qubes-doc/user/how-to-guides/how-to-organize-your-qubes.md

---
lang: en
layout: doc
permalink: /doc/how-to-organize-your-qubes/
title: How to organize your qubes
---

When people first learn about Qubes OS, their first reaction is often, "Wow,
this looks really cool! But... what can I actually *do* with it?" It's not
always obvious which qubes you should create, what you should do in each one,
and whether your organizational ideas makes sense from a security or usage
perspective.

Each qube is essentially a secure compartment, and you can create as many of
them as you like and connect them to each other in various ways. They're sort
of like Lego blocks in the sense that you can build whatever you want. But if
you're not sure what to build, then this open-ended freedom can be daunting.
It's a bit like staring at a blank document when you first sit down to write
something. The possibilities are endless, and you may not know where to begin!

The truth is that no one else can tell you *exactly* how you should organize
your qubes, as there is no single correct answer to that question. It depends
on your needs, desires, and preferences. Every user's optimal setup will be
different. However, what we *can* do is provide you with some illustrative
examples based on questionnaires and interviews with Qubes users and
developers, as well as our own personal experience and insight from using Qubes
over the years. You may be able to adapt some of these examples to fit your own
unique situation. More importantly, walking you through the rationale behind
various decisions will teach you how to apply the same thought process to your
own organizational decisions. Let's begin!


## Alice, the software developer

Alice is a freelance dev who works on several projects for different clients
simultaneously. The projects have varying requirements and often different
build environments. She has a separate set of qubes for each project. She keeps
them organized by coming up with a naming scheme, such as:

```
clientA-code
clientA-build
clientA-test
clientA-prod
projectB-code
projectB-build-test
projectB-prod
...
```

This helps her keep groups of qubes organized in a set. Some of her qubes are
based on [Debian templates](/doc/templates/debian/), while others are based on
[Fedora templates](/doc/templates/fedora/). The reason for this is that some
software packages are more readily available in one distribution as opposed to
the other. Alice's setup looks like this:

![[Alice's system: digram 1](/attachment/doc/howto_use_qubes_alice_1.png)](/attachment/doc/howto_use_qubes_alice_1.png)

- **Several qubes for writing code.** Here's where she runs her IDE, commits
  code, and signs her commits. These qubes are based on different templates
  depending on which tools and which development environment she needs. In
  general, Alice likes to have a separate qube of this type for each client or
  each project. This allows her to keep everything organized and avoid
  accidentally mixing up any access credentials or client code, which could be
  disastrous. This also allows her to truthfully tell her clients that their
  code is always securely isolated from all her other clients. She likes to use
  the [Qubes firewall](/doc/firewall/) to restrict these qubes' network access
  to only the code repositories she needs in that qube in order to avoid
  accidentally interacting with anything else on her local network or on the
  internet. Alice also has some qubes of this type for personal programming
  projects that she works on just for fun when she has "free time" (whatever
  that is).

- **Several qubes for building and testing.** Again, Alice usually likes to
  have one of these for each client or project in order to keep things
  organized. However, this can become rather cumbersome and memory-intensive
  when many such qubes are running at the same time, so Alice will sometimes
  use the same qube for building and testing, or for multiple projects that
  require the same environment, when she decides that the marginal benefits of
  extra compartmentalization aren't worth the trouble. Here's where she pulls
  any dependencies she needs, compiles her code, runs her build toolchain, and
  tests her deliverables. In some cases, she finds it useful to use
  [standalones](/doc/standalones-and-hvms/) for these so that it's easier to
  quickly [install different pieces of software](/doc/how-to-install-software/)
  without having to juggle rebooting both the template and an app qube. She
  also sometimes finds it necessary (or just convenient) to make edits to
  config files in the root filesystem, and she'd rather not have to worry about
  losing those changes during an app qube reboot. She knows that she could use
  [bind-dirs](/doc/bind-dirs/) to make those changes persistent, but sometimes
  she doesn't want to get bogged down doing with all that and figures it
  wouldn't be worth it just for this one qube. She's secretly glad that Qubes
  OS doesn't judge her this and just gives her the freedom to do things however
  she likes while keeping everything securely compartmentalized. At times like
  these, she takes comfort in knowing that things can be messy and disorganized
  *within* a qube while her overall digital life remains well-organized.

