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Merge branch 'master' into patch-2

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Steve Phillips 2017-04-23 22:11:29 -07:00 • committed by GitHub
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2
common-tasks/copying-files.md
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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ CLI
On inter-qube file copy security
----------------------------------
The scheme is *secure* because it doesn't allow other qubes to steal the files that are being copying, and also doesn't allow the source qube to overwrite arbitrary files on the destination qube. Also, Qubes's file copy scheme doesn't use any sort of virtual block devices for file copy -- instead we use Xen shared memory, which eliminates lots of processing of untrusted data. For example, the receiving qube is *not* forced to parse untrusted partitions or file systems. In this respect our file copy mechanism provides even more security than file copy between two physically separated (air-gapped) machines!
The scheme is *secure* because it doesn't allow other qubes to steal the files that are being copied, and also doesn't allow the source qube to overwrite arbitrary files on the destination qube. Also, Qubes file copy scheme doesn't use any sort of virtual block devices for file copy -- instead we use Xen shared memory, which eliminates lots of processing of untrusted data. For example, the receiving qube is *not* forced to parse untrusted partitions or file systems. In this respect our file copy mechanism provides even more security than file copy between two physically separated (air-gapped) machines!
However, one should keep in mind that performing a data transfer from *less trusted* to *more trusted* qubes can always be potentially insecure, because the data that we insert might potentially try to exploit some hypothetical bug in the destination qube (e.g. a seemingly innocent JPEG that we copy from an untrusted qube might contain a specially crafted exploit for a bug in JPEG parsing application in the destination qube). This is a general problem and applies to any data transfer between *less trusted to more trusted* qubes. It even applies to the scenario of copying files between air-gapped machines. So, you should always copy data only from *more trusted* to *less trusted* qubes.

5
common-tasks/software-update-dom0.md
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@ -117,10 +117,11 @@ To enable or disable any of these repos permanently, change the corresponding bo
### Kernel Upgrade ###
Install newer kernel. The following example installs kernel 3.19 and was tested on Qubes R3 RC1.
Install newer kernel for dom0 and VMs. The package `kernel` is for dom0 and the package `kernel-qubes-vm`
is needed for the VMs. (Note that the following example enables the unstable repo.)
~~~
sudo qubes-dom0-update kernel-3.19*
sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-unstable kernel kernel-qubes-vm
~~~
Rebuild grub config.

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common-tasks/usb.md
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@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ steps:
Attaching a single USB device to a qube (USB passthrough)
---------------------------------------------------------
Stating with Qubes 3.2, it is possible to attach a single USB device to any
Starting with Qubes 3.2, it is possible to attach a single USB device to any
Qube. While this is useful feature, it should be used with care, because there
are [many security implications][usb-challenges] from using USB devices and USB
passthrough will **expose your target qube** for most of them. If possible, use