2014-10-03 13:11:39 -04:00
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---
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2015-04-10 16:17:45 -04:00
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layout: doc
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2014-10-03 13:11:39 -04:00
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title: Qrexec3
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2015-10-28 18:14:40 -04:00
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permalink: /doc/qrexec3/
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2015-10-11 03:04:59 -04:00
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redirect_from:
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- /en/doc/qrexec3/
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2015-10-11 03:04:59 -04:00
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- /doc/Qrexec3/
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- /wiki/Qrexec3/
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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- /doc/qrexec/
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- /en/doc/qrexec/
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- /doc/Qrexec/
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- /wiki/Qrexec/
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- /doc/qrexec3-implementation/
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- /en/doc/qrexec3-implementation/
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- /doc/Qrexec3Implementation/
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- /wiki/Qrexec3Implementation/
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2014-10-03 13:11:39 -04:00
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---
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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# Command execution in VMs #
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(*This page is about qrexec v3. For qrexec v2, see
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[here](/doc/qrexec2/).*)
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The **qrexec** framework is used by core Qubes components to implement
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communication between domains. Qubes domains are isolated by design, but
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there is a need for a mechanism to allow the administrative domain (dom0) to
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force command execution in another domain (VM). For instance, when user
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selects an application from the KDE menu, it should be started in the selected
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VM. Also, it is often useful to be able to pass stdin/stdout/stderr from an
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application running in a VM to dom0 (and the other way around). In specific
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circumstances, Qubes allows VMs to be initiators of such communications (so,
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for example, a VM can notify dom0 that there are updates available for it).
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## Qrexec basics ##
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Qrexec is built on top of vchan (a library providing data links between
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VMs). During domain creation a process named `qrexec-daemon` is started
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in dom0, and a process named `qrexec-agent` is started in the VM. They are
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connected over **vchan** channel. `qrexec-daemon` listens for connections
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from dom0 utility named `qrexec-client`. Typically, the first thing that a
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`qrexec-client` instance does is to send a request to `qrexec-daemon` to
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start a process (let's name it `VMprocess`) with a given command line in
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a specified VM (`someVM`). `qrexec-daemon` assigns unique vchan connection
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details and sends them both to `qrexec-client` (in dom0) and `qrexec-agent`
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(in `someVM`). `qrexec-client` starts a vchan server which `qrexec-agent`
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connects to. Since then, stdin/stdout/stderr from the VMprocess is passed
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via vchan between `qrexec-agent` and the `qrexec-client` process.
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So, for example, executing in dom0:
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qrexec-client -d someVM user:bash
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allows to work with the remote shell. The string before the first
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semicolon specifies what user to run the command as. Adding `-e` on the
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`qrexec-client` command line results in mere command execution (no data
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passing), and `qrexec-client` exits immediately after sending the execution
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request and receiving status code from `qrexec-agent` (whether the process
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creation succeeded). There is also the `-l local_program` flag -- with it,
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`qrexec-client` passes stdin/stdout of the remote process to the (spawned
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for this purpose) `local_program`, not to its own stdin/stdout.
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The `qvm-run` command is heavily based on `qrexec-client`. It also takes care
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of additional activities, e.g. starting the domain if it is not up yet and
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starting the GUI daemon. Thus, it is usually more convenient to use `qvm-run`.
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There can be almost arbitrary number of `qrexec-client` processes for a
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domain (so, connected to the same `qrexec-daemon`, same domain) -- their
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data is multiplexed independently. Number of available vchan channels is
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the limiting factor here, it depends on the underlying hypervisor.
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## Qubes RPC services ##
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Some tasks (like inter-vm file copy) share the same rpc-like structure:
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a process in one VM (say, file sender) needs to invoke and send/receive
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data to some process in other VM (say, file receiver). Thus, the Qubes RPC
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framework was created, facilitating such actions.
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Obviously, inter-VM communication must be tightly controlled to prevent one
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VM from taking control over other, possibly more privileged, VM. Therefore
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the design decision was made to pass all control communication via dom0,
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that can enforce proper authorization. Then, it is natural to reuse the
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already-existing qrexec framework.
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Also, note that bare qrexec provides `VM <-> dom0` connectivity, but the
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command execution is always initiated by dom0. There are cases when VM needs
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to invoke and send data to a command in dom0 (e.g. to pass information on
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newly installed `.desktop` files). Thus, the framework allows dom0 to be
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the rpc target as well.