![[Alice's system: diagram 2](/attachment/doc/howto_use_qubes_alice_2.png)](/attachment/doc/howto_use_qubes_alice_2.png)

- **Several email qubes.** Since Alice is a command-line aficionado, she likes
  to use a terminal-based email client, so both her work and personal email
  qubes are based on a template with
  [Mutt](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/mutt.md)
  installed. The email qubes where she sends and receives PGP-signed and
  encrypted email securely accesses the private keys in her PGP backend qube
  (more on that below). To guard against malicious attachments, she configured
  Mutt to open all attachment files in [disposable
  qubes](/doc/how-to-use-disposables/).

- **Several qubes for communication tools,** like Signal, Slack, Zoom,
  Telegram, IRC, and Discord. This is where she teleconferences and chats with
  clients. She uses [USB passthrough](/doc/how-to-use-usb-devices/) to attach
  her webcam to each qube as needed and detaches it afterward. Likewise, she
  gives each qube access to her microphone while it's needed, then removes
  access afterward. This way, she doesn't have to trust any given video chat
  program's mute button and doesn't have to worry about being spied on when
  she's not on a call. She also has a qube for social media platforms like
  Twitter, Reddit, and Hacker News for networking and keeping up with new
  developments (or so she claims; in reality, it's mostly for feuds over
  programming language superiority, Vim vs. Emacs wars, and tabs vs. spaces
  crusades).

- **A GPG backend vault.** Vaults are completely offline qubes that are
  isolated from the network. This particular vault holds Alice's private keys
  (e.g., for code signing and email) and is securely accessed by several other
  "frontend" qubes via the [Split GPG](/doc/split-gpg/) system. Split GPG
  allows only the frontend qubes that Alice explicitly authorizes to have the
  ability to request PGP operations (e.g., signing and encryption) in the
  backend vault. Even then, no qube ever has direct access to Alice's private
  keys except the backend vault itself.

- **A password manager vault.** This is another completely offline,
  network-isolated qube where Alice uses her offline password manager,
  KeePassXC, to store all of her usernames and passwords. She uses the [secure
  copy and paste](/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) system to quickly copy
  credentials into other qubes whenever she needs to log into anything.

- **Personal qubes.** One of the things Alice loves the most about Qubes is
  that she can use it for both work *and* personal stuff without having to
  worry about cross-contamination. Accordingly, she has several qubes that
  pertain to her personal life. For example, she has an offline vault that
  holds her medical documents, test results, and vaccination records. She has
  another offline vault for her government documents, birth certificate, scans
  of her passport, and so on. She also has some personal social media accounts
  in a separate qube for keeping up with family members and friends from
  school.

When she finishes her work for a given client, Alice sends off her
deliverables, [backs up](/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/) the qubes
containing the work for that client, and deletes them from her system. If she
ever needs those qubes again or just wants to reference them, she can easily
restore them from her backup, and the internal state of each one will be
exactly as it was when she finished that project.


## Bob, the investigative journalist

As part of his research and reporting, Bob is frequently forced to interact
with suspicious files, often from anonymous sources. For example, he may
receive an email with an attachment that claims to be a tip about a story he's
working on. Of course, he knows that it could just as easily be malware
intended to infect his computer. Qubes OS is essential for Bob, since it allows
him to handle all this suspicious data securely, keeping it compartmentalized
so that it doesn't risk infecting the rest of his machine.

Bob isn't a super technical guy. He prefers to keep his tools simple so he can
focus on what's important to him: uncovering the truth, exposing the guilty,
exonerating the innocent, and shining light on the dark corners of society. His
mind doesn't naturally gravitate to the technical details of how his computer
works, but he's aware that people are getting hacked all the time and that the
nature of his work might make him a target. He wants to protect his sources,
his colleagues, his family, and himself; and he understands that computer
security is an important part of that. He has a Qubes laptop that he uses only
for work, which contains:

![[A diagram of Bob's system](/attachment/doc/howto_use_qubes_bob.png)](/attachment/doc/howto_use_qubes_bob.png)

- **One offline qube for writing.** It runs only LibreOffice Writer. This is
  where Bob does all of his writing. This window is usually open side-by-side
  with another window containing research or material from a source.

- **Multiple email qubes.** One is for receiving emails from the general
  public. Another is for emailing his editor and colleagues. Both are based on
  a [minimal template](/doc/templates/minimal/) with Thunderbird installed.
  He's configured both to open all attachments in
  [disposables](/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) that are offline in case an
  attachment contains a beacon that tries to phone home.

