVMs, since these are very common tasks.
However, it is possible to start an arbitrary application in a DispVM directly from Dom0 by running
R4.0 (border colour will be inherited from that set in the `dispvm-template`)
~~~
[joanna@dom0 ~]$ qvm-run --dispvm=dispvm-template --service qubes.StartApp+xterm
~~~
R3.2 (border colour can be specified in the command)
~~~
[joanna@dom0 ~]$ echo xterm | /usr/lib/qubes/qfile-daemon-dvm qubes.VMShell dom0 DEFAULT red
~~~
@ -92,8 +138,8 @@ However, it is possible to start an arbitrary application in a DispVM directly f
Customizing Disposable VMs
--------------------------
You can change the template used to generate the Disposable VM, and change settings used in the Disposable VM savefile.
These changes will be reflected in every new Disposable VM.
You can change the template used to generate the Disposable VMs, and change settings used in the Disposable VM savefile.
These changes will be reflected in every new Disposable VM based on that template.
Full instructions can be found [here](/doc/dispvm-customization/).
Disposable VMs and Local Forensics

2
common-tasks/full-screen-mode.md
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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ If one allowed one of the VMs to "own" the full screen, e.g. to show a movie on
Secure use of full screen mode
------------------------------
However, it is possible to deal with full screen mode in a secure way assuming there are mechanisms that can be used at any time to show the full desktop, and which cannot be intercepted by the VM. An example of such q mechanism is the KDE's "Present Windows" and "Desktop Grid" effects, which are similar to Mac's "Expose" effect, and which can be used to immediately detect potential "GUI forgery", as they cannot be intercepted by any of the VM (as the GUID never passes down the key combinations that got consumed by KDE Window Manager), and so the VM cannot emulate those. Those effects are enabled by default in KDE once Compositing gets enabled in KDE (System Settings -\> Desktop -\> Enable Desktop Effects), which is recommended anyway. By default they are triggered by Ctrl-F8 and Ctrl-F9 key combinations, but can also be reassigned to other shortcuts.
However, it is possible to deal with full screen mode in a secure way assuming there are mechanisms that can be used at any time to show the full desktop, and which cannot be intercepted by the VM. An example of such a mechanism is the KDE's "Present Windows" and "Desktop Grid" effects, which are similar to Mac's "Expose" effect, and which can be used to immediately detect potential "GUI forgery", as they cannot be intercepted by any of the VM (as the GUID never passes down the key combinations that got consumed by KDE Window Manager), and so the VM cannot emulate those. Those effects are enabled by default in KDE once Compositing gets enabled in KDE (System Settings -\> Desktop -\> Enable Desktop Effects), which is recommended anyway. By default they are triggered by Ctrl-F8 and Ctrl-F9 key combinations, but can also be reassigned to other shortcuts.
Another option is to use Alt+Tab for switching windows. This shortcut is also handled by dom0.
Enabling full screen mode for select VMs

8
common-tasks/managing-appvm-shortcuts.md
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@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ For ease of use Qubes aggregates shortcuts to applications that are installed in
![dom0-menu.png"](/attachment/wiki/ManagingAppVmShortcuts/dom0-menu.png)
To make newly installed applications show up in the menu, use the **qvm-sync-appmenus** command (Linux VMs does this automatically):
To make newly installed applications show up in the menu, use the **qvm-sync-appmenus** command (Linux VMs do this automatically):
`qvm-sync-appmenus vmname`
After that, select the *Add more shortcuts* entry in VM's submenu to customize which applications are shown:
After that, select the *Add more shortcuts* entry in the VM's submenu to customize which applications are shown:
![dom0-appmenu-select.png"](/attachment/wiki/ManagingAppVmShortcuts/dom0-appmenu-select.png)
@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ What about applications in DispVMs?
Behind the scenes
-----------------
The list of installed applications for each AppVM is stored in dom0's `/var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/templatename/apps.templates` (or in case of StandaloneVM: `/var/lib/qubes/appvms/vmname/apps.templates`). Each menu entry is a file that follows the [.desktop file format](https://standards.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/desktop-entry-spec-latest.html) with some wildcards (*%VMNAME%*, *%VMDIR%*). Applications selected to appear in the menu are stored in `/var/lib/qubes/appvms/vmname/apps`.
The list of installed applications for each AppVM is stored in dom0's `/var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/templatename/apps.templates` (or in the case of StandaloneVM: `/var/lib/qubes/appvms/vmname/apps.templates`). Each menu entry is a file that follows the [.desktop file format](https://standards.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/desktop-entry-spec-latest.html) with some wildcards (*%VMNAME%*, *%VMDIR%*). Applications selected to appear in the menu are stored in `/var/lib/qubes/appvms/vmname/apps`.
Actual command lines for the menu shortcuts involve `qvm-run` command which starts a process in another domain. Examples: `qvm-run -q --tray -a w7s 'cmd.exe /c "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Accessories\\Calculator.lnk"'` or `qvm-run -q --tray -a untrusted 'firefox %u'`
Note that you can create a shortcut that points to a .desktop file in your AppVM with e.g. `qvm-run -q --tray -a personal -- 'qubes-desktop-run /home/user/application.desktop'`
@ -45,4 +45,4 @@ For Linux VMs the service script is in `/etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.GetAppMenus`. In Wi
What if my application has not been automatically included in the list of available apps?
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
You can manually create new entries in the "available applications" list of shortcuts. See [Signal](/doc/signal/) for a worked example of creating a new menu item for a Chrome .desktop shortcut.
You can manually create new entries in the "available applications" list of shortcuts. See [Signal](/doc/signal/) for a working example of creating a new menu item for a Chrome .desktop shortcut.

24
common-tasks/software-update-dom0.md
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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Updating software in dom0
Why would one want to update software in dom0?
----------------------------------------------
Normally, there should be few reasons for updating software in dom0. This is because there is no networking in dom0, which means that even if some bugs are discovered e.g. in the dom0 Desktop Manager, this really is not a problem for Qubes, because none of the third-party software running in dom0 is accessible from VMs or the network in any way. Some exceptions to this include: Qubes GUI daemon, Xen store daemon, and disk back-ends. (We plan move the disk backends to an untrusted domain in Qubes 2.0.) Of course, we believe this software is reasonably secure, and we hope it will not need patching.
Normally, there should be few reasons for updating software in dom0. This is because there is no networking in dom0, which means that even if some bugs are discovered e.g. in the dom0 Desktop Manager, this really is not a problem for Qubes, because none of the third-party software running in dom0 is accessible from VMs or the network in any way. Some exceptions to this include: Qubes GUI daemon, Xen store daemon, and disk back-ends. (We plan move the disk backends to an untrusted domain in a future Qubes release.) Of course, we believe this software is reasonably secure, and we hope it will not need patching.
However, we anticipate some other situations in which updating dom0 software might be necessary or desirable:
@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ Of course, command line tools are still available for accomplishing various upda
sudo qubes-dom0-update package-version
~~~
Yum will say that there is no update, but the package will nonetheless be downloaded to dom0.
Dnf will say that there is no update, but the package will nonetheless be downloaded to dom0.
2. Downgrade the package:
~~~
sudo yum downgrade package-version
sudo dnf downgrade package-version
~~~
### How to re-install a package
@ -76,21 +76,21 @@ You can re-install in a similar fashion to downgrading.
sudo qubes-dom0-update package
~~~
Yum will say that there is no update, but the package will nonetheless be downloaded to dom0.
Dnf will say that there is no update, but the package will nonetheless be downloaded to dom0.
2. Re-install the package:
~~~
sudo yum reinstall package
sudo dnf reinstall package
~~~
Note that yum will only re-install if the installed and downloaded versions match. You can ensure they match by either updating the package to the latest version, or specifying the package version in the first step using the form `package-version`.
Note that Dnf will only re-install if the installed and downloaded versions match. You can ensure they match by either updating the package to the latest version, or specifying the package version in the first step using the form `package-version`.
### How to uninstall a package
If you've installed a package such as anti-evil-maid, you can remove it with the following command:
sudo yum remove anti-evil-maid
sudo dnf remove anti-evil-maid
### Testing repositories
@ -124,8 +124,16 @@ is needed for the VMs. (Note that the following example enables the unstable rep
sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-unstable kernel kernel-qubes-vm
~~~
Rebuild grub config.
If the update process does not automatically do it (you should see it mentioned in the CLI output
from the update command), you may need to manually rebuild the EFI or grub config depending on which
your system uses.
EFI (Replace the file names with the correct versions for your updated kernel)
~~~
sudo /usr/bin/dracut -f /boot/efi/EFI/qubes/initramfs-4.4.31-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64.img 4.4.31-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64
~~~
Grub2
~~~
sudo grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
~~~

30
common-tasks/software-update-vm.md
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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ In order to permanently install new software, you should:
- Install/update software as usual (e.g. using dnf, or the dedicated GUI application). Then, shutdown the template VM,
- You will see now that all the AppVMs based on this template (by default all your VMs) will be marked as "outdated" in the manager. This is because their filesystems have not been yet updated -- in order to do that, you must restart each VM. You don't need to restart all of them at the same time -- e.g. if you just need the newly installed software to be available in your 'personal' domain, then restart only this VM. You will restart others whenever this will be convenient to you.
- You will see now that all the AppVMs based on this template (by default all your VMs) will be marked as "outdated" in the manager. This is because their filesystems have not been yet updated -- in order to do that, you must restart each VM. You don't need to restart all of them at the same time -- e.g. if you just need the newly installed software to be available in your 'personal' domain, then restart only this VM. You can restart others whenever this will be convenient to you.
Testing repositories
--------------------
@ -125,17 +125,17 @@ As the TemplateVM is used for creating filesystems for other AppVMs, where you a
There are several ways to deal with this problem:
- Only install packages from trusted sources -- e.g. from the pre-configured Fedora repositories. All those packages are signed by Fedora, and as we expect that at least the package's installation scripts are not malicious. This is enforced by default (at the [firewall VM level](/doc/firewall/)), by not allowing any networking connectivity in the default template VM, except for access to the Fedora repos.
- Only install packages from trusted sources -- e.g. from the pre-configured Fedora repositories. All those packages are signed by Fedora, and we expect that at least the package's installation scripts are not malicious. This is enforced by default (at the [firewall VM level](/doc/firewall/)), by not allowing any networking connectivity in the default template VM, except for access to the Fedora repos.
- Use *standalone VMs* (see below) for installation of untrusted software packages.
- Use multiple templates (see below) for different classes of domains, e.g. a less trusted template, used for creation of less trusted AppVMs, would get various packages from somehow less trusted vendors, while the template used for more trusted AppVMs will only get packages from the standard Fedora repos.
- Use multiple templates (see below) for different classes of domains, e.g. a less trusted template, used for creation of less trusted AppVMs, would get various packages from less trusted vendors, while the template used for more trusted AppVMs will only get packages from the standard Fedora repos.
Some popular questions:
- So, why should we actually trust Fedora repos -- it also contains large amount of third-party software that might buggy, right?
As long as template's compromise is considered, it doesn't really matter whether /usr/bin/firefox is buggy and can be exploited, or not. What matters is whether its *installation* scripts (such as %post in the rpm.spec) are benign or not. Template VM should be used only for installation of packages, and nothing more, so it should never get a chance to actually run the /usr/bin/firefox and got infected from it, in case it was compromised. Also, some of your more trusted AppVMs, would have networking restrictions enforced by the [firewall VM](/doc/firewall/), and again they should not fear this proverbial /usr/bin/firefox being potentially buggy and easy to compromise.
As far as the template's compromise is concerned, it doesn't really matter whether /usr/bin/firefox is buggy and can be exploited, or not. What matters is whether its *installation* scripts (such as %post in the rpm.spec) are benign or not. Template VM should be used only for installation of packages, and nothing more, so it should never get a chance to actually run the /usr/bin/firefox and get infected from it, in case it was compromised. Also, some of your more trusted AppVMs, would have networking restrictions enforced by the [firewall VM](/doc/firewall/), and again they should not fear this proverbial /usr/bin/firefox being potentially buggy and easy to compromise.
- But why trust Fedora?
@ -148,13 +148,13 @@ Not quite. Dom0 compromise is absolutely fatal, and it leads to Game Over<sup>TM
Standalone VMs
--------------
Standalone VMs have their own copy of the whole filesystem, and thus can be updated and managed on its own. But this means that they take a few GBs on disk, and also that centralized updates do not apply to them.
Standalone VMs have their own copy of the whole filesystem, and thus can be updated and managed on their own. But this means that they take a few GBs on disk, and also that centralized updates do not apply to them.
Sometime it might be convenient to have a VM that has its own filesystem, where you can directly introduce changes, without the need to start/stop the template VM. Such situations include e.g.:
Sometimes it might be convenient to have a VM that has its own filesystem, where you can directly introduce changes, without the need to start/stop the template VM. Such situations include e.g.:
- VMs used for development (devel environments requires a lot of \*-devel packages and specific devel tools)
- VMs used for development (devel environments require a lot of \*-devel packages and specific devel tools)
- VMs used for installing untrusted packages. Normally you install digitally signed software from Red Hat/Fedora repositories, and it's reasonable that such software has non malicious *installation* scripts (rpm pre/post scripts). However, when you would like to install some packages form less trusted sources, or unsigned, then using a dedicated (untrusted) standalone VM might be a better way.
- VMs used for installing untrusted packages. Normally you install digitally signed software from Red Hat/Fedora repositories, and it's reasonable that such software has non malicious *installation* scripts (rpm pre/post scripts). However, when you would like to install some packages from less trusted sources, or unsigned, then using a dedicated (untrusted) standalone VM might be a better way.
In order to create a standalone VM you can use a command line like this (from console in Dom0):
@ -178,15 +178,18 @@ qvm-create <vmname> --template <templatename> --label <label>
Temporarily allowing networking for software installation
---------------------------------------------------------
Some third-party applications cannot be installed using the standard yum repositories, and need to be manually downloaded and installed. When the installation requires internet connection to access third-party repositories, it will naturally fail when run in a Template VM because the default firewall rules for templates only allow connections to standard yum repositories. So it is necessary to modify firewall rules to allow less restrictive internet access for the time of the installation, if one really wants to install those applications into a template. As soon as software installation is completed, firewall rules should be returned back to the default state. The user should decided by themselves whether such third-party applications should be equally trusted as the ones that come from the standard Fedora signed repositories and whether their installation will not compromise the default Template VM, and potentially consider installing them into a separate template or a standalone VM (in which case the problem of limited networking access doesn't apply by default), as described above.
Some third-party applications cannot be installed using the standard yum repositories, and need to be manually downloaded and installed. When the installation requires internet connection to access third-party repositories, it will naturally fail when run in a Template VM because the default firewall rules for templates only allow connections to standard yum repositories. So it is necessary to modify firewall rules to allow less restrictive internet access for the time of the installation, if one really wants to install those applications into a template. As soon as software installation is completed, firewall rules should be returned back to the default state. The user should decide by themselves whether such third-party applications should be equally trusted as the ones that come from the standard Fedora signed repositories and whether their installation will not compromise the default Template VM, and potentially consider installing them into a separate template or a standalone VM (in which case the problem of limited networking access doesn't apply by default), as described above.
Updates proxy
-------------
Updates proxy is a service which filters http access to allow access to only something that looks like yum or apt repository. This is meant to mitigate user errors (like using a browser in the template VM), rather than some real isolation. It is done with an http proxy (tinyproxy) instead of simple firewall rules because it is hard to list all the repository mirrors (and keep that list up to date). The proxy is used only to filter the traffic, not to cache anything.
There are two services ([qvm-service](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-service/), [service framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-service/)):
Updates proxy is a service which filters http access to allow access to only something that looks like a yum or apt repository. This is meant to mitigate user errors (like using browser in the template VM), rather than some real isolation. It is done with http proxy (tinyproxy) instead of simple firewall rules because it is hard to list all the repository mirrors (and keep that list up to date). The proxy is used only to filter the traffic, not to cache anything.
The proxy is running in selected VMs (by default all the NetVMs (1)) and intercepts traffic directed to 10.137.255.254:8082. Thanks to such configuration all the VMs can use the same proxy address, and if there is a proxy on network path, it will handle the traffic (of course when firewall rules allow that). If the VM is configured to have access to the updates proxy (2), the startup scripts will automatically configure dnf to really use the proxy (3). Also access to updates proxy is independent of any other firewall settings (VM will have access to updates proxy, even if policy is set to block all the traffic).
1. qubes-updates-proxy (and its deprecated name: qubes-yum-proxy) - a service providing a proxy for templates - by default enabled in NetVMs (especially: sys-net)
2. updates-proxy-setup (and its deprecated name: yum-proxy-setup) - use a proxy provided by another VM (instead of downloading updates directly), enabled by default in all templates
@ -199,6 +202,7 @@ qrexec policy: /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdatesProxy. By default this is set
sys-net and/or sys-whonix, depending on firstboot choices. This new design allows for templates to be
updated even when they are not connected to any netvm.
Example policy file in R4.0 (with whonix installed, but not set as default updatevm for all templates):
```
# any VM with tag `whonix-updatevm` should use `sys-whonix`; this tag is added to `whonix-gw` and `whonix-ws` during installation and is preserved during template clone
@ -230,7 +234,7 @@ a firewall rule to intercept traffic directed to 10.137.255.254:8082:
~~~
2. VMs using the proxy service Startup script (updates-proxy-setup or qubes-misc-post service) configure
dnf using /etc/yum.conf.d/qubes-proxy.conf file. It can either contain a
dnf using /etc/yum.conf.d/qubes-proxy.conf file. It can either contain
~~~
proxy=http://10.137.255.254:8082/
@ -243,7 +247,7 @@ Note on treating AppVM's root filesystem non-persistence as a security feature
As explained above, any AppVM that is based on a Template VM (i.e. which is not a Standalone VM) has its root filesystem non-persistent across the VM reboots. In other words whatever changes the VM makes (or the malware running in this AppVM makes) to its root filesystem, are automatically discarded whenever one restarts the AppVM. This might seem like an excellent anti-malware mechanism to be used inside the AppVM...
However, one should be careful with treating this property as a reliable way to keep the AppVM malware-free. This is because the non-persistence, in case of normal AppVMs, applies only to the root filesystem and not to the user filesystem (on which the `/home`, `/rw`, and `/usr/local` are stored) for obvious reasons. It is possible that malware, especially malware that could be specifically written to target a Qubes-based AppVMs, could install its hooks inside the user home directory files only. Examples of obvious places for such hooks could be: `.bashrc`, the Firefox profile directory which contains the extensions, or some PDF or DOC documents that are expected to be opened by the user frequently (assuming the malware found an exploitable bug in the PDF or DOC reader), and surely many others places, all in the user's home directory.
However, one should be careful with treating this property as a reliable way to keep the AppVM malware-free. This is because the non-persistence, in the case of normal AppVMs, applies only to the root filesystem and not to the user filesystem (on which the `/home`, `/rw`, and `/usr/local` are stored) for obvious reasons. It is possible that malware, especially malware that could be specifically written to target a Qubes-based AppVMs, could install its hooks inside the user home directory files only. Examples of obvious places for such hooks could be: `.bashrc`, the Firefox profile directory which contains the extensions, or some PDF or DOC documents that are expected to be opened by the user frequently (assuming the malware found an exploitable bug in the PDF or DOC reader), and surely many others places, all in the user's home directory.
One advantage of the non-persistent rootfs though, is that the malware is still inactive before the user's filesystem gets mounted and "processed" by system/applications, which might theoretically allow for some scanning programs (or a skilled user) to reliably scan for signs of infections of the AppVM. But, of course, the problem of finding malware hooks in general is hard, so this would work likely only for some special cases (e.g. an AppVM which doesn't use Firefox, as otherwise it would be hard to scan the Firefox profile directory reliably to find malware hooks there). Also note that the user filesystem's metadata might got maliciously modified by malware in order to exploit a hypothetical bug in the AppVM kernel whenever it mounts the malformed filesystem. However, these exploits will automatically stop working (and so the infection might be cleared automatically) after the hypothetical bug got patched and the update applied (via template update), which is an exceptional feature of Qubes OS.

