From e5d932251d5935b34defbaefc703e975c63482d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ganwtrs Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2025 19:53:26 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] Remove Kicksecure mention from Lokinet article Signed-off-by: Ganwtrs --- content/posts/qubes/Using Lokinet on Qubes OS/index.md | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/posts/qubes/Using Lokinet on Qubes OS/index.md b/content/posts/qubes/Using Lokinet on Qubes OS/index.md index 5e8fa8c..e522331 100644 --- a/content/posts/qubes/Using Lokinet on Qubes OS/index.md +++ b/content/posts/qubes/Using Lokinet on Qubes OS/index.md @@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ This post should not be considered an endorsement of Lokinet in any shape or for ## Creating the TemplateVM -Currently, the Lokinet client seems to work well with only Debian-based distributions. This means that our template will have to be one of the Debian-based ones. Personally, I use [this script](https://github.com/TommyTran732/QubesOS-Scripts/blob/main/debian-gnome/debian-gnome.sh) to trim down the Debian GNOME template and convert it to Kicksecure. Kicksecure reduces the attack surface of Debian with a substantial set of hardening configurations, and a nice feature to go with an anonymity network like Lokinet is [Boot Clock Randomization](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Boot_Clock_Randomization) which helps defend against [time-based denonymization attacks](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Time_Attacks). - +Currently, the Lokinet client seems to work well with only Debian-based distributions. This means that our template will have to be one of the Debian-based ones. Personally, I use [this script](https://github.com/TommyTran732/QubesOS-Scripts/blob/main/debian-gnome/debian-gnome.sh) to trim down and harden the Debian GNOME template. Start by creating the bind directories for Lokinet's configurations: ```bash