- **Whonix qubes.** He has the standard `sys-whonix` service qube for providing
  Torified network access, and he uses disposable `anon-workstation` app qubes
  for using Tor Browser to do research on stories he's writing. Since the topic
  is often of a sensitive nature and might implicate powerful individuals, it's
  important that he be able to conduct this research with a degree of
  anonymity. He doesn't want the subjects of his investigation to know that
  he's looking into them. He also doesn't want his network requests being
  traced back to his work or home IP addresses. Whonix helps with both of these
  concerns. He also has another Whonix-based disposable template for receiving
  tips anonymously via Tor, since some high-risk whistleblowers he's interacted
  with have said that they can't take a chance with any other form of
  communication.

- **Two qubes for
  [Signal](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/privacy/signal.md).**
  Bob has two Signal app qubes (both on the same template in which the Signal
  desktop app is installed). One is linked to his own mobile number for
  communicating with co-workers and other known, trusted contacts. The other is
  a public number that serves as an additional way for sources to reach him
  confidentially. This is especially useful for individuals who don't use Tor
  but for whom unencrypted communication could be dangerous.

- **Several data vaults.** When someone sends Bob material that turns out to be
  useful, or when he comes across useful material while doing his own research,
  he stores a copy in a completely offline, network-isolated vault qube. Most
  of these files are PDFs and images, though some are audio files, videos, and
  text files. Since most of them are from unknown or untrusted sources, Bob
  isn't sure if it would be safe to put them all in the same vault, so he makes
  different vaults (usually one for each story or topic) just in case. This has
  the side benefit of helping to keep things organized.

- **A [VPN
  qube](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md)
  and associated qubes for accessing work resources.** The servers at work can
  only be accessed from the organization's network, so Bob has certain qubes
  that are connected to a VPN qube so that he can upload his work and access
  anything he needs on the local network when he's not physically there.

- **A password manager vault.** Bob stores all of his login credentials in the
  default password manager that came with his offline vault qube. He [securely
  copies and pastes](/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) them into other qubes as
  needed.

A colleague helped Bob set up his Qubes system initially and showed him how to
use it. Since Bob's workflow is pretty consistent and straightforward, the way
his qubes are organized doesn't change much, and this is just fine by him. His
colleague told him to remember a few simple rules: Don't copy or move
[text](/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) or
[files](/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/) from less trusted to more trusted
qubes; [update](/doc/how-to-update/) your system when prompted; and make
regular [backups](/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/). Bob doesn't have
the need to try out new software or tweak any settings, so he can do everything
he needs to do on a daily basis without having to interact with the command
line.


## Carol, the investor

Carol works hard and lives below her means so that she can save money and
invest it for her future. She hopes to become financially independent and maybe
even retire early someday, and she's decided that her best bet for achieving
this is by investing for the long term and allow compounding to do its work.
However, after doing some research into her country's consumer financial
protection laws, she learned that there's no legal guarantee that customers
will be made whole in the event of theft or fraud. The various insurance and
protection organizations only guarantee recovery in the case of a financial
institution *failing*, which is quite different from an individual customer
being hacked. Moreover, even though many financial institutions have their own
cybercrime policies, rarely, if ever, do they explicitly guarantee
reimbursement in the event that a *customer* gets hacked (rather than the
institution itself).

<div class="alert alert-caution" role="alert">
  <i class="fa fa-exclamation-triangle"></i>
  Carol looked into how thieves might actually try to steal her hard-earned
  wealth and was surprised to learn that they have all sorts of ploys that she
  had never even considered. For example, she had assumed that any theft would,
  at the bare minimum, have to involve transferring money out of her account.
  That seems like a safe assumption. But then she read about "pump and dump"
  attacks, where thieves buy up some penny stock, hack into innocent people's
  brokerage accounts, then use the victims' funds to buy that same penny stock,
  "pumping" up its price so that the thieves can "dump" their shares on the
  market, leaving the victims with worthless shares. No money is ever
  transferred into or out of the victims' account; it's just used to buy and
  sell securities. So, all the safeguards preventing new bank accounts from
  being added or requiring extra approval for outbound transfers do nothing to
  protect victims' funds in cases like these. And this is just one example!
  Carol realized that she couldn't assume that existing safeguards against
  specific, known attacks were enough. She had to think about security at a
  more fundamental level and design it into her digital life from the ground
  up.
</div>