13
common-tasks/tips-and-tricks.md
View File

@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ This section provides user suggested tips that aim to increase Qubes OS usabilit
Opening links in your preferred AppVM
-------------------------------------
To increase both security and usability you can set an AppVM so that it automatically opens any link in an different AppVM of your choice. You can do this for example in the email AppVM, in this way you avoid to make mistakes like opening links in it. to learn more you can check [security guidelines](/doc/security-guidelines/) and [security goals](/security/goals/).
To increase both security and usability you can set an AppVM so that it automatically opens any link in an different AppVM of your choice. You can do this for example in the email AppVM, in this way you avoid to make mistakes like opening links in it. To learn more you can check [security guidelines](/doc/security-guidelines/) and [security goals](/security/goals/).
The command `qvm-open-in-vm` lets you open a document or a URL in another VM, it takes two parameters: vmname and filename.
The command `qvm-open-in-vm` lets you open a document or a URL in another VM. It takes two parameters: vmname and filename.
For example, if you launch this command from your email AppVM:
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ For example, if you launch this command from your email AppVM:
it will open duckduckgo.com in the `untrusted` AppVM (after you confirmed the request).
If you want this to happen automatically you can creatte a .desktop file that advertises itself as a handler for http/https links, and then setting this as your default browser.
If you want this to happen automatically you can create a .desktop file that advertises itself as a handler for http/https links, and then set this as your default browser.
Open a text editor and copy and paste this into it:
@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ Preventing data leaks
---------------------
First make sure to read [Understanding and Preventing Data Leaks](/doc/data-leaks/) section to understand the limits of this tip.
Suppose that you have a not so trusted enviroment, for example a Windows VM, an application that track and report it's usage or you simply want to protect your data.
Suppose that you have within a not so trusted enviroment - for example, a Windows VM - an application that tracks and reports its usage, or you simply want to protect your data.
Start Windows template VM (which has no user data), install/upgrade apps; then start Windows AppVM (with data) in offline mode. So, if you worry (hypothetically) that your Windows or app updater might want to send your data away, this Qubes OS trick will prevent this.
Start the Windows TemplateVM (which has no user data), install/upgrade apps; then start Windows AppVM (with data) in offline mode. So, if you worry (hypothetically) that your Windows or app updater might want to send your data away, this Qubes OS trick will prevent this.
This applies also to any TemplateBasedVM relative to its parent TemplateVM, but the privacy risk is especially high in the case of Windows.
Credit: [Joanna Rutkovska](https://twitter.com/rootkovska/status/832571372085850112)
@ -58,4 +58,5 @@ Trim for standalone AppVMs
---------------------
The `qvm-trim-template` command is not available for a standalone AppVM.
It is still possible to trim the AppVM disks by using the `fstrim --all` command from the appvm
It is still possible to trim the AppVM disks by using the `fstrim --all` command from the appvm.
You can also add the `discard` option to the mount line in `/etc/fstab` inside the standalone AppVM if you want trimming to be performed automatically, but there may be a performance impact on writes and deletes.

477
common-tasks/usb.md
View File

@ -24,10 +24,10 @@ Using and Managing USB Devices
Creating and Using a USB qube
-----------------------------
**Warning:** This has the potential to prevent you from connecting a keyboard to Qubes via USB. There are problems with doing this in an encrypted install (LUKS). If you find yourself in this situation, see this [issue][2270-comm23].
**Warning:** This has the potential to prevent you from connecting a keyboard to Qubes via USB. There are problems with doing this with a encrypted install (LUKS). If you find yourself in this situation, see this [issue][2270-comm23].
Connecting an untrusted USB device to dom0 is a security risk since dom0,
like almost every OS, reads partition tables automatically. The whole
The connection of an untrusted USB device to dom0 is a security risk since dom0,
like almost every OS, reads partition tables automatically and since the whole
USB stack is put to work to parse the data presented by the USB device in order
to determine if it is a USB mass storage device, to read its configuration, etc.
This happens even if the drive is then assigned and mounted in another qube.
@ -46,18 +46,18 @@ steps as root in dom0:
1. Enable `sys-usb`:
sudo qubesctl top.enable qvm.sys-usb
qubesctl top.enable qvm.sys-usb
2. Apply the configuration:
sudo qubesctl state.highstate
qubesctl state.highstate
Alternatively, you can create a USB qube manually as follows:
1. Read the [Assigning Devices] page to learn how to list and identify your
USB controllers. Carefully check whether you have a USB controller that
would be appropriate to assign to a USB qube. Note that it should have no
input devices, programmable devices, and any other devices that must be
would be appropriate to assign to a USB qube. Note that it should be free
of input devices, programmable devices, and any other devices that must be
directly available to dom0. If you find a free controller, note its name
and proceed to step 2.
2. Create a new qube. Give it an appropriate name and color label
@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ opt to create a USB qube during installation. This also occurs automatically if
you choose to [create a USB qube] using the `qubesctl` method, which is the
first pair of steps in the linked section.)
**Warning:** USB keyboard cannot be used to type the disk passphrase
**Warning:** A USB keyboard cannot be used to type the disk passphrase
if USB controllers were hidden from dom0. Before hiding USB controllers
make sure your laptop keyboard is not internally connected via USB
(by checking output of `lsusb` command) or that you have a PS/2 keyboard at hand
@ -150,77 +150,32 @@ If you have only a USB mouse connected to a USB qube, but the keyboard is connec
You must do this every time you leave your computer unattended, even if there no risk of anyone else having direct physical access to your computer.
This is because you are guarding the system not only against anyone with local access, but also against possible actions from a potentially compromised USB qube.
If your keyboard is also connected to a USB qube, things are much harder.
Locking the screen (with a traditional password) does not solve the problem, because the USB qube can simply sniff this password and later easily unlock the screen.
One possibility is to set up the screen locker to require an additional step to unlock (i.e., two-factor authentication).
One way to achieve this is to use a [YubiKey], or some other hardware token, or even to manually enter a one-time password.
How to use a USB keyboard
-------------------------
**Caution:** Please carefully read the [Security Warning about USB Input Devices] before proceeding.
In order to use a USB keyboard, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then give that qube permission to pass keyboard input to dom0.
Edit the `qubes.InputKeyboard` policy file in dom0, which is located here:
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.InputKeyboard
Add a line like this one to the top of the file:
sys-usb dom0 allow,user=root
(Change `sys-usb` to your desired USB qube.)
You can now use your USB keyboard.
For a confirmation dialog each time the USB keyboard is connected, change this line to:
```
sys-usb dom0 ask,default_target=dom0
```
How to use a USB mouse
----------------------
**Caution:** Please carefully read the [Security Warning about USB Input Devices] before proceeding.
In order to use a USB mouse, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then give that qube permission to pass mouse input to dom0.
Edit the `qubes.InputMouse` policy file in dom0, which is located here:
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.InputMouse
Add a line like this to the top of the file:
sys-usb dom0 allow,user=root
(Change `sys-usb` to your desired USB qube.)
You can now use your USB mouse.
For a confirmation dialog each time the USB mouse is connected, change this line to:
```
sys-usb dom0 ask,default_target=dom0
```
How to attach USB drives
------------------------
(**Note:** In the present context, the term "USB drive" denotes any
[USB mass storage device][mass-storage]. In addition to smaller flash memory
sticks, this includes things like USB external hard drives.)
Qubes OS supports the ability to attach a USB drive (or just one or more of its
partitions) to any qube easily, no matter which qube actually handles the USB
controller. (The USB controller may be assigned on the **Devices** tab of a
qube's settings page in Qubes VM Manager or by using the
[qvm-pci][Assigning Devices] command. For guidance on finding the correct USB
controller, see [here][usb-controller].)
controller.
USB drive mounting is integrated into the Qubes VM Manager GUI. Simply insert
your USB drive, right-click on the desired qube in the Qubes VM Manager list,
click **Attach/detach block devices**, and select your desired action and
device. This, however, only works for the whole device. If you would like to
attach individual partitions, you must use the command-line tool.
### R4.0 ###
USB drive mounting is integrated into the Devices Widget. This is the tool tray
icon with a yellow square located in the top right of your screen by default.
Simply insert
your USB drive and click on the widget. You will see multiple entries for your
USB drive; typically, `sys-usb:sda`, `sys-usb:sda1`, and `sys-usb:2-1` for example.
The simplest (but slightly less secure, see note below about attaching individual
partitions) option is to attach the entire block drive. In our example, this is `sda`,
so hover over it.
This will pop up a submenu showing running VMs to which the USB drive can be connected.
Click on one and your USB drive will be attached!
Note that attaching individual partitions can be slightly more secure because it doesn't
force the target AppVM to parse the partition table. However, it often means the
AppVM won't detect the new partition and you will need to manually mount it inside
the AppVM. See below for more detailed steps.
The command-line tool you may use to mount whole USB drives or their partitions
is `qvm-block`. This tool can be used to assign a USB drive to a qube as
follows:
@ -230,7 +185,7 @@ follows:
2. In a dom0 console (running as a normal user), list all available block
devices:
qvm-block -l
qvm-block
This will list all available block devices connected to any USB controller
in your system, no matter which qube hosts the controller. The name of the
@ -243,14 +198,14 @@ follows:
usbVM:sdb1 Disk () 2GiB
**Note:** If your device is not listed here, you may refresh the list by
calling (from the qube to which the device is connected):
calling from the qube to which the device is connected (typically `sys-usb`):
sudo udevadm trigger --action=change
3. Assuming your USB drive is attached to dom0 and is `sdb`, we attach the
3. Assuming your USB drive is attached to `sys-usb` and is `sdb`, we attach the
device to a qube with the name `personal` like so:
qvm-block -a personal dom0:sdb
qvm-block attach personal sys-usb:sdb
This will attach the device to the qube as `/dev/xvdi` if that name is not
already taken by another attached device, or `/dev/xvdj`, etc.
@ -258,6 +213,78 @@ follows:
You may also mount one partition at a time by using the same command with
the partition number after `sdb`.
4. The USB drive is now attached to the qube. If using a default qube, you may
open the Nautilus file manager in the qube, and your drive should be
visible in the **Devices** panel on the left. If you've attached a single
partition, you may need to manually mount before it becomes visible:
```
cd ~
mkdir mnt
sudo mount /dev/xvdi mnt
```
5. When you finish using your USB drive, click the eject button or right-click
and select **Unmount**. If you've manually mounted a single partition
in the above step, use:
`sudo umount mnt`
6. In a dom0 console, detach the stick
qvm-block detach <vmname> <device>
7. You may now remove the device.
### R3.2 ###
USB drive mounting is integrated into the Qubes VM Manager GUI. Simply insert
your USB drive, right-click on the desired qube in the Qubes VM Manager list,
click **Attach/detach block devices**, and select your desired action and
device. This, however, only works for the whole device. If you would like to
attach individual partitions, you must use the command-line tool.
Note that attaching individual partitions can be slightly more secure because it doesn't
force the target AppVM to parse the partition table. However, it often means the
AppVM won't detect the new partition and you will need to manually mount it inside
the AppVM. See below for more detailed steps.
The command-line tool you may use to mount whole USB drives or their partitions
is `qvm-block`. This tool can be used to assign a USB drive to a qube as
follows:
1. Insert your USB drive.
2. In a dom0 console (running as a normal user), list all available block
devices:
qvm-block
This will list all available block devices connected to any USB controller
in your system, no matter which qube hosts the controller. The name of the
qube hosting the USB controller is displayed before the colon in the device
name. The string after the colon is the name of the device used within the
qube, like so:
dom0:sdb1 Cruzer () 4GiB
usbVM:sdb1 Disk () 2GiB
**Note:** If your device is not listed here, you may refresh the list by
calling from the qube to which the device is connected (typically `sys-usb`):
sudo udevadm trigger --action=change
3. Assuming your USB drive is attached to `sys-usb` and is `sdb`, we attach the
device to a qube with the name `personal` like so:
qvm-block -a personal sys-usb:sdb
This will attach the device to the qube as `/dev/xvdi` if that name is not
already taken by another attached device, or `/dev/xvdj`, etc.
You may also mount one partition at a time by using the same command with
the partition number after `sdb`. This is slightly more secure because it
does not force the target AppVM to parse the partition table.
**Warning:** when working with single partitions, it is possible to assign
the same partition to multiple qubes. For example, you could attach `sdb1`
to qube1 and then `sdb` to qube2. It is up to the user not to make this
@ -267,10 +294,18 @@ follows:
4. The USB drive is now attached to the qube. If using a default qube, you may
open the Nautilus file manager in the qube, and your drive should be
visible in the **Devices** panel on the left.
visible in the **Devices** panel on the left. If you've attached a single
partition, you may need to manually mount before it becomes visible:
```
cd ~
mkdir mnt
sudo mount /dev/xvdi mnt
```
5. When you finish using your USB drive, click the eject button or right-click
and select **Unmount**.
and select **Unmount**. If you've manually mounted a single partition
in the above step, use:
`sudo umount mnt`
6. In a dom0 console, detach the stick
@ -291,7 +326,7 @@ manually. The device will show up as `/dev/xvdi` (or `/dev/xvdj` if there is
already one device attached -- if two, `/dev/xvdk`, and so on).
### What if I removed the device before detaching it from the VM? ###
### What if I removed the device before detaching it from the VM? (R3.2) ###
Currently (until issue [1082] gets implemented), if you remove the device
before detaching it from the qube, Qubes OS (more precisely, `libvirtd`) will
@ -310,7 +345,7 @@ steps:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-block
sys-usb:sda DataTraveler_2.0 () 246 MiB (attached to 'testvm' as 'xvdi')
[user@dom0 ~]$ xl block-attach testvm phy:/dev/sda backend=sys-usb xvdi
[user@dom0 ~]$ sudo xl block-attach testvm phy:/dev/sda backend=sys-usb xvdi
In above example, all `xl block-attach` parameters can be deduced from the
output of `qvm-block`. In order:
@ -319,7 +354,7 @@ steps:
brackets by `qvm-block` command
* `phy:/dev/sda` - physical path at which device appears in source qube
(just after source qube name in `qvm-block` output)
* `backend=sys-usb` - name of source qube, can be omitted in case of dom0
* `backend=sys-usb` - name of source qube, can be omitted in the case of dom0
* `xvdi` - "frontend" device name (listed at the end of line in `qvm-block`
output)
@ -331,10 +366,10 @@ Attaching a single USB device to a qube (USB passthrough)
---------------------------------------------------------
Starting with Qubes 3.2, it is possible to attach a single USB device to any
Qube. While this is useful feature, it should be used with care, because there
Qube. While this is a useful feature, it should be used with care, because there
are [many security implications][usb-challenges] from using USB devices and USB
passthrough will **expose your target qube** for most of them. If possible, use
method specific for particular device type (for example block devices described
a method specific for particular device type (for example block devices described
above), instead of this generic one.
### Installation of qubes-usb-proxy ###
@ -351,7 +386,52 @@ you want to attach the USB device to.
- Fedora: `sudo dnf install qubes-usb-proxy`
- Debian/Ubuntu: `sudo apt-get install qubes-usb-proxy`
### Usage of qubes-usb-proxy ###
### Usage of qubes-usb-proxy (R4.0) ###
This feature is also available from the Devices Widget. This is the tool tray
icon with a yellow square located in the top right of your screen by default.
Simply insert
your USB device and click on the widget. You will see an entry for your device
such as `sys-usb:2-5 - 058f_USB_2.0_Camera` for example.
Hover over it.
This will pop up a submenu showing running VMs to which the USB device can be connected.
Click on one and your device will be attached! You may also use the command line:
Listing available USB devices:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Attaching selected USB device:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb attach conferences sys-usb:2-5
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
conferences:2-1 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera (attached to conferences)
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Now, you can use your USB device (camera in this case) in the `conferences` qube.
If you see the error `ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the VM` instead,
please refer to the [Installation Section][installation].
When you finish, detach the device. This can be done in the GUI by
clicking on the Devices Widget. You will see an entry in bold for your device
such as **`sys-usb:2-5 - 058f_USB_2.0_Camera`**.
Hover over it.
This will pop up a submenu showing running VMs. The one which your device is
connected to will have an Eject button next to it. Click that and your device
will be detached. You may also use the command line:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb detach conferences sys-usb:2-5
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
### Usage of qubes-usb-proxy (R3.2) ###
Listing available USB devices:
@ -381,8 +461,231 @@ When you finish, detach the device:
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
This feature is not yet available in Qubes Manager however, if you would like to contribute to Qubes OS project by implementing it and are a student please consider applying for the [Google Summer of Code][gsoc-page] scholarship and choosing QubesOS Project as a mentor organization. You can find list of our our Project Ideas [here][project-page].
This feature is not available in Qubes Manager.
Creating and Using a USB qube
-----------------------------
**Warning:** This has the potential to prevent you from connecting a keyboard to Qubes via USB. There are problems with doing this in an encrypted install (LUKS). If you find yourself in this situation, see this [issue][2270-comm23].
Connecting an untrusted USB device to dom0 is a security risk since dom0,
like almost every OS, reads partition tables automatically. The whole
USB stack is put to work to parse the data presented by the USB device in order
to determine if it is a USB mass storage device, to read its configuration, etc.
This happens even if the drive is then assigned and mounted in another qube.
To avoid this risk, it is possible to prepare and utilize a USB qube.
A USB qube acts as a secure handler for potentially malicious USB devices,
preventing them from coming into contact with dom0 (which could otherwise be
fatal to the security of the whole system). With a USB qube, every time you
connect an untrusted USB drive to a USB port managed by that USB controller, you
will have to attach it to the qube in which you wish to use it (if different
from the USB qube itself), either by using Qubes VM Manager or the command line
(see instructions above). The USB controller may be assigned on the **Devices** tab of a
qube's settings page in Qubes VM Manager or by using the
[qvm-pci][Assigning Devices] command. For guidance on finding the correct USB
controller, see [here][usb-controller].
You can create a USB qube using the management stack by performing the following
as root in dom0:
sudo qubesctl state.sls qvm.sys-usb
Alternatively, you can create a USB qube manually as follows:
1. Read the [Assigning Devices] page to learn how to list and identify your
USB controllers. Carefully check whether you have a USB controller that
would be appropriate to assign to a USB qube. Note that it should have no
input devices, programmable devices, and any other devices that must be
directly available to dom0. If you find a free controller, note its name
and proceed to step 2.
2. Create a new qube. Give it an appropriate name and color label
(recommended: `sys-usb`, red). If you need to attach a networking device,
it might make sense to create a NetVM. If not, an AppVM might make more
sense. (The default `sys-usb` is a NetVM.)
3. In the qube's settings, go to the "Devices" tab. Find the USB controller
that you identified in step 1 in the "Available" list. Move it to the
"Selected" list.
**Caution:** By assigning a USB controller to a USB qube, it will no longer
be available to dom0. This can make your system unusable if, for example,
you have only one USB controller, and you are running Qubes off of a USB
drive.
4. Click "OK." Restart the qube.
5. Recommended: Check the box on the "Basic" tab which says "Start VM
automatically on boot." (This will help to mitigate attacks in which
someone forces your system to reboot, then plugs in a malicious USB
device.)
If the USB qube will not start, see [here][faq-usbvm].
How to hide all USB controllers from dom0
-----------------------------------------
If you create a USB qube manually, there will be a brief period of time during the
boot process during which dom0 will be exposed to your USB controllers (and any
attached devices). This is a potential security risk, since even brief exposure
to a malicious USB device could result in dom0 being compromised. There are two
approaches to this problem:
1. Physically disconnect all USB devices whenever you reboot the host.
2. Hide (i.e., blacklist) all USB controllers from dom0.
**Warning:** If you use a USB [AEM] device, do not use the second option. Using
a USB AEM device requires dom0 to have access to the USB controller to which
your USB AEM device is attached. If dom0 cannot read your USB AEM device, AEM
will hang.
The procedure to hide all USB controllers from dom0 is as follows:
* GRUB2
1. Open the file `/etc/default/grub` in dom0.
2. Find the line that begins with `GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX`.
3. Add `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` to that line.
4. Save and close the file.
5. Run the command `grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg` in dom0.
6. Reboot.
* EFI
1. Open the file `/boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg` in dom0.
2. Find the lines that begin with `kernel=`. There may be more than one.
3. Add `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` to those lines.
4. Save and close the file.
5. Reboot.
(Note: Beginning with R3.2, `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` is set automatically if you
opt to create a USB qube during installation. This also occurs automatically if
you choose to [create a USB qube] using the `qubesctl` method, which is the
first pair of steps in the linked section.)
**Warning:** A USB keyboard cannot be used to type the disk passphrase
if USB controllers were hidden from dom0. Before hiding USB controllers
make sure your laptop keyboard is not internally connected via USB
(by checking output of `lsusb` command) or that you have a PS/2 keyboard at hand
(if using a desktop PC). Failure to do so will render your system unusable.
Removing a USB qube
-------------------
**Warning:** This procedure will result in your USB controller(s) being attached
directly to dom0.
* GRUB2
1. Shut down the USB qube.
2. In Qubes Manager, right-click on the USB qube and select "Remove VM."
3. Open the file `/etc/default/grub` in dom0.
4. Find the line(s) that begins with `GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX`.
5. If `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` appears anywhere in those lines, remove it.
6. Save and close the file.
7. Run the command `grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg` in dom0.
8. Reboot.
* EFI
1. Shut down the USB qube.
2. In Qubes Manager, right-click on the USB qube and select "Remove VM."
3. Open the file `/boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg` in dom0.
4. Find the line(s) that begins with `kernel=`.
5. If `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` appears anywhere in those lines, remove it.
6. Save and close the file.
7. Reboot.
Security Warning about USB Input Devices
----------------------------------------
**Important security warning. Please read this section carefully!**
If you connect USB input devices (keyboard and mouse) to a VM, that VM will effectively have control over your system.
Because of this, the benefits of using a USB qube are much smaller than using a fully untrusted USB qube.
In addition to having control over your system, such VM can also sniff all the input you enter there (for example, passwords in the case of a USB keyboard).
There is no simple way to protect against sniffing, but you can make it harder to exploit control over input devices.
If you have only a USB mouse connected to a USB qube, but the keyboard is connected directly to dom0 (using a PS/2 connector, for example), you simply need to lock the screen when you are away from your computer.
You must do this every time you leave your computer unattended, even if there no risk of anyone else having direct physical access to your computer.
This is because you are guarding the system not only against anyone with local access, but also against possible actions from a potentially compromised USB qube.
If your keyboard is also connected to a USB qube, things are much harder.
Locking the screen (with a traditional password) does not solve the problem, because the USB qube can simply sniff this password and later easily unlock the screen.
One possibility is to set up the screen locker to require an additional step to unlock (i.e., two-factor authentication).
One way to achieve this is to use a [YubiKey], or some other hardware token, or even to manually enter a one-time password.
How to use a USB keyboard
-------------------------
**Caution:** Please carefully read the [Security Warning about USB Input Devices] before proceeding.
If you use USB keyboard, automatic USB qube creation during installation is disabled.
Additional steps are required to avoid locking you out from the system.
Those steps are not performed by default, because of risk explained in [Security Warning about USB Input Devices].
### R4.0, using salt ###
To allow USB keyboard usage (including early boot for LUKS passphrase), make sure you have the latest `qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-virtual-machines` package (simply [install dom0 updates][dom0-updates]) and execute in dom0:
sudo qubesctl state.sls qvm.usb-keyboard
The above command will take care of all required configuration, including creating USB qube if not present.
Note that it will expose dom0 to USB devices while entering LUKS passphrase.
Users are advised to physically disconnect other devices from the system for that time, to minimize the risk.
If you wish to perform only subset of this configuration (for example do not enable USB keyboard during boot), see manual instructions below.
### R3.2, manual ###
In order to use a USB keyboard, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then give that qube permission to pass keyboard input to dom0.
Edit the `qubes.InputKeyboard` policy file in dom0, which is located here:
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.InputKeyboard
Add a line like this one to the top of the file:
sys-usb dom0 allow,user=root
(Change `sys-usb` to your desired USB qube.)
You can now use your USB keyboard.
For a confirmation dialog each time the USB keyboard is connected, change this line to:
```
sys-usb dom0 ask,default_target=dom0
```
Additionally, if you want to use USB keyboard to enter LUKS passphrase, it is incompatible with [hiding USB controllers from dom0][How to hide all USB controllers from dom0].
You need to revert that procedure (remove `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` option from files mentioned there) and employ alternative protection during system boot - disconnect other devices during startup.
How to use a USB mouse
----------------------
**Caution:** Please carefully read the [Security Warning about USB Input Devices] before proceeding.
In order to use a USB mouse, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then give that
qube permission to pass mouse input to dom0.
The following steps are already done by default if you created the sys-usb qube with
`qubesctl state.sls qvm.sys-usb` above, or let Qubes create it for you on first boot. However,
if you've created the USB qube manually:
Edit the `qubes.InputMouse` policy file in dom0, which is located here:
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.InputMouse
Add a line like this to the top of the file:
sys-usb dom0 allow,user=root
(Change `sys-usb` to your desired USB qube.)
You can now use your USB mouse.
For a confirmation dialog each time the USB mouse is connected, change this line to:
```
sys-usb dom0 ask,default_target=dom0
```
[mass-storage]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USB_mass_storage_device_class
[Assigning Devices]: /doc/assigning-devices/
@ -398,8 +701,8 @@ This feature is not yet available in Qubes Manager however, if you would like to
[1618]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1618
[create a USB qube]: #creating-and-using-a-usb-qube
[usb-challenges]: https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/05/31/usb-security-challenges.html
[project-page]: /gsoc/
[gsoc-page]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6239659689508864/
[YubiKey]: /doc/YubiKey/
[Security Warning about USB Input Devices]: #security-warning-about-usb-input-devices
[How to hide all USB controllers from dom0]: #how-to-hide-all-usb-controllers-from-dom0
[qubes-usb-proxy]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-app-linux-usb-proxy
[dom0-updates]: /doc/software-update-dom0/#how-to-update-software-in-dom0