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Thanks to the framework, RPC programs are very simple -- both rpc client
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and server just use their stdin/stdout to pass data. The framework does all
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the inner work to connect these processes to each other via `qrexec-daemon`
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and `qrexec-agent`. Additionally, disposable VMs are tightly integrated --
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rpc to a DisposableVM is identical to rpc to a normal domain, all one needs
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is to pass `$dispvm` as the remote domain name.
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## Qubes RPC administration ##
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(*TODO: fix for non-linux dom0*)
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In dom0, there is a bunch of files in `/etc/qubes-rpc/policy` directory,
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whose names describe the available rpc actions. Their content is the rpc
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access policy database. Currently defined actions are:
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2017-01-29 06:37:30 -05:00
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qubes.ClipboardPaste
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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qubes.Filecopy
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2017-01-29 06:37:30 -05:00
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qubes.GetImageRGBA
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qubes.GetRandomizedTime
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qubes.Gpg
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qubes.GpgImportKey
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qubes.InputKeyboard
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qubes.InputMouse
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qubes.NotifyTools
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qubes.NotifyUpdates
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qubes.OpenInVM
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2017-01-29 06:37:30 -05:00
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qubes.OpenURL
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qubes.PdfConvert
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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qubes.ReceiveUpdates
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qubes.SyncAppMenus
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2017-01-29 06:37:30 -05:00
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qubes.USB
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qubes.VMShell
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2017-01-29 06:37:30 -05:00
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qubes.WindowIconUpdater
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These files contain lines with the following format:
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srcvm destvm (allow|deny|ask)[,user=user_to_run_as][,target=VM_to_redirect_to]
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You can specify srcvm and destvm by name, or by one of `$anyvm`, `$dispvm`,
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`dom0` reserved keywords (note string `dom0` does not match the `$anyvm`
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pattern; all other names do). Only `$anyvm` keyword makes sense in srcvm
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field (service calls from dom0 are currently always allowed, `$dispvm`
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means "new VM created for this particular request," so it is never a
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source of request). Currently there is no way to specify source VM by
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type. Whenever a rpc request for action X is received, the first line in
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`/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/X` that match srcvm/destvm is consulted to determine
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2016-08-16 19:01:42 -04:00
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whether to allow rpc, what user account the program should run in target VM
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under, and what VM to redirect the execution to. Note that if the request is
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redirected (`target=` parameter), policy action remains the same - even if
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there is another rule which would otherwise deny such request. If the policy
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file does not exits, user is prompted to create one; if still there is no
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policy file after prompting, the action is denied.
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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In the target VM, the `/etc/qubes-rpc/RPC_ACTION_NAME` must exist, containing
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2016-05-15 16:31:40 -04:00
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the file name of the program that will be invoked, or being that program itself
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- in which case it must have executable permission set (`chmod +x`).
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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In the src VM, one should invoke the client via:
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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/usr/lib/qubes/qrexec-client-vm target_vm_name RPC_ACTION_NAME rpc_client_path client arguments
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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Note that only stdin/stdout is passed between rpc server and client --
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notably, no command line argument are passed. Source VM name is specified by
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`QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN` environment variable. By default, stderr of client
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and server is logged to respective `/var/log/qubes/qrexec.XID` files.
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2016-05-15 16:31:40 -04:00
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It is also possible to call service without specific client program - in which
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case server stdin/out will be connected with the terminal:
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/usr/lib/qubes/qrexec-client-vm target_vm_name RPC_ACTION_NAME
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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Be very careful when coding and adding a new rpc service. Unless the
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offered functionality equals full control over the target (it is the case
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with e.g. `qubes.VMShell` action), any vulnerability in a rpc server can
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be fatal to Qubes security. On the other hand, this mechanism allows to
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2016-12-24 13:39:23 -05:00
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delegate processing of untrusted input to less privileged (or disposable)
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AppVMs, thus wise usage of it increases security.
