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6
developer/general/doc-guidelines.md
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@ -143,13 +143,11 @@ There are some exceptions to this policy (e.g., information that is certain not
### Core vs. external documentation ### Core vs. external documentation
*See [#4693](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4693) for more information.*
Core documentation resides in the [Qubes OS Project's official repositories](https://github.com/QubesOS/), mainly in [qubes-doc]. Core documentation resides in the [Qubes OS Project's official repositories](https://github.com/QubesOS/), mainly in [qubes-doc].
External documentation can be anywhere else (such as forums, community websites, and blogs), but there is an especially large collection in the [Qubes Community](https://github.com/Qubes-Community) project. External documentation can be anywhere else (such as forums, community websites, and blogs), but there is an especially large collection in the [Qubes Community](https://github.com/Qubes-Community) project.
External documentation should not be submitted to [qubes-doc]. External documentation should not be submitted to [qubes-doc].
If you've written a piece of documentation that is not appropriate for [qubes-doc], we encourage you to submit it to the [Qubes Community](https://github.com/Qubes-Community) project instead. If you've written a piece of documentation that is not appropriate for [qubes-doc], we encourage you to submit it to the [Qubes Community](https://github.com/Qubes-Community) project instead.
At the time of this writing, there is also a section of external documentation in [qubes-doc] that is in the process of being moved to the [Qubes Community](https://github.com/Qubes-Community) project (see [#4693](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4693)). However, *linking* to external documentation from [qubes-doc] is perfectly fine.
The main difference between **core** (or **official**) and **external** (or **community** or **unofficial**) documentation is whether it documents software that is officially written and maintained by the Qubes OS Project. The main difference between **core** (or **official**) and **external** (or **community** or **unofficial**) documentation is whether it documents software that is officially written and maintained by the Qubes OS Project.
The purpose of this distinction is to keep the core docs maintainable and high-quality by limiting them to the software output by the Qubes OS Project. The purpose of this distinction is to keep the core docs maintainable and high-quality by limiting them to the software output by the Qubes OS Project.
@ -174,6 +172,8 @@ The community is better positioned to write and maintain documentation that appl
In addition, just because the Qubes OS Project has officially written and maintains some flexible framework, such as `qrexec`, it does not make sense to include every tutorial that says "here's how to do something cool with `qrexec`" in the core docs. In addition, just because the Qubes OS Project has officially written and maintains some flexible framework, such as `qrexec`, it does not make sense to include every tutorial that says "here's how to do something cool with `qrexec`" in the core docs.
Such tutorials generally also belong in the community documentation. Such tutorials generally also belong in the community documentation.
See [#4693](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4693) for more background information.
### Version-specific documentation ### Version-specific documentation
*See [#5308](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5308) for potential changes to this policy.* *See [#5308](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5308) for potential changes to this policy.*

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doc.md
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@ -221,75 +221,78 @@ For more, please see [Qubes Community Documentation](https://github.com/Qubes-Co
### Operating System Guides ### Operating System Guides
* [Template: Ubuntu](/doc/templates/ubuntu/) * [Template: Ubuntu](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/ubuntu.md)
* [Template: Whonix](/doc/whonix/) * [Template: Whonix](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/privacy/whonix.md)
* [Pentesting](/doc/pentesting/) * [Template: CentOS](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/centos.md)
* [Pentesting: BlackArch](/doc/pentesting/blackarch/) * [Template: Gentoo](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/gentoo.md)
* [Pentesting: Kali](/doc/pentesting/kali/) * [Pentesting](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/pentesting.md)
* [Pentesting: PTF](/doc/pentesting/ptf/) * [Pentesting: BlackArch](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/pentesting/blackarch.md)
* [Tips for Using Linux in an HVM](/doc/linux-hvm-tips/) * [Pentesting: Kali](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/pentesting/kali.md)
* [Creating a NetBSD VM](/doc/netbsd/) * [Pentesting: PTF](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/pentesting/ptf.md)
* [Tips for Using Linux in an HVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/linux-hvm-tips.md)
* [Creating a NetBSD VM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/netbsd.md)
### Security Guides ### Security Guides
* [Security Guidelines](/doc/security-guidelines/) * [Security Guidelines](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/security-guidelines.md)
* [Using Multi-factor Authentication with Qubes](/doc/multifactor-authentication/) * [Using Multi-factor Authentication with Qubes](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/multifactor-authentication.md)
* [How to Set Up a Split Bitcoin Wallet in Qubes](/doc/split-bitcoin/) * [How to Set Up a Split Bitcoin Wallet in Qubes](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/split-bitcoin.md)
* [Split dm-crypt](https://github.com/rustybird/qubes-split-dm-crypt) * [Split dm-crypt](https://github.com/rustybird/qubes-split-dm-crypt)
* [Split SSH](https://kushaldas.in/posts/using-split-ssh-in-qubesos-4-0.html) * [Split SSH](https://kushaldas.in/posts/using-split-ssh-in-qubesos-4-0.html)
* [Using OnlyKey with Qubes OS](https://docs.crp.to/qubes.html) * [Using OnlyKey with Qubes OS](https://docs.crp.to/qubes.html)
### Privacy Guides ### Privacy Guides
* [Whonix for Privacy & Anonymity](/doc/whonix/) * [Whonix for Privacy & Anonymity](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/privacy/whonix.md)
* [Running Tails in Qubes](/doc/tails/) * [Running Tails in Qubes](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/privacy/tails.md)
* [Anonymizing your MAC Address](/doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/) * [Anonymizing your MAC Address](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/privacy/anonymizing-your-mac-address.md)
* [Signal](/doc/signal/) * [Signal](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/privacy/signal.md)
* [Reducing the fingerprint of the text-based web browser w3m](/doc/w3m/) * [Reducing the fingerprint of the text-based web browser w3m](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/w3m.md)
### Configuration Guides ### Configuration Guides
* [Qubes Tips and Tricks](/doc/tips-and-tricks/) * [Qubes Tips and Tricks](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/tips-and-tricks.md)
* [How to set up a ProxyVM as a VPN Gateway](/doc/vpn/) * [How to set up a ProxyVM as a VPN Gateway](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md)
* [Multibooting](/doc/multiboot/) * [Multibooting](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/multiboot.md)
* [Changing your Time Zone](/doc/change-time-zone/) * [Changing your Time Zone](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/change-time-zone.md)
* [Installing ZFS in Qubes](/doc/zfs/) * [Installing ZFS in Qubes](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/zfs.md)
* [Mutt Guide](/doc/mutt/) * [Mutt Guide](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/mutt.md)
* [Postfix Guide](/doc/postfix/) * [Postfix Guide](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/postfix.md)
* [Fetchmail Guide](/doc/fetchmail/) * [Fetchmail Guide](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/fetchmail.md)
* [Creating Custom NetVMs and ProxyVMs](https://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2011/09/playing-with-qubes-networking-for-fun.html) * [Creating Custom NetVMs and ProxyVMs](https://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2011/09/playing-with-qubes-networking-for-fun.html)
* [How to make proxy for individual tcp connection from networkless VM](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/4ca950ab6d7cd11a) * [How to make proxy for individual tcp connection from networkless VM](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/4ca950ab6d7cd11a)
* [Adding Bridge Support to the NetVM (EXPERIMENTAL)](/doc/network-bridge-support/) * [Adding Bridge Support to the NetVM (EXPERIMENTAL)](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/network-bridge-support.md)
* [Enabling TRIM for SSD disks](/doc/disk-trim/) * [Enabling TRIM for SSD disks](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/disk-trim.md)
* [Configuring a Network Printer](/doc/network-printer/) * [Configuring a Network Printer](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/network-printer.md)
* [Using External Audio Devices](/doc/external-audio/) * [Using External Audio Devices](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/external-audio.md)
* [Rxvt Guide](/doc/rxvt/) * [Rxvt Guide](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/rxvt.md)
* [Adding SSD storage cache](https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/a08359c9-9eb0-4d1a-ad92-a8a9bc676ea6%40googlegroups.com) * [Adding SSD storage cache](https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/a08359c9-9eb0-4d1a-ad92-a8a9bc676ea6%40googlegroups.com)
* [How to Make a Multimedia TemplateVM](/doc/multimedia/) * [How to Make a Multimedia TemplateVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/multimedia.md)
* [How to install an Nvidia driver in dom0](/doc/install-nvidia-driver/) * [How to install an Nvidia driver in dom0](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/install-nvidia-driver.md)
### Customization Guides ### Customization Guides
* [Customizing Fedora minimal templates](/doc/fedora-minimal-template-customization/) * [Customizing Fedora minimal templates](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/customization/fedora-minimal-template-customization.md)
* [Customizing Windows 7 templates](/doc/windows-template-customization/) * [Customizing Windows 7 templates](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/customization/windows-template-customization.md)
* [Language Localization](/doc/language-localization/) * [Language Localization](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/customization/language-localization.md)
* [Dark Theme in Dom0 and DomU](/doc/dark-theme/) * [Dark Theme in Dom0 and DomU](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/customization/dark-theme.md)
* [Safely Removing TemplateVM Packages (Example: Thunderbird)](/doc/removing-templatevm-packages/) * [Safely Removing TemplateVM Packages (Example: Thunderbird)](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/customization/removing-templatevm-packages.md)
### Troubleshooting ### Troubleshooting
* [Nvidia Troubleshooting](/doc/nvidia-troubleshooting/)
* [Lenovo ThinkPad Troubleshooting](/doc/thinkpad-troubleshooting/) * [Nvidia Troubleshooting](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/nvidia-troubleshooting.md)
* [Apple MacBook Troubleshooting](/doc/macbook-troubleshooting/) * [Lenovo ThinkPad Troubleshooting](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/thinkpad-troubleshooting.md)
* [Sony Vaio Troubleshooting](/doc/sony-vaio-tinkering/) * [Apple MacBook Troubleshooting](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/macbook-troubleshooting.md)
* [Intel Integrated Graphics Troubleshooting](/doc/intel-igfx-troubleshooting/) * [Sony Vaio Troubleshooting](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/sony-vaio-tinkering.md)
* [Multiboot Troubleshooting](/doc/multiboot/#troubleshooting) * [Intel Integrated Graphics Troubleshooting](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/intel-igfx-troubleshooting.md)
* [Application Troubleshooting](/doc/application-troubleshooting/) * [Multiboot Troubleshooting](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/multiboot.md#troubleshooting)
* [Tails Troubleshooting](/doc/tails-troubleshooting/) * [Application Troubleshooting](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/application-troubleshooting.md)
* [Tails Troubleshooting](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/tails-troubleshooting.md)
### Building Guides ### Building Guides
* [Building a TemplateVM based on a new OS (ArchLinux example)](/doc/building-non-fedora-template/) * [Building a TemplateVM based on a new OS (ArchLinux example)](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/building/building-non-fedora-template.md)
* [Building the Archlinux Template](/doc/building-archlinux-template/) * [Building the Archlinux Template](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/building/building-archlinux-template.md)
* [Building the Whonix Templates](/doc/building-whonix-template/) * [Building the Whonix Templates](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/building/building-whonix-template.md)
* [How to compile kernels for dom0](https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/yBeUJPwKwHM/discussion) * [How to compile kernels for dom0](https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/yBeUJPwKwHM/discussion)

