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Even on Gnome, a single dbus call allows applications outside of
sandboxes to overwrite their permissions in the portal permission
store. A sandbox that is supported by portals for identifying apps is
also required: otherwise, a malicious app could trivially spoof a name
on the bus. Currently, only Flatpak and Snap are subclasses of the
XdpAppInfo class, required for xdg-desktop-portal to be able to
identify a client.
Privileged Wayland protocols are also not an issue. KDE's kwin requires
that applications have an entry in a system-installed desktop file[1],
meaning that random crap can't simply capture the screen, and Flatpak
supports the security-context-v1 protocol, which is used to filter
access to these privileged protocols[2].
An example of the dbus call for Gnome:
dbus-send --session --print-reply=literal --dest=org.freedesktop.impl.portal.PermissionStore /org/freedesktop/impl/portal/PermissionStore org.freedesktop.impl.portal.PermissionStore.SetPermission string:'screenshot' boolean:true string:'screenshot' string:'' array:string:'yes'
[1] https://github.com/KDE/kwin/blob/master/src/wayland_server.cpp#L129-L134
[2]
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| windows | ||
| android-overview.md | ||
| index.md | ||
| ios-overview.md | ||
| linux-overview.md | ||
| macos-overview.md | ||
| qubes-overview.md | ||