style: Reorganize and tweak email-related pages (#2973)

Signed-off-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>

.vscode/ltex.dictionary.en-US.txt

@@ -545,3 +545,14 @@ Codeberg
 simple-codeberg
 simple-reddit
 fontawesome-brands-linkedin
+simple-keepassxc
+OnlyKey
+fontawesome-solid-unlock-keyhole
+KeeShare
+KeePassium
+MWEB
+Cyd
+Semiphemeral
+Dangerzone
+simple-activitypub
+ActivityPub

blog/.authors.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 authors:
+  aprilfools:
+    name: Anita Key
+    description: Government Liaison
+    avatar: https://github.com/privacyguides.png
   contributors:
     type: Organization
     name: Privacy Guides

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blog/posts/encryption-is-not-a-crime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-04-11T16:00:00Z
+categories:
+    - Opinion
+authors:
+    - em
+description: Encryption is not a crime, encryption protects all of us. Encryption, and especially end-to-end encryption, is an essential tool to protect everyone online. Attempts to undermine encryption are an attack to our fundamental right to privacy and an attack to our inherent right to security and safety.
+schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle
+preview:
+  cover: blog/assets/images/encryption-is-not-a-crime/encryption-is-not-a-crime-cover.webp
+---
+# Encryption Is Not a Crime
+
+![Photo of a red key on an all black background.](../assets/images/encryption-is-not-a-crime/encryption-is-not-a-crime-cover.webp)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Matt Artz / Unsplash</small>
+
+Contrary to what some policymakers seem to believe, whether naively or maliciously, encryption is not a crime. Anyone asserting encryption is a tool for crime is either painfully misinformed or is attempting to manipulate legislators to gain oppressive power over the people.<!-- more -->
+
+Encryption is not a crime, encryption is a shield.
+
+Encryption is the digital tool that protects us against all sorts of attacks. It is the lock on your digital door preventing harmful intruders from entering your home. Encryption is also the door itself, protecting your privacy and intimacy from creepy eavesdroppers while you go about your life.
+
+It's not a crime to lock your home's door for protection, **why would it be a crime to lock your digital door?**
+
+[Encryption protects you](privacy-means-safety.md) from cyberattack, identity theft, discrimination, doxxing, stalking, sexual violence, physical harm, and much more.
+
+## Who says encryption is a crime
+
+Anyone who is well-informed will find it hard to believe someone could want to sabotage such fantastic protection.
+
+Yet, [year](https://www.wired.com/1993/02/crypto-rebels/) after [year](https://www.wired.com/story/a-new-era-of-attacks-on-encryption-is-starting-to-heat-up/), oppressive regimes and lazy or greedy [law enforcement](https://www.techradar.com/computing/cyber-security/anonymity-is-not-a-fundamental-right-experts-disagree-with-europol-chiefs-request-for-encryption-back-door) entities around the world have attempted to [undermine encryption](https://www.howtogeek.com/544727/what-is-an-encryption-backdoor/) using the pretext this is needed to "solve crime", despite all the experts *repeatedly* warning on how [unnecessary](https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/08/post-snowden-tech-became-more-secure-but-is-govt-really-at-risk-of-going-dark/) and [dangerous](https://www.globalencryption.org/2020/11/breaking-encryption-myths/) this would be. And this is without accounting for all the countries where encryption is *already* [severely restricted](https://www.gp-digital.org/world-map-of-encryption/), such as Russia, China, India, Iran, Egypt, Cuba, and others.
+
+Whether breaking encryption is brought up naively by misinformed authorities, or as a disguised excuse for mass surveillance is up for debate.
+
+Nevertheless, the result is the same: An attempt to destroy **a tool we all need to stay safe**.
+
+## Encryption is a protective shield
+
+Encryption, moreover end-to-end encryption, is a tool we all use in our digital life to stay safe.
+
+In today's world, the boundary between online and offline life is largely dissolved. Almost everything we do "offline" has a record of it "online". Online life is regular life now. It's not just your browsing history.
+
+Your medical record from a visit at the clinic, your purchase transaction from a trip to the store, your travel photos saved in the cloud, your text conversations with your friends, family, and children, are all likely protected with encryption, perhaps even with *end-to-end* encryption.
+
+Such a large trove of personal data needs to be protected against eavesdropping and malicious attacks for everyone to stay safe.
+
+Encryption offers this protection. End-to-end encryption all the more.
+
+## What is end-to-end encryption, and what is the war against it
+
+End-to-end encryption is a type of encryption where only the intended recipient(s) have the ability to decrypt (read) the encrypted data.
+
+This means that if you send a message through [Signal](https://signal.org/) for example, only the participants to this conversation will be able to read the content of this conversation. Even Signal cannot know what is being discussed on Signal.
+
+This greatly annoys some over-controlling authorities who would like to be granted unlimited power to spy on anyone anytime they wish, for vaguely defined purposes that could change at any moment.
+
+End-to-end encryption can also mean a situation where you are "both ends" of the communication.
+
+For example, when enabling Apple's [Advanced Data Protection for iCloud](https://support.apple.com/en-ca/guide/security/sec973254c5f/web) (ADP), it activates end-to-end encryption protection for almost all of iCloud data, including photos. This means that even Apple could not see your photos, or be forced to share your photos with a governmental entity.
+
+Without ADP, Apple can read or share your photos (or other data) if they are legally compelled to, or if they feel like it. The same is true for Google's services, Microsoft's services, and any other online services that aren't end-to-end encrypted.
+
+This is at the root of the latest attack on encryption:
+
+In February this year, it was reported that [Apple was served with a notice](uk-forced-apple-to-remove-adp.md) from the UK's Home Office to force it to break ADP's end-to-end encryption. In response, Apple removed access to ADP from the UK entirely, making this protection unavailable to UK residents.
+
+Do not mistakenly think this attack is limited to the UK and Apple users, however. If this regulation notice or a similar one gets enforced, it would **impact the whole world.** Other countries would likely soon follow, and other services would likely soon get under attack as well.
+
+Moreover, do not feel unaffected just because you use end-to-end encryption with [Signal](https://www-svt-se.translate.goog/nyheter/inrikes/signal-lamnar-sverige-om-regeringens-forslag-pa-datalagring-klubbas?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp) or [Proton](https://www.techradar.com/vpn/vpn-privacy-security/secure-encryption-and-online-anonymity-are-now-at-risk-in-switzerland-heres-what-you-need-to-know) services instead of Apple, they are both **under attack** as well in this war.
+
+Just in recent years, the war against encryption has affected the [US](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/04/earn-it-bill-back-again-seeking-scan-our-messages-and-photos), the [UK](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgj54eq4vejo), [Sweden](https://www.globalencryption.org/2025/04/joint-letter-on-swedish-data-storage-and-access-to-electronic-information-legislation/), [France](https://www.laquadrature.net/en/warondrugslaw/), [Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, Japan](https://www.theverge.com/2020/10/12/21513212/backdoor-encryption-access-us-canada-australia-new-zealand-uk-india-japan), and all the European Union countries with proposals such as [Chat Control](the-future-of-privacy.md/#chat-control-wants-to-break-end-to-end-encryption).
+
+## The arguments given to break encryption make no sense
+
+Authoritarian entities generally use the same populist excuses to justify their senseless demands. "Protecting the children" is always a fashionable disingenuous argument.
+
+Because no one would disagree that protecting the children is important, it is often used as an attempt to deceitfully make an irrefutable argument to justify breaking encryption.
+
+The problem is, **breaking encryption doesn't protect the children**, it [endangers](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/jan/21/end-to-end-encryption-protects-children-says-uk-information-watchdog) them.
+
+When law enforcement officials claim they need to be able to read everyone's messages and see everyone's personal photos to be able to fight child predators, they seem to neglect that:
+
+- This means they will expose the children's messages, contact information, locations, and photos in the process, potentially *endangering the children further*.
+
+- Exposing everyone's data will make this data much more likely to be found and exploited by criminals, making *everyone* more vulnerable to attacks.
+
+- Predators will simply move to underground channels, [unbothered](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/back_doors_wont.html).
+
+They use the same kind of deceptive argument trying to justify weakening the protections we have to supposedly catch "criminals" and "terrorists".
+
+Of course the exact definition of what is a "criminal" or a "terrorist" is always vague and subject to change. In the past, human rights activists and authoritarian regime dissidents have been labeled as such, climate change activists as well, LGBTQ+ people even in some countries. Maybe next year this label will include "DEI advocates", who knows where they draw the line and what can be considered a "criminal" worth spying on.
+
+You *cannot* remove everyone's right to privacy and protection from harm while pretending it is to protect them. No one who is well-informed and well-intended could possibly consider this a smart thing to do.
+
+**An attack on end-to-end encryption isn't an attack on criminals, it's an attack on all of us.**
+
+## Magical backdoor only for "the good guys" is a complete fantasy
+
+Let's say the strategy is akin to creating a MagicalKey that unlocks every door (a magical key because thinking encryption backdoors would only be used by "the good guys" is a great example of [magical thinking](https://www.britannica.com/science/magical-thinking)).
+
+Imagine, for the sake of this exercise, the MagicalLock for this MagicalKey is impossible to pick, and imagine only police officers have MagicalKeys. Let's say one thousand police officers each have a MagicalKey.
+
+They argue they need to be able to unlock anyone's door if they suspect a crime is happening inside. "It's for safety!"
+
+Overtime, let's say only 1% of the police officers accidentally lose their MagicalKey. This kind of things happen. Now 10 MagicalKeys are lost in the wild and could be used by anyone else, for any purposes, including crime.
+
+Then, let's say only 0.1% of police officers get corrupted by a crime gang. That's just one right? This corrupted "good guy" lets the gang create a double of the MagicalKey. Which crime gang wouldn't want a key that can magically open any door? They pay the police officer good money for this. It's an investment.
+
+Now, the gang creates doubles of the MagicalKey they have. They obfuscate its serial number, so it cannot be traced back to them. They use it subtly at first to avoid detection. They make sure they never leave traces behind, so victims have no idea their door got unlocked.
+
+During this time, they steal your data, they sell it, they use it to impersonate you, they use it to harm you and your loved ones.
+
+Then, another criminal figures out on their own how to emulate a MagicalKey without even having access to one. The criminal creates a reproducible mold for this Emulated-MagicalKey and sells it to other criminals on the criminal market. Now, the MagicalKey™️ is available to any criminals looking for it. Restrictions on the backdoor are off. **Your personal data is up for grabs.**
+
+This is what is going to happen if backdoors are implemented in end-to-end encryption. But don't worry they say, "it's only for the good guys!".
+
+At least, the criminals' data will also be up for grabs, right?
+
+Nope! The criminals knew about this, so they just started using different channels that weren't impacted. Criminals will have their privacy intact, they don't care about using illegal tools, but **your legal privacy protections will be gone**.
+
+*Backdoored* end-to-end encryption isn't end-to-end anymore, it's just open-ended encryption. This offers pretty much no protection at all.
+
+## Ignoring experts doesn't make facts disappear
+
+Where is the opposition to this? Where are the experts pushing against this nightmare? Everywhere.
+
+Thankfully, opposition has been strong, despite the relentless ignorance or malevolence from authoritarian authorities repeatedly pushing against encryption.
+
+Many people and groups have been fighting valiantly to defend our collective right to privacy and security. Countless experts have patiently taken the time to explain [again](https://signal.org/blog/uk-online-safety-bill/) and [again](https://www.globalencryption.org/2020/10/cdt-gpd-and-internet-society-reject-time-worn-argument-for-encryption-backdoors/) and [again](https://www.schneier.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/paper-keys-under-doormats-CSAIL.pdf) how an encryption backdoor only for "the good guys" is simply impossible.
+
+Weakening encryption to let "the good guys" enter, lets *anyone* enter, including criminals. There is no way around this.
+
+Seemingly ignoring warnings and advice from the most respected specialists in the field, authoritarian officials continue to push against encryption. So much so that it has become difficult to assume good intent misguided by ignorance at this point.
+
+Unfortunately, ignoring the experts or silencing the debate will not make the facts magically disappear.
+
+In an encouraging development this week, Apple [won a case](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvgn1lz3v4no) fighting an attempt from the UK Home Office to hide from the public details of their latest attack on encryption.
+
+This battle and all battles to protect our privacy rights, *must* be fought is broad daylight, for all to see and to support.
+
+## Fight for encryption rights everywhere you can
+
+The war against encryption isn't anything new, it has been happening for decades. However, the quantity of data, personal and sensitive data, that is collected, stored, and shared about us is much larger today. It is essential we use the proper tools to secure this information.
+
+This is what have changed, and what is making encryption and end-to-end encryption even more indispensable today.
+
+Mass surveillance will not keep us safe, it will endanger us further and damage our democracies and freedoms in irreparable ways.
+
+We must fight to keep our right to privacy, and use of strong end-to-end encryption to protect ourselves, our friends, our family, and yes also to protect the children.
+
+### How can you support the right to encryption?
+
+- [x] Use end-to-end encryption everywhere you can.
+
+- [x] Talk about the benefits of end-to-end encryption to everyone around you, especially your loved ones less knowledgeable about technology. Talk about how it is essential to protect everyone's data, including the children's.
+
+- [x] Use social media to promote the benefits of end-to-end encryption and post about how it protects us all.
+
+- [x] Write or call your government representatives to let them know you care about end-to-end encryption and are worried about dangerous backdoors or chat control proposals.
+
+- [x] Support organizations fighting for encryption, such as:
+
+    - [Global Encryption Coalition](https://www.globalencryption.org/)
+
+    - [Open Rights Group](https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaign/save-encryption/)
+
+    - [Fight For The Future](https://www.makedmssafe.com/)
+
+    - [Signal app](https://signal.org/donate/)
+
+    - [Internet Society](https://www.internetsociety.org/open-letters/fix-the-take-it-down-act-to-protect-encryption/)
+
+    - [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/issues/end-end-encryption)
+
+    - [Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/donate/) 💛
+
+Finally, have a look at our [recommendations](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) if you want to start using more tools protecting your privacy using end-to-end encryption.
+
+This is a long war, but the importance of it doesn't allow us to give up.
+
+We must continue fighting for the right to protect our data with end-to-end encryption, **we owe it to ourselves, our loved ones, and the future generations.**

blog/posts/hide-nothing.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ On the surface, this seems true to many people – but the reality is very diffe
 
 In the end it only convicted one person.
 