454
external/building-guides/building-archlinux-template.md vendored
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@ -1,461 +1,11 @@
--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Building Archlinux Template title: Building Archlinux Template
permalink: /doc/building-archlinux-template/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/building/building-archlinux-template.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/building-archlinux-template/
- /en/doc/building-archlinux-template/ - /en/doc/building-archlinux-template/
- /doc/BuildingArchlinuxTemplate/ - /doc/BuildingArchlinuxTemplate/
- /wiki/BuildingArchlinuxTemplate/ - /wiki/BuildingArchlinuxTemplate/
--- ---
Archlinux template building instructions
===========================================
**These are the instructions for Qubes 4.0. They will take you step by step through the entire process start to finish**
1: Create and configure a qube for template building
------------------------------------------------------------
* The qube should be based on a Fedora template. I named the qube
`build-archlinux2`, based on the minimal Fedora template.
![arch-template-01](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-01.png)
* Ensure there is at least 15GB of free space in the private storage.
![arch-template-02](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-02.png)
2: Create GitHub Account (optional)
-------------------------------------------
* It can be helpful. Creating only a basic account is all that is needed. This will allow you to help, going forward, with the Qubes project. You could be help edit errors in documentation. It can also be of use building other templates.
* Create user account here https://github.com
![arch-template-03](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-03.png)
3: Install necessary packages to `build-archlinux2` qube for "Qubes Automated Build System"
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```shell_session
# dnf install git make
```
4: Downloading and verifying the integrity of the "Qubes Automated Build System"
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Import the Qubes master key
```shell_session
$ gpg --import /usr/share/qubes/qubes-master-key.asc
```
* Verify its fingerprint, set as 'trusted'. [This is described here](/doc/VerifyingSignatures).
* Download the Qubes developers' keys.
```shell_session
$ wget https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-developers-keys.asc
$ gpg --import qubes-developers-keys.asc
```
* Download the latest stable qubes-builder repository:
```shell_session
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder.git /home/user/qubes-builder/
```
* Verify the integrity of the downloaded repository. The last line should read `gpg: Good signature from`...
```shell_session
$ cd /home/user/qubes-builder/
$ git tag -v $(git describe)
```
* Install the remaining dependencies
```shell_session
$ make install-deps
```
5: Run the 'setup' script to build the builder.conf file
-------------------------------------------------------------
( The manual way would be to copy an example config like '**/home/user/qubes-builder/example-configs/qubes-os-r4.0.conf**' to '**/home/user/qubes-builder/builder.conf**' and edit the file )
* Run the 'setup' script located in '**/home/user/qubes-builder/**' Make sure you are in directory '**qubes-builder**'
```shell_session
$ cd /home/user/qubes-builder/
$ ./setup
```
![arch-template-04](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-04.png)
* Install the missing dependencies
![arch-template-05](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-05.png)
* First screen will ask you to import 'Qubes-Master-Signing-key.asc'. The 'setup' script not only downloads but confirms the key to that of the key on Qubes-OS website.
* Select '**YES**'
* Select '**OK**' Press '**Enter**'
![arch-template-06](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-06.png)
* Next screen will ask you to import Marek Marczykowski-Goracki (Qubes OS signing key). Again 'setup' will confirm this key to the fingerprint.
* Select '**YES**'
* Select '**OK**' Press '**Enter**'
![arch-template-07](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-07.png)
* This screen will give you the choice of which Qubes Release to build the template for.
* Select '**Qubes Release 4.0**'
* Select '**OK**' Press '**Enter**'
![arch-template-08](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-08.png)
* Screen "**Choose Repos To Use To Build Packages**"
* Select 'QubesOS/qubes- Stable - Default Repo'
* Select '**OK**' Press '**Enter**'
![arch-template-09](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-09.png)
* Screen "**Git Clone Faster**"
* Select '**OK**' Press '**Enter**'
![arch-template-10](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-10.png)
* Screen '**Choose Pre-Build Packages Repositories**'
* Select nothing, Press '**Enter**'
![arch-template-11](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-11.png)
* Screen "**Build Template Only?**"
* Select '**Yes**' Press '**Enter**'
![arch-template-12](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-12.png)
* Screen '**Template Distribution Selection**' will give choices of distributions to build
* Deselect everything
* Select '**archlinux**'
![arch-template-13](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-13.png)
* Screen '**Builder Plugin Selection**' will give choices of builder plugins to use for the build.
* Deselect everything
* Select '**builder-archlinux**'
* Select '**OK**' Press **Enter**
![arch-template-14](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-14.png)
* Screen '**Get sources**' wants to download additional packages needed for the choosen plugin/s.
* Select '**Yes**' Press '**Enter**'
![arch-template-15](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-15.png)
* Then wait for download to finish and press '**OK**'
6: Get all the require sources for the build
-----------------------------------------------
```shell_session
$ make get-sources
```
7: Make all the require Qubes Components
------------------------------------------------
* **Note:** You can run a single command to build all the Qubes components or you can run them each individually.
Both ways below:
* Single command to build all Qubes components together: (this command can take a long time to process depending of your pc proccessing power)
```shell_session
$ make qubes-vm
```
* These are the indivual component 'make' commands:
```shell_session
$ make vmm-xen-vm
$ make core-vchan-xen-vm
$ make core-qubesdb-vm
$ make linux-utils-vm
$ make core-agent-linux-vm
$ make gui-common-vm
$ make gui-agent-linux-vm
$ make app-linux-split-gpg-vm
$ make vmm-xen-vm
$ make core-vchan-xen-vm
$ make core-qubesdb-vm
$ make linux-utils-vm
$ make core-agent-linux-vm
$ make gui-common-vm
$ make gui-agent-linux-vm
$ make app-linux-split-gpg-vm
```
8: Make the actual Archlinux template
----------------------------------------
```shell_session
$ make template
```
9: Transfer Template into Dom0
----------------------------------
* You need to ensure these two files are in the '**noarch**' directory
```shell_session
$ cd /home/user/qubes-builder/qubes-src/linux-template-builder/rpm/
$ ls
install-templates.sh
$ cd noarch
$ ls
qubes-template-archlinux-X.X.X-XXXXXXXXXXXX.noarch.rpm
```
![arch-template-16](/attachment/wiki/ArchlinuxTemplate/arch-template-16.png)
* **Transfer the install-templates.sh script file into Dom0**
*Note: as there is not a typical file transfer method for Dom0, for security reasons, this less than simple transfer function has to be used*
* Switch to Dom0 and open a terminal window.
```shell_session
$ qvm-run --pass-io build-archlinux2 'cat /home/user/qubes-builder/qubes-src/linux-template-builder/rpm/install-templates.sh' > install-templates.sh
$ chmod +x install-templates.sh
$ ./install-templates.sh
```
* If everything went correct there should be a Archlinux template listed in your Qubes Manager
Debugging the build process
===============================
Archlinux use bleeding edge version of everything, so it is usually the
first template to break when new software version came out.
So an important point is to understand how to debug the template, how to fix
it, and then do a pull request :).
[My personal building script is here](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/code/OS-administration/build-archlinux.sh).
The most important part about this script is where to add custom code that is not in the QubesOS repositories
After the command:
```shell_session
$ make get-sources
```
And before the command:
```shell_session
$ make qubes-vm
```
you can put your custom code by replacing the qubes-src/ directories.
For example:
```shell_session
$ rm -Rf "$directory/qubes-src/gui-agent-linux/"
$ cp -R ~/qubes-gui-agent-linux "$directory/qubes-src/gui-agent-linux"
```
Example
-----------------------
Launch the build
```shell_session
$ ./build_arch.sh
```
It crash
~~~~
Makefile:202: target 'builder-archlinux.get-sources' given more than once in the same rule
Makefile:204: target 'builder-archlinux.get-sources-extra' given more than once in the same rule
Makefile:225: target 'builder-archlinux-vm' given more than once in the same rule
Makefile:237: target 'builder-archlinux-dom0' given more than once in the same rule
Makefile:585: target 'builder-archlinux.grep' given more than once in the same rule
-> Building template archlinux (logfile: build-logs/template-archlinux.log)...
make: *** [Makefile:319: template-local-archlinux+minimal] Error 1
~~~~
Let's check '**build-logs/template-archlinux.log**'
~~~~
--> Finishing installation of qubes packages...
resolving dependencies...
warning: cannot resolve "xorg-server<1.20.7", a dependency of "qubes-vm-gui"
:: The following package cannot be upgraded due to unresolvable dependencies:
qubes-vm-gui
:: Do you want to skip the above package for this upgrade? [y/N] error: failed to prepare transaction (could not satisfy dependencies)
:: unable to satisfy dependency 'xorg-server<1.20.7' required by qubes-vm-gui
make[1]: *** [Makefile:64: rootimg-build] Error 1
~~~~
The xorg-server package was probably updated to a version greater than 1.20.7.
Let's search what is the current version of xorg-server... Currently, it is
**1.20.7-1**.
Nor a fix nor a minor version change is likely to break things.
So let's find the dependency for "**xorg-server<1.20.7**" and change it to
"**xorg-server<1.21**".
```shell_session
$ rg -iuu "xorg-server<1.20.7" ./qubes-builder/qubes-src/ 2> /dev/null
./qubes-builder/qubes-src/gui-agent-linux/archlinux/PKGBUILD
55: 'xorg-server>=1.20.4' 'xorg-server<1.20.7'
```
So we need to modify the file **/archlinux/PKGBUILD** of the repository
"qubes-gui-agent-linux".
Let's clone "qubes-gui-agent-linux", be sure to checkout the correct
branch (example: `release4.0` instead of master ), and then edit the **/archlinux/PKGBUILD**
to do the modification you want to try.
In your building script, right before the "make qubes-vm", remove the existing
"gui-agent-linux" folder, and replace it with your own.
Example, add this to the script
```shell_session
$ rm -Rf "~/qubes-builder/qubes-src/gui-agent-linux/"
$ cp -R ~/qubes-gui-agent-linux "~/qubes-builder/qubes-src/gui-agent-linux"
```
and retry to build the template.
If it build successfully and that the template work as expected, do a pull request on github to share your fix.
Debugging the qube runtime
================================================================
If you are able to launch a terminal and execute command, just use your usual
archlinux-fu to fix the issue.
If you are not able to launch a terminal, then, shutdown the qube, create a new
DisposableVM, [mount the Archlinux disk in the DisposableVM](/doc/mount-lvm-image/), chroot to it, and then use
your archlinux-fu.
Below, and example of this kind of debugging [that happened on
reddit](https://old.reddit.com/r/Qubes/comments/eg50ne/built_arch_linux_template_and_installed_but_app/):
Question
------------------------------
Hello.
I just built archlinux template and moved to dom0 and installed the template.
Then I tried to open a terminal in archlinux TemplateVM, but it shows nothing.
Can you please check this logs and please tell me what is wrong. Thanks
I searched the word 'Failed" and found few.
~~~~
[0m] Failed to start..... Initialize and mount /rw and /home.... see 'systemctl status qubes-mount-dirs.service' for details
[0m] Failed unmounting.... /usr/lib/modules....
... msg='unit=qubes-mount-dirs comm="systemd" exe="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd" hostname=" addr=? terminal=? res=failed'
tsc: Fast TSC calibration failed
failed to mount moving /dev to /sysroot/dev: Invalid argument
failed to mount moving /proc to /sysroot/dev: Invalid argument
failed to mount moving /sys to /sysroot/dev: Invalid argument
failed to mount moving /run to /sysroot/dev: Invalid argument
when I tried to run terminal, in log says
audit: type=1131 audit(some number): pid=1 uid=0 auid=some number ses=some number msg='unit=systemd=tmpfiles-clean cmm="systemd" exe="/usr/lib/systemd" hostname=? addr=? terminal? res=success'
~~~~
how can I debug this qube?
Answer
---------
I tried to rebuild archlinux and got the same issue.
The issue come from a systemd unit named "qubes-mount-dirs". We want to know more about that. We can't execute command into the qube, so let's shut it down.
Then, we mount the archlinux root disk into a DisposableVM (
[mount_lvm_image.sh](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/code/OS-administration/mount_lvm_image.sh)
& [mount-lvm-image](/doc/mount-lvm-image/) )
```shell_session
$ ./mount_lvm_image.sh /dev/qubes_dom0/vm-archlinux-minimal-root fedora-dvm
```
then in the newly created DisposableVM we mount the disk and chroot to it
```shell_session
# mount /dev/xvdi3 /mnt
# chroot /mnt
```
Then check the journal:
~~~~
[root@disp9786 /]# journalctl -u qubes-mount-dirs
-- Logs begin at Fri 2019-12-27 09:26:15 CET, end at Fri 2019-12-27 09:27:58 CET. --
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux systemd[1]: Starting Initialize and mount /rw and /home...
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[420]: /usr/lib/qubes/init/setup-rwdev.sh: line 16: cmp: command not found
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[414]: Private device management: checking /dev/xvdb
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[414]: Private device management: fsck.ext4 /dev/xvdb failed:
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[414]: fsck.ext4: Bad magic number in super-block while trying to open /dev/xvdb
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[414]: /dev/xvdb:
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[414]: The superblock could not be read or does not describe a valid ext2/ext3/ext4
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[414]: filesystem. If the device is valid and it really contains an ext2/ext3/ext4
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[414]: filesystem (and not swap or ufs or something else), then the superblock
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[414]: is corrupt, and you might try running e2fsck with an alternate superblock:
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[414]: e2fsck -b 8193 <device>
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[414]: or
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[414]: e2fsck -b 32768 <device>
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[430]: mount: /rw: wrong fs type, bad option, bad superblock on /dev/xvdb, missing codepage or helper program, or other error.
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux systemd[1]: qubes-mount-dirs.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=32/n/a
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux systemd[1]: qubes-mount-dirs.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.
Dec 27 09:26:16 archlinux systemd[1]: Failed to start Initialize and mount /rw and /home.
-- Reboot --
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[423]: /usr/lib/qubes/init/setup-rwdev.sh: line 16: cmp: command not found
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[416]: Private device management: checking /dev/xvdb
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux systemd[1]: Starting Initialize and mount /rw and /home...
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[416]: Private device management: fsck.ext4 /dev/xvdb failed:
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[416]: fsck.ext4: Bad magic number in super-block while trying to open /dev/xvdb
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[416]: /dev/xvdb:
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[416]: The superblock could not be read or does not describe a valid ext2/ext3/ext4
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[416]: filesystem. If the device is valid and it really contains an ext2/ext3/ext4
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[416]: filesystem (and not swap or ufs or something else), then the superblock
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[416]: is corrupt, and you might try running e2fsck with an alternate superblock:
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[416]: e2fsck -b 8193 <device>
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[416]: or
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[416]: e2fsck -b 32768 <device>
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux mount-dirs.sh[432]: mount: /rw: wrong fs type, bad option, bad superblock on /dev/xvdb, missing codepage or helper program, or other error.
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux systemd[1]: qubes-mount-dirs.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=32/n/a
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux systemd[1]: qubes-mount-dirs.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.
Dec 27 09:26:54 archlinux systemd[1]: Failed to start Initialize and mount /rw and /home.
~~~~
The most important line we saw is:
~~~~
/usr/lib/qubes/init/setup-rwdev.sh: line 16: cmp: command not found
~~~~
Let's check `setup-rwdev.sh`:
~~~~
[root@disp9786 /]# cat /usr/lib/qubes/init/setup-rwdev.sh
#!/bin/sh
set -e
dev=/dev/xvdb
max_size=1073741824 # check at most 1 GiB
if [ -e "$dev" ] ; then
# The private /dev/xvdb device is present.
# check if private.img (xvdb) is empty - all zeros
private_size=$(( $(blockdev --getsz "$dev") * 512))
if [ $private_size -gt $max_size ]; then
private_size=$max_size
fi
if cmp --bytes $private_size "$dev" /dev/zero >/dev/null && { blkid -p "$dev" >/dev/null; [ $? -eq 2 ]; }; then
# the device is empty, create filesystem
echo "Virgin boot of the VM: creating private.img filesystem on $dev" >&2
if ! content=$(mkfs.ext4 -m 0 -q "$dev" 2>&1) ; then
echo "Virgin boot of the VM: creation of private.img on $dev failed:" >&2
echo "$content" >&2
echo "Virgin boot of the VM: aborting" >&2
exit 1
fi
#.................
~~~~
That is definitely something that we want to be working. So the binary `cmp` is missing, let's find it:
```shell_session
# pacman -Fy cmp
```
It is in `core/diffutils`, that, for some unknown reason, is not installed.
Let's modify the archlinux template builder to add this package. Modify the files `qubes-builder/qubes-src/builder-archlinux/script/packages` to add the `diffutils`, and rebuild the template.
Why this package was not installed in the first place? I am unsure. It could be that it was a dependency of the package `xf86dgaproto` that was removed few days ago, but I don't have the PKGBUILD of this package since it was deleted, so can't confirm. It can be something else too.
I rebuild the template with those modification, and it is working as expected.
I will send a pull request. Does someone have a better idea on "Why `diffutils` was not installed in the first place?" ?
[The commit](https://github.com/neowutran/qubes-builder-archlinux/commit/09a435fcc6bdcb19144d198ea20f7a27826c1d80)
Creating a archlinux repository
===========================
Once the template have been build, you could use the generated archlinux packages to create your own archlinux repository for QubesOS packages.
You need to:
* Sign the packages with your GPG key
* Host the packages on your HTTP server
I will assume that you already have a working http server.
So you need to sign the packages and transmit everything to the qubes that will upload them to your http server.
The script `update-remote-repo.sh` of the qubes-builder-archlinux repository can do that.
Below, an example of code that sign the packages + template rpm file, and transmit everything to another qube.
```bash
$directory/qubes-src/builder-archlinux/update-remote-repo.sh
rpmfile=$(ls -1 $directory/qubes-src/linux-template-builder/rpm/noarch/*.rpm | head -n 1)
qubes-gpg-client-wrapper --detach-sign $rpmfile > $rpmfile.sig
qvm-copy $rpmfile
qvm-copy $rpmfile.sig
qvm-copy $directory/qubes-packages-mirror-repo/vm-archlinux/pkgs/
```
Upload everything to your http server, and you are good.
You can now modify the file `/etc/pacman.d/99-qubes-repository-4.0.conf` in your archlinux template to use your repository.
Example of content for this file (replace the server URL with your own):
```
[qubes]
Server = https://neowutran.ovh/qubes/vm-archlinux/pkgs
```
About the package `qubes-vm-keyring`
=====================================
The goal of this package was to add a `pacman` source for the Qubes OS packages, and to set the maintainer gpg key as trusted.
Currently, no one want to provide binary packages.
**So this package is currently useless.**
If in the future, enough people think it is better to restart providing binary packages instead of the current "Do It Yourself" way, the gpg key and fingerprint of the new maintainer should be added in the files below:
* https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-agent-linux/blob/master/archlinux/PKGBUILD-keyring-keys
* https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-agent-linux/blob/master/archlinux/archlinux/PKGBUILD-keyring-trusted

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@ -1,168 +1,11 @@
--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Building Non-Fedora Template title: Building Non-Fedora Template
permalink: /doc/building-non-fedora-template/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/building/building-non-fedora-template.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/building-non-fedora-template/
- /en/doc/building-non-fedora-template/ - /en/doc/building-non-fedora-template/
- /doc/BuildingNonFedoraTemplate/ - /doc/BuildingNonFedoraTemplate/
- /wiki/BuildingNonFedoraTemplate/ - /wiki/BuildingNonFedoraTemplate/
--- ---
Building a TemplateVM for a new OS
==============================================================
If you don't like using one of the existing templates because of specific administration, package management or other building needs, you can build a TemplateVM for your distribution of choice.
This article shows how to go about building a template for a different OS.
You should make sure you understand the details of the BuilderPlugins API - they are explained [here][API].
Qubes builder scripts
=====================
One way to start is by creating Qubes builder scripts for your new OS.
Note that this will probably make your testing process harder than trying to build the package directly in an HVM on which you have already installed the new OS.
chroot initialization
---------------------
You need to customize some scripts that will be used to build all the Qubes tools.
Create a new directory to hold the files for the new os.
You can start from the Fedora scripts in `builder-rpm/template-scripts`, and see how they have been changed for Debian and Archlinux.
The scripts you need are in :
~~~
builder-archlinux/scripts
builder-debian/template-debian
builder-rpm/template-scripts
~~~
### 00\_prepare.sh
The goal of the first script `00_prepare.sh` is to download and verify the signature of the installation CD and tools, or the native tools for building an OS.
You can use the `$CACHEDIR` directory variable to store files that could be reused (such as downloaded scripts or iso files).
### 01\_install\_core.sh
The goal of this script is to install a base environment of your target OS inside the `$INSTALLDIR` directory variable.
Generally you need to bootstrap/install your package manager inside the `$INSTALLDIR` directory and install the base packages.
### Testing the installation process
Edit the file `builder.conf` to change the variable `$DISTS_VM` to your OS name (`DISTS_VM=your_os_name`).
Then try to create (make) the template to check that at least these first two scripts are working correctly:
~~~
make linux-template-builder
~~~
Qubes builder Makefiles
-----------------------
Now you need to create Makefiles specific to your OS.
You will find the required scripts to adapt in the `builder-*` folders:
~~~
prepare-chroot-yourOSname
Makefile.yourOSname
~~~
### prepare-chroot-yourOSname
The goal of this file is to prepare a development environment of your target OS inside a chroot.
You will reuse the `00_prepare.sh` and `01_install_core.sh` scripts.
Additionally, the following things have to be done in this Makefile:
- the `$1` variable will contain the installation directory (`$INSTALLDIR` should contain the same value as `$1` when you run `00_prepare.sh` or `01_install_core.sh`)
- after your base system is installed, you should install development tools and libraries (gcc, make, ...)
- create a user called 'user' inside your chroot, and give them enough rights to run the command sudo without any password
- register all the repositories that will be necessary and synchronize the package database
- register a custom repository that will be used to store Qubes packages
### Makefile.yourOSname
This file will be used to define the action required when installing a custom package.
The most important one are:
- `dist-prepare-chroot`: that's where you will call `prepare-chroot-yourOSname` if the chroot has not been initialized.
- `dist-package`: that's where you will chroot the development environment and run the command used to build a package.
- `dist-build-dep`: that's where you will create the custom repository for your target OS based on already compiled packages.
These additional targets need to exist once you have created your first packages:
- `dist-copy-out`: that's where you will retrieve the package you just built and put it with all the other packages you prepared.
- `update-repo`: that's where you will retrieve the package that has been built and add it to the custom repository.
### Testing the development chroot
You will be able to test these scripts when making the first Qubes packages.
Don't forget that the first things that run when running `make somecomponent-vm` will be these two scripts, and that you will need to debug it at this point.
Qubes packages
--------------
* [vmm-xen](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-vmm-xen)
* [core-vchan-xen](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-vchan-xen)
* [linux-utils](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-utils)
* [core-agent-linux](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-agent-linux)
* [gui-common](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-gui-common)
* [gui-agent-linux](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-gui-agent-linux)
Additional Installation scripts
-------------------------------
Again you need to create new scripts based on the existing scripts in these folders:
~~~
builder-archlinux/scripts
builder-debian/template-debian
builder-rpm/template-scripts
~~~
### 02\_install\_groups.sh
The goal of this script is to install all the packages that you want to use in your template (eg: firefox, thunderbird, a file manager, Xorg...).
### 04\_install\_qubes.sh
The goal of this script is to install in your template all the packages you built previously.
Also you need to edit the fstab file of your template to mount Qubes virtual hard drives.
### 09\_cleanup.sh
This script is used to finalize and to remove unnecessary things from your template, such as cached packages, unused development packages ...
Starting with an HVM
====================
If no Qubes packages are available for your selected OS you could start by installing your OS in an HVM.
Your goals will be:
- to identify how to install the OS using command lines
- to create required Qubes packages
- to identify potential issues, making sure all Qubes agents and scripts work correctly.
As soon as you manage to get `qrexec` and `qubes-gui-agent` working, you will be ready to start preparing a template VM.
### Xen libraries
Several Xen libraries are required for Qubes to work correctly.
In fact, you need to make `xenstore` commands working before anything else.
For this, Qubes git can be used as several patches have been selected by Qubes developers that could impact the activity inside a VM.
Start by retrieving a recent git and identify how you can build a package from it: `git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-vmm-xen.git`.
Find the .spec file in the git repository (this is the file used to build rpm packages), and try to adapt it to your OS in order to build a package similar to the target 'vmm-xen'.
For example, a PKGBUILD has been created for
[ArchLinux](/doc/building-archlinux-template/) which can be found in the vmm-xen repository.
Don't be afraid of the complexity of the PKGBUILD: most of the code is almost a copy/paste of required sources and patches found in the .spec file provided in the git repository.
Note once the package has been successfully compiled and installed, you need to setup XEN filesystem.
Add the following line to your fstab (you can create this line in your package install script):
`xen /proc/xen xenfs defaults 0 0`.
Now install the package you built and mount `/proc/xen`.
Verify that xenstore-read works by running: `xenstore-read name`. That should give you the current qube name.
[API]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/blob/master/doc/BuilderPluginAPI.md

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@ -1,94 +1,9 @@
--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Building Whonix Templates title: Building Whonix Templates
permalink: /doc/building-whonix-template/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/building/building-whonix-template.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/building-whonix-template/
- /en/doc/building-whonix-template/ - /en/doc/building-whonix-template/
--- ---
## Building Whonix Templates
The Whonix templates are easily downloaded and installed by following the [procedure here](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Install).
However, they are integrated into `qubes-builder` so they are straight-forward to build yourself if you prefer.
Many other Qubes templates can also be built by following this procedure.
Simply choose the appropriate builder(s) and template(s) you wish to build in the `./setup` procedure below.
Always include the `mgmt-salt` builder.
First, set up the [Build Environment](/doc/qubes-iso-building/#build-environment) (follow the build environment section only).
Next, configure the builder:
~~~
cd ~/qubes-builder
./setup
# Select Yes to add Qubes Master Signing Key
# Select Yes to add Qubes OS Signing Key
# Select 4.0 for version
# Stable
# Select Current (if you want the option to use pre-built packages)
# Yes (we want to build only templates)
# Select fc29 and stretch (for the currently shipping templates)
# Select builder-rpm, builder-debian, template-whonix, mgmt-salt
# Yes (to download)
~~~
Once it completes downloading, re-run `setup` to add the Whonix templates:
~~~
./setup
# Choose the same options as above, except at templates select:
# whonix-gateway-14, whonix-workstation-14
# If prompted, choose Yes to add adrelanos's third party key
~~~
Continue the build process with:
~~~
make install-deps
make get-sources
~~~
You will often need to edit/update `qubes-src/template-whonix/builder.conf` at this stage to specify the currently shipping Tor Browser version.
Open it in your favorite editor, then look for "Extra Whonix Build Options" and add/edit the `WHONIX_TBB_VERSION` variable to specify the current version.
For example:
```
################################################################################
# Extra Whonix Build Options
################################################################################
# Whonix repository.
WHONIX_APT_REPOSITORY_OPTS ?= stable
#WHONIX_APT_REPOSITORY_OPTS = off
# Use turbo mode to build template
BUILDER_TURBO_MODE ?= 1
# Enable Tor by default (0: disable; 1: enable)
WHONIX_ENABLE_TOR ?= 0
WHONIX_TBB_VERSION ?= 7.5.2
```
You can add/edit the `WHONIX_TBB_VERSION` variable in `~/qubes-builder/builder.conf` instead of this file if preferred.
Finally, use:
~~~
make qubes-vm
make template
~~~
Once the build is complete, the install packages for your newly built templates will be located in `~/qubes-builder/qubes-src/linux-template-builder/rpm/noarch`.
Copy them from there to dom0 and install:
~~~
qvm-run --pass-io <src-vm> 'cat ~/qubes-builder/qubes-src/linux-template-builder/rpm/noarch/qubes-template-whonix-gw-4.0.0-201802250036.noarch.rpm' > ~/qubes-template-whonix-gw-4.0.0-201802250036.noarch.rpm
qvm-run --pass-io <src-vm> 'cat ~/qubes-builder/qubes-src/linux-template-builder/rpm/noarch/qubes-template-whonix-ws-4.0.0-201802250145.noarch.rpm' > ~/qubes-template-whonix-ws-4.0.0-201802250145.noarch.rpm
sudo dnf install qubes-template-whonix-gw-4.0.0-201802250036.noarch.rpm
sudo dnf install qubes-template-whonix-ws-4.0.0-201802250145.noarch.rpm
~~~
And you are done!

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@ -1,36 +1,8 @@
--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Changing your Time Zone title: Changing your Time Zone
permalink: /doc/change-time-zone/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/change-time-zone.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/change-time-zone/
--- ---
# Changing your Time Zone #
## Qubes 4.0 ##
### Command line ###
If you use the i3 window manager or would prefer to change the system's time
zone in terminal you can issue the `timedatectl` command with the option
`set-timezone`.
For example, to set the system's time zone to Berlin, Germany type in a dom0
terminal:
$ sudo timedatectl set-timezone 'Europe/Berlin'
You can list the available time zones with the option `list-timezones` and show
the current settings of the system clock and time zone with option `status`.
Example output status of `timedatectl` on a system with time zone set to
Europe/Berlin:
[user@dom0 ~]$ timedatectl status
Local time: Sun 2018-10-14 06:20:00 CEST
Universal time: Sun 2018-10-14 04:20:00 UTC
RTC time: Sun 2018-10-14 04:20:00
Time zone: Europe/Berlin (CEST, +0200)
Network time on: no
NTP synchronized: no
RTC in local TZ: no

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@ -1,112 +1,11 @@
--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Disk TRIM title: Disk TRIM
permalink: /doc/disk-trim/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/disk-trim.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/disk-trim/
- /en/doc/disk-trim/ - /en/doc/disk-trim/
- /doc/DiskTRIM/ - /doc/DiskTRIM/
- /wiki/DiskTRIM/ - /wiki/DiskTRIM/
--- ---
Disk Trim
=========
Disk trimming is the procedure by which the operating system informs the underlying storage device of which storage blocks are no longer in use.
It does this by issuing an `ATA_TRIM` command for the block. This is also known as a `discard`.
In this way, the storage device can perform garbage collection of the unused blocks and internally prepare them for reuse. SSDs in general benefit from this, while HDDs do not.
In a Linux system running on bare metal, this is relatively straight-forward.
When instructed by the operating system, discards are issued by the file-system driver directly to the storage driver and then to the SSD.
In Qubes, this gets more complex due to virtualization, LUKS, and LVM (and thin pools on R4.0 and up).
If you run `fstrim --all` inside a TemplateVM, in a worst case the `discard` can follow a path like:
OS -> File-system Driver -> Virtual Storage Driver -> Backend Storage Driver -> LVM Storage Driver -> LUKS Driver -> Physical Storage Driver -> Physical Storage Device
If discards are not supported at any one of those layers, it will not make it to the underlying physical device.
There are some security implications to permitting TRIM (read for example [this article](https://asalor.blogspot.com/2011/08/trim-dm-crypt-problems.html)), but in most cases not exploitable.
Conversely, TRIM can improve security against local forensics when using SSDs, because with TRIM enabled deleting data (usually) results in the actual data being erased quickly, rather than remaining in unallocated space indefinitely.
However deletion is not guaranteed, and can fail to happen without warning for a variety of reasons.
Configuration
----------
In all versions of Qubes, you may want to set up a periodic job in `dom0` to trim the disk.
This can be done with either systemd (weekly only) or cron (daily or weekly).
* **Systemd**
From a terminal as a regular user:
```
systemctl enable fstrim.timer
systemctl start fstrim.timer
```
* **Cron**
This can be done from a terminal as root, by creating a `trim` file in `/etc/cron.daily` (or `/etc/cron.weekly`).
Add the following contents:
```
#!/bin/bash
/sbin/fstrim --all
```
And mark it as executable with `chmod 755 /etc/cron.daily/trim`.
**Note** Although discards can be issued on every delete inside `dom0` by adding the `discard` mount option to `/etc/fstab`, this option can hurt performance so the above procedure is recommended instead.
However, inside App and Template qubes, the `discard` mount option is on by default to notify the LVM thin pool driver that the space is no longer needed and can be zeroed and re-used.
If you are using Qubes with LVM, you may also want to set `issue_discards = 1` in `/etc/lvm/lvm.conf`.
Setting this option will permit LVM to issue discards to the SSD when logical volumes are shrunk or deleted.
In R4.x, LVM Logical volumes are frequently deleted (every time a disposable VM is shut down, for example) so you may want to set `issue_discards = 1` if using an SSD, but see the article linked in the first section of this page.
However, this is relatively rare in R3.x.
LUKS
----------
If you have enabled LUKS in dom0, discards will not get passed down to the storage device.
To enable TRIM support in dom0 with LUKS you need to:
1. Get your LUKS device UUID:
~~~
ls /dev/mapper/luks-*
~~~
2. Add entry to `/etc/crypttab` (replace luks-\<UUID\> with the device name and the \<UUID\> with UUID alone):
~~~
luks-<UUID> UUID=<UUID> none discard
~~~
3. Add `rd.luks.options=discard` to kernel cmdline (follow either GRUB2 or EFI, not both):
* GRUB2: `/etc/default/grub`, `GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX` line and
Rebuild grub config (`grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg`), then
Rebuild initrd (`dracut -f`)
* EFI: `/boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg`, `kernel=` line(s), then
Rebuild initrd (`dracut -f /boot/efi/EFI/qubes/initramfs-$(uname -r).img $(uname -r)`)
4. Reboot the system.
5. To verify if discards are enabled you may use `dmsetup table` (confirm the line for your device mentions "discards") or just run `fstrim -av` (you should see a `/` followed by the number of bytes trimmed).
Swap Space
----------
By default TRIM is not enabled for swap.
To enable it add the `discard` flag to the options for the swap entry in `/etc/fstab`.
This may or may not actually improve performance.
If you only want the security against local forensics benefit of TRIM, you can use the `discard=once` option instead to only perform the TRIM operation once during at boot.
To verify that TRIM is enabled, check `dmesg` for what flags were enabled when the swap space was activated.
You should see something like the following:
Adding 32391164k swap on /dev/mapper/qubes_dom0-swap. Priority:-2 extents:1 across:32391164k SSDscFS
The `s` indicates that the entire swap device will be trimmed at boot, and `c` indicates that individual pages are trimmed after they are no longer being used.

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: External Audio title: External Audio
permalink: /doc/external-audio/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/external-audio.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/external-audio/
- /en/doc/external-audio/ - /en/doc/external-audio/
- /doc/ExternalAudio/ - /doc/ExternalAudio/
- /wiki/ExternalAudio/ - /wiki/ExternalAudio/
--- ---
Using External Audio Devices
============================
Why you want to use external audio devices
------------------------------------------
Qubes audio virtualization protocol does not implement latency reporting for security reasons, keeping the protocol as simple as possible.
Also, in a compromise between low latency and low CPU usage, latency may be around 200 ms.
So applications demanding higher audio quality (even Skype) need a better environment.
But Qubes flexibility fully allows that using external audio devices.
These are mostly USB audio cards, but firewire devices also might be used.
Implementing external audio devices
-----------------------------------
First you need to identify an user VM dedicated to audio and [assign a device](/doc/AssigningDevices) to it.
In the most common case the assigned device is the USB controller to which your USB audio card will be connected.
### Fedora VMs
In a terminal of the template from which you user VM depends, install pavucontrol with:
~~~
sudo dnf install pavucontrol
~~~
Close the template and start or restart your user VM, insert your external audio device, open a terminal and prepare pulseaudio to use it with:
~~~
sudo chmod a+rw /dev/snd/*
pactl load-module module-udev-detect
~~~
Start the audio application that is going to use the external audio device.
Launch pavucontrol, for example using "run command in VM" of Qubes Manager and select your external audio card in pavucontrol.
You need to do that only the first time you use a new external audio device, then pulse audio will remember your selection.
If you detach your external audio device, then want to insert it again (or want to change it with another one), you need to repeat the previous commands in terminal adding another line at the beginning:
~~~
pactl unload-module module-udev-detect
sudo chmod a+rw /dev/snd/*
pactl load-module module-udev-detect
~~~

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Fetchmail title: Fetchmail
permalink: /doc/fetchmail/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/fetchmail.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/fetchmail/
- /en/doc/fetchmail/ - /en/doc/fetchmail/
- /doc/Fetchmail/ - /doc/Fetchmail/
- /wiki/Fetchmail/ - /wiki/Fetchmail/
--- ---
Fetchmail
=========
Fetchmail is standalone MRA (Mail Retrieval Agent) aka "IMAP/POP3 client". Its sole purpose is to fetch your messages and store it locally or feed to local MTA (Message Transfer Agent). It cannot "read" messages — for that, use a MUA like Thunderbird or [Mutt](/doc/mutt/).
Installation
------------
`dnf install fetchmail`
Configuration
-------------
Assuming you have more than one account (safe assumption these days), you need to spawn multiple fetchmail instances, one for each IMAP/POP3 server (though one instance can watch over several accounts on one server). The easiest way is to create template systemd unit and start it several times. Fedora does not supply any, so we have to write one anyway.
**NOTE:** this assumes you use [Postfix](/doc/postfix/) or Exim4 as your local MTA.
In TemplateVM create `/etc/systemd/system/fetchmail@.service`:
~~~
[Unit]
Description=Mail Retrieval Agent
After=network.target
Requires=postfix.service
[Service]
User=user
ExecStart=/bin/fetchmail -f /usr/local/etc/fetchmail/%I.rc -d 60 -i /usr/local/etc/fetchmail/.%I.fetchids --pidfile /usr/local/etc/fetchmail/.%I.pid
RestartSec=1
~~~
Alternatively, in Debian with Exim4:
~~~
[Unit]
Description=Mail Retrieval Agent
After=network.target
Requires=exim4.service
[Service]
User=user
ExecStart=/usr/bin/fetchmail -f /usr/local/etc/fetchmail/%I.rc -d 60 -i /usr/local/etc/fetchmail/.%I.fetchids --pidfile /usr/local/etc/fetchmail/.%I.pid
RestartSec=1
~~~
Then shutdown TemplateVM, start AppVM and create directory `/usr/local/etc/fetchmail`. In it, create one `.rc` file for each instance of fetchmail, ie. `personal1.rc` and `personal2.rc`. Sample configuration file:
~~~
set syslog
set no bouncemail
#set daemon 600
poll mailserver1.com proto imap
no dns
uidl
tracepolls
user woju pass supersecret
ssl
sslproto "TLS1"
sslcertfile "/etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/openssl/ca-bundle.trust.crt"
sslcertck
mda "/usr/sbin/sendmail -i -f %F -- user"
fetchall
idle
# vim: ft=fetchmail
~~~
Then `chown -R user:user /usr/local/etc/fetchmail` and `chmod 600 /usr/local/etc/fetchmail/*.rc`. **This is important**, fetchmail will refuse to run with wrong permissions on its rc-file.
Next, add this to `/rw/config/rc.local`:
~~~
#!/bin/sh
for rc in /usr/local/etc/fetchmail/*.rc; do
instance=${rc%.*}
instance=${instance##*/}
systemctl --no-block start fetchmail@${instance}
done
~~~
Make sure the folder '/rw/config/qubes-bind-dirs.d' exists.
~~~
sudo mkdir -p /rw/config/qubes-bind-dirs.d
~~~
Create the file '/rw/config/qubes-bind-dirs.d/50_user.conf' with root rights.
Now edit it to append the '/var/spool/mail/' directory to the binds variable.
~~~
binds+=( '/var/spool/mail' )
~~~
Now reboot your AppVM and you are done.

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: How to Install an Nvidia Driver title: How to Install an Nvidia Driver
permalink: /doc/install-nvidia-driver/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/install-nvidia-driver.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/install-nvidia-driver/
- /en/doc/install-nvidia-driver/ - /en/doc/install-nvidia-driver/
- /doc/InstallNvidiaDriver/ - /doc/InstallNvidiaDriver/
- /wiki/InstallNvidiaDriver/ - /wiki/InstallNvidiaDriver/
--- ---
# Nvidia proprietary driver installation
You can use rpm packages from rpmfusion, or you can build the driver yourself.
## Word of Caution
Proprietary (NVIDIA/AMD) drivers are known to be sometimes highly problematic, or completely unsupported.
Radeon driver support is prebaked in the Qubes kernel (v4.4.14-11) but only versions 4000-9000 give or take.
Support for newer cards is limited until AMDGPU support in the 4.5+ kernel, which isn't released yet for Qubes.
Built in Intel graphics, Radeon graphics (between that 4000-9000 range), and perhaps some prebaked NVIDIA card support that I don't know about. Those are your best bet for great Qubes support.
If you do happen to get proprietary drivers working on your Qubes system (via installing them), please take the time to go to the
[Hardware Compatibility List (HCL)](/doc/hcl/#generating-and-submitting-new-reports )
Add your computer, graphics card, and installation steps you did to get everything working.
Before continuing, you may wish to try the `kernel-latest` package from the `current` repository. This kernel may better support your card and if so, you would not have to rely on proprietary drivers. This can be installed from dom0 with:
~~~
sudo qubes-dom0-update kernel-latest
~~~
## RpmFusion packages
There are rpm packages with all necessary software on rpmfusion. The only package you have to compile is the kernel module (but there is a ready built src.rpm package).
### Download packages
You will need any Fedora 18 system to download and build packages. You can use Qubes AppVM for it, but it isn't necessary. To download packages from rpmfusion - add this repository to your yum configuration (instructions are on their website). Then download packages using yumdownloader:
~~~
yumdownloader --resolve xorg-x11-drv-nvidia
yumdownloader --source nvidia-kmod
~~~
### Build kernel package
You will need at least kernel-devel (matching your Qubes dom0 kernel), rpmbuild tool and kmodtool, and then you can use it to build the package:
~~~
yum install kernel-devel rpm-build kmodtool
rpmbuild --nodeps -D "kernels `uname -r`" --rebuild nvidia-kmod-260.19.36-1.fc13.3.src.rpm
~~~
In the above command, replace `uname -r` with kernel version from your Qubes dom0. If everything went right, you have now complete packages with nvidia drivers for the Qubes system. Transfer them to dom0 (e.g. using a USB stick) and install (using standard "yum install /path/to/file").
Then you need to disable nouveau (normally it is done by install scripts from nvidia package, but unfortunately it isn't compatible with Qubes...):
Edit /etc/default/grub:
~~~
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="quiet rhgb nouveau.modeset=0 rd.driver.blacklist=nouveau video=vesa:off"
~~~
Regenerate grub configuration:
~~~
grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
~~~
Reboot.
## Manual installation
This process is quite complicated: First - download the source from nvidia.com site. Here "NVIDIA-Linux-x86\_64-260.19.44.run" is used. Copy it to dom0. Every next step is done in dom0.
See [this page](/doc/copy-to-dom0/) for instructions on how to transfer files to Dom0 (where there is normally no networking).
**WARNING**: Nvidia doesn't sign their files. To make it worse, you are forced to download them over a plaintext connection. This means there are virtually dozens of possibilities for somebody to modify this file and provide you with a malicious/backdoored file. You should realize that installing untrusted files into your Dom0 is a bad idea. Perhaps it might be a better idea to just get a new laptop with integrated Intel GPU? You have been warned.
### Userspace components
Install libraries, Xorg driver, configuration utilities. This can by done by nvidia-installer:
~~~
./NVIDIA-Linux-x86_64-260.19.44.run --ui=none --no-x-check --keep --no-nouveau-check --no-kernel-module
~~~
### Kernel module
You will need:
- nvidia kernel module sources (left from previous step)
- kernel-devel package installed
- gcc, make, etc
This installation must be done manually, because nvidia-installer refused to install it on Xen kernel. Firstly ensure that kernel-devel package installed all needed files. This should consist of:
- */usr/src/kernels/2.6.34.1-12.xenlinux.qubes.x86\_64*
- */lib/modules/2.6.34.1-12.xenlinux.qubes.x86\_64/build* symlinked to the above directory
- */usr/src/kernels/2.6.34.1-12.xenlinux.qubes.x86\_64/arch/x64/include/mach-xen* should be present (if not - take it from kernel sources)
If all the files are not there correct the errors manually. To build the kernel module, enter *NVIDIA-Linux-x86\_64-260.19.44/kernel* directory and execute:
~~~
make
IGNORE_XEN_PRESENCE=1 CC="gcc -DNV_VMAP_4_PRESENT -DNV_SIGNAL_STRUCT_RLIM" make -f Makefile.kbuild
mv /lib/modules/2.6.34.1-12.xenlinux.qubes.x86_64/kernel/drivers/video/nvidia.ko /lib/modules/2.6.34.1-12.xenlinux.qubes.x86_64/extra/
~~~
Ignore any errors while inserting nvidia.ko (at the end of make phase).
### Disable nouveau:
~~~
cat /etc/modprobe.d/nouveau-disable.conf
# blacklist isn't enough...
install nouveau /bin/true
~~~
Add *rdblacklist=nouveau* option to /boot/grub/menu.lst (at the end of line containing *vmlinuz*).
### Configure Xorg
Finally, you should configure Xorg to use nvidia driver. You can use *nvidia-xconfig* or do it manually:
~~~
X -configure
mv /root/xorg.conf.new /etc/X11/xorg.conf
# replace Driver in Device section by "nvidia"
~~~
Reboot to verify all this works.
## Troubleshooting lack of video output during installation
The GRUB menu may show up fine, the installation environment starts loading, and then the display(s) go into standby mode. This is, typically, related to some sort of an issue with the kernel's KMS/video card modules. See the [Nvidia Troubleshooting](/doc/nvidia-troubleshooting/#lack-of-video-output-during-nvidia-driver-installation) guide for troubleshooting steps.

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Multibooting title: Multibooting
permalink: /doc/multiboot/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/multiboot.md
redirect_from:
- https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/multiboot.md
--- ---
Multibooting Qubes
========================================
Introduction
---------------------
You should think carefully before dual booting Qubes on your box.
Read the [guidelines](/doc/security-guidelines) carefully.
One problem is that when you dual or multiboot, even if you are using
encryption on your Qubes installation, /boot is still unprotected and
could be maliciously modified by the other OS, possibly leading to Qubes
itself being maliciously modified.
The other problem is firmware security - for example the other system
could infect the BIOS firmware, which might enable compromise or spying on
the Qubes system.
You can use [Anti Evil Maid](/doc/anti-evil-maid/), which would inform
you if /boot had been modified, but it cannot prevent or fix the problem.
If you have considered these issues, tried out the live system and want to
install Qubes alongside your existing OS, these notes should help.
They assume that you are installing Qubes on a PC where you already have
another OS installed.
The first thing to do is STOP.
Before you do anything else back up all your data.
If possible do a full system backup.
Back up the MBR.
Back up /boot.
If you are really paranoid clone your disc.
Make sure you have install discs on hand for the existing operating system.
Qubes by default does not include other systems in the generated grub menu,
because handling of other systems has been disabled. This means
that you will have to manually add grub entries for any other OS.
The general approach is:
* Enable legacy boot mode
* Ensure current OS boots in legacy mode
* Install Qubes
* Manually add boot stanzas to /etc/grub.d/40_custom
* Update grub
Windows
----------------------
If you change boot mode to legacy boot almost certainly the Windows
installation will not boot.
You will either have to format the disk and reinitialise it, and then reinstall
Windows in legacy boot mode, or use a utility like Easy Recovery Essentials
which will change the existing installation to be bootable in both
UEFI/GPT and BIOS/MBR mode in-place, without losing any data.
At this stage you can install Qubes.
As noted above the default configuration will not add an entry for Windows to
the grub menu, so you will need to add one.
1. Boot into Qubes
2. Identify the Windows system partition that has /bootmgr:
In blkid output, the system partition is the one with LABEL='SYSTEM
RESERVED' or LABEL='SYSTEM' and is only about 100 to 200 MB in size
3. Add this stanza to /etc/grub.d/40_custom:
~~~
menuentry "Windows" {
insmod part_msdos
insmod ntldr
insmod ntfs
ntldr (hd1,X)/bootmgr
}
~~~
(Change `X` to reflect the relevant system partition.)
Then update the grub config:
~~~
sudo grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
~~~
There is no need to reinstall grub itself.
If the above stanza does not work, you may try this one (at your own risk!)
instead:
~~~
menuentry "Windows" {
insmod part_msdos
insmod ntfs
set root='(hd0,msdosX)'
chainloader +1
}
~~~
(Change `X` to reflect the relevant system partition.)
Linux
----------------------
If you have had to change to legacy boot mode then you may have to reinstall grub in
the existing OS. (Make sure that you use grub rather than a grub-efi version).
Micah Lee
[suggests](https://micahflee.com/2014/04/dual-booting-qubes-and-ubuntu-with-encrypted-disks/)
installing grub to a partition, and then installing Qubes with grub
installed in MBR.
If you take this approach then you need to add to /etc/grub.d/40_custom in Qubes
dom0:
~~~
menuentry "Other Linux" {
set root=(hd1,X)
chainloader +1
}
(Change X to reflect the relevant partition where grub is installed.)
~~~
Then update the grub config:
~~~
sudo grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
~~~
There is no need to reinstall grub itself.
Existing /boot partition, grub installed in MBR
----------------------
Most distros will have already installed grub to the MBR.
It is possible to use the *same* /boot for both OS.
To do this, do **NOT** choose the automatic configuration option when installing
Qubes.
Select 'custom' layout, and assign the existing /boot partition as /boot.
Deselect the 'Format' option.
Then continue with the installation.
This will install the qubes boot files in /boot *alongside* the existing files,
but overwrite the grub.cfg file in /boot/grub2.
If the other distro uses legacy grub you can simply copy the relevant sections
from /boot/grub/grub.cfg into /etc/grub.d/40_custom.
If the other distro uses grub2 then copy the relevant sections
from the backup you made into /etc/grub.d/40_custom.
Then update the grub config:
~~~
sudo grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
~~~
Troubleshooting
----------------------
If you install Qubes without making any backups beforehand, don't worry.
If you didn't overwrite the original partitions, then it is usually
possible to recover your old systems relatively easily, as described above.
If you decided to use a shared /boot and *don't* have backups of your previous
grub config, it is quite easy to fix this.
This example may help.
* Boot into Qubes
* Back up (at a minimum) /boot/grub2
* Identify the partition containing the other OS
* Then mount the other OS and chroot in to it:
~~~
sudo mount /dev/sdX /mnt
sudo mount --bind /dev/sdY /mnt/boot
sudo mount --bind /dev /mnt/dev
sudo mount --bind /dev/pts /mnt/dev/pts
sudo mount --bind /proc /mnt/proc
sudo mount --bind /sys /mnt/sys
sudo chroot /mnt
~~~
* Update the grub config:
~~~
sudo grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg.new
~~~
* Exit out the chroot, and reverse the mounts
* Copy the relevant sections from /boot/grub2/grub.cfg.new in to
/etc/grub.d/40_custom
* Update the grub config:
~~~
sudo grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
~~~

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: How to Make a Multimedia TemplateVM title: How to Make a Multimedia TemplateVM
permalink: /doc/multimedia/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/multimedia.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/multimedia/
- /en/doc/multimedia/ - /en/doc/multimedia/
- /doc/Multimedia/ - /doc/Multimedia/
- /wiki/Multimedia/ - /wiki/Multimedia/
--- ---
How to Make a Multimedia TemplateVM
===================================
Note: This Howto has been written and was tested under Qubes 4rc4
You can consolidate most of your media streaming tasks into one "multimedia" App-VM. This howto explains how to create a multimedia template which can be used to play multimedia content.
This includes:
- Spotify
- Amazon Prime
- Netflix
- DVDs
Installation
------------
Start by cloning the default debian template in dom0.
Hint:
t-multimedia is just the template VM where we will install all packages.
In the last step we will create an AppVM from this template.
`qvm-clone debian-10 t-multimedia`
Launch a Terminal in the new template VM:
`qvm-run --auto t-multimedia gnome-terminal`
Important:
Enter all the following commands in the terminal of the template VM
Become the root user to run all following command without the need to use sudo in the multimedia template VM
`sudo -i`
This howto assumes that you have xclip available in the AppVM where you download the Repository Signing keys.
xclip will be used to paste the content of the clipboard to a file.
You can install xclip via:
`apt-get install xclip` on Debian
`dnf install xclip` on Fedora
You can of course install xclip just into the AppVM where you download the signing keys to have it available for this howto and it will be deleted if you reboot the AppVM. To have xclip available also after a reboot you need to install it in the Template VM on which your Internet AppVM is based (make sure to reboot the AppVM after you've installed any package in its template)
Installation of Spotify
-----------------------
Import GPG-Key for spotify
As the template VM can't connect to internet you need to get the public key file from another AppVM and copy it to the template VM. The easiest way is to use the Qubes Clipboard to copy the keys from the AppVM where you get the key to the Template VM.
In an AppVM which has Internet access:
- Open <https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x4773BD5E130D1D45>
- Copy content of page to the Clipboard (Ctrl+A and Ctrl+C)
- open a Terminal in this AppVM and copy the content of the clipboard to a file
`xclip -o > spotify.pubkey`
Copy the public signing key over to the multimedia template VM
- copy the file via `qvm-copy-to-vm t-multimedia spotify.pubkey`
- or create a new file on the Template VM and copy the content of the clipboard (the public key)
Copy content of page to the Qubes Clipboard (Ctrl+C and then Shift+Ctrl+C)
Switch to the gnome terminal in the Multimedia Template VM
`nano spotify.pubkey`
Paste the content from the Qubes Clipboard into nano (Shift+Ctrl+V and then Paste)
Save the file (Ctrl+O <Enter> Ctrl+X)
Check the signature of the signing key (in the multimedia Template VM).
Hint: depending on your installed version of GnuPG the command to show a public might slightly be different.
See [this StackExchange question](https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/391344/gnupg-command-to-show-key-info-from-file) for more information.
If this command doesn't show a fingerprint choose one of the other commands mentioned in the above link.
`gpg --with-fingerprint spotify.pubkey`
This should look like:
[user@t-multimedia ~]$ `gpg --with-fingerprint spotify.pubkey`
pub 4096R/130D1D45 2019-07-15 Spotify Public Repository Signing Key <tux@spotify.com>
Key fingerprint = 2EBF 997C 15BD A244 B6EB F5D8 4773 BD5E 130D 1D45
You can (and should) lookup the fingerprint on at least one (or more) keyservers as the above information might be outdated.
<https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x4773BD5E130D1D45&fingerprint=on>
Add the public key to the repository keyring
`apt-key add spotify.pubkey`
Add the Spotify repository to your list of package sources:
`echo deb http://repository.spotify.com stable non-free > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/spotify.list`
Update the list of all known packages
`apt-get update`
Install Spotify
`apt-get install -y spotify-client`
Create a spotify desktop-entry
`cp -p /usr/share/spotify/spotify.desktop /usr/share/applications/`
`cp /usr/share/spotify/icons/spotify-linux-16.png /usr/share/icons/hicolor/16x16/apps/spotify.png`
Installation of VLC
-------------------
To play DVDs you can install VLC with the needed Codecs
Download the public key which signs the VLC package repositories
In an AppVM which has Internet access:
- Open <https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x6BCA5E4DB84288D9>
- Repeat all steps to save the public signing key on the AppVM (see above / Spotify example)
`xclip -o > videolan.pubkey`
Copy the public signing key over to the multimedia template VM
- copy the file via `qvm-copy-to-vm t-multimedia videolan.pubkey`
- or create a new file on the Template VM and copy the content of the clipboard (the public key)
Copy content of page to the Qubes Clipboard (Ctrl+C and then Shift+Ctrl+C)
Switch to the gnome terminal in the Multimedia Template VM
`nano videolan.pubkey`
Paste the content from the Qubes Clipboard into nano (Shift+Ctrl+V and then Paste)
Save the file (Ctrl+O <Enter> Ctrl+X)
Check the signature of the signing key
`gpg --with-fingerprint videolan.pubkey`
This should look like:
[user@t-multimedia ~]$ `gpg --with-fingerprint videolan.pubkey`
pub 2048R/B84288D9 2013-08-27 VideoLAN APT Signing Key <videolan@videolan.org>
Key fingerprint = 8F08 45FE 77B1 6294 429A 7934 6BCA 5E4D B842 88D9
sub 2048R/288D4A2C 2013-08-27
You can (and should) lookup the fingerprint on at least one (or more) keyservers as the above information might be outdated.
<https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x6BCA5E4DB84288D9&fingerprint=on>
Add the public key to the repository keyring
`apt-key add videolan.pubkey`
Add the new VLC package repositories to your list of sources
`echo "deb http://download.videolan.org/pub/debian/stable/ /" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/vlc.list`
`echo "deb-src http://download.videolan.org/pub/debian/stable/ /" >> /etc/apt/sources.list.d/vlc.list`
Update package repositories
`apt-get update`
Install libdvdcss and VLC
`apt-get install -y libdvdcss2 vlc`
Installation Google Chrome
--------------------------
To play Videos with Netflix, Amazon Prime & Co using Chrome is a good option as it has all needed codecs included.
Hint: Using Chromium will not work for some reasons.
Download the public key which signs the Google package repositories
In an AppVM which has Internet access:
- Open <https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x7721F63BD38B4796>
- Repeat all steps to save the public signing key on the AppVM (see above / Spotify example)
`xclip -o > google.pubkey`
Copy the public signing key over to the multimedia template VM
- copy the file via `qvm-copy-to-vm t-multimedia google.pubkey`
- or create a new file on the Template VM and copy the content of the clipboard (the public key)
Copy content of page to the Qubes Clipboard (Ctrl+C and then Shift+Ctrl+C)
Switch to the gnome terminal in the Multimedia Template VM
`nano google.pubkey`
Paste the content from the Qubes Clipboard into nano (Shift+Ctrl+V and then Paste)
Save the file (Ctrl+O <Enter> Ctrl+X)
Check the signature of the signing key (still in the AppVM where you downloaded the key)
`gpg --with-fingerprint google.pubkey`
This should look like:
[user@t-multimedia ~]$ `gpg --with-fingerprint google.pubkey`
pub 4096R/D38B4796 2016-04-12 Google Inc. (Linux Packages Signing Authority)
<linux-packages-keymaster@google.com>
Key fingerprint = EB4C 1BFD 4F04 2F6D DDCC EC91 7721 F63B D38B 4796
sub 4096R/640DB551 2016-04-12 [expires: 2019-04-12]
sub 4096R/997C215E 2017-01-24 [expires: 2020-01-24]
You can (and should) lookup the fingerprint on at least one (or more) keyservers as the above information might be outdated.
<https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x7721F63BD38B4796&fingerprint=on>
or
<https://www.google.com/linuxrepositories/>
Add the public key to the repository keyring
`apt-key add google.pubkey`
Add the Google package repositories to your list of sources
`echo "deb http://dl.google.com/linux/chrome/deb/ stable main"> /etc/apt/sources.list.d/google.list`
Update package repositories
`apt-get update`
Install Chrome
`apt-get install google-chrome-stable`
Create a Multimedia AppVM
-------------------------
The last step is to create a multimedia AppVM (named "my-multimedia" here) based on the new multimedia template.
`qvm-create --template t-multimedia --label orange my-multimedia`

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@ -1,226 +1,11 @@
--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Mutt title: Mutt
permalink: /doc/mutt/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/mutt.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/mutt/
- /en/doc/mutt/ - /en/doc/mutt/
- /doc/Mutt/ - /doc/Mutt/
- /wiki/Mutt/ - /wiki/Mutt/
--- ---
Mutt
====
Mutt is a fast, standards-compliant, efficient MUA (Mail User Agent). In some areas it works better than Thunderbird+Enigmail, and is certainly faster and more responsive.
Mutt lacks true MTA (Message Transfer Agent aka "SMTP client") and MRA (Mail
Retrieval Agent aka "IMAP/POP3 client"), thus there are some provisions
built-in. In principle it is only mail reader and composer. You may install
true MTA such as [Postfix](/doc/postfix/) or Exim and MRA such as
[Fetchmail](/doc/fetchmail/). Alternatively you can synchronize your mailbox
using [OfflineIMAP](https://github.com/OfflineIMAP/offlineimap) and just stick
to integrated SMTP support. You can even use integrated IMAP client, but it is
not very convenient.
Installation
------------
`dnf install mutt cyrus-sasl-plain`
`cyrus-sasl-plain` package is necessary for SMTP authentication to work.
Configuration
-------------
Mutt generally works out of the box. This configuration guide discusses only Qubes-specific setup. In this example we will have one TemplateVM and several AppVMs. It also takes advantage of [SplitGPG](/doc/split-gpg/), which is assumed to be already working.
**NOTE:** this requires `qubes-gpg-split >= 2.0.9`. 2.0.8 and earlier contains bug which causes this setup to hang in specific situations and does not allow to list keys.
First, paste this to `/etc/Muttrc.local` in TemplateVM:
~~~
# specify your key or override in ~/.mutt/muttrc in AppVM
set pgp_sign_as="0xDEADBEEF"
set pgp_use_gpg_agent = no
# this needs qubes-gpg-split >= 2.0.8; 2.0.7 end earlier has had a deadlock on this
set pgp_decode_command="qubes-gpg-client-wrapper --status-fd=2 --batch %f"
#set pgp_decode_command="gpg --status-fd=2 %?p?--passphrase-fd=0? --no-verbose --quiet --batch --output - %f"
set pgp_decrypt_command="$pgp_decode_command"
set pgp_verify_command="qubes-gpg-client-wrapper --status-fd=2 --no-verbose --quiet --batch --output - --verify %s %f"
set pgp_sign_command="qubes-gpg-client-wrapper --batch --armor --detach-sign --textmode %?a?-u %a? %f"
set pgp_clearsign_command="qubes-gpg-client-wrapper --batch --armor --textmode --clearsign %?a?-u %a? %f"
# I found no option to add Charset armor header when it is UTF-8, since this is
# default (as specified in RFC4880). This is needed to workaround bug in
# Enigmail, which ignores RFC and without this header Thunderbird interprets
# plaintext as us-ascii. See https://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/bugs/38/.
### also note you must specify absolute path of pgpewrap when using debian
### e.g. /usr/lib/mutt/pgpewrap
set pgp_encrypt_only_command="pgpewrap qubes-gpg-client-wrapper --batch --textmode --armor --always-trust %?a?--encrypt-to %a? --encrypt -- -r %r -- %f | sed -e '2iCharset: UTF-8'"
set pgp_encrypt_sign_command="pgpewrap qubes-gpg-client-wrapper --batch --textmode --armor --always-trust %?a?--encrypt-to %a? --encrypt --sign %?a?-u %a? -- -r %r -- %f | sed -e '2iCharset: UTF-8'"
# we need to import both into vault and locally wrt $pgp_verify_command
set pgp_import_command="qubes-gpg-import-key %f; gpg --no-verbose --import %f"
# those are unsupported by split-gpg
set pgp_export_command="gpg --no-verbose --export --armor %r"
set pgp_verify_key_command="gpg --no-verbose --batch --fingerprint --check-sigs %r"
# read in the public key ring
set pgp_list_pubring_command="qubes-gpg-client-wrapper --no-verbose --batch --quiet --with-colons --list-keys %r"
# read in the secret key ring
set pgp_list_secring_command="qubes-gpg-client-wrapper --no-verbose --batch --quiet --with-colons --list-secret-keys %r"
# this set the number of seconds to keep in memory the passpharse used to encrypt/sign
# the more the less secure it will be
set pgp_timeout=600
# it's a regexp used against the GPG output: if it matches some line of the output
# then mutt considers the message a good signed one (ignoring the GPG exit code)
#set pgp_good_sign="^gpg: Good signature from"
set pgp_good_sign="^\\[GNUPG:\\] GOODSIG"
# mutt uses by default PGP/GPG to sign/encrypt messages
# if you want to use S-mime instead set the smime_is_default variable to yes
# automatically sign all outcoming messages
set crypt_autosign=yes
# sign only replies to signed messages
#set crypt_replysign
# automatically encrypt outcoming messages
#set crypt_autoencrypt=yes
# encrypt only replies to signed messages
set crypt_replyencrypt=yes
# encrypt and sign replies to encrypted messages
set crypt_replysignencrypted=yes
# automatically verify the sign of a message when opened
set crypt_verify_sig=yes
# disable use of gpgme, which interferes with Split-GPG
# and defaults to 'yes' on Debian 9 and higher
set crypt_use_gpgme=no
send-hook "~A" set pgp_autoinline=no crypt_autoencrypt=no
send-hook "~t @invisiblethingslab\.com" set crypt_autoencrypt=yes
# vim:ft=muttrc
~~~
Then shutdown your TemplateVM. Next open your AppVM, create file `/home/user/.mutt/muttrc` and adjust for your needs:
~~~
#
# accounts
#
set from = "Wojciech Zygmunt Porczyk <woju@invisiblethingslab.com>"
alternates '^woju@invisiblethingslab\.com$'
alternates '^wojciech@porczyk\.eu$'
#
# crypto
#
set pgp_sign_as = "0xDEADBEEF"
send-hook "~t @my\.family\.com" set crypt_autoencrypt=no
#
# lists
#
# google groups
lists .*@googlegroups\.com
subscribe (qubes-(users|devel)|othergroup)@googlegroups\.com
fcc-save-hook qubes-users@googlegroups\.com =list/qubes-users/
fcc-save-hook qubes-devel@googlegroups\.com =list/qubes-devel/
fcc-save-hook othergroup@googlegroups\.com =list/othergroup/
~~~
You may also create `/home/user/.signature`:
~~~
regards,
Wojciech Porczyk
~~~
Some additional useful settings
-------------------------------
In `muttrc`:
###qubes integration stuff
#open links in a dispvm using urlview
#see below for sample .urlview
macro pager \cb <pipe-entry>'urlview'<enter> 'Follow links with urlview'
#override default mailcap MIME settings with qvm-open-in-dvm calls
#see sample .mailcap below
set mailcap_path=~/.mailcap
bind attach <return> view-mailcap
Debian-specific options:
#use debian mutt-patched package for mailbox sidebar hack
set sidebar_width = 30
set sidebar_visible = no
set sidebar_delim='|'
#show/hide sidebar
macro index S '<enter-command>toggle sidebar_visible<enter>'
macro pager S '<enter-command>toggle sidebar_visible<enter>'
#navigate the sidebar folders
bind index CP sidebar-prev
bind index CN sidebar-next
bind index CO sidebar-open
bind pager CP sidebar-prev
bind pager CN sidebar-next
In `.urlview`:
### TODO: this doesn't work with encrypted emails --
### urlview can't find the links
###
COMMAND qvm-open-in-dvm %s
In `.mailcap`:
### TODO: override most/all default mailcap settings to prevent
### opening in muttvm
### is there a way to do this polymorphically? i.e. not
### listing every damn mimetype by hand
###
### also would be convenient to use mailcap's TEST feature to
### show some html in mutt pager (e.g. with w3m, links or html2text),
### else open others in dispvm
# MS Word documents
application/msword; qvm-open-in-dvm %s
application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.spreadsheet; qvm-open-in-dvm %s
application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.text; qvm-open-in-dvm %s
# Images
image/jpg; qvm-open-in-dvm %s
image/jpeg; qvm-open-in-dvm %s
image/png; qvm-open-in-dvm %s
image/gif; qvm-open-in-dvm %s
# PDFs
application/pdf; qvm-open-in-dvm %s
# HTML
text/html; w3m -T text/html '%s' | cat --squeeze-blank; nametemplate=%s.html; copiousoutput
text/html; qvm-open-in-dvm %s

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@ -1,146 +1,11 @@
--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Network Bridge Support title: Network Bridge Support
permalink: /doc/network-bridge-support/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/network-bridge-support.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/network-bridge-support/
- /en/doc/network-bridge-support/ - /en/doc/network-bridge-support/
- /doc/NetworkBridgeSupport/ - /doc/NetworkBridgeSupport/
- /wiki/NetworkBridgeSupport/ - /wiki/NetworkBridgeSupport/
--- ---
Network Bridge Support (EXPERIMENTAL and UNSUPPORTED)
=====================================================
The Qubes development team does not support bridging the network interfaces found in NetVM and don't plan to support it at all. Several reasons for that:
- Using a bridged VM is almost only necessary for developers testing or working on OSI layer 2 or layer 3 tools (MAC or routing protocols). If not for testing, such tools are almost only used directly on routers ...).
- Most of these tools can be anyway used directly inside the NetVM, which has direct access to the network card.
- It is also possible to use a secondary network card plugged into a specific development VM.
- Such a setup could break security features of Qubes such as AppVM firewalling.
Now if you really want to work with OSI layer2 / layer 3 tools, that you don't have a secondary network card, or that you want to completely expose services of a given AppVM (at your own risk), a bridged setup may help you.
Qubes manager patch (Qubes R2B2)
--------------------------------
The following patches can be applied to the Qubes Manager GUI in order to add an option to easily bridge a VM. Use it at your own risk. If the patch breaks the Qubes Manager, you can try to restore the Qubes packages:
~~~
# qubes-dom-update qubes-core-dom0 qubes-manager
# yum reinstall qubes-core-dom0
# yum reinstall qubes-manager
~~~
First, retrieve the attachment of this Wifi article in dom0. Then apply the three patches the following way after installing the patch tool :
~~~
# qubes-dom0-update patch
# patch /usr/lib64/python2.7/site-package/qubes/qubes.py < qubes.py-bridge.diff
# patch /usr/lib64/python2.7/site-package/qubesmanager/settings.py < settings.py-bridge.diff
# patch /usr/lib64/python2.7/site-package/qubesmanager/ui_settingsdlg.py < ui_settingsdlg.py-bridge.diff
~~~
Finally restart the qubes manager GUI.
An option is available in the AppVM Settings to enable setting the NetVM in bridge mode. For a bridged AppVM, you should then select a NetVM instead of a FirewallVM/ ProxyVM, enable the Bridge option, and restart your AppVM.
NetVM patch (Qubes R2B2)
------------------------
You need to modify manually the NetVM iptable script inside the NetVM. The reason is that by default the NetVM only accepts traffic coming from network interfaces called vif\* (in our case, we will use an additional interface called bridge0. The second reason is that all traffic is NATed by default. In our case, we want to forward traffic from the bridge interface without modifying it, while NATing traffic coming from vif\* interfaces.
Modify manually the Template you use for your NetVM (not the NetVM itself). This is by default fedora-x86\_64. Edit the file /etc/sysconfig/iptables. You need to modify two parts of the file.
- Starting from the line -A POSTROUTING -j MASQUERADE that you need to comment :
~~~
# Bridge support
# Comment the following line
#-A POSTROUTING -j MASQUERADE
# Ensure packets coming from firewallVMs or AppVMs use NAT
-A POSTROUTING -m iprange --src-range 10.137.1.0-10.137.2.255 -j MASQUERADE
# Allow redirection of bridge packets (optional as POSTROUTING default is ACCEPT)
#-A POSTROUTING -o bridge+ -j ACCEPT
# End Bridge support
~~~
- Starting from the line -A FORWARD -i vif+ -j ACCEPT:
~~~
-A FORWARD -i vif+ -o vif+ -j DROP
-A FORWARD -i vif+ -j ACCEPT
# Bridge Support
-A FORWARD -i bridge+ -j ACCEPT
# End Bridge Support
-A FORWARD -j DROP
~~~
Ensure that the IP addresses used by default in Qubes are in the form 10.137.1.\* or 10.137.2.\* by running ifconfig. Of course, this setup won't work with IPv6.
Now you need to restart the NetVM and FirewallVM or only iptables in both VMs if you prefer:
~~~
# systemctl restart iptables
~~~
Create a Bridge inside the NetVM
--------------------------------
A bridge can be created inside the standard network manager (the network icon in the taskbar).
This requires:
- creating a bridge that will be your main IP (ex: setup the bridge with DHCP)
- attach eth0 to your bridge
Note: A wireless interface cannot be bridged.
The bridge edition GUI is somewhat buggy as it does not remember all the parameters you set up. You can fix it by editing manually the files in /etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/. Here is one example for these files:
- Bridge-DHCP
~~~
[connection]
id=Bridge-DHCP
uuid=fd68198b-313a-47cb-9155-52e95cdc67f3
type=bridge
autoconnect=false
timestamp=1363938302
[ipv6]
method=auto
[ipv4]
method=auto
[bridge]
interface-name=bridge0
stp=false
~~~
Note: Do not forget to put stp=false if you bridge only eth0 because sending BPDUs could make your admins angry :)
- bridge0-eth0
~~~
[802-3-ethernet]
duplex=full
mac-address=88:AE:1D:AE:30:31
[connection]
id=bridge0-eth0
uuid=38320e5b-226c-409e-9fd6-0fbf4d0460a0
type=802-3-ethernet
autoconnect=false
timestamp=1363601650
master=fd68198b-313a-47cb-9155-52e95cdc67f3
slave-type=bridge
~~~
If you do not manage to start your bridge, you can start it manually from a NetVM terminal:
~~~
$ nmcli con up id bridge0-eth0
~~~
Now that the bridge is ready, the bridged AppVM can be started...

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Network Printer title: Network Printer
permalink: /doc/network-printer/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/network-printer.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/network-printer/
- /en/doc/network-printer/ - /en/doc/network-printer/
- /doc/NetworkPrinter/ - /doc/NetworkPrinter/
- /wiki/NetworkPrinter/ - /wiki/NetworkPrinter/
--- ---
Configuring a network printer for Qubes AppVMs
==============================================
Where to configure printers and install drivers?
------------------------------------------------
One would normally want to configure a printer in a template VM, rather than in particular AppVMs.
This is because all the global settings made to AppVMs (those stored in its /etc, as well as binaries installed in /usr) would be discarded upon AppVM shutdown.
When printer is added and configured in a template VM, then all the AppVMs based on this template should automatically be able to use it (without the need for the template VM to be running, of course).
Alternatively one can add a printer in a standalone VM, but this would limit the printer usage to this particular VM.
Security considerations for network printers and drivers
--------------------------------------------------------
Some printers require third-party drivers, typically downloadable from the vendor's website.
Such drivers are typically distributed in a form of ready to install RPM packages.
However, they are often unsigned, and additionally the downloads are available via HTTP connections only.
As a result, installation of such third-party RPMs in a default template VM exposes a risk of compromise of this template VM, which, in turn, leads automatically to compromise of all the AppVMs based on the template.
(Again, it's not buggy or malicious drivers that we fear here, but rather malicious installation scripts for those drivers).
In order to mitigate this risk, one might consider creating a custom template (i.e. clone the original template) and then install the third-party, unverified drivers there.
Such template might then be made a DVM template for [DisposableVM creation](/doc/disposablevm/), which should allow one to print any document by right-clicking on it, choosing "Open in DisposableVM" and print from there.
This would allow to print documents from more trusted AppVMs (based on a trusted default template that is not poisoned by third-party printer drivers).
However, one should be aware that most (all?) network printing protocols are insecure, unencrypted protocols.
This means, that an attacker who is able to sniff the local network, or who is controlling the (normally untrusted) Qubes NetVM, will likely to be able to see the documents being printed.
This is a limitation of today's printers and printing protocols, something that cannot be solved by Qubes or any other OS.
Additionally, the printer drivers as well as CUPS application itself, might be buggy and might get exploited when talking to a compromised printer (or by an attacker who controls the local network, or the default NetVM).
Consider not using printing from your more trusted AppVMs for this reason.
Steps to configure a network printer in a template VM
----------------------------------------------------------
1. Start the "Printer Settings" App in a template VM (either via Qubes "Start Menu", or by launching the `system-config-printer` in the template).
2. Add/Configure the printer in the same way as one would do on any normal Linux.
You may need to allow network access from the template VM to your printer to complete configuration, as normally the template VM is not allowed any network access except to the Qubes proxy for software installation.
One can use Qubes Manager to modify firewall rules for particular VMs.
3. Optional: Test the printer by printing a test page. If it works, shut down the template VM.
4. Open an AppVM (make sure it's based on the template where you just installed the printer, normally all AppVMs are based on the default template), and test if printing works.
If it doesn't then probably the AppVM doesn't have networking access to the printer -- in that case adjust the firewall settings for that AppVM in Qubes Manager.
Also, make sure that the AppVM gets restarted after the template was shutdown.
5. Alternatively if you do not want to modify the firewall rules of the template VM (that have security scope) you can simply shut down the template VM without trying to print the test page (which will not work), start or restart an AppVM based on the template and test printing there.

13
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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Postfix title: Postfix
permalink: /doc/postfix/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/postfix.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/postfix/
- /en/doc/postfix/ - /en/doc/postfix/
- /doc/Postfix/ - /doc/Postfix/
- /wiki/Postfix/ - /wiki/Postfix/
@ -143,13 +144,3 @@ list/qubes-devel/
Run Run
--- ---
Open `/rw/config/rc.local` and add those two lines (before fetchmail lines, if you have them):
~~~
#!/bin/sh
mount --bind /usr/local/etc/postfix /etc/postfix
systemctl --no-block start postfix
~~~
Make sure `/rw/config/rc.local` is executable (i.e., `chmod a+x /rw/config/rc.local`). Reboot your AppVM and you are done.

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Rxvt title: Rxvt
permalink: /doc/rxvt/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/rxvt.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/rxvt/
- /en/doc/rxvt/ - /en/doc/rxvt/
- /doc/Rxvt/ - /doc/Rxvt/
- /wiki/Rxvt/ - /wiki/Rxvt/
--- ---
Rxvt
====
`rxvt-unicode` is an advanced and efficient vt102 emulator. Here is a quick guide to configuration in both dom0 and guest VM.
Installation
------------
`dnf install rxvt-unicode-256color-ml` will bring both base `rxvt-unicode` and extension.
Let me also recommend excellent Terminus font: `dnf install terminus-fonts`.
Xresources
----------
In TemplateVM create file `/etc/X11/Xresources.urxvt` and paste config below.
`!`-lines are comments and may be left out.
`#`-lines are directives to CPP (C preprocessor) and are necessary.
This shouldn't go to `/etc/X11/Xresources`, because that file is not preprocessed by default.
~~~
! CGA colour palette
!*color0: #000000
!*color1: #AA0000
!*color2: #00AA00
!*color3: #AA5500
!*color4: #0000AA
!*color5: #AA00AA
!*color6: #00AAAA
!*color7: #AAAAAA
!*color8: #555555
!*color9: #FF5555
!*color10: #55FF55
!*color11: #FFFF55
!*color12: #5555FF
!*color13: #FF55FF
!*color14: #55FFFF
!*color15: #FFFFFF
! Qubes' favourite tango palette (improved with cyan)
#define TANGO_Butter1 #c4a000
#define TANGO_Butter2 #edd400
#define TANGO_Butter3 #fce94f
#define TANGO_Orange1 #ce5c00
#define TANGO_Orange2 #f57900
#define TANGO_Orange3 #fcaf3e
#define TANGO_Chocolate1 #8f5902
#define TANGO_Chocolate2 #c17d11
#define TANGO_Chocolate3 #e9b96e
#define TANGO_Chameleon1 #4e9a06
#define TANGO_Chameleon2 #73d216
#define TANGO_Chameleon3 #8ae234
#define TANGO_SkyBlue1 #204a87
#define TANGO_SkyBlue2 #3465a4
#define TANGO_SkyBlue3 #729fcf
#define TANGO_Plum1 #5c3566
#define TANGO_Plum2 #75507b
#define TANGO_Plum3 #ad7fa8
#define TANGO_ScarletRed1 #a40000
#define TANGO_ScarletRed2 #cc0000
#define TANGO_ScarletRed3 #ef2929
#define TANGO_Aluminium1 #2e3436
#define TANGO_Aluminium2 #555753
#define TANGO_Aluminium3 #888a85
#define TANGO_Aluminium4 #babdb6
#define TANGO_Aluminium5 #d3d7cf
#define TANGO_Aluminium6 #eeeeec
*color0: TANGO_Aluminium1
*color1: TANGO_ScarletRed2
*color2: TANGO_Chameleon1
*color3: TANGO_Chocolate2
*color4: TANGO_SkyBlue1
*color5: TANGO_Plum2
*color6: #06989a
*color7: TANGO_Aluminium4
*color8: TANGO_Aluminium3
*color9: TANGO_ScarletRed3
*color10: TANGO_Chameleon3
*color11: TANGO_Butter3
*color12: TANGO_SkyBlue3
*color13: TANGO_Plum3
*color14: #34e2e2
*color15: TANGO_Aluminium6
URxvt.foreground: #E0E0E0
!URxvt.background: black
!URxvt.cursorColor: rgb:ffff/0000/0000
URxvt.cursorColor: TANGO_ScarletRed3
!URxvt.font: -*-terminus-*-*-*-*-14-*-*-*-*-*-iso8859-2
!URxvt.boldFont: -*-terminus-*-*-*-*-14-*-*-*-*-*-iso8859-2
URxvt.font: xft:Terminus:pixelsize=14:style=Bold
URxvt.boldFont: xft:Terminus:pixelsize=14:style=Bold
URxvt.italicFont: xft:Terminus:pixelsize=14:style=Regular
URxvt.boldItalicFont: xft:Terminus:pixelsize=14:style=Regular
URxvt.scrollBar: False
URxvt.visualBell: False
! Qubes X11 passthrough does not support those, but in dom0 they are nice.
URxvt.background: rgba:0000/0000/0000/afff
URxvt.depth: 32
URxvt.urgentOnBell: True
! TODO: write qubes-rpc to handle printing
URxvt.print-pipe: cat > $(TMPDIR=$HOME mktemp urxvt.XXXXXX)
! selection-to-clipboard violates
! http://standards.freedesktop.org/clipboards-spec/clipboards-latest.txt [1],
! but it does for greater good: urxvt has no other means to move PRIMARY to
! CLIPBOARD, so Qubes' clipboard won't work without it. Also the rationale given
! in [1] has little relevance to advanced terminal emulator, specifically there
! is no need for w32-style intuition and virtually no need to "paste over".
URxvt.perl-ext-common: default,selection-to-clipboard
! Prevent rxvt from entering Keyboard symbols entry mode whenever you press
! ctrl+shift, e.g. to copy or paste something to/from Qubes' clipboard.
URxvt.iso14755_52: false
URxvt.insecure: False
! some termcap-aware software sometimes throw '$TERM too long'
!URxvt.termName: rxvt-256color
~~~
Then create script to automatically merge those to xrdb.
File `/etc/X11/xinit/xinitrc.d/urxvt.sh`:
~~~
#!/bin/sh
[ -r /etc/X11/Xresources.urxvt ] && xrdb -merge /etc/X11/Xresources.urxvt
~~~
Shortcuts
---------
For each AppVM, go to *Qubes Manager \> VM Settings \> Applications*.
Find `rxvt-unicode` (or `rxvt-unicode (256-color) multi-language`) and add.

53
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@ -1,55 +1,8 @@
--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Tips and Tricks title: Tips and Tricks
permalink: /doc/tips-and-tricks/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/tips-and-tricks.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/tips-and-tricks/
--- ---
Tips and Tricks
===============
This section provides user suggested tips that aim to increase Qubes OS usability, security or that allow users to discover new ways to use your computer that are unique to Qubes OS.
Opening links in your preferred AppVM
-------------------------------------
To increase both security and usability you can set an AppVM so that it automatically opens any link in an different AppVM of your choice. You can do this for example in the email AppVM, in this way you avoid to make mistakes like opening links in it. To learn more you can check [security guidelines](/doc/security-guidelines/) and [security goals](/security/goals/).
The command `qvm-open-in-vm` lets you open a document or a URL in another VM. It takes two parameters: vmname and filename.
For example, if you launch this command from your email AppVM:
`qvm-open-in-vm untrusted https://duckduckgo.com`
it will open duckduckgo.com in the `untrusted` AppVM (after you confirmed the request).
If you want this to happen automatically you can create a .desktop file that advertises itself as a handler for http/https links, and then set this as your default browser.
Open a text editor and copy and paste this into it:
[Desktop Entry]
Encoding=UTF-8
Name=BrowserVM
Exec=qvm-open-in-vm APPVMNAME %u
Terminal=false
X-MultipleArgs=false
Type=Application
Categories=Network;WebBrowser;
MimeType=x-scheme-handler/unknown;x-scheme-handler/about;text/html;text/xml;application/xhtml+xml;application/xml;application/vnd.mozilla.xul+xml;application/rss+xml;application/rdf+xml;image/gif;image/jpeg;image/png;x-scheme-handler/http;x-scheme-handler/https;
Replace `APPVMNAME` with the AppVM name you want to open links in. Now save, in the AppVM that you want to modify, this file to `~/.local/share/applications/browser_vm.desktop`
Finally, set it as your default browser:
`xdg-settings set default-web-browser browser_vm.desktop`
Credit: [Micah Lee](https://micahflee.com/2016/06/qubes-tip-opening-links-in-your-preferred-appvm/)
Preventing data leaks
---------------------
First make sure to read [Understanding and Preventing Data Leaks](/doc/data-leaks/) section to understand the limits of this tip.
Suppose that you have within a not so trusted environment - for example, a Windows VM - an application that tracks and reports its usage, or you simply want to protect your data.
Start the Windows TemplateVM (which has no user data), install/upgrade apps; then start Windows AppVM (with data) in offline mode. So, if you worry (hypothetically) that your Windows or app updater might want to send your data away, this Qubes OS trick will prevent this.
This applies also to any TemplateBasedVM relative to its parent TemplateVM, but the privacy risk is especially high in the case of Windows.
Credit: [Joanna Rutkovska](https://twitter.com/rootkovska/status/832571372085850112)

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@ -1,321 +1,12 @@
--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: VPN title: VPN
permalink: /doc/vpn/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md
- /doc/privacy/vpn/ - /doc/privacy/vpn/
- /en/doc/vpn/ - /enhttps://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md
- /doc/VPN/ - /doc/VPN/
- /wiki/VPN/ - /wiki/VPN/
--- ---
How To make a VPN Gateway in Qubes
==================================
<div class="alert alert-info" role="alert">
<i class="fa fa-info-circle"></i>
<b>Note:</b> If you seek to enhance your privacy, you may also wish to consider <a href="/doc/whonix/">Whonix</a>.
You should also be aware of <a href="https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tunnels/Introduction">the potential risks of VPNs</a>.
</div>
Although setting up a VPN connection is not by itself Qubes specific, Qubes includes a number of tools that can make the client-side setup of your VPN more versatile and secure. This document is a Qubes-specific outline for choosing the type of VM to use, and shows how to prepare a ProxyVM for either NetworkManager or a set of fail-safe VPN scripts.
Please refer to your guest OS and VPN service documentation when considering the specific steps and parameters for your connection(s); The relevant documentation for the Qubes default guest OS (Fedora) is [Establishing a VPN Connection.](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/Fedora/23/html/Networking_Guide/sec-Establishing_a_VPN_Connection.html)
### NetVM
The simplest case is to set up a VPN connection using the NetworkManager service inside your NetVM. Because the NetworkManager service is already started, you are ready to set up your VPN connection. However this has some disadvantages:
- You have to place (and probably save) your VPN credentials inside the NetVM, which is directly connected to the outside world
- All your AppVMs which are connected to the NetVM will be connected to the VPN (by default)
### AppVM
While the NetworkManager service is not started here (for a good reason), you can configure any kind of VPN client in your AppVM as well. However this is only suggested if your VPN client has special requirements.
### ProxyVM
One of the best unique features of Qubes OS is its special type of VM called a ProxyVM. The special thing is that your AppVMs see this as a NetVM (or uplink), and your NetVMs see it as a downstream AppVM. Because of this, you can place a ProxyVM between your AppVMs and your NetVM. This is how the default sys-firewall VM functions.
Using a ProxyVM to set up a VPN client gives you the ability to:
- Separate your VPN credentials from your NetVM.
- Separate your VPN credentials from your AppVM data.
- Easily control which of your AppVMs are connected to your VPN by simply setting it as a NetVM of the desired AppVM.
Set up a ProxyVM as a VPN gateway using NetworkManager
------------------------------------------------------
1. Create a new VM, name it, click the ProxyVM radio button, and choose a color and template.
![Create\_New\_VM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Create_New_VM.png)
2. Add the `network-manager` service to this new VM.
![Settings-services.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Settings-services.png)
3. Set up your VPN as described in the NetworkManager documentation linked above.
4. (Optional) Make your VPN start automatically.
Edit `/rw/config/rc.local` and add these lines:
```bash
# Automatically connect to the VPN once Internet is up
while ! ping -c 1 -W 1 1.1.1.1; do
sleep 1
done
PWDFILE="/rw/config/NM-system-connections/secrets/passwd-file.txt"
nmcli connection up file-vpn-conn passwd-file $PWDFILE
```
You can find the actual "file-vpn-conn" in `/rw/config/NM-system-connections/`.
Create directory `/rw/config/NM-system-connections/secrets/` (You can put your `*.crt` and `*.pem` files here too).
Create a new file `/rw/config/NM-system-connections/secrets/passwd-file.txt`:
```
vpn.secrets.password:XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
```
And substitute "XXXXXXXXXXXXXX" for the actual password.
The contents of `passwd-file.txt` may differ depending on your VPN settings. See the [documentation for `nmcli up`](https://www.mankier.com/1/nmcli#up).
5. (Optional) Make the network fail-close for the AppVMs if the connection to the VPN breaks.
Edit `/rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script` and add these lines:
```bash
# Block forwarding of connections through upstream network device
# (in case the vpn tunnel breaks)
iptables -I FORWARD -o eth0 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -i eth0 -j DROP
ip6tables -I FORWARD -o eth0 -j DROP
ip6tables -I FORWARD -i eth0 -j DROP
```
6. Configure your AppVMs to use the new VM as a NetVM.
![Settings-NetVM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Settings-NetVM.png)
7. Optionally, you can install some [custom icons](https://github.com/Zrubi/qubes-artwork-proxy-vpn) for your VPN
Set up a ProxyVM as a VPN gateway using iptables and CLI scripts
----------------------------------------------------------------
This method is more involved than the one above, but has anti-leak features that also make the connection _fail closed_ should it be interrupted.
It has been tested with Fedora 30 and Debian 10 templates.
Before proceeding, you will need to download a copy of your VPN provider's configuration file(s) and have your VPN login information handy.
1. Create a new VM, name it, choose "provides network", and choose a color and template.
![Create\_New\_VM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Create_New_VM.png)
Note: Do not enable NetworkManager in the ProxyVM, as it can interfere with the scripts' DNS features.
If you enabled NetworkManager or used other methods in a previous attempt, do not re-use the old ProxyVM...
Create a new one according to this step.
If your choice of TemplateVM doesn't already have the VPN client software, you'll need to install the software in the template before proceeding. The 'openvpn' package comes installed in the Fedora template, and in Debian it can be installed with the following command:
sudo apt-get install openvpn
Disable any auto-starting service that comes with the software package.
For example for OpenVPN.
sudo systemctl disable openvpn.service
2. Set up and test the VPN client.
Make sure the VPN VM and its TemplateVM is not running.
Run a terminal (CLI) in the VPN VM -- this will start the VM.
Then create a new `/rw/config/vpn` folder with:
sudo mkdir /rw/config/vpn
Copy your VPN configuration files to `/rw/config/vpn`.
Your VPN config file should be named `openvpn-client.ovpn` so you can use the scripts below as is without modification. Otherwise you would have to replace the file name. Files accompanying the main config such as `*.crt` and `*.pem` should also be placed in the `/rw/config/vpn` folder.
Check or modify configuration file contents using a text editor:
sudo gedit /rw/config/vpn/openvpn-client.ovpn
Files referenced in `openvpn-client.ovpn` should not use absolute paths such as `/etc/...`.
The config should route all traffic through your VPN's interface after a connection is created; For OpenVPN the directive for this is `redirect-gateway def1`.
Make sure it already includes or add:
redirect-gateway def1
The VPN client may not be able to prompt you for credentials when connecting to the server, so we'll add a reference to a file containing the VPN username and password.
For example for OpenVPN, add or modify `auth-user-pass` like so:
auth-user-pass pass.txt
Save the `/rw/config/vpn/openvpn-client.ovpn` file.
Now make sure a `/rw/config/vpn/pass.txt` file actually exists.
sudo gedit /rw/config/vpn/pass.txt
Add:
username
password
Replace `username` and `password` with your actual username and password.
**Test your client configuration:**
Run the client from a CLI prompt in the 'vpn' folder, preferably as root.
For example:
sudo openvpn --cd /rw/config/vpn --config openvpn-client.ovpn
Watch for status messages that indicate whether the connection is successful and test from another VPN VM terminal window with `ping`.
ping 1.1.1.1
`ping` can be aborted by pressing the two keys `ctrl` + `c` at the same time.
DNS may be tested at this point by replacing addresses in `/etc/resolv.conf` with ones appropriate for your VPN (although this file will not be used when setup is complete).
Diagnose any connection problems using resources such as client documentation and help from your VPN service provider.
Proceed to the next step when you're sure the basic VPN connection is working.
3. Create the DNS-handling script.
sudo gedit /rw/config/vpn/qubes-vpn-handler.sh
Add the following:
~~~
#!/bin/bash
set -e
export PATH="$PATH:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
case "$1" in
up)
# To override DHCP DNS, assign DNS addresses to 'vpn_dns' env variable before calling this script;
# Format is 'X.X.X.X Y.Y.Y.Y [...]'
if [[ -z "$vpn_dns" ]] ; then
# Parses DHCP foreign_option_* vars to automatically set DNS address translation:
for optionname in ${!foreign_option_*} ; do
option="${!optionname}"
unset fops; fops=($option)
if [ ${fops[1]} == "DNS" ] ; then vpn_dns="$vpn_dns ${fops[2]}" ; fi
done
fi
iptables -t nat -F PR-QBS
if [[ -n "$vpn_dns" ]] ; then
# Set DNS address translation in firewall:
for addr in $vpn_dns; do
iptables -t nat -A PR-QBS -i vif+ -p udp --dport 53 -j DNAT --to $addr
iptables -t nat -A PR-QBS -i vif+ -p tcp --dport 53 -j DNAT --to $addr
done
su - -c 'notify-send "$(hostname): LINK IS UP." --icon=network-idle' user
else
su - -c 'notify-send "$(hostname): LINK UP, NO DNS!" --icon=dialog-error' user
fi
;;
down)
su - -c 'notify-send "$(hostname): LINK IS DOWN !" --icon=dialog-error' user
;;
esac
~~~
Save the script.
Make it executable.
sudo chmod +x /rw/config/vpn/qubes-vpn-handler.sh
4. Configure client to use the DNS handling script. Using openvpn as an example, edit the config.
sudo gedit /rw/config/vpn/openvpn-client.ovpn
Add the following.
script-security 2
up 'qubes-vpn-handler.sh up'
down 'qubes-vpn-handler.sh down'
Remove other instances of lines starting with `script-security`, `up` or `down` should there be any others.
Save the script.
**Restart the client and test the connection again** ...this time from an AppVM!
5. Set up iptables anti-leak rules.
Edit the firewall script.
sudo gedit /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script
Clear out the existing lines and add:
~~~
#!/bin/bash
# Block forwarding of connections through upstream network device
# (in case the vpn tunnel breaks):
iptables -I FORWARD -o eth0 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -i eth0 -j DROP
ip6tables -I FORWARD -o eth0 -j DROP
ip6tables -I FORWARD -i eth0 -j DROP
# Accept traffic to VPN
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT
iptables -F OUTPUT
# Add the `qvpn` group to system, if it doesn't already exist
if ! grep -q "^qvpn:" /etc/group ; then
groupadd -rf qvpn
sync
fi
sleep 2s
# Block non-VPN traffic to clearnet
iptables -I OUTPUT -o eth0 -j DROP
# Allow traffic from the `qvpn` group to the uplink interface (eth0);
# Our VPN client will run with group `qvpn`.
iptables -I OUTPUT -p all -o eth0 -m owner --gid-owner qvpn -j ACCEPT
~~~
Save the script.
Make it executable.
sudo chmod +x /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script
5. Set up the VPN's autostart.
sudo gedit /rw/config/rc.local
Clear out the existing lines and add:
~~~
#!/bin/bash
VPN_CLIENT='openvpn'
VPN_OPTIONS='--cd /rw/config/vpn/ --config openvpn-client.ovpn --daemon'
su - -c 'notify-send "$(hostname): Starting $VPN_CLIENT..." --icon=network-idle' user
groupadd -rf qvpn ; sleep 2s
sg qvpn -c "$VPN_CLIENT $VPN_OPTIONS"
~~~
If you are using anything other than OpenVPN, change the `VPN_CLIENT` and `VPN_OPTIONS` variables to match your VPN software.
Save the script.
Make it executable.
sudo chmod +x /rw/config/rc.local
6. Restart the new VM!
The link should then be established automatically with a popup notification to that effect.
Usage
-----
Configure your AppVMs to use the VPN VM as a NetVM...
![Settings-NetVM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Settings-NetVM.png)
If you want to update your TemplateVMs through the VPN, you can enable the `qubes-updates-proxy` service for your new VPN VM and configure the [qubes-rpc policy](/doc/software-update-domu/#updates-proxy).
Troubleshooting
---------------
See the [VPN Troubleshooting](/doc/vpn-troubleshooting/) guide for tips on how to fix common VPN issues.

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Reducing the fingerprint of the text-based web browser w3m title: Reducing the fingerprint of the text-based web browser w3m
permalink: /doc/w3m/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/w3m.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/w3m/
- /en/doc/mutt/ - /en/doc/mutt/
- /doc/W3m/ - /doc/W3m/
- /wiki/W3m/ - /wiki/W3m/
--- ---
Reducing the fingerprint of the text-based web browser w3m
====
TL;DR: You can reduce the amount of information w3m gives about itself and the environment it is running in (and, by extension, you). **It will not make you anonymous; your fingerprint will still be unique.** But it may improve your privacy.
[w3m](http://w3m.sourceforge.net/) 'is a text-based web browser as well as a pager like `more` or `less`. With w3m you can browse web pages through a terminal emulator window (xterm, rxvt or something like that). Moreover, w3m can be used as a text formatting tool which typesets HTML into plain text.'
You can reduce the [browser fingerprint](https://panopticlick.eff.org/about#browser-fingerprinting) by applying the following changes to `~/.w3m/config` in any AppVM you want to use w3m in. (If you have not run w3m yet, you might need to copy the config file from elsewhere.) You can also apply the same changes to `/etc/w3m/config` in the relevant TemplateVM(s) to have them apply to multiple AppVMs; but make sure they are not reversed by the contents of `~/.w3m/config` in any of the AppVMs. (w3m reads `~/.w3m/config` after `/etc/w3m/config`).
* Set `user_agent` to `user_agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0`.
By default w3m identifies itself as `w3m/` + version number. The user agent `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0` is the most common and the one used by the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB). One in fourteen browsers fingerprinted by Panopticlick has this value.
* Make w3m use the same HTTP_ACCEPT headers the TBB by adding the following lines at the end of the file:
accept_language en-US,en;q=0.5
accept_encoding gzip, deflate
accept_media text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
These changes will hide your computer's locale and some other information that may or may not be unique to the VM in which it is running. With the modifications above w3m will have the same headers as about one in fifteen browsers fingerprinted by Panopticlick.
Testing these settings on <https://browserprint.info> returns a fingerprint that is distinguishable from that of the TBB (with JavaScript disabled) only by 'Screen Size (CSS)' and 'Browser supports HSTS?'.\* (<https://panopticlick.eff.org> does not work with w3m.) Due to the low number of w3m users it is highly likely that you will have an unique browser fingerprint among the visitors of a website using somewhat sophisticated browser fingerprinting technology. But at least your browser fingerprint will not reveal your computer's locale settings or other specifics about it in the HTTP_ACCEPT headers. And while it may be inferred from your fingerprint that you use w3m, it is not be explicitly stated in the User-Agent header.
**Reminder: Do not rely on these settings for anonymity. Using w3m is all but guaranteed to make you stand out in the crowd.**
PS: You still need to delete cookies manually (`~/.w3m/cookie`) if you are not running w3m in a DispVM anyway. If you set w3m to not accept cookies, its fingerprint will change. (You can configure w3m to not use store cookies or accept new ones (or both), but the setting `use_cookie` seems to really mean `accept_cookie` and vice-versa, so maybe it is best to delete them manually for now.)
* * *
\* Does someone know how to fix this?

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: ZFS title: ZFS
permalink: /doc/zfs/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/zfs.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/zfs/
- /en/doc/zfs/ - /en/doc/zfs/
- /doc/ZFS/ - /doc/ZFS/
- /wiki/ZFS/ - /wiki/ZFS/
--- ---
ZFS in Qubes
============
**Use at your own risk**!
Beware: Dragons might eat your precious data!
Install ZFS in Dom0
===================
Install DKMS style packages for Fedora <sup>(defunct in 0.6.2 due to spl/issues/284)</sup>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fetch and install repository for DKMS style packages for your Dom0 Fedora version [http://zfsonlinux.org/fedora.html](http://zfsonlinux.org/fedora.html):
~~~
disp1# wget http://archive.zfsonlinux.org/fedora/zfs-release-1-1$(rpm -E %dist).noarch.rpm
dom0# qvm-run --pass-io disp1 'cat /home/user/zfs-release-1-1.fc18.noarch.rpm' > /home/user/zfs-release-1-1.fc18.noarch.rpm
dom0# sudo yum localinstall /home/user/zfs-release-1-1.fc18.noarch.rpm
dom0# sudo sed -i 's/$releasever/18/g' /etc/yum.repo.d/zfs.repo
dom0# sudo qubes-dom0-update @development-tools
dom0# sudo qubes-dom0-update zfs
~~~
Install DKMS style packages from git-repository
-----------------------------------------------
Build and install your DKMS or KMOD packages as described in [http://zfsonlinux.org/generic-rpm.html](http://zfsonlinux.org/generic-rpm.html).
### Prerequisites steps in AppVM <sup>(i.e. disp1)</sup>
Checkout repositories for SPL and ZFS:
~~~
mkdir ~/repositories && cd ~/repositories
git clone https://github.com/zfsonlinux/spl.git
git clone https://github.com/zfsonlinux/zfs.git
~~~
Revert changes in SPL repository due to this bug: [https://github.com/zfsonlinux/spl/issues/284](https://github.com/zfsonlinux/spl/issues/284)
~~~
cd ~/repositories/spl
git config --global user.email "user@example.com"
git config --global user.name "user"
git revert e3c4d44886a8564e84aa697477b0e37211d634cd
~~~
### Installation steps in Dom0
Copy repositories over to Dom0:
~~~
mkdir ~/repositories
qvm-run --pass-io disp1 'tar -cf - -C ~/repositories/ {spl,zfs}' | tar -xpf - -C ~/repositories/
~~~
Installing build requirements for SPL and ZFS DKMS modules:
~~~
sudo qubes-dom0-update dkms kernel-devel zlib-devel libuuid-devel libblkid-devel lsscsi bc autoconf automake binutils bison flex gcc gcc-c++ gdb gettext libtool make pkgconfig redhat-rpm-config rpm-build strace
~~~
Configure and build SPL DKMS packages:
~~~
cd ~/repositories/spl
./autogen.sh
./configure --with-config=user
make rpm-utils rpm-dkms
~~~
Configure and build ZFS DKMS packages:
~~~
cd ~/repositories/zfs
./autogen.sh
./configure --with-config=user
make rpm-utils rpm-dkms
~~~
Install SPL and ZFS packages (i.e. version 0.6.2):
~~~
sudo yum localinstall \
~/repositories/spl/spl-0.6.2-1.qbs2.x86_64.rpm \
~/repositories/spl/spl-dkms-0.6.2-1.qbs2.noarch.rpm \
~/repositories/zfs/zfs-0.6.2-1.qbs2.x86_64.rpm \
~/repositories/zfs/zfs-dkms-0.6.2-1.qbs2.noarch.rpm \
~/repositories/zfs/zfs-dracut-0.6.2-1.qbs2.x86_64.rpm \
~/repositories/zfs/zfs-test-0.6.2-1.qbs2.x86_64.rpm
~~~
Configure ZFS
=============
Automatically load modules
--------------------------
/etc/sysconfig/modules/zfs.modules
~~~
#!/bin/sh
for module in spl zfs; do
modprobe ${module} >/dev/null 2>&1
done
~~~
Make this file executable.
Tuning
------
Tame the memory-eating dragon (i.e. 512 Mb zfs\_arc\_max):
/etc/modprobe.d/zfs.conf
~~~
options zfs zfs_arc_max=536870912
~~~
Setup a zpool with ZFS datasets
-------------------------------
You can create a ZFS dataset for each AppVM, ServiceVM, HVM or TemplateVM or just use a pool as your backup location.
Move your existing directory to a temporary location, or the ZFS mount will overlay your directory.
Beware: VMs on a ZFS dataset aren't working, if your ZFS installation deserts you.
So keep netvm, firewallvm and your templates on your root file-system (preferably on a SSD).
~~~
zpool create -m none -o ashift=12 -O atime=off -O compression=lz4 qubes mirror /dev/mapper/<cryptname1> /dev/mapper/<cryptname2>
zfs create -p qubes/appvms
zfs create -m /var/lib/qubes/backup-zfs qubes/backup
zfs create -m /var/lib/qubes/appvms/banking qubes/appvms/banking
zfs create -m /var/lib/qubes/appvms/personal qubes/appvms/personal
zfs create -m /var/lib/qubes/appvms/untrusted qubes/appvms/untrusted
zfs create -m /var/lib/qubes/appvms/work qubes/appvms/work
~~~
Have fun with zpool and zfs.
Tips and Hints
==============
Backup your data
----------------
You're depending on an huge amount of code for this file system, keep this in mind and backup your precious data.
Encrypt underlying devices
--------------------------
~~~
dom0# cryptsetup -c aes-xts-plain64 luksFormat <device1>
dom0# cryptsetup luksOpen <device1> <cryptname1>
~~~
With the use of cryptsetup a keyfile can be specified to decrypt devices.
~~~
dom0# head -c 256 /dev/random > /root/keyfile1
dom0# chmod 0400 /root/keyfile1
dom0# cryptsetup luksAddKey <device1> /root/keyfile1
~~~
Decrypt devices on boot
-----------------------
Add your devices to /etc/crypttab.
~~~
<cryptname1> <device1> <keyfile1>
<cryptname2> <device2> none
~~~
Specifying a keyfile is especially useful, if ZFS should be ready during boot.
Further Reading
---------------
- [http://www.open-zfs.org](http://www.open-zfs.org)
- [http://zfsonlinux.org](http://zfsonlinux.org)

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Dark Theme in Dom0 and DomU title: Dark Theme in Dom0 and DomU
permalink: /doc/dark-theme/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/customization/dark-theme.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/dark-theme/
--- ---
Dark Theme in Dom0
==================
Dark KDE in Dom0
----------------
The following text describes how to change the default light theme to a dark theme. This is just an example, feel free to adjust the appearance to your taste.
The image below shows the default light theme after installation.
![begin light theme](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/kde-fresh-installed-standard.png)
This is the result after applying the steps described here.
![end result dark theme](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/kde-end-result.png)
1. Change `Workspace Appearance`
1. Open the `Workspace Appearance` window
Qubes Menu -> System Tools -> System Settings -> Workspace Appearance
![Workspace Appearance](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/kde-app-appearance-menu-style.png)
2. Go to `Desktop Theme`
![Desktop Menu](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/kde-appearance-settings-desktop-theme-oxygen.png)
3. Select `Oxygen` and `Apply` the change
2. (Optional) Remove blue glowing task items
![blue glowing task bar items](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/kde-taskbar-blue-glowing-border.png)
1. Adjust Oxygen `Details`
Qubes Menu -> System Tools -> System Settings -> Workspace Appearance -> Desktop Theme -> Details (Tab)
2. Select `Oxygen`
3. Change `Theme Item -> Task Items` from `Oxygen Task Items` to `Air Task Items`
![Change Task items look](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/kde-desktop-theme-details.png)
4. Apply changes
![task bar items blue glowing removed](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/kde-taskbar-blue-glowing-removed.png)
3. Change `Application Appearance`
1. Open the `Application Appearance` window
Qubes Menu -> System Tools -> System Settings -> Application Appearance
2. Go to `Colors`
![colors tab](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/kde-app-appearance-menu-colors.png)
3. Select `Obsidian Coast`
![set to Obsidian Coast](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/kde-app-appearance-menu-colors-set.png)
4. Apply Changes
Qubes VM Manager should now look like the image below.
![result black Qubes Manager](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/kde-black-qubes-manager.png)
**Note:** Changing the `Window Decorations` from `Plastik for Qubes` will remove the border color and the VM name. The problem with `Plastik for Qubes` is that it does not overwrite the background and text color for Minimize, Maximize and Close buttons. The three buttons are therefore hard to read.
Dark XCFE in Dom0
-----------------
The following text describes how to change the default light theme to a dark theme. This is just an example, feel free to adjust the appearance to your taste.
The image below shows the default light theme after installation.
![begin light theme](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/xfce-fresh-installed.png)
This is the result after applying the steps described here.
![end result dark theme](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/xfce-end-result.png)
1. Change Appearance
1. Open the `Appearance` dialog
Qubes Menu -> System Tools -> Appearance
![appearance dialog](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/xfce-appearance-dialog.png)
2. Change Style to `Albatross`
**Note:** The black appearance theme `Xfce-dusk` makes the VM names in the `Qubes OS Manager` unreadable.
2. *(Optional)* Change Window Manager Style
1. Open the `Window Manager` dialog
Qubes Menu -> System Tools -> Appearance
![window manager dialog](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/xfce-window-manager-theme.png)
2. Change the Theme in the `Style` Tab (e. g. Defcon-IV). All available themes work.
Dark App VM, Template VM, Standalone VM, HVM (Linux Gnome)
==========================================================
Almost all Qubes VMs use default applications based on the GTK toolkit. Therefore the description below is focused on tools from the Gnome Desktop Environment.
Using "Gnome-Tweak-Tool"
------------------------
The advantage of creating a dark themed Template VM is, that each AppVM which is derived from the Template VM will be dark themed by default.
**Note:** Gnome-Tweak-Tool crashes under Archlinux. A workaround is to assign the AppVM to another TemplateVM (Debian, Fedora) which has Gnome-Tweak-Tool installed. Start the AppVM and configure the settings. Shutdown the machine and switch the TemplateVM back to Archlinux.
1. Start VM
**Note:** Remember that if you want to make the change persistent, the change needs to be made in the TemplateVM, not the AppVM.
2. Install `Gnome-Tweak-Tool`
- Fedora
sudo dnf install gnome-tweak-tool
- Debian
sudo apt-get install gnome-tweak-tool
3. *(Only AppVM)* Stop TemplateVM and start AppVM
4. Add `Gnome-Tweak-Tool` to the Application Menu
1. `Right-click` on VM entry in `Qubes VM Manager` select `Add/remove app shortcuts`
2. Select `Tweak Tool` and press the `>` button to add it
![Application Dialog](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/dialog-add-gnome-tweak-tool.png)
5. Enable `Global Dark Theme`
1. *Debian only*
cd ~/.config/
mkdir gtk-3.0
cd gtk-3.0/
touch settings.ini
2. Start `Tweak Tool` from the VM application menu and set the `Global Dark Theme` switch to `on`
![Global Dark Theme enabled](/attachment/wiki/Dark-Theme/gnome-tweak-tool.png)
6. *(Optional)* Modify Firefox
**Note:** Firefox uses GTK style settings by default. This can create side effects such as unusable forms or search fields. One way to avoid this is to add the following line to `/rw/config/rc.local`:
sed -i.bak "s/Exec=firefox %u/Exec=bash -c 'GTK_THEME=Adwaita:light firefox %u'/g" /usr/share/applications/firefox.desktop
7. Restart VM or all applications
Manually
--------
Manually works for Debian, Fedora and Archlinux.
1. Start VM
**Note:** Remember that if you want to make the change persistent, the change needs to be made in the TemplateVM, not the AppVM.
2. Enable `Global Dark Theme`
cd ~/.config/
mkdir gtk-3.0
cd gtk-3.0/
touch settings.ini
Add the following lines to `settings.ini`
[Settings]
gtk-application-prefer-dark-theme=1
3. Follow steps 6 and 7 in: Using `Gnome-Tweak-Tool`

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Fedora Minimal Template Customization title: Fedora Minimal Template Customization
permalink: /doc/fedora-minimal-template-customization/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/customization/fedora-minimal-template-customization.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/fedora-minimal-template-customization/
redirect_from: /en/doc/fedora-minimal-template-customization/ redirect_from: /en/doc/fedora-minimal-template-customization/
--- ---
FEDORA Packages Recommendations
======================
(starting from a minimal template)
Template installation
------------------------------
> [dom0]#qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-26-minimal
*Note*: If you have doubts about a set of tools or package you want to install, start installing and testing it in an AppVM.
You can then reproduce it later in your TemplateVM if you are satisfied.
That is the template philosophy in QubesOS.
For more information on the uses of a minimal template read [this page][Minimal].
Standard tools installation
================
Administration (documented)
---------------------------------------------
> sudo pciutils vim-minimal less tcpdump telnet psmisc nmap nmap-ncat usbutils
*Notes*: nmap can be used to discover hosts on a network (nmap -sP [network]), especially if you are inside a Microsoft network, because your AppVM will be protected/NATted behind the Qubes firewall.
(Microsoft / home networks make heavy use of autodiscovery technologies which require clients to be in the same local network (no firewall/no NAT), eg: your printer.)
Some recommendations here: check your current network using the Network manager applet (eg: 192.168.1.65).
Then run nmap in your current AppVM/TemplateVM to search for the selected printer/equipment:
nmap -sP 192.168.1.-.
Don't forget to temporarily allow traffic via the Qubes Firewall if you are doing this in a TemplateVM.
Administration (undocumented)
-------------------------------------------------
> openssh keepassx openssl gnome-keyring man
Dependency note: keepassx rely on qt which takes ~30MB
Network VM (documented)
----------------------------------------
> NetworkManager NetworkManager-wifi network-manager-applet wireless-tools dbus-x11 tar tinyproxy iptables
Network VM (undocumented)
--------------------------------------------
> which dconf dconf-editor
*Notes*: which is required for autostart scripts
*Notes*: dconf is required to remember the VM settings that are changed (the gsetting backend will be in memory only if gconf is not installed).
Network VM (manual operations - documented)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Search for wireless firmware matching your wireless card (to be launched in network VM)
> lspci; dnf search firmware
ProxyVM/NetworkVM for 3G Modems
--------------------------------------------
> ModemManager NetworkManager-wwan usb_modeswitch modem-manager-gui
Dependency note: modem-manager-gui relies on webkit-gtk and is optional (NetworkManager can handle the modem alone)
Source: [3GMODEM]
ProxyVM for VPNs
--------------------------------------------
Search for a VPN package for your particular vpn solution then [configure][VPNNM] NetworkManager
> dnf search NetworkManager [openvpn\|openconnect\|openswat\|...]
OR
Refer to [this guide][VPN] which includes instructions for failsafe anti-leak VPN configuration using CLI scripts. (An early discussion about OpenVPN configuration can be viewed [here][OPENVPNSETUP].) Required packages will be `iptables` in addition to VPN software such as `openvpn`.
Printer Setup
--------------------------------------------
> system-config-printer system-config-printer-applet cups
Dependency Note: depends on python3 + python3 additional libraries which takes more than 40 M once installed.
Dependency Note: cups depends on ghostscript and require installing additional printing fonts (not documented here), so it can takes several dozen of MB
Manual operations
---------------------------
- Don't forget to restart your TemplateVM or only the cups service when you installed cups (systemctl start cups)
- First you need to search for your printer. If you don't know its name or IP, search for it using nmap: check your current network using the Network manager applet (eg: 192.168.1.65). Then run nmap in your current AppVM/TemplateVM to search for the selected printer/equipement: nmap -sP 192.168.1.-. Don't forget to temporarily allow traffic via the Qubes Firewall if you are inside a TemplateVM.
- Once you identified your printer, run system-config-printer GUI to install your printer
- You may need to cancel the operation to install more adapted printer drivers (eg: if the driver cannot be found automatically). Use dnf search printername to find potential drivers (eg dnf search photosmart)
GUI recommendations
======================
Lightweight packages recommendations
---------------------------------------------------------------
> lxterminal dejavu-sans-mono-fonts dejavu-sans-fonts gnome-settings-daemon
*Note*: You need to install sans-mono fonts for the terminal or it will be unreadable (overlapping characters....), while the sans fonts are just to get nicer GUI menus.
*Scite* is a nice notepad that can also highlight scripts with very light dependencies
> scite
*Meld* allows easy comparison of two text files/ two configuration files.
> meld
*Thunar* is a light file manager usually used by xfce
> thunar thunar-volman ntfs-3g
Dependency Note: xfce4 dependencies (but still quite light ~1.4M downloads)
Miscellaneous packages
--------------------------
*pycairo* package is needed for file's contextual menu "Send to VM" to function (to actually popup dialog box and enter VM's name where the file will be sent to).
*pinentry-gtk* package is responsible for pop-up dialog window where you enter password for your password protected gpg key.
Install this package in the qube holding your password protected gpg keys.
If you do not use password protected gpg keys, there is no need to install this package.
GUI themes
-----------------
Managing GUI theme / appearance is often complex because when you do not want to depend on a specific desktop system.
For this reason, we need to customize themes for each GUI framework that our application depends on.
This often includes GTK2, GTK3 (which us a different configuration/themes than GTK2), Qt.
The appearance of Windows can only be changed in dom0, however, the appearance of all buttons, menus, icons, widgets are specific to each AppVM.
### Packages
Choose theme packages for each framework. I recommend the following documentation [THEMEPACKAGES]
> clearlooks-phenix-gtk2-theme clearlooks-phenix-gtk3-theme
You can search for other themes using `dnf search theme gtk`.
You can check your currently installed theme packages (to eventually remove them) using `rpm -qa | grep theme`.
### Tweaking theme and appearance
First you can get an insight of installed Gtk theme and see how it will appear using lxappearance.
I recommend not applying settings using lxappearance (do not click on apply) because it will create multiple configuration files.
To remove these files, follow cleanup notes.
#### Cleanup notes
~~~
rm ~/.gtkrc-2.0
rm ~/.icons/default/index.theme
rm ~/.config/gtk-3.0/settings.ini
rm ~/.config/Trolltech.conf
~~~
Cleaning the whole dconf settings is also possible by removing the following file. Please note that it will remove all preferences set for gnome application (not only the themes)
~~~
rm ~/.config/dconf/user
~~~
*Note*: lxappearance only has an effect on gtk3 themes so it won't work to change gtk2 themes (used by Firefox, Thunderbird ...).
However, it is very lightweight and can be used to identify the name and look of themes you are interested in.
Once you have the name, you can apply it using gsetting command line or gconf-editor.
*Note*: if you really want a GUI theme editor, you can install gnome-tweak-tools, but this tool has a lot
of gnome dependencies (~150MB of dependencies). You can install it and uninstall it as soon as you change your theme.
#### Testing notes
The following programs can be used to see if theme has been correctly applied:
* GTK2 program: scite, thunderbird, firefox
* GTK3 program: lxterminal
* Qt program: keepassx
*Note*: testing in a TemplateVM will not work as expected because gnome-settings-daemon is not started in TemplateVM.
so test your themes in an AppVM and then update the TemplateVM accordingly.
### Forcing theme change for all AppVM depending on a TemplateVM
This can be done for gtk themes by creating dconf global settings. I recommend reading these articles:
[DCONF1]
[DCONF2]
#### Creating global file
* Setup global config file:
> mkdir /etc/dconf/db/qubes.d
Edit/Create the following file: /etc/dconf/db/qubes.d/10-global-theme-settings:
~~~
[org/gnome/desktop/interface]
cursor-theme="Adwaita"
gtk-theme="Clearlooks-Phenix"
icon-theme="Adwaita"
font-name="Cantarell 11"
monospace-font-name="Monospace 11"
~~~
* Generate global config database
> dconf update
* Configure default user profile
Edit/Create the following file: /etc/dconf/profile/user:
~~~
user-db:user
system-db:qubes
~~~
#### Locking configuration
It should be noted that the user dconf settings stored in ~/.config/dconf/user always takes precedence over the global dconf settings.
User dconf settings can be browsed using dconf-editor GUI.
If you want to force specific settings to be applied for all user (so in our case for all AppVMs depending on the template), you need to create locks:
> mkdir /etc/dconf/db/qubes.d/locks
Edit/Create the following file: /etc/dconf/db/qubes.d/locks/theme.lock:
~~~
/org/gnome/desktop/interface/gtk-theme
~~~
Finally, regenerate the dconf database
> dconf update
### Uniform look for Qt & GTK
Getting an uniform look for Qt & GTK is not achieved yet. A good source is on the following link [UNIFORMTHEME]
Two case:
1. You installed packages of the theme you selected both for Qt, GTK2 and GTK3.
(eg: Adwaita which is the default theme. I have not found another cross framework theme on fedora default packages).
2. You want to use the GTK theme you selected for Qt but there is no qt package.
In this case QGtkStyle will take precedence and convert the style automatically.
You can verify if it is enabled by searching for "style=GTK+" in /etc/xdg/Trolltech.conf.
If style is changed to another name, it will be used instead of your GTK theme.
*Note*: check that ~/.config/Trolltech.conf in your AppVMs is not defining another "style=" because it will take precedence over your global Qt theme.
[3GMODEM]: https://www.codeenigma.com/community/blog/installing-3g-usb-modems-linux
[OPENVPNSETUP]: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/qubes-users/openvpn$20setup/qubes-users/UbY4-apKScE/lhB_ouTnAwAJ
[THEMEPACKAGES]: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!search/appvm$20theme/qubes-users/RyVeDiEZ6D0/YR4ITjgdYX0J
[DCONF1]: http://www.mattfischer.com/blog/?p=431
[DCONF2]: https://wiki.gnome.org/Projects/dconf/SystemAdministrators
[UNIFORMTHEME]: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Uniform_look_for_Qt_and_GTK_applications
[Minimal]: ../templates/fedora-minimal/
[VPNNM]: ../vpn/#set-up-a-proxyvm-as-a-vpn-gateway-using-networkmanager
[VPN]: ../vpn/#set-up-a-proxyvm-as-a-vpn-gateway-using-iptables-and-cli-scripts

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Language Localization title: Language Localization
permalink: /doc/language-localization/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/customization/language-localization.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/language-localization/
- /en/doc/language-localization/ - /en/doc/language-localization/
- /doc/LanguageLocalization/ - /doc/LanguageLocalization/
- /wiki/LanguageLocalization/ - /wiki/LanguageLocalization/
--- ---
Language Localization
=====================
Enable UTF-8 in dom0 title bars
-------------------------
You can enable UTF-8 characters in the title bar for all qubes or on a per-qube basis. Follow the instructions [here](/doc/config-files/#gui-and-audio-configuration-in-dom0) for further information.
How to set up pinyin input in Qubes
-----------------------------------
The pinyin input method will be installed in a TemplateVM to make it available after restarts and across multiple AppVMs.
1. In a TemplateVM, install `ibus-pinyin` via the package manager or terminal.
If the template is Fedora-based, run `sudo dnf install ibus-pinyin`.
If the template is Debian-based, run `sudo apt install ibus-pinyin`
2. Shut down the TemplateVM.
3. Start or restart an AppVM based on the template in which you installed `ibus-pinyin` and open a terminal.
4. Run `ibus-setup`.
5. You will likely get an error message telling you to paste the following into your bashrc:
export GTK_IM_MODULE=ibus
export XMODIFIERS=@im=ibus
export QT_IM_MODULE=ibus
Copy the text into your `~/.bashrc` file with your favorite text editor.
You will need to do this for any AppVM in which you wish to use pinyin input.
6. Set up ibus input as you like using the graphical menu (add pinyin or intelligent pinyin to selections).
You can bring the menu back by issuing `ibus-setup` from a terminal.
7. Set up your shortcut for switching between inputs.
By default it is super-space.
If `ibus-pinyin` is not enabled when you restart one of these AppVMs, open a terminal and run `ibus-setup` to activate ibus again.
For further discussion, see [this qubes-users thread](https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/qubes-users/languge/qubes-users/VcNPlhdgVQM/iF9PqSzayacJ).

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Removing TemplateVM Packages title: Removing TemplateVM Packages
permalink: /doc/removing-templatevm-packages/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/customization/removing-templatevm-packages.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/removing-templatevm-packages/
--- ---
# Removing TemplateVM Packages
When removing any packages from a default TemplateVM, be sure to check what's being removed by `apt autoremove` or `dnf`.
When removing certain packages, for instance Thunderbird, `apt` and `dnf` will attempt to remove many packages required by qubes for the template to function correctly under qubes.
As an example from a terminal in a TemplateVM:
```shell_session
$ sudo apt remove thunderbird
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree
Reading state information... Done
The following packages were automatically installed and are no longer required:
debugedit libjs-sphinxdoc libjs-underscore librpm3 librpmbuild3 librpmio3
librpmsign3 libsqlite0 linux-headers-4.9.0-6-amd64
linux-headers-4.9.0-6-common linux-image-4.9.0-6-amd64 python-backports-abc
python-cffi-backend python-concurrent.futures python-croniter
python-cryptography python-dateutil python-enum34 python-idna
python-iniparse python-ipaddress python-jinja2 python-libxml2 python-lzma
python-markupsafe python-msgpack python-openssl python-pyasn1 python-pycurl
python-requests python-rpm python-singledispatch python-six python-sqlite
python-sqlitecachec python-tornado python-tz python-urlgrabber
python-urllib3 python-xpyb python-yaml qubes-core-agent-dom0-updates
qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root qubes-gpg-split qubes-img-converter
qubes-input-proxy-sender qubes-mgmt-salt-vm-connector qubes-pdf-converter
qubes-usb-proxy rpm rpm-common rpm2cpio salt-common salt-ssh usbutils yum
yum-utils
Use 'sudo apt autoremove' to remove them.
The following packages will be REMOVED:
icedove lightning qubes-thunderbird qubes-vm-recommended thunderbird
0 upgraded, 0 newly installed, 5 to remove and 0 not upgraded.
After this operation, 151 MB disk space will be freed.
Do you want to continue? [Y/n]
```
Note all of the qubes packages are tracked as dependencies that will no longer be required. `apt remove` will only remove the packages listed, which is ok.
If, however you also run `apt autoremove` the other qubes packages necessary for TemplateVMs will be removed.
If you'd still like to remove one of these applications without breaking your TemplateVM you have a couple different options.
## Removing Only Packages Not Needed for a Qubes TemplateVM
### Debian
1. In your TemplateVM terminal run:
```shell_session $ apt remove package-name```
Note the packages "no longer required"
2. If the list of "no longer required" packages includes anything beginning with `qubes-` or `salt-` make a note to yourself to **never** run `$ sudo apt autoremove` on this TemplateVM
**Recommended but optional:** Use `apt-mark` to make `apt autoremove` safe again.
```shell_session
$ sudo apt-mark manual package-name package-name
```
Replace package-names with actual `qubes-*` and `salt-*` packages you'd like to retain.
For example, still in your TemplateVM terminal:
```shell_session
$ sudo apt-mark manual qubes-core-agent-dom0-updates qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root qubes-gpg-split qubes-img-converter qubes-input-proxy-sender qubes-mgmt-salt-vm-connector qubes-pdf-converter salt-common salt-ssh qubes-usb-proxy
```
`$ apt autoremove` should now be safe to use.
### Fedora
In your TemplateVM terminal, run:
```shell_session
$ dnf remove --noautoremove package-name
```
## Recovering A TemplateVM which you've already removed needed qubes-* packages
If you've already removed packages, run `apt autoremove` and restarted your VM you've lost passwordless sudo access.
You can login as root, open a terminal in dom0 and run:
```shell_session
$ qvm-run -u root vmname xterm
```
This will open an xterm terminal in the TemplateVM named `vmname`
Once you're logged in as root, reinstall these packages & their dependencies:
### Debian
```shell_session
$ sudo apt install qubes-core-agent-dom0-updates qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root qubes-gpg-split qubes-img-converter qubes-input-proxy-sender qubes-mgmt-salt-vm-connector qubes-pdf-converter salt-common salt-ssh
```
### Fedora
Similar to Debian for example (package names may vary):
```shell_session
$ sudo dnf install qubes-core-agent-dom0-updates qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root qubes-gpg-split qubes-img-converter qubes-input-proxy-sender qubes-mgmt-salt-vm-connector qubes-pdf-converter salt-common salt-ssh
```

