qubes-doc/security/firewall.md

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---
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layout: doc
title: The Qubes Firewall
permalink: /doc/firewall/
redirect_from:
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- /doc/qubes-firewall/
- /en/doc/qubes-firewall/
- /doc/QubesFirewall/
- /wiki/QubesFirewall/
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---
Understanding Qubes networking and firewall
===========================================
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Understanding firewalling in Qubes
----------------------------------
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Every qube in Qubes is connected to the network via a FirewallVM, which is used to
enforce network-level policies. By default there is one default FirewallVM, but
the user is free to create more, if needed.
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For more information, see the following:
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- [https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/browse\_thread/thread/9e231b0e14bf9d62](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/browse_thread/thread/9e231b0e14bf9d62)
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- [https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/09/28/playing-with-qubes-networking-for-fun.html](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/09/28/playing-with-qubes-networking-for-fun.html)
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How to edit rules
-----------------
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In order to edit rules for a given qube, select it in the Qubes
Manager and press the "firewall" button:
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![r2b1-manager-firewall.png](/attachment/wiki/QubesFirewall/r2b1-manager-firewall.png)
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*R4.0 note:* ICMP and DNS are no longer accessible in the GUI, but can be changed
via `qvm-firewall` described below. Connections to Updates Proxy are no longer made
over network so can not be allowed or blocked with firewall rules
(see [R4.0 Updates proxy](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/software-update-vm/) for more detail.
Note that if you specify a rule by DNS name it will be resolved to IP(s)
*at the moment of applying the rules*, and not on the fly for each new
connection. This means it will not work for servers using load balancing. More
on this in the message quoted below.
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Alternatively, one can use the `qvm-firewall` command from Dom0 to edit the
firewall rules by hand. The firewall rules for each VM are saved in an XML file
in that VM's directory in dom0:
/var/lib/qubes/appvms/<vm-name>/firewall.xml
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Please note that there is a 3 kB limit to the size of the `iptables` script.
This equates to somewhere between 35 and 39 rules.
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If this limit is exceeded, the qube will not start.
It is possible to work around this limit by enforcing the rules on the qube itself
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by putting appropriate rules in `/rw/config`.
See the "Where to put firewall rules" sections below for [R4.0](#where-to-put-firewall-rules-r40) and [R3.2](#where-to-put-firewall-rules-r32).
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In complex cases, it might be appropriate to load a ruleset using `iptables-restore`
called from `/rw/config/rc.local`.
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Reconnecting VMs after a NetVM reboot (R4.0)
----------------------------------------
Normally Qubes doesn't let the user stop a NetVM if there are other qubes
running which use it as their own NetVM. But in case the NetVM stops for
whatever reason (e.g. it crashes, or the user forces its shutdown via qvm-kill
via terminal in Dom0), Qubes R4.0 will often automatically repair the
connection. If it does not, then there is an easy way to restore the connection to
the NetVM by issuing:
` qvm-prefs <vm> netvm <netvm> `
Normally qubes do not connect directly to the actual NetVM which has networking
devices, but rather to the default sys-firewall first, and in most cases it would
be the NetVM that will crash, e.g. in response to S3 sleep/restore or other
issues with WiFi drivers. In that case it is only necessary to issue the above
command once, for the sys-firewall (this assumes default VM-naming used by the
default Qubes installation):
` qvm-prefs sys-firewall netvm sys-net `
Reconnecting VMs after a NetVM reboot (R3.2)
----------------------------------------
Normally Qubes doesn't let the user stop a NetVM if there are other qubes
running which use it as their own NetVM. But in case the NetVM stops for
whatever reason (e.g. it crashes, or the user forces its shutdown via qvm-kill
via terminal in Dom0), then there is an easy way to restore the connection to
the NetVM by issuing:
` qvm-prefs <vm> -s netvm <netvm> `
Normally qubes do not connect directly to the actual NetVM which has networking
devices, but rather to the default sys-firewall first, and in most cases it would
be the NetVM that will crash, e.g. in response to S3 sleep/restore or other
issues with WiFi drivers. In that case it is only necessary to issue the above
command once, for the sys-firewall (this assumes default VM-naming used by the
default Qubes installation):
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` qvm-prefs sys-firewall -s netvm sys-net `
Network service qubes
--------------------------------------
Qubes does not support running any networking services (e.g. VPN, local DNS server, IPS, ...) directly in a qube that is used to run the Qubes firewall service (usually sys-firewall) for good reasons. In particular if one wants to ensure proper functioning of the Qubes firewall one should not not tinker with iptables or nftables rules in such qubes.