-Now, many have argued that stopping one terrorist might be worth giving up some security for, but [according](https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/surveillance-under-patriot-act) to the ACLU, the conviction would have occurred without the Patriot Act.
+Now, many have argued that stopping one terrorist might be worth giving up some security for, but [according](https://web.archive.org/web/20230318132243/https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/surveillance-under-patriot-act) to the ACLU, the conviction would have occurred without the Patriot Act.
 
 Many legal actions you take today could be deemed illegal by future laws or future government. In the US today there is discussion around the possibility of Roe v. Wade being overturned, allowing states to outlaw abortions. You may not currently feel the need to hide internet searches, menstrual cycle apps, or donations to women's health clinics today because it's not illegal, but tomorrow that information could be used against you.
 

blog/posts/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey.md

@@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-03-18T17:00:00Z
+categories:
+    - Tutorials
+authors:
+    - em
+description: This tutorial demonstrates how to install the local-only password manager KeePassXC and secure a password database with YubiKey.
+schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
+---
+# KeePassXC + YubiKey: How to set up a local-only password manager
+
+![Illustration showing a laptop computer with the KeePassXC logo on it. On the right is a green plus sign and a photo of a YubiKey.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-cover.webp)
+<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Privacy Guides | Graphics: Yubico | Logo: KeePassXC</small>
+
+If you are looking for a good remote password manager you can use from anywhere, there are plenty of excellent [options](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/) to choose from. However, if you prefer to only store your passwords locally, [KeePassXC](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/#keepassxc) is what you need. In this tutorial, we will set up KeePassXC to work with [YubiKey](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/security-keys/#yubikey) as an additional factor to secure your local-only password database.<!-- more -->
+
+## :simple-keepassxc: KeePassXC summary
+
+KeePassXC is a free, open-source, and desktop-only password manager. The community-driven project was first released in 2012 and is a fork of both the *KeePass Password Safe* application and *KeePassX*, which is no longer actively maintained.
+
+In addition to having its [code](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc) available for all to see, KeePassXC also went through an independent [security review](https://keepassxc.org/blog/2023-04-15-audit-report/) in 2023.
+
+Because it does not automatically sync with any remote cloud service, KeePassXC works offline by default. This offers additional protections for your privacy, and potentially for your security as well, depending on your specific situation.
+
+### Platforms
+
+KeePassXC can run on Linux, macOS, and Windows computers. There is no direct option for a KeePassXC application on mobile. The KeePassXC team [suggests](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-platform-mobile) using [KeePassDX](https://www.keepassdx.com/) or [KeePass2Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=keepass2android.keepass2android) on Android phones, and [Strongbox](https://strongboxsafe.com/) or [KeePassium](https://keepassium.com/) on iPhones.
+
+### Database cloud backup
+
+KeePassXC is local-first and will not automatically back up your password database in the cloud. This can be both an advantage for security and privacy, and a disadvantage if something were to happen to your device.
+
+To prevent losing access to your passwords, it is recommended to regularly back up your encrypted database `.kdbx` file in a remote [cloud storage](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cloud/) of your choice, or on an encrypted external drive or USB stick.
+
+When copying this file to a third-party cloud service, it will [remain fully encrypted](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_storing_your_database) and only get decrypted locally on your device. That being said, it's still always best to select an end-to-end encrypted cloud storage whenever possible.
+
+### Feature overview
+
+This tutorial only covers the basic installation to get you ready using KeePassXC locally, with a main password secured with a YubiKey. However, KeePassXC offers a lot of features you might also want to have a look at.
+
+In addition to the features we will set up here, KeePassXC offers the following:
+
+- [Passkey support](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_passkeys)
+
+- [Password generator](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_password_generator)
+
+- [Command line tool](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_command_line_tool)
+
+- [SSH agent integration](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_ssh_agent_integration)
+
+- [KeeShare and groups](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_database_sharing_with_keeshare)
+
+- [Import password databases from 1Password, Bitwarden, Proton Pass, KeePass, CSV files](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_importing_databases)
+
+- [Export databases to CSV, HTML, or XML files](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_exporting_databases)
+
+- [And more](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_GettingStarted#_features)
+
+### What's new with KeePassXC 2.7.10
+
+On March 4th, KeePassXC released its most recent update. This update includes the capacity to import Proton Pass databases, to generate passphrases using *mixed* case (a mix of uppercase and lowercase), and many other [useful features](https://keepassxc.org/blog/2025-03-04-2.7.10-released/).
+
+## :material-toolbox: Requirements and preparation
+
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Operating systems</p>
+
+This tutorial was completed using macOS, but your experience shouldn't be much different if you are using Linux or Windows.
+
+</div>
+
+For this tutorial you will need:
+
+- [x] Computer running Linux, macOS, or Windows
+- [x] Internet connection
+- [x] Ability to install software on this computer
+- [x] One or two YubiKeys (ideally two)
+
+## :material-download-circle: Setting up KeePassXC
+
+### Step 1: Download and Install KeePassXC
+
+Go to KeePassXC's download page and download the application version for your operating system. If the website doesn't detect your system automatically, you can change it on the top menu, or click on the "See more options" yellow button for previous versions.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC website download page.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-1-download.webp)
+
+<div class="admonition success" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Verifying signatures</p>
+
+For ideal security, you can verify the authenticity and integrity of the file you just downloaded by verifying the file's signatures. To do this, [follow the instructions](https://keepassxc.org/verifying-signatures/) from the website to guarantee the file you downloaded was created by the KeePassXC Team and has not been tampered with.
+
+</div>
+
+Complete the process for your respective OS to install and open the application once verified.
+
+![Screenshot of the application installation window for KeePassXC on macOS.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-2-install.webp)
+
+On macOS, you will be prompted with a warning message saying "**“KeePassXC.app” is an app downloaded from the Internet. Are you sure you want to open it?**", click "Open".
+
+![Screenshot of a macOS warning popup before opening an application that was downloaded from the Internet.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-3-installwarning.webp)
+
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">KeePassXC blocks screenshots by default</p>
+
+Interestingly, KeePassXC has a security feature that [blocks](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_screenshot_security) screenshots and recordings of the application window on macOS and Windows.
+
+This is a great feature to prevent accidentally sharing your decrypted password database information during a meeting presentation, for example.
+
+Thankfully for writing this tutorial, there is a way to disable it temporarily, but **you** should definitely keep it on.
+
+</div>
+
+### Step 2: Adjust the settings
+
+Once you have installed and opened KeePassXC, before creating a database for your passwords, click on the "Settings" gear button on the upper-right, on the *toolbar*.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the Settings section.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-4-settings.webp)
+
+From there, you will see many options you can adjust to your preferences. The default settings are already good, but you might want to tweak a few things to your specific usage.
+
+#### Keep a previous version backup (recommended)
+
+Scrolling down to the "File Management" section, you might want to enable the option to "Backup database file before saving". This will ensure you always have a backup of the previous version of your database, in case you accidentally delete important information for example.
+
+You can store this backup in the same or a different directory. You can change this backup's name or keep the default that will append `.old` to your database filename.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the Settings General section with the Backup database file before saving checkbox checked.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-5-backupprevious.webp)
+
+#### Add icons specific to each service (optional)
+
+If you want to use icons specific to each service for your password entries, you can go to the "Security" subsection on the left-side menu, then in "Privacy" at the bottom *enable* "Use DuckDuckGo service to download website icons". This isn't enabled by default. Then click "OK" on the lower-right.
+
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Offline only?</p>
+
+Do not enable this if you wish to use KeePassXC offline only. You will still be able to use different default icons for you entries instead of downloading specific icons from the internet.
+
+</div>
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the Settings Security section with the checkbox for DuckDuckGo checked.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-6-duckduckgo.webp)
+
+### Step 3: Create a database
+
+A database in KeePassXC is an encrypted file that will contain all the passwords you register.
+
+You can use multiple separate databases with KeePassXC. For example, you could have a database for work, a database for your family, and a database for your personal accounts. All stored in separate files with separate main passwords. In the application, each database can be opened in its own tab.
+
+To create a new database, from the Welcome section click on the "Create Database" button on the lower-left.
+
+If you want to create a secondary database, you can also click on the dropdown Database menu on the application menu bar, then select "New Database".
+
+<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Importing an existing database</p>
+
+If you already have a password database file in the format `.kdbx`, you can import it from the Welcome page by clicking on "Import File" on the lower-right.
+
+</div>
+
+You will see a window pop up with "General Database Information". Pick a name and description for your database and click on "Continue" at the bottom.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the popup to Create a new KeePassXC database.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-7-databasecreation.webp)
+
+For the second step, an "Encryption Settings" section will pop up. From there, you will be able to change the settings to your preferences. If you are not familiar with encryption algorithms, simply keep the defaults on and click "Continue" again.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the popup to Create a new KeePassXC database in the Encryption Settings.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-8-databaseencryption.webp)
+
+For the next step, a "Database Credentials" section will pop up. From there, you will be able to choose a main password to lock your entire password database.
+
+At this step, it is very important to [choose a password](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/passwords-overview/#best-practices) that is **unique, complex, and long**. This is the password that will protect all your other passwords. It should be easy to remember for you, but it must be *unique* and *long*. Ideally, pick a **passphrase**.
+
+#### Generate a main password (optional)
+
+If you do not feel inspired, you can use the "Generate password" dice button on the right to help you pick a strong password.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the popup to Generate Password.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-9-passwordgenerate.webp)
+
+No matter if you invent or generate your main password/passphrase, **make sure to remember this main password well**. You cannot rely on your password manager for this one.
+
+<div class="admonition success" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">This step isn't over yet!</p>
+
+This is where you will be adding your YubiKey to further secure your database. Keep the "Database Credentials" application window open and **continue with the step below** :material-arrow-down-bold:
+
+</div>
+
+## :material-shield-key: Securing your database with a YubiKey
+
+To add a YubiKey to secure your KeePassXC database, you will first need to prepare your YubiKey(s) for it, if it's not already ready to use with a [Challenge-Response](https://docs.yubico.com/yesdk/users-manual/application-otp/challenge-response.html) application.
+
+<details class="note" markdown>
+<summary>Using a YubiKey will not add authentication per se (read more)</summary>
+
+Technically speaking, adding a YubiKey to your KeePassXC database isn't a second factor of authentication because KeePassXC isn't a service, therefore it cannot "authenticate" you.
+
+However, adding a YubiKey to secure your KeePassXC database will make decryption of your database more secure by enhancing the encryption key of your database.
+
+The Challenge-Response will remain the same each time you decrypt your database, *however*, it will change each time the database is updated (each time there is a change to it, such as adding an entry, removing an entry, adding a note, etc.). Note that the previous versions of your database could get unlocked with your main password + your key's previous Challenge-Response, however.
+
+If your key's Challenge-Response were to become compromised, you could update your database (by adding or changing an entry for example), then fully delete all previous versions of your database. This would effectively make all previous Challenge-Response obsolete to unlock your current database.
+
+You can read more on this in KeePassXC's [documentation](https://keepassxc.org/docs/).
+
+</details>
+
+### Step 4: Prepare your YubiKey(s)
+
+Because you cannot register two YubiKeys for this type of application, you should first make sure that you either have a secure backup for this Challenge-Response, or that you have cloned it to two YubiKeys, or more. This is important in case you were to lose your YubiKey.
+