8
configuration/assigning-devices.md
View File

@ -58,15 +58,15 @@ list of available devices, which you can select to be assigned to that VM.
Finding the right USB controller
--------------------------------
If you want assign a certain [USB] device to a VM (by attaching the whole
USB controller), you need to figure out which PCI device is the right
If you want to assign a certain [USB] device to a VM by attaching the whole
USB controller, you need to figure out which PCI device is the right
controller. First, check to which USB bus the device is connected:
~~~
lsusb
~~~
For example, I want assign a broadband modem to the netvm. In the out put of
For example, I want to assign a broadband modem to the NetVM. In the output of
`lsusb` it can be listed as something like this. (In this case, the device isn't
fully identified):
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ Bus 003 Device 003: ID 413c:818d Dell Computer Corp.
The device is connected to USB bus \#3. Then check which other devices are
connected to the same bus, since *all* of them will be assigned to the same VM.
Now is the time to find right USB controller:
Now is the time to find the right USB controller:
~~~
readlink /sys/bus/usb/devices/usb3

4
configuration/config-files.md
View File

@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ problematic device drivers.
Note that scripts need to be executable (chmod +x) to be used.
Also take a look at [bind-dirs][/doc/bind-dirs] for instruction how to easily
modify arbitrary system file in AppVM and have those changes persistent.
Also take a look at [bind-dirs](/doc/bind-dirs) for instructions on
how to easily modify arbitrary system files in AppVM and have those changes persist.
GUI and audio configuration in dom0
===================================

73
configuration/disk-trim.md
View File

@ -8,31 +8,82 @@ redirect_from:
- /wiki/DiskTRIM/
---
VMs have already TRIM enabled by default, but dom0 doesn't. There are some security implications (read for example [this article](https://asalor.blogspot.com/2011/08/trim-dm-crypt-problems.html)), but IMO not very serious.
Disk Trim
----------
To enable TRIM in dom0 you need:
Disk trimming is the procedure by which the operating system informs the underlying storage device of which storage blocks are no longer in use.
It does this by issuing an `ATA_TRIM` command for the block. This is also known as a `discard`.
In this way, the storage device can perform garbage collection of the unused blocks and internally prepare them for reuse. SSDs in general benefit from this, while HDDs do not.
1. Get your LUKS device UUID:
In a Linux system running on bare metal, this is relatively straight-forward.
When instructed by the operating system, discards are issued by the file-system driver directly to the storage driver and then to the SSD.
In Qubes, this gets more complex due to virtualization, LUKS, and LVM (and thin pools on R4.0 and up).
If you run `fstrim --all` inside a TemplateVM, in a worst case the `discard` can follow a path like:
OS -> File-system Driver -> Virtual Storage Driver -> Backend Storage Driver -> LVM Storage Driver -> LUKS Driver -> Physical Storage Driver -> Physical Storage Device
If discards are not supported at any one of those layers, it will not make it to the underlying physical device.
There are some security implications to permitting TRIM (read for example [this article](https://asalor.blogspot.com/2011/08/trim-dm-crypt-problems.html)), but in most cases not exploitable.
Configuration
----------
In all versions of Qubes, you may want to set up a periodic job in `dom0` to trim the disk.
This can be done from a terminal as root, by creating a `trim` file in `/etc/cron.daily` (or `/etc/cron.weekly`).
Add the following contents:
```
#!/bin/bash
/sbin/fstrim --all
```
And mark it as executable with `chmod 755 /etc/cron.daily/trim`.
**Note** Although discards can be issued on every delete inside `dom0` by adding the `discard` mount option to `/etc/fstab`, this option can hurt performance so the above procedure is recommended instead.
However, inside App and Template qubes, the `discard` mount option is on by default to notify the LVM thin pool driver (R4.0) or sparse file driver (R3.2) that the space is no longer needed and can be zeroed and re-used.
If you are using Qubes with LVM, you may also want to set `issue_discards = 1` in `/etc/lvm/lvm.conf`.
Setting this option will permit LVM to issue discards to the SSD when logical volumes are shrunk or deleted.
In R4.x, LVM Logical volumes are frequently deleted (every time a disposable VM is shut down, for example) so setting `issue_discards = 1` is recommended if using an SSD.
However, this is relatively rare in R3.x.
LUKS
----------
If you have enabled LUKS in dom0, discards will not get passed down to the storage device.
To enable TRIM support in dom0 with LUKS you need to:
1. Get your LUKS device UUID:
~~~
ls /dev/mapper/luks-*
~~~
2. Add entry to `/etc/crypttab` (replace luks-\<UUID\> with the device name and the \<UUID\> with UUID alone):
2. Add entry to `/etc/crypttab` (replace luks-\<UUID\> with the device name and the \<UUID\> with UUID alone):
~~~
luks-<UUID> UUID=<UUID> none allow-discards
luks-<UUID> UUID=<UUID> none discard
~~~
3. Add `rd.luks.allow-discards=1` to kernel cmdline (`/etc/default/grub`, GRUB\_CMDLINE\_LINUX line)
4. Rebuild grub config (`grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg`)
5. Rebuild initrd **in hostonly mode**:
3. Add `rd.luks.options=discard` to kernel cmdline (follow either GRUB2 or EFI, not both):
* GRUB2: `/etc/default/grub`, `GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX` line and
Rebuild grub config (`grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg`)
* EFI: `/boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg`, `kernel=` line(s)
4. Rebuild initrd **in hostonly mode**:
~~~
dracut -H -f
~~~
6. Add "discard" option to `/etc/fstab` for root device
7. Reboot the system, verify that allow-discards is really enabled (`dmsetup table`)
5. Reboot the system.
6. To verify if discards are enabled you may use `dmsetup table` (confirm the line for your device mentions "discards") or just run `fstrim -av` (you should see a `/` followed by the number of bytes trimmed).
There is a [bug affecting allow-discards option](https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=890533), once it will be fixed, first two steps will be no longer needed.

16
configuration/external-audio.md
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@ -14,19 +14,24 @@ Using External Audio Devices
Why you want to use external audio devices
------------------------------------------
Qubes audio virtualization protocol does not implement latency reporting for security reasons, keeping the protocol as simple as possible. Also, in a compromise between low latency and low CPU usage, latency may be around 200 ms. So applications demanding higher audio quality (even Skype) need a better environment. But Qubes flexibility fully allows that using external audio devices. These are mostly USB audio cards, but firewire devices also might be used.
Qubes audio virtualization protocol does not implement latency reporting for security reasons, keeping the protocol as simple as possible.
Also, in a compromise between low latency and low CPU usage, latency may be around 200 ms.
So applications demanding higher audio quality (even Skype) need a better environment.
But Qubes flexibility fully allows that using external audio devices.
These are mostly USB audio cards, but firewire devices also might be used.
Implementing external audio devices
-----------------------------------
First you need to identify an user VM dedicated to audio and [assign a device](/doc/AssigningDevices) to it. In the most common case the assigned device is the USB controller to which your USB audio card will be connected.
First you need to identify an user VM dedicated to audio and [assign a device](/doc/AssigningDevices) to it.
In the most common case the assigned device is the USB controller to which your USB audio card will be connected.
### Fedora VMs
In a terminal of the template from which you user VM depends, install pavucontrol with:
~~~
sudo yum install pavucontrol
sudo dnf install pavucontrol
~~~
Close the template and start or restart your user VM, insert your external audio device, open a terminal and prepare pulseaudio to use it with:
@ -38,9 +43,10 @@ pactl load-module module-udev-detect
Start the audio application that is going to use the external audio device.
Launch pavucontrol, for example using "run command in VM" of Qubes Manager and select you external audio card in pavucontrol. You need to do that only the first time you use a new external audio device, then pulse audio will remember you selection.
Launch pavucontrol, for example using "run command in VM" of Qubes Manager and select your external audio card in pavucontrol.
You need to do that only the first time you use a new external audio device, then pulse audio will remember your selection.
If you detach your external audio device, then want to insert it again, or change it with another one, you need to repeat the previous commands in terminal, adding an other line at the beginning:
If you detach your external audio device, then want to insert it again (or want to change it with another one), you need to repeat the previous commands in terminal adding another line at the beginning:
~~~
pactl unload-module module-udev-detect

2
configuration/fetchmail.md
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Fetchmail is standalone MRA (Mail Retrieval Agent) aka "IMAP/POP3 client". Its s
Installation
------------
`yum install fetchmail`
`dnf install fetchmail`
Configuration
-------------

6
configuration/http-filtering-proxy.md
View File

@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ prevents websites that use DNS-based load balancers from working
unless the user reloads the firewall rules (which re-resolve the DNS
names) whenever the balancer transfer her session to another IP. Third
the initial setup of the rules is complicated as the firewall drops
the connection silently. As a workaround on can use browser's network
the connection silently. As a workaround one can use browser's network
console to see what is blocked, but this is time-consuming and one can
trivially miss some important cases like including in the firewall
white list sites for OCSP SSL certificate verification.
white-list sites for OCSP SSL certificate verification.
These drawbacks can be mitigated if one replaces iptable-based rules
with a filtering HTTP proxy. The following describes how to setup
@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ Setup
name.ip-address-of-app-vm
The name part before the dot can be arbitrary. For convenience one can
use AppVm name here, but this is not required. It is important to get
use AppVM name here, but this is not required. It is important to get
ip address part right as this is what the control script uses to
determine for which AppVM to apply the proxy rules. One can check the
IP address of AppVM in Qubes VM manager in the VM settings dialog, see