Instead, one should deploy a network infrastructure such as
~~~
sys-net <--> sys-firewall-1 <--> network service qube <--> sys-firewall-2 <--> [client qubes]
~~~
Thereby sys-firewall-1 is only needed if one has client qubes connected there as well or wants to manage the traffic of the local network service qube. The sys-firewall-2 proxy ensures that:
1. Firewall changes done in the network service qube cannot render the Qubes firewall ineffective.
1. Changes to the Qubes firewall by the Qubes maintainers cannot lead to unwanted information leakage in combination with user rules deployed in the network service qube.
1. A compromise of the network service qube does not compromise the Qubes firewall.
For the VPN service please also have a look at the [VPN documentation](/doc/vpn).
Enabling networking between two qubes
--------------------------------------
Normally any networking traffic between qubes is prohibited for security reasons.
However, in special situations, one might want to selectively allow specific qubes
to establish networking connectivity between each other. For example,
this might be useful in some development work, when one wants to test
networking code, or to allow file exchange between HVM domains (which do not
have Qubes tools installed) via SMB/scp/NFS protocols.
In order to allow networking between qubes A and B follow these steps:
* Make sure both A and B are connected to the same firewall vm (by default all
VMs use the same firewall VM).
* Note the Qubes IP addresses assigned to both qubes. This can be done using the
`qvm-ls -n` command, or via the Qubes Manager preferences pane for each qube.
* Start both qubes, and also open a terminal in the firewall VM
* In the firewall VM's terminal enter the following iptables rule:
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~~~
sudo iptables -I FORWARD 2 -s <IP address of A> -d <IP address of B> -j ACCEPT
~~~
* In qube B's terminal enter the following iptables rule:
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~~~
sudo iptables -I INPUT -s <IP address of A> -j ACCEPT
~~~
* Now you should be able to reach B from A -- test it using e.g. ping
issued from A. Note however, that this doesn't allow you to reach A from
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B -- for this you would need two more rules, with A and B swapped.
* If everything works as expected, then the above iptables rules should be
written into firewallVM's `qubes-firewall-user-script` script which is run
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on every firewall update, and A and B's `rc.local` script which is run when
the qube is launched. The `qubes-firewall-user-script` is necessary because Qubes
orders every firewallVM to update all the rules whenever a new connected qube is
started. If we didn't enter our rules into this "hook" script, then shortly
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our custom rules would disappear and inter-VM networking would stop working.
Here's an example how to update the script (note that, by default, there is no
script file present, so we will probably be creating it, unless we had some other
custom rules defined earlier in this firewallVM):
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~~~
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[user@sys-firewall ~]$ sudo bash
[root@sys-firewall user]# echo "iptables -I FORWARD 2 -s 10.137.2.25 -d 10.137.2.6 -j ACCEPT" >> /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script
[root@sys-firewall user]# chmod +x /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script
~~~
* Here is an example how to update `rc.local`:
~~~
[user@B ~]$ sudo bash
[root@B user]# echo "iptables -I INPUT -s 10.137.2.25 -j ACCEPT" >> /rw/config/rc.local
[root@B user]# chmod +x /rw/config/rc.local
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~~~
Port forwarding to a qube from the outside world
--------------------------------------------------
In order to allow a service present in a qube to be exposed to the outside world
in the default setup (where the qube has sys-firewall as network VM, which in
turn has sys-net as network VM)
the following needs to be done:
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* In the sys-net VM:
* Route packets from the outside world to the sys-firewall VM
* Allow packets through the sys-net VM firewall
* In the sys-firewall VM:
* Route packets from the sys-net VM to the VM
* Allow packets through the sys-firewall VM firewall
* In the qube:
* Allow packets through the qube firewall to reach the service
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As an example we can take the use case of a web server listening on port 443
that we want to expose on our physical interface eth0, but only to our local
network 192.168.x.0/24.