+If you do have two YubiKeys, we have a [guide on how to reset your YubiKeys entirely and set up multiple keys as a backup](yubikey-reset-and-backup.md) which you may be interested in.
+
+If you only need to learn more about the Challenge-Response YubiKey application, jump to [this section](yubikey-reset-and-backup.md#step-9-create-and-clone-your-keys-challenge-response) of the tutorial directly.
+
+### Step 5: Add your YubiKey
+
+Once your YubiKey's Challenge-Response slot has been properly configured and backed up, return to the KeePassXC's "Database Credentials" window, and click on the "Add additional protection" button in the middle.
+
+This will open a new section with "Key File" and "Challenge-Response" options. Scroll down to "Challenge-Response". Plug in your YubiKey in your computer's port (only plug one key at the time), then click on the "Add Challenge-Response" button.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the popup to Create a new KeePassXC database in the Database Credentials section and highlighting the Add Challenge-Response button.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-10-challengeresponse.webp)
+
+<div class="admonition question" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">YubiKey or OnlyKey</p>
+
+You can also use an OnlyKey to secure your KeePassXC database in the same way.
+
+</div>
+
+You should see your YubiKey's model and serial number listed, and also which YubiKey slot you have stored your Challenge-Response in. Once the correct key is selected, click on "Done" at the bottom.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the popup to Create a new KeePassXC database in the Database Credentials section when a YubiKey is plugged in.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-11-selectyubikey.webp)
+
+A window will pop up to ask where you want to save your password database. Name your database file and save it in a secure directory on your computer. You will then be asked to touch your YubiKey.
+
+Touch the gold part of your YubiKey to save your database file. You will have to touch your YubiKey each time you save this database, and the file will be saved each time you make changes to it.
+
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Important! Unlocking your database</p>
+
+Each time you unlock your KeePassXC database, make sure to first plug in your YubiKey and verify that the "Use hardware key" checkbox is checked. Then, enter your main password and touch the gold part of your YubiKey when prompted.
+
+If you do not plug in your YubiKey first, an error will be triggered, and you will be unable to unlock your database.
+
+</div>
+
+## :fontawesome-solid-unlock-keyhole: Using KeePassXC
+
+Using KeePassXC is quite simple and resembles most other password manager applications. The biggest difference is that your passwords will remain stored locally, unless you decide to back up your password database to a cloud service of your choice.
+
+All the options to manage and use your entries credentials will be located on the *toolbar* at the top.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing an empty database section.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-12-databasenew.webp)
+
+<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Locking the database</p>
+
+At all time when the application is open, you can click in the "Lock Database" padlock button on the toolbar to lock your database. You can also adjust the settings to lock your database each time you minimize the application window (this is disabled by default).
+
+Your database will already lock itself automatically when your laptop lid is closed, the session is locked, or if your switch user (unless you disabled these options manually in settings).
+
+</div>
+
+### Step 6: Create a password entry
+
+To create a [new entry](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_GettingStarted#_entry_handling) for a password, click on the "Add a new entry" plus-shaped button on the toolbar.
+
+From this section, you will be able to register a "Title", "Username", "Password" (or generate one), "URL" (this is important if you use the browser extension), "Tags", "Expires" date, "Notes", and more.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the Add entry section filled with information.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-13-newentry.webp)
+
+<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Keep your YubiKey plugged in when changing your database</p>
+
+When adding/removing entries or changing your database in any other way, make sure your YubiKey is plugged in. You will have to touch it each time you save changes to your database.
+
+</div>
+
+Before saving your entry by clicking "OK" on the lower-right, explore the options on the left-side menu.
+
+For example, in the "Advanced" section you can add additional attributes and store attachments, in the "Icon" section you can select an icon to represent your password entry (or download one from the web), in the "Auto-type" section you can enable/disable Auto-type, and in the "Properties" section you will see additional metadata for this entry.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the Add entry section in the Icon subsection.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-14-entryicons.webp)
+
+Once you have set up all the information you need for this password entry, click "OK" to save it to your database. You will be prompted to touch the gold part of your YubiKey to complete the operation. You should now see your entry listed in your database.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the database section with one password entry filled.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-15-entrycreated.webp)
+
+Each time you need this information, you can select an entry and click on the "Copy username to clipboard" character-shaped button, or the "Copy password to clipboard" key-shaped button, or the "Copy URL to clipboard" earth-shaped button on the toolbar.
+
+The data will stay in your computer's clipboard for 10 seconds then will get cleared (unless you changed this from the default setting). Once copied, paste this information in the appropriate field for your service.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the database section with all three buttons Username, Password, and URL for entry pointed at with arrows.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-16-useentry.webp)
+
+<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Accidental deletion danger!</p>
+
+Be careful not to mistakenly click on the dangerous "Delete Entry" trash-shaped button left to the "Copy username to clipboard" button on the toolbar!
+
+You would have to touch your YubiKey to confirm deletion, but remain careful. If you click on it accidentally, do NOT touch your YubiKey to confirm!
+
+If this accident happened to you, you might see your entry has been moved to a "Recycle Bin" directory on the left. Right-click on your entry and select "Restore Entry" at the top of the entry menu. Touch your YubiKey when prompted. You should now see your entry back in the "Root" directory on the left-side menu.
+
+</div>
+
+### Step 7: Back up your database
+
+There are many ways to [back up](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_database_backup_options) your KeePassXC database:
+
+#### Automatic local backup
+
+If you enabled this setting on [Step 2](#step-2-adjust-the-settings), you will see a second file getting saved in the same directory with the same name but with an appended `.old` to it when you make a change to your password database.
+
+This is the previous version of your database. If you delete a password entry by mistake for example, you can easily restore it with this secondary database backup file.
+
+#### Manual backup from the application menu
+
+When your database is unlocked, you can click on the dropdown "Database" menu in the application menu bar (not the toolbar), then select "Save Database Backup".
+
+You will have the option to rename this file and choose a different location. Then, you will be prompted to touch your YubiKey to confirm.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the application menu with the Database dropdown menu rolled down and the Save Database Backup option selected.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-17-savedatabase.webp)
+
+#### Manual backup from copying the database file
+
+Another way to keep a backup of your password database is to simply copy the database `.kdbx` file somewhere else.
+
+You can copy this file to another local directory, an external drive (ideally encrypted), or a secure [cloud service](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cloud/) of your choice (ideally an end-to-end encrypted one). Even if your database will be encrypted, it's always better to choose secure cloud services that offer solid end-to-end encryption.
+
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Entry history</p>
+
+Within your database, KeePassXC also maintains a history of changes made to each of your entries. You can read more about this feature from KeePassXC's [documentation](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_history).
+
+</div>
+
+### Step 8: Install the browser extension (optional)
+
+When you need to use KeePassXC to fill credentials in a browser or an app, you can always copy the entry field you need manually, as explained on [Step 6](#step-6-create-a-password-entry). But if you prefer, to facilitate filling credentials for web-based services, you can take advantage of KeePassXC's [browser extension](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_browser_integration).
+
+To install the extension, go to [this page](https://keepassxc.org/download/#browser) from the KeePassXC website and click on your browser's *category*.
+
+This means that for any Firefox-based browser, you can click on the Firefox logo, and for any Chromium-based browser, you can click on the Chrome logo. Some browsers might not be supported, however.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC website page to download the browser extension.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-18-downloadextension.webp)
+
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Privacy warning</p>
+
+Keep in mind that although browser extensions can be very convenient, they can also introduce some risk to your privacy.
+
+Even if the KeePassXC browser extension only [runs locally](https://keepassxc.org/privacy/), it does need to collect some information for its functionalities, and any additional extension installed has the potential to [introduce](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/browser-extensions/) a new attack surface.
+
+Additionally, the more unique your combination of hardware, software, and browser extensions is, the more you are vulnerable to [browser fingerprinting](https://neat.tube/w/fdszTYBKzeoE3ySQUGTzmo). Always be mindful to consider your specific threat model when installing new browser extensions.
+
+</div>
+
+Once you have installed the extension for your browser, go back to the KeePassXC application and click on the "Settings" gear button on toolbar. Click on "Browser Integration" on the left-side menu and check the box for "Enable browser integration" at the top of the section.
+
+![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the Settings section in the Browser Integration subsection with the checkbox for Enable browser integration checked.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-19-browserintegration.webp)
+
+From this [section](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_configure_keepassxc_browser), check the box for the browser(s) or browser type(s) you have installed the extension on. You can also enable the option "Search in all opened databases for matching credentials" if you are using multiple databases. Then click "OK" on the lower-right to save these options.
+
+Make sure your KeePassXC database is *unlocked*, then **restart your browser**.
+
+#### If you encounter an error while running the extension
+
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">You don't have to use the extension</p>
+
+If you are not able to make the KeePassXC extension work with the browser you use, you can still use KeePassXC by manually copy-pasting your entries' credentials. It can even be a more secure and more private way to use it.
+
+</div>
+
+After installing the extension and enabling it from the KeePassXC settings, you might encounter an error where the KeePassXC icon in a credential field is [marked](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_GettingStarted#_using_the_browser_extension) with a red "**X**", a red "**!**", or a padlock icon.
+
+If this happens, try the following:
+
+1. Make sure your KeePassXC application is open, and your database is *unlocked*.
+
+2. Check if your YubiKey is *plugged* in your computer's port.
+
+3. Verify that your browser is *compatible* and does not use protections that could block the extension from working.
+
+4. Follow KeePassXC's [instructions](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_using_the_browser_extension) to connect your KeePassXC database to your KeePassXC browser extension.
+
+5. Look for possible solutions from KeePassXC's [troubleshooting guide](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc-browser/wiki/Troubleshooting-guide).
+
+![Screenshot of the CryptPad website login page showing in the Username field the KeePassXC logo greyed out and marked with a red "X".](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-20-errorconnection.webp)
+
+#### Filling credentials using the extension
+
+<div class="admonition note" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">The database is connected but the logo is greyed out</p>
+
+If you do not have an entry for this website, or if you have not registered a URL (or the correct one) for this entry, your will see the KeePassXC logo greyed out. This simply means your database could not find any credentials matching this website's URL.
+
+</div>
+
+Once configured and connected properly, you should see a green KeePassXC logo in the credential fields, when you have a corresponding entry in your database.
+
+Click on the green KeePassXC logo to populate all credential fields automatically.
+
+![Screenshot of the CryptPad website login page showing in the Username field the KeePassXC logo in green and both the credentials for Username and Password are filled.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-21-credentialsextension.webp)
+
+<div class="admonition success" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Congratulation! You're in!</p>
+
+You are now logged in, thanks to KeePassXC!
+
+</div>
+
+## :material-hand-heart: Consider supporting KeePassXC
+
+KeePassXC is a free and open-source project built by the community. If you use and love this application, it's always a great idea to support the project if you can.
+
+Here are a few ways you can help keep KeePassXC thriving:
+
+- [Contributing on GitHub](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/blob/develop/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md)
+- [Following KeePassXC on Mastodon](https://fosstodon.org/@keepassxc)
+- [Donating to KeePassXC to help with the development and maintenance of the application](https://keepassxc.org/donate/)
+
+For more information on KeePassXC and its many features, you can consult the official [Documentation and FAQ](https://keepassxc.org/docs/) or even have a look at KeePassXC's [code](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc) on GitHub.
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Unless credited otherwise, all screenshots from: Privacy Guides</small>