After learning about all this, Carol decided that it was ultimately up to her
to take care of her own cybersecurity. She couldn't rely on anyone else to do
it for her. Sure, most people just use regular consumer tech and will probably
end up fine, but, she reminded herself, most people also don't have as much to
lose. It's not a risk that she was willing to take with her future, especially
knowing that there's probably no government bailout waiting for her and that
all the brokerage firms' vaguely reassuring marketing language about
cybersecurity isn't legally binding. So, Carol started reading more about
computer security and eventually stumbled upon Qubes OS after searching the web
for "most secure operating system." She read about how it's designed and why.
Although she didn't immediately understand all of the technical details, the
fundamental principle of [security-by-compartmentalization](/doc/architecture/)
made intuitive sense to her, and the more she learned about the technical
aspects, the more she realized that this is what she'd been looking for. Today,
her setup looks like this:

![[A diagram of Carol's system](/attachment/doc/howto_use_qubes_carol.png)](/attachment/doc/howto_use_qubes_carol.png)

- **One qube for each investment firm and bank.** Carol has a few different
  retirement accounts, brokerage accounts, and bank accounts. She treats each
  qube like a "secure terminal" for accessing only that one institution's
  website. She makes her transactions and saves any statements and
  confirmations she downloads in that qube. She uses the [Qubes
  firewall](/doc/firewall/) to enable access only to that institution's website
  in that qube so that she doesn't accidentally visit any others. Since most of
  what she does involves using websites and PDFs, most of Carol's app qubes are
  based on a [minimal template](/doc/templates/minimal/) with just a web
  browser (which doubles as a PDF viewer) and a file manager installed.

- **One qube for all her credit card accounts.** Carol started to make a
  separate qube for each credit card account but ultimately decided against it.
  For one thing, the consumer protections for credit card fraud in her country
  are much better than for losing assets to theft or fraud in a bank or
  brokerage account, so the security risk isn't as high. Second, there's
  actually not a whole lot that an attacker could do with access to her credit
  cards' online accounts or her old credit card statements, since online access
  to these generally doesn't allow spending or withdrawing any money. So, even
  the worst case scenario here wouldn't be catastrophic, unlike with her bank
  and brokerage accounts. Third, she's not too worried about any of her credit
  card company websites being used to attach each other or her qube (As long as
  it's contained to a single qube, she's fine with that level of risk.) Last,
  but not least: She has way too many credit cards! While Carol is very frugal,
  she likes to collect the sign-up bonuses that are offered for opening new
  cards, so she's accumulated quite a few of them. (However, she's always
  careful to pay off her balance each month, so she never pays interest. She's
  also pretty disciplined about only spending what she would have spent
  *anyway* and not being tempted to spend more just to meet a spending
  requirement or because she can.) At any rate, Carol has decided that the tiny
  benefit she stands to gain from having a separate qube for every credit card
  website wouldn't be worth the hassle of having to manage so many extra qubes.

- **A qube for credit monitoring, credit reports, and credit history
  services.** Carol has worked hard to build up a good credit score, and she's
  concerned about identity theft, so she has one qube dedicated to managing her
  free credit monitoring services and downloading her free annual credit
  reports.

- **Two qubes for taxes.** Carol has a [Windows
  qube](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/os/windows/windows.md)
  for running her Windows-only tax software. She also has an offline vault
  where she stores all of her tax-related forms and documents, organized by
  year.

- **A qube for financial planning and tracking.** Carol loves spreadsheets, so
  this offline qube is where she maintains a master spreadsheet to track all of
  her investments and her savings rate. She also keeps her budgeting
  spreadsheet, insurance spreadsheet, and written investment policy statement
  here. This qube is based on a template with some additional productivity
  software, like LibreOffice and Gnumeric (so that Carol can run her own Monte
  Carlo simulations).

- **Various email qubes.** Carol likes to have one email qube for her most
  important financial accounts; a separate one for her credit cards accounts,
  online shopping accounts, and insurance companies; and another one for
  personal email. They're all based on the same template with Thunderbird
  installed.

- **A password manager vault.** A network-isolated qube where Carol stores all
  of her account usernames and passwords in KeePassXC. She uses the [Qubes
  global clipboard](/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) to copy and paste them
  into her other qubes when she needs to log into her accounts.