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> Note: To have all interfaces available and configured, make sure the 3 qubes are up and running
> Note: [Issue #4028](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4028) discusses adding a command to automate exposing the port.
**1. Route packets from the outside world to the FirewallVM**
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From a Terminal window in sys-net VM, take note of the 'Interface name' and
'IP address' on which you want to expose your service (i.e. ens5, 192.168.x.x)
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` ifconfig | grep -i cast `
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> Note: The vifx.0 interface is the one connected to your sys-firewall VM so it
is _not_ an outside world interface...
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From a Terminal window in sys-firewall VM, take note of the 'IP address' for
interface Eth0 (10.137.1.x or 10.137.0.x in Qubes R4)
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` ifconfig | grep -i cast `
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Back into the sys-net VM's Terminal, code a natting firewall rule to route
traffic on the outside interface for the service to the sys-firewall VM
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` iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 443 -d 192.168.x.x -j DNAT --to-destination 10.137.1.x `
Code the appropriate new filtering firewall rule to allow new connections for
the service
` iptables -I FORWARD 2 -i eth0 -d 10.137.1.x -p tcp --dport 443 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j ACCEPT `
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> Note: If you want to expose the service on multiple interfaces, repeat the
steps described in part 1 for each interface
> Note: In Qubes R4, at the moment ([QubesOS/qubes-issues#3644](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3644)), nftables is also used which imply that additional rules need to be set in a `qubes-firewall` nft table with a forward chain.
`nft add rule ip qubes-firewall forward meta iifname eth0 ip daddr 10.137.0.x tcp dport 443 ct state new counter accept`
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Verify you are cutting through the sys-net VM firewall by looking at its
counters (column 2)
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` iptables -t nat -L -v -n `
` iptables -L -v -n `
> Note: On Qubes R4, you can also check the nft counters
`nft list table ip qubes-firewall`
Send a test packet by trying to connect to the service from an external device
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` telnet 192.168.x.x 443 `
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Once you have confirmed that the counters increase, store these command in
`/rw/config/rc.local` so they get set on sys-net start-up
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` sudo nano /rw/config/rc.local `
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~~~
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#!/bin/sh
####################
# My service routing
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# Create a new firewall natting chain for my service
if iptables -t nat -N MY-HTTPS; then
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# Add a natting rule if it did not exit (to avoid cluter if script executed multiple times)
iptables -t nat -A MY-HTTPS -j DNAT --to-destination 10.137.1.x
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fi
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# If no prerouting rule exist for my service
if ! iptables -t nat -n -L PREROUTING | grep --quiet MY-HTTPS; then
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# add a natting rule for the traffic (same reason)
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 443 -d 192.168.0.x -j MY-HTTPS
fi
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######################
# My service filtering
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# Create a new firewall filtering chain for my service
if iptables -N MY-HTTPS; then
# Add a filtering rule if it did not exit (to avoid cluter if script executed multiple times)
iptables -A MY-HTTPS -s 192.168.x.0/24 -j ACCEPT
fi
# If no forward rule exist for my service
if ! iptables -n -L FORWARD | grep --quiet MY-HTTPS; then
# add a forward rule for the traffic (same reason)
iptables -I FORWARD 2 -d 10.137.1.x -p tcp --dport 443 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j MY-HTTPS
fi
~~~
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> Note: Again in R4 the following needs to be added:
~~~
#############
# In Qubes R4
# If not already present
if nft -nn list table ip qubes-firewall | grep "tcp dport 443 ct state new"; then
# Add a filtering rule
nft add rule ip qubes-firewall forward meta iifname eth0 ip daddr 10.137.0.x tcp dport 443 ct state new counter accept
fi
~~~
Finally make this file executable, so it runs at each boot
` sudo chmod +x /rw/config/rc.local `
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**2. Route packets from the FirewallVM to the VM**
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From a Terminal window in the VM where the service to be exposed is running, take note of the 'IP address' for
interface Eth0 (i.e. 10.137.2.y, 10.137.0.y in Qubes R4)