blog/posts/interview-with-micah-lee.md

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-03-28T17:00:00Z
+categories:
+    - News
+authors:
+    - em
+description: 'This article is an interview with Micah Lee, the creator of Cyd and OnionShare, founder of Lockdown Systems, and author of Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations: The Art of Analyzing Hacked and Leaked Data.'
+schema_type: NewsArticle
+preview:
+  cover: blog/assets/images/interview-with-micah-lee/social-preview-cover.webp
+---
+# Interview with Micah Lee: Cyd, Lockdown Systems, OnionShare, and more
+
+![Photo of Micah Lee over a yellow and purple graphic background, and with the name Micah Lee written on the right.](../assets/images/interview-with-micah-lee/micah-lee-cover.webp)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides | Photo: Micah Lee</small>
+
+If you don't know who Micah Lee is yet, here's why you should: Micah is an information security engineer, a software engineer, a journalist, and an author who has built an impressive career developing software for the public good, and working with some of the most respected digital rights organizations in the United States.<!-- more -->
+
+If you have been following software development related to data privacy and security for a while, you probably already know one of Micah's projects such as [OnionShare](https://onionshare.org/), [Dangerzone](https://dangerzone.rocks/), the [Tor Browser Launcher](https://github.com/torproject/torbrowser-launcher), and more recently [Cyd](https://cyd.social/) (a rebirth of Semiphemeral). Additionally, he is also a core contributor to the [Tor Project](https://www.torproject.org/) and a contributor to [Hush Line](https://hushline.app/).
+
+Besides software development, Micah is a board member for [Science & Design](https://scidsg.org/) and [Distributed Denial of Secrets](https://ddosecrets.com/), a former board member and cofounder of [Freedom of the Press Foundation](https://freedom.press), and has been a Staff Technologist for the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/).
+
+You might have already read some of Micah's articles when he worked at [The Intercept](https://theintercept.com/staff/micah-lee/), or even read his new [book](https://hacksandleaks.com/) Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations: The Art of Analyzing Hacked and Leaked Data.
+
+We spoke with Micah over email and are delighted that he decided to talk with us at Privacy Guides. Let's get into it!
+
+***Em:*** *Hi Micah! We're thrilled that you have accepted to give us this interview at Privacy Guides. Thank you for taking time off your busy schedule to talk with us.*
+
+## Cyd: The app to claw back your data from Big Tech
+
+***Em:*** *Let's start with your newest project. [Cyd](https://cyd.social) is an application you have created in 2024 to help people backing up and deleting their tweets on X-(Twitter). This app emerged from the ashes of [Semiphemeral](https://micahflee.com/2024/07/like-a-phoenix-semiphemeral-will-rise-from-the-ashes/), a great tool that was unfortunately rendered unusable when Twitter decided to [shut off its API](https://mashable.com/article/twitter-ending-free-api-tier-elon-musk-worst-decision). I personally loved Semiphemeral and used it to delete thousands of my tweets before eventually deleting my whole Twitter account later on. Can you tell us more about how Cyd works despite not using X's API?*
+
+**Micah:**
+
+APIs make it way simpler for programmers to interact with online services, but they're not the only way. As long as social media platforms like X still run websites, and it's still possible for you, the human, to manually scroll through your tweets and delete them, it's possible to write a program that can do this for you.
+
+This is basically how Cyd works. It's a desktop app that includes an embedded web browser. When you add an X account to it, you login to your account in the browser, and then Cyd takes over. You can tell it that you want to delete your tweets, or likes, or bookmarks, or unfollow everyone, or save a backup of your DMs, or plenty of other things, and it does this by automating the embedded browser on your behalf. No API required.
+
+Cyd uses open APIs when they're available and make sense. For example, if you want to quit X but you don't want your old tweets to disappear forever, Cyd can migrate them to Bluesky using Bluesky's API -- soon we'll add support for migrating to Mastodon too. But for closed platforms that suck (like X, and Facebook too, which we're adding support for right now), we're forced to do it the hard way.
+
+***Em:*** *Talking about openness, recently this year you have decided to [make Cyd open source](https://infosec.exchange/@micahflee/113885066507235250). This is fantastic news! What did you take into consideration before making this decision and what kind of [contributions](https://github.com/lockdown-systems/cyd) or feedback are you hoping to receive from the community?*
+
+**Micah:**
+
+I'm extremely happy that Cyd is now open source. I've open-sourced most code that I've ever written, so it honestly felt kind of weird starting out making Cyd proprietary.
+
+My biggest concern with making it open was that I want Cyd to be a sustainable business, where some of the features are free and some of the features are premium and cost money -- enough so that me, and eventually other people working on it, could get paid a decent wage. And as an open source app, it would be easy for someone to fork it and remove the bits of code that check if you've paid for premium access.
+
+But after talking it through with some other people who are very experienced open source devs, I decided that this isn't that big of a deal, and that the benefits of being open source far outweigh the costs.
+
+Now when you use Cyd, you can now *confirm* that it doesn't have access to your social media accounts or any of the data in it. Having an open issue tracker on GitHub is great too, because people in the community can open issues, post comments, and track the progress of features they're looking forward to. Also being open source means we have the ability to accept grants and donations, in addition to selling premium accounts. You can check out our Open Collective page at [https://opencollective.com/lockdown-systems](https://opencollective.com/lockdown-systems).
+
+I'm hoping that members of the community will discuss features we're making, or even contribute code directly to our project. Right now, Cyd is only available in English, but we're also hoping to translate it into many different languages going forward, so I'm hoping that people will eventually chip in it to help translate Cyd to their native languages.
+
+***Em:*** *Having access to Cyd in multiple languages would really be wonderful. Likewise for multiple social media, when additional ones will be added later on. But at the moment, Cyd definitely seems to be [focusing](https://cyd.social/want-to-quit-x-in-2025-heres-how-to-do-it-the-right-way-with-cyd/) on X. You have personally been on the receiving end of Elon Musk's vengeful whims before when your Twitter account got [banned](https://micahflee.com/2023/05/elon-banned-me-from-twitter-for-doing-journalism-good-riddance/) in 2022 for criticizing him. I would say this qualifies as a badge of honor. Do you think you could still be on his radar with Cyd focusing on [data deletion for X](https://cyd.social/delete-all-your-tweets-for-free-with-cyd/) even though X has shut off its API? Have you taken any specific measures about this?*
+
+**Micah:**
+
+I think it's actually more likely that I'll be on Elon Musk's radar because of my [recent work](https://www.youtube.com/live/APHo7bea_p4?si=stSrkmo1MWy5_iVX&t=3338) with the Tesla Takedown movement than with Cyd... Right now, Musk is spending all of his time purging the US government of critics and consolidating executive power under Trump. So maybe he's too distracted on his fascism project to care about what we're doing with deleting tweets?
+
+But that said, Musk is litigious and we're definitely concerned about legal threats. We've consulted lawyers and we're trying to be as safe as possible.
+
+## Lockdown Systems: The new organization developing Cyd
+
+***Em:*** *Cyd is a project of [Lockdown Systems](https://lockdown.systems), a new organization you have created with colleagues just a few months ago. Can you tell us more about the structure of this organization and who else is involved?*
+
+**Micah:**
+
+We're still finalizing the paperwork, but Lockdown Systems is a new worker-owned collective! At the moment there are five of us:
+
+- me
+- Jen, a former SecureDrop engineer who was the technical editor of my book and, for several years, my Dungeons & Dragons dungeon master
+- Saptak, a talented human-rights-focused open source developer who I work with on OnionShare
+- Yael, an investigative journalist friend who, among other things, broke a story with me about how Zoom had lied about supporting end-to-end encryption just as everyone started using it during the pandemic
+- Akil, a talented newsroom engineer I worked closely with at The Intercept
+
+Most companies are owned by investors who only care about profit. They don't care about the workers, and they definitely don't care about the end-users of the software they make. This is why it's so common for tech companies to end up spying on their users and selling that data: it's an additional way to make a profit for their investors.
+
+We're different. Lockdown Systems is owned by its workers, and we don't have outside investors. We have all agreed to the explicit goals of: ensuring the well-being of our members; making tools that help fight fascism and authoritarianism; and prioritizing impact over profit.
+
+We make decisions by coming to consensus, and everyone in the collective gets paid the same wage. Even though I started Cyd, I don't have more say than anyone else.
+
+***Em:*** *That is such a great organizational structure for software development. Lockdown Systems really has an impressive team of skilled and dedicated people. Presently, it seems from the website and [GitHub page](https://github.com/lockdown-systems) that Lockdown Systems is focusing on developing and growing Cyd only. Are you planning on using Lockdown Systems mainly for Cyd or are you envisaging other applications getting added to Lockdown Systems in the near (or far) future?*
+
+**Micah:**
+
+So far, Cyd is our only product. There are many features we plan on building, and we also need to get it the point where it can fund our continued work. Most likely, this will be our main project for the near future.
+
+That said, we're definitely open to branching out. We make software that directly empowers individuals, helping them reclaim their autonomy and privacy. So if we see an opportunity to build something that will directly help people who are facing fascist threats -- whether it's supporting abortion access, keeping immigrants safe, helping communities organize mutual aid, etc. -- we will absolutely do it.
+
+***Em:*** *If one day some generous millionaire (let's keep it at millionaire, we all know what happens at billionaire) decided to give Lockdown Systems a huge budget bump no string attached, how would you like to grow the organization with this money?*
+
+**Micah:**
+
+One cool thing about being a member of a collective is that if this happened, the whole collective would brainstorm together and we'd come up with ideas that are far better than what I could come up with alone. But that said, I definitely have some thoughts.
+
+Right now, everyone is working part time, between about 10 and 30 hours a week each. If we had the resources, many of us would work on Cyd full-time, and we'd be able to offer benefits like health care and retirement contributions. We could also increase how many people are part of the collective, and build out new features at a much faster rate.
+
+In my mind, future Cyd will be a single app (possible available on mobile devices, not just desktop) where you can have total control over all of your data that's currently stored by tech companies (X, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, LinkedIn, Reddit, Bluesky, Mastodon, Discord, Slack, Telegram, Amazon, Airbnb, Substack, and on and on). You can backup all your data and then have choice over where you want the rest of it: you can delete *everything*, or you can choose to keep your online presence that you're proud of. You can easily cross-post to multiple platforms, and also automatically delete your older posts from the corporate platforms, while keeping them live on the open ones. Or, however else you choose to do it.
+
+If we had a bigger team to pay for more labor, there's a lot that we could get done.
+
+***Em:*** *In the meantime, I imagine one million $1 donations could also help. If our readers would like to support the development of Lockdown Systems, they can make a [donation on this page](https://opencollective.com/lockdown-systems).*
+
+## OnionShare: The app to share files, host websites, and chat anonymously through Tor
+
+***Em:*** *Our community is likely familiar with this great application included in so many security and privacy-focused projects, including [Tails](https://tails.net/), [Qubes OS](https://www.qubes-os.org/), [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org/), and [Parrot OS](https://parrotsec.org/). What motivated you to create [OnionShare](https://onionshare.org) more than 10 years ago, and what do you think is the best way to use it now?*
+
+**Micah:**
+
+I made OnionShare in 2014 while I was helping journalists report on the Snowden documents. The big motivation was a border search: Glenn Greenwald's partner, David, traveled from Berlin, where he was visiting Laura Poitras, back to his home in Rio de Janeiro. He was carrying an encrypted hard drive, on an assignment for The Guardian. During his layover at Heathrow airport in London, UK authorities detained him and searched him.
+
+None of this was necessary. Using the internet, encryption, and Tor, it's possible to securely move documents around the world without putting anyone at risk at a border crossing. In fact, I was already doing something similar with journalists I was collaborating with on Snowden stories myself. To send someone secret documents, I'd first encrypt them using PGP, and then place them in a folder on my laptop. I'd start up a web server with a simple directory listing for that folder, and then make that web server accessible as a Tor onion service.
+
+While this wasn't too hard for me, an experienced Linux nerd, to set up, it would be very challenging for most people. I made OnionShare basically as a user-friendly way for anyone to be able to securely share files, peer-to-peer, without needing to first upload them to some third party service like Dropbox.
+
+Today, OnionShare has more features. It's basically like a graphical interface to do cool things with Tor onion services -- you can send files, but you can also turn your laptop into an anonymous dropbox so people can upload files to you, and you can quickly host onion websites and spin up temporary chatrooms too. And there are Android and iPhone apps!
+
+The last time I used OnionShare myself was last week. On my personal newsletter, I'm writing a [series of posts](https://micahflee.com/exploring-the-paramilitary-leaks/) exploring the Paramilitary Leaks, 200 GB of data from the American militia movement, obtained by an infiltrator name John Williams. While working on one of my posts, John used OnionShare to send me some additional documents.
+
+## Other projects and thoughts
+
+***Em:*** *You have been a prolific writer as a journalist for [The Intercept](https://theintercept.com/staff/micah-lee/), your own [Blog](https://micahflee.com/), and in January 2024 you [released](https://micahflee.com/2023/12/hacks-leaks-and-revelations-the-art-of-analyzing-hacked-and-leaked-data/) a book called Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations: The Art of Analyzing Hacked and Leaked Data. What is this book about, and who is it written for?*
+
+**Micah:**
+
+I spent many years reporting on hacked and leaked datasets, starting with the Snowden archive. Since then, I've seen the amount of hacked and leaked data grow exponentially. And at the same time, journalists and researchers -- the people who really need to dig through this data and find the good stories -- don't even know where to start.
+
+So that's what my book is, an interactive guide to downloading and exploring datasets. It doesn't require any prior knowledge, but it does get pretty technically, including two chapters teaching Python programming. If you're following along, near the beginning of the book you'll encrypt a USB hard drive and then download a copy of BlueLeaks to it -- hundreds of gigabytes of hacked police documents from the middle of the Black Lives Matter uprising in 2020. You'll use this dataset, along with several others, as examples as you learn how to make sense of data like this.
+
+You should definitely buy the book if you're interested and you can, but information wants to be free, so I also released the whole book under a Creative Commons license. You can read the whole thing online at [hacksandleaks.com](https://hacksandleaks.com/).
+
+***Em:*** *I can see how much of a valuable skill this is to learn for journalists and researchers in this day and age. Even if nothing compares to having a physical paper copy (in my opinion), it's wonderful that you share your book online for people who, for various reasons, cannot order a copy. You have worked or still work with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Freedom of the Press Foundation, Science & Design, the Tor Project, and Distributed Denial of Secrets. Your contribution and commitment to digital rights is undeniable. From your experience, what are you envisioning for the future of digital rights activism?*
+
+**Micah:**
+
+I don't have all of the answers, but I do think that it's important for digital rights activists to meet the moment. Fascist politicians are gaining power around the world. The gap between the ultra rich and everyone else is wider than it's ever been before. Elon Musk has openly bought the US government, and the Trump-supporting oligarchs control all of our critical tech infrastructure. Climate change deniers and anti-vaxxers are the ones in charge right now, at least in the US. Things are pretty bad.
+
+Whatever we do, we should have the goal of shifting power away from the fascists and billionaires and towards everyone else. We need alternative platforms that are not only open and democratic, but also just as easy to use as the corporate walled gardens. We need digital rights, not to mention digital security, to fully integrate itself into the rest of the mass movements going on now, whether it's to save the planet from climate change, to protect immigrants getting sent to gulags, or to stop the genocide in Gaza.
+
+***Em:*** *Absolutely, and digital rights advocates and organizations undeniably have a crucial role to play in these movements. Finally, is there anything else you would like to share with us that we haven't discussed yet?*
+
+**Micah:**
+
+If you want to support Lockdown Systems and you work for an organization that might be interested in offering Cyd as a benefit to their employees, check out Cyd for Teams! If we can get organizations on board this will go a long way to making sure we can continue to get paid doing this work: [https://docs.cyd.social/docs/cyd-for-teams/intro](https://docs.cyd.social/docs/cyd-for-teams/intro)
+
+***Em:*** *Thank you so much Micah for taking the time to answer our questions today! The new projects you are working on are fascinating, and so important in the current landscape. I'm excited for more people to discover Cyd and Lockdown Systems, and will myself be following their evolution and expansion enthusiastically.*
+
+## Consider supporting Micah Lee's projects
+
+If you would like to follow Micah Lee's work and support his projects, consider:
+
+- [Following Micah Lee on Mastodon](https://infosec.exchange/@micahflee)
+
+- [Reading Micah Lee's Blog](https://micahflee.com/)
+
+- [Donating to Cyd and Lockdown Systems](https://opencollective.com/lockdown-systems)
+
+- [Signing up for Cyd for Teams](https://docs.cyd.social/docs/cyd-for-teams/sign-up)
+
+- [Getting a copy of Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations](https://hacksandleaks.com/)
+
+- [Contributing to one of Micah Lee's software](https://github.com/micahflee)