24
configuration/managing-vm-kernel.md
View File

@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ updatevm : sys-firewall
Installing different kernel using Qubes kernel package
----------------------------------
VM kernels are packages by Qubes team in `kernel-qubes-vm` packages. Generally system will keep the 3 newest available versions. You can list them with the `rpm` command:
VM kernels are packages by Qubes team in `kernel-qubes-vm` packages. Generally the system will keep the 3 newest available versions. You can list them with the `rpm` command:
~~~
[user@dom0 ~]$ rpm -qa 'kernel-qubes-vm*'
@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ kernel-qubes-vm-3.18.16-3.pvops.qubes.x86_64
kernel-qubes-vm-3.18.17-4.pvops.qubes.x86_64
~~~
If you want more recent version, you can check `qubes-dom0-unstable` repository. As the name suggest, keep in
If you want a more recent version, you can check `qubes-dom0-unstable` repository. As the name suggests, keep in
mind that those packages may be less stable than the default ones.
Checking available versions in `qubes-dom0-unstable` repository:
@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ possible to use VM kernel, which is not packaged by Qubes team. This includes:
To prepare such VM kernel, you need to install `qubes-kernel-vm-support`
package in dom0 and also have matching kernel headers installed (`kernel-devel`
package in case of Fedora kernel package). You can install required stuff using `qubes-dom0-update`:
package in the case of Fedora kernel package). You can install required stuff using `qubes-dom0-update`:
~~~
[user@dom0 ~]$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-kernel-vm-support kernel-devel
@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ This is possible thanks to PV GRUB2 - GRUB2 running in the VM. To make it happen
1. Install PV GRUB2 in dom0 - package is named `grub2-xen`.
2. Install kernel in the VM. As with all VM software installation - this needs to be done in TemplateVM (of StandaloneVM if you are using one).
3. Set VM kernel to `pvgrub2` value. You can use `pvgrub2` in selected VMs, not necessary all of them, even when it's template has kernel installed. You can still use dom0-provided kernel for selected VMs.
3. Set VM kernel to `pvgrub2` value. You can use `pvgrub2` in selected VMs, not necessary all of them, even when its template has kernel installed. You can still use dom0-provided kernel for selected VMs.
**WARNING: When using kernel from within VM, `kernelopts` parameter is ignored.**
@ -227,10 +227,10 @@ sudo qubes-dom0-update grub2-xen
### Installing kernel in Fedora VM
In Fedora based VM, you need to install `qubes-kernel-vm-support` package. This
package include required additional kernel module and initramfs addition
package includes required additional kernel module and initramfs addition
required to start Qubes VM (for details see
[template implementation](/doc/template-implementation/)). Additionally you
need some GRUB tools to create it's configuration. Note: you don't need actual
need some GRUB tools to create its configuration. Note: you don't need actual
grub bootloader as it is provided by dom0. But having one also shouldn't harm.
~~~
@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ sudo yum install qubes-kernel-vm-support grub2-tools
Then install whatever kernel you want. If you are using distribution kernel
package (`kernel` package), initramfs and kernel module should be handled
automatically, but you need to ensure you have `kernel-devel` package for the
same kernel version installed. If you are using manually build kernel, you need
same kernel version installed. If you are using a manually built kernel, you need
to handle this on your own. Take a look at `dkms` and `dracut` documentation.
Especially `dkms autoinstall` command may be useful.
@ -265,10 +265,10 @@ start kernel configured within VM.
### Installing kernel in Debian VM
In Debian based VM, you need to install `qubes-kernel-vm-support` package. This
package include required additional kernel module and initramfs addition
package includes required additional kernel module and initramfs addition
required to start Qubes VM (for details see
[template implementation](/doc/template-implementation/)). Additionally you
need some GRUB tools to create it's configuration. Note: you don't need actual
need some GRUB tools to create its configuration. Note: you don't need actual
grub bootloader as it is provided by dom0. But having one also shouldn't harm.
~~~
@ -326,9 +326,9 @@ When starting the VM you can safely ignore any warnings about a missing module '
### Troubleshooting
In case of problems, you can access VM console (using `sudo xl console VMNAME` in dom0) to access
GRUB menu. You need to call it just after starting VM (until `GRUB_TIMEOUT`
expires) - for example in separate dom0 terminal window.
In the event of a problem, you can access the VM console (using `sudo xl console VMNAME` in dom0) to access
the GRUB menu. You need to call it just after starting VM (until `GRUB_TIMEOUT`
expires) - for example in a separate dom0 terminal window.
In any case you can later access VM logs (especially VM console log (`guest-VMNAME.log`).

2
configuration/multiboot.md
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@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ If you install Qubes without making any backups beforehand, don't worry.
If you didn't overwrite the original partitions, then it is usually
possible to recover your old systems relatively easily, as described above.
If you decided to use a shared /boot and *dont* have backups of your previous
If you decided to use a shared /boot and *don't* have backups of your previous
grub config, it is quite easy to fix this.
This example may help.

8
configuration/network-bridge-support.md
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@ -42,12 +42,12 @@ First, retrieve the attachment of this Wifi article in dom0. Then apply the thre
Finally restart the qubes manager GUI.
A new option is now available in the AppVM Settings to enable set the NetVM in bridge mode. For a bridged AppVM, you should the select a netvm instead of a firewall vm, enabled the Bridge option and restart your AppVM.
An option is available in the AppVM Settings to enable setting the NetVM in bridge mode. For a bridged AppVM, you should then select a NetVM instead of a FirewallVM/ ProxyVM, enable the Bridge option, and restart your AppVM.
NetVM patch (Qubes R2B2)
------------------------
You need to modify manually the NetVM iptable script inside the NetVM. The reason is that by default the NetVM only accept traffic coming from network interfaces called vif\* (in our case, we will use an additional interface called bridge0. The second reason is that all trafic is NATed by default. In our case, we want to forward traffic from the bridge interface without modifying it, while NATing traffic coming from vif\* interfaces.
You need to modify manually the NetVM iptable script inside the NetVM. The reason is that by default the NetVM only accepts traffic coming from network interfaces called vif\* (in our case, we will use an additional interface called bridge0. The second reason is that all trafic is NATed by default. In our case, we want to forward traffic from the bridge interface without modifying it, while NATing traffic coming from vif\* interfaces.
Modify manually the Template you use for your NetVM (not the NetVM itself). This is by default fedora-x86\_64. Edit the file /etc/sysconfig/iptables. You need to modify two parts of the file.
@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ This requires:
Note: A wireless interface cannot be bridged.
The bridge edition GUI is somehow buggy as it does not remember all the parameter you setup. You can fix it by editing manually the files in /etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/. Here is one example for these files:
The bridge edition GUI is somewhat buggy as it does not remember all the parameters you set up. You can fix it by editing manually the files in /etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/. Here is one example for these files:
- Bridge-DHCP
@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ Note: Do not forget to put stp=false if you bridge only eth0 because sending BPD
slave-type=bridge
~~~
If you do not manager to start your bridge, you can start it manually from a NetVM terminal:
If you do not manage to start your bridge, you can start it manually from a NetVM terminal:
~~~
$ nmcli con up id bridge0-eth0

29
configuration/network-printer.md
View File

@ -14,27 +14,42 @@ Configuring a network printer for Qubes AppVMs
Where to configure printers and install drivers?
------------------------------------------------
One would normally want to configure a printer in a template VM, rather than in particular AppVMs. This is because all the global settings made to AppVMs (those stored in its /etc, as well as binaries installed in /usr) would be discarded upon AppVM shutdown. When printer is added and configured in a template VM, then all the AppVMs based on this template should automatically be able to use it (without the need for the template VM to be running, of course).
One would normally want to configure a printer in a template VM, rather than in particular AppVMs.
This is because all the global settings made to AppVMs (those stored in its /etc, as well as binaries installed in /usr) would be discarded upon AppVM shutdown.
When printer is added and configured in a template VM, then all the AppVMs based on this template should automatically be able to use it (without the need for the template VM to be running, of course).
Alternatively one can add a printer in a standalone VM, but this would limit the printer usage to this particular VM.
Security considerations for network printers and drivers
--------------------------------------------------------
Some printers require third-party drivers, typically downloadable from the vendor's website. Such drivers are typically distributed in a form of ready to install RPM packages. However, they are often unsigned, and additionally the downloads are available via HTTP connections only. As a result, installation of such third-party RPMs in a default template VM exposes a risk of compromise of this template VM, which, in turn, leads automatically to compromise of all the AppVMs based on the template. (Again, it's not buggy or malicious drivers that we fear here, but rather malicious installation scripts for those drivers).
Some printers require third-party drivers, typically downloadable from the vendor's website.
Such drivers are typically distributed in a form of ready to install RPM packages.
However, they are often unsigned, and additionally the downloads are available via HTTP connections only.
As a result, installation of such third-party RPMs in a default template VM exposes a risk of compromise of this template VM, which, in turn, leads automatically to compromise of all the AppVMs based on the template.
(Again, it's not buggy or malicious drivers that we fear here, but rather malicious installation scripts for those drivers).
In order to mitigate this risk, one might consider creating a custom template (i.e. clone the original template) and then install the third-party, unverified drivers there. Such template might then be made the default template for [Disposable VM creation](/doc/dispvm/), which should allow one to print any document by right-clicking on it, choosing "Open in Disposable VM" and print from there. This would allow to print documents from more trusted AppVMs (based on a trusted default template, that is not poisoned by third-party printer drivers).
In order to mitigate this risk, one might consider creating a custom template (i.e. clone the original template) and then install the third-party, unverified drivers there.
Such template might then be made a DVM template for [Disposable VM creation](/doc/dispvm/), which should allow one to print any document by right-clicking on it, choosing "Open in Disposable VM" and print from there.
This would allow to print documents from more trusted AppVMs (based on a trusted default template that is not poisoned by third-party printer drivers).
However, one should be aware that most (all?) network printing protocols are insecure, unencrypted protocols. This means, that an attacker who is able to sniff the local network, or who is controlling the (normally untrusted) Qubes NetVM, will likely to be able to see the documents being printed. This is a limitation of today's printers and printing protocols, something that cannot be solved by Qubes or any other OS.
However, one should be aware that most (all?) network printing protocols are insecure, unencrypted protocols.
This means, that an attacker who is able to sniff the local network, or who is controlling the (normally untrusted) Qubes NetVM, will likely to be able to see the documents being printed.
This is a limitation of today's printers and printing protocols, something that cannot be solved by Qubes or any other OS.
Additionally, the printer drivers as well as CUPS application itself, might be buggy and might got exploited when talking to a compromised printer (or by an attacker who controls the local network, or the default NetVM). Consider not using printing from your more trusted AppVMs for this reason.
Additionally, the printer drivers as well as CUPS application itself, might be buggy and might get exploited when talking to a compromised printer (or by an attacker who controls the local network, or the default NetVM).
Consider not using printing from your more trusted AppVMs for this reason.
Steps to configure a network printer in a template VM
----------------------------------------------------------
1. Start the "Printer Settings" App in a template VM (either via Qubes "Start Menu", or by launching the `system-config-printer` in the template).
2. Add/Configure the printer in the same way as one would do on any normal Linux. Be sure to allow network access from the template VM to your printer, as normally the template VM is not allowed any network access, except to the Qubes proxy for software installation. One can use Qubes Manager to modify firewall rules for particular VMs.
2. Add/Configure the printer in the same way as one would do on any normal Linux.
You may need to allow network access from the template VM to your printer to complete configuration, as normally the template VM is not allowed any network access except to the Qubes proxy for software installation.
One can use Qubes Manager to modify firewall rules for particular VMs.
3. Optional: Test the printer by printing a test page. If it works, shut down the template VM.
4. Open an AppVM (make sure it's based on the template where you just installed the printer, normally all AppVMs are based on the default template), and test if printing works. If it doesn't then probably the AppVM doesn't have networking access to the printer -- in that case adjust the firewall settings for that AppVM in Qubes Manager. Also, make sure that the AppVM gets restarted after the template was shutdown.
4. Open an AppVM (make sure it's based on the template where you just installed the printer, normally all AppVMs are based on the default template), and test if printing works.
If it doesn't then probably the AppVM doesn't have networking access to the printer -- in that case adjust the firewall settings for that AppVM in Qubes Manager.
Also, make sure that the AppVM gets restarted after the template was shutdown.
5. Alternatively if you do not want to modify the firewall rules of the template VM (that have security scope) you can simply shut down the template VM without trying to print the test page (which will not work), start or restart an AppVM based on the template and test printing there.

8
configuration/postfix.md
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@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ Postfix is full featured MTA (Message Transfer Agent). Here we will configure it
Installation
------------
`yum install postfix procmail make cyrus-sasl cyrus-sasl-plain`
`dnf install postfix procmail make cyrus-sasl cyrus-sasl-plain`
Cyrus-sasl is installed to authenticate to remote servers. Procmail is not strictly necessary, but is useful to sort your incoming mail, for example to put each mailing list in its own directory. Make is also not necessary, but is used to keep Postfix lookup tables.
You should also check `alternatives` command, to see if it is the default `mta`. It probably is not. You may need to `yum remove ssmtp` or something
You should also check `alternatives` command, to see if it is the default `mta`. It probably is not. You may need to `dnf remove ssmtp` or something
Configuration
-------------
@ -99,14 +99,14 @@ alias_maps = hash:/etc/aliases
@localhost your.mail@example.com
~~~
`/usr/local/etc/postfix/sender_relay`. This is important file. Put there all your SMTP servers. Pay attention to port (smtp/submission). Square brackets have their special meaning, they are almost certainly needed. For more info consult Postfix manual.
`/usr/local/etc/postfix/sender_relay`. This is an important file. Put all your SMTP servers there. Pay attention to port (smtp/submission). Square brackets have their special meaning, they are almost certainly needed. For more info consult Postfix manual.
~~~
your.mail@exmaple.com [mail.example.com]:submission
your.other@mail.com [smtp.mail.com]:smtp
~~~
`/usr/local/etc/postfix/saslpass`. Here you put passwords to above mentioned servers. It depends on provider if you need to put whole email as username or just the part before `@`.
`/usr/local/etc/postfix/saslpass`. Here you put passwords to above mentioned servers. It depends on your provider if you need to put whole email as username or just the part before `@`.
~~~
[mail.example.com]:submission your.mail:y0urP4ssw0rd

96
configuration/resize-disk-image.md
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
layout: doc
title: Resize Disk Image
title: Resize Private Disk Image
permalink: /doc/resize-disk-image/
redirect_from:
- /en/doc/resize-disk-image/
@ -8,40 +8,65 @@ redirect_from:
- /wiki/ResizeDiskImage/
---
Resize Disk Image
Resize Private Disk Image
-----------------
There are several disk images which can be easily extended. But pay attention to the overall consumed space of your sparse disk images.
There are several disk images which can be easily extended, but pay attention to the overall consumed space of your sparse disk images.
See also additional information and caveats about [resizing the root disk image](/doc/resize-root-disk-image/).
### Private disk image
1048576 MB is the maximum size which can be assigned to a private storage through qubes-manager.
### Private disk image (R4.0)
To grow the private disk image of a AppVM beyond this limit [qubes-grow-private](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-grow-private/) can be used:
1048576 MiB is the maximum size which can be assigned to private storage through Qube Manager.
To grow the private disk image of an AppVM beyond this limit, `qvm-volume` can be used:
~~~
qvm-volume extend <vm_name>:private <size>
~~~
Note: Size is the target size (i.e. 4096MB or 16GB, ...), not the size to add to the existing disk.
### Private disk image (R3.2)
1048576 MB is the maximum size which can be assigned to private storage through Qubes Manager.
To grow the private disk image of an AppVM beyond this limit, [qvm-grow-private](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-grow-private/) can be used:
~~~
qvm-grow-private <vm-name> <size>
~~~
Note: Size is the target size (i.e. 4096MB or 16GB, ...), not the size to add to the existing disk.
Note: Size is the target size (i.e. 4096MB or 16GB, ...), not the size to add to the existing disk.
### Shrinking private disk image (Linux VM)
### Shrinking private disk image (Linux VM, R4.0)
**This operation is dangerous and this is why it isn't available in standard Qubes tools. If you have enough disk space, it is safer to create new VM with smaller disk and move the data.**
1. Create a new qube with smaller disk using Qube Manager or `qvm-create`
2. Move data to the new qube using `qvm-copy` or OS utilities
3. Delete old qube using Qube Manager or `qvm-remove`
### Shrinking private disk image (Linux VM, R3.2)
**This operation is dangerous and this is why it isn't available in standard Qubes tools.
If you have enough disk space, it is safer to create a new VM with a smaller disk and move the data.**
The basic idea is to:
1. Shrink filesystem on the private disk image.
2. Then shrink the image.
Ext4 does not support online shrinking, so can't be done as convenient as image grown. Note that we don't want to touch the VM filesystem directly in dom0 for security reasons. First you need to start VM without `/rw` mounted. One of the possibility is to interrupt its normal startup by adding `rd.break` kernel option:
Ext4 does not support online shrinking, so it can't be done as conveniently as growing the image.
Note that we don't want to touch the VM filesystem directly in dom0 for security reasons.
First you need to start VM without `/rw` mounted.
One possibility is to interrupt its normal startup by adding the `rd.break` kernel option:
~~~
qvm-prefs -s <vm-name> kernelopts rd.break
qvm-start --no-guid <vm-name>
~~~
And wait for qrexec connect timeout (or simply press Ctrl-C). Then you can connect to VM console and shrink the filesystem:
And wait for qrexec connect timeout (or simply press Ctrl-C).
Then you can connect to VM console and shrink the filesystem:
~~~
sudo xl console <vm-name>
@ -63,7 +88,9 @@ Now you can resize the image:
truncate -s <new-desired-size> /var/lib/qubes/appvms/<vm-name>/private.img
~~~
**It is critical to use the same (or bigger for some safety margin) size in truncate call compared to resize2fs call. Otherwise you will loose your data!** Then reset kernel options back to default:
**It is critical to use the same (or bigger for some safety margin) size in truncate call compared to resize2fs call.
Otherwise you will lose your data!**
Then reset kernel options back to default:
~~~
qvm-prefs -s <vm-name> kernelopts default
@ -71,43 +98,18 @@ qvm-prefs -s <vm-name> kernelopts default
Done.
>In order to avoid error, you might want to first reduce the filesystem to a smaller size than desired (say 3G), then truncate the image to the target size (for example 4G), and lastly grow the filesystem to the target size. In order to do this, after the `truncate` step, start the vm again in maintenance mode and use the following command to extend the filesystem to the correct size : `resize2fs /dev/xvdb`.
>In order to avoid error, you might want to first reduce the filesystem to a smaller size than desired (say 3G), then truncate the image to the target size (for example 4G), and lastly grow the filesystem to the target size.
>In order to do this, after the `truncate` step, start the vm again in maintenance mode and use the following command to extend the filesystem to the correct size : `resize2fs /dev/xvdb`.
>
>With no argument, resize2fs grows the filesystem to match the underlying block device (the .img file you just shrunk)
>With no argument, resize2fs grows the filesystem to match the underlying block device (the .img file you just shrunk).
### Template disk image
OS Specific Follow-up Instructions
-----------------
If you want install a lot of software in your TemplateVM, you may need to increase the amount of disk space your TemplateVM can use. See also additional information and caveats about [resizing the root disk image].
1. Make sure that all the VMs based on this template are shut off (including netvms etc).
2. Sanity check: verify that none of loop device are pointing at this template root.img. Run this in dom0: `sudo losetup -a`
3. Resize root.img file. Run this in dom0: `truncate -s <desired size> <path to root.img>` (the root.img path can be obtained from qvm-prefs).
4. If any netvm/proxyvm used by this template is based on it, set template netvm to none.
5. Start the template.
6. Execute `sudo resize2fs /dev/mapper/dmroot` in the template.
7. Verify available space in the template using `df -h`
8. Shutdown the template.
9. Restore original netvm setting (if changed), check firewall settings (setting netvm to none causes firewall reset to "block all")
### HVM disk image
In this example we will grow the disk image of an HVM to 30GB.
First, stop/shutdown the HVM.
Then, from a Dom0 terminal (in KDE: System Tools -\> Terminal Emulator) do the following:
~~~
cd /var/lib/qubes/appvms/<yourHVM>/
ls -lh root.img (<--verify current size of disk image)
truncate -s 30GB root.img
ls -lh root.img (<--verify new size of disk image)
~~~
The partition table and file-system must be adjusted after this change.
Use tools appropriate to the OS in your HVM. Brief instructions for Windows 7,
FreeBSD, and Linux are provided below.
After resizing volumes, the partition table and file-system may need to be adjusted.
Use tools appropriate to the OS in your qube.
Brief instructions for Windows 7, FreeBSD, and Linux are provided below.
#### Windows 7
@ -129,8 +131,6 @@ zpool online -e poolname ada0
#### Linux
Qubes will automatically grow the filesystem for you on AppVMs but not HVMs.
You will see that there is unallocated free space at the end of your primary disk.
You can use standard linux tools like fdisk and mkfs to make this space available.
[resizing the root disk image]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/resize-root-disk-image/

74
configuration/resize-root-disk-image.md
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@ -11,11 +11,53 @@ redirect_from:
Resize Root Disk Image
----------------------
The safest way to increase the size of `root.img` is to turn your TemplateVM into a StandaloneVM. Doing this means it will have it's own root filesystem *(StandaloneVMs use a copy of template, instead of smart sharing)*. To do this run `qvm-create --standalone` from `dom0` Konsole.
See additional information and caveats about [resizing private disk images](/doc/resize-disk-image/), paying particular attention to "OS Specific Follow-up Instructions" at the end.
### Resize a StandaloneVM Root Image
### Template disk image
In `dom0` Konsole run the following command (replace the size and path):
If you want install a lot of software in your TemplateVM, you may need to increase the amount of disk space your TemplateVM can use.
*Make sure changes in the TemplateVM between reboots don't exceed 10G.*
1. Make sure that all the VMs based on this template are shut down (including netvms etc).
2. Resize root image using Qubes version specific procedure below.
3. If any netvm/proxyvm used by this template is based on it, set template's netvm to none.
4. Start the template.
5. Resize the filesystem using OS appropriate tools (Qubes will handle this automatically with Linux templates).
6. Verify available space in the template using `df -h` or OS specific tools.
7. Shutdown the template.
8. Restore original netvm setting (if changed), check firewall settings (setting netvm to none causes the firewall to reset to "block all")
### Root disk image (R4.0)
1048576 MiB is the maximum size which can be assigned to root storage through Qube Manager.
To grow the root disk image of an AppVM beyond this limit, `qvm-volume` can be used:
~~~
qvm-volume extend <vm_name>:root <size>
~~~
Note: Size is the target size (i.e. 4096MB or 16GB, ...), not the size to add to the existing disk.
### Root disk image (R3.2)
1048576 MB is the maximum size which can be assigned to root storage through Qubes Manager.
To grow the root disk image of an AppVM beyond this limit, `qvm-grow-root` can be used:
~~~
qvm-grow-root <vm-name> <size>
~~~
Note: Size is the target size (i.e. 4096MB or 16GB, ...), not the size to add to the existing disk.
### Resize a StandaloneVM Root Image (R3.2)
Another way to increase the size of `root.img` is to turn your TemplateVM into a StandaloneVM.
Doing this means it will have it's own root filesystem *(StandaloneVMs use a copy of template, instead of smart sharing)*.
To do this run `qvm-create --standalone` from `dom0` console.
In `dom0` console run the following command (replace the size and path):
~~~
truncate -s 20G /var/lib/qubes/appvms/standalonevm/root.img
@ -27,28 +69,4 @@ Then start Terminal for this StandaloneVM and run:
sudo resize2fs /dev/mapper/dmroot
~~~
Shutdown the StandaloneVM and you will have extended the size of it's `root.img`
### Resize a TemplateVM Root Image
Shut down the TemplateVM, as well as all VMs based on that template (since they
share `root.img`).
In `dom0` Konsole run the following command (replace the size and path):
*Make sure changes in the TemplateVM between reboots didn't exceed 10G.*
~~~
truncate -s 20G /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-21/root.img
~~~
Then start only the TemplateVM and run the following. Note that if you are
resizing the TemplateVM used by, e.g., your NetVM, you may need to disable
networking so when the TemplateVM is started, it does not autostart other VMs
based on the same `root.img`. Otherwise you will get an error message `Nothing
to do!`.
~~~
sudo resize2fs /dev/mapper/dmroot
~~~
Shutdown the TemplateVM and you will have extended the size of it's `root.img`.
Shutdown the StandaloneVM and you will have extended the size of its `root.img`.