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2016-08-16 19:01:42 -04:00
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### Extra keywords available in Qubes 4.0 and later
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**This section is about not yet released version, some details may change**
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In Qubes 4.0, target VM can be specified also as `$dispvm:DISP_VM`, which is
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very similar to `$dispvm` but force using particular VM (`DISP_VM`) as a base
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VM to be started as Disposable VM. For example:
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anon-whonix $dispvm:anon-whonix-dvm allow
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Adding such policy itself will not force usage of this particular `DISP_VM` -
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it will only allow it when specified by the caller. But `$dispvm:DISP_VM` can
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also be used as target in request redirection, so _it is possible_ to force
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particular `DISP_VM` usage, when caller didn't specified it:
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anon-whonix $dispvm allow,target=$dispvm:anon-whonix-dvm
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Note that without redirection, this rule would allow using default Disposable
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VM (`default_dispvm` VM property, which itself defaults to global
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`default_dispvm` property).
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Also note that the request will be allowed (`allow` action) even if there is no
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second rule allowing calls to `$dispvm:anon-whonix-dvm`, or even if
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there is a rule explicitly denying it. This is because the redirection happen
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_after_ considering the action.
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2017-06-25 07:02:48 -04:00
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In Qubes 4.0 there are also additional methods to specify source/target VM:
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* `$tag:some-tag` - meaning a VM with tag `some-tag`
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* `$type:type` - meaning a VM of `type` (like `AppVM`, `TemplateVM` etc)
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Target VM can be also specified as `$default`, which matches the case when
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calling VM didn't specified any particular target (either by using `$default`
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target, or empty target).
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2016-05-15 16:33:03 -04:00
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### Service argument in policy
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Sometimes just service name isn't enough to make reasonable qrexec policy. One
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example of such situation is [qrexec-based USB
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2016-11-11 04:23:23 -05:00
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passthrough](https://github.com/qubesos/qubes-issues/issues/531) - using just
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service name it isn't possible to express policy "allow access to device X and
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deny to others". It isn't also feasible to create separate service for every
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device...
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2016-05-15 16:33:03 -04:00
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For this reason, starting with Qubes 3.2, it is possible to specify service
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argument, which will be subject to policy. Besides above example of USB
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passthrough, service argument can make many service policies more fine-grained
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and easier to write precise policy with "allow" and "deny" actions, instead of
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"ask" (offloading additional decisions to the user). And generally the less
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choices user must make, the lower chance to make a mistake.
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The syntax is simple: when calling service, add an argument to the service name
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separated with `+` sign, for example:
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/usr/lib/qubes/qrexec-client-vm target_vm_name RPC_ACTION_NAME+ARGUMENT
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Then create policy as usual, including argument
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(`/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/RPC_ACTION_NAME+ARGUMENT`). If policy for specific
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argument is not set (file does not exist), then default policy for this service
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is loaded (`/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/RPC_ACTION_NAME`).
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In target VM (when the call is allowed) service file will searched as:
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- `/etc/qubes-rpc/RPC_ACTION_NAME+ARGUMENT`
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- `/etc/qubes-rpc/RPC_ACTION_NAME`
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In any case, the script will receive `ARGUMENT` as its argument and additionally as
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`QREXEC_SERVICE_ARGUMENT` environment variable. This means it is also possible
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to install different script for particular service argument.
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See below for example service using argument.
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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### Revoking "Yes to All" authorization ###
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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Qubes RPC policy supports "ask" action. This will prompt the user whether given
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RPC call should be allowed. That prompt window has also "Yes to All" option,
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which will allow the action and add new entry to the policy file, which will
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unconditionally allow further calls for given service-srcVM-dstVM tuple.
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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In order to remove such authorization, issue this command from a dom0 terminal
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(for `qubes.Filecopy` service):
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sudo nano /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.Filecopy
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and then remove the first line(s) (before the first `##` comment) which are
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the "Yes to All" results.
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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### Qubes RPC example ###
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2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
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We will show the necessary files to create rpc call that adds two integers
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on the target and returns back the result to the invoker.