blog/posts/privacy-means-safety.md

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-03-25T20:30:00Z
+categories:
+    - News
+authors:
+    - em
+description: Privacy is a human right that should be granted to everyone, no matter the reason. That being said, it's also important to remember that for millions of people around the world, data privacy is crucial for physical safety. For people in extreme situations, privacy can literally mean life or death.
+schema_type: NewsArticle
+---
+# Privacy Means Safety
+
+![Photo of a padlock with "SOS" written on it and a drawn heart instead of an "O" letter. It is locked on a metal fence.](../assets/images/privacy-means-safety/privacy-means-safety-cover.webp)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Georgy Rudakov / Unsplash</small>
+
+Privacy is a human right that should be granted to everyone, no matter the reason. That being said, it's also important to remember that for millions of people around the world, data privacy is crucial for physical safety. For people in extreme situations, privacy can literally mean life or death.<!-- more -->
+
+Many of us have experienced moments when our privacy concerns have been minimized or even completely dismissed.
+
+This general hostility towards data protection is dangerous. Yes, dangerous. **Data privacy isn't a trivial matter.**
+
+There are many circumstances where inadvertently or maliciously exposed data can put someone in grave danger. Worse, sometimes this danger might not even be known at the time, but might become incredibly important later on.
+
+We should never downplay the serious risk of exposing someone's data, even if this isn't a situation we personally experience, or even understand.
+
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Content Warning: This article contains mention of sexual assault, violence, and death.</p></div>
+
+## Leaked data can have grave consequences
+
+This isn't a hypothetical situation. There has been many tragic events where people have been harmed and even killed because data about them was leaked, stolen, or otherwise revealed to someone hostile.
+
+### Children
+
+The data of children is something our society should be much more invested in protecting, yet most new legislation [proposed](the-future-of-privacy.md#chat-control-wants-to-break-end-to-end-encryption) or [passed](the-future-of-privacy.md#age-verification-wants-to-collect-your-sensitive-data) to supposedly protect the children are doing the complete *opposite*, endangering everyone's data, *including* the children's.
+
+As for the data protection we already have, they are insufficient to protect most people's data, also including the children's.
+
+In 2020, the Irish child and family agency, Tusla, was fined €75,000 for a breach of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Investigation [revealed](https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/tusla-becomes-first-organisation-fined-for-gdpr-rule-breach-1.4255692) three instances where data about children had been negligently disclosed to unauthorized parties.
+
+In one case, the location and contact information of a mother and child was revealed to an alleged abuser. In another, the agency neglectfully [provided](https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/social-affairs/2025/03/04/abusers-using-data-protection-law-to-get-details-on-victims/) the address of a child and the mother's phone number to a man accused of child sexual abuse.
+
+Such data leaks should never be tolerated. Sadly, much stronger fines will be required to stop organizations from being so dangerously careless.
+
+In 2018, an incredibly unfortunate 12-year-old gamer and his mother were both likely [traumatized for life](https://www.pcgamesn.com/fortnite/fortnite-stream-swatting) by a violent [swatting attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swatting) when the child's home address was exposed online. The outcome of this horrible attack could have ended much more tragically. The story doesn't explain how the child's address was found.
+
+Swatting attacks have become such a [problem](#mistaken-identity) in the United States that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recently [created](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fbi-formed-national-database-track-prevent-swatting-rcna91722) a national database to help track and prevent such attacks.
+
+### Victims of stalkers
+
+Stalking victims are incredibly vulnerable to any data leak. People in such situation can often be gravely endangered by data broker services, data breaches, information they might have shared online recently or decades ago, and information shared about them by friends and family.
+
+Unfortunately, this kind of horrifying situation isn't rare.
+
+The danger to victims of online stalkers should never be minimized. Stalking and harassment are serious crimes that should be reported and severely punished. Overlooking these offenses is being ignorant to how quickly the consequences of such crimes can escalate.
+
+In 2019, a 21-year-old Japanese pop star got stalked and sexually [assaulted](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-50000234) by a man who found her location from a picture she posted online. The photo had such high definition that the perpetrator was able to see and identify a specific train station that was visible *through a reflection in the singer's eyes*.
+
+The aggressor also gathered information about the victim's home by examining the photos she posted from her apartment to determine the exact unit location. He then went to the train station he identified from the photo, waited for her, and followed her home.
+
+In 2023, a podcast host and her husband were [killed](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/podcast-host-killed-stalker-deep-seated-fear-safety-records-reveal-rcna74842) by an online stalker. Despite having requested a protection order against the murderer, and despite blocking his phone number and social media accounts, after months of intense harassment online, the man eventually found the podcaster's home address, broke in, and fatally shot her and her husband.
+
+### Victims of domestic violence
+
+Victims of domestic violence are at an elevated risk of severe or even fatal repercussions when their data gets leaked or shared. People in this extreme situation often have to take extreme measures to protect data that could allow their abuser to find their new location.
+
+Things as banal as exposing someone's license plate, or posting online a photo taken in a public space could literally get a person in such situation killed.
+
+Moreover, some abusers are [weaponizing](https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/social-affairs/2025/03/04/abusers-using-data-protection-law-to-get-details-on-victims/) subject access requests in an attempt to find the location of the victims fleeing them.
+
+It is imperative to ensure that data access legislation cannot be misused in such a dangerous way. Data legally shared with a subject should never lead to the harm of someone else.
+
+In another instance, a woman who was raped by a former partner was unable to safely receive counseling care because the notes from her counseling sessions could have been [shared](https://www.irishtimes.com/crime-law/courts/2025/01/17/calls-for-law-to-be-changed-to-end-access-to-rape-victims-counselling-notes/) in court with the perpetrator.
+
+Data privacy regulations should protect such sensitive data from being shared without explicit and free consent from the patient.
+
+### Healthcare seekers
+
+People seeking essential healthcare in adverse jurisdictions can be prosecuted when their private communications or locations are intercepted.
+
+In 2023, a mother from Nebraska (US) was arrested and criminally [charged](https://www.theverge.com/2023/7/11/23790923/facebook-meta-woman-daughter-guilty-abortion-nebraska-messenger-encryption-privacy) after she helped her 17-year-old daughter get an abortion.
+
+The woman was arrested partly based on the Facebook messages she exchanged with her daughter discussing medication for the abortion. Police obtained a copy of the private Facebook conversation by serving a warrant to Meta, which the company quickly complied with.
+
+### Whistleblowers and activists
+
+Whistleblowers and activists are at especially high risk of harm, particularly if they have publicly opposed or exposed oppressive regimes or criminal groups.
+
+Governments around the world, especially more authoritarian ones, have been increasingly [monitoring social media](https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/5337/social-media-monitoring-uk-invisible-surveillance-tool-increasingly-deployed) to track, identify, and persecute critics, activists, and journalists.
+
+Authorities have also been mandating direct collaboration from service providers to arrest activists. In 2021, a French climate activist was [arrested](https://techcrunch.com/2021/09/06/protonmail-logged-ip-address-of-french-activist-after-order-by-swiss-authorities/) after Proton Mail was legally [compelled](https://proton.me/blog/climate-activist-arrest) by Swiss laws to log and share the activist's IP address with authorities.
+
+In 2017, a 25-year-old working for the American National Security Agency (NSA) as a contractor was arrested after she was [identified](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/06/how-a-few-yellow-dots-burned-the-intercepts-nsa-leaker/) as the whistleblower who leaked a report about Russian electoral interference in the United States.
+
+The whistleblower had mailed the classified document to The Intercept anonymously. However, when the news organization tried to confirm the authenticity of the document with the NSA, the agency was able to determine which printer was used to print this copy, and from there deanonymized [Reality Winner](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reality_Winner). The technique used to track the document was the reading of almost invisible [printer tracking dots](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printer_tracking_dots) that many laser printers and photocopiers produce on all printed documents.
+
+This year on March 7th, community activist and whistleblower Pamela Mabini was [shot and killed](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/11/activist-and-whistleblower-killed-south-africa) just outside her home in South Africa. She was an activist working with the [Maro Foundation](https://www.dailydispatch.co.za/local-heroes/2023-07-10-helping-others-is-the-reason-for-pamela-mabinis-smile/), a nonprofit organization dedicated to fighting poverty and gender-based violence.
+
+Mabini's murder has sparked a debate on the importance of protections offered to whistleblowers [exposing criminals](https://www.citizen.co.za/news/another-high-profile-whistleblower-gunned-down-how-safe-speak-out/) to justice. Following the activist's death, organizations have been calling to fast-track the [Whistleblower Protection Bill](https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/calls-for-government-to-fast-track-protection-bill-following-activists-murder-3e8adc20-be58-4f3d-9a55-4a5818171c92) to bring more protections to those fighting for justice in South Africa.
+
+### Trans and queer activists
+
+Trans and queer activists are at elevated risk of harassment online in today's political climate. In 2022, 28-year-old trans activist Clara Sorrenti was victim of a swatting attack after police believed a fake report about violent threats made by her aggressor.
+
+She was arrested at gunpoint by the police, handcuffed, had her electronic devices seized, and her apartment searched for eight hours for non-existent evidence. The aggressor who made the false threats had [provided](https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/london/trans-twitch-star-arrested-at-gunpoint-fears-for-life-after-someone-sent-police-to-her-london-ont-home-1.6546015) her name and home address to police.
+
+### Journalists
+
+Journalists around the world can become vulnerable to attacks even from governments when they report on oppressive regimes. This kind of situation can be extremely dangerous, considering the almost unlimited resources state-backed attackers can have to identify, track, and persecute their victims.
+
+In 2018, the prominent journalist and critic of Saudi Arabia's government Jamal Khashoggi was [murdered](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-45812399). Despite being based in the United States, the journalist traveled to Istanbul's Saudi consulate in Turkey to pick up official documents. Khashoggi was killed inside the consulate a few days later on October 2nd.
+
+Investigations revealed that people close to Khashoggi had their devices infected by NSO's [Pegasus spyware](https://freedom.press/digisec/blog/journalists-targeted-with-pegasus-yet-again/). This likely allowed the attacker to gather information about Khashoggi traveling outside the United States.
+
+Many other journalists, politicians, and human rights activists have been [targeted](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-57891506) by state-backed spyware such as Pegasus.
+
+In 2022, Human Rights Watch [reported](https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/05/iran-state-backed-hacking-activists-journalists-politicians) that two of their staff members and at least 18 other activists, researchers, or journalists working on Middle East issues had been targeted by a phishing campaign coming from a group affiliated with the Iranian government. The entity succeeded in stealing emails and other sensitive data from at least three human rights defenders.
+
+### Targeted harassment
+
+Another danger of leaked data that shouldn't be minimized is targeted harassment. Targeted harassment can have devastating consequences ranging from silencing their victims, to suicide, to death by swatting attack.
+
+A well-known example of targeted harassment is Gamergate. Gamergate was a loosely organized [harassment campaign](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamergate_(harassment_campaign)) targeting women in the video game industry. It started in 2014 when Zoë Quinn's ex-partner published a blog post with false insinuation about Quinn, a video game developer.
+
+Quinn was subsequently subjected to an incredibly intrusive [doxxing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doxing) campaign, and even received rape threats and death threats. Attackers were able to steal an insecure password and [break into](https://time.com/4927076/zoe-quinn-gamergate-doxxing-crash-override-excerpt/) one of Quinn's account, which resulted in horrible consequences. The harassment campaign later expanded to target others who had defended Quinn online.
+
+In another case, targeted harassment resulted in one death and a five years prison sentence. In 2020, Mark Herring started receiving requests asking him to give up his Twitter handle, which he refused. Herring's "crime" was to have been quick enough to secure the handle "@Tennessee" shortly after Twitter came online.
+
+Over weeks, harassment escalated from sustained text messaging to random food delivery to his house. After Herring's harasser posted his home address in [a Discord chat room used by criminals](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/07/serial-swatter-who-caused-death-gets-five-years-in-prison/), someone used this data to direct a swatting attack at Herring's place. Police surrounded his home and demanded he crawl under a back fence, despite his health. After crawling under the fence, 60-year-old Mark Herring stoop up then collapsed from a heart attack, and died soon after.
+
+### Mistaken identity
+
+What is more, everyone can get victimized by exposed data, even people who are not online and even people who are not a whistleblower, a journalist, an activist, a victim of domestic violence, or someone who has committed the "unthinkable crime" of securing a cool Twitter handle.
+
+In 2017, 28-year-old Andrew Finch was [shot and killed](https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/14/us/swatting-sentence-casey-viner/index.html) by police during a swatting attack in the United States.
+
+The attack was conducted after the perpetrator had an argument online over a multiplayer first-person shooter game. The perpetrator, who was later sentenced, threatened another player he was upset with to "swat" him. The perpetrator then enlisted another man to call the police and conduct the attack on the player, with the home address the player provided. This address turned out to be the previous address of the player, which was now Andrew Finch's address.
+
+When police arrived at Andrew Finch's home and surrounded the place, Finch, completely unaware of what was happening, barely had the time to comply and get outside when the police shot and killed him at the front door.
+
+The man who conducted the swatting attack for the perpetrator got [sentenced](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Wichita_swatting) to 20 years in federal prison.
+
+In 2021, an Australian 15-year-old girl was [mistakenly targeted](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-26/canberra-family-doxxed-sent-death-threats-after-social-video/100014706) and later doxxed with her real information after she had been wrongly identified online as someone who had participated in a racist social media video posted on Facebook.
+
+A few hours after her name was shared online, the girl started to be inundated by hateful messages and unspeakable threats from all around the world. Her phone number and home address were eventually shared online. Her family received hateful messages from strangers as well.
+
+During the ordeal, her mother had to be hospitalized for heart disease. The girl, who had absolutely nothing to do with the racist video that spawned the attacks, contemplated suicide due to the violence of the harassment. She and her mother no longer felt safe.
+
+Digital traces of the personal data that was exposed during the attacks will likely remain online forever, even if the girl and her family were completely innocent and unrelated to what triggered the cyber-swarming.
+
+The 26-year-old American who incorrectly identified the Australian girl and shared her name and social media accounts online later apologized for his mistake.
+
+## How data finds its way to an aggressor
+
+### Targeted research, attack, and spyware
+
+For targeted attacks, aggressors will often use simple techniques to find a victim's data from what is already leaked online, or openly shared on social media. For more sophisticated attacks, perpetrators might use criminal methods such as impersonation for [SIM swap attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam). When attackers have more resources, such as a state-backed attackers, more sophisticated processes might be used, like device infection with [NSO Group's spyware](https://citizenlab.ca/tag/nso-group/).
+
+### Maliciously stolen or negligently leaked
+
+Data can be stolen maliciously in all sort of ways, but even more often and common, data is leaked online from banal *negligence*.
+
+Once data is leaked online, it will likely become accessible to anyone looking for it eventually. Additionally, any data breach happening now has the potential to endanger someone years down the line. Perhaps it's a home address that has not changed in years, a phone number used for a decade, a legal name, a photograph, or even a [medical file](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2024/04/man-who-mass-extorted-psychotherapy-patients-gets-six-years/).
+
+Unfortunately, the data broker industry thrives on bundling up all this data together in neat packages to be sold to anyone looking for it, making any attacker's job much easier.
+
+#### Unencrypted data
+
+When the data leaked or stolen is well encrypted, the [risk is reduced](https://www.maketecheasier.com/how-secure-stolen-encrypted-data/). If the leaked data cannot be decrypted easily, this will greatly mitigate the damage done by a breach. Conversely, unencrypted leaked data will always inflict maximum damage.
+
+This is why we should demand that all the services we use implement strong, *end-to-end* encryption wherever possible.
+
+### Obliviously shared without consent
+
+Sometimes, the data endangering someone isn't leaked negligently or stolen maliciously, but simply shared by a friend or a family member oblivious to the danger.
+
+This is [a cultural problem we all need to work on](the-privacy-of-others.md).
+
+Despite all the technological protections we can put on data, and despite all the regulations we can ask organizations to comply with, if our culture doesn't understand the danger of sharing the data of others, we will fail to protect the most vulnerable people in our society.
+
+## Protecting data for everyone's safety is a societal, communal, and individual responsibility
+
+Protecting data isn't simply a matter of preference, although it can absolutely be. But for so many people around the world, it is vital to understand how *crucial* data privacy is.
+
+As explicitly demonstrated above, data protection can literally mean life or death for people in vulnerable situations. Beyond that, it is unfortunately also true for anyone unlucky enough to get mistakenly targeted when their data is shared.
+
+In all of these situations, **data privacy means safety**.
+
+We must demand that governments, corporations, and organizations of all kinds do better to improve data protection practices and technologies.
+
+As a community, we also have a responsibility to protect the most vulnerable people from harm caused by data leaks.
+
+And finally, as individuals, we share this duty of care and must all work on improving the way we protect our own data, but even more importantly, the data of everyone around us.
+
+**Privacy means safety, for everyone.**
+
+---
+
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Resources in the United States & Canada</p>
+
+If you or someone you know is in one of the situations described above, these additional resources may help. Make sure to take [appropriate measures](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/threat-modeling/) to protect your privacy if your situation is sensitive. If you are in a high risk situation, you might want to access these resources using [Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/) or [Tails](installing-and-using-tails.md).
+
+**Suicide & Crisis Support Line** :material-arrow-right-bold: [988 Lifeline](https://988lifeline.org/) Phone number: 988 (US & Canada)
+
+**Trans Peer Support** :material-arrow-right-bold: [Trans Lifeline Hotline](https://translifeline.org/hotline/) Phone number US: 1-877-565-8860 / Canada: 1-877-330-6366
+
+**Stalking Victim Support**  :material-arrow-right-bold: US: [SafeHorizon](https://www.safehorizon.org/get-help/stalking/) / Canada: [The Canadian Resource Centre for Victims of Crime](https://crcvc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Cyberstalking-_DISCLAIMER_Revised-Aug-2022_FINAL.pdf)
+
+**Domestic Violence Victim Support** :material-arrow-right-bold: US: [The National Domestic Violence Hotline](https://www.thehotline.org/) Phone number: 1-800-799-7233 / Canada: [Canadian resources by situation and province](https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/health-promotion/stop-family-violence/services.html)
+
+**Reproductive Rights & Healthcare** :material-arrow-right-bold: US: [Planned Parenthood](https://www.plannedparenthood.org/) / Canada: [Action Canada for Sexual Health & Rights](https://www.actioncanadashr.org/resources/services)
+
+**Journalists and Whistleblowers** :material-arrow-right-bold: US: [Freedom or the Press Foundation Guides & Resources](https://freedom.press/digisec/guides/) / Canada: [Canadian Association of Journalists](https://caj.ca/advocacy/digital-security/)
+
+**Protesters** :material-arrow-right-bold: [The Protesters' Guide to Smartphone Security](activists-guide-securing-your-smartphone.md)
+
+</div>
+
+---
+
+**Correction (Mar. 27):** This article was updated to correct a typo in a date. The previous version wrongly described the arrest of a French climate activist happening in 2012, when these events actually happened in 2021. 