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Windows Template Customization title: Windows Template Customization
permalink: /doc/windows-template-customization/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/customization/windows-template-customization.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/windows-template-customization/
redirect_from: /en/doc/windows-template-customization/ redirect_from: /en/doc/windows-template-customization/
--- ---
Disable/Uninstall unnecessary features/services
=============================
Windows features
----------------------------
Uninstall windows features from Control Panel > Turn windows features On/Off.
Generally, it will be required to reboot after features are uninstalled.
If you do not manage to uninstall some features, it is sometimes necessary to uninstall them one by one or two by two.
Only keep:
* Print and Document Service => Internet Printing Client
* Print and Document Service => Windows Fax and Scan (apparently it cannot be uninstalled)
* Windows search
*Note*: Windows search is recommended because it is a nightmare to find something in menus if it is not enabled (it removes the search bar from the start menu, from the explorer, and from the control panel).
*Note*: Unselecting windows media, .Net and Internet Explorer will uninstall these components. On a new install they are generally old versions anyway and it will be quicker to install directly the new versions later.
Windows services
---------------------------
Disable the following services that are not required or have no sense in a VM context:
* Base Filtering Engine (only required if you want to use Microsoft IPSEC)
* DHCP Client
* Function Discovery Provider Host
this will not work anyway because SSDP discovery uses multicast - need to be on the same network which is not the case because of Qubes firewall
* Peer Name Resolution Protocol
* Peer Netwoking Grouping
* Peer Networking Identity Manager
* SSDP Discovery
* Security Center (is it only notifications ?)
* TCP/IP Netbios Help (is Netbios still really used by Windows ? Maybe for discovery only ?)
* Themes (if you don't care about theme)
* Volume Shadow Copy (see next note in the performance section)
* Windows defender
* Windows Firewall
*Notes*: IP Helper is required as it is used by Qubes Agent to configure the IP address.
Windows update
--------------------------
I recommend disabling windows update (Never Check for Update) because checking for updates will start every time you start an AppVM if you haven't started your template in a while.
Running windows update is also apparently IO hungry.
Of course I recommend starting the template regularly and checking manually for updates.
System properties
---------------------------
Right click on computer and go to Properties > Advanced > Performance:
* If you don't care about visual effect, in Visual Effect select "Adjust for best performance"
* I personally tweak the page file size to gain some space on my root.
In Advanced>Performances>Advanced tab, change Virtual memory:
1. unselect automatically manage paging file size for all drive
2. click on drive C:
3. select no paging file
4. click on set
5. click on drive d:
6. select customer size
7. use an initial size of 500 and a max size of 1000. If the page file is too small, you will notice a low memory pop up when working on windows. In this case, it often means that you should extend your AppVM RAM.
* System Protection
Here you can disable Shadow Folder because it has little sense in the case of Qubes because
* we do regular backups of AppVMs/TemplateVMs;
* we can revert at least one template change if we break something.
Select drives where system protection is enabled and click Configure. "Turn off system protection" "Delete all restore points"
* Remote
Unselect Allow Remote Assistance connections to this computer.
Task scheduler
-----------------------
Open the task scheduler and *disable* the following tasks.
If you remove these tasks they may be recreated automatically by various windows management tools (such as defragmentation)
* Autochk: All
* Application Experience: All
* Customer Experience Improvement Program: All
* Defrag: All
* DiskDiagnosis: All (the disk is virtual anyway so S.M.A.R.T. has no sense)
* Maintenance: All
* SystemRestore: All
* WindowsBackup: All
Power options
-------------
First, enable the "Power" Windows service. Then, set all of the following:
* Put the computer to sleep: `Never`
* Turn the display off: `Never`
* Turn off hard disk after: Setting (Minutes): `0`
Turn off hibernation. Open a command prompt (`cmd.exe`) as an administrator,
then execute:
powercfg -h off
The hibernation file (`C:\hyberfil.sys`) should now be deleted.
Manual tasks that can/should be started in the template
-------------------------------------------------------
* Disk defragmentation
* Windows Update
* Windows file cleaning
1. Run windows drive cleaner as Administrator.
2. Enable all the task and run the cleaner
* CCleaner file cleaning
1. Install CCleaner free
2. Copy the attached ccleaner configuration file in CCleaner program file folder
3. Run ccleaner with all option set except "wipe free space" (it will also remove user history and preferences)
4. Run ccleaner only with the option "wipe free space".
It will write zeros in all unused space. This will allow you to strip the root.img file later
* TemplateVM stripping
Ensure that you know what you are doing in this section as you may destroy by error your template root.img file.
* If you ran ccleaner with "wipe free space", follow the following procedure
1. from dom0, go to /var/lib/templates-vm/yourtemplate
2. copy root.img using the following command
> cp --sparse=always root.img root.img.clean
3. if the copy worked, you can move the new root file by running this command
> mv root.img.clean root.img
* If it doesn't manage to fill the free space with zeros, you can follow the following *unsafe* undocumented procedure
1. from dom0, go to /var/lib/templates-vm/yourtemplate
2. check the partitioning to identify the filesystem offset of root.img
3. mount the filesystem
4. create a file with zeros inside the filesystem until the mounted filesystem is full
5. remove the file
6. unmount the partition
7. make a copy of root.img in sparse mode.