## Bonus: Carol explores new financial technology

The vast majority of Carol's assets are in broad-based, low-cost,
passively-managed indexed funds. Lately, however, she's started getting
interested in cryptocurrency. She's still committed to staying the course with
her tried-and-true investments, and she's always been skeptical of new asset
classes, especially those that don't generate cash flows or that often seem to
be associated with scams or wild speculation. However, she finds the ability to
self-custody a portion of her assets appealing from a long-term risk management
perspective, particularly as a hedge against certain types of political risk.
She recognizes that cryptocurrency is extremely volatile, and she knows that
she has the self-discipline to invest only what she can afford to lose, so
she's decided to dip her toe in the water by allocating a small portion of her
portfolio. This has led her to add the following to her Qubes setup:

- **A standalone qube for running Bitcoin Core and an offline wallet vault.**
  Carol finds the design and security properties of Bitcoin very interesting,
  so she's experimenting with running a full node. She also created a
  network-isolated vault in order to try running a copy of Bitcoin Core
  completely offline as a "cold storage" wallet. She's still trying to figure
  out how this compares to an actual hardware wallet, paper wallet, or
  physically air-gapped machine, but she's figures they all have different
  security properties. She also recently heard about using [Electrum as a
  "split" wallet in
  Qubes](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/split-bitcoin.md)
  and is interested in exploring that further.

- **Whonix qubes.** Carol read somewhere that Bitcoin nodes should be run over
  Tor for privacy and security. She found it very convenient that Whonix is
  already integrated into Qubes, so she simply set her Bitcoin Core "full node"
  qube to use `sys-whonix` as its networking qube.

- **Various qubes for DeFi and web3.** Carol has also started getting into DeFi
  (decentralized finance) and web3 on Ethereum and other smart contract
  blockchains, so a friend recommended that she get a Ledger hardware wallet.
  She downloaded the Ledger Live software in an app qube and [set up her system
  to recognize the
  Ledger](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Ledger_Hardware_Wallet). She can now
  start her [USB qube](/doc/usb-qubes/), plug her Ledger into it into a USB
  port, [use the Qubes Devices widget to attach it](/doc/how-to-use-devices/)
  to her Ledger Live qube, and from there she can interact with the software.
  She has a separate qube with the Metamask extension installed in a web
  browser. She can also use the Qubes Devices widget to attach her Ledger to
  this qube so she can use Metamask in conjunction with her Ledger to interact
  with smart contracts and decentralized exchanges.

- **Various qubes for research and centralized exchanges.** Carol uses these
  when she wants to check block explorer websites, coin listing and market cap
  sites, aggregation tools, or just to see what the latest buzz is on Crypto
  Twitter.

Carol makes sure to back up all of her qubes that contain important account
statements, confirmations, spreadsheets, cryptocurrency wallets, and her
password manager vault. If she has extra storage space, she'll also back up her
templates and even her Bitcoin full node qube, but she'll skip them if she
doesn't have time or space, since she knows she can always recreate them again
later and download what she needs from the Internet.

## Conclusion

The characters we've met today may be fictional, but they represent the needs
of real users like you. You may find that your own needs overlap with more than
one of them, in which case you may find it useful to model certain subsets of
your overall Qubes system on different examples. You probably also noticed that
there are commonalities among them. Most people need to use email, for example,
so most people will need at least one email qube and a suitable template to
base it on. But not everyone will need [Split GPG](/doc/split-gpg/), and not
everyone will want to use the same email client. On the other hand, almost
everyone will need a password manager, and it pretty much always makes sense to
keep it in an offline, network-isolated vault.

<div class="alert alert-info" role="alert">
  <i class="fa fa-circle-info"></i>
  As you gain experience with Qubes, you may find yourself disagreeing with
  some of the decisions our fictional friends made. That's okay! There are many
  different ways to organize a Qubes system, and the most important criterion
  is that it serves the needs of its owner. Since everyone's needs are
  different, it's perfectly normal to find yourself doing things a bit
  differently. Nonetheless, there are some general principles that almost all
  users find helpful, especially when they're first starting out.
</div>

As you're designing your own Qubes system, keep in mind some of the following
lessons from our case studies:

- **You'll probably change your mind as you go.** You'll realize that one qube
  should really be split into two, or you'll realize that it doesn't really
  make sense for two qubes to be separate and that they should instead be
  merged into one. That's okay. Qubes OS supports your ability to adapt and
  make changes as you go. Try to maintain a flexible mindset. Things will
  eventually settle down, and you'll find your groove. Changes to the way you
  organize your qubes will become less drastic and less frequent over time.