blog/posts/private-european-alternatives.md

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-03-19T21:00:00Z
+categories:
+    - News
+authors:
+    - jonah
+description: There is a growing sentiment that the US shouldn't be relied upon for the technologies that many people and businesses use every day. These privacy-centric recommendations come from a variety of European-based companies and organizations, that you should definitely consider checking out!
+schema_type: NewsArticle
+preview:
+  color: "#003399"
+  text_color: "#ffffff"
+  site_logo: privacy-guides-logo-notext-colorbg-white.svg
+  icon: simple/europeanunion
+---
+# Privacy-Respecting European Tech Alternatives
+
+![European Union flag and Privacy Guides logo side by side](../assets/images/private-european-alternatives/eu-alternatives.webp)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides</small>
+
+There is a growing sentiment that the US shouldn't be relied upon for the technologies that many people and businesses use every day. Lately, the US has been unilaterally [cutting off](https://archive.ph/EJ26f) access to critical technologies to European countries, prompting [calls for "radical action"](https://techcrunch.com/2025/03/16/european-tech-industry-coalition-calls-for-radical-action-on-digital-sovereignty-starting-with-buying-local/) to bolster European tech stacks from EU lawmakers.<!-- more -->
+
+At Privacy Guides, we generally value technical guarantees over matters like jurisdiction. There is simply no alternative to privacy technologies like strong *end-to-end encryption* when it comes to protecting your information.
+
+That being said, the United States *certainly* does not have a monopoly on the best technologies, and many of our favorite [recommended tools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) come from Europe and all over the world. Tools from the European Union also generally benefit from much stronger data protection laws, thanks to the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
+
+If supporting the European tech industry is something that is important to you, here's a non-exhaustive list of some of our favorites. We have many more recommendations throughout our website if you are interested in learning more about privacy-respecting tech alternatives!
+
+## :material-email: Email Services
+
+Many people and businesses are tied to Google's Gmail or Microsoft's Outlook products, but there are *far* more secure and private [alternative email providers](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/) out there!
+
+### Tuta :flag_de:
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Tuta logo](../assets/img/email/tuta.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+![Tuta logo](../assets/img/email/tuta-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+
+Based in Hanover, Germany, **Tuta** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since 2011.
+
+Free accounts start with 1 GB of storage.
+
+[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/#tuta){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://tuta.com){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+### Proton Mail :flag_ch:
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Proton Mail logo](../assets/img/email/protonmail.svg){ align=right }
+
+Based in Geneva, Switzerland, **Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since 2013.
+
+The Proton Mail Free plan comes with 500 MB of Mail storage, which you can increase up to 1 GB for free.
+
+[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/#proton-mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://proton.me){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+## :material-file-document-edit: Office Suites
+
+Of course, email isn't the only thing offered by solutions like Google Workspace and Microsoft 365. Many people use their entire suite of [productivity tools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/document-collaboration/) to manage their businesses and collaborate with others.
+
+Luckily, there are plenty of alternatives that incorporate strong encryption and can even be self-hosted, which will not only decrease your reliance on the traditional Big Tech companies, but keep your data far more secure as well.
+
+### CryptPad :flag_fr:
+
+Developed and hosted by *XWiki* in Paris, France, **CryptPad** is a complete online office suite with applications including Documents, Rich Text, Spreadsheets, Code/Markdown, Kanban, Slides, Whiteboard and Forms.
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![CryptPad logo](../assets/img/document-collaboration/cryptpad.svg){ align=right }
+
+**CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily.
+
+[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/document-collaboration/#cryptpad){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://cryptpad.org){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+:material-star-box: We recently did a [full review of CryptPad](cryptpad-review.md), which you should definitely check out if you might be interested in switching!
+
+### Nextcloud :flag_de:
+
+**Nextcloud** comes from German startup *Nextcloud GmbH*, and offers a complete cloud drive alternative to Google Drive or OneDrive.
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Nextcloud logo](../assets/img/document-collaboration/nextcloud.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/document-collaboration/#nextcloud){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://nextcloud.com){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+### LibreOffice :flag_de:
+
+**LibreOffice** is developed by *The Document Foundation* based in Berlin, Germany. It's a free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality.
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![LibreOffice logo](../assets/img/office-suites/libreoffice.svg){ align=right }
+
+Web-based editors aren't for everyone. If you need a full-fledged office suite that runs locally on your computer, **LibreOffice** is a fantastic alternative to Microsoft Office.
+
+[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/office-suites/#libreoffice){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://libreoffice.org){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+## :material-search-web: Search Engines
+
+One of the most frequently used tools on the internet is the venerable search engine. Switching from **Google** to an [alternative](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/) is one of the biggest impact approaches to improving your privacy that you can make.
+
+### Startpage :flag_nl:
+
+Headquartered and developed in the Netherlands, Startpage is one great alternative to Google you could consider:
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Startpage logo](../assets/img/search-engines/startpage.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+![Startpage logo](../assets/img/search-engines/startpage-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+
+**Startpage** is a private search engine. One of Startpage's unique features is the [Anonymous View](https://startpage.com/en/anonymous-view), which puts forth efforts to standardize user activity to make it more difficult to be uniquely identified. The feature can be useful for hiding [some](https://support.startpage.com/hc/articles/4455540212116-The-Anonymous-View-Proxy-technical-details) network and browser properties. However, unlike the name suggests, the feature should not be relied upon for *total* anonymity.
+
+[:octicons-info-16: Homepage](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/#startpage){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://startpage.com){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+It is worth noting that [since 2020](relisting-startpage.md), Startpage has been a subsidiary of American company System1. Their operations and employees remain in the Netherlands, and you can choose to utilize only European servers if you wish.
+
+## :material-earth: Web Browsers
+
+Web browsers are historically very tricky to build, and the three major browser engines, Chromium, Gecko (Firefox), and WebKit (Safari) are all *primarily* developed by American companies. This is a space that could certainly use improvement.
+
+### Mullvad Browser :flag_se:
+
+One of our [recommended browsers](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop-browsers/) is spearheaded by Swedish VPN company *Mullvad*, although it's worth noting that its development is somewhat reliant on American non-profits Mozilla and the Tor Project, being a Tor Browser fork.
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Mullvad Browser logo](../assets/img/browsers/mullvad_browser.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Mullvad Browser** is a version of Tor Browser with Tor network integrations removed. It aims to provide to VPN users Tor Browser's anti-fingerprinting browser technologies, which are key protections against mass surveillance programs. It is developed by the Tor Project and distributed by Mullvad, although it does *not* require the use of Mullvad's VPN.
+
+[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop-browsers/#mullvad-browser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/browser){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+## :material-map: Maps & Navigation
+
+Mapping and location apps like Google Maps can track your every move, and that data is used by tech companies for a wide variety of purposes, including for military and defense. The best mapping apps for your privacy can be used completely offline:
+
+### Organic Maps :flag_ee:
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Organic Maps logo](../assets/img/maps/organic-maps.svg){ align=right }
+
+Based in Estonia, **Organic Maps** is an open source, community-developed map display and satnav-style navigation app for walkers, drivers, and cyclists. The app offers worldwide offline maps based on OpenStreetMap data, and navigation with privacy — no location tracking, no data collection, and no ads. The app can be used completely offline.
+
+[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/maps/#organic-maps){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://organicmaps.app){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+### OsmAnd :flag_nl:
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![OsmAnd logo](../assets/img/maps/osmand.svg){ align=right }
+
+Based in the Netherlands, **OsmAnd** is an offline map and navigation application based on OpenStreetMap, offering turn-by-turn navigation for walking, cycling, driving, as well as public transport. It is open-source and does not collect any user data.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/maps/#osmand){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://osmand.net){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+## :material-form-textbox-password: Password Managers
+
+### KeePassXC :flag_de:
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![KeePassXC logo](../assets/img/password-management/keepassxc.svg){ align=right }
+
+**KeePassXC** is a community fork of KeePassX, a native cross-platform port of KeePass Password Safe, with the goal of extending and improving it with new features and bug fixes to provide a feature-rich, cross-platform, and modern open-source password manager.
+
+[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/#keepassxc){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://keepassxc.org){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+:material-star-box: We recently published an article on [securely using KeePassXC with a YubiKey](installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey.md)!
+
+### Proton Pass :flag_ch:
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Proton Pass logo](../assets/img/password-management/protonpass.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Proton Pass** is an open-source, end-to-end encrypted password manager developed by the Swiss company Proton AG, the team behind Proton Mail. It securely stores your login credentials, generates unique email aliases, and supports and stores passkeys.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/#proton-pass){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://proton.me/pass){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+## :material-chat-processing: Instant Messengers
+
+Switching off of WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, or iMessage in favor of a more [private instant messenger](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/) is an excellent way to safeguard your chats.
+
+### Element :flag_gb:
+
+Element is based in the United Kingdom, which is of course no longer in the European Union. However, it is a trusted messaging platform by the [French government](https://element.io/case-studies/tchap), and the [German military](https://element.io/case-studies/bundeswehr), among many other organizations in Europe and around the world looking for sovereignty from Big Tech messaging platforms like Slack and Google Messages.
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Element logo](../assets/img/messengers/element.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Element** is the flagship client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/chat_basics/matrix-for-im) protocol, an [open standard](https://spec.matrix.org/latest) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
+
+Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE, as are one-to-one voice and video calls.
+
+[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#element){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://element.io){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+### SimpleX :flag_gb:
+