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: CentOS Template title: CentOS Template
permalink: /doc/templates/centos/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/templates/centos.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/templates/centos/
--- ---
# CentOS Template
If you would like to use a stable, predictable, manageable and reproducible distribution in your AppVMs, you can install the CentOS template, provided by Qubes in ready to use binary package. For the minimal and Xfce versions, please see the [Minimal TemplateVMs] and [Xfce TemplateVMs] pages.
## Installation
The standard CentOS TemplateVM can be installed with the following command in dom0, where `X` is the desired version number:
[user@dom0 ~]$ sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-templates-community qubes-template-centos-X
To switch, reinstall and uninstall a CentOS TemplateVM that is already installed in your system, see *How to [switch], [reinstall] and [uninstall]*.
#### After Installing
After a fresh install, we recommend to [Update the TemplateVM](/doc/software-update-vm/).
## Want to contribute?
* [How can I contribute to the Qubes Project?](/doc/contributing/)
* [Guidelines for Documentation Contributors](/doc/doc-guidelines/)
[switch]: /doc/templates/#switching
[reinstall]: /doc/reinstall-template/
[uninstall]: /doc/templates/#uninstalling
[Minimal TemplateVMs]: /doc/templates/minimal/
[Xfce TemplateVMs]: /doc/templates/xfce/

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Gentoo Template title: Gentoo Template
permalink: /doc/templates/gentoo/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/templates/gentoo.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/templates/gentoo/
--- ---
# Gentoo Template
If you would like to use a stable, predictable, manageable and reproducible distribution in your AppVMs, you can install the Gentoo template, provided by Qubes in ready to use binary package. For the minimal and Xfce versions, please see the [Minimal TemplateVMs] and [Xfce TemplateVMs] pages.
## Installation
The standard Gentoo TemplateVM can be installed with the following command in dom0:
[user@dom0 ~]$ sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-templates-community qubes-template-gentoo
To switch, reinstall and uninstall a Gentoo TemplateVM that is already installed in your system, see *How to [switch], [reinstall] and [uninstall]*.
#### After Installing
After a fresh install, we recommend to [Update the TemplateVM](/doc/software-update-vm/). We highlight that the template memory/CPU allocation certainly need to be adjusted in some cases. As Gentoo is a *linux source distribution*, the template needs resources to perform updates or installing any packages. By default, each TemplateVM has *2 VCPUs* for *4000 MB Max memory* allocated. If needed, double those values, *4 VCPUs* for *8000 MB Max memory*. For example, it has been observed failing updates or builds with *4 VCPUs* for *4000 MB Max memory* due to out of memory issue. For more general considerations, we refer to the official [Gentoo Handbook].
## Want to contribute?
* [How can I contribute to the Qubes Project?](/doc/contributing/)
* [Guidelines for Documentation Contributors](/doc/doc-guidelines/)
[switch]: /doc/templates/#switching
[reinstall]: /doc/reinstall-template/
[uninstall]: /doc/templates/#uninstalling
[Minimal TemplateVMs]: /doc/templates/minimal/
[Xfce TemplateVMs]: /doc/templates/xfce/
[Gentoo Handbook]: https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Handbook:AMD64

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Linux HVM Tips title: Linux HVM Tips
permalink: /doc/linux-hvm-tips/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/linux-hvm-tips.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/linux-hvm-tips/
- /en/doc/linux-hvm-tips/ - /en/doc/linux-hvm-tips/
- /doc/LinuxHVMTips/ - /doc/LinuxHVMTips/
- /wiki/LinuxHVMTips/ - /wiki/LinuxHVMTips/
--- ---
Tips for Linux in HVM domain
============================
How to fix bootup kernel error
-------------------------------
If the HVM pauses on boot and shows a series of warnings, visit [HVM Troubleshooting](/doc/hvm-troubleshooting/#hvm-pauses-on-boot-followed-by-kernel-error) for a fix.
Screen resolution
-----------------
Some kernel/Xorg combinations use only 640x480 in HVM, which is quite small.
To enable maximum resolution, some changes in the Xorg configuration are needed:
1. Force "vesa" video driver
2. Provide wide horizontal synchronization range
To achieve it (all commands to be run as root):
1. Generate XOrg configuration (if you don't have it):
~~~
X -configure :1 && mv ~/xorg.conf.new /etc/X11/xorg.conf
~~~
1. Add HorizSync line to Monitor section, it should look something like:
~~~
Section "Monitor"
Identifier "Monitor0"
VendorName "Monitor Vendor"
ModelName "Monitor Model"
HorizSync 30.0 - 60.0
EndSection
~~~
1. Change driver to "vesa" in Device section:
~~~
Section "Device"
# (...)
Identifier "Card0"
Driver "vesa"
VendorName "Technical Corp."
BoardName "Unknown Board"
BusID "PCI:0:2:0"
EndSection
~~~
Now you should get resolution of at least 1280x1024 and should be able to choose other modes.
Qubes agents
------------
Linux Qubes agents are written primarily for PV qubes, but it is possible to run them also in a HVM qube.
However some work may be required to achieve this. Check [this thread](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/browse_thread/thread/081df4a43e49e7a5).