14
configuration/rxvt.md
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@ -16,12 +16,16 @@ Rxvt
Installation
------------
`yum install rxvt-unicode-256color-ml` will bring both base `rxvt-unicode` and extension. Let me also recommend excellent Terminus font: `yum install terminus-fonts`.
`dnf install rxvt-unicode-256color-ml` will bring both base `rxvt-unicode` and extension.
Let me also recommend excellent Terminus font: `dnf install terminus-fonts`.
Xresources
----------
In TemplateVM create file `/etc/X11/Xresources.urxvt` and paste config below. `!`-lines are comments and may be left out. `#`-lines are directives to CPP (C preprocessor) and are necessary. This shouldn't go to `/etc/X11/Xresources`, because that file is not preprocessed by default.
In TemplateVM create file `/etc/X11/Xresources.urxvt` and paste config below.
`!`-lines are comments and may be left out.
`#`-lines are directives to CPP (C preprocessor) and are necessary.
This shouldn't go to `/etc/X11/Xresources`, because that file is not preprocessed by default.
~~~
! CGA colour palette
@ -132,7 +136,8 @@ URxvt.insecure: False
!URxvt.termName: rxvt-256color
~~~
Then create script to automatically merge those to xrdb. File `/etc/X11/xinit/xinitrc.d/urxvt.sh`:
Then create script to automatically merge those to xrdb.
File `/etc/X11/xinit/xinitrc.d/urxvt.sh`:
~~~
#!/bin/sh
@ -143,4 +148,5 @@ Then create script to automatically merge those to xrdb. File `/etc/X11/xinit/xi
Shortcuts
---------
For each AppVM, go to *Qubes Manager \> VM Settings \> Applications*. Find `rxvt-unicode` (or `rxvt-unicode (256-color) multi-language`) and add.
For each AppVM, go to *Qubes Manager \> VM Settings \> Applications*.
Find `rxvt-unicode` (or `rxvt-unicode (256-color) multi-language`) and add.

2
configuration/salt.md
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@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ compromise cannot spread from one VM to another.
## Writing Your Own Configurations
Let's start with quick a example:
Let's start with a quick example:
my new and shiny VM:
qvm.present:

4
configuration/secondary-storage.md
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@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Known Issues
dom0.) Do not attempt to detach these disks. (They will automatically be
detached when you shut down the AppVM.) [[2]]
[Qubes Backup]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/BackupRestore/
[TemplateVM]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/Templates/
[Qubes Backup]: /doc/BackupRestore/
[TemplateVM]: /doc/Templates/
[1]: https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/EITd1kBHD30/discussion
[2]: https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/nDrOM7dzLNE/discussion

307
configuration/vpn.md
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@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ Please refer to your guest OS and VPN service documentation when considering the
The simplest case is to set up a VPN connection using the NetworkManager service inside your NetVM. Because the NetworkManager service is already started, you are ready to set up your VPN connection. However this has some disadvantages:
- You have to place (and probably save) your VPN credentials inside the NetVM, which is directly connected to the outside world
- All your AppVMs which are connected to the NetVM will be connected to the VPN (by default)
- You have to place (and probably save) your VPN credentials inside the NetVM, which is directly connected to the outside world
- All your AppVMs which are connected to the NetVM will be connected to the VPN (by default)
### AppVM
@ -33,26 +33,26 @@ One of the best unique features of Qubes OS is its special type of VM called a P
Using a ProxyVM to set up a VPN client gives you the ability to:
- Separate your VPN credentials from your NetVM.
- Separate your VPN credentials from your AppVM data.
- Easily control which of your AppVMs are connected to your VPN by simply setting it as a NetVM of the desired AppVM.
- Separate your VPN credentials from your NetVM.
- Separate your VPN credentials from your AppVM data.
- Easily control which of your AppVMs are connected to your VPN by simply setting it as a NetVM of the desired AppVM.
Set up a ProxyVM as a VPN gateway using NetworkManager
------------------------------------------------------
1. Create a new VM, name it, click the ProxyVM radio button, and choose a color and template.
1. Create a new VM, name it, click the ProxyVM radio button, and choose a color and template.
![Create\_New\_VM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Create_New_VM.png)
![Create\_New\_VM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Create_New_VM.png)
2. Add the `network-manager` service to this new VM.
2. Add the `network-manager` service to this new VM.
![Settings-services.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Settings-services.png)
![Settings-services.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Settings-services.png)
3. Set up your VPN as described in the NetworkManager documentation linked above.
3. Set up your VPN as described in the NetworkManager documentation linked above.
4. Configure your AppVMs to use the new VM as a NetVM.
4. Configure your AppVMs to use the new VM as a NetVM.
![Settings-NetVM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Settings-NetVM.png)
![Settings-NetVM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Settings-NetVM.png)
5. Optionally, you can install some [custom icons](https://github.com/Zrubi/qubes-artwork-proxy-vpn) for your VPN
@ -60,140 +60,206 @@ Set up a ProxyVM as a VPN gateway using NetworkManager
Set up a ProxyVM as a VPN gateway using iptables and CLI scripts
----------------------------------------------------------------
This method is more involved than the one above, but has anti-leak features that also make the connection _fail closed_ should it be interrupted. It has been tested with Fedora 23 and Debian 8 templates.
This method is more involved than the one above, but has anti-leak features that also make the connection _fail closed_ should it be interrupted.
It has been tested with Fedora 23 and Debian 8 templates.
1. Create a new VM, name it, click the ProxyVM radio button, and choose a color and template.
![Create\_New\_VM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Create_New_VM.png)
Note: Do not enable NetworkManager in the ProxyVM, as it can interfere with the scripts' DNS features. If you enabled NetworkManager or used other methods in a previous attempt, do not re-use the old ProxyVM... Create a new one according to this step.
If your choice of template VM doesn't already have the VPN client software, you'll need to install the software in the template before proceeding. Disable any auto-starting service that comes with the software package: for example `sudo systemctl disable openvpn.service`.
You may also wish to install `nano` or another simple text editor for entering the scripts below.
![Create\_New\_VM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Create_New_VM.png)
2. Set up and test the VPN client.
Note: Do not enable NetworkManager in the ProxyVM, as it can interfere with the scripts' DNS features.
If you enabled NetworkManager or used other methods in a previous attempt, do not re-use the old ProxyVM...
Create a new one according to this step.
Make sure the VPN VM and its template VM are not running.
Run a terminal (CLI) in the VPN VM -- this will start the VM. Then make a new 'vpn' folder with `sudo mkdir /rw/config/vpn` and copy your VPN config files here (the example config filename used here is `openvpn-client.ovpn`). Files accompanying the main config such as *.crt and *.pem should also go here, and should not be referenced in the main config by absolute paths such as '/etc/...'.
If your choice of TemplateVM doesn't already have the VPN client software, you'll need to install the software in the template before proceeding.
Disable any auto-starting service that comes with the software package.
For example for OpenVPN.
Notes about VPN config options: The VPN scripts here are intended to work with commonly used `tun` interfaces, whereas `tap` mode is untested. Also, the config should route all traffic through your VPN's interface after a connection is created; For openvpn the directive for this is `redirect-gateway def1`. Lastly, the VPN client may not be able to prompt you for credentials when connecting to the server: Creating a file in the 'vpn' folder with your credentials and using a directive such as openvpn's `auth-user-pass <filename>` is recommended.
__Test your client configuration:__ Run the client from a CLI prompt in the 'vpn' folder, preferably as root. For example:
```
sudo openvpn --cd /rw/config/vpn --config openvpn-client.ovpn
```
Watch for status messages that indicate whether the connection is successful and test from another VPN VM terminal window with `ping` and `traceroute`. DNS may be tested at this point by replacing addresses in `/etc/resolv.conf` with ones appropriate for your VPN (although this file will not be used when setup is complete). Diagnose any connection problems using resources such as client documentation and help from your VPN service provider.
Proceed to the next step when you're sure the basic VPN connection is working.
sudo systemctl disable openvpn.service
3. Create the DNS-handling script.
Use `sudo nano /rw/config/vpn/qubes-vpn-handler.sh` to edit and add:
You may also wish to install `nano` or another simple text editor for entering the scripts below.
~~~
#!/bin/bash
set -e
export PATH="$PATH:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
2. Set up and test the VPN client.
Make sure the VPN VM and its TemplateVM is not running.
Run a terminal (CLI) in the VPN VM -- this will start the VM.
Then create a new `/rw/config/vpn` folder with.
case "$1" in
sudo mkdir /rw/config/vpn
up)
# To override DHCP DNS, assign DNS addresses to 'vpn_dns' env variable before calling this script;
# Format is 'X.X.X.X Y.Y.Y.Y [...]'
if [[ -z "$vpn_dns" ]] ; then
# Parses DHCP foreign_option_* vars to automatically set DNS address translation:
for optionname in ${!foreign_option_*} ; do
option="${!optionname}"
unset fops; fops=($option)
if [ ${fops[1]} == "DNS" ] ; then vpn_dns="$vpn_dns ${fops[2]}" ; fi
done
fi
Copy your VPN config files to `/rw/config/vpn`.
Your VPN config file should be named `openvpn-client.ovpn`) so you can use the scripts below as is without modification.
Otherwise you would have to replace the file name.
`openvpn-client.ovpn` contents:
iptables -t nat -F PR-QBS
if [[ -n "$vpn_dns" ]] ; then
# Set DNS address translation in firewall:
for addr in $vpn_dns; do
iptables -t nat -A PR-QBS -i vif+ -p udp --dport 53 -j DNAT --to $addr
iptables -t nat -A PR-QBS -i vif+ -p tcp --dport 53 -j DNAT --to $addr
done
su - -c 'notify-send "$(hostname): LINK IS UP." --icon=network-idle' user
else
su - -c 'notify-send "$(hostname): LINK UP, NO DNS!" --icon=dialog-error' user
fi
* Files accompanying the main config such as `*.crt` and `*.pem` should also go to `/rw/config/vpn` folder.
* Files referenced in `openvpn-client.ovpn` should not use absolute paths such as `/etc/...`.
;;
down)
su - -c 'notify-send "$(hostname): LINK IS DOWN !" --icon=dialog-error' user
;;
esac
~~~
The VPN scripts here are intended to work with commonly used `tun` interfaces, whereas `tap` mode is untested.
Also, the config should route all traffic through your VPN's interface after a connection is created; For OpenVPN the directive for this is `redirect-gateway def1`.
Now save the script and make it executable:
`sudo chmod +x /rw/config/vpn/qubes-vpn-handler.sh`
4. Configure client to use the DNS handling script. Using openvpn as an example, edit the config with `sudo nano /rw/config/vpn/openvpn-client.ovpn` and add these lines:
sudo nano /rw/config/vpn/openvpn-client.ovpn
~~~
script-security 2
up 'qubes-vpn-handler.sh up'
down 'qubes-vpn-handler.sh down'
~~~
Make sure it already includes or add:
**Restart the client and test the connection again** ...this time from an AppVM!
redirect-gateway def1
5. Set up iptables anti-leak rules.
The VPN client may not be able to prompt you for credentials when connecting to the server.
Create a file in the `/rw/config/vpn` folder with your credentials and using a directive.
For example for OpenVPN, add:
Edit the firewall script with `sudo nano /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script` then clear out the existing lines and add:
auth-user-pass pass.txt
~~~
#!/bin/bash
# Block forwarding of connections through upstream network device
# (in case the vpn tunnel breaks):
iptables -I FORWARD -o eth0 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -i eth0 -j DROP
# Block all outgoing traffic
iptables -P OUTPUT DROP
iptables -F OUTPUT
iptables -I OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT
Save file `/rw/config/vpn/openvpn-client.ovpn`.
Make sure a `/rw/config/vpn/pass.txt` file actually exists.
# Add the `qvpn` group to system, if it doesn't already exist
if ! grep -q "^qvpn:" /etc/group ; then
sudo nano /rw/config/vpn/pass.txt
Add:
username
password
Replace `username` and `password` with your actual username and password.
**Test your client configuration:**
Run the client from a CLI prompt in the 'vpn' folder, preferably as root.
For example:
sudo openvpn --cd /rw/config/vpn --config openvpn-client.ovpn
Watch for status messages that indicate whether the connection is successful and test from another VPN VM terminal window with `ping`.
ping 8.8.8.8
`ping` can be aborted by pressing the two keys `ctrl` + `c` at the same time.
DNS may be tested at this point by replacing addresses in `/etc/resolv.conf` with ones appropriate for your VPN (although this file will not be used when setup is complete).
Diagnose any connection problems using resources such as client documentation and help from your VPN service provider.
Proceed to the next step when you're sure the basic VPN connection is working.
3. Create the DNS-handling script.
sudo nano /rw/config/vpn/qubes-vpn-handler.sh
Edit and add:
~~~
#!/bin/bash
set -e
export PATH="$PATH:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
case "$1" in
up)
# To override DHCP DNS, assign DNS addresses to 'vpn_dns' env variable before calling this script;
# Format is 'X.X.X.X Y.Y.Y.Y [...]'
if [[ -z "$vpn_dns" ]] ; then
# Parses DHCP foreign_option_* vars to automatically set DNS address translation:
for optionname in ${!foreign_option_*} ; do
option="${!optionname}"
unset fops; fops=($option)
if [ ${fops[1]} == "DNS" ] ; then vpn_dns="$vpn_dns ${fops[2]}" ; fi
done
fi
iptables -t nat -F PR-QBS
if [[ -n "$vpn_dns" ]] ; then
# Set DNS address translation in firewall:
for addr in $vpn_dns; do
iptables -t nat -A PR-QBS -i vif+ -p udp --dport 53 -j DNAT --to $addr
iptables -t nat -A PR-QBS -i vif+ -p tcp --dport 53 -j DNAT --to $addr
done
su - -c 'notify-send "$(hostname): LINK IS UP." --icon=network-idle' user
else
su - -c 'notify-send "$(hostname): LINK UP, NO DNS!" --icon=dialog-error' user
fi
;;
down)
su - -c 'notify-send "$(hostname): LINK IS DOWN !" --icon=dialog-error' user
;;
esac
~~~
Save the script.
Make it executable.
sudo chmod +x /rw/config/vpn/qubes-vpn-handler.sh
4. Configure client to use the DNS handling script. Using openvpn as an example, edit the config.
sudo nano /rw/config/vpn/openvpn-client.ovpn
Add the following.
script-security 2
up 'qubes-vpn-handler.sh up'
down 'qubes-vpn-handler.sh down'
Remove other instances of lines starting with `script-security`, `up` or `down` should there be any others.
Save the script.
**Restart the client and test the connection again** ...this time from an AppVM!
5. Set up iptables anti-leak rules.
Edit the firewall script.
sudo nano /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script
Clear out the existing lines and add:
~~~
#!/bin/bash
# Block forwarding of connections through upstream network device
# (in case the vpn tunnel breaks):
iptables -I FORWARD -o eth0 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -i eth0 -j DROP
# Block all outgoing traffic
iptables -P OUTPUT DROP
iptables -F OUTPUT
iptables -I OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT
# Add the `qvpn` group to system, if it doesn't already exist
if ! grep -q "^qvpn:" /etc/group ; then
groupadd -rf qvpn
sync
fi
sleep 2s
fi
sleep 2s
# Allow traffic from the `qvpn` group to the uplink interface (eth0);
# Our VPN client will run with group `qvpn`.
iptables -I OUTPUT -p all -o eth0 -m owner --gid-owner qvpn -j ACCEPT
~~~
# Allow traffic from the `qvpn` group to the uplink interface (eth0);
# Our VPN client will run with group `qvpn`.
iptables -I OUTPUT -p all -o eth0 -m owner --gid-owner qvpn -j ACCEPT
~~~
Save the script.
Make it executable.
Now save the script and make it executable:
`sudo chmod +x /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script`
sudo chmod +x /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script
5. Set up the VPN's autostart.
5. Set up the VPN's autostart.
Use `sudo nano /rw/config/rc.local` to clear out the existing lines and add:
sudo nano /rw/config/rc.local
~~~
#!/bin/bash
VPN_CLIENT='openvpn'
VPN_OPTIONS='--cd /rw/config/vpn/ --config openvpn-client.ovpn --daemon'
su - -c 'notify-send "$(hostname): Starting $VPN_CLIENT..." --icon=network-idle' user
groupadd -rf qvpn ; sleep 2s
sg qvpn -c "$VPN_CLIENT $VPN_OPTIONS"
~~~
Change the `VPN_CLIENT` and `VPN_OPTIONS` variables to match your VPN software.
Clear out the existing lines and add:
~~~
#!/bin/bash
VPN_CLIENT='openvpn'
VPN_OPTIONS='--cd /rw/config/vpn/ --config openvpn-client.ovpn --daemon'
su - -c 'notify-send "$(hostname): Starting $VPN_CLIENT..." --icon=network-idle' user
groupadd -rf qvpn ; sleep 2s
sg qvpn -c "$VPN_CLIENT $VPN_OPTIONS"
~~~
If you are using anything other than OpenVPN, change the `VPN_CLIENT` and `VPN_OPTIONS` variables to match your VPN software.
Save the script.
Make it executable.
sudo chmod +x /rw/config/rc.local`
6. Restart the new VM!
The link should then be established automatically with a popup notification to that effect.
Now save the script and make it executable:
`sudo chmod +x /rw/config/rc.local`
6. Restart the new VM! The link should then be established automatically with a popup notification to that effect.
Usage
-----
@ -202,14 +268,13 @@ Configure your AppVMs to use the VPN VM as a NetVM...
![Settings-NetVM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Settings-NetVM.png)
If you want to be able to use the [Qubes firewall](/doc/firewall), create a new FirewallVM (as a ProxyVM) and set it to use the VPN VM as its NetVM.
Then, configure AppVMs to use your new FirewallVM as their NetVM.
If you want to update your TemplateVMs through the VPN, enable the `qubes-updates-proxy` service in your new FirewallVM.
You can do this in the Services tab in Qubes VM Manager or on the command-line:
$ qvm-service -e <name> qubes-updates-proxy
qvm-service -e <name> qubes-updates-proxy
Then, configure your templates to use your new FirewallVM as their NetVM.

40
configuration/w3m.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
---
layout: doc
title: Reducing the fingerprint of the text-based web browser w3m
permalink: /doc/w3m/
redirect_from:
- /en/doc/mutt/
- /doc/W3m/
- /wiki/W3m/
---
Reducing the fingerprint of the text-based web browser w3m
====
TL;DR: You can reduce the amount of information w3m gives about itself and the environment it is running in (and, by extension, you). **It will not make you anonymous; your fingerprint will still be unique.** But it may improve your privacy.
[w3m](http://w3m.sourceforge.net/) 'is a text-based web browser as well as a pager like `more` or `less`. With w3m you can browse web pages through a terminal emulator window (xterm, rxvt or something like that). Moreover, w3m can be used as a text formatting tool which typesets HTML into plain text.'
You can reduce the [browser fingerprint](https://panopticlick.eff.org/about#browser-fingerprinting) by applying the following changes to `~/.w3m/config` in any AppVM you want to use w3m in. (If you have not run w3m yet, you might need to copy the config file from elsewhere.) You can also apply the same changes to `/etc/w3m/config` in the relevant TemplateVM(s) to have them apply to multiple AppVMs; but make sure they are not reversed by the contents of `~/.w3m/config` in any of the AppVMs. (w3m reads `~/.w3m/config` after `/etc/w3m/config`).
* Set `user_agent` to `user_agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0`.
By default w3m identifies itself as `w3m/` + version number. The user agent `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0` is the most common and the one used by the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB). One in fourteen browsers fingerprinted by Panopticlick has this value.
* Make w3m use the same HTTP_ACCEPT headers the TBB by adding the following lines at the end of the file:
accept_language en-US,en;q=0.5
accept_encoding gzip, deflate
accept_media text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
These changes will hide your computer's locale and some other information that may or may not be unique to the VM in which it is running. With the modifications above w3m will have the same headers as about one in fifteen browsers fingerprinted by Panopticlick.
Testing these settings on <https://browserprint.info> returns a fingerprint that is distinguishable from that of the TBB (with JavaScript disabled) only by 'Screen Size (CSS)' and 'Browser supports HSTS?'.\* (<https://panopticlick.eff.org> does not work with w3m.) Due to the low number of w3m users it is highly likely that you will have an unique browser fingerprint among the visitors of a website using somewhat sophisticated browser fingerprinting technology. But at least your browser fingerprint will not reveal your computer's locale settings or other specifics about it in the HTTP_ACCEPT headers. And while it may be inferred from your fingerprint that you use w3m, it is not be explicitly stated in the User-Agent header.
**Reminder: Do not rely on these settings for anonymity. Using w3m is all but guaranteed to make you stand out in the crowd.**
PS: You still need to delete cookies manually (`~/.w3m/cookie`) if you are not running w3m in a DispVM anyway. If you set w3m to not accept cookies, its fingerprint will change. (You can configure w3m to not use store cookies or accept new ones (or both), but the setting `use_cookie` seems to really mean `accept_cookie` and vice-versa, so maybe it is best to delete them manually for now.)
* * *
\* Does someone know how to fix this?

6
customization/bind-dirs.md
View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ redirect_from:
# How to make any file in a TemplateBasedVM persistent using bind-dirs #
## What is bind-dirs? ##
## What are bind-dirs? ##
With [bind-dirs](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-agent-linux/blob/master/vm-systemd/bind-dirs.sh)
any arbitrary files or folders can be made persistent in TemplateBasedVMs.
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ Multiple entries are possible, each on a separate line.
6. Done.
If you added for example folder `/var/lib/tor` to the `binds` variable, from now any files within that folder would persist reboots. If you added for example file `/etc/tor/torrc` to the `binds` variable, from now any modifications to that file would persist reboots.
If you added for example folder `/var/lib/tor` to the `binds` variable, from now on any files within that folder will persist reboots. If you added for example file `/etc/tor/torrc` to the `binds` variable, from now on any modifications to that file will persist reboots.
## Other Configuration Folders ##
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ For example, if you wanted to make `/var/lib/tor` non-persistant in `sys-whonix`
binds=( "${binds[@]/'/var/lib/tor'}" )
~~~
(Editing `/usr/lib/qubes-bind-dirs.d/40_qubes-whonix.conf` directly is recommended against, since such changes get lost when that file is changed in the package on upgrades.)
(Editing `/usr/lib/qubes-bind-dirs.d/40_qubes-whonix.conf` directly is strongly discouraged, since such changes get lost when that file is changed in the package on upgrades.)
## Discussion ##

8
customization/dark-theme.md
View File

@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ This is the result after applying the steps described here.
![result black Qubes Manager](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/kde-black-qubes-manager.png)
**Note:** Chaning the `Window Decorations` from `Plastik for Qubes` will remove the border color and the VM name. The problem with `Plastik for Qubes` is, that it does not overwrite the background and text color for Minimize, Maximize and Close buttons. The three button are therefor hard to read.
**Note:** Changing the `Window Decorations` from `Plastik for Qubes` will remove the border color and the VM name. The problem with `Plastik for Qubes` is, that it does not overwrite the background and text color for Minimize, Maximize and Close buttons. The three button are therefore hard to read.
Dark XCFE in Dom0
-----------------
@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ This is the result after applying the steps described here.
Dark App VM, Template VM, Standalone VM, HVM (Linux Gnome)
==========================================================
Almost all Qubes VM's are based on the Gnome desktop. Therefor the description below is focused on the Gnome Desktop Environment.
Almost all Qubes VMs use default applications based on the GTK toolkit. Therefore the description below is focused on tools from the Gnome Desktop Environment.
Using "Gnome-Tweak-Tool"
------------------------
@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ The advantage of creating a dark themed Template VM is, that each AppVM which is
1. Start VM
**Note:** In case of App VM start the Template on which the AppVM is based on.
**Note:** Remember that if you want to make the change persistent, the change needs to be made in the TemplateVM, not the AppVM.
2. Install `Gnome-Tweak-Tool`
@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ Manually works for Debian, Fedora and Archlinux.
1. Start VM
**Note:** In case of App VM start the Template on which the AppVM is based on.
**Note:** Remember that if you want to make the change persistent, the change needs to be made in the TemplateVM, not the AppVM.
2. Enable `Global Dark Theme`

2
customization/dispvm-customization.md
View File

@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ It is possible to change the settings of each new Disposable VM (DispVM). This c
2. Change the VM's settings and/or applications, as desired. Note that currently Qubes supports exactly one DispVM template, so any changes you make here will affect all DispVMs. Some examples of changes you may want to make include:
- Changing Firefox's default startup settings and homepage.
- Changing Nautilus' default file preview settings.
- Changing the DispVM's default NetVM. For example, you may wish to set the NetVM to "none." Then, whenever you start a new DispVM, you can choose your desired ProxyVM manually (by changing the newly-started DipsVMs settings). This is useful if you sometimes wish to use a DispVM with a TorVM, for example. It is also useful if you sometimes wish to open untrusted files in a network-disconnected DispVM.
- Changing the DispVM's default NetVM. For example, you may wish to set the NetVM to "none." Then, whenever you start a new DispVM, you can choose your desired ProxyVM manually (by changing the newly-started DispVM's settings). This is useful if you sometimes wish to use a DispVM with a TorVM, for example. It is also useful if you sometimes wish to open untrusted files in a network-disconnected DispVM.
3. Create an empty `/home/user/.qubes-dispvm-customized` file in the VM (not in dom0):

