mirror of
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc.git
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94 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
94 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
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---
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layout: wiki
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title: VMSudo
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permalink: /wiki/VMSudo/
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---
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Password-less root access in VM
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===============================
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Background ([/etc/sudoers.d/qubes](http://git.qubes-os.org/?p=qubes-r2/core-agent-linux.git;a=blob;f=misc/qubes.sudoers;hb=HEAD) in VM):
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``` {.wiki}
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user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
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# WTF?! Have you lost your mind?!
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#
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# In Qubes VMs there is no point in isolating the root account from
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# the user account. This is because all the user data are already
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# accessible from the user account, so there is no direct benefit for
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# the attacker if she could escalate to root (there is even no benefit
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# in trying to install some persistent rootkits, as the VM's root
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# filesystem modifications are lost upon each start of a VM).
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#
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# One might argue that some hypothetical attacks against the
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# hypervisor or the few daemons/backends in Dom0 (so VM escape
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# attacks) most likely would require root access in the VM to trigger
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# the attack.
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#
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# That's true, but mere existence of such a bug in the hypervisor or
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# Dom0 that could be exploited by a malicious VM, no matter whether
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# requiring user, root, or even kernel access in the VM, would be
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# FATAL. In such situation (if there was such a bug in Xen) there
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# really is no comforting that: "oh, but the mitigating factor was
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# that the attacker needed root in VM!" We're not M$, and we're not
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# gonna BS our users that there are mitigating factors in that case,
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# and for sure, root/user isolation is not a mitigating factor.
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#
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# Because, really, if somebody could find and exploit a bug in the Xen
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# hypervisor -- so far there have been only one (!) publicly disclosed
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# exploitable bug in the Xen hypervisor from a VM, found in 2008,
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# incidentally by one of the Qubes developers (RW) -- then it would be
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# highly unlikely if that person couldn't also found a user-to-root
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# escalation in VM (which as we know from history of UNIX/Linux
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# happens all the time).
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#
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# At the same time allowing for easy user-to-root escalation in a VM
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# is simply convenient for users, especially for update installation.
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#
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# Currently this still doesn't work as expected, because some idotic
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# piece of software called PolKit uses own set of policies. We're
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# planning to address this in Beta 2. (Why PolKit is an idiocy? Do a
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# simple experiment: start 'xinput test' in one xterm, running as
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# user, then open some app that uses PolKit and asks for root
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# password, e.g. gpk-update-viewer -- observe how all the keystrokes
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# with root password you enter into the "secure" PolKit dialog box can
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# be seen by the xinput program...)
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#
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# joanna.
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```
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While ITL still supports above statement, some Qubes users want to enable user/root isolation in VM anyway. We do not support it in any our package, but of course nothing can stop the user from making some modifications in own system.
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Below is a complete list of configuration made according to the above statement, with (not necessary complete) list of mechanisms depending on each of them:
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1. sudo (/etc/sudoers.d/qubes):
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``` {.wiki}
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user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
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(...)
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```
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- easy user-\>root access (main option for the user)
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- qvm-usb (not really working, as of R2)
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2. PolicyKit (/etc/polkit-1/rules.d/00-qubes-allow-all.rules):
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``` {.wiki}
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//allow any action, detailed reasoning in sudoers.d/qubes
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polkit.addRule(function(action,subject) { return polkit.Result.YES; });
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```
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- NetworkManager configuration from normal user (nm-applet)
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- updates installation (gpk-update-viewer)
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- user can use pkexec just like sudo Note: above is needed mostly because Qubes user GUI session isn't treated by [PolicyKit?](/wiki/PolicyKit)/logind as "local" session because of the way in which X server and session is started. Perhaps we will address this issue in the future, but this is really low priority. Patches welcomed anyway.
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3. Empty root password
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- used for access to 'root' account from text console (xl console) - the only way to access the VM when GUI isn't working
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- can be used for easy 'su -' from user to root
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Dom0 password-less sudo
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-----------------------
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There is also password-less user-\>root access in dom0. As stated in comment in sudo configuration there (different one than VMs one), there is really no point in user/root isolation, because all the user data (and VM management interface) is already accessible from dom0 user level, so there is nothing more to get from dom0 root account.
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