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: How to Create a NetBSD VM title: How to Create a NetBSD VM
permalink: /doc/netbsd/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/netbsd.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/netbsd/
--- ---
How to Create a NetBSD VM
=========================
1. Create a StandaloneVM with the default template.
2. Replace `vmlinuz` with the `netbsd-INSTALL_XEN3_DOMU` kernel.
3. During setup, choose to install on the `xbd1` hard disk.
4. Attach the CD to the VM.
5. Configure the networking.
6. Optionally enable SSHD during the post-install configuration.
7. Replace the kernel with `netbsd-XEN3_DOMU`.
8. The VM may fail to boot automatically, in which case you must explicitly
specify `xbd1a` as the root device when prompted.
For further discussion, please see this [thread] and this [guide].
[thread]: https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/4015c8900a813985
[guide]: https://wiki.xen.org/wiki/How_to_install_a_NetBSD_PV_domU_on_a_Debian_Squeeze_host_%28Xen_4.0.1%29

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Penetration Testing title: Penetration Testing
permalink: /doc/pentesting/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/pentesting.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/pentesting/
--- ---
**Legal notice:**
The usage of penetration testing tools outside your own laboratory environment requires the permission of the organization you attack. Penetration testing without permission can have legal consequences.
To avoid such legal conflicts please refer to the [EC-Council: Code of Ethics](https://www.eccouncil.org/Support/code-of-ethics).
Penetration Testing
===================
"A penetration test, colloquially known as a pen test, is an authorised simulated attack on a computer system that looks for security weaknesses, potentially gaining access to the system's features and data." (Source: [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penetration_test)).
Penetration Testing Distributions
---------------------------------
The following instructions explain how to install a penetration testing distribution within Qubes OS.
- [BlackArch](/doc/pentesting/blackarch/)
- [Kali](/doc/pentesting/kali/)
- [PenTester Framework (PTF)](/doc/pentesting/ptf/)
Using Qubes OS to host a "hacking" laboratory
---------------------------------------------
Qubes OS is a hypervisor based operating system. Qubes OS can host various operating systems such as Linux, Unix or Windows and run them in parallel. Qubes OS can therefore be used to host your own "hacking" laboratory.

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: How to Create a BlackArch VM title: How to Create a BlackArch VM
permalink: /doc/pentesting/blackarch/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/pentesting/blackarch.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/pentesting/blackarch/
- /doc/blackarch/ - /doc/blackarch/
--- ---
**General reminder:**
- The installation scripts and provided tools may have bugs, be vulnerable to Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks or other vulnerabilities.
- Adding additional repositories or tools for installing software extends your trust to those tool providers.
Please keep in mind that using such a VM or VMs based on the template for security and privacy critical tasks is not recommended.
How to Create a BlackArch VM
============================
[BlackArch](https://www.blackarch.org) Linux is an [Arch Linux](https://www.archlinux.org)-based distribution for penetration testers and security researchers. The repository contains [1434](https://www.blackarch.org/tools.html) tools.
- List of [tools](https://www.blackarch.org/tools.html)
- [Installation Instructions](https://www.blackarch.org/downloads.html)
Create ArchLinux Based BlackArch Template
-----------------------------------------
1. Create ArchlLinux Template
- Follow the [Archlinux Template instructions](/doc/building-archlinux-template/)
2. Update Template
sudo pacman -Syyu
3. Clone template
1. Via Qubes VM Manager
2. Via command line
qvm-clone archlinux blackarch
4. Install BlackArch repository
$ curl -O https://blackarch.org/strap.sh
# The SHA1 sum should match: 34b1a3698a4c971807fb1fe41463b9d25e1a4a09
$ sha1sum strap.sh
# Set execute bit
$ chmod +x strap.sh
# Run strap.sh
$ sudo ./strap.sh
5. Install tools
- install all tools
sudo pacman -S blackarch
- or by category:
# list available categories
pacman -Sg | grep blackarch
# install category
sudo pacman -S blackarch-<category>
# example
sudo pacman -S blackarch-forensic
- or specific tool
# Search for tool
pacman -Ss <tool-name>
# Install tool
sudo pacman -S <tool-name>
# Example
pacman -Ss burpsuite
sudo pacman -S burpsuite
6. Create a AppVMs based on the `blackarch` template
- (Optional) Attach necessary devices
Alternative Options to BlackArch
--------------------------------
- [Kali](/doc/pentesting/kali/)
- [PenTester Framework (PTF)](/doc/pentesting/ptf/)
- [Pentesting](/doc/pentesting/)

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: How to create a Kali Linux VM title: How to create a Kali Linux VM
permalink: /doc/pentesting/kali/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/pentesting/kali.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/pentesting/kali/
- /doc/kali/ - /doc/kali/
--- ---
How to create a Kali Linux VM
===============================
Warnings
--------------
* The installation scripts and provided tools may have bugs, be vulnerable to Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks or other vulnerabilities.
* Adding additional repositories or tools for installing software extends your trust to those tool providers.
* Please keep in mind that using such a template for security and privacy critical tasks is not recommended.
* Kali Linux distribution is a rolling distribution based on Debian testing release, so it will always have a newer software base than available in the Qubes OS Debian template. Keep in mind that this may result in problems (especially in regard to package dependencies) not covered by this tutorial.
From the official ISO file <a name="hvm4_0"/>
==================================================
Only use this method if you want the full Kali GUI (desktop, fancy menus, etc.).
It comes at the cost of much greater resources consumption.
1. Download the Kali ISO
2. [Create a new HVM][qubes-new-hvm]
3. Start the HVM with attached CD/DVD
```shell_session
$ qvm-start <hvm-name> --cdrom <vm-name>:/home/user/Downloads/<iso-name>.iso
```
From a Debian template <a name="templatevm-from-debian4_0"/>
================================================================
This is the recommended method.
Easier to maintain and less demanding on resources, but you won’t have the full Kali GUI.
If you need to install custom kernel modules (wifi drivers, …) you need to use the kernel provided by Kali instead of the kernel provided by Qubes, see [Managing VM Kernel.](/doc/managing-vm-kernel/)
The steps can be summarized as:
1. Install Qubes stable Debian template
2. Upgrade from Debian `stable` to Debian `testing` for Qubes repositories
3. Add `testing` and `securitytesting` Qubes repositories
4. Replace the content of `/etc/apt/sources.list` file with the Kali repository
5. Update the template
Get Kali Linux PGP key
-----------------------
**CAUTION:** Before proceeding, please carefully read [On Digital Signatures and Key Verification][qubes-verifying-signatures].
This website cannot guarantee that any PGP key you download from the Internet is authentic.
In order to obtain a trusted fingerprint, check its value against multiple sources.
Then, check the keys you download against your trusted fingerprint.
This step is required since by (security) default TemplateVM do not have a
direct Internet connectivity. Users understanding the risks of enabling such
access can change this configuration in firewall settings for the TemplateVM.
1. Retrieve the Kali Linux PGP key using a DisposableVM.
```shell_session
$ gpg --keyserver hkps://keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 44C6513A8E4FB3D30875F758ED444FF07D8D0BF6
$ gpg --list-keys --with-fingerprint 44C6513A8E4FB3D30875F758ED444FF07D8D0BF6
$ gpg --export --armor 44C6513A8E4FB3D30875F758ED444FF07D8D0BF6 > kali-key.asc
```
2. **DO NOT TURN OFF** the DisposableVM, the `kali-key.asc` file will be copied in
the Kali Linux template for a further step.
3. Make sure the key is the authentic Kali key.
See the [Kali website] for further advice and instructions on verification.
Create a Kali Linux (rolling) template
----------------------------------------
These instructions will show you how to upgrade a Debian TemplateVM to Kali Linux.
1. (Optional) Check for latest Debian stable template and install it (if not already done)
```shell_session
# qubes-dom0-update --action="search all" qubes-template-debian
# qubes-dom0-update <latest Debian template>
```
2. Clone `debian-X` template
```shell_session
$ qvm-clone debian-<X> kali-rolling
```
3. Check the name of currently used repository in `/etc/apt/sources.list.d/qubes-r<X>.list` and current testing [Debian release][Debian-releases]. Update repository list accordingly
```shell_session
# sed -i 's/<current stable>/<current testing>/g' /etc/apt/sources.list.d/qubes-r<X>.list
```
e.g. in this example we update `buster` stable repository to `bullseye` testing repository
```shell_session
# sed -i 's/buster/bullseye/g' /etc/apt/sources.list.d/qubes-r<X>.list
```
4. Enable the QubesOS `testing` and `securitytesting` repositories
In `/etc/apt/sources.list.d/qubes-r<X>.list`, enable the `testing` and `securitytesting` repository.
We do that to reduce the 'dependency hell' between Qubes repository and Kali repository.
5. Copy the Kali PGP key from the DisposableVM to the new template:
```shell_session
$ qvm-copy kali-key.asc
```
The DisposableVM can now be turned off.
6. Add the Kali PGP key to the list of keys trusted to authenticate packages:
```shell_session
# cat /home/user/QubesIncoming/dispXXX/kali-key.asc | apt-key add -
```
This command should return: `OK`.
7. Replace Debian repositories with Kali repository
```shell_session
# echo 'deb https://http.kali.org/kali kali-rolling main non-free contrib' > /etc/apt/sources.list
```
8. Replace `gcc8` to work around a dependency issue
```shell_session
# apt-get remove libgcc-8-dev && apt-get install libc6-dev
```
**Note:** This kind of dependency issue will pop up and disappear without notice.
Such issues arise because of the differences of dependencies in packages from
the Kali repository, the Qubes testing repository and the Debian testing
repository.
So this step [step 8] is currently needed. But it will not always be the case.
9. Update the template
**Note:** During execution of the update, carefully read list of packages to be removed. If it contains `qubes-vm-dependencies` package, terminate operation and try to resolve missing dependencies first. For other `qubes-*` packages, it is up to you to decide if you need them.
10. Ensure a terminal can be opened in the new template.
```shell_session
$ qvm-run -a kali-rolling gnome-terminal
```
Install the Kali tools
------------------------------
At this point you should have a working template and you can install the tools you need.
You can find [a list of Kali Linux `Metapackages` here](https://tools.kali.org/kali-metapackages)
Keep in mind that the tools you will install can easily take more than 10 GB, [so you will need to **grow** the size of the VM system storage.][qubes-resize-disk-image]
Alternative Options to Kali Linux
===================================
* [PenTester Framework][PTF], with [PTF Qubes OS guide][qubes-ptf]
* BlackArch Linux, with [BA Qubes OS guide][qubes-blackarch]
* more on the [Penetration Testing page][qubes-pentesting]
Notes
=============
Thanks to the people in [the discussion thread](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1981).
[qubes-verifying-signatures]: /security/verifying-signatures/
[qubes-pentesting]: /doc/pentesting/
[qubes-blackarch]: /doc/pentesting/blackarch/
[qubes-ptf]: /doc/pentesting/ptf/
[qubes-template-debian-install]: /doc/templates/debian/#install
[qubes-resize-disk-image]: /doc/resize-disk-image/
[qubes-new-hvm]: /doc/standalone-and-hvm/
[kali]: https://www.kali.org/
[kali-vbox]: https://www.offensive-security.com/kali-linux-vmware-virtualbox-image-download/
[kali website]: https://docs.kali.org/introduction/download-official-kali-linux-images
[PTF]: https://www.trustedsec.com/may-2015/new-tool-the-pentesters-framework-ptf-released/
[katoolin]: https://github.com/LionSec/katoolin
[katoolin-howto]: http://www.tecmint.com/install-kali-linux-tools-using-katoolin-on-ubuntu-debian/
[Debian-releases]: https://www.debian.org/releases/
[Debian-security-naming-convention]: https://www.mail-archive.com/debian-security@lists.debian.org/msg41223.html

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: How to create Penetration Testers Framework (PTF) VM title: How to create Penetration Testers Framework (PTF) VM
permalink: /doc/pentesting/ptf/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/pentesting/ptf.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/pentesting/ptf/
- /doc/ptf/ - /doc/ptf/
--- ---
**General reminder:**
- The installation scripts and provided tools may have bugs, be vulnerable to Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks or other vulnerabilities.
- Adding additional repositories or tools for installing software extends your trust to those tool providers.
Please keep in mind that using such a VM or VM's based on the template for security and privacy critical tasks is not recommended.
How to create Penetration Testers Framework (PTF) VM
====================================================
"The PenTesters Framework (PTF) is a Python script designed for Debian/Ubuntu/ArchLinux based distributions to create a similar and familiar distribution for Penetration Testing.
PTF attempts to install all of your penetration testing tools (latest and greatest), compile them, build them, and make it so that you can install/update your distribution on any machine." (source [PTF Readme](https://github.com/trustedsec/ptf/blob/master/README.md))
**Note** PTF works on Debian testing as well as on Debian 8. PTF itself works with Debian 8, but the software tools will have missing dependencies. Metasploit for example requires a newer Ruby version than Debian 8 has in the repositories. Therefore the best way to install PTF is by upgrading a Debian 8 into Debian testing with additional Kali repositories. Instead of installing the tools from Kali, PTF will install and update the newest tools.
Create Debian Based Penetration Testers Framework (PTF) Template
----------------------------------------------------------------
1. Create PTF template
1. Follow [Create Debian Based Kali Template](/doc/pentesting/kali/) till step 7.
2. (Optional) Rename the cloned template to `ptf`
2. Download PTF
sudo apt-get install git
cd /opt
sudo git clone https://github.com/trustedsec/ptf.git
- (Optional) Configure PTF
1. Go to configuration directory
cd /opt/ptf/config
2. Edit the configuration file
for example by using vim:
sudo vim ptf.config
the configuration options are described in the `ptf.config` file
3. Install PTF
cd /opt/ptf
sudo ./ptf
**Note:** the config file has to be in the same directory as the executable. It is not
possible to do sudo ptf/ptf
PTF will put itself into `/usr/local/bin/ptf`. You can use `ptf` from now on.
4. Install/Update modules (tools)
1. Start PTF
sudo ptf
![PTF start banner](/attachment/wiki/PTF/ptf-banner.png)
2. Show available modules (tools)
ptf> show modules
3. Install/Update modules (all/)
- Install/Update all tools
ptf> use modules/install_update_all
- or by category Install/Update
ptf> use modules/code-audit/install_update_all
- or individually (example Metasploit)
1. Search for module
ptf> search metasploit
[*] Search results below:
modules/exploitation/metasploit
2. Use module
ptf> use modules/exploitation/metasploit
ptf:(modules/exploitation/metasploit)>
3. Install module
ptf:(modules/exploitation/metasploit)>install
4. Run Metasploit
ptf:(modules/exploitation/metasploit)>exit
ptf> quit
[*] Exiting PTF - the easy pentest platform creation framework.
sudo msfconsole
5. Create an AppVM based on the `ptf` template
- (Optional) Attach necessary devices
Alternative Options to PTF
--------------------------
- [BlackArch](/doc/pentesting/blackarch/)
- [Kali](/doc/pentesting/kali/)
- [Pentesting](/doc/pentesting/)

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Ubuntu Template title: Ubuntu Template
permalink: /doc/templates/ubuntu/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/templates/ubuntu.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/templates/ubuntu/
- /doc/ubuntu/ - /doc/ubuntu/
- /en/doc/templates/ubuntu/ - /en/doc/templates/ubuntu/
- /doc/Templates/Ubuntu/ - /doc/Templates/Ubuntu/
- /wiki/Templates/Ubuntu/ - /wiki/Templates/Ubuntu/
--- ---
Ubuntu template(s)
==================
If you would like to use Ubuntu Linux distribution in your AppVMs, you can build and install one of the available Ubuntu templates.
These templates are currently not provided by Qubes in ready to use binary packages, because Canonical does not allow redistribution of a modified Ubuntu.
The redistribution is not allowed by their [Intellectual property rights policy][IP].
Building the Template
-------
Templates can be built using [Qubes Builder][builder]
(You can also access documentation in the [source code repository][repo].)
Please carefully read the [instructions][builder] for setting up and using Qubes Builder.
To quickly prepare the builder configuration, you can use the `setup` script available in the repository - it will interactively ask you which templates you want to build.
Select one of the Ubuntu version options.
On the "Choose Pre-Built Packages Repositories" page you must not select either option.
This is because Qubes does not provide offical Pre-Built packages for Ubuntu.
Once you have completed setup, in the qubes-builder directory, run:
```
make qubes-vm
make template
```
The build for Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (Xenial) is straightforward.
The build for Ubuntu 18.04 LTS (Bionic) is straightforward.
Installing the template
-------
You must copy the template you have built in to dom0 and install it there.
Rather than do this manually, there is a script you can use.
In dom0, run :
```
qvm-run -p <build_qube> 'cat /home/user/qubes-builder/qubes-src/linux-template-builder/rpm/install-templates.sh ' > install-templates.sh
```
If you have built other templates, edit the `install-templates.sh` to ensure you only retain the templates you want to install.
Then run `./install-templates.sh`
----------
If you want to help in improving the template, feel free to [contribute][contrib].
[IP]: https://www.ubuntu.com/legal/terms-and-policies/intellectual-property-policy
[repo]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/blob/master/README.md
[builder]: /doc/qubes-builder/
[contrib]: /doc/contributing/

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Qubes Windows Tools title: Qubes Windows Tools
permalink: /doc/windows-tools/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/windows-tools.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/windows-tools/
- /doc/windows-appvms/ - /doc/windows-appvms/
- /en/doc/windows-appvms/ - /en/doc/windows-appvms/
- /doc/WindowsAppVms/ - /doc/WindowsAppVms/
@ -14,335 +15,3 @@ redirect_from:
- /wiki/WindowsTools/ - /wiki/WindowsTools/
--- ---
Qubes Windows Tools
===================
Qubes Windows Tools are a set of programs and drivers that provide integration of Windows AppVMs with the rest of the Qubes system. Currently the following features are available for Windows VMs after installation of those tools:
- **Qubes Video Driver** - provides for the Seamless GUI mode that integrates apps windows onto the common Qubes trusted desktop
- **File sender/receiver** - Support for [secure clipboard copy/paste](/doc/copy-paste/) between the Windows VM and other AppVMs
- ***File sender/receiver** - Support for [secure file exchange](/doc/copying-files/) between the Windows VM and other AppVMs
- **Copy/Edit in Disposable VM** - Support for editing files in DisposableVMs as well as for qvm-run and generic qrexec for the Windows VM (e.g. ability to run custom service within/from the Windows VM)
- **Xen PV drivers** for Windows that increase performance compared to qemu emulated devices
Below is a breakdown of the feature availability depending on the windows version:
| Feature | Windows 7 x64 | Windows 10 x64 |
| ------------------------------------ | :------------: | :------------: |
| Qubes Video Driver | + | - |
| Qubes Network Setup | + | + |
| Private Volume Setup (move profiles) | + | + |
| File sender/receiver | + | + |
| Clipboard Copy/Paste | + | + |
| Application shortcuts | + | + |
| Copy/Edit in Disposable VM | + | + |
| Block device | + | + |
| USB device | - | - |
| Audio | - | - |
Qubes Windows Tools are open source and are distributed under a GPL license.
NOTES:
- Qubes Windows Tools are currently unmaintained
- Currently only 64-bit versions of Windows 7 and Windows 10 are supported by Qubes Windows Tools. Only emulated SVGA GPU is supported (although [there has been reports](https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/qubes-users/cmPRMOkxkdA) on working GPU passthrough).
- __This page documents the process of installing Qubes Windows Tools on versions up to R3.2.__. Installation on Qubes R4.0 is possible but is a work in progress and there are limitations/bugs (see [issue #3585](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3585)).
Installing Windows OS in a Qubes VM
-----------------------------------
Please refer to [this page](/doc/windows-vm/) for instructions on how to install Windows in a Qubes VM.
NOTE: It is strongly suggested to enable autologon for any Windows HVMs that will have Qubes Tools installed. To do so, run `netplwiz` command from the `Win+R`/Start menu and uncheck the *Users must enter a user name and password to use this computer* option.
Installing Qubes guest tools in Windows 10 VMs
----------------------------------------------
This will allow you to install the Qubes Windows Tools on Windows 10 both as a StandaloneVM as well as a Template VM and a corresponding AppVM. But some features are not available:
> **Note:** seamless mode is currently not available for windows. Please check the top of this document for the full feature availability breakdown.
1. In the Windows 10 VM, download from the [XEN website](https://xenproject.org/downloads/windows-pv-drivers/windows-pv-drivers-9-series/windows-pv-drivers-9-0-0/) the installation kits for Xen bus (`xenbus`) and storage drivers (`xenvbd`) Version 9.0.0 (two files`xenvbd.tar`and `xenbus.tar`).
2. Use an archive extractor like [7-zip](https://www.7-zip.org/) to extract the contents of the `.tar` files.
3. Install `xenvbd` and `xenbus` by starting the file `dpinst.exe` from the `x64` directories of the extracted tar-files. If during installation, the Xen driver requests a reboot, select "No" and let the installation continue.
4. After installation, reboot.
5. Download the Qubes Windows Tools (`qubes-tools-4.0.1.3.exe`) from [the qubes FTP server](https://ftp.qubes-os.org/qubes-windows-tools/) and move it to `C:\`.
6. Check the integrity of the file `qubes-tools-4.0.1.3.exe`by comparing its hash checksum. This can be done using the Windows command `certutil` on the windows command prompt (`cmd.exe`) and specifying an appropriate hash algorithm like:
certutil --hashfile C:\qubes-tools-4.0.1.3.exe SHA256
And compare it the value to `148A2A993F0C746B48FA6C5C9A5D1B504E09A7CFBA3FB931A4DCF86FDA4EC9B1` (**it has to exactly match for security reasons**). If it matches, feel free to continue the installation. If not, repeat the download to make sure it was not corrupted due to a network problem. If keeps on not matching it might be an attacker attempting to do something nasty to your system -- Ask for support.
> **Note**: this is a workaround for installing the qubes windows tools on windows 10 since the standard way is broken.
7. Install Qubes Windows Tools 4.0.1.3 by starting `qubes-tools-4.0.1.3.exe`, not selecting the `Xen PV disk drivers` and the `Move user profiles` (which would probably lead to problems in Windows, anyhow). If during installation, the Xen driver requests a reboot, select "No" and let the installation continue - the system will be rebooted later.
8. Shut down Windows.
9. On a `dom0` terminal write: *(where `<VMname>` is the name of your Windows 10 VM)*
qvm-features <VMname> gui 1
10. Reboot Windows. If the VM starts, but does not show any window then shutdown Windows from the Qube manager and reboot Windows once more.
11. Now the system should be up, with QWT running correctly.
12. Lastly to enable file copy operations to a Windows 10 VM the `default_user` property should be set the `<username>` that you use to login to the Windows VM. This can be done via the following command on a `dom0` terminal: *(where `<VMname>` is the name of your Windows 10 VM)*
`qvm-prefs <VMname> default_user <username>`
> **Note:** If this property is not set or set to a wrong value, files copied to this VM are stored in the folder `C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\Documents\QubesIncoming\<source_VM>`.
> If the target VM is an AppVM, this has the consequence that the files are stored in the corresponding TemplateVM and so are lost on AppVM shutdown.
Installing Qubes guest tools in Windows 7 VMs
---------------------------------------------
First, make sure that `qubes-windows-tools` is installed in your system:
~~~
sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-windows-tools
~~~
(If the above command does not work, it could be that the Qubes Tools are not in the stable repo yet. Try installing from the testing repo instead.)
You can also install the package from testing repositories, where we usually publish new versions first:
~~~
sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-current-testing qubes-windows-tools
~~~
This package brings the ISO with Qubes Windows Tools that is passed to the VM when `--install-windows-tools` is specified for the `qvm-start` command. Please note that none of this software ever runs in Dom0 or any other part of the system except for the Windows AppVM in which it is to be installed.
Before proceeding with the installation we need to disable Windows mechanism that allows only signed drivers to be installed, because currently (beta releases) the drivers we provide as part of the Windows Tools are not digitally signed with a publicly recognizable certificate. To do that:
- Start command prompt as Administrator, i.e. right click on the Command Prompt icon (All Programs -> Accessories) and choose "Run as administrator"
- In the command prompt type `bcdedit /set testsigning on`
- Reboot your Windows VM
In the future this step will not be necessary anymore, because we will sign our drivers with a publicly verifiable certificate. However, it should be noted that even now, the fact that those drivers are not digitally signed, this doesn't affect security of the Windows VM in 'any' way. This is because the actual installation ISO (the `qubes-windows-tools-*.iso` file) is distributed as a signed RPM package and its signature is verified by the `qubes-dom0-update` utility once it's being installed in Dom0. The only downside of those drivers not being signed is the inconvenience to the user that he or she must disable the signature enforcement policy before installing the tools.
To install the Qubes Windows Tools in a Windows VM one should start the VM passing the additional option `--install-windows-tools`:
~~~
qvm-start lab-win7 --install-windows-tools
~~~
Once the Windows VM boots, a CDROM should appear in the 'My Computer' menu (typically as `D:`) with a setup program in its main directory.
After successful installation, the Windows VM must be shut down and started again, possibly a couple of times.
Qubes will automatically detect the tools has been installed in the VM and will set appropriate properties for the VM, such as `qrexec_installed`, `guiagent_installed`, and `default_user`. This can be verified (but is not required) using qvm-prefs command:
~~~
qvm-prefs <your-appvm-name>
~~~
NOTE: it is recommended to increase the default value of Windows VM's `qrexec_timeout` property from 60 (seconds) to, for example, 300. During one of the first reboots after Windows Tools installation Windows user profiles are moved onto the private VM's virtual disk (private.img) and this operation can take some time. Moving profiles is performed in an early boot phase when qrexec is not yet running, so timeout may occur with the default value. To change the property use this command in dom0:
~~~
qvm-prefs -s <vm-name> qrexec_timeout 300
~~~
Xen PV drivers and Qubes Windows Tools
--------------------------------------
Installing Xen's PV drivers in the VM will lower its resources usage when using network and/or I/O intensive applications, but *may* come at the price of system stability (although Xen's PV drivers on a Win7 VM are usually very stable). There are two ways of installing the drivers:
1. installing the drivers independently, from Xen's [official site](https://www.xenproject.org/developers/teams/windows-pv-drivers.html)
2. installing Qubes Windows Tools (QWT), which bundles Xen's PV drivers.
Notes about using Xen's VBD (storage) PV driver:
- **Windows 7:** installing the driver requires a fully updated VM or else you'll likely get a BSOD and a VM in a difficult to fix state. Updating Windows takes *hours* and for casual usage there isn't much of a performance between the disk PV driver and the default one; so there is likely no need to go through the lengthy Windows Update process if your VM doesn't have access to untrusted networks and if you don't use I/O intensive apps. If you plan to update your newly installed Windows VM it is recommended that you do so *before* installing Qubes Windows Tools (QWT). If QWT are installed, you should temporarily re-enable the standard VGA adapter in Windows and disable Qubes' (see the section above).
- the option to install the storage PV driver is disabled by default in Qubes Windows Tools
- in case you already had QWT installed without the storage PV driver and you then updated the VM, you may then install the driver from Xen's site (xenvbd.tar).
**Caution:** Installing the version 9.0.0 Xen drivers on Windows 7 (a system without QWT - QWT uninstalled) leads to an unbootable system. The drivers install without error, but after reboot, the system aborts the reboot saying `Missing driver xenbus.sys`.
- **Windows 10:** The version 9.0.0 Xen drivers have to be installed before installing Qubes Windows Tools. Installing them on a system with QWT installed is likely to produce a system which crashes or has the tools in a non-functional state. Even if the tools were installed and then removed before installing the Xen drivers, they probably will not work as expected.
With Qubes Windows Tools installed the early graphical console provided in debugging mode isn't needed anymore since Qubes' display driver will be used instead of the default VGA driver:
~~~
qvm-prefs -s win7new debug false
~~~
Using Windows AppVMs in seamless mode
-------------------------------------
> **Note:** This feature is only available for Windows 7
Once you start a Windows-based AppVM with Qubes Tools installed, you can easily start individual applications from the VM (note the `-a` switch used here, which will auto-start the VM if it is not running):
~~~
qvm-run -a my-win7-appvm explorer.exe
~~~
![windows-seamless-4.png](/attachment/wiki/WindowsAppVms/windows-seamless-4.png) ![windows-seamless-1.png](/attachment/wiki/WindowsAppVms/windows-seamless-1.png)
Also, the inter-VM services work as usual -- e.g. to request opening a document or URL in the Windows AppVM from another VM:
~~~
[user@work ~]$ qvm-open-in-vm work-win7 roadmap.pptx
~~~
~~~
[user@work ~]$ qvm-open-in-vm work-win7 https://invisiblethingslab.com
~~~
... just like in the case of Linux AppVMs. Of course all those operations are governed by central policy engine running in Dom0 -- if the policy doesn't contain explicit rules for the source and/or target AppVM, the user will be asked whether to allow or deny the operation.
Inter-VM file copy and clipboard works for Windows AppVMs the same way as for Linux AppVM (except that we don't provide a command line wrapper, `qvm-copy-to-vm` in Windows VMs) -- to copy files from Windows AppVMs just right-click on the file in Explorer, and choose: Send To-\> Other AppVM.
To simulate CTRL-ALT-DELETE in the HVM (SAS, Secure Attention Sequence), press Ctrl-Alt-Home while having any window of this VM in the foreground.
![windows-seamless-7.png](/attachment/wiki/WindowsAppVms/windows-seamless-7.png)
Changing between seamless and full desktop mode
-----------------------------------------------
You can switch between seamless and "full desktop" mode for Windows HVMs in their settings in Qubes Manager. The latter is the default.
Using template-based Windows AppVMs
-----------------------------------
Qubes allows HVM VMs to share a common root filesystem from a select Template VM, just as for Linux AppVMs. This mode is not limited to Windows AppVMs, and can be used for any HVM (e.g. FreeBSD running in a HVM).
In order to create a HVM TemplateVM one can use the following command, suitably adapted:
~~~
qvm-create --class TemplateVM win-template --property virt_mode=HVM --property kernel='' -l green
~~~
... , set memory as appropriate, and install Windows OS (or other OS) into this template the same way as you would install it into a normal HVM -- please see instructions on [this page](/doc/hvm-create/).
If you use this Template as it is, then any HVMs that use it will effectively be DisposableVMs - the User directory will be wiped when the HVN is closed down.
If you want to retain the User directory between reboots, then it would make sense to store the `C:\Users` directory on the 2nd disk which is automatically exposed by Qubes to all HVMs.
This 2nd disk is backed by the `private.img` file in the AppVMs' and is not reset upon AppVMs reboot, so the user's directories and profiles would survive the AppVMs reboot, unlike the "root" filesystem which will be reverted to the "golden image" from the Template VM automatically.
To facilitate such separation of user profiles, Qubes Windows Tools provide an option to automatically move `C:\Users` directory to the 2nd disk backed by `private.img`.
It's a selectable feature of the installer, enabled by default, but working only for Windows 7.
If that feature is selected during installation, completion of the process requires two reboots:
- The private disk is initialized and formatted on the first reboot after tools installation. It can't be done **during** the installation because Xen mass storage drivers are not yet active.
- User profiles are moved to the private disk on the next reboot after the private disk is initialized.
Reboot is required because the "mover utility" runs very early in the boot process so OS can't yet lock any files in there.
This can take some time depending on the profiles' size and because the GUI agent is not yet active dom0/Qubes Manager may complain that the AppVM failed to boot.
That's a false alarm (you can increase AppVM's default boot timeout using `qvm-prefs`), the VM should appear "green" in Qubes Manager shortly after.
For Windows 10, the user directories have to be moved manually, because the automatic transfer during QWT installation is bound to crash due to undocumented new features of NTFS, and a system having the directory `users`on another disk than `C:` will break on Windows update. So the following steps should be taken:
- The Windows disk manager may be used to add the private volume as disk `D:`, and you may, using the documented Windows operations, move the user directories `C:\users\<username>\Documents` to this new disk, allowing depending AppVMs to have their own private volumes. Moving the hidden application directories `AppData`, however, is likely to invite trouble - the same trouble that occurs if, during QWT installation, the option `Move user profiles` is selected.
- Configuration data like those stored in directories like `AppData` still remain in the TemplateVM, such that their changes are lost each time the AppVM shuts down. In order to make permanent changes to these configuration data, they have to be changed in the TemplateVM, meaning that applications have to be started there, which violates and perhaps even endangers the security of the TemplateVM. Such changes should be done only if absolutely necessary and with great care. It is a good idea to test them first in a cloned TemplateVM before applying them in the production VM.
It also makes sense to disable Automatic Updates for all the template-based AppVMs -- of course this should be done in the Template VM, not in individual AppVMs, because the system-wide settings are stored in the root filesystem (which holds the system-wide registry hives). Then, periodically check for updates in the Template VM and the changes will be carried over to any child AppVMs.
Once the template has been created and installed it is easy to create AppVMs based on it:
~~~
qvm-create --property virt_mode=hvm <new windows appvm name> --template <name of template vm> --label <label color>
~~~
Components
----------
Qubes Windows Tools (QWT for short) contain several components than can be enabled or disabled during installation:
- Shared components (required): common libraries used by QWT components.
- Xen PV drivers: drivers for the virtual hardware exposed by Xen.
- Base Xen PV Drivers (required): paravirtual bus and interface drivers.
- Xen PV Disk Drivers: paravirtual storage drivers.
- Xen PV Network Drivers: paravirtual network drivers.
- Qubes Core Agent: qrexec agent and services. Needed for proper integration with Qubes.
- Move user profiles: user profile directory (c:\users) is moved to VM's private disk backed by private.img file in dom0 (useful mainly for HVM templates).
- Qubes GUI Agent: video driver and gui agent that enable seamless showing of Windows applications on the secure Qubes desktop.
- Disable UAC: User Account Control may interfere with QWT and doesn't really provide any additional benefits in Qubes environment.
**In testing VMs only** it's probably a good idea to install a VNC server before installing QWT. If something goes very wrong with the Qubes gui agent, a VNC server should still allow access to the OS.
**NOTE**: Xen PV disk drivers are not installed by default. This is because they seem to cause problems (BSOD = Blue Screen Of Death). We're working with upstream devs to fix this. *However*, the BSOD seems to only occur after the first boot and everything works fine after that. **Enable the drivers at your own risk** of course, but we welcome reports of success/failure in any case (backup your VM first!). With disk PV drivers absent `qvm-block` will not work for the VM, but you can still use standard Qubes inter-VM file copying mechanisms.
Xen PV driver components may display a message box asking for reboot during installation -- it's safe to ignore them and defer the reboot.
Installation logs
-----------------
If the install process fails or something goes wrong during it, include the installation logs in your bug report. They are created in the `%TEMP%` directory, by default `<user profile>\AppData\Local\Temp`. There are two text files, one small and one big, with names starting with `Qubes_Windows_Tools`.
Uninstalling QWT is supported from version 3.2.1. Uninstalling previous versions is **not recommended**.
After uninstalling you need to manually enable the DHCP Client Windows service, or set IP settings yourself to restore network access.
Configuration
-------------
Starting from version 2.2.\* various aspects of Qubes Windows Tools can be configured through registry. Main configuration key is located in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Invisible Things Lab\Qubes Tools`. Configuration values set on this level are global to all QWT components. It's possible to override global values with component-specific keys, this is useful mainly for setting log verbosity for troubleshooting. Possible configuration values are:
|**Name**|**Type**|**Description**|**Default value**|
|:-------|:-------|:--------------|:----------------|
|LogDir|String|Directory where logs are created|c:\\Program Files\\Invisible Things Lab\\Qubes Tools\\log|
|LogLevel|DWORD|Log verbosity (see below)|2 (INFO)|
|LogRetention|DWORD|Maximum age of log files (in seconds), older logs are automatically deleted|604800 (7 days)|
Possible log levels:
||
|1|Error|Serious errors that most likely cause irrecoverable failures|
|2|Warning|Unexpected but non-fatal events|
|3|Info|Useful information (default)|
|4|Debug|Internal state dumps for troubleshooting|
|5|Verbose|Trace most function calls|
Debug and Verbose levels can generate large volume of logs and are intended for development/troubleshooting only.
To override global settings for a specific component, create a new key under the root key mentioned above and name it as the executable name, without `.exe` extension. For example, to change qrexec-agent's log level to Debug, set it like this:
![qtw-log-level.png](/attachment/wiki/WindowsTools/qtw-log-level.png)
Component-specific settings currently available:
|**Component**|**Setting**|**Type**|**Description**|**Default value**|
|:------------|:----------|:-------|:--------------|:----------------|
|qga|DisableCursor|DWORD|Disable cursor in the VM. Useful for integration with Qubes desktop so you don't see two cursors. Can be disabled if you plan to use the VM through a remote desktop connection of some sort. Needs gui agent restart to apply change (locking OS/logoff should be enough since qga is restarted on desktop change).|1|
Troubleshooting
---------------
If the VM is inaccessible (doesn't respond to qrexec commands, gui is not functioning), try to boot it in safe mode:
- `qvm-start --debug vmname`
- mash F8 on the boot screen to enable boot options and select Safe Mode (optionally with networking)
Safe Mode should at least give you access to logs (see above).
**Please include appropriate logs when reporting bugs/problems.** Starting from version 2.4.2 logs contain QWT version, but if you're using an earlier version be sure to mention which one. If the OS crashes (BSOD) please include the BSOD code and parameters in your bug report. The BSOD screen should be visible if you run the VM in debug mode (`qvm-start --debug vmname`). If it's not visible or the VM reboots automatically, try to start Windows in safe mode (see above) and 1) disable automatic restart on BSOD (Control Panel - System - Advanced system settings - Advanced - Startup and recovery), 2) check the system event log for BSOD events. If you can, send the `memory.dmp` dump file from c:\Windows.
Xen logs (/var/log/xen/console/guest-*) are also useful as they contain pvdrivers diagnostic output.
If a specific component is malfunctioning, you can increase its log verbosity as explained above to get more troubleshooting information. Below is a list of components:
||
|qrexec-agent|Responsible for most communication with Qubes (dom0 and other domains), secure clipboard, file copying, qrexec services.|
|qrexec-wrapper|Helper executable that's responsible for launching qrexec services, handling their I/O and vchan communication.|
|qrexec-client-vm|Used for communications by the qrexec protocol.|
|qga|Gui agent.|
|QgaWatchdog|Service that monitors session/desktop changes (logon/logoff/locking/UAC...) and simulates SAS sequence (ctrl-alt-del).|
|qubesdb-daemon|Service for accessing Qubes configuration database.|
|network-setup|Service that sets up network parameters according to VM's configuration.|
|prepare-volume|Utility that initializes and formats the disk backed by `private.img` file. It's registered to run on next system boot during QWT setup, if that feature is selected (it can't run *during* the setup because Xen block device drivers are not yet active). It in turn registers move-profiles (see below) to run at early boot.|
|relocate-dir|Utility that moves user profiles directory to the private disk. It's registered as an early boot native executable (similar to chkdsk) so it can run before any profile files are opened by some other process. Its log is in a fixed location: `c:\move-profiles.log` (it can't use our common logger library so none of the log settings apply).|
Updates
-------
When we publish new QWT version, it's usually pushed to the `current-testing` or `unstable` repository first. To use versions from current-testing, run this in dom0:
`qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-current-testing qubes-windows-tools`
That command will download a new QWT .iso from the testing repository. It goes without saying that you should **backup your VMs** before installing anything from testing repos.