20
customization/fedora-minimal-template-customization.md
View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Template installation
> [dom0]#qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-26-minimal
*Note*: If you have doubts about a set of tool or package you want to install, start installing and testing it in an AppVM.
*Note*: If you have doubts about a set of tools or package you want to install, start installing and testing it in an AppVM.
You can then reproduce it later in your TemplateVM if you are satisfied.
That is the template philosophy in QubesOS.
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Administration (documented)
Some recommendations here: check your current network using the Network manager applet (eg: 192.168.1.65).
Then run nmap in your current AppVM/TemplateVM to search for the selected printer/equipment:
nmap -sP 192.168.1.-.
Don't forget to open temporarily the Qubes Firewall if you are doing this in a TemplateVM.
Don't forget to temporarily allow traffic via the Qubes Firewall if you are doing this in a TemplateVM.
Administration (undocumented)
-------------------------------------------------
@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ Manual operations
- Don't forget to restart your TemplateVM or only the cups service when you installed cups (systemctl start cups)
- First you need to search for your printer. If you don't know its name or IP, search for it using nmap: check your current network using the Network manager applet (eg: 192.168.1.65). Then run nmap in your current AppVM/TemplateVM to search for the selected printer/equipement: nmap -sP 192.168.1.-. Don't forget to allow temporarily the Qubes Firewall if you are inside a TemplateVM.
- First you need to search for your printer. If you don't know its name or IP, search for it using nmap: check your current network using the Network manager applet (eg: 192.168.1.65). Then run nmap in your current AppVM/TemplateVM to search for the selected printer/equipement: nmap -sP 192.168.1.-. Don't forget to temporarily allow traffic via the Qubes Firewall if you are inside a TemplateVM.
- Once you identified your printer, run system-config-printer GUI to install your printer
@ -142,13 +142,13 @@ If you do not use password protected gpg keys, there is no need to install this
GUI themes
-----------------
Managing GUI theme / appearance is often complex because when you do not want to depends on a specific desktop system.
Managing GUI theme / appearance is often complex because when you do not want to depend on a specific desktop system.
For this reason, we need to customize themes for each GUI framework that our application depends on.
This often includes GTK2, GTK3 (which us a different configuration/themes than GTK2), Qt.
The apparance of Windows can only be changed in dom0, however, the appearance of all buttons, menus, icons, widgets are specific to each AppVM.
The appearance of Windows can only be changed in dom0, however, the appearance of all buttons, menus, icons, widgets are specific to each AppVM.
### Packages
@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ You can check your currently installed theme packages (to eventually remove them
### Tweaking theme and appearance
First you can get an insight of installed Gtk theme and see how it will appears using lxappearance.
First you can get an insight of installed Gtk theme and see how it will appear using lxappearance.
I recommend not applying settings using lxappearance (do not click on apply) because it will create multiple configuration files.
@ -183,12 +183,12 @@ Cleaning the whole dconf settings is also possible by removing the following fil
rm ~/.config/dconf/user
~~~
*Note*: lxappearance only have effect on gtk3 theme so it won't work to change gtk2 themes (used by Firefox, Thunderbird ...).
*Note*: lxappearance only has an effect on gtk3 themes so it won't work to change gtk2 themes (used by Firefox, Thunderbird ...).
However, it is very lightweight and can be used to identify the name and look of themes you are interested in.
Once you have the name, you can apply it using gsetting command line or gconf-editor.
*Note*: if you really want a GUI theme editor, you can install gnome-tweak-tools, but this tool have a lot
of gnome dependencies (~150MB of dependencies). Eventually install it and uninstall it as soon as you changed your theme.
*Note*: if you really want a GUI theme editor, you can install gnome-tweak-tools, but this tool has a lot
of gnome dependencies (~150MB of dependencies). You can install it and uninstall it as soon as you change your theme.
#### Testing notes
@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ Getting an uniform look for Qt & GTK is not achieved yet. A good source is on th
Two case:
1. You installed packages of the theme you selected both for Qt, GTK2 and GTK3.
(eg: Adwaita which is the default theme. I did not found another cross framework theme on fedora default packages).
(eg: Adwaita which is the default theme. I have not found another cross framework theme on fedora default packages).
2. You want to use the GTK theme you selected for Qt but there is no qt package.
In this case QGtkStyle will take precedence and convert the style automatically.

2
customization/kde.md
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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Installation
------------
Prior to R3.2, KDE was the default desktop environment in Qubes. Beginning with
R3.2, however, [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/). Nonetheless, it is
R3.2, however, [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/). Nonetheless, it is
still possible to install KDE by issuing this command in dom0:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update @kde-desktop-qubes

2
customization/language-localization.md
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ How to set up pinyin input in Qubes
2. Close and shut down the TemplateVM.
3. Restart an AppVM which based on the template you installed `ibus-pinyin` and open a terminal.
3. Restart an AppVM which is based on the template you installed `ibus-pinyin` in, and open a terminal.
4. Run `ibus-setup`

22
customization/windows-template-customization.md
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@ -25,14 +25,14 @@ Only keep:
*Note*: Windows search is recommended because it is a nightmare to find something in menus if it is not enabled (it removes the search bar from the start menu, from the explorer, and from the control panel).
*Note*: Unselecting windows media, .Net and Internet Explorer will uninstall these components. on a new install it is generally old versions anyway and it will be quicker to install directly the new versions later.
*Note*: Unselecting windows media, .Net and Internet Explorer will uninstall these components. On a new install they are generally old versions anyway and it will be quicker to install directly the new versions later.
Windows services
---------------------------
Disable the following services that are not required or have no sense in a VM context:
* Base Filtering Engine (only required if your want to use Microsoft IPSEC)
* Base Filtering Engine (only required if you want to use Microsoft IPSEC)
* DHCP Client
* Function Discovery Provider Host
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Disable the following services that are not required or have no sense in a VM co
Windows update
--------------------------
I recommend disabling windows update (Never Check for Update) because checking for updates will start every time you start an AppVM if you don't started your template after some days.
I recommend disabling windows update (Never Check for Update) because checking for updates will start every time you start an AppVM if you haven't started your template in a while.
Running windows update is also apparently IO hungry.
@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ Of course I recommend starting the template regularly and checking manually for
System properties
---------------------------
Right click on computer and go to Properties > Advanced > Performances:
Right click on computer and go to Properties > Advanced > Performance:
* If your don't care about visual effect, in Visual Effect select "Adjust for best performance"
* I personally tweak the page file size to win some place on my root.
* If you don't care about visual effect, in Visual Effect select "Adjust for best performance"
* I personally tweak the page file size to gain some space on my root.
In Advanced>Performances>Advanced tab, change Virtual memory:
@ -75,16 +75,16 @@ Right click on computer and go to Properties > Advanced > Performances:
4. click on set
5. click on drive d:
6. select customer size
7. use an initial size of 500 and a max size of 1000. If the page file is too small, you will notify a low memory pop up when working on windows. In this case, it often means that you should extend your AppVM RAM.
7. use an initial size of 500 and a max size of 1000. If the page file is too small, you will notice a low memory pop up when working on windows. In this case, it often means that you should extend your AppVM RAM.
* System Protection
Here you can disable Shadow Folder because it has little sense in case of Qubes because
Here you can disable Shadow Folder because it has little sense in the case of Qubes because
* we do backup regularly of AppVMs/TemplateVMs;
* we do regular backups of AppVMs/TemplateVMs;
* we can revert at least one template change if we break something.
Select drives where system protection is enabled and click Configure. "Turn of system protection" "Delete all restore points"
Select drives where system protection is enabled and click Configure. "Turn off system protection" "Delete all restore points"
* Remote
@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ Manual tasks that can/should be started in the template
> mv root.img.clean root.img
* If don't managed to fill the free space with zeros, you can follow the following *unsafe* undocumented procedure
* If it doesn't manage to fill the free space with zeros, you can follow the following *unsafe* undocumented procedure
1. from dom0, go to /var/lib/templates-vm/yourtemplate
2. check the partitioning to identify the filesystem offset of root.img

2
customization/xfce.md
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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ XFCE installation in dom0
**Disclaimer: The article is obsolete for Qubes OS 3.2 and later.**
Prior to R3.2, KDE was the default desktop environment in Qubes. Beginning with
R3.2 [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/) and does not require manual installation.
R3.2 [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/) and does not require manual installation.
Installation:

20
debugging/vm-interface.md
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@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ QubesDB
- `none` - none
- `/qubes-timezone - name of timezone based on dom0 timezone. For example `Europe/Warsaw`
- `/qubes-keyboard` - keyboard layout based on dom0 layout. Its syntax is suitable for `xkbcomp` command (after expanding escape sequences like `\n` or `\t`). This is meant only as some default value, VM can ignore this option and choose its own keyboard layout (this is what keyboard setting from Qubes Manager does). This entry is created as part of gui-daemon initialization (so not available when gui-daemon disabled, or not started yet).
- `/qubes-debug-mode` - flag whether VM have debug mode enabled (qvm-prefs setting). One of `1`, `0`
- `/qubes-debug-mode` - flag whether VM has debug mode enabled (qvm-prefs setting). One of `1`, `0`
- `/qubes-service/SERVICE_NAME` - subtree for VM services controlled from dom0 (using qvm-service command or Qubes Manager). One of `1`, `0`. Note that not every service will be listed here, if entry is missing, it means "use VM default". List of currently supported services is in [qvm-service man page](/wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmService)
- `/qubes-netmask` - network mask (only when VM has netvm set); currently hardcoded "255.255.255.0"
- `/qubes-ip - IP address for this VM (only when VM has netvm set)
@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ QubesDB
QubesDB is also used to configure firewall in ProxyVMs. Rules are stored in
separate key for each target VM. Entries:
- `/qubes-iptables` - control entry - dom0 writing `reload` here signal `qubes-firewall` service to reload rules
- `/qubes-iptables` - control entry - dom0 writing `reload` here signals `qubes-firewall` service to reload rules
- `/qubes-iptables-header` - rules not related to any particular VM, should be applied before domains rules
- `/qubes-iptables-domainrules/NNN` - rules for domain `NNN` (arbitrary number)
in `iptables-save` format. Rules are self-contained - fill `FORWARD` iptables
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ final default action (`DROP`/`ACCEPT`)
VM after applying rules may signal some error, writing a message to
`/qubes-iptables-error` key. This does not exclude any other way of
communicating problem - like a popup.
communicating problems - like a popup.
#### Firewall rules in 4.x ####
@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ by space. Order of those pairs in a single rule is undefined. QubesDB enforces
a limit on a single entry length - 3072 bytes.
Possible options for a single rule:
- `action`, values: `accept`, `drop`; this is present it every rule
- `action`, values: `accept`, `drop`; this is present in every rule
- `dst4`, value: destination IPv4 address with a mask; for example: `192.168.0.0/24`
- `dst6`, value: destination IPv6 address with a mask; for example: `2000::/3`
- `dstname`, value: DNS hostname of destination host
@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ Possible options for a single rule:
Rule matches only when all predicates matches. Only one of `dst4`, `dst6`,
`dstname`, `specialtarget` can be used in a single rule.
If tool applying firewall encounter any parse error (unknown option, invalid
If tool applying firewall encounters any parse error (unknown option, invalid
value etc), it should drop all the traffic coming from that `SOURCE_IP`,
regardless of properly parsed rules.
@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ Example valid rules:
- `memory/meminfo` (**xenstore**) - used memory (updated by qubes-meminfo-writer), input information for qmemman;
- Qubes 3.x format: 6 lines (EOL encoded as `\n`), each in format "FIELD: VALUE kB"; fields: `MemTotal`, `MemFree`, `Buffers`, `Cached`, `SwapTotal`, `SwapFree`; meaning the same as in `/proc/meminfo` in Linux.
- Qubes 4.0+ format: used memory size in the VM, in kbytes
- `/qubes-block-devices` - list of block devices exposed by this VM, each device (subdirectory) should be named in a way that VM can attach the device based on it. Each should contain those entries:
- `/qubes-block-devices` - list of block devices exposed by this VM, each device (subdirectory) should be named in a way that VM can attach the device based on it. Each should contain these entries:
- `desc` - device description (ASCII text)
- `size` - device size in bytes
- `mode` - default connection mode; `r` for read-only, `w` for read-write
@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ Qubes RPC
Services called by dom0 to provide some VM configuration:
- `qubes.SetMonitorLayout` - provide list of monitors, one in a line, each line contains four numbers: `width height X Y width_mm height_mm` (physical dimensions - `width_mm` and `height_mm` - are optional)
- `qubes.SetMonitorLayout` - provide list of monitors, one per line. Each line contains four numbers: `width height X Y width_mm height_mm` (physical dimensions - `width_mm` and `height_mm` - are optional)
- `qubes.WaitForSession` - called to wait for full VM startup
- `qubes.GetAppmenus` - receive appmenus from given VM (template); TODO: describe format here
- `qubes.GetImageRGBA` - receive image/application icon. Protocol:
@ -173,10 +173,10 @@ Other Qrexec services installed by default:
- `qubes.Restore` - retrieve Qubes backup. The service receives backup location
entered by the user (one line, terminated by '\n'), then should output backup
archive in [qfile format](/doc/qfilecopy/) (core-agent-linux component contains
`tar2qfile` utility to do the conversion
`tar2qfile` utility to do the conversion)
- `qubes.SelectDirectory`, `qubes.SelectFile` - services which should show
file/directory selection dialog and return (to stdout) a single line
containing selected path, or nothing in case of cancellation
containing selected path, or nothing in the case of cancellation
- `qubes.SuspendPre` - service called in every VM with PCI device attached just
before system suspend
- `qubes.SuspendPost` - service called in every VM with PCI device attached just
@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ abstraction. This will change in the future. Those tools are:
- `gpk-update-viewer` - called by Qubes Manager to display available updates in a TemplateVM
- `systemctl start qubes-update-check.timer` (and similarly stop) - called when enabling/disabling updates checking in given VM (`qubes-update-check` [qvm-service](/doc/qubes-service/))
Additionally automatic tests extensively calls various commands directly in VMs. We do not plan to change that.
Additionally, automatic tests extensively run various commands directly in VMs. We do not plan to change that.
GUI protocol
------------

13
doc.md
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@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ Privacy Guides
* [Whonix for Privacy & Anonymity](/doc/whonix/)
* [Running Tails in Qubes](/doc/tails/)
* [Anonymizing your MAC Address](/doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/)
* [TorVM](/doc/torvm/)
* [Martus](/doc/martus/)
* [Signal](/doc/signal/)
* [Reducing the fingerprint of the text-based web browser w3m](/doc/w3m/)
Configuration Guides
@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ Configuration Guides
* [How to set up a ProxyVM as a VPN Gateway](/doc/vpn/)
* [Storing AppVMs on Secondary Drives](/doc/secondary-storage/)
* [Multibooting](/doc/multiboot/)
* [Resizing AppVM and HVM Disk Images](/doc/resize-disk-image/)
* [Extending `root.img` Size](/doc/resize-root-disk-image/)
* [Resize Private Disk Image](/doc/resize-disk-image/)
* [Resize Root Disk Image](/doc/resize-root-disk-image/)
* [RPC Policies](/doc/rpc-policy/)
* [Installing ZFS in Qubes](/doc/zfs/)
* [Mutt Guide](/doc/mutt/)
@ -139,7 +139,6 @@ Configuration Guides
* [Enabling TRIM for SSD disks](/doc/disk-trim/)
* [Configuring a Network Printer](/doc/network-printer/)
* [Using External Audio Devices](/doc/external-audio/)
* [Booting with GRUB2 and GPT](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/browse_thread/thread/e4ac093cabd37d2b/d5090c20d92c4128#d5090c20d92c4128)
* [Rxvt Guide](/doc/rxvt/)
* [Managing VM kernel](/doc/managing-vm-kernel/)
* [Salt management stack](/doc/salt/)
@ -176,8 +175,10 @@ Troubleshooting
Reference Pages
---------------
* [Dom0 Command-Line Tools](/doc/dom0-tools/)
* [DomU Command-Line Tools](/doc/vm-tools/)
* [Command-Line Tools: Qubes 3.2, dom0](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/)
* [Command-Line Tools: Qubes 3.2, domU](/doc/tools/3.2/domU/)
* [Command-Line Tools: Qubes 4.0, dom0](/doc/tools/4.0/dom0/)
* [Command-Line Tools: Qubes 4.0, domU](/doc/tools/4.0/domU/)
* [Glossary of Qubes Terminology](/doc/glossary/)
* [Qubes Service Framework](/doc/qubes-service/)
* [Command Execution in VMs (and Qubes RPC)](/doc/qrexec/)

3
installing/installation-guide.md
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@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ partition (e.g., `/dev/sda1`).
On Windows, you can use the [Rufus] tool. Be sure to select "DD image" mode (you
need to do that **after** selecting the Qubes ISO):
**Warning:** If you do that on Windows 10, you can only install Qubes without
MediaTest, which isn't recommended.
<img src="/attachment/wiki/InstallationGuide/rufus-main-boxed.png" height="350">
Before proceeding with the installation, you are encouraged to first read all

8
installing/live-usb.md
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@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ traditional Linux distros don't have to bother with:
version, sorry.
2. We discovered that the Fedora liveusb-create does *not* verify signatures on
downloaded packages. We have temporarily fixed that by creating a local repo,
verifying the signatures manually (ok, with a script ;) and then building
verifying the signatures manually (ok, with a script ;) ) and then building
from there. Sigh.
3. We had to solve the problem of Qubes too easily triggering an Out Of Memory
condition in Dom0 when running as Live OS.
@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Live USB variant:
A nice variant of this persistence option, especially for frequent
travelers, would be to augment our backup tools so that it was
possible to create a LiveUSB-hosted backups of select VMs. One could then
pick a few of their VMs, necessary for a specific travel, back them to a
pick a few of their VMs, necessary for a specific trip, back them up to a
LiveUSB stick, and take this stick when traveling to a hostile country (not
risking taking other, more sensitive ones for the travel). This should make
life a bit simpler
@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ expectations accordingly.)
3. Currently there is no "install to disk" option. We will be adding this
in the future.
4. The amount of "disk" space is limited by the amount of RAM the laptop
has. This has a side effect of e.g. not being able to restore (even few) VMs
has. This has a side effect of e.g. not being able to restore (even a few) VMs
from a large Qubes backup blob.
5. It's easy to generate Out Of Memory (OOM) in Dom0 by creating lots of VMs
which are writing a lot into the VMs filesystem.
@ -121,5 +121,5 @@ Downloading and burning
and `of` or specify an incorrect device, you could accidentally overwrite
your primary system drive. Please be careful!
[project-page]: https://www.qubes-os.org/gsoc/
[project-page]: /gsoc/
[gsoc-page]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6239659689508864/

2
installing/upgrade/upgrade-to-r3.0.md
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@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Now, when you have dom0 upgraded, you can install new templates from Qubes R3.0
Upgrading template on already upgraded dom0
-------------------------------------------
When for some reason you did not upgraded all the templates and standalone VMs before upgrading dom0, you can still do this, but it will be somehow more complicated. This can be a case when you restore backup done on Qubes R2.
If for some reason you did not upgrade all the templates and standalone VMs before upgrading dom0, you can still do this, but it will be more complicated. This can be the case when you restore backup done on Qubes R2.
When you start R2 template/standalone VM on R3.0, there will be some limitations:

15
installing/upgrade/upgrade-to-r4.0.md
View File

@ -84,18 +84,19 @@ Restore from your backup
4. Go to **Qubes menu -> System Tools -> Qubes Manager** to start it.
5. Follow the **Restoring from a Backup** section in the [Backup, Restoration, and Migration](/doc/backup-restore/) guide.
It is cleanest to restore only the [AppVMs](/doc/glossary/#appvm) and [StandaloneVMs](/doc/glossary/#standalonevm) from R3.2, so it is recommended not to select any **sys-** or templates to restore unless you've heavily customized them.
If the restore tool complains about missing templates, you can select the option to restore the AppVMs anyways, then change them after restore to use one of the default R4.0 templates.
We recommend that you restore only your [TemplateBasedVMs](/doc/glossary/#templatebasedvm) and [StandaloneVMs](/doc/glossary/#standalonevm) from R3.2.
Using [TemplateVMs](/doc/templates/) and [SystemVMs](/doc/glossary/#systemvm) from R3.2 is not fully supported (see [#3514](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3514)).
Instead, we recommend using the TemplateVMs that were created specifically for R4.0, which you can [customize](/doc/software-update-vm/) according to your needs.
For the TemplateVM OS versions supported in R4.0, see [Supported Versions](/doc/supported-versions/#templatevms).
If the restore tool complains about missing templates, you can select the option to restore the AppVMs anyway, then change them afterward to use one of the default R4.0 templates.
Upgrade all Template and Standalone VM(s)
-----------------------------------------
By default, in Qubes R4.0, there are few [TemplateVMs](/doc/templates/) and no [StandaloneVMs](/doc/glossary/#standalonevm).
However, users are free to create StandaloneVMs.
More information on using multiple TemplateVMs, as well as StandaloneVMs, can be found [here](/doc/software-update-vm/).
We strongly recommend that you upgrade **all** TemplateVMs and StandaloneVMs.
Please consult the guides below for specific instructions:
We strongly recommend that you update **all** TemplateVMs and StandaloneVMs before use so that you have the latest security patches from upstream distributions.
In addition, if the default templates have reached EOL (end-of-life) by the time you install R4.0, we strongly recommend that you upgrade them before use.
Please see [Supported Versions](/doc/supported-versions/) for information on supported OS versions and consult the guides below for specific upgrade instructions:
* [Upgrading Fedora TemplateVMs](/doc/templates/fedora/#upgrading)
* [Upgrading Debian TemplateVMs](/doc/templates/debian/#upgrading)

8
installing/version-scheme.md
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ From now on, it will be as follows.
Qubes distributions and products
--------------------------------
We intend to make it easy to make a remix of qubes, targeting another
We intend to make it easy to make a remix of Qubes, targeting another
hypervisor or isolation provider. We may also create commercial products
intended for specific circumstances. There is one distinguished distribution
called **Qubes OS**. All source code for it is available for download under GPL
@ -28,13 +28,13 @@ Release version
---------------
Qubes OS as a whole is released from time to time. Version scheme for all
releases is modeled after Linux kernel version numbers. When announcing new
releases is modeled after Linux kernel version numbers. When announcing a new
release, we decide on the major.minor version (like `3.0`) and release
`3.0-rc1`. When we feel that enough progress has been made, we put `3.0-rc2`
and so on. All these versions are considered unstable and not ready for
production. You may ask for support on mailing lists (specifically
**qubes-devel**), but it is not guaranteed (you may for example get answer
„update to newer `-rc`”). Public ISO image may or may not be available.
“update to newer `-rc`”). Public ISO image may or may not be available.
When enough development has been made, we announce the first stable version,
like e.g. `3.0.0` (i.e. without `-rc`). This version is considered stable and
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ bugfixes as `3.0.1`, `3.0.2` and so on, while new features come into the next
release e.g. `3.1-rcX`.
Tickets in the tracker are sorted out by release major.minor, such as `3.0`,
`3.1` (trac calls this „milestone”).
`3.1` (trac calls this “milestone”).
Release schedule
----------------

14
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@ -17,8 +17,14 @@ What are HVM domains?
HVM domains (Hardware VM), in contrast to PV domains (Paravirtualized domains), allow one to create domains based on any OS for which one has an installation ISO. For example, this allows one to have Windows-based VMs in Qubes.
Interested readers might want to check [this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2012/03/03/windows-support-coming-to-qubes.html) to learn why it took so long for Qubes OS to support HVM domains (Qubes 1 only supported Linux based PV domains). As of
Qubes 4, every VM is HVM by default ([see here](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2017/07/31/qubes-40-rc1.html)).
Interested readers might want to check
[this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2012/03/03/windows-support-coming-to-qubes.html)
to learn why it took so long for Qubes OS to support HVM domains
(Qubes 1 only supported Linux based PV domains). As of
Qubes 4, every VM is PVH by default, except those with attached PCI devices which are HVM.
[See here](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2017/07/31/qubes-40-rc1.html) for a discussion
of the switch to HVM from R3.2's PV, and [here](/news/2018/01/11/qsb-37/)
for changing the default to PVH.
Creating an HVM domain
----------------------
@ -55,7 +61,7 @@ The above command assumes the installation ISO was transferred to Dom0 (copied u
qvm-start win7 --cdrom=/dev/cdrom
~~~
