From 084913b3de8c667fe05c2e3f73a3b3fb031ad789 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rafal Wojtczuk <rafal@invisiblethingslab.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2011 12:21:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Trusted_parts changed

---
 Trusted_parts.md | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/Trusted_parts.md b/Trusted_parts.md
index 5a038322..39be3725 100644
--- a/Trusted_parts.md
+++ b/Trusted_parts.md
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ Trusted Qubes-specific components
 -   dom0-side libvchan library
 -   GUI virtualization code in dom0 (*qubes-guid*)
 -   sound virtualization code in dom0 (*pacat-simple-vchan*); note at the current state, it parses no data from VM (just passes raw audio frames to pulseaudio), so it should be safe
+-   qmemman
 -   qrexec-related code in dom0 (*qrexec\_daemon*)
 -   some Qubes rpc servers. The servers implementing qubes.Filecopy, qubes.[ReceiveUpdates?](/wiki/ReceiveUpdates) and qubes.[SyncAppMenus?](/wiki/SyncAppMenus) must be bullet-proof. In case of qubes.OpenInVM and qubes.VMShell, their incarnation require explicit consent from the user, and such consent basically grants control over the target VM to the source VM, thus they are not critical.