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+title: "Using Split GPG and Split SSH on Qubes OS"
+date: 2022-08-13
+tags: ['Operating Systems', 'Qubes OS', 'Security']
+author: Tommy
+
+![Split GPG & SSH](/split-gpg-ssh.png)
+
+This post will go over setting up Split GPG, then setting up Split SSH with the same PGP keys, emulating what you can do with a PGP smartcard on QubesOS.
+
+## Split GPG
+
+Follow the official Qubes OS [documentation](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/split-gpg/) to set this up.
+
+Note that if you already have a PGP key with a passphrase, you can remove it by installing `pinentry-gtk` to `vault`'s TemplateVM, then do `gpg2 --edit-key <key_id>` and `passwd` to set an empty passphrase. The default non-graphical pinentry will just make an infinite loop and will not allow you to set an empty passphrase.
+
+## Split SSH
+
+This part is based on the Qubes Community's [guide](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/split-ssh.md); however, I will deviate from it to use the PGP keys for SSH instead of generating a new key pair.
+
+In `dom0`:
+
+- Create `/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.SshAgent` with `@anyvm @anyvm ask,default_target=vault` as the content. Since the keys ar not passphrase protected, you should **not** set the policy to allow.
+
+In `vault` AppVM:
+- Add `enable-ssh-support` to the end of `~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf`
+
+In `vault`'s TemplateVM:
+
+- Create `/etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.SshAgent` with the following content:    
+```bash
+#!/bin/sh
+# Qubes App Split SSH Script
+
+# Activate GPG Agent and set the correct SSH socket
+export SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$(gpgconf --list-dirs agent-ssh-socket)
+gpgconf --launch gpg-agent
+
+# safeguard - Qubes notification bubble for each ssh request
+notify-send "[$(qubesdb-read /name)] SSH agent access from: $QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN"
+
+# SSH connection
+socat - "UNIX-CONNECT:$SSH_AUTH_SOCK"
+
+```
+
+- Make it executable with `sudo chmod +x /etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.SshAgent`
+- Turn off the templateVM. If the `vault` VM is running, turn it off, then start it to update the VM's configuration.
+
+In `ssh-client` AppVM:
+
+- Add the following to the end of `/rw/config/rc.local`:
+```bash
+# SPLIT SSH CONFIGURATION >>>
+# replace "vault" with your AppVM name which stores the ssh private key(s)
+SSH_VAULT_VM="vault"
+
+if [ "$SSH_VAULT_VM" != "" ]; then
+  export SSH_SOCK="/home/user/.SSH_AGENT_$SSH_VAULT_VM"
+  rm -f "$SSH_SOCK"
+  sudo -u user /bin/sh -c "umask 177 && exec socat 'UNIX-LISTEN:$SSH_SOCK,fork' 'EXEC:qrexec-client-vm $SSH_VAULT_VM qubes.SshAgent'" &
+fi
+# <<< SPLIT SSH CONFIGURATION
+```
+
+- Add the following to the end of `~/bash.rc`:
+```bash
+# SPLIT SSH CONFIGURATION >>>
+# replace "vault" with your AppVM name which stores the ssh private key(s)
+SSH_VAULT_VM="vault"
+
+if [ "$SSH_VAULT_VM" != "" ]; then
+  export SSH_AUTH_SOCK="/home/user/.SSH_AGENT_$SSH_VAULT_VM"
+fi
+# <<< SPLIT SSH CONFIGURATION
+```
+
+- Restart `ssh-client` and confirm if it's working with `ssh-add -L`.
+
+### Limitations:
+A malicious `ssh-client` AppVM can hold onto the ssh-agent connection for more than one use until it is shut down. While your private key is protected, a malicious actor with access to the AppVM can still abuse the ssh-agent to log into your servers.
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