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* rpc client code (`/usr/bin/our_test_add_client`):
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#!/bin/sh
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echo $1 $2 # pass data to rpc server
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exec cat >&$SAVED_FD_1 # print result to the original stdout, not to the other rpc endpoint
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* rpc server code (*/usr/bin/our\_test\_add\_server*)
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#!/bin/sh
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read arg1 arg2 # read from stdin, which is received from the rpc client
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echo $(($arg1+$arg2)) # print to stdout - so, pass to the rpc client
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* policy file in dom0 (*/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/test.Add* )
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$anyvm $anyvm ask
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* server path definition ( */etc/qubes-rpc/test.Add*)
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/usr/bin/our_test_add_server
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2014-10-03 13:11:39 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
|
|
|
* invoke rpc via
|
2014-10-03 13:11:39 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
|
|
|
/usr/lib/qubes/qrexec-client-vm target_vm test.Add /usr/bin/our_test_add_client 1 2
|
2014-10-03 13:11:39 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
|
|
|
and we should get "3" as answer, after dom0 allows it.
|
2014-10-03 13:11:39 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
|
|
|
**Note:** For a real world example of writing a qrexec service, see this
|
2017-05-03 11:26:39 -04:00
|
|
|
[blog post](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2013/02/21/converting-untrusted-pdfs-into-trusted.html).
|
2014-10-03 13:11:39 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-15 16:33:03 -04:00
|
|
|
### Qubes RPC example - with argument usage ###
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
We will show the necessary files to create rpc call that reads specific file
|
|
|
|
from predefined directory on the target. Besides really naive storage, it may
|
|
|
|
be very simple password manager.
|
|
|
|
Additionally in this example simplified workflow will be used - server code
|
|
|
|
placed directly in service definition file (in `/etc/qubes-rpc` directory). And
|
|
|
|
no separate client script will be used.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* rpc server code (*/etc/qubes-rpc/test.File*)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#!/bin/sh
|
|
|
|
argument="$1" # service argument, also available as $QREXEC_SERVICE_ARGUMENT
|
|
|
|
if [ -z "$argument" ]; then
|
|
|
|
echo "ERROR: No argument given!"
|
|
|
|
exit 1
|
|
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# service argument is already sanitized by qrexec framework and it is
|
|
|
|
# quaranted to not contain any space or /, so no need for additional path
|
|
|
|
# sanitization
|
|
|
|
cat "/home/user/rpc-file-storage/$argument"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* specific policy file in dom0 (*/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/test.File+testfile1* )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source_vm1 target_vm allow
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* another specific policy file in dom0 (*/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/test.File+testfile2* )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source_vm2 target_vm allow
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* default policy file in dom0 (*/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/test.File* )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
$anyvm $anyvm deny
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* invoke rpc from `source_vm1` via
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/usr/lib/qubes/qrexec-client-vm target_vm test.File+testfile1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
and we should get content of `/home/user/rpc-file-storage/testfile1` as answer.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* also possible to invoke rpc from `source_vm2` via
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/usr/lib/qubes/qrexec-client-vm target_vm test.File+testfile2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
But when invoked with other argument or from different VM, it should be denied.
|
2014-10-03 13:11:39 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 19:57:16 -05:00
|
|
|
# Qubes RPC internals #
|
2014-10-03 13:11:39 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
|
|
|
(*This is about the implementation of qrexec v3. For the implementation of
|
2015-11-08 19:20:01 -05:00
|
|
|
qrexec v2, see [here](/doc/qrexec2/#qubes-rpc-internals).*)
|
2014-10-03 13:11:39 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
|
|
|
Qrexec framework consists of a number of processes communicating with each
|
|
|
|
other using common IPC protocol (described in detail below). Components
|
|
|
|
residing in the same domain use pipes as the underlying transport medium,
|
|
|
|
while components in separate domains use vchan link.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 19:57:16 -05:00
|
|
|
## Dom0 tools implementation ##
|
2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* `/usr/lib/qubes/qrexec-daemon`: One instance is required for every active
|
|
|
|
domain. Responsible for:
|
|
|
|
* Handling execution and service requests from **dom0** (source:
|
|
|
|
`qrexec-client`).
|
|
|
|
* Handling service requests from the associated domain (source:
|
|
|
|
`qrexec-client-vm`, then `qrexec-agent`).
|
|
|
|
* Command line: `qrexec-daemon domain-id domain-name [default user]`
|
|
|
|
* `domain-id`: Numeric Qubes ID assigned to the associated domain.
|
|
|
|
* `domain-name`: Associated domain name.
|
|
|
|
* `default user`: Optional. If passed, `qrexec-daemon` uses this user as
|
|
|
|
default for all execution requests that don't specify one.
|
|
|
|
* `/usr/lib/qubes/qrexec-policy`: Internal program used to evaluate the
|
|
|
|
RPC policy and deciding whether a RPC call should be allowed.