- **[Make frequent backups.](/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/)** Losing
  data is never fun, whether it's from an accidental deletion, a system crash,
  buggy software, or a hardware failure. By getting into the habit of making
  frequent backups now, you'll save yourself from a lot of pain in the future.
  Many people never take backups seriously until they suffer catastrophic data
  loss. That's human nature. If you've experienced that before, then you know
  the pain. Resolve now never to let it happen again. If you've never
  experienced it, count yourself lucky and try to learn from the hard-won
  experience of others. Keeping good backups also allows you to be a bit more
  free with reorganizations. You can delete qubes that you think you won't need
  anymore without having to worry that you might need them again someday, since
  you know you can always restore them from a backup.

- **Think about which programs you want to run and where you want to store
  data.** In some cases, it makes sense to run programs and store data in the
  same qube, for example, if the data is generated by that program. In other
  cases, it makes sense to have qubes that are exclusively for storing data
  (e.g., offline data storage vaults) and other qubes that are exclusively for
  running programs (e.g., web browser-only qubes). Remember that when you make
  backups, it's only essential to back up data that can't be replaced. This can
  allow you to achieve minimal backups that are quite small compared to the
  total size of your installation. Templates, service qubes, and qubes that are
  used exclusively for running programs and that contain no data don't
  necessarily have to be backed up as long as you're confident that you can
  recreate them if needed. This is why it's a good practice to keep notes on
  which packages you installed in which templates and which customizations and
  configurations you made. Then you can refer to your notes the next time you
  need to recreate those qubes. Of course, backing up everything is not a bad
  idea either. It may require a bit more time and disk space upfront, but for
  some people, it can be just as important as backing up their irreplaceable
  data. If your system is mission-critical, and you can't afford more than a
  certain amount of downtime, then by all means, back everything up!

- **Introspect on your own behavior.** For example, if you find yourself
  wanting to find some way to get two qubes to share the same storage space,
  then this is probably a sign that those two qubes shouldn't be separate in
  the first place. Sharing storage with each other largely breaks down the
  secure wall between them, making the separation somewhat pointless. But you
  probably had a good reason for wanting to make them two separate qubes
  instead of one to begin with. What exactly was that reason? If it has to do
  with security, then why are you okay with them freely sharing data that could
  allow one to infect the other? If you're sure sharing the data wouldn't cause
  one to infect the other, then what's the security rationale for keeping them
  separate? By critically examining your own thought process in this way, you
  can uncover inconsistencies and contradictions that allow you to better
  refine your system, resulting in a more logical organization that serves your
  needs better and better over time.

- **Don't assume that just because *you* can't find a way to attack your
  system, an adversary wouldn't be able to.** When you're thinking about
  whether it's a good idea to combine different activities or data in a single
  qube, for example, you might think, "Well, I can't really see how these pose
  a risk to each other." The problem is that we often miss attack vectors that
  sophisticated adversaries spot and can use against us. After all, most people
  don't think that using a conventional monolithic operating system is risky,
  when in reality their entire digital life can be taken down in one fell
  swoop. That's why a good rule of thumb is: When in doubt, compartmentalize.

- **But remember that compartmentalization --- like everything else --- can be
  taken to an extreme.** The appropriate amount depends on your temperament,
  time, patience, experience, risk tolerance, and expertise. In short, there
  can be such a thing as *too much* compartmentalization! You also have to be
  able to actually *use* your computer efficiently to do the things you need to
  do. For example, if you immediately try to jump into doing everything in
  [disposables](/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) and find yourself constantly
  losing working (e.g., because you forget to transfer it out before the
  disposable self-destructs), then that's a big problem! Your extra
  self-imposed security measures are interfering with the very thing they're
  designed to protect. At times like these, take a deep breath and remember
  that you've already reaped the vast majority of the security benefit simply
  by using Qubes OS in the first place and performing basic
  compartmentalization (e.g., no random web browsing in templates). Each
  further step of hardening and compartmentalization beyond that represents an
  incremental gain with diminishing marginal utility. Try not to allow the
  perfect to be the enemy of the good!