Next, the VM will start booting from the attached CDROM device (which in the example above just happens to be a Windows 7 installation disk). Depending on the OS being installed in the VM, one might be required to start the VM several times (as is the case with Windows 7 installations), because whenever the installer wants to "reboot the system" it actually shutdowns the VM and Qubes won't automatically start it. Several invocations of qvm-start command (as shown above) might be needed.
Next, the VM will start booting from the attached CDROM device (which in the example above just happens to be a Windows 7 installation disk). Depending on the OS being installed in the VM, one might be required to start the VM several times (as is the case with Windows 7 installations), because whenever the installer wants to "reboot the system" it actually shuts down the VM and Qubes won't automatically start it. Several invocations of qvm-start command (as shown above) might be needed.
**Note:** If your Windows installation gets stuck at the glowing Windows logo, you might want to read [Issue 2488](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2488) for a solution.
@ -179,7 +185,7 @@ Cloning HVM domains
Just like normal AppVMs, the HVM domains can also be cloned either using a command-line `qvm-clone` command or via manager's 'Clone VM' option in the right-click menu.
The cloned VM will get identical root and private image and will essentially be an identical of the original VM except that it will get a different MAC address for the networking interface:
The cloned VM will get identical root and private images and will essentially be identical to the original VM except that it will get a different MAC address for the networking interface:
~~~
[joanna@dom0 ~]$ qvm-prefs win7

2
managing-os/netbsd.md
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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ How to Create a NetBSD VM
1. Create a StandaloneVM with the default template.
2. Replace `vmlinuz` with the `netbsd-INSTALL_XEN3_DOMU` kernel.
3. During setup, chose to install on the `xbd1` hard disk.
3. During setup, choose to install on the `xbd1` hard disk.
4. Attach the CD to the VM.
5. Configure the networking.
6. Optionally enable SSHD during the post-install configuration.

4
managing-os/pentesting/blackarch.md
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@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ redirect_from:
- The installation scripts and provided tools may have bugs, be vulnerable to Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks or other vulnerabilities.
- Adding additional repositories or tools for installing software extends your trust to those tool provider.
- Adding additional repositories or tools for installing software extends your trust to those tool providers.
Please keep in mind that using such a VM or VM's based on the template for security and privacy critical tasks is not recommended.
Please keep in mind that using such a VM or VMs based on the template for security and privacy critical tasks is not recommended.
How to Create a BlackArch VM
============================

2
managing-os/pentesting/kali.md
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ redirect_from:
- The installation scripts and provided tools may have bugs, be vulnerable to Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks or other vulnerabilities.
- Adding additional repositories or tools for installing software extends your trust to those tool provider.
- Adding additional repositories or tools for installing software extends your trust to those tool providers.
Please keep in mind that using such a VM or VM's based on the template for security and privacy critical tasks is not recommended.

6
managing-os/pentesting/ptf.md
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ redirect_from:
- The installation scripts and provided tools may have bugs, be vulnerable to Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks or other vulnerabilities.
- Adding additional repositories or tools for installing software extends your trust to those tool provider.
- Adding additional repositories or tools for installing software extends your trust to those tool providers.
Please keep in mind that using such a VM or VM's based on the template for security and privacy critical tasks is not recommended.
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ How to create Penetration Testers Framework (PTF) VM
PTF attempts to install all of your penetration testing tools (latest and greatest), compile them, build them, and make it so that you can install/update your distribution on any machine." (source [PTF Readme](https://github.com/trustedsec/ptf/blob/master/README.md))
**Note** PTF works on Debian testing as well as on Debian 8. PTF itself works with Debian 8, but the software tools will have missing dependencies. Metasploit for examples requires a newer Ruby version than Debian 8 has in the repositories. Therefor the best way to install PTF is by upgrading a Debian 8 into Debian testing with additional Kali repositories. Instead of installing the tools from Kali, PTF will install and update the newest tools.
**Note** PTF works on Debian testing as well as on Debian 8. PTF itself works with Debian 8, but the software tools will have missing dependencies. Metasploit for example requires a newer Ruby version than Debian 8 has in the repositories. Therefore the best way to install PTF is by upgrading a Debian 8 into Debian testing with additional Kali repositories. Instead of installing the tools from Kali, PTF will install and update the newest tools.
Create Debian Based Penetration Testers Framework (PTF) Template
----------------------------------------------------------------
@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ possible to do sudo ptf/ptf
[*] Exiting PTF - the easy pentest platform creation framework.
sudo msfconsole
5. Create a AppVMs based on the `ptf` template
5. Create an AppVM based on the `ptf` template
- (Optional) Attach necessary devices

37
managing-os/templates.md
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@ -45,7 +45,23 @@ By installing these templates, you are trusting not only ITL and the distributio
* [Archlinux](/doc/templates/archlinux/)
Important Notes
Important Notes (R4.0)
---------------
* Whenever a TemplateBasedVM is created, the contents of the `/home`
directory of its parent TemplateVM are *not* copied to the child TemplateBasedVM's
`/home`. The child TemplateBasedVM's `/home`
is always independent from its parent TemplateVM's `/home`, which means that any
subsequent changes to the parent TemplateVM's `/home` will not affect
the child TemplateBasedVM's `/home`.
* Template VMs are created in a thin pool, making `qvm-trim-template`
no longer necessary.
The root filesystems in Standalone VMs can employ
TRIM/discard on the root fs using normal tools and configuration options.
Important Notes (R3.2 and earlier)
---------------
* Whenever a TemplateBasedVM is created, the contents of the `/home`
@ -54,6 +70,16 @@ Important Notes
is independent from its parent TemplateVM's `/home`, which means that any
subsequent changes to the parent TemplateVM's `/home` will no longer affect
the child TemplateBasedVM's `/home`.
* Template VMs can occupy more space on the dom0 filesystem than necessary
because they cannot employ automatic TRIM/discard on the root fs. The
`qvm-trim-template` command in dom0 is used to recover this unused space.
Conversely, the root filesystems in Standalone VMs *can* employ
TRIM/discard on the root fs using normal tools and configuration options.
Important Notes (all versions)
---------------
* Once a TemplateBasedVM has been created, any changes in its `/home`,
`/usr/local`, or `/rw/config` directories will be persistent across reboots,
@ -71,18 +97,11 @@ Important Notes
update a template from dom0 (and thereby lose any user modifications in the
existing template), you must first uninstall the existing template from dom0:
$ sudo yum remove qubes-template-fedora-25
$ sudo dnf remove qubes-template-fedora-25
* Standalone VMs using Template VMs as a basis can be created easily. These
VMs receive a *copy* of the operating system and do not get automatically
updated when Template VMs are updated--they must be updated individually.
* Template VMs can occupy more space on the dom0 filesystem than necessary
because they cannot employ automatic TRIM/discard on the root fs. The
`qvm-trim-template` command in dom0 is used to recover this unused space.
Conversely, the root filesystems in Standalone VMs *can* employ
TRIM/discard on the root fs using normal tools and configuration options.
* On XFCE based Dom0, a manual action may be required to remove the "Start Menu"
sub-menu of the removed TemplateVM. For example, to remove a dangling sub-menu

74
managing-os/templates/archlinux.md
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@ -32,11 +32,41 @@ A prebuilt template is available only for Qubes 3.2. Before Qubes 3.2, it should
## Binary packages activation
The update repository is disabled when you install (signed) template package. You can however choose to trust it by registering it into pacman.
The Qubes update repository is disabled by default in the Archlinux template. You can however choose to trust it by registering it into pacman.
Since November 2017, an activation package is present in the template. The update repository can thus be activated by running the following command inside the template:
# pacman -sU /etc/pacman.d/qubes-vm-keyring*.pkg.tar.xz
It should be noted to this command will create a trust for packages provided by [Olivier Médoc](mailto:o_medoc@yahoo.fr) and signed by the PGP key above.
If the qubes-vm-keyring package is not present in `/etc/pacman.d/`, please refer to the section #Activating binary packages manually.
## Optional Qubes packages
Several Qubes packages are not necessarily installed by default in the Archlinux Template. These packages can be installed to add additional functionnalities to the template:
* `qubes-vm-networking`: Contains Qubes tools and dependencies required to use the template as a NetVM/ProxyVM
* `qubes-vm-pulseaudio`: Contains `Pulseaudio` agent enabling sound support in the template
## Default template packages
In order to keep the template as small and simple as possible, default installed package have been arbitrarily selected based on multiple subjective criterias that however essentially include libraries dependencies. This packages are:
* Some font packages to keep good user experience
* leafpad: a note pad
* xfce4-terminal: a terminal
* thunar: a file browser that supports mounting usb keys
* firefox: web browser
* thunderbird: a mail browser
* evince: a document viewer
Note that Archlinux does not install GUI packages by default as this decision is left to users. These packages have only been selected to have a usable template.
## Activating binary packages manually
Enable the repository by running the following command:
# mv /etc/pacman.d/99-qubes-repository-3.2.disabled /etc/pacman.d/99-qubes-repository-3.2.conf
# rm /etc/pacman.d/99-qubes-repository-3.2.conf
# ln -s /etc/pacman.d/99-qubes-repository-3.2.disabled /etc/pacman.d/99-qubes-repository-3.2.conf
Then you need to install and sign the public GPG key of the package maintainer (note that accessing to GPG servers requires to temporarily disable the firewall in your template):
@ -47,24 +77,17 @@ If the fingerprint is correct, you can then sign the key:
# pacman-key --lsign-key 2043E7ACC1833B9C
## Default packages
## Updating a Qubes-3.2 Archlinux Template
In order to keep the template as small and simple as possible, default installed package have been arbitrarily selected based on multiple subjective criterias that however essentially include libraries dependencies. This packages are:
* Some font packages to keep good user experience
* leafpad: a note pad
* xfce4-terminal: a terminal
* thunar: a file browser that support mounting usb keys
* firefox: web browser
* thunderbird: a mail browser
* evince: a document viewer
Because of changes in the Qubes-4.0 partition layout, and usage of XEN HVMs instead of pv-guests. It is not straightforward to update a Qubes-3.2 template to Qubes-4.0.
Note that Archlinux does not install GUI packages by default as this decision is left to users. This packages have only been selected to have a usable template.
For this reason, it is recommended to start from a new template in Qubes-4.0.
## Updating a Qubes-3.1 Archlinux Template
If you decide to use binary packages but that you where using a Qubes-3.1 Template, your can follow these instructions to enable Qubes 3.2 agents.
If you decide to use binary packages but that you were using a Qubes-3.1 Template, you can follow these instructions to enable Qubes 3.2 agents.
You can use a template that you built for Qubes 3.1 in Qubes 3.2. The qrexec and gui agent functionnalities should still be working so that you can at least open a terminal.
You can use a template that you built for Qubes 3.1 in Qubes 3.2. The qrexec and gui agent functionalities should still be working so that you can at least open a terminal.
In order to enable binary packages for Qubes 3.2, add the following lines to the end of /etc/pacman.conf
@ -76,22 +99,22 @@ Server = http://olivier.medoc.free.fr/archlinux/current/
You should then follow the instruction related to pacman-key in order to sign the binary packages PGP key. With the key enabled, a pacman update will update qubes agents:
` # pacman -Suy `
The two line that have just been added to /etc/pacman.conf should then be removed as they have been included in the qubes-vm-core update in the file `/etc/pacmand.d/99-qubes-repository-3.2.conf`
The two lines that have just been added to /etc/pacman.conf should then be removed as they have been included in the qubes-vm-core update in the file `/etc/pacmand.d/99-qubes-repository-3.2.conf`
## Known Issues
### Package cannot be updated because of errors related to xorg-server or pulseaudio versions
In case archlinux upgrade pulseaudio major version or xorg-server version, updating these packages will break the qubes GUI agent. To avoid breaking things, the update is blocked until a new version of the GUI agent is available.
The Qubes GUI agent must be rebuilt whenever xorg-server or pulseaudio make major changes.
If an update of one of these packages causes your template to break, simply [revert it](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/software-update-vm/#reverting-changes-to-a-templatevm) and wait for corresponding Qubes package updates to be available (or attempt to build them yourself, if you're so inclined).
This should not happen frequently.
In this case, the gui-agent-linux component of Qubes-OS needs to be rebuild using these last xorg-server or pulseaudio libraries. You can try to rebuilt it yourself or wait for a new qubes-vm-gui package to be available.
### qubes-vm is apparently starting properly (green dot) however graphical applications do not appear to work
### qubes-vm is apparently starting properly (green dot) however graphical applications do not appears to work
They are multiple potential reasons. Some of them are described in the following issues:
They are multiple potential reasons. Some of them are described in the following issue:
* https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2612
In issue 2612, check that the option `noauto` is present for all lines in /etc/fstab related to /rw or /home. This bug can appears if you come from an old Archlinux Template (pre February 2017).
In issue 2612, check that the option `noauto` is present for all lines in /etc/fstab related to /rw or /home. This bug can appear if you come from an old Archlinux Template (pre February 2017).
## Debugging a broken VM
@ -101,7 +124,7 @@ In order to identify the issue, you should start by getting a console access to
* Or by running in dom0 `sudo xl console yourbrokenvm`
Starts by trying to run a GUI application such as xfce4-terminal in order to identify any error message.
Start by trying to run a GUI application such as xfce4-terminal in order to identify any error message.
Then you can check potential broken systemd service by running the following command inside the broken vm: `systemctl | grep fail`.
@ -111,8 +134,7 @@ Finally, errors related to the GUI agent can be found inside the VM in `/home/us
## Packages manager wrapper
Powerpill is a full Pacman wrapper that not only give easy proxy configuration but further offers numerous other advantages.
Powerpill is a full Pacman wrapper that not only gives easy proxy configuration but further offers numerous other advantages.
Please check out:
@ -121,7 +143,7 @@ Please check out:
[XYNE's (dev) Powerpill](http://xyne.archlinux.ca/projects/powerpill/)
**Important Note:** As you are working in a template vm, by default, you will have to open network access to the template to download files manually, except for package managed which should be handled by the Qubes proxy. You can use the "allow full access for" a given time period in the FW settings of the template in the VMM or open up the various services through the same window. Remember to change it back if you choose the later route. Actions needing network access will be noted with (needs network access)
**Important Note:** As you are working in a template vm, by default, you will have to open network access to the template to download files manually, except for managed packages which should be handled by the Qubes proxy. You can use the "allow full access for" a given time period in the FW settings of the template in the VMM or open up the various services through the same window. Remember to change it back if you choose the later route. Actions needing network access will be noted with (needs network access)
<br>
<br>
@ -134,7 +156,7 @@ Please check out:
* **$ sudo nano -w /etc/pacman.conf**
* Below is the output of a correct pacman.conf file Make the changes so your file matches this one or rename the original and create a new one and copy and paste this text into it. Text should be justified left in the file. The changes from your default are to make gpg sig signing mandatory for packages but not required for DBs for the archlinux repos. Also to add the repo (at the end) for the Powerpill package.
* Below is the output of a correct pacman.conf file Make the changes so your file matches this one or rename the original and create a new one and copy and paste this text into it. Text should be justified left in the file. The changes from your default are to make gpg signing mandatory for packages but not required for DBs for the archlinux repos. Also to add the repo (at the end) for the Powerpill package.
<br>

2
managing-os/templates/debian.md
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@ -114,5 +114,5 @@ More information
* [Debian wiki](https://wiki.debian.org/Qubes)
[stretch]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/debian/upgrade-8-to-9/
[stretch]: /doc/template/debian/upgrade-8-to-9/

16
managing-os/templates/fedora-minimal.md
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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ The download may take a while depending on your connection speed.
Duplication and first steps
---------------------------
It is higly recommended to clone the original template, and make any changes in the clone instead of the original template. The following command clones the template. Replace `your-new-clone` with your desired name.
It is highly recommended to clone the original template, and make any changes in the clone instead of the original template. The following command clones the template. Replace `your-new-clone` with your desired name.
~~~
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-clone fedora-26-minimal your-new-clone
@ -72,12 +72,6 @@ In Qubes R4.0, sudo is not installed by default in the minimal template. To upd
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-run -u root fedora-26-minimal xterm
~~~
If you would like to skip this step in future, please install the `sudo` package:
~~~
[user@your-new-clone ~]$ dnf install sudo
~~~
In Qubes 4.0, additional packages from the `qubes-core-agent` suite may be needed to make the customized minimal template work properly. These packages are:
- `qubes-core-agent-qrexec`: Qubes qrexec agent. Installed by default.
@ -85,9 +79,11 @@ In Qubes 4.0, additional packages from the `qubes-core-agent` suite may be neede
- `qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root`, `polkit`: By default the 'fedora-26-minimal' template doesn't have passwordless root. These two packages fix the situation.
- `qubes-core-agent-nautilus`: This package provides integration with the Nautilus file manager (without it things like "copy to VM/open in disposable VM" will not be shown in Nautilus).
- `qubes-core-agent-sysvinit`: Qubes unit files for SysV init style or upstart.
- `qubes-core-agent-networking`: Networking support. Useful if the template has to be used for a `sys-net` VM.
- `qubes-core-agent-network-manager`: Integration for NetworkManager. Useful if the template has to be used for a `sys-net` VM.
- `qubes-core-agent-dom0-updates`: Script required to handle `dom0` updates. Any template which the VM respondible for 'dom0' updates is based on must contain this package.
- `qubes-core-agent-networking`: Networking support. Required if the template is to be used for a `sys-net` or `sys-firewall` VM.
- `qubes-core-agent-network-manager`: Integration for NetworkManager. Useful if the template is to be used for a `sys-net` VM.
- `network-manager-applet`: Useful (together with `dejavu-sans-fonts` and `notification-daemon`) to have a system tray icon if the template is to be used for a `sys-net` VM.
- `qubes-core-agent-dom0-updates`: Script required to handle `dom0` updates. Any template which the VM responsible for 'dom0' updates (e.g. `sys-firewall`) is based on must contain this package.
- `qubes-usb-proxy`: Required if the template is to be used for a USB qube (`sys-usb`) or for any destination qube to which USB devices are to be attached (e.g `sys-net` if using USB network adapter).
- `pulseaudio-qubes`: Needed to have audio on the template VM.

2
managing-os/templates/fedora/upgrade-20-to-21.md
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@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ In this case, you have several options:
1. [Increase the TemplateVM's disk image size](/doc/resize-disk-image/).
This is the solution mentioned in the main instructions above.
2. Delete files in order to free up space. One way to do this is by
uninstalling packages. You may then reinstalling them again after you
uninstalling packages. You may then reinstall them again after you
finish the upgrade process, if desired). However, you may end up having to
increase the disk image size anyway (see previous option).
3. Increase the `root.img` size with `qvm-grow-root`. It should be easy to

2
managing-os/templates/fedora/upgrade-21-to-23.md
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@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ In this case, you have several options:
1. [Increase the TemplateVM's disk image size](/doc/resize-disk-image/).
This is the solution mentioned in the main instructions above.
2. Delete files in order to free up space. One way to do this is by
uninstalling packages. You may then reinstalling them again after you
uninstalling packages. You may then reinstall them again after you
finish the upgrade process, if desired). However, you may end up having to
increase the disk image size anyway (see previous option).
3. Increase the `root.img` size with `qvm-grow-root`. It should be easy to

2
managing-os/templates/fedora/upgrade-23-to-24.md
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@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ In this case, you have several options:
1. [Increase the TemplateVM's disk image size][resize-disk-image].
This is the solution mentioned in the main instructions above.
2. Delete files in order to free up space. One way to do this is by
uninstalling packages. You may then reinstalling them again after you
uninstalling packages. You may then reinstall them again after you
finish the upgrade process, if desired). However, you may end up having to
increase the disk image size anyway (see previous option).
3. Increase the `root.img` size with `qvm-grow-root`.

8
managing-os/windows/windows-appvms.md
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@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ Also, the inter-VM services work as usual -- e.g. to request opening a document
[user@work ~]$ qvm-open-in-vm work-win7 https://invisiblethingslab.com
~~~
... just like in case of Linux AppVMs. Of course all those operations are governed by central policy engine running in Dom0 -- if the policy doesn't contain explicit rules for the source and/or target AppVM, the user will be asked for decision whether to allow or deny the operation.
... just like in the case of Linux AppVMs. Of course all those operations are governed by central policy engine running in Dom0 -- if the policy doesn't contain explicit rules for the source and/or target AppVM, the user will be asked whether to allow or deny the operation.
Inter-VM file copy and clipboard works for Windows AppVMs the same way as for Linux AppVM (except that we don't provide a command line wrapper, `qvm-copy-to-vm` in Windows VMs) -- to copy files from Windows AppVMs just right-click on the file in Explorer, and choose: Send To-\> Other AppVM.
@ -124,14 +124,14 @@ Qubes allows HVM VMs to share a common root filesystem from a select Template VM
qvm-create --hvm-template win7-x64-template -l green
~~~
... and install Windows OS (or other OS) into this template the same way as you would install it into a normal HVM -- please see [this page](/doc/hvm-create/) instructions. However, it would make lots of sense to store the `C:\Users` directory on the 2nd disk which is automatically exposed by Qubes to all HVMs. This 2nd disk is backed by the `private.img` file in the AppVMs' and is not reset upon AppVMs reboot, so the user's directories and profiles would survive the AppVMs reboot, unlike the "root" filesystem which will be reverted to the "golden image" from the Template VM automatically. To facilitate such separation of user profiles, Qubes Windows Tools provide an option to automatically move `C:\Users` directory to the 2nd disk backed by `private.img`. It's a selectable feature of the installer, enabled by default. If that feature is selected during installation, completion of the process requires two reboots:
... and install Windows OS (or other OS) into this template the same way as you would install it into a normal HVM -- please see instructions on [this page](/doc/hvm-create/). However, it would make lots of sense to store the `C:\Users` directory on the 2nd disk which is automatically exposed by Qubes to all HVMs. This 2nd disk is backed by the `private.img` file in the AppVMs' and is not reset upon AppVMs reboot, so the user's directories and profiles would survive the AppVMs reboot, unlike the "root" filesystem which will be reverted to the "golden image" from the Template VM automatically. To facilitate such separation of user profiles, Qubes Windows Tools provide an option to automatically move `C:\Users` directory to the 2nd disk backed by `private.img`. It's a selectable feature of the installer, enabled by default. If that feature is selected during installation, completion of the process requires two reboots:
- The private disk is initialized and formatted on the first reboot after tools installation. It can't be done **during** the installation because Xen mass storage drivers are not yet active.
- User profiles are moved to the private disk on the next reboot after the private disk is initialized. Reboot is required because the "mover utility" runs very early in the boot process so OS can't yet lock any files in there. This can take some time depending on the profiles' size and because the GUI agent is not yet active dom0/Qubes Manager may complain that the AppVM failed to boot. That's a false alarm (you can increase AppVM's default boot timeout using `qvm-prefs`), the VM should appear "green" in Qubes Manager shortly after.
It also makes sense to disable Automatic Updates for all the template-based AppVMs -- of course this should be done in the Template VM, not in individual AppVMs, because the system-wide setting are stored in the root filesystem (which holds the system-wide registry hives). Then, periodically check for updates in the Template VM and the changes will be carried over to any child AppVMs.
It also makes sense to disable Automatic Updates for all the template-based AppVMs -- of course this should be done in the Template VM, not in individual AppVMs, because the system-wide settings are stored in the root filesystem (which holds the system-wide registry hives). Then, periodically check for updates in the Template VM and the changes will be carried over to any child AppVMs.
Once the template has been created and installed it is easy to create AppVMs based on:
Once the template has been created and installed it is easy to create AppVMs based on it:
~~~
qvm-create --hvm <new windows appvm name> --template <name of template vm> --label <label color>