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` ifconfig | grep -i cast `
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Back into the sys-firewall VM's Terminal, code a natting firewall rule to route
traffic on its outside interface for the service to the qube
` iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 443 -d 10.137.1.x -j DNAT --to-destination 10.137.2.y `
Code the appropriate new filtering firewall rule to allow new connections for
the service
` iptables -I FORWARD 2 -i eth0 -s 192.168.x.0/24 -d 10.137.2.y -p tcp --dport 443 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j ACCEPT `
> Note: If you do not wish to limit the IP addresses connecting to the service,
remove the ` -s 192.168.0.1/24 `
> Note: On Qubes R4
`nft add rule ip qubes-firewall forward meta iifname eth0 ip saddr 192.168.x.0/24 ip daddr 10.137.0.y tcp dport 443 ct state new counter accept`
Once you have confirmed that the counters increase, store these command in `/rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script`
` sudo nano /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script `
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~~~
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#!/bin/sh
####################
# My service routing
# Create a new firewall natting chain for my service
if iptables -t nat -N MY-HTTPS; then
# Add a natting rule if it did not exit (to avoid cluter if script executed multiple times)
iptables -t nat -A MY-HTTPS -j DNAT --to-destination 10.137.2.y
fi
# If no prerouting rule exist for my service
if ! iptables -t nat -n -L PREROUTING | grep --quiet MY-HTTPS; then
# add a natting rule for the traffic (same reason)
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 443 -d 10.137.1.x -j MY-HTTPS
fi
######################
# My service filtering
# Create a new firewall filtering chain for my service
if iptables -N MY-HTTPS; then
# Add a filtering rule if it did not exit (to avoid cluter if script executed multiple times)
iptables -A MY-HTTPS -s 192.168.x.0/24 -j ACCEPT
fi
# If no forward rule exist for my service
if ! iptables -n -L FORWARD | grep --quiet MY-HTTPS; then
# add a forward rule for the traffic (same reason)
iptables -I FORWARD 4 -d 10.137.2.y -p tcp --dport 443 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j MY-HTTPS
fi
################
# In Qubes OS R4
# If not already present
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if ! nft -nn list table ip qubes-firewall | grep "tcp dport 443 ct state new"; then
# Add a filtering rule
nft add rule ip qubes-firewall forward meta iifname eth0 ip saddr 192.168.x.0/24 ip daddr 10.137.0.y tcp dport 443 ct state new counter accept
fi
~~~
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Finally make this file executable (so it runs at every Firewall VM update)
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~~~
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sudo chmod +x /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script
~~~
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**3. Allow packets into the qube to reach the service**
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Here no routing is required, only filtering. Proceed in the same way as above
but store the filtering rule in the `/rw/config/rc.local` script.
` sudo name /rw/config/rc.local `
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~~~
######################
# My service filtering
# Create a new firewall filtering chain for my service
if iptables -N MY-HTTPS; then
# Add a filtering rule if it did not exit (to avoid cluter if script executed multiple times)
iptables -A MY-HTTPS -j ACCEPT
fi
# If no forward rule exist for my service
if ! iptables -n -L FORWARD | grep --quiet MY-HTTPS; then
# add a forward rule for the traffic (same reason)
iptables -I INPUT 5 -d 10.137.2.x -p tcp --dport 443 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j MY-HTTPS
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fi
~~~
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This time testing should allow connectivity to the service as long as the
service is up :-)
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Where to put firewall rules (R4.0)
---------------------------
Implicit in the above example [scripts](/doc/config-files/), but worth
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calling attention to: for all qubes *except* AppVMs supplying networking,
iptables commands should be added to the `/rw/config/rc.local` script. For
AppVMs supplying networking (`sys-firewall` inclusive),
iptables commands should be added to
`/rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script`.
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Where to put firewall rules (R3.2)
---------------------------
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Implicit in the above example [scripts](/doc/config-files/), but worth
calling attention to: for all qubes *except* ProxyVMs, iptables commands
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should be added to the `/rw/config/rc.local` script. For ProxyVMs
(`sys-firewall` inclusive), iptables commands should be added to
`/rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script`. This is because a ProxyVM is
constantly adjusting its firewall, and therefore initial settings from
`rc.local` do not persist.