+Another open-source option from the United Kingdom, SimpleX chat has very strong security features, and can be entirely self-hosted anywhere in the world if you prefer the assurances a [custom server](https://simplex.chat/docs/server.html) can bring.
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Simplex logo](../assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right }
+
+**SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against censorship.
+
+[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#simplex-chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplex.chat){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+### Briar :earth_africa:
+
+Briar is an open source project not legally incorporated in any jurisdiction, although it has received funding from European initiatives like [NGI](https://ngi.eu/) and the [NLnet Foundation](https://nlnet.nl/), and includes many Europeans in their voluntary board and team.
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Briar logo](../assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing censorship. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
+
+[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#briar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+
+</div>
+
+## More Services...
+
+Looking for more? Here's a short (and non-exhaustive) list of other recommendations of ours which are based in Europe:
+
+- [**VPN Services**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/): :flag_se: [Mullvad](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/#mullvad) and :flag_ch: [Proton VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/#proton-vpn)
+- [**DNS Providers**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/dns/#recommended-providers): :flag_fr: [dns0.eu](https://dns0.eu/), :flag_se: [Mullvad DNS](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls), and :flag_ch: [Quad9](https://quad9.net/)
+- [**Calendars**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/calendar/): :flag_de: [Tuta](https://tuta.com/calendar) and :flag_ch: [Proton Calendar](https://proton.me/calendar)
+- [**Notes Apps**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/notebooks/): :flag_gb: [Joplin](https://joplinapp.org/) and :flag_ee: [Crypt.ee](https://crypt.ee/)
+- [**Pastebins**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/pastebins/): :flag_fr: [PrivateBin](https://privatebin.info/)
+- [**Linux Distros**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop/): :flag_de: [openSUSE](https://www.opensuse.org/)
+
+If you're in Europe and looking to build or host your *own* European technology, there are also plenty of alternatives to the typical American IT providers. Topics like cloud computing platforms, web analytics services, and content delivery networks are currently out of scope for what we cover here at Privacy Guides, but [European Alternatives](https://european-alternatives.eu/) is one great resource for finding more services like these.
+
+At the end of the day, we trust *all* of our [recommended privacy tools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) to keep you safe from prying eyes, but there are many valid reasons you may prefer to stick to the European market.

blog/posts/signal-configuration-and-hardening.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 date:
     created: 2022-07-07T19:00:00Z
-    updated: 2024-08-23T19:00:00Z
+    updated: 2025-04-15T04:00:00Z
 authors:
     - contributors
     - matchboxbananasynergy
@@ -176,9 +176,16 @@ On Android/iOS:
 
 For incoming calls from people who are not in your Contacts app, the call will be relayed through the Signal server regardless of how you've set it up.
 
-### Proxy Support
+### Bypass Internet Censorship
 
-If Signal is blocked in your country, Signal allows you to set up a proxy to bypass it.
+If Signal is blocked in your country, it has a built-in "Censorship Circumvention" feature that uses domain fronting to bypass restrictions.
+
+On Android/iOS:
+
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Advanced**
+- [x] Turn on **Censorship Circumvention**
+
+Additionally, Signal allows you to set up a proxy to bypass censorship.
 
 !!! Warning
 

blog/posts/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption.md

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-04-01T05:40:00Z
+categories:
+    - Opinion
+tags:
+    - April Fools
+authors:
+    - aprilfools
+license: BY-SA
+description: Privacy Guides is formally taking a stand against dangerous and frightening technologies.
+schema_type: SatiricalArticle
+preview:
+  logo: blog/assets/images/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption/fire.svg
+---
+# The Dangers of End-to-End Encryption
+
+![An image showing a burning car](../assets/images/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption/cover.webp)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Flavio / Unsplash</small>
+
+In the digital age, nothing is more important than convenience and easy access to data. Unfortunately, there has been an alarming trend among technologists to implement **End-to-End Encryption** (E2EE) in their applications, to the detriment of all the important work being done by countless organizations, including the best and brightest intelligence agencies and big tech companies.<!-- more -->
+
+<div class="admonition tip inline" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">April Fools!</p>
+
+This article was published on April 1st, 2025.
+
+Privacy Guides supports strong encryption as a cornerstone of digital security and personal freedom. End-to-end encryption ensures that **your** communications remain **yours**, which is a principle worth preserving.
+
+</div>
+
+Security-focused developers and misguided "advocates" have long attempted to convince those involved in privacy and security that E2EE is an advanced security measure designed to protect your sensitive data, and *Privacy Guides* has stood by for far too long not setting the record straight.
+
+In this article, we are going to explore how these "protections" actually endanger you and pose critical threats to society at large. Threats that are so grave that numerous government agencies around the world insist that we immediately limit or eliminate E2EE entirely, before our world as we know it falls apart.
+
+*Privacy Guides* is acutely aware of these serious concerns, and believes privacy should always be a conditional right, used *responsibly*.
+
+## E2EE hampers *legitimate* government surveillance
+
+Every day, intelligence agencies carry out perfectly legitimate surveillance activities against both their own citizens and foreigners. There is no question that these agencies are crucial to the upkeep of our national security, and it is our moral obligation to assist them in these warrantless activities, whether we know it or not.
+
+When services like [Signal](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/) or [Tuta](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/) keep all of their users messages locked in an impenetrable vault, how are they supposed to keep tabs on potential criminals using their services?
+
+The reality is that if the government is not allowed to read *every* message being sent, they might never encounter the *one* that actually warrants suspicion.
+
+It's true that end-to-end encryption also protects the lives of journalists, whistleblowers, and human-rights activists from those few governments which are *actually* oppressive, but these edge-cases should not be used as an excuse to hinder legitimate governments like in the US or the UK.
+
+## E2EE encourages crime
+
+With end-to-end encryption, criminals are granted a free pass for unlimited criminal activity. *Nobody* can read their messages besides them! Shocking, isn't it?
+
+If platforms simply removed all forms of encryption from their services, we could solve cybercrime, illegal drug dealing, dangerous hacking attempts, child exploitation, and terrorism overnight... right?
+
+There is plenty of historical precedent here. Platforms like Snapchat which *don't* utilize end-to-end encryption have bravely been [involved in noble arrests](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68099669), stopping criminals in their tracks before they had a chance to act.
+
+Users of these platforms who aren't criminals do benefit a bit from end-to-end encryption. It protects them from identity theft, surveillance, and data breaches every day. With any sort of trade-off like this, this is certainly a factor to consider. We believe it is very clear that giving up minor protections like this is a small price to pay to potentially intercept the next dangerous joke in a group text.
+
+## It prevents *helpful* backdoors
+
+Many tech companies have tried to [introduce backdoors into their end-to-end encrypted platforms](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/apples-plan-think-different-about-encryption-opens-backdoor-your-private-life), only to be lambasted by the legion of completely unreasonable "privacy advocates" out there. Our stance on privacy is far more principled, and we believe there is a middle-ground to be found in the laws of mathematics.
+
+The solution proposed by companies like Apple and agencies like the FBI is a sound one. They will protect your messages, *unless* they encounter something suspicious. At that point, keys to decrypt your data will be given **only to the good guys**, so that they can enforce the law.
+
+This approach makes a lot of sense. By carefully controlling access to these skeleton keys, it's trivial for companies to make sure they only fall into the right hands. The notion that they might be leaked, or that someone with enough resources could replicate that access, is so far into slippery slope territory that it borders on nonsense. Let's stick with what we know about the security capabilities of these companies today, instead of imagining ridiculous scenarios where they are breached.
+
+## It harms innovation
+
+Think about all the services you use online every day. The companies behind those services *rely* on collecting as much of your personal data as possible in order to constantly produce exciting new innovations. Without mass data collection, how would you get personalized ads for weeks about different new sneakers, because you bought that pair on Amazon yesterday? How else would companies emulate the real-life experience of constantly being hounded by a salesperson in a store selling you the exact thing you desperately need?
+
+E2EE prevents companies from truly knowing their users, stifling these massive advances in advanced user profiling!
+
+Big tech companies monetizing your personal data in ways that you don't need to understand nor consent to is what makes the internet such a magical place. If your private chats are protected with E2EE, companies won't be able to serve you the moment you even *think* about a new lawnmower. What do you think about that?
+
+## It's challenging for developers
+
+Another way E2EE slows down innovation even in the digital security realm is its complexity. Implementing robust cryptographic libraries and user-friendly key management systems is complicated, and software development is supposed to be a piece of cake.
+
+The problem of digital security has already been solved: simply store that information in a database and protect that database from anyone who isn't approved to see it. Protections beyond this tend to be complexity for the sake of complexity. If we did away with the countless developer hours wasted on protection nobody *really* needs, we'd have more time to add longer animations and innovative features like infinite scrolling to keep users happily using their apps for hours on end.
+
+## E2EE is a slippery slope!
+
+Constantly pushing E2EE sets up consumers with a wildly unreasonable expectation, that privacy should be the default. If people got comfortable communicating without tech companies and governments constantly peeking over their shoulder, it's impossible to imagine what they might start thinking next. Maybe they'd start to believe personal liberty is a right, instead of a *privilege*.
+
+End-to-end encryption is an insidious technology that has crept its way into some of the best instant messengers, [cloud storage providers](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cloud/), and other apps. It stands in the way of law enforcement, government security agencies, data-collecting corporations, and anyone else who might need to peek into your personal life.
+
+It's time we took a stand against this technology and demand a true solution from our governments: **Sensible** regulations that allow for *partial* protections while keeping the option for these entities to decrypt it when necessary intact. The sense of security is all that truly matters to most people anyway.
+
+[Who needs *complete* privacy](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/why-privacy-matters/) when you can have a half-baked version easily circumvented by the good guys? What is privacy in the first place, if not a convenient cover for wrongdoing? If we can't read all messages (just in case), how are we expected to keep society safe?
+
+---
+
+This article was published on April Fools' Day. If you've made it to the end, and you haven't noticed how we buried the real benefits of end-to-end encryption in our hyperbolic worst-case scenarios, well... surprise! 😄
+
+Privacy Guides supports strong encryption as a cornerstone of digital security and personal freedom. End-to-end encryption ensures that **your** communications remain **yours**, which is a principle worth preserving.
+
+If the "dangers" of E2EE upset you, maybe it is time to reflect on how crucial privacy is to everyone: You, me, whistleblowers, activists, and everyday people who just want to live their lives. Happy April 1st, and stay secure out there!
+
+*Written by: Jonah Aragon*