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Installing a Windows VM title: Installing a Windows VM
permalink: /doc/windows-vm/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/windows-vm.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/windows-vm/
--- ---
Installing a Windows VM
=======================
Simple Windows install
----------------------
If you just want something simple and you can live without some features.
Works:
- display (1440x900 or 1280x1024 are a nice fit onto FHD hw display)
- keyboard (incl. correct mapping), pointing device
- network (emulated Realtek NIC)
Does not work:
- copy & paste (the qubes way)
- copying files into / out of the VM (the qubes way)
- assigning USB devices (the qubes way via the tray applet)
- audio output and input
- PCI device 5853:0001 (Xen platform device) - no driver
- all other features/hardware needing special tool/driver support
Installation procedure:
- Have the Windows 10 ISO image (I used the 64-bit version) downloaded in some qube.
- Create a new Qube:
- Name: Win10, Color: red
- Standalone Qube not based on a template
- Networking: sys-firewall (default)
- Launch settings after creation: check
- Click "OK".
- Settings:
- Basic:
- System storage: 30000+ MB
- Advanced:
- Include in memory balancing: uncheck
- Initial memory: 4096+ MB
- Kernel: None
- Mode: HVM
- Click "Apply".
- Click "Boot from CDROM":
- "from file in qube":
- Select the qube that has the ISO.
- Select ISO by clicking "...".
- Click "OK" to boot into the windows installer.
- Windows Installer:
- Mostly as usual, but automatic reboots will halt the qube - just restart
it again and again until the installation is finished.
- Install on first disk.
- Windows license may be read from flash via root in dom0:
`strings < /sys/firmware/acpi/tables/MSDM`
Alternatively, you can also try a Windows 7 license key (as of 2018/11
they are still accepted for a free upgrade).
I first installed Windows and all updates, then entered the license key.
- Afterwards:
- In case you switch from `sys-network` to `sys-whonix`, you'll need a static
IP network configuration, DHCP won't work for `sys-whonix`.
- Use `powercfg -H off` and `disk cleanup` to save some disk space.
Qubes 4.0 - importing a Windows VM from R3.2
-------------------------------------------
Importing should work, simply make sure that you are not using Xen's newer linux stubdomain and that the VM is in HVM mode (these steps should be done automatically when importing the VM):
~~~
qvm-features VMNAME linux-stubdom ''
qvm-prefs VMNAME virt_mode hvm
~~~
Note however that you are better off creating a new Windows VM to benefit from the more recent emulated hardware: R3.2 uses a MiniOS based stubdomain with an old and mostly unmaintained 'qemu-traditional' while R4.0 uses a Linux based stubdomain with a recent version of upstream qemu (see [this post](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/tBqwJmOAJ94/xmFCGJnuAwAJ)).
Windows VM installation
-----------------------
### qvm-create-windows-qube ###
An unofficial, third-party tool for automating this process is available [here](https://github.com/elliotkillick/qvm-create-windows-qube).
(Please note that this tool has not been reviewed by the Qubes OS Project.
Use it at your own risk.)
However, if you are an expert or want to do it manually you may continue below.
### Summary ###
~~~
qvm-create --class StandaloneVM --label red --property virt_mode=hvm win7new
qvm-prefs win7new memory 4096
qvm-prefs win7new maxmem 4096
qvm-prefs win7new kernel ''
qvm-volume extend win7new:root 25g
qvm-prefs win7new debug true
qvm-features win7new video-model cirrus
qvm-start --cdrom=untrusted:/home/user/windows_install.iso win7new
# restart after the first part of the windows installation process ends
qvm-start win7new
# once Windows is installed and working
qvm-prefs win7new memory 2048
qvm-prefs win7new maxmem 2048
qvm-features --unset win7new video-model
qvm-prefs win7new qrexec_timeout 300
# with Qubes Windows Tools installed:
qvm-prefs win7new debug false
~~~
To install Qubes Windows Tools, follow instructions in [Qubes Windows Tools](/doc/windows-tools/).
### Detailed instructions ###
MS Windows versions considerations:
- The instructions *may* work on other versions than Windows 7 x64 but haven't been tested.
- Qubes Windows Tools (QWT) only supports Windows 7 x64. Note that there are [known issues](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3585) with QWT on Qubes 4.x
- For Windows 10 under Qubes 4.0, a way to install QWT 4.0.1.3, which has worked in several instances, is described in [Qubes Windows Tools](/doc/windows-tools/).
Create a VM named win7new in [HVM](/doc/hvm/) mode (Xen's current PVH limitations precludes from using PVH):
~~~
qvm-create --class StandaloneVM --label red --property virt_mode=hvm win7new
~~~
Windows' installer requires a significant amount of memory or else the VM will crash with such errors:
`/var/log/xen/console/hypervisor.log`:
> p2m_pod_demand_populate: Dom120 out of PoD memory! (tot=102411 ents=921600 dom120)
> (XEN) domain_crash called from p2m-pod.c:1218
> (XEN) Domain 120 (vcpu#0) crashed on cpu#3:
So, increase the VM's memory to 4096MB (memory = maxmem because we don't use memory balancing).
~~~
qvm-prefs win7new memory 4096
qvm-prefs win7new maxmem 4096
~~~
Disable direct boot so that the VM will go through the standard cdrom/HDD boot sequence:
~~~
qvm-prefs win7new kernel ''
~~~
A typical Windows 7 installation requires between 15GB up to 19GB of disk space depending on the version (Home/Professional/...). Windows updates also end up using significant space. So, extend the root volume from the default 10GB to 25GB (note: it is straightforward to increase the root volume size after Windows is installed: simply extend the volume again in dom0 and then extend the system partition with Windows's disk manager).
~~~
qvm-volume extend win7new:root 25g
~~~
Set the debug flag in order to have a graphical console:
~~~
qvm-prefs win7new debug true
~~~
The second part of the installation process will crash with the standard VGA video adapter and the VM will stay in "transient" mode with the following error in `guest-win7new-dm.log`:
> qemu: /home/user/qubes-src/vmm-xen-stubdom-linux/build/qemu/exec.c:1187: cpu_physical_memory_snapshot_get_dirty: Assertion `start + length <= snap->end' failed.
To avoid that error we temporarily have to switch the video adapter to 'cirrus':
~~~
qvm-features win7new video-model cirrus
~~~
The VM is now ready to be started; the best practice is to use an installation ISO [located in a VM](/doc/standalone-and-hvm/#installing-an-os-in-an-hvm):
~~~
qvm-start --cdrom=untrusted:/home/user/windows_install.iso win7new
~~~
Given the higher than usual memory requirements of Windows, you may get a `Not enough memory to start domain 'win7new'` error. In that case try to shutdown unneeded VMs to free memory before starting the Windows VM.
At this point you may open a tab in dom0 for debugging, in case something goes amiss:
~~~
tailf /var/log/qubes/vm-win7new.log \
/var/log/xen/console/hypervisor.log \
/var/log/xen/console/guest-win7new-dm.log
~~~
The VM will shutdown after the installer completes the extraction of Windows installation files. It's a good idea to clone the VM now (eg. `qvm-clone win7new win7newbkp1`). Then, (re)start the VM with `qvm-start win7new`.
The second part of Windows' installer should then be able to complete successfully. You may then perform the following post-install steps:
Decrease the VM's memory to a more reasonable value (memory balancing on Windows is unstable so keep `memory` equal to `maxmen`).
~~~
qvm-prefs win7new memory 2048
qvm-prefs win7new maxmem 2048
~~~
Revert to the standard VGA adapter: the 'cirrus' adapter will limit the maximum screen resolution to 1024x768 pixels, while the default VGA adapter allows for much higher resolutions (up to 2560x1600 pixels).
~~~
qvm-features --unset win7new video-model
~~~
Finally, increase the VM's `qrexec_timeout`: in case you happen to get a BSOD or a similar crash in the VM, utilities like chkdsk won't complete on restart before qrexec_timeout automatically halts the VM. That can really put the VM in a totally unrecoverable state, whereas with higher qrexec_timeout, chkdsk or the appropriate utility has plenty of time to fix the VM. Note that Qubes Windows Tools also require a larger timeout to move the user profiles to the private volume the first time the VM reboots after the tools' installation.
~~~
qvm-prefs win7new qrexec_timeout 300
~~~
At that point you should have a functional and stable Windows VM, although without updates, Xen's PV drivers nor Qubes integration (see sections [Windows Update](#windows-update) and [Xen PV drivers and Qubes Windows Tools](/doc/windows-tools/#xen-pv-drivers-and-qubes-windows-tools)). It is a good time to clone the VM again.
Windows as TemplateVM
---------------------
Windows 7 and 10 can be installed as TemplateVM by selecting
~~~
qvm-create --class TemplateVM --property virt_mode=HVM --property kernel='' --label black Windows-template
~~~
when creating the VM. To have the user data stored in AppVMs depending on this template, Windows 7 and 10 have to be treated differently:
- For Windows 7, the option to move the user directories from drive `C` to drive `D` works and causes any user data to be stored in the AppVMs based on this template, and not in the template itself.
- After installation of Windows 10 as a TemplateVM, the Windows disk manager may be used to add the private volume as disk `D:`, and you may, using the documented Windows operations, move the user directories `C:\users\<username>\Documents` to this new disk, allowing depending AppVMs to have their own private volumes. Moving the hidden application directories `AppData`, however, is likely to invite trouble - the same trouble that occurs if, during QWT installation, the option `Move user profiles` is selected.
For Windows 10, configuration data like those stored in directories like `AppData` still remain in the TemplateVM, such that their changes are lost each time the AppVM shuts down. In order to make permanent changes to these configuration data, they have to be changed in the TemplateVM, meaning that applications have to be started there, which violates and perhaps even endangers the security of the TemplateVM. Such changes should be done only if absolutely necessary and with great care. It is a good idea to test them first in a cloned TemplateVM before applying them in the production VM.
AppVMs based on these templates can be created the normal way by using the Qube Manager or by specifying
~~~
qvm-create --class=AppVM --template=<VMname>
~~~
On starting the AppVM, sometimes a message is displayed that the Xen PV Network Class needs to restart the system. This message can be safely ignored and closed by selecting "No".
**Caution:** These AppVMs must not be started while the corresponding TemplateVM is running, because they share the TemplateVM's license data. Even if this could work sometimes, it would be a violation of the license terms.
### Windows 10 Usage According to GDPR
If Windows 10 is used in the EU to process personal data, according to GDPR no automatic data transfer to countries outside the EU is allowed without explicit consent of the person(s) concerned, or other legal consent, as applicable. Since no reliable way is found to completely control the sending of telemetry from Windows 10, the system containing personal data must be completely shielded from the internet.
This can be achieved by installing Windows 10 on a TemplateVM with the user data directory moved to a separate drive (usually `D:`). Personal data must not be stored within the TemplateVM, but only in AppVMs depending on this TemplateVM. Network access by these AppVMs must be restricted to the local network and perhaps additional selected servers within the EU. Any data exchange of the AppVMs must be restricted to file and clipboard operations to and from other VMs in the same Qubes system.
Windows update
--------------
Depending on how old your installation media is, fully updating your Windows VM may take *hours* (this isn't specific to Xen/Qubes) so make sure you clone your VM between the mandatory reboots in case something goes wrong. This [comment](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3585#issuecomment-366471111) provides useful links on updating a Windows 7 SP1 VM.
Note: if you already have Qubes Windows Tools installed the video adapter in Windows will be "Qubes video driver" and you won't be able to see the Windows Update process when the VM is being powered off because Qubes services would have been stopped by then. Depending on the size of the Windows update packs it may take a bit of time until the VM shutdowns by itself, leaving one wondering if the VM has crashed or still finalizing the updates (in dom0 a changing CPU usage - eg. shown with `xentop` - usually indicates that the VM hasn't crashed).
To avoid guessing the VM's state enable debugging (`qvm-prefs -s win7new debug true`) and in Windows' device manager (My computer -> Manage / Device manager / Display adapters) temporarily re-enable the standard VGA adapter and disable "Qubes video driver". You can disable debugging and revert to Qubes' display once the VM is updated.
Further customization
---------------------
Please see the [Customizing Windows 7 templates](/doc/windows-template-customization/) page (despite the focus on preparing the VM for use as a template, most of the instructions are independent from how the VM will be used - ie. TemplateVM or StandaloneVM).

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Anonymizing your MAC Address title: Anonymizing your MAC Address
permalink: /doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/privacy/anonymizing-your-mac-address.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/
- /doc/randomizing-your-mac-address/ - /doc/randomizing-your-mac-address/
--- ---
Anonymizing your MAC Address
============================
Although it is not the only metadata broadcast by network hardware, changing the default [MAC Address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) of your hardware could be [an important step in protecting privacy](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/MAC_address/#index1h1).
Currently, Qubes OS *does not* automatically "anonymize" or spoof the MAC Address, so unless this gets implemented by default you can randomize your MAC Address with the following guide.
## Upgrading and configuring Network Manager in Qubes
Newer versions of Network Manager have options for randomizing MAC addresses, and can handle the entire process across reboots, sleep/wake cycles and different connection states.
In particular, versions 1.4.2 and later should be well suited for Qubes. Qubes R4.0's default sys-net should have 1.8.2-4 by default.
However, use of the NetworkManager GUI to set these options is **unreliable** - there are numerous reports of changes not being saved for particular cards or interfaces.
You should check carefully that any settings you make in the GUI are saved, before relying on this method.
If the settings are not saved, you can use the method described below using a config file.
Network Manager 1.4.2 or later is available from the Fedora 25 repository as well as the Debian 10 repository.
Check that Network Manager version is now at least 1.4.2:
~~~
$ sudo NetworkManager -V
1.4.2
~~~
## Randomize a single connection
Right click on the Network Manager icon of your NetVM in the tray and click 'Edit Connections..'.
Select the connection to randomize and click Edit.
Select the Cloned MAC Address drop down and set to Random or Stable.
Stable will generate a random address that persists until reboot, while Random will generate an address each time a link goes up.
![Edit Connection](/attachment/wiki/RandomizeMAC/networkmanager-mac-random.png)
Save the change and reconnect the connection (click on Network Manager tray icon and click disconnect under the connection, it should automatically reconnect).
## Randomize all Ethernet and Wifi connections
These steps should be done inside a template to be used to create a NetVM as it relies on creating a config file that would otherwise be deleted after a reboot due to the nature of AppVMs.
Write the settings to a new file in the `/etc/NetworkManager/conf.d/` directory, such as `00-macrandomize.conf`.
The following example enables Wifi and Ethernet MAC address randomization while scanning (not connected), and uses a randomly generated but persistent MAC address for each individual Wifi and Ethernet connection profile.
~~~
[device]
wifi.scan-rand-mac-address=yes
[connection]
wifi.cloned-mac-address=stable
ethernet.cloned-mac-address=stable
connection.stable-id=${CONNECTION}/${BOOT}
~~~
* `stable` in combination with `${CONNECTION}/${BOOT}` generates a random address that persists until reboot.
* `random` generates a random address each time a link goes up.
To see all the available configuration options, refer to the man page: `man nm-settings`
Next, create a new NetVM using the edited template and assign network devices to it.
Finally, shutdown all VMs and change the settings of sys-firewall, etc. to use the new NetVM.
You can check the MAC address currently in use by looking at the status pages of your router device(s), or inside the NetVM with the command `sudo ip link show`.
## Randomize your hostname
DHCP requests also leak your hostname to your LAN. Since your hostname is usually `sys-net`, other network users can easily spot that you're using Qubes OS.
Unfortunately `NetworkManager` currently doesn't provide an option to disable that leak globally ([Gnome Bug 768076](https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=768076)).
You may however use the following code to assign a random hostname to a VM during each of its startup. Please follow the instructions mentioned in the beginning to properly install it.
```.bash
#!/bin/bash
set -e -o pipefail
#
# Set a random hostname for a VM session.
#
# Instructions:
# 1. This file must be placed and made executable (owner: root) inside the template VM of your network VM such that it will be run before your hostname is sent over a network.
# In a Fedora template, use `/etc/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/pre-up.d/00_hostname`.
# In a Debian template, use `/etc/network/if-pre-up.d/00_hostname`.
# 2. Execute `sudo touch /etc/hosts.lock` inside the template VM of your network VM.
# 3. Execute inside your network VM:
# `sudo bash -c 'mkdir -p /rw/config/protected-files.d/ && echo -e "/etc/hosts\n/etc/hostname" > /rw/config/protected-files.d/protect_hostname.txt'`
#NOTE: mv is atomic on most systems
if [ -f "/rw/config/protected-files.d/protect_hostname.txt" ] && rand="$RANDOM" && mv "/etc/hosts.lock" "/etc/hosts.lock.$rand" ; then
name="PC-$rand"
echo "$name" > /etc/hostname
hostname "$name"
#NOTE: NetworkManager may set it again after us based on DHCP or /etc/hostname, cf. `man NetworkManager.conf` @hostname-mode
#from /usr/lib/qubes/init/qubes-early-vm-config.sh
if [ -e /etc/debian_version ]; then
ipv4_localhost_re="127\.0\.1\.1"
else
ipv4_localhost_re="127\.0\.0\.1"
fi
sed -i "s/^\($ipv4_localhost_re\(\s.*\)*\s\).*$/\1${name}/" /etc/hosts
sed -i "s/^\(::1\(\s.*\)*\s\).*$/\1${name}/" /etc/hosts
fi
exit 0
```
Assuming that you're using `sys-net` as your network VM, your `sys-net` hostname should now be `PC-[number]` with a different `[number]` each time your `sys-net` is started.
Please note that the above script should _not_ be added to [/rw/config/rc.local](/doc/config-files/)) as that is executed only _after_ the network fully started.

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Signal title: Signal
permalink: /doc/signal/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/privacy/signal.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/signal/
--- ---
Signal
======
What is [Signal]?
[According to Wikipedia:][signal-wikipedia]
> Signal is an encrypted instant messaging and voice calling application
> for Android and iOS. It uses end-to-end encryption to secure all
> communications to other Signal users. Signal can be used to send and receive
> encrypted instant messages, group messages, attachments and media messages.
> Users can independently verify the identity of their messaging correspondents
> by comparing key fingerprints out-of-band. During calls, users can check the
> integrity of the data channel by checking if two words match on both ends of
> the call.
>
> Signal is developed by Open Whisper Systems. The clients are published as free
> and open-source software under the GPLv3 license.
How to install Signal in Qubes
------------------------------
**CAUTION:** Before proceeding, please carefully read [On Digital Signatures and Key Verification][qubes-verifying-signatures].
This website cannot guarantee that any PGP key you download from the Internet is authentic.
Always obtain a trusted key fingerprint via other channels, and always check any key you download against your trusted copy of the fingerprint.
1. (Optional)Create a TemplateVM (Debian, 9 is used as an example but feel free to use any more updated by changing the 9 to a 10, etc.)
[user@dom0 ~]$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-debian-9
2. Open a terminal in Debian 9 (Or your previously chosen template)
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-run -a debian-9 gnome-terminal
3. Use these commands in your terminal (If you chose a different distribution, such as buster, substitute that for xenial in the 3rd command)
(Optional)[user@debian-8 ~]$ sudo apt-get install curl
[user@debian-8 ~]$ curl -s -x 127.0.0.1:8082 https://updates.signal.org/desktop/apt/keys.asc | sudo apt-key add -
[user@debian-8 ~]$ echo "deb [arch=amd64] https://updates.signal.org/desktop/apt xenial main" | sudo tee -a /etc/apt/sources.list.d/signal-xenial.list
[user@debian-8 ~]$ sudo apt update && sudo apt install signal-desktop
5. Shutdown the TemplateVM (substitute your template name if needed) :
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-shutdown debian-9
6. Create an AppVM based on this TemplateVM
7. With your mouse select the `Q` menu -> `Domain: "AppVM Name"` -> 'AppVM name: Qube Settings' -> OK -> 'Applications'
(or `"AppVM Name": VM Settings` -> `Applications`).
Select `Signal` from the left `Available` column, move it to the right `Selected` column by clicking the `>` button and then `OK` to apply the changes and close the window.
-----
[qubes-verifying-signatures]: /security/verifying-signatures/
[Signal]: https://whispersystems.org/
[signal-wikipedia]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_(software)
[shortcut]: https://support.whispersystems.org/hc/en-us/articles/216839277-Where-is-Signal-Desktop-on-my-computer-
[shortcut-desktop]: /doc/managing-appvm-shortcuts/#tocAnchor-1-1-1
[message]: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/rMMgeR-KLbU/XXOFri26BAAJ
[mailing list]: /support/

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Running Tails in Qubes title: Running Tails in Qubes
permalink: /doc/tails/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/privacy/tails.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/tails/
- /doc/running-tails - /doc/running-tails
--- ---
Running Tails in Qubes
============================
[Tails](https://tails.boum.org) stands for The Amnesic Incognito Live System.
It is a live operating system that aims to preserve your privacy and anonymity.
Tails is intended to be booted off of a live CD and leave no trace on the computer it is run on, but using Tails this way requires the user to restart their computer every time they want to switch from their installed OS to Tails.
Despite this, in case that method becomes cumbersome, Tails can be used inside virtualization software and Qubes.
To run Tails under Qubes:
1. Read about [creating and using HVM qubes](/doc/hvm/)
2. Download and verify Tails from [https://tails.boum.org](https://tails.boum.org) in a qube, (saved as `/home/user/Downloads/tails.iso` on qube "isoVM" for purposes of this guide).
3. Create a HVM
- In Manager, click "VM menu" and select "Create VM"
- Name the new qube - "Tails"
- Select "HVM"
- Set "initial memory" and "max memory" as the same ([official documentation](https://tails.boum.org/doc/about/requirements/index.en.html) recommends at least 2048 MB)
- Configure networking
- Click "OK" to create new HVM.
4. Open dom0 Konsole and start Tails:
qvm-start Tails --cdrom=isoVM:/home/user/Downloads/tails.iso
5. Configure Tails at start up.
6. Once the Tails qube has started, configure networking in the qube.
- Check the IP address allocated to the qube - either from GUI Manager, or ```qvm-ls -n Tails``` in Konsole. (E.g. `10.137.1.101` with gateway `10.137.1.1`)
- In the Tails qube, open systems menu in top-right corner. Select "Wired Settings", and change IPv4 configuration from "Automatic (DHCP)" to "Manual".
- Enter the Address: `10.137.1.101` in our example.
- Enter the Netmask: `255.255.255.0`
- Enter the Gateway: `10.137.1.1` in our example.
- Enter DNS: `10.137.1.1` in our example.
- Click "Apply". You should now see "Connected".
7. Use Tails as normal.
## Security
You will probably want to implement [MAC spoofing](/doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/).
There are added security concerns for Tails users when running it in a virtual machine.
If you intend to do this, you should read [the warnings](https://tails.boum.org/doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/) from the Tails team about it.
While the Qubes security model mitigates most of the risks identified, traces of the Tails session may remain on the disk.
Live booting Tails, though less convenient, is always more secure than using it inside virtualization software or Qubes, because you don't run the added risk of the virtualization software or Host OS being compromised.
Depending on your threat model, this might induce too much risk.
## Troubleshooting
See the [Tails Troubleshooting guide](/doc/tails-troubleshooting/).

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: TorVM title: TorVM
permalink: /doc/torvm/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/privacy/torvm.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/torvm/
- /doc/privacy/torvm/ - /doc/privacy/torvm/
- /en/doc/torvm/ - /en/doc/torvm/
- /doc/TorVM/ - /doc/TorVM/
@ -10,272 +11,3 @@ redirect_from:
- /wiki/UserDoc/TorVM/ - /wiki/UserDoc/TorVM/
--- ---
Known issues:
-------------
- [Service doesn't start without (even empty) user torrc](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/fyBVmxIpbSs/R5mxUcIEZAQJ)
Qubes TorVM (qubes-tor)
==========================
Qubes TorVM is a deprecated ProxyVM service that provides torified networking to
all its clients. **If you are interested in TorVM, you will find the
[Whonix implementation in Qubes](/doc/privacy/whonix/) a
more usable and robust solution for creating a torifying traffic proxy.**
By default, any AppVM using the TorVM as its NetVM will be fully torified, so
even applications that are not Tor aware will be unable to access the outside
network directly.
Moreover, AppVMs running behind a TorVM are not able to access globally
identifying information (IP address and MAC address).
Due to the nature of the Tor network, only IPv4 TCP and DNS traffic is allowed.
All non-DNS UDP and IPv6 traffic is silently dropped.
See [this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/09/28/playing-with-qubes-networking-for-fun.html) for a description of the concept, architecture, and the original implementation.
## Warning + Disclaimer
1. Qubes TorVM is produced independently from the Tor(R) anonymity software and
carries no guarantee from The Tor Project about quality, suitability or
anything else.
2. Qubes TorVM is not a magic anonymizing solution. Protecting your identity
requires a change in behavior. Read the "Protecting Anonymity" section
below.
3. Traffic originating from the TorVM itself **IS NOT** routed through Tor.
This includes system updates to the TorVM. Only traffic from VMs using TorVM
as their NetVM is torified.
Installation
============
0. *(Optional)* If you want to use a separate vm template for your TorVM
qvm-clone fedora-23 fedora-23-tor
1. In dom0, create a proxy vm and disable unnecessary services and enable qubes-tor
qvm-create -p torvm
qvm-service torvm -d qubes-netwatcher
qvm-service torvm -d qubes-firewall
qvm-service torvm -e qubes-tor
# if you created a new template in the previous step
qvm-prefs torvm -s template fedora-23-tor
2. From your TemplateVM, install the torproject Fedora repo
sudo yum install qubes-tor-repo
3. Then, in the template, install the TorVM init scripts
sudo yum install qubes-tor
5. Configure an AppVM to use TorVM as its NetVM (for example a vm named anon-web)
qvm-prefs -s anon-web netvm torvm
... repeat for any other AppVMs you want torified...
6. Shutdown the TemplateVM.
7. Set the prefs of your TorVM to use the default sys-net or sys-firewall as its NetVM
qvm-prefs -s torvm netvm sys-net
8. Start the TorVM and any AppVM you have configured to be route through the TorVM
9. From the AppVMs, verify torified connectivity, e.g. by visiting
`https://check.torproject.org`.
### Troubleshooting ###
1. Check if the qubes-tor service is running (on the torvm)
[user@torvm] $ sudo service qubes-tor status
2. Tor logs to syslog, so to view messages use
[user@torvm] $ sudo grep Tor /var/log/messages
3. Restart the qubes-tor service (and repeat 1-2)
[user@torvm] $ sudo service qubes-tor restart
4. You may need to manually create the private data directory and set its permissions:
[user@torvm] $ sudo mkdir /rw/usrlocal/lib/qubes-tor
[user@torvm] $ sudo chown user:user /rw/usrlocal/lib/qubes-tor
Usage
=====
Applications should "just work" behind a TorVM, however there are some steps
you can take to protect anonymity and increase performance.
## Protecting Anonymity
The TorVM only purports to prevent the leaking of two identifiers:
1. WAN IP Address
2. NIC MAC Address
This is accomplished through transparent TCP and transparent DNS proxying by
the TorVM.
The TorVM cannot anonymize information stored or transmitted from your AppVMs
behind the TorVM.
*Non-comprehensive* list of identifiers TorVM does not protect:
* Time zone
* User names and real name
* Name+version of any client (e.g. IRC leaks name+version through CTCP)
* Metadata in files (e.g., exif data in images, author name in PDFs)
* License keys of non-free software
### Further Reading
* [Information on protocol leaks](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO#Protocolleaks)
* [Official Tor Usage Warning](https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en#warning)
* [Tor Browser Design](https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/)
## How to use Tor Browser behind TorVM
1. In a clean VM, [download Tor Browser from the Tor Project][tor-browser].
2. [Verify the PGP signature][tor-verify-sig].
3. Copy/move the Tor Browser archive into your AnonVM (i.e., the AppVM which has your TorVM as its netvm).
4. Unpack the Tor Browser archive into your home directory.
5. In dom0, right click the KDE Application Launcher Menu (AKA "Start Menu") and left click "Edit Applications..."
6. In the KDE Menu Editor, find your AnonVM's group and create a new item (or make a copy of an existing item).
7. Edit the following fields on the "General" tab:
* Name: `my-new-anonvm: Tor Browser`
* Command: `qvm-run -q --tray -a my-new-anonvm 'TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 TOR_SKIP_CONTROLPORTTEST=1 TOR_SOCKS_PORT=9050 TOR_SOCKS_HOST=1.2.3.4 ./tor-browser_en-US/Browser/start-tor-browser'`
* Replace `my-new-anonvm` with the name of your AnonVM.
* Replace `1.2.3.4` with your TorVM's internal Qubes IP address, which can be viewed in Qubes VM Manager by clicking "View" --> "IP" or by running `qvm-ls -n` in dom0.
* Replace `en-US` with your locale ID, if different.
8. Click "Save" in the KDE Menu Editor.
Tor Browser should now work correctly in your AnonVM when launched via the shortcut you just created.
**Note:** If you want to use Tor Browser in a [DispVM][dispvm], the steps are the same as above, except you should copy the Tor Browser directory into your DVM template, [regenerate the DVM template][dispvm-customization], then use the following command in your KDE menu entry:
`sh -c 'echo TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 TOR_SKIP_CONTROLPORTTEST=1 TOR_SOCKS_PORT=9050 TOR_SOCKS_HOST=1.2.3.4 ./tor-browser_en-US/Browser/start-tor-browser | /usr/lib/qubes/qfile-daemon-dvm qubes.VMShell dom0 DEFAULT red'`
(Replace `1.2.3.4` and `en-US` as indicated above.)
## Performance
In order to mitigate identity correlation TorVM makes use of Tor's new [stream
isolation feature][stream-isolation]. Read "Threat Model" below for more
information.
However, this isn't desirable in all situations, particularly web browsing.
These days loading a single web page requires fetching resources (images,
javascript, css) from a dozen or more remote sources. Moreover, the use of
IsolateDestAddr in a modern web browser may create very uncommon HTTP behavior
patterns, that could ease fingerprinting.
Additionally, you might have some apps that you want to ensure always share a
Tor circuit or always get their own.
For these reasons TorVM ships with two open SOCKS5 ports that provide Tor
access with different stream isolation settings:
* Port 9050 - Isolates by SOCKS Auth and client address only
Each AppVM gets its own circuit, and each app using a unique SOCKS
user/pass gets its own circuit
* Port 9049 - Isolates client + destination port, address, and by SOCKS Auth
Same as default settings listed above, but additionally traffic
is isolated based on destination port and destination address.
## Custom Tor Configuration
Default tor settings are found in the following file and are the same across
all TorVMs.
/usr/lib/qubes-tor/torrc
You can override these settings in your TorVM, or provide your own custom
settings by appending them to:
/rw/config/qubes-tor/torrc
For information on tor configuration settings `man tor`
Threat Model
============
TorVM assumes the same Adversary Model as [TorBrowser][tor-threats], but does
not, by itself, have the same security and privacy requirements.
## Proxy Obedience
The primary security requirement of TorVM is *Proxy Obedience*.
Client AppVMs MUST NOT bypass the Tor network and access the local physical
network, internal Qubes network, or the external physical network.
Proxy Obedience is assured through the following:
1. All TCP traffic from client VMs is routed through Tor
2. All DNS traffic from client VMs is routed through Tor
3. All non-DNS UDP traffic from client VMs is dropped
4. Reliance on the [Qubes OS network model][qubes-net] to enforce isolation
## Mitigate Identity Correlation
TorVM SHOULD prevent identity correlation among network services.
Without stream isolation, all traffic from different activities or "identities"
in different applications (e.g., web browser, IRC, email) end up being routed
through the same tor circuit. An adversary could correlate this activity to a
single pseudonym.
TorVM uses the default stream isolation settings for transparently torified
traffic. While more paranoid options are available, they are not enabled by
default because they decrease performance and in most cases don't help
anonymity (see [this tor-talk thread][stream-isolation-explained])
By default TorVM does not use the most paranoid stream isolation settings for
transparently torified traffic due to performance concerns. By default TorVM
ensures that each AppVM will use a separate tor circuit (`IsolateClientAddr`).
For more paranoid use cases the SOCKS proxy port 9049 is provided that has all
stream isolation options enabled. User applications will require manual
configuration to use this socks port.
Future Work
===========
* Integrate Vidalia
* Create Tor Browser packages w/out bundled tor
* Use local DNS cache to speedup queries (pdnsd)
* Support arbitrary [DNS queries][dns]
* Fix Tor's openssl complaint
* Support custom firewall rules (to support running a relay)
Acknowledgements
================
Qubes TorVM is inspired by much of the previous work done in this area of
transparent torified solutions. Notably the following:
* [Patrick Schleizer](mailto:adrelanos@riseup.net) for his work on [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org)
* The [Tor Project wiki](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO)
* And the many people who contributed to discussions on [tor-talk](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/)
[stream-isolation]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/171-separate-streams.txt
[stream-isolation-explained]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html
[tor-threats]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#adversary
[qubes-net]: /doc/QubesNet/
[dns]: https://tails.boum.org/todo/support_arbitrary_dns_queries/
[tor-browser]: https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html
[tor-verify-sig]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html
[dispvm]: /doc/DisposableVms/
[dispvm-customization]: /doc/UserDoc/DispVMCustomization/

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Whonix for Privacy & Anonymity title: Whonix for Privacy & Anonymity
permalink: /doc/whonix/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/privacy/whonix.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/whonix/
- /doc/privacy/whonix/ - /doc/privacy/whonix/
- /doc/templates/whonix/ - /doc/templates/whonix/
- /en/doc/templates/whonix/ - /en/doc/templates/whonix/
@ -18,41 +19,3 @@ redirect_from:
- /doc/privacy/updating-whonix/ - /doc/privacy/updating-whonix/
--- ---
Whonix for Privacy & Anonymity
==============================
To improve your privacy and anonymity on the internet, you can install the
Whonix Template on your Qubes machine.
[Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) is based on [Debian](https://www.debian.org)
and [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) and utilizes two VMs, a **"gateway"** and
a **"workstation"**. Qubes security architecture makes use of Whonix's isolation
by using the gateway as a ProxyVM to route all network traffic through Tor,
while the workstation is used for making AppVMs.
Whonix in Qubes replaces the deprecated [TorVM](/doc/torvm) service used in earlier
versions of Qubes.
*The following pages are written by the Whonix developers and are located on their website.*
## Getting Started with Whonix
Note: To install Whonix in Qubes, you must [install Qubes](/doc/installation-guide/) first.
* [Installing Whonix in Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Install)
* [Updating Whonix in Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Update)
* [Uninstalling Whonix from Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Uninstall)
## Configuring Whonix
* [Using Whonix with DisposableVMs](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Disposable_VM)
* [Post-Installation Security Advice](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Post_Install_Advice)
* [How to set up Tor Bridges in Whonix on Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Bridges)
* [Using Multiple Whonix-Workstations with Whonix on Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Multiple_Whonix-Workstations#Qubes-Whonix)
* [How to use Corridor (a Tor traffic whitelisting gateway) with Whonix](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Corridor)
## Support for Whonix
* [Whonix Support](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Support) - General Whonix, Debian, Tor, etc... related issues
* [Whonix Qubes Forum](https://forums.whonix.org/c/qubes) - Whonix specific issues