9
privacy/anonymizing-your-mac-address.md
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ privacy](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/MAC_address/#index1h1). Curren
Newer versions of Network Manager have a robust set of options for randomizing MAC addresses, and can handle the entire process across reboots, sleep/wake cycles and different connection states. In particular, versions 1.4.2 and later should be well suited for Qubes.
Network Manager 1.4.2 or later is available from the Fedora 25 repository as well as the Debian 9 repository, which you can install by [upgrading a Debian 8 template to version 9.](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/debian-template-upgrade-8/)
Network Manager 1.4.2 or later is available from the Fedora 25 repository as well as the Debian 9 repository, which you can install by [upgrading a Debian 8 template to version 9.](/doc/debian-template-upgrade-8/)
In the Debian 9 or Fedora 25 template you intend to use as a NetVM, check that Network Manager version is now at least 1.4.2:
@ -34,10 +34,11 @@ wifi.scan-rand-mac-address=yes
[connection]
wifi.cloned-mac-address=stable
ethernet.cloned-mac-address=stable
connection.stable-id=${CONNECTION}/${BOOT}
~~~
`stable` generates a random address that persists for each boot session.
`random` generates a random address each time a link goes up.
* `stable` in combination with `${CONNECTION}/${BOOT}` generates a random address that persists until reboot.
* `random` generates a random address each time a link goes up.
To see all the available configuration options, refer to the man page: `man nm-settings`
@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ macspoof-enp0s0 meminfo-writer updates-proxy-setup
~~~
Now, also within the TemplateVM, type the following commands for each hardware device that you want to randomize a MAC
addresses for
address for
~~~
sudo systemctl enable macspoof@wlp0s1

1
privacy/signal.md
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@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ Always obtain a trusted key fingerprint via other channels, and always check any
6. Create an AppVM based on this TemplateVM
7. With your mouse select the `Q` menu -> `Domain: "AppVM Name"` -> `"AppVM Name": Add more shortcuts`
(or `"AppVM Name": VM Settings` -> `Applications`).
Select `Signal` from the left `Available` column, move it to the right `Selected` column by clicking the `>` button and then `OK` to apply the changes and close the window.
-----

4
privacy/tails.md
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Despite this, in case that method becomes cumbersome, Tails can be used inside v
To run Tails under Qubes:
1. Read about [creating and using HVM qubes](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/hvm/)
1. Read about [creating and using HVM qubes](/doc/hvm/)
2. Download and verify Tails from [https://tails.boum.org](https://tails.boum.org) in a qube, (saved as `/home/user/Downloads/tails.iso` on qube "isoVM" for purposes of this guide).
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ The Tails qube will not shut down cleanly.
Kill it from the GUI Manager or ```qvm-kill Tails``` in Konsole.
### Security
You will probably want to implement [MAC spoofing](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/).
You will probably want to implement [MAC spoofing](/doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/).
There are added security concerns for Tails users when running it in a virtual machine.
If you intend to do this, you should read [the warnings](https://tails.boum.org/doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/) from the Tails team about it.

8
privacy/torvm.md
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Qubes TorVM (qubes-tor)
Qubes TorVM is a deprecated ProxyVM service that provides torified networking to
all its clients. **If you are interested in TorVM, you will find the
[Whonix implementation in Qubes](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/privacy/whonix/) a
[Whonix implementation in Qubes](/doc/privacy/whonix/) a
more usable and robust solution for creating a torifying traffic proxy.**
By default, any AppVM using the TorVM as its NetVM will be fully torified, so
@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ transparent torified solutions. Notably the following:
[stream-isolation]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/171-separate-streams.txt
[stream-isolation-explained]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html
[tor-threats]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#adversary
[qubes-net]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/QubesNet/
[qubes-net]: /doc/QubesNet/
[dns]: https://tails.boum.org/todo/support_arbitrary_dns_queries/
[tor-browser]: https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html
[tor-verify-sig]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html
[dispvm]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/DisposableVms/
[dispvm-customization]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/UserDoc/DispVMCustomization/
[dispvm]: /doc/DisposableVms/
[dispvm-customization]: /doc/UserDoc/DispVMCustomization/

4
privacy/whonix-install.md
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@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Using privacy and anonymization tools like Whonix is not a magical solution that
* Do you think nobody can eavesdrop on your communications because you are using Tor?
* Do you know how Whonix works?
If you answered no, have a look at the [about](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/About), [warning](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Warning) and [do not](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/DoNot) pages (on the Whonix website) to make sure Whonix is the right tool for you and you understand it's limitations.
If you answered no, have a look at the [about](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/About), [warning](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Warning) and [do not](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/DoNot) pages (on the Whonix website) to make sure Whonix is the right tool for you and you understand its limitations.
---
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ After doing this, you should see two new TemplateVMs in the VM Manager called `w
### Enabling AppArmor
This is an optional security enhancement (for testers-only). If you’re technical & interested, see [Enabling AppArmor](/doc/privacy/customizing-whonix/).
This is an optional security enhancement (for testers-only). If you’re technical and interested, see [Enabling AppArmor](/doc/privacy/customizing-whonix/).
### Running Applications

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@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ a **"workstation"**. Qubes security architecture makes use of Whonix's isolation
by using the gateway as a ProxyVM to route all network traffic through Tor,
while the workstation is used for making AppVMs.
Whonix in Qubes replaces the deprecated [TorVM](/doc/torvm) service used in earlier
versions of Qubes.
## Getting Started with Whonix
* Note: To install Whonix in Qubes, you must already have a working Qubes machine.
* [Installing Whonix in Qubes](/doc/whonix/install/)

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@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
---
layout: doc
title: Dom0 Tools
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/
redirect_from:
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/
- /doc/DomZeroTools/
- /wiki/DomZeroTools/
---
QVM-tools:
- [qubes-dom0-update](/doc/dom0-tools/qubes-dom0-update/)
- [qubes-prefs](/doc/dom0-tools/qubes-prefs/)
- [qvm-add-appvm](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-appvm/)
- [qvm-add-template](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-template/)
- [qvm-backup-restore](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup-restore/)
- [qvm-backup](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup/)
- [qvm-block](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-block/)
- [qvm-clone](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-clone/)
- [qvm-create-default-dvm](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-create-default-dvm/)
- [qvm-create](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-create/)
- [qvm-firewall](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-firewall/)
- [qvm-grow-private](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-grow-private/)
- [qvm-ls](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-ls/)
- [qvm-kill](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-kill/)
- [qvm-pci](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-pci/)
- [qvm-prefs](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-prefs/)
- [qvm-remove](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-remove/)
- [qvm-revert-template-changes](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-revert-template-changes/)
- [qvm-run](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-run/)
- [qvm-service](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-service/)
- [qvm-shutdown](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-shutdown/)
- [qvm-start](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-start/)
- [qvm-sync-appmenus](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-sync-appmenus/)
- [qvm-template-commit](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-template-commit/)

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@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ The main principle of Qubes OS is security by compartmentalization (or isolation
VM
--
An abbreviation for "virtual machine."
A software implementation of a machine (for example, a computer) which executes programs like a physical machine.
A software implementation of a machine (for example, a computer) that executes programs like a physical machine.
Qube
----
@ -62,34 +62,38 @@ By default, most domUs lack direct hardware access.
TemplateVM
----------
Template Virtual Machine.
Any [VM](#vm) which supplies its root filesystem to another VM.
Any [VM](#vm) that supplies its root filesystem to another VM.
TemplateVMs are intended for installing and updating software applications, but not for running them.
* Colloquially, TemplateVMs are often referred to as "templates."
* Since every TemplateVM supplies its *own* root filesystem to at least one other VM, no TemplateVM can be based on another TemplateVM.
In other words, no TemplateVM is a [TemplateBasedVM](#templatebasedvm).
* Since every TemplateVM supplies its *root* filesystem to at least one other VM, no [DVM Template](#dvm-template) is a TemplateVM.
TemplateBasedVM
---------------
Any [VM](#vm) which depends on a [TemplateVM](#templatevm) for its root filesystem.
Any [VM](#vm) that depends on a [TemplateVM](#templatevm) for its root filesystem.
Standalone(VM)
--------------
Standalone (Virtual Machine).
In general terms, a [VM](#vm) is described as **standalone** if and only if it does not depend on any other VM for its root filesystem.
(In other words, a VM is standalone if and only if it is not a TemplateBasedVM.)
More specifically, a **StandaloneVM** is a type of VM in Qubes which is created by cloning a TemplateVM.
More specifically, a **StandaloneVM** is a type of VM in Qubes that is created by cloning a TemplateVM.
Unlike TemplateVMs, however, StandaloneVMs do not supply their root filesystems to other VMs.
(Therefore, while a TemplateVM is a type of standalone VM, it is not a StandaloneVM.)
AppVM
-----
Application Virtual Machine.
A [VM](#vm) which is intended for running software applications.
A [VM](#vm) that is intended for running software applications.
Typically a TemplateBasedVM, but may be a StandaloneVM. Never a TemplateVM.
NetVM
-----
Network Virtual Machine.
A type of [VM](#vm) which connects directly to a network and provides access to that network to other VMs which connect to the NetVM.
A type of [VM](#vm) that connects directly to a network.
Other VMs gain access to a network by connecting to a NetVM (usually indirectly, via a [FirewallVM](#firewallvm)).
A NetVM called `sys-net` is created by default in most Qubes installations.
Alternatively, "NetVM" may refer to whichever VM is directly connected to a VM for networking purposes.
@ -98,18 +102,18 @@ For example, if `untrusted` is directly connected to `sys-firewall` for network
ProxyVM
-------
Proxy Virtual Machine.
A type of [VM](#vm) which proxies network access for other VMs.
Typically, a ProxyVM sits between a NetVM and another VM (such as an AppVM or a TemplateVM) which requires network access.
A type of [VM](#vm) that proxies network access for other VMs.
Typically, a ProxyVM sits between a NetVM and another VM (such as an AppVM or a TemplateVM) that requires network access.
FirewallVM
----------
Firewall Virtual Machine.
A type of [ProxyVM](#proxyvm) which is used to enforce network-level policies (a.k.a. "firewall rules").
A type of [ProxyVM](#proxyvm) that is used to enforce network-level policies (a.k.a. "firewall rules").
A FirewallVM called `sys-firewall` is created by default in most Qubes installations.
DispVM
------
[Disposable Virtual Machine]. A temporary [AppVM](#appvm) based on a [DVM Template](#dvm-template) which can quickly be created, used, and destroyed.
[Disposable Virtual Machine]. A temporary [AppVM](#appvm) based on a [DVM Template](#dvm-template) that can quickly be created, used, and destroyed.
DVM
---
@ -117,12 +121,18 @@ An abbreviation of [DispVM](#dispvm), typically used to refer to [DVM Templates]
DVM Template
------------
TemplateBasedVMs on which [DispVMs](#dispvm) are based.
A type of [TemplateBasedVM](#templatebasedvm) on which [DispVMs](#dispvm) are based.
By default, a DVM Template named `fedora-XX-dvm` is created on most Qubes installations (where `XX` is the Fedora version of the default TemplateVM).
DVM Templates are neither [TemplateVMs](#templatevm) nor [AppVMs](#appvm).
They are intended neither for installing nor running software.
Rather, they are intended for *customizing* or *configuring* software that has already been installed on the TemplateVM on which the DVM Template is based (see [DispVM Customization]).
This software is then intended to be run (in its customized state) in DispVMs that are based on the DVM Template.
DVM Templates are not [TemplateVMs](#templatevm), since (being TemplateBasedVMs) they do not have root filesystems of their own to provide to other VMs.
Rather, DVM Templates are complementary to TemplateVMs insofar as DVM Templates provide their own user filesystems to the DispVMs based on them.
There are two main kinds of DVM Templates:
* **Dedicated** DVM Templates are intended neither for installing nor running software.
Rather, they are intended for *customizing* or *configuring* software that has already been installed on the TemplateVM on which the DVM Template is based (see [DispVM Customization]).
This software is then intended to be run (in its customized state) in DispVMs that are based on the DVM Template.
* **Non-dedicated** DVM Templates are typically [AppVMs](#appvm) on which DispVMs are based.
For example, an AppVM could be used to generate and store trusted data.
Then, a DispVM could be created based on the AppVM (thereby making the AppVM a DVM Template) so that the data can be analyzed by an untrusted program without jeopardizing the integrity of the original data.
PV
--
@ -139,12 +149,12 @@ Although HVMs are typically slower than paravirtualized VMs due to the required
StandaloneHVM
-------------
Any [HVM](#hvm) which is standalone (i.e., does not depend on any other VM for its root filesystem).
Any [HVM](#hvm) that is standalone (i.e., does not depend on any other VM for its root filesystem).
In Qubes, StandaloneHVMs are referred to simply as **HVMs**.
TemplateHVM
-----------
Any [HVM](#hvm) which functions as a [TemplateVM](#templatevm) by supplying its root filesystem to other VMs.
Any [HVM](#hvm) that functions as a [TemplateVM](#templatevm) by supplying its root filesystem to other VMs.
In Qubes, TemplateHVMs are referred to as **HVM templates**.
TemplateBasedHVM
@ -157,6 +167,12 @@ Service Virtual Machine.
A [VM](#vm) the primary purpose of which is to provide a service or services to other VMs.
NetVMs and ProxyVMs are examples of ServiceVMs.
SystemVM
--------
System Virtual Machine.
A synonym for [ServiceVM](#servicevm).
SystemVMs usually have the prefix `sys-`.
PVHVM
-----
[PV](#pv) on [HVM](#hvm).

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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
---
layout: doc
title: Command-Line Tools
permalink: /doc/tools/
---
Command-Line Tools
==================
Please see the page for your version of Qubes OS:
* [Qubes 4.0 Command-Line Tools](/doc/tools/4.0)
* [Qubes 3.2 Command-Line Tools](/doc/tools/3.2)

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---
layout: doc
title: Dom0 Command-Line Tools for Qubes 3.2
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/
redirect_from:
- /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/
- /en/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/
- /doc/DomZeroTools/
- /wiki/DomZeroTools/
---
Dom0 Command-Line Tools for Qubes 3.2
=====================================
* [qubes-dom0-update](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qubes-dom0-update/)
* [qubes-prefs](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qubes-prefs/)
* [qvm-add-appvm](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-add-appvm/)
* [qvm-add-template](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-add-template/)
* [qvm-backup-restore](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-backup-restore/)
* [qvm-backup](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-backup/)
* [qvm-block](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-block/)
* [qvm-clone](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-clone/)
* [qvm-create-default-dvm](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-create-default-dvm/)
* [qvm-create](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-create/)
* [qvm-firewall](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-firewall/)
* [qvm-grow-private](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-grow-private/)
* [qvm-ls](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-ls/)
* [qvm-kill](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-kill/)
* [qvm-pci](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-pci/)
* [qvm-prefs](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-prefs/)
* [qvm-remove](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-remove/)
* [qvm-revert-template-changes](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-revert-template-changes/)
* [qvm-run](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-run/)
* [qvm-service](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-service/)
* [qvm-shutdown](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-shutdown/)
* [qvm-start](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-start/)
* [qvm-sync-appmenus](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-sync-appmenus/)
* [qvm-template-commit](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-template-commit/)

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---
layout: doc
title: qubes-dom0-update
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qubes-dom0-update/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qubes-dom0-update/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qubes-dom0-update/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qubes-dom0-update/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QubesDom0Update/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QubesDom0Update/

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---
layout: doc
title: qubes-prefs
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qubes-prefs/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qubes-prefs/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qubes-prefs/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qubes-prefs/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QubesPrefs/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QubesPrefs/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-add-appvm
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-appvm/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-add-appvm/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-appvm/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-appvm/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmAddAppvm/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmAddAppvm/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-add-template
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-template/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-add-template/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-template/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-template/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmAddTemplate/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmAddTemplate/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-backup-restore
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup-restore/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-backup-restore/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup-restore/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup-restore/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmBackupRestore/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmBackupRestore/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-backup
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-backup/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmBackup/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmBackup/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-block
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-block/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-block/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-block/
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-block/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-block/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmBlock/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmBlock/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-clone
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-clone/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-clone/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-clone/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-clone/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmClone/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmClone/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-create-default-dvm
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-create-default-dvm/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-create-default-dvm/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-create-default-dvm/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-create-default-dvm/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmCreateDefaultDvm/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmCreateDefaultDvm/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-create
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-create/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-create/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-create/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-create/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmCreate/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmCreate/

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layout: doc
title: qvm-firewall
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-firewall/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-firewall/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-firewall/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-firewall/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmFirewall/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmFirewall/

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layout: doc
title: qvm-grow-private
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-grow-private/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-grow-private/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-grow-private/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-grow-private/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmGrowPrivate/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmGrowPrivate/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-kill
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-kill/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-kill/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-kill/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-kill/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmKill/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmKill/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-ls
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-ls/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-ls/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-ls/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-ls/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmLs/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmLs/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-pci
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-pci/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-pci/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-pci/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-pci/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmPci/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmPci/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-prefs
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-prefs/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-prefs/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-prefs/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-prefs/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmPrefs/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmPrefs/

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layout: doc
title: qvm-remove
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-remove/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-remove/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-remove/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-remove/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmRemove/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmRemove/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-revert-template-changes
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-revert-template-changes/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-revert-template-changes/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-revert-template-changes/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-revert-template-changes/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmRevertTemplateChanges/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmRevertTemplateChanges/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-run
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-run/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-run/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-run/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-run/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmRun/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmRun/
@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ Run command in a VM as a specified user
Use tray notifications instead of stdout
--all
Run command on all currently running VMs (or all paused, in case of --unpause)
Run command on all currently running VMs (or all paused, in the case of --unpause)
--exclude=EXCLUDE\_LIST
When --all is used: exclude this VM name (might be repeated)

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-service
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-service/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-service/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-service/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-service/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmService/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmService/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-shutdown
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-shutdown/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-shutdown/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-shutdown/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-shutdown/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmShutdown/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmShutdown/

3
reference/dom0-tools/qvm-start.md → reference/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-start.md
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@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
---
layout: doc
title: qvm-start
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-start/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-start/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-start/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-start/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmStart/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmStart/

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