Use long form PGP key IDs and reference-style links

This commit is contained in:
Andrew David Wong 2016-08-05 20:28:34 -07:00
parent 83bd0ec13c
commit 0ae2e72217
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 8CE137352A019A17

View File

@ -61,20 +61,16 @@ Importing Qubes Signing Keys
Every file published by the Qubes Project (ISO, RPM, TGZ files and git
repositories) is digitally signed by one of the developer or release signing
keys. Each such key is signed by the Qubes Master Signing Key
([`0x36879494`](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc)).
keys. Each such key is signed by the [Qubes Master Signing Key]
(`0xDDFA1A3E36879494`).
The public portion of the Qubes Master Signing Key can be imported directly
from a [
keyserver](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_server_%28cryptographic%29#Keyserver_examples)
(specified on first use with --keyserver URI, keyserver saved in
`~/.gnupg/gpg.conf`), e.g.,
from a [keyserver] (specified on first use with `--keyserver <URI>`, keyserver
saved in `~/.gnupg/gpg.conf`), e.g.,
gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
or downloaded
[here](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc) and
imported with gpg,
or downloaded [here][Qubes Master Signing Key] and imported with gpg,
$ gpg --import ./qubes-master-signing-key.asc
@ -83,24 +79,17 @@ or fetched directly with gpg.
$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
For additional security we also publish the fingerprint of the Qubes Master
Signing Key
([`0x36879494`](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc))
here in this document:
Signing Key here in this document:
pub 4096R/36879494 2010-04-01
Key fingerprint = 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
uid Qubes Master Signing Key
There should also be a copy of this key at the project's main website, in the
[Qubes Security Pack](/doc/security-pack/), and in the archives of the
project's
[developer](https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/qubes-devel/RqR9WPxICwg/kaQwknZPDHkJ)
and
[user](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/CLnB5uFu_YQ/ZjObBpz0S9UJ)
mailing lists.
[Qubes Security Pack], and in the archives of the project's [developer] and
[user] [mailing lists].
Once you have obtained the Qubes Master Signing Key
([`0x36879494`](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc)),
Once you have obtained the Qubes Master Signing Key,
you should verify the fingerprint of this key very carefully by obtaining
copies of the fingerprint from trustworthy independent sources and comparing
them to the downloaded key's fingerprint to ensure they match. Then set its
@ -151,9 +140,8 @@ verify all the keys signed by the Qubes Master Signing Key:
Now you can easily download any of the developer or release signing keys that
happen to be used to sign particular ISO, RPM, TGZ files or git tags.
For example: Qubes OS Release 3 Signing Key
([`0x03FA5082`](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-release-3-signing-key.asc))
is used for all Release 3 ISO images.
For example, the Qubes OS [Release 3 Signing Key] (`0xCB11CA1D03FA5082`) is
used for all Release 3 ISO images:
$ gpg --recv-keys 0xC52261BE0A823221D94CA1D1CB11CA1D03FA5082
gpg: requesting key 03FA5082 from hkp server keys.gnupg.net
@ -166,16 +154,12 @@ is used for all Release 3 ISO images.
You can also download all the currently used developers' signing keys and
current and older release signing keys (and also a copy of the Qubes Master
Signing Key) from the [keys directory on our
server](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/) and from the [Qubes Security
Pack](/doc/security-pack/).
Signing Key) from the [Qubes OS Keyserver] and from the [Qubes Security Pack].
The developer signing keys are set to be valid for 1 year only, while the Qubes
Master Signing Key
([`0x36879494`](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc))
has no expiration date. This latter key was generated and is kept only within a
dedicated, air-gapped "vault" machine, and the private portion will (hopefully)
never leave this isolated machine.
Master Signing Key has no expiration date. This latter key was generated and is
kept only within a dedicated, air-gapped "vault" machine, and the private
portion will (hopefully) never leave this isolated machine.
You can now verify the ISO image (`Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso`) matches its
signature (`Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso.asc`):
@ -187,10 +171,8 @@ signature (`Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso.asc`):
gpg: Good signature from "Qubes OS Release 3 Signing Key"
gpg: binary signature, digest algorithm SHA256
The Release 3 Signing Key
([`0x03FA5082`](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-release-3-signing-key.asc))
used to sign this ISO image should be signed by the Qubes Master Signing Key
([`0x36879494`](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc)):
The Release 3 Signing Key used to sign this ISO image should be signed by the
Qubes Master Signing Key:
$ gpg --list-sig 03FA5082
pub 4096R/03FA5082 2014-11-19
@ -308,3 +290,14 @@ trusted!
To verify a signature on a git tag, you can use:
$ git tag -v <tag name>
[Qubes Master Signing Key]: https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
[keyserver]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_server_%28cryptographic%29#Keyserver_examples
[Qubes Security Pack]: /doc/security-pack/
[developer]: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/qubes-devel/RqR9WPxICwg/kaQwknZPDHkJ
[user]: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/CLnB5uFu_YQ/ZjObBpz0S9UJ
[mailing lists]: /mailing-lists/
[Release 3 Signing Key]: https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-release-3-signing-key.asc
[Qubes OS Keyserver]: https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/