|
|
|
|
* `/usr/lib/qubes/qrexec-client`: Used to pass execution and service requests
|
|
|
|
to `qrexec-daemon`. Command line parameters:
|
|
|
|
* `-d target-domain-name`: Specifies the target for the execution/service
|
|
|
|
request.
|
|
|
|
* `-l local-program`: Optional. If present, `local-program` is executed
|
|
|
|
and its stdout/stdin are used when sending/receiving data to/from the
|
|
|
|
remote peer.
|
|
|
|
* `-e`: Optional. If present, stdout/stdin are not connected to the remote
|
|
|
|
peer. Only process creation status code is received.
|
|
|
|
* `-c <request-id,src-domain-name,src-domain-id>`: used for connecting
|
|
|
|
a VM-VM service request by `qrexec-policy`. Details described below in
|
|
|
|
the service example.
|
|
|
|
* `cmdline`: Command line to pass to `qrexec-daemon` as the
|
|
|
|
execution/service request. Service request format is described below in
|
|
|
|
the service example.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
**Note:** None of the above tools are designed to be used by users directly.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 19:57:16 -05:00
|
|
|
## VM tools implementation ##
|
2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* `qrexec-agent`: One instance runs in each active domain. Responsible for:
|
|
|
|
* Handling service requests from `qrexec-client-vm` and passing them to
|
|
|
|
connected `qrexec-daemon` in dom0.
|
|
|
|
* Executing associated `qrexec-daemon` execution/service requests.
|
|
|
|
* Command line parameters: none.
|
|
|
|
* `qrexec-client-vm`: Runs in an active domain. Used to pass service requests
|
|
|
|
to `qrexec-agent`.
|
|
|
|
* Command line: `qrexec-client-vm target-domain-name service-name local-program [local program arguments]`
|
|
|
|
* `target-domain-name`: Target domain for the service request. Source is
|
|
|
|
the current domain.
|
|
|
|
* `service-name`: Requested service name.
|
|
|
|
* `local-program`: `local-program` is executed locally and its stdin/stdout
|
|
|
|
are connected to the remote service endpoint.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 19:57:16 -05:00
|
|
|
## Qrexec protocol details ##
|
2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Qrexec protocol is message-based. All messages share a common header followed
|
|
|
|
by an optional data packet.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* uniform for all peers, data type depends on message type */
|
|
|
|
struct msg_header {
|
|
|
|
uint32_t type; /* message type */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t len; /* data length */
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When two peers establish connection, the server sends `MSG_HELLO` followed by
|
|
|
|
`peer_info` struct:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct peer_info {
|
|
|
|
uint32_t version; /* qrexec protocol version */
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The client then should reply with its own `MSG_HELLO` and `peer_info`. If
|
|
|
|
protocol versions don't match, the connection is closed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(*TODO: fallback for backwards compatibility, don't do handshake in the
|
|
|
|
same domain?*)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Details of all possible use cases and the messages involved are described below.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 19:57:16 -05:00
|
|
|
### dom0: request execution of `some_command` in domX and pass stdin/stdout ###
|
2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` is invoked in **dom0** as follows:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
`qrexec-client -d domX [-l local_program] user:some_command`
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- `user` may be substituted with the literal `DEFAULT`. In that case,
|
|
|
|
default Qubes user will be used to execute `some_command`.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` sets `QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN` environment variable
|
|
|
|
to **domX**.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: If `local_program` is set, `qrexec-client` executes it and uses
|
|
|
|
that child's stdin/stdout in place of its own when exchanging data with
|
|
|
|
`qrexec-agent` later.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` connects to **domX**'s `qrexec-daemon`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-daemon` sends `MSG_HELLO` header followed by `peer_info`
|
|
|
|
to `qrexec-client`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` replies with `MSG_HELLO` header followed by
|
|
|
|
`peer_info` to `qrexec-daemon`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` sends `MSG_EXEC_CMDLINE` header followed by
|
|
|
|
`exec_params` to `qrexec-daemon`.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* variable size */
|
|
|
|
struct exec_params {
|
|
|
|
uint32_t connect_domain; /* target domain id */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t connect_port; /* target vchan port for i/o exchange */
|
|
|
|
char cmdline[0]; /* command line to execute, size = msg_header.len - sizeof(struct exec_params) */
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In this case, `connect_domain` and `connect_port` are set to 0.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-daemon` replies to `qrexec-client` with
|
|
|
|
`MSG_EXEC_CMDLINE` header followed by `exec_params`, but with empty `cmdline`
|
|
|
|
field. `connect_domain` is set to Qubes ID of **domX** and `connect_port`
|
|
|
|
is set to a vchan port allocated by `qrexec-daemon`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-daemon` sends `MSG_EXEC_CMDLINE` header followed
|
|
|
|
by `exec_params` to the associated **domX** `qrexec-agent` over
|
|
|
|
vchan. `connect_domain` is set to 0 (**dom0**), `connect_port` is the same
|
|
|
|
as sent to `qrexec-client`. `cmdline` is unchanged except that the literal
|
|
|
|
`DEFAULT` is replaced with actual user name, if present.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` disconnects from `qrexec-daemon`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` starts a vchan server using the details received
|
|
|
|
from `qrexec-daemon` and waits for connection from **domX**'s `qrexec-agent`.
