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Signed-off-by: Tommy <contact@tommytran.io>
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Tommy 2022-08-14 20:01:33 -04:00 committed by tommytran732
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content/knowledge/FLOSS Security.md
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@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ Decompilers are seldom used alone in this context. Instead, they're typically a
These reverse-engineering techniques---a combination of tracing, packet sniffing, binary analysis, and memory dumps---make up the workings of most modern malware analysis. See [this example](https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/1ef3b7e9ba5f486afe53fcbd71f69c3f9a01813f35732222f64c0981a0906429/5e428f69c88e9e64c33afe64) of a fully-automated analysis of the Zoom Windows installer. It enumerates plenty of information about Zoom without access to its source code: reading unique machine information, anti-VM and anti-reverse-engineering tricks, reading config files, various types of network access, scanning mounted volumes, and more.
To try this out yourself, use a sandbox designed for dynamic analysis. [Cuckoo](https://cuckoosandbox.org/) is a common and easy-to-use solution, while [DRAKVUF](https://drakvuf.com/) is more advanced.
To try this out yourself, use a sandbox designed for dynamic analysis. [Cuckoo](https://github.com/cuckoosandbox) is a common and easy-to-use solution, while [DRAKVUF](https://drakvuf.com/) is more advanced.
### Extreme example: the truth about Intel ME and AMT
@ -221,4 +221,4 @@ Releasing source code is just one thing vendors can do to improve audits; other
[^13]: Linux distributions' CFI+<abbr title="Adress-Space Layout Randomization">ASLR</abbr> implementations rely executables compiled with CFI+PIE support, and ideally with stack-smashing protectors and no-execute bits. These implementations are flawed (see [On the Effectiveness of Full-ASLR on 64-bit Linux](https://web.archive.org/web/20211021222659/http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib-paper.pdf) and [Brad Spengler's presentation comparing these with PaX's own implementation](https://grsecurity.net/PaX-presentation.pdf)).
[^14]: The [best attempt I know of](https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/) leverages [Trusted Execution Environments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_execution_environment), but for limited functionality using an implementation that's [far from bulletproof](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_Guard_Extensions#Attacks).
[^14]: The [best attempt I know of](https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/) leverages [Trusted Execution Environments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_execution_environment), but for limited functionality using an implementation that's [far from bulletproof](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_Guard_Extensions#Attacks).