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Multifactor Authentication title: Multifactor Authentication
permalink: /doc/multifactor-authentication/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/multifactor-authentication.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/multifactor-authentication/
- /en/doc/multifactor-authentication/ - /en/doc/multifactor-authentication/
- /doc/Multi-factorAuthentication/ - /doc/Multi-factorAuthentication/
--- ---
Using Multi-factor Authentication with Qubes
============================================
(Note: This page concerns multi-factor authentication for logging into external
services, not for logging into Qubes itself. For the latter, see
[here][YubiKey].)
[Multi-factor authentication (MFA)][MFA] today most commonly takes the form of a
numerical code generated by a smartphone app or sent via SMS (text message)
which the user must enter in addition to a password in order to log in to a
website or other service.
One of the primary features of Qubes is that it allows us to create securely
isolated VMs which can run arbitrary programs. (These VMs are securely isolated
not only from each other but also, optionally, from the network.) This means
that we can create a dedicated, network-isolated VM to function as a secure
authenticator.
This guide will show you how to set up a VM which uses [oathtool][], an
open-source one-time password tool, to generate authentication codes. This
method presents several benefits over relying on a consumer smartphone app or
SMS:
* `oathtool` includes the [time-based one-time password (TOTP)][TOTP]
algorithm, which is the same algorithm used by [Google Authenticator][], one
of the most commonly used authenticator apps. This means that we can use
`oathtool` as a complete open-source replacement for Google Authenticator
(which became propriety (closed-source) in May 2013 after version 2.21).
* By keeping all of our authenticator data as plain text files in a dedicated
VM, we have complete control over the secret keys used to generate our
authentication tokens, and we can back up, copy, and transfer our
authenticator data at will.
* By creating a minimal environment in which to run `oathtool` from the command
line, we can minimize our attack surface relative to most smartphone apps and
SMS. Consumer smartphones are typically internet-facing devices which are
increasingly targeted by malware. Most smartphones are bundled with
proprietary software which allows service providers almost complete control
over the device. Likewise, consumer SMS messages are often cleartext
communications which can feasibly be intercepted and read by third parties.
(In cases in which SMS messages are encrypted on the network by the service
provider, the service provider itself still has full access, which means that
the contents of such messages could be read by unscrupulous admins or turned
over to government agencies.)
* Using `oathtool` in a dedicated, network-isolated Qubes VM allows us to
achieve a unique combination of security and convenience. The strong isolation
Qubes provides allows us to reap the full security benefits of MFA, while
virtualization frees us from having to worry about finding and handling a
second physical device.
Optional Preparation Steps
--------------------------
1. Start with a minimal template. In this example, we'll use the
[minimal Fedora template][FedoraMinimal]. Get it if you haven't already done
so:
[user@dom0 ~]$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-30-minimal
2. Since we'll be making some modifications, you may want to clone the minimal
template:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-clone fedora-30-minimal fedora-30-min-mfa
3. To open a root shell on the minimal template (for details, see [Passwordless Root]), run the following command:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-run -u root fedora-30-min-mfa xterm
4. Since this is going to be a minimal environment in which we run `oathtool`
from the command line, we'll install only a couple of packages:
[root@fedora-30-min-mfa ~]# dnf install oathtool vim-minimal
[root@fedora-30-min-mfa ~]$ poweroff
5. Create an AppVM and set it to use the TemplateVM we just created:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-create -l black mfa
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-prefs -s mfa template fedora-30-min-mfa
6. Isolate the new AppVM from the network:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-prefs -s mfa netvm none
Using the MFA AppVM
-------------------
Now that we have an AppVM set up to use `oathtool` securely, let's use it with
an external service. This process will vary slightly from service to service but
is largely the same.
1. Proceed with setting up multi-factor authentication as you normally would.
If you are prompted to scan a QR code, instead select the option (if
available) to view the secret key as text:
![Secret Key Example 0](/attachment/wiki/Multi-factorAuthentication/secret-key-example-0.png)
You should then see the secret key as text:
![Secret Key Example 1](/attachment/wiki/Multi-factorAuthentication/secret-key-example-1.png)
Note that the length and format of the secret key may vary by service:
![Secret Key Example 2](/attachment/wiki/Multi-factorAuthentication/secret-key-example-2.png)
2. In your MFA AppVM, you can now use `oathtool` to generate base32 TOTP
authentication tokens just like Google Authenticator would. In this example,
we'll use the secret key `xd2n mx5t ekg6 h6bi u74d 745k n4m7 zy3x` from the
second image above (substitute your own):
[user@mfa ~]$ oathtool --base32 --totp "xd2n mx5t ekg6 h6bi u74d 745k n4m7 zy3x"
279365
The output is `279365`. This is what you would enter when prompted for an
authenticator code. (Note that this is a *time*-based one-time password,
which means that your VM's clock must be sufficiently accurate in order to
generate a valid token. Qubes handles VM time syncing automatically, so you
normally shouldn't have to worry about this. As usual, the token will change
after a short period of time.)
3. To make this easier on ourselves in the future, we can create a simple shell
script for each service we use. (The example service here is a Google
account, using the example key from above. You'll get a unique secret key
from each service.) Create the script like so:
[user@mfa ~]$ > google
[user@mfa ~]$ vi google
#!/usr/bin/env bash
##My Google Account
##me@gmail.com
oathtool --base32 --totp "xd2n mx5t ekg6 h6bi u74d 745k n4m7 zy3x"
[user@mfa ~]$ chmod +x google
Since the secret key stored in the script never changes, we should never
have to update this script, but we can easily do so if we ever want to.
4. Now, whenever Google prompts us for an authenticator code, all we have to do
is this:
[user@mfa ~]$ ./google
640916
Done!
5. Now you can create scripts for any other TOTP-supporting services you use,
and enjoy the security and ease of quickly generating authentication tokens
right from your Qubes VM command-line:
[user@mfa ~]$ ./github
495272
[user@mfa ~]$ ./aws
396732
[user@mfa ~]$ ./facebook
851956
[user@mfa ~]$ ./dropbox
294106
[user@mfa ~]$ ./microsoft
295592
[user@mfa ~]$ ./slack
501731
[user@mfa ~]$ ./wordpress
914625
[user@mfa ~]$ ./tumblr
701463
For a more complete list of compatible services, see [here][usage].
[YubiKey]: /doc/YubiKey/
[MFA]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-factor_authentication
[oathtool]: http://www.nongnu.org/oath-toolkit/man-oathtool.html
[TOTP]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-based_One-time_Password_Algorithm
[Google Authenticator]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Authenticator
[FedoraMinimal]: /doc/Templates/FedoraMinimal/
[usage]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Authenticator#Usage
[Passwordless Root]: /doc/templates/minimal/#passwordless-root

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Security Guidelines title: Security Guidelines
permalink: /doc/security-guidelines/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/security-guidelines.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/security-guidelines/
- /en/doc/security-guidelines/ - /en/doc/security-guidelines/
- /doc/SecurityGuidelines/ - /doc/SecurityGuidelines/
- /wiki/SecurityGuidelines/ - /wiki/SecurityGuidelines/
--- ---
Security Guidelines
===================
Without some active and responsible participation of the user, no real security is possible. Running Firefox inside of an AppVM does not automagically make it (or any other app) more secure.
Programs themselves remain just as secure [(or insecure)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_insecurity) on Qubes as on a normal Linux or Windows OS.
What drastically changes is the context in which your applications are used.
[This context](/doc/qubes-architecture/) is a [responsibility of the user](/security/goals/).
But managing security in this context well requires knowledge of some new concepts and procedures. So it is worth stressing some basic items:
Download Verification
---------------------
**Verify the authenticity and integrity of your downloads, [particularly the Qubes iso](/security/verifying-signatures/).**
The internet is always a dangerous place.
While your connection to the Qubes website and download mirrors is encrypted, meaning that your downloads from here can't be modified by a third party en route, there is always the chance that these websites themselves have been compromised.
Signature verification allows us to validate for ourselves that these files were the ones authored and signed by their creators (in this case the Qubes development team).
Because it's so easy for a hacker who manages to tamper with the downloaded iso files this way to patch in malware, it is of the utmost importance that you **verify the signature of the Qubes iso** you use to install Qubes.
See the page on [Verifying Signatures](/security/verifying-signatures/) for more information and a tutorial on how to accomplish this.
Once you have Qubes installed, the standard program installation command for Fedora and Qubes repositories
~~~
sudo dnf install <program>
~~~
automatically accomplishes this verification.
Custom user-added repositories might come with gpgcheck disabled. [Check the config files](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/Fedora/12/html/Deployment_Guide/sec-Configuring_Yum_and_Yum_Repositories.html) and verify that
~~~
gpgcheck=1
~~~
Plus, make sure you also **safely import their signing keys**. This may require you to check from multiple sources that the signing key is always the same.
Even then, you might want to consider new repositories to be **less** secure and not use them in templates that feed your more trusted VMs.
If you **need** to download programs that cannot be verified, then it is much less dangerous to install them in a **cloned template or a standalone VM**.
Remember: Qubes cannot automatically verify the signature of files that come from other sources like your browser, torrenting client, or home-made tofu recipe downloader. If the providers of these downloads provide keys for you to verify the signatures of their downloads, do it!
Observing Security Contexts
---------------------------
Each VM is assigned a specific colour for its window borders. These borders are how Qubes displays the **security context** of applications and data so that users can be easily aware of this at all times. Be sure to check the colour of window borders before taking any action, particularly if it affects the security of your system. [See this blog post for more information](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/05/21/app-oriented-ui-model-and-its-security.html).
Always remember that any "red" window can draw "green" password prompts.
Don't let yourself be tricked into entering credentials designated to one qube into a forged input box rendered by another.
For XFCE users (which is the default desktop environment on QubesOS) it would be wise to manually move the more trusted window so that it is not displayed on top of a less trusted one, but rather over the trusted Dom0 wallpaper.
If you use KDE, it has a helpful feature called **Expose-like effect** that is activated in System Tools -\> System Settings -\> Desktop Effects -\> All Effects -\> Desktop Grid Present Windows.
Performing these steps makes it easier to tell the difference between when you're being phished and when you're genuinely being asked for credentials.
Installing Versus Running Programs
----------------------------------
With the exception of a text editor used to modify configuration files, one should not run applications in either template VMs or in Dom0. From a security standpoint there is a great difference between installing a program and running it.
Enabling and Verifying VT-d/IOMMU
---------------------------------
In **Dom0** terminal, run:
~~~
qubes-hcl-report <userVM>
~~~
where \<userVM\> is the name of the VM within which the report will be written (but the report will also be displayed in the Dom0 terminal). If it displays that VT-d is active, you should be able to assign **PCIe devices to an HVM** and **enjoy DMA protection** for your driver domains, so you successfully passed this step.
If VT-d is not active, attempt to activate it by selecting the **VT-d flag** within the BIOS settings. If your processor/BIOS does not allow VT-d activation you still enjoy much better security than alternative systems, but you may be vulnerable to **DMA attacks**. Next time you buy a computer consult our **[HCL (Hardware Compatibility List)](/hcl/)** and possibly contribute to it.
Updating Software
-----------------
To keep your system regularly updated against security related bugs and get new features, run in Dom0:
~~~
sudo qubes-dom0-update
~~~
and run in templates and standalone VM
~~~
sudo dnf update
~~~
or use the equivalent items in Qubes Manager, which displays an icon when an update is available.
Handling Untrusted Files
------------------------
When you receive or download any file from an **untrusted source**, do not browse to it with a file manager which has preview enabled. Enabling previews in your file manager gives malware another attack vector. **To disable preview in Nautilus**: Gear (up-right-icon) -\> Preferences -\> Preview (tab) -\> Show thumbnails: Never. Note that this change can be made in a TemplateVM (including the [DispVM template](/doc/dispvm-customization/)) so that future AppVMs created from this TemplateVM will inherit this feature.
Also, **do not open it in trusted VMs**. Rather, open it in a **disposable VM** right-clicking on it. You may even modify it within the disposable VM and then [copy it to other VM](/doc/copying-files/).
Alternatively PDFs may be converted to **trusted PDFs** by right clicking on them. This converts the PDF's text to graphic form, so the disk size these documents take up will increase.
Anti Evil Maid
--------------
If there is a risk that somebody may gain **physical access** to your computer when you leave it powered down, or if you use Qubes in **dual boot mode**, then you may want to [install AEM](/doc/anti-evil-maid/) (Anti Evil Maid). AEM will inform you of any unauthorized modifications to your BIOS or boot partition. If AEM alerts you of an attack, it is really bad news because **there is no true fix**. If you are really serious about security, you will have to buy a new laptop and install Qubes from a trusted ISO. Buying a used laptop runs a higher risk of tampering and is not an option for a security focused environment.
Reassigning USB Controllers
---------------------------
Before you [assign a USB controller to a VM](/doc/assigning-devices/), check if any **input devices** are included in that controller.
Assigning a USB keyboard will **deprive Dom0 VM of a keyboard**. Since a USB controller assignment survives reboot, you may find yourself **unable to access your system**. Most non-Apple laptops have a PS/2 input for keyboard and mouse, so this problem does not exist.
But **if you need to use a USB keyboard or mouse**, identify the USB controller in which you have your keyboard/mouse plugged in and do NOT assign it to a VM. Also, makes sure you know all the other USB ports for that controller, and use them carefully, knowing **you are exposing Dom0** (ie NO bluetooth device on it).
All USB devices should be assumed **side channel attack vectors** (mic via sound, others via power usage), so you might prefer to remove them. [See this about rootkits](https://web.archive.org/web/20070829112704/http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/080207-black-hat-virtual-machine-rootkit-detection.html)
Using a **web-cam** also involves a risk, so better to physically cover it with adhesive tape or disconnect it if you do not use it. If you need it, you need **to assign it to a VM** and cover it with a cap or an elastic band when not in use. Attaching a **microphone** using Qubes VM Manager may also be risky, so attach it only when required.
It is preferable to avoid using **Bluetooth** if you travel or do not trust your neighbours. Kids with high-gain directional antennas might also gain long range access to your Bluetooth. In this case, buy a computer that does not have a Bluetooth hardware module, or, if you have it, assign it to an untrusted VM. Assigning it to its own Qube will also allow you to use Bluetooth without trusting it, if need be.
Many laptops allow one to disable various hardware (Camera, BT, Mic, etc) **in BIOS**. This might or might not be a dependable way of getting rid of those devices, depending on how much you trust your BIOS vendor.
If the VM will not start after you have assigned a USB controller, look at [this FAQ](/faq/#i-created-a-usbvm-and-assigned-usb-controllers-to-it-now-the-usbvm-wont-boot).
Creating and Using a USBVM
--------------------------
See [here](/doc/usb/).
Dom0 Precautions
----------------
As explained [here](/getting-started/), dom0 should not be used for any user operations. There are several reasons for this:
1. Secure isolation among domUs (i.e., AppVMs, StandaloneVMs, HVMs, etc.) is the *raison d'être* of Qubes. This is the primary reason that we recommend the delegation of all user activities to some number of AppVMs. In the event that any given VM is compromised, only that particular VM is compromised. (TemplateVMs are the exception to this. If a TemplateVM were compromised, then every AppVM based on it might also be compromised. Even in this case, however, the entire system would not necessarily have been compromised, since StandaloneVM(s), HVM(s), and/or multiple TemplateVMs might be in use.) By contrast, if dom0 were ever compromised, the entire system would thereby be compromised.
2. Due to the absence of convenience mechanisms in dom0 such as the inter-VM clipboard and inter-VM file copying, it is significantly less convenient to attempt to use dom0 for user operations (e.g., password management) in conjunction with AppVMs than it is to use another dedicated AppVM (e.g., a "vault" VM).
3. Dom0 has access to every VM's data in the form of its private image file, including untrusted (e.g., red-bordered) VMs. If the user were to make a mistake (or be tricked into making one) and thereby inadvertently access untrusted files from dom0, those files could exploit the application which accessed them (e.g., a file manager) and gain control over dom0 and, therefore, the entire system. Even simply displaying the data in a [terminal emulator](http://securityvulns.com/docs4128.html) can be dangerous. For example, some file managers (such as the Thunar File Manager, which is pre-installed by default in the Xfce4 version of dom0) list loop devices used by running VMs. When one of these devices is selected in the file manager, the loop device is mounted to dom0, effectively [transferring the contents](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/_tkjmBa9m9w/9BbKh94PVtcJ) of the home directory of a (by definition less trusted) AppVM to dom0.
4. There is a (hopefully small, but always non-zero) chance that any given program is malicious. Even packages by third-party developers you trust might have been modified and then signed by an attacker who managed to get that developer's private key(s). For this reason, it is very important that as few programs as possible be run in dom0 in as restricted a manner as possible. For example, although GnuPG is used in dom0 for verifying updates received from the firewallvm, it does not follow that GnuPG should be used for regular user operations (e.g., key management) in dom0. This is because only a single GnuPG operation, the "verify signature" operation (which is believed to be the most bulletproof operation in GnuPG), is used by default in dom0. No other key management operations (e.g., importing unverified keys) or any other data parsing takes place in dom0 by default.
5. Any VM can be shut down in order to make it even more difficult for an adversary to access, and shutting down one VM does not restrict the user of other VMs. By contrast, one cannot shut down dom0 and use other VMs at the same time.
6. As far as we are aware, there are no special mechanisms in Xen which make dom0 more protected than any other VM, so there is no inherent security advantage to performing any user operations in dom0.
TemplateBasedVM Directories
---------------------------
* Once a TemplateBasedVM has been created, any changes in its `/home`,
`/usr/local`, or `/rw/config` directories will be persistent across reboots,
which means that any files stored there will still be available after
restarting the TemplateBasedVM. No changes in any other directories in
TemplateBasedVMs persist in this manner. If you would like to make changes
in other directories which *do* persist in this manner, you must make those
changes in the parent TemplateVM.
* See [here](/doc/templates) for more detail and version specific information.

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Split Bitcoin title: Split Bitcoin
permalink: /doc/split-bitcoin/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/split-bitcoin.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/split-bitcoin/
--- ---
How to Set Up a Split Bitcoin Wallet in Qubes
=============================================
What is a "Split" Bitcoin Wallet?
---------------------------------
A "split" bitcoin wallet is a strategy of protecting your bitcoin by having your wallet split into an offline "[cold storage](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Cold_storage)" wallet and an online "watching only" wallet.
A "Watching" Wallet and a "Cold" Wallet
---------------------------------------
1. Create a fedora-25-electrum template using the Qubes VM Manager or running
`qvm-clone fedora-25 fedora-25-electrum` in dom0.
2. Start the new template:
`qvm-start fedora-25-electrum`
`qvm-run fedora-25-electrum xterm`
3. Install `electrum` to fedora-25-electrum template VM. From fedora-25-electrum terminal enter:
`sudo dnf update`.
`sudo dnf install electrum`.
4. Shut down your `fedora-25-electrum` template
5. Create an `offline-bitcoin` qube based on `fedora-25-electrum` using the Qubes VM Manager or running `qvm-create -t fedora-25-electrum -l black offline-bitcoin` and `qvm-prefs -s offline-bitcoin netvm none` in dom0.
6. Follow the [electrum documentation in creating an offline wallet](http://docs.electrum.org/en/latest/coldstorage.html#create-an-offline-wallet)
7. Create a `watching-bitcoin` qubes based on `fedora-25-electrum` connecting to the internet how ever you prefer using the Qubes VM Manager or running for example `qvm-create -t fedora-25-electrum -l green watching-bitcoin` and `qvm-prefs -s watching-bitcoin netvm sys-whonix` in dom0.
8. Follow the [electrum documentation in creating an online watching-only wallet](http://docs.electrum.org/en/latest/coldstorage.html#create-a-watching-only-version-of-your-wallet)
Important Notes
---------------
* The private keys (xpriv) should never be moved outside of `offline-bitcoin`.
* For copying out the public keys (xpub), Qubes provides two secure, convenient
methods: the [inter-VM clipboard] and [inter-VM file copy] tools. Compared to
traditional physically air-gapped machines, these tools make it very easy to
copy out public keys.
[inter-VM clipboard]: /doc/copy-paste/
[inter-VM file copy]: /doc/copying-files/

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Application Troubleshooting title: Application Troubleshooting
permalink: /doc/application-troubleshooting/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/application-troubleshooting.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/application-troubleshooting/
--- ---
# Troubleshooting default applications on Qubes #
## Fullscreen Firefox is frozen ##
Press F11 twice.
## Firefox crashes ##
If you are facing frequent crashes or lags when using Firefox browser (especially when watching videos), you may need to turn off Hardware Acceleration. You can do this by navigating to "Preferences", then "Performance". Untick the "Use recommended performance settings" checkbox, followed by "Use hardware acceleration when available".
If this doesn't fix the issue, try turning off smooth scrolling by unticking "Use smoothing scrolling" under the "Browsing" section.
## LibreOffice open as a tiny window ##
Some programs like LibreOffice open as a tiny window -- small enough that the content of the file is not even visible.
You can open LibreOffice as a larger window using this workaround:
### Using the command line
1. In the VM where you want to open the LibreOffice, open the `registrymodifications.xcu` file in an editor:
~~~
sudo nano ~/.config/libreoffice/4/user/registrymodifications.xcu
~~~
2. Find the lines containing `ooSetupFactoryWindowAttributes`. It will look like this:
~~~
<item oor:path="/org.openoffice.Setup/Office/Factories/org.openoffice.Setup:Factory['com.sun.star.sheet.SpreadsheetDocument']"><prop oor:name="ooSetupFactoryWindowAttributes" oor:op="fuse"><value>61,61,1807,982;5;38,56,1807,982;</value></prop></item>
~~~
3. We are interested in the values between the `<value>` tag. These window position values are specified as: `x-pos,y-pos,width,height ; window-state ; maximized-x-pos,maximized-y-pos,maximized-width,maximized-height`. Edit the third and fourth values to your desired width and height (for example, to 1800 and 900).
4. Do this once for every template and the program will always open at this size.
### Using the GUI
1. Open any Libreoffice app.
2. Navigate to the "Tools" menu, select "Options", then "Advanced". Click the "Open Expert Configuration" button.
3. Search for "ooSetupFactoryWindowAttributes".
4. Scroll right to see the values set for each component as a string value. For example: `61,61,1807,982;5;38,56,1807,982;`. These window position values are specified as: `x-pos,y-pos,width,height ; window-state ; maximized-x-pos,maximized-y-pos,maximized-width,maximized-height`. Edit the third and fourth values to your desired width and height (for example, to 1800 and 900).
5. Do this once for every template and the program will always open at this size.

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Intel Integrated Graphics Troubleshooting title: Intel Integrated Graphics Troubleshooting
permalink: /doc/intel-igfx-troubleshooting/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/intel-igfx-troubleshooting.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/intel-igfx-troubleshooting/
--- ---
# Intel Integrated Graphics Troubleshooting #
## Software Rendering or Video Lags
If you are experiencing this issue, you will see extremely slow graphics updates.
You will be able to watch the screen and elements paint slowly from top to bottom.
You can confirm this is the issue by looking for a line similar to the following in your `/var/log/Xorg.0.log` file:
[ 131.769] (EE) AIGLX: reverting to software rendering
Newer versions of the Linux kernel have renamed the `i915.preliminary_hw_support=1` option to `i915.alpha_support=1`, so if you needed this kernel option in the past you will have to rename it or add it to your configuration files (follow either GRUB2 or EFI, not both):
* GRUB2: `/etc/default/grub`, `GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX` line and
Rebuild grub config (`grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg`)
* EFI: `/boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg`, `kernel=` line(s)
## IOMMU-related issues ##
Dom0 Kernels currently included in Qubes have issues related to VT-d (IOMMU) and some versions of the integrated Intel Graphics Chip.
Depending on the specific hardware / software combination the issues are quite wide ranging, from apparently harmless log errors, to VM window refresh issues, to complete screen corruption and crashes rendering the machine unusable with Qubes.
Such issues have been reported on at least the following machines:
* HP Elitebook 2540p
* Lenovo x201
* Lenovo x220
* Thinkpad T410
* Thinkpad T450s
Log errors only on :
* Librem 13v1
* Librem 15v2
The installer for Qubes 4.0 final has been updated to disable IOMMU for the integrated intel graphics by default.
However, users of 3.2 may experience issues on install or on kernel upgrades to versions higher than 3.18.x.
Disabling IOMMU for the integrated graphics chip is not a security issue, as the device currently lives in dom0 and is not passed to a VM.
This behaviour is planned to be changed as of Qubes 4.1, when passthrough capabilities will be required for the GUI domain <sup id="a1-1">[1](#f1)</sup>.
## Workaround for existing systems with VT-d enabled (grub / legacy mode) ##
Edit the startup parameters for Xen:
1. Open a terminal in dom0
2. Edit `/etc/default/grub` (e.g. `sudo nano /etc/default/grub`)
3. Add to the line `GRUB_CMDLINE_XEN_DEFAULT` the setting `iommu=no-igfx`, save and quit
4. Commit the change with`sudo grub2-mkconfig --output /boot/grub2/grub.cfg`
## Workaround for existing systems with VT-d enabled (UEFI) ##
Edit the startup parameters for Xen:
1. Open a terminal in dom0
2. Edit `/boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg` (e.g. `sudo nano /boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg`)
3. Add to the line `options` the setting `iommu=no-igfx`, save and quit
<b name="f1">1</b> <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2841> [↩](#a1-1)

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Apple MacBook Troubleshooting title: Apple MacBook Troubleshooting
permalink: /doc/macbook-troubleshooting/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/macbook-troubleshooting.md
redirect_from:
- https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/macbook-troubleshooting.md
--- ---
# Apple MacBook Troubleshooting
## System freezes after attaching Broadcom BCM43602 Wi-Fi card
You may experience system freezes or crashes after attaching a Broadcom Wi-Fi adapter to the sys-net VM. This issue has been reported to exist on both Qubes 3.2 and 4.0.
### Qubes 3.2
To fix this issue on Qubes 3.2:
1. During VM setup, force a reboot and press `OPTION` key.
2. You will reach the grub shell
~~~
configfile /EFI/qubes/grub.cfg
~~~
3. Press Fn+F10 to boot without XEN support.
4. Once booted, press Fn+CTRL+ALT+F4 to open a shell.
5. Log into the system
~~~
sudo su -
systemctl disable qubes-netvm
~~~
6. Press Fn+F2 and complete the setup.
7. Reboot Qubes.
8. DO NOT launch the sys-net qube.
Rather, open its setting and remove the Wi-Fi adapter from the Selected devices using the Qubes Manager.
You can also remove it from the command line, if you know the BDF of the adapter.
You can see the list of devices attached to sys-net and their associated BDFs by running:
~~~
qvm-pci -l sys-net
~~~
For a device with a BDF of `04:00.0`, you can remove it with:
~~~
qvm-pci -d sys-net 04:00.0
~~~
9. In a dom0 terminal, run:
~~~
sudo su -
xl pci-assignable-list
echo 04:00.0 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/permissive
qvm-start sys-net
xl pci-attach sys-net DEVICE_BDF
~~~
Be sure to replace "DEVICE_BDF" with the actual BDF of the Wi-Fi adapter.
After following the above steps, you should be able to launch sys-net with Wi-Fi access. These steps can be automated in a custom `systemd` service.
### Qubes 4.0
For Qubes 4.0, you may have to remove the wireless card from sys-net or replace it, as described in the [PCI Troubleshooting](/doc/pci-troubleshooting/#broadcom-bcm43602-wi-fi-card-causes-system-freeze) guide.
It is a bit tricky to execute, but you may be able to successfully attach a Broadcom BCM43602 to sys-net by executing the `attach` command immediately after starting sys-net. Follow these steps:
1. Disable "Start qube automatically on boot" for sys-net and sys-firewall in the Qubes Manager.
2. Manually start sys-net using the `qvm-start sys-net` command.
3. Immediately (About 2 seconds later) after stating sys-net, attach the device to sys-net using permissive mode:
`sudo xl pci-attach sys-net 'DEVICE_BDF,permissive=1`
Replace `DEVICE_BDF,` with the BDF of your wireless card. If you can immediately attach the device to sys-net while it is still starting up, it could work. If it is attached too late, the VM doesn't seem to detect it.
You can use the following script to do the above steps quickly after each boot:
~~~
#!/bin/bash
qvm-start sys-net &
sleep 3
sudo xl pci-attach sys-net '03:00.0,permissive=1'
~~~
## Broadcom BCM4360 doesn't work in a Fedora-based qube
Several people have been unable use the Broadcom BCM4360 Wireless card on a Fedora-based qube. This issue appears to be [related to Fedora](https://ask.fedoraproject.org/t/cant-connect-to-wifi-after-update-bcm4360-with-broadcom-wl-driver/482?page=2), not Qubes.
To get internet access in sys-net, try shutting down all your VMs, then changing sys-net to use the Debian 10 template. Finally, install the [broadcom-sta-dkms](https://pkgs.org/download/broadcom-sta-dkms) package.
## Boot freezes at "Setting up networking"
After installing Qubes 3.2 on a MacBook Air 13" mid-2011 (MacBookAir 4,2), it may freeze at "Setting up networking" during booting. This issue is caused by the Broadcom Wireless adapter, if you have one.
To fix the problem, you need to [remove the Wi-Fi card from your Mac][bluetooth-replacement] or put the Wi-Fi adapter into PCI passthrough, as explained below:
1. Run in a terminal:
~~~
# diskutil list
(find your usb device)
# bless –device /dev/diskX –legacy –setBoot –nextonly # bless the disk not the partition
# reboot
~~~
2. Insert your Qubes 3.2 USB flash drive. The ISOLINUX boot screen should come up.
Select Troubleshooting and Boot the Rescue image. Enter your disk password when
prompted. Select continue and after mounting the HD filesystem and launching a
shell, `chroot` as instructed.
3. Find your Wi-Fi card:
~~~
# lspci
...
02:00.0 Network controller: Broadcom Corporation BCM43224 802.11a/b/g/n (rev 01)
~~~
In the above example, the device has a BDF of `02:00.0`.
To assign this device to the sys-net VM:
~~~
# qvm-pci -a sys-net 02:00.0
~~~
4. Create `/etc/systemd/system/qubes-pre-netvm.service` with:
~~~
[Unit]
Description=Netvm fix for Broadcom
Before=qubes-netvm.service
[Service]
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c 'echo 02:00.0 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/permissive'
Type=oneshot
RemainAfterExit=yes
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
~~~
5. To enable the `qubes-pre-netvm` services, run:
~~~
systemctl enable qubes-pre-netvm.service
~~~
6. After reboot, boot Mac OS X again by running in a terminal:
~~~
# diskutil list
(find the HD device where you installed Qubes)
# bless –device /dev/diskX –legacy –setBoot # bless the disk not the partition
# reboot
~~~
## Can't boot the installer
You can install Qubes 3.2 on a MacBook Pro Retina, 15 inch, Mid-2015 (MacBookPro 11,5) using BIOS or UEFI (If one method fails, try the other):
* BIOS/CSM/Legacy
* UEFI plain: Here, the grub menu appears, but any gives a quick flash and returns the main menu. Then, you can boot it manually and fix the `grub.cfg` file by adding the commands `linuexefi` and `initrdefi` and pointing to the proper files in `/efi/boot`. After boot, you may end up with no root file system.
* UEFI, using rEFInd: This method may prove successful, but there are some issues to be fixed manually after the installation is complete.
1. Download [rEFInd] refind-bin-0.10.4.zip. Note that this file is not signed, so decide if you trust it or not. The SHA1 sum is 3d69c23b7d338419e5559a93cd6ae3ec66323b1e
2. Unzip it and run the installer, which installs rEFInd on the internal SSD
3. If installation fails due to SIP, reboot in recovery mode, open a terminal and run the command:
~~~
csrutil disable
~~~
4. Reboot. You will see some icons.
5. Choose Boot EFI\BOOT\xen.efi from ANACONDA. After a while, the graphical installer is up (keyboard and touchpad working)
## Can't boot using GRUB2
After installing Qubes 3.2 on a MacBook Mid-2015, you may be unable to boot using `EFI/qubes/xen.efi` because the [XEN bootloader configuration is broken](/doc/macbook-troubleshooting/#cant-boot-using-xen-bootloader).
You can't also boot using GRUB2 without XEN support because the GRUB configuration is broken as well.
To start fixing this issue manually, switch to the console by pressing Fn+CTRL+ALT+F2.
It can be very useful – during troubleshooting – to have a rescue system at hand. It could help you boot Qubes, even without XEN support. This troubleshoot assumes you are performing a [UEFI boot, using rEFInd](/doc/macbook-troubleshooting/#cant-boot-the-installer).
At this point, the GRUB configuration file is using some wrong commands, which are not compatible with grub2-efi
~~~
chroot /mnt/sysimage
sed -i.bak -e "s/multiboot/chainloader/" -e "s/module.*--nounzip/initrdefi/" -e "s/module/linuxefi/" /etc/grub.d/20_linux_efi
exit
~~~
Now, despite XEN configuration is still broken, you have a rescue system booting vmlinux from rEFInd screen.
TBV1: chainloading XEN does not work, unless you specify the right disk prefix, eg: (hd1,gpt4)
TBV2: grub.cfg set the wrong disk in "set root" command
TBV3: in case you reach grub shell, you can
~~~
ls
~~~
and also reload config file and change it manually before booting
~~~
configfile /EFI/qubes/grub.cfg
~~~
Then press "e", edit `grub.cfg` and boot by pressing Fn+F10.
## Can't boot using XEN bootloader
You may be unable to boot Qubes 3.2 using `EFI/qubes/xen.efi` on a MacBook Mid-2015 because the XEN bootloader configuration is broken. This issue is accompanied by the GRUB2 configuration being broken as well. After [fixing the GRUB configuration](/doc/macbook-troubleshooting/#cant-boot-using-grub2), follow the following steps to fix the bootloader. This troubleshoot assumes you are performing a [UEFI boot, using rEFInd](/doc/macbook-troubleshooting/#cant-boot-the-installer).
* Fix grub2 configuration, which uses wrong command for EFI boot
* Analyzing `/mnt/sysimage/var/log/anaconda/program.log`, you may find the faulty commands issued by the Anaconda installer.
~~~
chrooot /mnt/sysimage
~~~
* Edit the `/boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg` file to add the following content:
~~~
[global]
default=4.4.14-11.pvops.qubes.x868_64
[4.4.14-11.pvops.qubes.x868_64]
options=loglvl=all dom0_mem=min:1024M dom0_mem=max:4096M
kernel=vmlinuz-4.4.14-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64
ramdisk=initramfs-4.4.14-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64.img
~~~
* The main mistake is that `efibootmgr` needs the right commands. Just in case, reapply all the commands, adapting them to your own disk layout (`-d /dev/sdxxx -p partition_number`)
~~~
grep Running /mnt/sysimage/var/log/anaconda/program.log | tail -n 20
efibootmgr -b 0000 -B
efibootmgr -c -w -L Qubes -d /dev/sda -p 4 -l \\EFI\\qubes\\xen-4.6.1.efi
/usr/libexec/mactel-boot-setup
kernel-install add 4.4.14-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64 /boot/vmlinuz-4.4.14-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64
systemctl disable qubes-netvm
reboot
~~~
At the rEFInd screen, choose Boot EFI/qubes/xen-4.6.1.efi.
Everything should now be ok, Qubes OS boots using EFI and you will get the last setup screen.
Select "Qubes OS", do not change anything and click on "Done".
VMs are created, including NetVM.
## System freezes often for 20 seconds
Using Qubes 3.2 on the MacBook Mid-2015 was reported to have frequent freezes, which lasts for 20 seconds. Upon looking at the `journalctl` output, you may see that pulseaudio locks the CPU for 20 seconds, very often.
To fix this issue, kill audio support with this quick workaround:
1. Open a dom0 terminal as root
2. Edit `/etc/pulse/client.conf` and add `autospawn = no`
3. As normal user, kill pulseaudio with the command `pulseaudio --kill`
[bluetooth-replacement]: https://www.ifixit.com/Guide/MacBook+Air+13-Inch+Mid+2011+AirPort-Bluetooth+Card+Replacement/6360
[rEFInd]: http://www.rodsbooks.com/refind/getting.html