|
|
|
|
- **domX**: `qrexec-agent` receives `MSG_EXEC_CMDLINE` header followed by
|
|
|
|
`exec_params` from `qrexec-daemon` over vchan.
|
|
|
|
- **domX**: `qrexec-agent` connects to `qrexec-client` over vchan using the
|
|
|
|
details from `exec_params`.
|
|
|
|
- **domX**: `qrexec-agent` executes `some_command` in **domX** and connects
|
|
|
|
the child's stdin/stdout to the data vchan. If the process creation fails,
|
|
|
|
`qrexec-agent` sends `MSG_DATA_EXIT_CODE` to `qrexec-client` followed by
|
|
|
|
the status code (**int**) and disconnects from the data vchan.
|
|
|
|
- Data read from `some_command`'s stdout is sent to the data vchan using
|
|
|
|
`MSG_DATA_STDOUT` by `qrexec-agent`. `qrexec-client` passes data received as
|
|
|
|
`MSG_DATA_STDOUT` to its own stdout (or to `local_program`'s stdin if used).
|
|
|
|
- `qrexec-client` sends data read from local stdin (or `local_program`'s
|
|
|
|
stdout if used) to `qrexec-agent` over the data vchan using
|
|
|
|
`MSG_DATA_STDIN`. `qrexec-agent` passes data received as `MSG_DATA_STDIN`
|
|
|
|
to `some_command`'s stdin.
|
|
|
|
- `MSG_DATA_STDOUT` or `MSG_DATA_STDIN` with data `len` field set to 0 in
|
|
|
|
`msg_header` is an EOF marker. Peer receiving such message should close the
|
|
|
|
associated input/output pipe.
|
|
|
|
- When `some_command` terminates, **domX**'s `qrexec-agent` sends
|
|
|
|
`MSG_DATA_EXIT_CODE` header to `qrexec-client` followed by the exit code
|
|
|
|
(**int**). `qrexec-agent` then disconnects from the data vchan.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-08 19:57:16 -05:00
|
|
|
### domY: invoke execution of qubes service `qubes.SomeRpc` in domX and pass stdin/stdout ###
|
2015-11-08 19:14:25 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- **domY**: `qrexec-client-vm` is invoked as follows:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
`qrexec-client-vm domX qubes.SomeRpc local_program [params]`
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- **domY**: `qrexec-client-vm` connects to `qrexec-agent` (via local
|
|
|
|
socket/named pipe).
|
|
|
|
- **domY**: `qrexec-client-vm` sends `trigger_service_params` data to
|
|
|
|
`qrexec-agent` (without filling the `request_id` field):
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct trigger_service_params {
|
|
|
|
char service_name[64];
|
|
|
|
char target_domain[32];
|
|
|
|
struct service_params request_id; /* service request id */
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct service_params {
|
|
|
|
char ident[32];
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- **domY**: `qrexec-agent` allocates a locally-unique (for this domain)
|
|
|
|
`request_id` (let's say `13`) and fills it in the `trigger_service_params`
|
|
|
|
struct received from `qrexec-client-vm`.
|
|
|
|
- **domY**: `qrexec-agent` sends `MSG_TRIGGER_SERVICE` header followed by
|
|
|
|
`trigger_service_params` to `qrexec-daemon` in **dom0** via vchan.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: **domY**'s `qrexec-daemon` executes `qrexec-policy`: `qrexec-policy
|
|
|
|
domY_id domY domX qubes.SomeRpc 13`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-policy` evaluates if the RPC should be allowed or
|
|
|
|
denied. If the action is allowed it returns `0`, if the action is denied it
|
|
|
|
returns `1`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: **domY**'s `qrexec-daemon` checks the exit code of `qrexec-policy`.
|
|
|
|
- If `qrexec-policy` returned **not** `0`: **domY**'s `qrexec-daemon`
|
|
|
|
sends `MSG_SERVICE_REFUSED` header followed by `service_params` to
|
|
|
|
**domY**'s `qrexec-agent`. `service_params.ident` is identical to the one
|
|
|
|
received. **domY**'s `qrexec-agent` disconnects its `qrexec-client-vm`
|
|
|
|
and RPC processing is finished.
|
|
|
|
- If `qrexec-policy` returned `0`, RPC processing continues.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: if `qrexec-policy` allowed the RPC, it executed `qrexec-client
|
|
|
|
-d domX -c 13,domY,domY_id user:QUBESRPC qubes.SomeRpc domY`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` sets `QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN` environment variable
|
|
|
|
to **domX**.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` connects to **domX**'s `qrexec-daemon`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: **domX**'s `qrexec-daemon` sends `MSG_HELLO` header followed by
|
|
|
|
`peer_info` to `qrexec-client`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` replies with `MSG_HELLO` header followed by
|
|
|
|
`peer_info` to **domX**'s`qrexec-daemon`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` sends `MSG_EXEC_CMDLINE` header followed by
|
|
|
|
`exec_params` to **domX**'s`qrexec-daemon`
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* variable size */
|
|
|
|
struct exec_params {
|
|
|
|
uint32_t connect_domain; /* target domain id */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t connect_port; /* target vchan port for i/o exchange */
|
|
|
|
char cmdline[0]; /* command line to execute, size = msg_header.len - sizeof(struct exec_params) */
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In this case, `connect_domain` is set to id of **domY** (from the `-c`
|
|
|
|
parameter) and `connect_port` is set to 0. `cmdline` field contains the
|
|
|
|
RPC to execute, in this case `user:QUBESRPC qubes.SomeRpc domY`.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: **domX**'s `qrexec-daemon` replies to `qrexec-client` with
|
|
|
|
`MSG_EXEC_CMDLINE` header followed by `exec_params`, but with empty `cmdline`
|
|
|
|
field. `connect_domain` is set to Qubes ID of **domX** and `connect_port`
|
|
|
|
is set to a vchan port allocated by **domX**'s `qrexec-daemon`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: **domX**'s `qrexec-daemon` sends `MSG_EXEC_CMDLINE` header
|
|
|
|
followed by `exec_params` to **domX**'s `qrexec-agent`. `connect_domain`
|
|
|
|
and `connect_port` fields are the same as in the step above. `cmdline` is
|
|
|
|
set to the one received from `qrexec-client`, in this case `user:QUBESRPC
|
|
|
|
qubes.SomeRpc domY`.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` disconnects from **domX**'s `qrexec-daemon`
|
|
|
|
after receiving connection details.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` connects to **domY**'s `qrexec-daemon` and
|
|
|
|
exchanges `MSG_HELLO` as usual.
|
|
|
|
- **dom0**: `qrexec-client` sends `MSG_SERVICE_CONNECT` header followed by
|
|
|
|
`exec_params` to **domY**'s `qrexec-daemon`. `connect_domain` is set to ID
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of **domX** (received from **domX**'s `qrexec-daemon`) and `connect_port` is
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the one received as well. `cmdline` is set to request ID (`13` in this case).
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- **dom0**: **domY**'s `qrexec-daemon` sends `MSG_SERVICE_CONNECT` header
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followed by `exec_params` to **domY**'s `qrexec-agent`. Data fields are
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unchanged from the step above.
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- **domY**: `qrexec-agent` starts a vchan server on the port received in
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the step above. It acts as a `qrexec-client` in this case because this is
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a VM-VM connection.
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- **domX**: `qrexec-agent` connects to the vchan server of **domY**'s
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`qrexec-agent` (connection details were received before from **domX**'s
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`qrexec-daemon`).
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- After that, connection follows the flow of the previous example (dom0-VM).
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2014-10-03 13:11:39 -04:00
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