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--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Nvidia Troubleshooting title: Nvidia Troubleshooting
permalink: /doc/nvidia-troubleshooting/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/nvidia-troubleshooting.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /en/doc/nvidia-troubleshooting/ - https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/nvidia-troubleshooting.md
- /enhttps://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/nvidia-troubleshooting.md
- /doc/NvidiaTroubleshooting/ - /doc/NvidiaTroubleshooting/
- /wiki/NvidiaTroubleshooting/ - /wiki/NvidiaTroubleshooting/
--- ---
# Nvidia Troubleshooting Guide
## System freezes during boot / Graphical login manager is not visible
If you have an NVidia graphics card it will probably not work under Xen out of the box. If your system freezes during boot and you don't see the graphical login manager after you installed Xen, then this problem most likely affects you. The following steps should provide a workaround so that you should be able to use your NVidia with X under Xen, however without any fancy "desktop effects".
### Boot in failsafe
Boot your system using the "failsafe" boot menu, that should have been automatically added to your `grub.conf` when you installed the Dom0 kernel.
If the X Window System doesn't start now, this is probably a non-Xen related issue and this guide will probably not help you.
### Configure X with nouveau
Assuming your X Window System works fine now when you booted from the "failsafe" configuration, do the next steps...
1. Do not log into X, but instead switch to a text console (press Ctrl-Alt-F2)
2. Log in as root
3. Switch to runlevel 3 (this should kill your X server):
~~~
init 3
~~~
4. Run X-autoconfiguration:
~~~
Xorg -configure
~~~
This should generate a file `xorg.conf.new` in the `/root` directory.
In most cases you can ignore any warning or error messages displayed by the X server, assuming it generated the xorg.conf.new file.
5. Edit this newly generated `xorg.conf.new` file and introduce the following two modifications:
First, uncomment the ShadowFB option, so that you should now have something like this:
~~~
Option "ShadowFB" # [<bool>]
~~~
Second, change the driver name to `nouveau` (you will probably have `nv` written there):
~~~
Driver "nouveau"
~~~
Save the modification, exit the editor.
6. Move the file to `/etc/X11` and rename it as `xorg.conf`:
~~~
mv /root/xorg.conf.new /etc/X11/xorg.conf
~~~
7. Verify that X will work with those new settings:
~~~
xinit
~~~
If you see a terminal window in the top left corner, it means you most likely succeeded, even if your keyboard or mouse do not work now (don't worry about them).
8. Reboot and let the system boot from the normal boot configuration. You should be able to use X under Xen now.
## Boot failure after GRUB menu / System freezes followed by reboot
If Qubes fails to properly boot after the GRUB Boot menu and you are stuck on a black screen that displays messages starting with `nouveau` then it means that the nouveau driver failed to launch properly.
One way to get rid of this for now is to disable nouveau.
### Disabling Nouveau
Example error:
~~~
nouveau E[ PGRAPH][0000:01:00.0] grctx template channel unload timeout
nouveau E[ PGRAPH][0000:01:00.0] failed to construct context
nouveau E[ PGRAPH][0000:01:00.0] init failed, -16
~~~
Tip: In case you only have an external monitor it is advised to attach it directly to a connector of the motherboard if it is present, this should ensure that you're using the integrated graphics card instead of the nvidia graphics card.
If you're seeing this error then that means another graphics card (most likely an integrated one) acted as failsafe. Disabling nouveau has the consequences of disabling nvidia support altogether.
#### EFI
1. Open a terminal in dom0.
2. To edit the `xen.cfg` file using the `nano` editor:
~~~
sudo nano /boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg
~~~
3. Locate the three `kernel=` lines. Press the left/right arrow keys to position the cursor at the end of the lines, after `rhgb quiet`.
4. Add the following:
~~~
nouveau.modeset=0 rd.driver.blacklist=nouveau video=vesa:off
~~~
This will disable nouveau until the option is manually edited back to its original state.
5. Press the `Ctrl+X` keys, then `y` to save changes.
6. Reboot
#### GRUB
1. Verify that that GRUB Boot Menu is displaying, you should be presented with two options and a progressbar/timer than goes rather fast.
~~~
Qubes
Qubes with advanced Xen options
~~~
2. Quickly press the "E" key before the time is up.
3. An editor will open up that allows you to temporarily change the grub options for the next boot.
4. Press the down arrow key and move the cursor to the line after the line with the kernel options. The line with the kernel options will look like this:
~~~
module /vmlinux-4.1.13-9.pvops.qubes.x86_64 placeholder root=/dev/mapper/qubes_dom0-root ro ... rhgb quiet
~~~
It is not an exact copy as it may differ from system to system.
Please note: choose the module that starts with `vmlinux`!
5. Press the left/right arrow keys to position the cursor at the end of kernel options line, after `rhgb quiet` in this case.
6. Add the following:
~~~
nouveau.modeset=0 rd.driver.blacklist=nouveau video=vesa:off
~~~
This will temporarily disable nouveau until next boot.
7. Press either the F10 key or Ctrl+X to start the boot process.
Qubes should now boot properly, if that's the case then we should make this change permanent such that the GRUB config knows to not run nouveau.
You'll have to do the following to make this change persistent, so that it will work properly on every boot :
1. Open a terminal (do this by clicking on Q > 'run command' > type 'terminal' and hit enter)
2. type following commands:
~~~
cd /etc/default/
sudo nano grub
~~~
3. Edit `GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX`, add the following to it at the end:
~~~
nouveau.modeset=0 rd.driver.blacklist=nouveau video=vesa:off
~~~
4. ctrl + X and then y to save the file.
5. The final step is to compile the configuration file to something the bootloader can read.
~~~
sudo grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
~~~
## Lack of video output during Nvidia driver installation
Specifically, the notes below are aimed to help when during Nvidia driver installation, the GRUB menu shows up fine, the installation environment starts loading, and then the display(s) go into standby mode. This is, typically, related to some sort of an issue with the kernel's KMS/video card modules.
### Initial setup.
*Note*: The steps below do *not* produce a fully-functional Qubes OS install. Rather, only a dom0 instance is functional, and there is no networking there. However, they can be used to gather data in order to troubleshoot video card issues and/or possible other basic kernel module issues.
1. Append `nomodeset ip=dhcp inst.nokill inst.vnc` to the kernel command line. Remove `rhgb` and `quiet` to see the kernel messages scroll by, which may help in further diagnostics.
* If DHCP is not available on the installation network, the syntax becomes a bit more involved. The full list of variants is documented in the [Dracut Command-line parameters] (http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/dracut.cmdline.7.html)
2. The VGA console should switch into the installer's multi-virtual-terminal display. VNC may take a number of minutes to start, please be patient.
* Using the anaconda installer interface, switch to the "shell" TTY (ALT-F2), and use `ip a` command to display the IP addresses.
3. Using the Connect to the IP (remember the :1) using a VNC viewer.
4. Follow the installation UI.
* Since this won't be a usable install, skipping LUKS encryption is an option which will simplify this troubleshooting process.
* Do *not* reboot at the end of the installation.
5. Once the installation completes, use the local VGA console switch to TTY2 via ALT-F2
* Switch to the chroot of the newly-installed system via `chroot /mnt/sysinstall`
* Set the root password (this will also enable the root account login)
* Double-check that `/boot/grub2/grub.cfg` contains a `nomodeset` kernel parameter.
* Exit out of the chroot environment (`exit` or CTRL-D)
6. Reboot
*Note* If the kernel parameters do *not* include `quiet` and `rhgb`, the kernel messages can easily obscure the LUKS passphrase prompt. Additionally, each character entered will cause the LUKS passphrase prompt to repeat onto next line. Both of these are cosmetic. The trade-off between kernel messages and the easy-to-spot LUKS passphrase prompt is left as an exercise to the user.
### Gather initial `dmesg` output
If all is well, the newly-installed Qubes OS instance should allow for user root to log in.
Run `dmesg > dmesg.nomodeset.out` to gather an initial dmesg output.
### Gather the 'video no worky' `dmesg` output
1. Reboot and interrupt the Grub2's process, modifying the kernel parameters to no longer contain `nomodeset`.
* If the LUKS passphrase was set, blindly enter it.
2. Wait for the system to finish booting (about 5 minutes, typically).
3. Blindly switch to a TTY via CTRL-ALT-F2.
4. Blindly log in as user root
5. Blindly run `dmesg > dmesg.out`
6. Blindly run `reboot` (this will also serve to confirm that logging in as root, and running commands blindly is possible rather than, say, the kernel having hung or some such).
* Should this step fail, perhaps by the time step #3 was undertaken, the OS hasn't finished coming up yet. Please retry, possibly with a different TTY (say, 3 or 4 - so CTRL-ALT-F3?)
### Exfiltrate the dmesg outputs
Allow the system to boot normally, log in as user root, and sneakernet the files off the system for analysis, review, bug logging, et cetera.

51
external/troubleshooting/sony-vaio-tinkering.md vendored
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@ -1,58 +1,11 @@
--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Sony Vaio Tinkering title: Sony Vaio Tinkering
permalink: /doc/sony-vaio-tinkering/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/sony-vaio-tinkering.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/sony-vaio-tinkering/
- /en/doc/sony-vaio-tinkering/ - /en/doc/sony-vaio-tinkering/
- /doc/SonyVaioTinkering/ - /doc/SonyVaioTinkering/
- /wiki/SonyVaioTinkering/ - /wiki/SonyVaioTinkering/
--- ---
Instructions for getting your Sony Vaio Z laptop working with Qubes/Linux
=========================================================================
The following issues were reported on Qubes 3.2 and may not be prevalent on Qubes 4.0.
Graphics card does not work
---------------------------
Newer models of Sony Vaio Z come with an "intelligent" GPU switch, that automatically chooses either Intel Integrated GPU (IGD) or the discrete NVIDIA GPU. This confuses the Linux graphics so much, that in most cases, it won't even be able to install a regular Linux on such a machine. Unfortunately, moving the switch into the "Stamina" position apparently doesn't work, and the automatic GPU switching is still active.
One solution that actually worked for me was to reflash the BIOS (I know, I know, this is scary) and to enable the so called "Advanced Menu" in the BIOS. This Advanced Menu allows you to choose the desired behaviour of the GPU switch, which in our case would be to set it to "Static" and then move the mechanical switch to the "Stamina" position, that enabled the Intel IGD (which is much better supported on Linux).
If you think you are ready to reflash you BIOS, you can follow [these instructions](http://forum.notebookreview.com/sony/473226-insyde-hacking-new-vaio-z-advanced-menu-bios.html).
**WARNING**: We take absolutely no responsibility that the BIOS reflashing instructions given at the referenced forum are 1) valid, 2) non-malicious, and 3) work at all. Do this step at your own risk. Keep in mind that reflashing your BIOS might yield your system unusable. If you don't feel like taking this risk (which is a reasonable state of mind), look for a different notebook, or ask Sony Support to enable this option for you.
In practice I have downloaded the BIOS-patching tools, run them in a VM on a BIOS image I extracted from my laptop, diffed the two versions, and concluded that it doesn't *seem* malicious, and then bravely applied the patched image. If you don't know what are you doing, just get a different laptop, really!
On a side note, we should note that allowing anybody to reflash the BIOS is really a bad idea from a security point of view (Hello Evil Maids!). Shame on you, Sony!
Touchpad does not work during installation
------------------------------------------
In order to get the touchpad working during installation you should pass the `i8042.nopnp=1` option to the kernel before the installer starts:
~~~
sudo nano /etc/default/grub
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="i8042.nopnp=1"
~~~
Applying other fixes
--------------------
There are a few more fixes needed for Sony Vaio Z, and we have prepared a special package that you can install in dom0 that applies them all. After the installation is complete, open a console in dom0 and do the following:
~~~
$ sudo bash
# qvm-dom0-networking up
# yum install qubes-core-dom0-vaio-fixes
# reboot
~~~
This script takes care about the following:
- Setting i8042.nopnp for your installed system
- Adding special option for the sound module (so you can get sound)
- Adding pm-suspend scripts that take care about restoring your screen after resume

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@ -1,33 +1,8 @@
--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Tails Troubleshooting title: Tails Troubleshooting
permalink: /doc/tails-troubleshooting/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/tails-troubleshooting.md
redirect_from:
- /doc/tails-troubleshooting/
--- ---
# Tails Troubleshooting Guide #
## Black screen during startup
This was reported with earlier versions of Tails -- the problem should now be fixed.
If you do encounter a black screen during Tails startup, you can try to constrain display settings by appending vga codes to the Tails boot parameters.
If you do not know the codes, append `vga=999`, and a helpful prompt will appear.
Note: Tails 2.3 does not appear to honour the vga code.
## Window extends beyond the bottom of the screen
This problem seems to arise because Tails sizes to the height of the screen, but there is a title bar at the top of the window.
Either remove the title bar altogether, or move the window upwards using ALT+drag.
## Persistent tools do not work
The persistence tools, such as persistent volume, may not work because Tails has not been launched from USB.
The HVM disk(s) can be configured and mounted from within Tails to provide persistent storage.
If you want to use an existing USB persistent volume:
1. Interrupt the Tails vm boot process with arrow-up when the grub boot menu appears.
2. In dom0 attach the USB drive containing the persistent volume to the Tails VM.
3. Continue booting Tails. Tails-greeter will detect the encrypted partition on the attached USB.
4. Unlock the persistent volume in Tails-greeter and use it as normal.
## Tails qube doesn't shut down cleanly
If the Tails qube will not shut down cleanly, you can kill it from the GUI Manager or enter ```qvm-kill Tails``` in the console.

82
external/troubleshooting/thinkpad-troubleshooting.md vendored
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@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
--- ---
layout: doc layout: doc
title: Lenovo ThinkPad Troubleshooting title: Lenovo ThinkPad Troubleshooting
permalink: /doc/thinkpad-troubleshooting/ redirect_to: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/thinkpad-troubleshooting.md
redirect_from: redirect_from:
- /doc/thinkpad-troubleshooting/
- /doc/thinkpad_x201/ - /doc/thinkpad_x201/
- /en/doc/thinkpad_x201/ - /en/doc/thinkpad_x201/
- /doc/Thinkpad_X201/ - /doc/Thinkpad_X201/
@ -13,82 +14,3 @@ redirect_from:
- /wiki/Lenovo450Tinkering/ - /wiki/Lenovo450Tinkering/
--- ---
# Lenovo ThinkPad Troubleshooting #
## Installation from USB stick fails for newer (UEFI-only) ThinkPads ##
Some newer ThinkPads (e.g. T470, T470p, [P51](https://www.svensemmler.org/blog/2017/12/17/qubes-on-thinkpad-p51.html), ThinkPad 25, but not the [P53](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5851)) are likely to fail installation attempts made from a USB stick that was created with dd or Rufus, and even from a DVD burned using official ISO images - if the ThinkPad is configured for UEFI boot. If you don't want to use Legacy Mode as a workaround, the following instructions should help you create a Qubes Installation USB stick that works in UEFI-only mode.
In a nutshell, you need to use the Fedora livecd-tools to make a Qubes Installation USB Stick from the Qubes ISO image, then update the label on the partition of that USB stick to "BOOT", and then update the BOOT/EFI/BOOTX64.cfg file on the USB stick so that all labels point to BOOT. In more detail:
1. On your ThinkPad, enter the UEFI setup (press F1 at startup) and make sure to set at least the following options:
- *USB UEFI BIOS Support: Enabled*
- *UEFI/Legacy Boot: UEFI Only*
- *Secure Boot: Disabled*
2. On a different computer, create a "Fedora Live USB Stick": Download a current Fedora Live CD image, and put it onto a USB stick (e.g. using dd or Rufus). Start your ThinkPad from the Fedora Live USB Stick on your ThinkPad (Press F12 at startup to select boot device). Of course, you can alternatively start a different machine from the Fedora Live USB Stick, or use an existing Fedora installation. The next steps all occur within Fedora:
3. Install livecd-tools: `# dnf install livecd-tools`
4. Download the desired Qubes ISO image (or attach a storage device containing it), and verify the signatures as described in the Qubes installation guide. For these instructions, I assume the ISO image is at */run/media/liveuser/qsrc/Qubes-R4.0-rc3-x86_64.iso* (so whenever you see that path going forward in these instructions, replace it with whatever your own path is)
5. Within Fedora, attach the USB stick that you would like to turn into your Qubes Installation USB Stick. Use `dmesg` to figure out what the device name of that stick is. For these instructions, I assume it's */dev/sdd* (so whenever you see */dev/sdd* going forward in these instructions, replace it with whatever your actual device name is)
6. Make sure your target USB stick (presumed to be /dev/sdd) has no mounted partitions: ``# umount /dev/sdd*`` (the asterisk at the end makes sure to unmount all partitions if more than one exists). If none are mounted you'll get an error that you can ignore.
7. Use livecd-tools to copy the image: ``# livecd-iso-to-disk --format --efi /run/media/liveuser/qsrc/Qubes-R4.0-rc3-x86_64.iso /dev/sdd``. **This will erase everything on the drive. Make sure you specify the correct destination.** Then press ENTER when prompted to proceed. This process will take quite a while, be patient.
8. When imaging is complete, change the partition label to BOOT: ``# dosfslabel /dev/sdd1 BOOT``
9. Now create a mount point and mount the partition:
``# mkdir /mnt/qinst``
``# mount /dev/sdd1 /mnt/qinst/``
10. Use your favorite editor to edit the file */mnt/qinst/EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.cfg*: Replace all instances of ``LABEL=Qubes-R4.0-rc3-x86_64`` with ``LABEL=BOOT``. There is typically no space in front of ``LABEL``, but there is a space at the end of the portion you replace.
11. Unmount the Qubes Installation USB stick: ``# umount /dev/sdd*`` and disconnect it.
That's it! You can now reboot the machine with the Qubes USB Installation stick attached, and press F12 to select it as the boot device at startup. Proceed to install Qubes OS normally. Enjoy!
## Random reboots on ThinkPads with Intel HD 3000 graphics ##
Several ThinkPad models have Intel HD 3000 graphics, including the T420s and the
T520. Some users with these laptops have experienced random reboots, which were
solved by adding `i915.enable_rc6=0` as a kernel parameter to
`GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX` in the file `/etc/default/grub` in dom0.
## Can't boot the installer from a USB on Thinkpad X201 & X200 ##
For being able to boot the installer from USB, you have to disable VT-d in the BIOS.
Enter the BIOS by hitting F1, go to Config - CPU and then disable VT-d there.
After the installation, you have to set a startup-parameter for Xen, to be able to activate VT-d again:
1. Open a terminal in dom0
2. Edit `/etc/default/grub`
3. Add to the line `GRUB_CMDLINE_XEN_DEFAULT` the setting `iommu=no-igfx`, save and quit
4. sudo `grub2-mkconfig --output /boot/grub2/grub.cfg`
Then reboot, enter BIOS and re-enable VT-d.
### Getting scrolling with the Trackpoint and the Middle Button to work ###
1. Create a script with the following content:
~~~
#!/bin/sh
xinput set-prop "TPPS/2 IBM TrackPoint" "Evdev Wheel Emulation" 1
xinput set-prop "TPPS/2 IBM TrackPoint" "Evdev Wheel Emulation Button" 2
xinput set-prop "TPPS/2 IBM TrackPoint" "Evdev Wheel Emulation Timeout" 200
xinput set-prop "TPPS/2 IBM TrackPoint" "Evdev Wheel Emulation Axes" 6 7 4 5
~~~
2. Add the script to the startup-items of your desktop environment.
## Can’t boot from USB stick on Lenovo 450 ##
Lenovo 450 uses UEFI, so some settings are needed to get Qubes (or Fedora) to boot, otherwise Qubes install USB stick will reboot right after boot selector screen and not continue install.
### Setting UEFI options to get Qubes install to boot ###
1. Enable Legacy USB mode
2. Disable all Secure Boot and UEFI options, but leave this enabled: Config / USB / USB UEFI BIOS SUPPORT
3. Save settings and reboot
5. Install Qubes
... and now enjoy :) These settings may be needed also in other UEFI computers.

4
introduction/faq.md
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@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ If you need to support not-fully-updated systems, check for the existence of `/u
Yes, Qubes natively supports automation via [Salt (SaltStack)][Salt]. Yes, Qubes natively supports automation via [Salt (SaltStack)][Salt].
There is also the unofficial [ansible-qubes toolkit][ansible]. There is also the unofficial [ansible-qubes toolkit][ansible].
(**Warning:** Since this is an external project that has not been reviewed or endorsed by the Qubes team, [allowing it to manage dom0 may be a security risk](/doc/security-guidelines/#dom0-precautions).) (**Warning:** Since this is an external project that has not been reviewed or endorsed by the Qubes team, [allowing it to manage dom0 may be a security risk](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/security-guidelines.md#dom0-precautions).)
[4.x System Requirements]: /doc/system-requirements/#qubes-release-4x [4.x System Requirements]: /doc/system-requirements/#qubes-release-4x
[Admin API]: /news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/ [Admin API]: /news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/
@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ There is also the unofficial [ansible-qubes toolkit][ansible].
[dm-crypt]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dm-crypt [dm-crypt]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dm-crypt
[doc-signing keys]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/tree/master/keys/doc-signing [doc-signing keys]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/tree/master/keys/doc-signing
[documentation guidelines]: /doc/doc-guidelines [documentation guidelines]: /doc/doc-guidelines
[documentation on multibooting]: /doc/multiboot/ [documentation on multibooting]: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/multiboot.md
[Enable RPMFusion]: /doc/software-update-domu/#rpmfusion-for-fedora-templatevms [Enable RPMFusion]: /doc/software-update-domu/#rpmfusion-for-fedora-templatevms
[file]: /doc/copying-files [file]: /doc/copying-files
[firewalls]: /doc/firewall [firewalls]: /doc/firewall

2
user/common-tasks/getting-started.md
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@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ If you encounter any problems, please visit the [Help, Support, and Mailing List
[security domain]: /doc/glossary/#domain [security domain]: /doc/glossary/#domain
[template]: /doc/glossary/#templatevm [template]: /doc/glossary/#templatevm
[dom0]: /doc/glossary/#dom0 [dom0]: /doc/glossary/#dom0
[dom0-precautions]: /doc/security-guidelines/#dom0-precautions [dom0-precautions]: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/security-guidelines.md#dom0-precautions
[tools]: /doc/tools/ [tools]: /doc/tools/
[partitioning]: https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html [partitioning]: https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html
[update]: /doc/updating-qubes-os/ [update]: /doc/updating-qubes-os/

2
user/common-tasks/optical-discs.md
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Currently, the only options for reading and recording optical discs (e.g., CDs,
1. Use a USB optical drive. 1. Use a USB optical drive.
2. Attach a SATA optical drive to a secondary SATA controller, then assign this secondary SATA controller to a VM. 2. Attach a SATA optical drive to a secondary SATA controller, then assign this secondary SATA controller to a VM.
3. Use a SATA optical drive attached to dom0. 3. Use a SATA optical drive attached to dom0.
(**Caution:** This option is [potentially dangerous](/doc/security-guidelines/#dom0-precautions).) (**Caution:** This option is [potentially dangerous](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/security-guidelines.md#dom0-precautions).)
To access an optical disc via USB follow the [typical procedure for attaching a USB device](/doc/usb-devices/#with-the-command-line-tool), then check with the **Qubes Devices** widget to see what device in the target qube the USB optical drive was attached to. To access an optical disc via USB follow the [typical procedure for attaching a USB device](/doc/usb-devices/#with-the-command-line-tool), then check with the **Qubes Devices** widget to see what device in the target qube the USB optical drive was attached to.
Typically this would be `sr0`. Typically this would be `sr0`.

8
user/managing-os/minimal-templates.md
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@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ As usual, the required packages are to be installed in the running template with
- [FirewallVM](/doc/firewall/), such as the template for `sys-firewall`: at least `qubes-core-agent-networking` and `iproute`, and also `qubes-core-agent-dom0-updates` if you want to use it as the `UpdateVM` (which is normally `sys-firewall`). - [FirewallVM](/doc/firewall/), such as the template for `sys-firewall`: at least `qubes-core-agent-networking` and `iproute`, and also `qubes-core-agent-dom0-updates` if you want to use it as the `UpdateVM` (which is normally `sys-firewall`).
- NetVM, such as the template for `sys-net`: `qubes-core-agent-networking` `qubes-core-agent-network-manager` `NetworkManager-wifi` `network-manager-applet` `wireless-tools` `notification-daemon` `gnome-keyring` `polkit` `@hardware-support`. If your network devices need extra packages for the template to work as a network VM, use the `lspci` command to identify the devices, then run `dnf search firmware` (replace `firmware` with the appropriate device identifier) to find the needed packages and then install them. If you need utilities for debugging and analyzing network connections, install `tcpdump` `telnet` `nmap` `nmap-ncat`. - NetVM, such as the template for `sys-net`: `qubes-core-agent-networking` `qubes-core-agent-network-manager` `NetworkManager-wifi` `network-manager-applet` `wireless-tools` `notification-daemon` `gnome-keyring` `polkit` `@hardware-support`. If your network devices need extra packages for the template to work as a network VM, use the `lspci` command to identify the devices, then run `dnf search firmware` (replace `firmware` with the appropriate device identifier) to find the needed packages and then install them. If you need utilities for debugging and analyzing network connections, install `tcpdump` `telnet` `nmap` `nmap-ncat`.
- [USB qube](/doc/usb-qubes/), such as the template for `sys-usb`: `qubes-usb-proxy` to provide USB devices to other Qubes and `qubes-input-proxy-sender` to provide keyboard or mouse input to dom0. - [USB qube](/doc/usb-qubes/), such as the template for `sys-usb`: `qubes-usb-proxy` to provide USB devices to other Qubes and `qubes-input-proxy-sender` to provide keyboard or mouse input to dom0.
- [VPN qube](/doc/vpn/): Use the `dnf search "NetworkManager VPN plugin"` command to look up the VPN packages you need, based on the VPN technology you'll be using, and install them. Some GNOME related packages may be needed as well. After creation of a machine based on this template, follow the [VPN instructions](/doc/vpn/#set-up-a-proxyvm-as-a-vpn-gateway-using-networkmanager) to configure it. - [VPN qube](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md): Use the `dnf search "NetworkManager VPN plugin"` command to look up the VPN packages you need, based on the VPN technology you'll be using, and install them. Some GNOME related packages may be needed as well. After creation of a machine based on this template, follow the [VPN instructions](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md#set-up-a-proxyvm-as-a-vpn-gateway-using-networkmanager) to configure it.
- `default-mgmt-dvm`: requires `qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root` and `qubes-mgmt-salt-vm-connector`. - `default-mgmt-dvm`: requires `qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root` and `qubes-mgmt-salt-vm-connector`.
In Qubes 4.0, additional packages from the `qubes-core-agent` suite may be needed to make the customized minimal template work properly. In Qubes 4.0, additional packages from the `qubes-core-agent` suite may be needed to make the customized minimal template work properly.
@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ As usual, the required packages are to be installed in the running template with
- [FirewallVM](/doc/firewall/), such as the template for `sys-firewall`: at least `qubes-core-agent-networking`, and also `qubes-core-agent-dom0-updates` if you want to use it as the `UpdateVM` (which is normally `sys-firewall`). - [FirewallVM](/doc/firewall/), such as the template for `sys-firewall`: at least `qubes-core-agent-networking`, and also `qubes-core-agent-dom0-updates` if you want to use it as the `UpdateVM` (which is normally `sys-firewall`).
- NetVM, such as the template for `sys-net`: `qubes-core-agent-networking` `qubes-core-agent-network-manager`. If your network devices need extra packages for a network VM, use the `lspci` command to identify the devices, then find the package that provides necessary firmware and install it. If you need utilities for debugging and analyzing network connections, install the following packages: `tcpdump` `telnet` `nmap` `nmap-ncat`. - NetVM, such as the template for `sys-net`: `qubes-core-agent-networking` `qubes-core-agent-network-manager`. If your network devices need extra packages for a network VM, use the `lspci` command to identify the devices, then find the package that provides necessary firmware and install it. If you need utilities for debugging and analyzing network connections, install the following packages: `tcpdump` `telnet` `nmap` `nmap-ncat`.
- [USB qube](/doc/usb-qubes/), such as the template for `sys-usb`: `qubes-usb-proxy` to provide USB devices to other Qubes and `qubes-input-proxy-sender` to provide keyboard or mouse input to dom0. - [USB qube](/doc/usb-qubes/), such as the template for `sys-usb`: `qubes-usb-proxy` to provide USB devices to other Qubes and `qubes-input-proxy-sender` to provide keyboard or mouse input to dom0.
- [VPN qube](/doc/vpn/): You may need to install network-manager VPN packages, depending on the VPN technology you'll be using. After creating a machine based on this template, follow the [VPN howto](/doc/vpn/#set-up-a-proxyvm-as-a-vpn-gateway-using-networkmanager) to configure it. - [VPN qube](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md): You may need to install network-manager VPN packages, depending on the VPN technology you'll be using. After creating a machine based on this template, follow the [VPN howto](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md#set-up-a-proxyvm-as-a-vpn-gateway-using-networkmanager) to configure it.
- `default-mgmt-dvm`: requires `qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root` and `qubes-mgmt-salt-vm-connector`. - `default-mgmt-dvm`: requires `qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root` and `qubes-mgmt-salt-vm-connector`.
In Qubes 4.0, additional packages from the `qubes-core-agent` suite may be needed to make the customized minimal template work properly. In Qubes 4.0, additional packages from the `qubes-core-agent` suite may be needed to make the customized minimal template work properly.
@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ As usual, the required packages are to be installed in the running template with
- [FirewallVM](/doc/firewall/), such as the template for `sys-firewall`: at least `qubes-core-agent-networking`, and also `qubes-core-agent-dom0-updates` if you want to use it as the `UpdateVM` (which is normally `sys-firewall`). - [FirewallVM](/doc/firewall/), such as the template for `sys-firewall`: at least `qubes-core-agent-networking`, and also `qubes-core-agent-dom0-updates` if you want to use it as the `UpdateVM` (which is normally `sys-firewall`).
- NetVM, such as the template for `sys-net`: `qubes-core-agent-networking` `qubes-core-agent-network-manager` `NetworkManager-wifi` `network-manager-applet` `wireless-tools` `notification-daemon` `gnome-keyring`. If your network devices need extra packages for a network VM, use the `lspci` command to identify the devices, then find the package that provides necessary firnware and install it. If you need utilities for debugging and analyzing network connections, install the following packages: `tcpdump` `telnet` `nmap` `nmap-ncat` - NetVM, such as the template for `sys-net`: `qubes-core-agent-networking` `qubes-core-agent-network-manager` `NetworkManager-wifi` `network-manager-applet` `wireless-tools` `notification-daemon` `gnome-keyring`. If your network devices need extra packages for a network VM, use the `lspci` command to identify the devices, then find the package that provides necessary firnware and install it. If you need utilities for debugging and analyzing network connections, install the following packages: `tcpdump` `telnet` `nmap` `nmap-ncat`
- [USB qube](/doc/usb-qubes/), such as the template for `sys-usb`: `qubes-usb-proxy` to provide USB devices to other Qubes and `qubes-input-proxy-sender` to provide keyboard or mouse input to dom0. - [USB qube](/doc/usb-qubes/), such as the template for `sys-usb`: `qubes-usb-proxy` to provide USB devices to other Qubes and `qubes-input-proxy-sender` to provide keyboard or mouse input to dom0.
- [VPN qube](/doc/vpn/): You may need to install network-manager VPN packages, depending on the VPN technology you'll be using. After creating a machine based on this template, follow the [VPN howto](/doc/vpn/#set-up-a-proxyvm-as-a-vpn-gateway-using-networkmanager) to configure it. - [VPN qube](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md): You may need to install network-manager VPN packages, depending on the VPN technology you'll be using. After creating a machine based on this template, follow the [VPN howto](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md#set-up-a-proxyvm-as-a-vpn-gateway-using-networkmanager) to configure it.
- `default-mgmt-dvm`: requires `qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root` and `qubes-mgmt-salt-vm-connector`. - `default-mgmt-dvm`: requires `qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root` and `qubes-mgmt-salt-vm-connector`.
In Qubes 4.0, additional packages from the `qubes-core-agent` suite may be needed to make the customized minimal template work properly. In Qubes 4.0, additional packages from the `qubes-core-agent` suite may be needed to make the customized minimal template work properly.
@ -223,6 +223,6 @@ You could, of course, use `qubes-vm-recommended` to automatically install many o
[doc-guidelines]: /doc/doc-guidelines/ [doc-guidelines]: /doc/doc-guidelines/
[pref-default]: /faq/#could-you-please-make-my-preference-the-default [pref-default]: /faq/#could-you-please-make-my-preference-the-default
[testing]: /doc/testing/ [testing]: /doc/testing/
[customization]: /doc/fedora-minimal-template-customization/ [customization]: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/customization/fedora-minimal-template-customization.md
[Passwordless Root Access in VMs]: /doc/vm-sudo/ [Passwordless Root Access in VMs]: /doc/vm-sudo/

4
user/security-in-qubes/anti-evil-maid.md
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@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ For more information, see the [qubes-antievilmaid](https://github.com/QubesOS/qu
Security Considerations Security Considerations
----------------------- -----------------------
[Qubes security guidelines](/doc/security-guidelines/) dictate that USB devices should never be attached directly to dom0, since this can result in the entire system being compromised. [Qubes security guidelines](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/security-guidelines.md) dictate that USB devices should never be attached directly to dom0, since this can result in the entire system being compromised.
However, in its default configuration, installing and using AEM requires attaching a USB drive (i.e., [mass storage device](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USB_mass_storage_device_class)) directly to dom0. However, in its default configuration, installing and using AEM requires attaching a USB drive (i.e., [mass storage device](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USB_mass_storage_device_class)) directly to dom0.
(The other option is to install AEM to an internal disk. (The other option is to install AEM to an internal disk.
However, this carries significant security implications, as explained [here](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/09/07/anti-evil-maid.html).) This presents us with a classic security trade-off: each Qubes user must make a choice between protecting dom0 from a potentially malicious USB drive, on the one hand, and protecting the system from Evil Maid attacks, on the other hand. However, this carries significant security implications, as explained [here](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/09/07/anti-evil-maid.html).) This presents us with a classic security trade-off: each Qubes user must make a choice between protecting dom0 from a potentially malicious USB drive, on the one hand, and protecting the system from Evil Maid attacks, on the other hand.
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Therefore, it is up to each individual Qubes user to evaluate the relative risk
For example, a user who frequently travels with a Qubes laptop holding sensitive data may be at a much higher risk of Evil Maid attacks than a home user with a stationary Qubes desktop. For example, a user who frequently travels with a Qubes laptop holding sensitive data may be at a much higher risk of Evil Maid attacks than a home user with a stationary Qubes desktop.
If the frequent traveler judges her risk of an Evil Maid attack to be higher than the risk of a malicious USB device, she might reasonably opt to install and use AEM. If the frequent traveler judges her risk of an Evil Maid attack to be higher than the risk of a malicious USB device, she might reasonably opt to install and use AEM.
On the other hand, the home user might deem the probability of an Evil Maid attack occurring in her own home to be so low that there is a higher probability that any USB drive she purchases is already compromised, in which case she might reasonably opt never to attach any USB devices directly to dom0. On the other hand, the home user might deem the probability of an Evil Maid attack occurring in her own home to be so low that there is a higher probability that any USB drive she purchases is already compromised, in which case she might reasonably opt never to attach any USB devices directly to dom0.
(In either case, users can--and should--secure dom0 against further USB-related attacks through the use of a [USBVM](/doc/security-guidelines/#creating-and-using-a-usbvm).) (In either case, users can--and should--secure dom0 against further USB-related attacks through the use of a [USBVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/security-guidelines.md#creating-and-using-a-usbvm).)
For more information, please see [this discussion thread](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/EBc4to5IBdg/n1hfsHSfbqsJ). For more information, please see [this discussion thread](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/EBc4to5IBdg/n1hfsHSfbqsJ).

2
user/security-in-qubes/firewall.md
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@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ The sys-firewall-2 proxy ensures that:
2. Changes to the Qubes firewall by the Qubes maintainers cannot lead to unwanted information leakage in combination with user rules deployed in the network service qube. 2. Changes to the Qubes firewall by the Qubes maintainers cannot lead to unwanted information leakage in combination with user rules deployed in the network service qube.
3. A compromise of the network service qube does not compromise the Qubes firewall. 3. A compromise of the network service qube does not compromise the Qubes firewall.
For the VPN service please also look at the [VPN documentation](/doc/vpn). For the VPN service please also look at the [VPN documentation](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md).
Enabling networking between two qubes Enabling networking between two qubes

4
user/troubleshooting/installation-troubleshooting.md
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@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ These errors may also occur due to an incompatible Nvidia graphics card. If you
noexitboot=1 modprobe.blacklist=nouveau rd.driver.blacklist=nouveau --- intitrd.img noexitboot=1 modprobe.blacklist=nouveau rd.driver.blacklist=nouveau --- intitrd.img
For more information, look at the [Nvidia Troubleshooting guide](/doc/nvidia-troubleshooting/#disabling-nouveau). For more information, look at the [Nvidia Troubleshooting guide](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/nvidia-troubleshooting.md#disabling-nouveau).
## Installation freezes at "Setting up Networking" ## ## Installation freezes at "Setting up Networking" ##
If you are facing this problem on an Apple computer, check out the [Macbook Troubleshooting guide](/doc/macbook-troubleshooting/). If you are facing this problem on an Apple computer, check out the [Macbook Troubleshooting guide](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/macbook-troubleshooting.md).
This issue occurs due to the network card, which may be missing some drivers or is incompatible with Qubes. This issue occurs due to the network card, which may be missing some drivers or is incompatible with Qubes.

2
user/troubleshooting/pci-troubleshooting.md
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@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ You can also configure strict reset directly from the Qubes interface by followi
## Broadcom BCM43602 Wi-Fi card causes system freeze ## ## Broadcom BCM43602 Wi-Fi card causes system freeze ##
You may face the problem where the BCM43602 Wi-Fi chip causes a system freeze whenever it is attached to a VM. To fix this problem on a Macbook, follow the steps in [Macbook Troubleshooting](/doc/macbook-troubleshooting/#system-freezes-after-attaching-broadcom-bcm43602-wi-fi-card). You may face the problem where the BCM43602 Wi-Fi chip causes a system freeze whenever it is attached to a VM. To fix this problem on a Macbook, follow the steps in [Macbook Troubleshooting](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/macbook-troubleshooting.md#system-freezes-after-attaching-broadcom-bcm43602-wi-fi-card).
For other non-Macbook machines, it is advisable to replace the Broadcom BCM43602 with one known to work on Qubes, such as the Atheros AR9462. For other non-Macbook machines, it is advisable to replace the Broadcom BCM43602 with one known to work on Qubes, such as the Atheros AR9462.

2
user/troubleshooting/uefi-troubleshooting.md
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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ If you've installed successfully in legacy mode but had to change some kernel pa
## Installation freezes before displaying installer ## ## Installation freezes before displaying installer ##
If you have an Nvidia card, see also [Nvidia Troubleshooting](/doc/nvidia-troubleshooting/#disabling-nouveau). If you have an Nvidia card, see also [Nvidia Troubleshooting](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/troubleshooting/nvidia-troubleshooting.md#disabling-nouveau).
### Removing `noexitboot` and `mapbs` ### ### Removing `noexitboot` and `mapbs` ###