blog/posts/the-future-of-privacy.md

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
 date:
     created: 2025-02-03T19:00:00Z
 categories:
-    - Opinion
+    - News
 authors:
     - em
 description: Privacy is intrinsically intertwined with politics. Each change in governance can have serious effects on privacy rights and privacy tools, for better or for worse. Let's examine with concrete examples how politics affect legislations that can have an immense impact on the privacy tools and features we use.
-schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle
+schema_type: NewsArticle
 ---
 
 # The Future of Privacy: How Governments Shape Your Digital Life

blog/posts/the-privacy-of-others.md

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
 date:
     created: 2025-03-10T20:00:00Z
 categories:
-    - Opinion
+    - Explainers
 authors:
     - em
 description: In privacy, we talk a lot about how to protect our own data, but what about our responsibility to protect the data of others? If you care about privacy rights, you must also care for the data of the people around you. Together, we must start building a culture of data privacy where everyone cares for the data of others.
-schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle
+schema_type: NewsArticle
 ---
 # Privacy is Also Protecting the Data of Others
 

docs/about/donate.md

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Support our mission to defend digital rights and spread the word about mass surv
 
 <small markdown>
 
-MAGIC Grants is our fiscal host, and their custom, open-source donation platform allows you to donate to our project with **Monero**, **Bitcoin**, or **debit/credit card**. You can also donate using [:simple-github: GitHub Sponsors](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides).
+MAGIC Grants is our fiscal host, and their custom, open-source donation platform allows you to donate to our project with **Monero**, **Litecoin (MWEB)**, **Bitcoin**, or **debit/credit card**. You can also donate using [:simple-github: GitHub Sponsors](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides).
 
 </small>
 

docs/ai-chat.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ cover: ai-chatbots.webp
 - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
 - [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }
 
-Since the release of ChatGPT in 2022, interactions with Large Language Models (LLMs) have become increasingly common. LLMs can help us write better, understand unfamiliar subjects, or answer a wide range of questions. They can statistically predict the next word based on a vast amount of data scraped from the web.
+The use of **AI chat**, also known as Large Language Models (LLMs), has become increasingly common since the release of ChatGPT in 2022. LLMs can help us write better, understand unfamiliar subjects, or answer a wide range of questions. They work by statistically predicting the next word in their responses based on a vast amount of data scraped from the web.
 
 ## Privacy Concerns About LLMs
 
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ To run AI locally, you need both an AI model and an AI client.
 
 ### Choosing a Model
 
-There are many permissively licensed models available to download. [Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models) is a platform that lets you browse, research, and download models in common formats like [GGUF](https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/en/gguf). Companies that provide good open-weights models include big names like Mistral, Meta, Microsoft, and Google. However, there are also many community models and 'fine-tunes' available. As mentioned above, quantized models offer the best balance between model quality and performance for those using consumer-grade hardware.
+There are many permissively licensed models available to download. [Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models) is a platform that lets you browse, research, and download models in common formats like [GGUF](https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/en/gguf). Companies that provide good open-weights models include big names like Mistral, Meta, Microsoft, and Google. However, there are also many community models and [fine-tuned](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuning_(deep_learning)) models available. As mentioned above, quantized models offer the best balance between model quality and performance for those using consumer-grade hardware.
 
 To help you choose a model that fits your needs, you can look at leaderboards and benchmarks. The most widely-used leaderboard is the community-driven [LM Arena](https://lmarena.ai). Additionally, the [OpenLLM Leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/open-llm-leaderboard/open_llm_leaderboard) focuses on the performance of open-weights models on common benchmarks like [MMLU-Pro](https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.01574).  There are also specialized benchmarks which measure factors like [emotional intelligence](https://eqbench.com), ["uncensored general intelligence"](https://huggingface.co/spaces/DontPlanToEnd/UGI-Leaderboard), and [many others](https://www.nebuly.com/blog/llm-leaderboards).
 
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ To help you choose a model that fits your needs, you can look at leaderboards an
 
 ![Kobold.cpp Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/kobold.png){align=right}
 
-Kobold.cpp is an AI client that runs locally on your Windows, Mac, or Linux computer. It's an excellent choice if you are looking for heavy customization and tweaking, such as for role-playing purposes.
+**Kobold.cpp** is an AI client that runs locally on your Windows, Mac, or Linux computer. It's an excellent choice if you are looking for heavy customization and tweaking, such as for role-playing purposes.
 
 In addition to supporting a large range of text models, Kobold.cpp also supports image generators such as [Stable Diffusion](https://stability.ai/stable-image) and automatic speech recognition tools such as [Whisper](https://github.com/ggerganov/whisper.cpp).
 
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ In addition to supporting a large range of text models, Kobold.cpp also supports
 
 </div>
 
-<div class="admonition note" markdown>
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Compatibility Issues</p>
 
 Kobold.cpp might not run on computers without AVX/AVX2 support.
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ Kobold.cpp allows you to modify parameters such as the AI model temperature and
 
 ![Ollama Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/ollama.png){align=right}
 
-Ollama is a command-line AI assistant that is available on macOS, Linux, and Windows. Ollama is a great choice if you're looking for an AI client that's easy-to-use, widely compatible, and fast due to its use of inference and other techniques. It also doesn't involve any manual setup.
+**Ollama** is a command-line AI assistant that is available on macOS, Linux, and Windows. Ollama is a great choice if you're looking for an AI client that's easy-to-use, widely compatible, and fast due to its use of inference and other techniques. It also doesn't involve any manual setup.
 
 In addition to supporting a wide range of text models, Ollama also supports [LLaVA](https://github.com/haotian-liu/LLaVA) models and has experimental support for Meta's [Llama vision capabilities](https://huggingface.co/blog/llama32#what-is-llama-32-vision).
 
@@ -123,9 +123,9 @@ Ollama simplifies the process of setting up a local AI chat by downloading the A
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![Llamafile Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.svg){align=right}
+![Llamafile Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.png){align=right}
 
-Llamafile is a lightweight single-file executable that allows users to run LLMs locally on their own computers without any setup involved. It is [backed by Mozilla](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2023/11/introducing-llamafile) and available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+**Llamafile** is a lightweight, single-file executable that allows users to run LLMs locally on their own computers without any setup involved. It is [backed by Mozilla](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2023/11/introducing-llamafile) and available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
 
 Llamafile also supports LLaVA. However, it doesn't support speech recognition or image generation.
 
@@ -137,7 +137,9 @@ Llamafile also supports LLaVA. However, it doesn't support speech recognition or
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
 
-- [:fontawesome-solid-desktop: Desktop](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart)
+- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart)
+- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart)
+- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart)
 
 </details>
 
@@ -170,11 +172,11 @@ Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend. In addi
 
 ### Minimum Requirements
 
-- Must be open-source.
+- Must be open source.
 - Must not transmit personal data, including chat data.
 - Must be multi-platform.
 - Must not require a GPU.
-- Must support GPU-powered fast inference.
+- Must support GPU-powered, fast inference.
 - Must not require an internet connection.
 
 ### Best-Case
@@ -185,4 +187,11 @@ Our best-case criteria represent what we *would* like to see from the perfect pr
 - Should have a built-in model downloader option.
 - The user should be able to modify the LLM parameters, such as its system prompt or temperature.
 
+*[LLaVA]: Large Language and Vision Assistant (multimodal AI model)
+*[LLM]: Large Language Model (AI model such as ChatGPT)
+*[LLMs]: Large Language Models (AI models such as ChatGPT)
+*[open-weights models]: AI models that anyone can download and use, but the underlying training data and/or algorithms for them are proprietary.
+*[system prompt]: The general instructions given by a human to guide how an AI chat should operate.
+*[temperature]: A parameter used in AI models to control the level of randomness and creativity in the generated text.
+
 [^1]: A file checksum is a type of anti-tampering fingerprint. A developer usually provides a checksum in a text file that can be downloaded separately, or on the download page itself. Verifying that the checksum of the file you downloaded matches the one provided by the developer helps ensure that the file is genuine and wasn't tampered with in transit. You can use commands like `sha256sum` on Linux and macOS, or `certutil -hashfile file SHA256` on Windows to generate the downloaded file's checksum.

docs/alternative-networks.md

@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
 
 [Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
 
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+
 <div class="admonition example" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Try it out!</p>
 
@@ -41,12 +43,50 @@ You can try connecting to *Privacy Guides* via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
 
 </div>
 
+#### Orbot
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Orbot logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/orbot.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+<details class="downloads" markdown>
+<summary>Downloads</summary>
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+</details>
+
+</div>
+
+We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+=== "Android"
+
+    Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+    Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+
+=== "iOS"
+
+    On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+
 #### Snowflake
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![Snowflake logo](assets/img/browsers/snowflake.svg#only-light){ align=right }
-![Snowflake logo](assets/img/browsers/snowflake-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+![Snowflake logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/snowflake.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+![Snowflake logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/snowflake-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
 
 **Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
 
@@ -109,4 +149,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
 
 There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
 
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
 Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.

docs/android/index.md

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that
 
 [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
 
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
 
 AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
 

docs/basics/account-creation.md

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security,
 
 #### Email aliases
 
-If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign-up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
+If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We describe them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign-up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
 
 Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.
 
@@ -50,19 +50,19 @@ Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails t
 
 ### "Sign in with..." (OAuth)
 
-OAuth is an authentication protocol that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information with the service provider, if any, by using an existing account you have with another service instead. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign in with *provider name*" on a registration form, it's typically using OAuth.
+[Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth) is an authentication protocol that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information with the service provider, if any, by using an existing account you have with another service instead. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign in with *provider name*" on a registration form, it's typically using OAuth.
 
 When you sign in with OAuth, it will open a login page with the provider you choose, and your existing account and new account will be connected. Your password won't be shared, but some basic information typically will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.
 
 The main advantages are:
 
-- **Security**: you don't have to trust the security practices of the service you're logging into when it comes to storing your login credentials, because they are stored with the external OAuth provider, which when it comes to services like Apple and Google typically follow the best security practices, continuously audit their authentication systems, and don't store credentials inappropriately (such as in plain text).
-- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
+- **Security**: You don't have to trust the security practices of the service you're logging into when it comes to storing your login credentials because they are stored with the external OAuth provider. Common OAuth providers like Apple and Google typically follow the best security practices, continuously audit their authentication systems, and don't store credentials inappropriately (such as in plain text).
+- **Ease-of-use**: Multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
 
 But there are disadvantages:
 
-- **Privacy**: the OAuth provider you log in with will know the services you use.
-- **Centralization**: if the account you use for OAuth is compromised, or you aren't able to log in to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
+- **Privacy**: The OAuth provider you log in with will know the services you use.
+- **Centralization**: If the account you use for OAuth is compromised, or you aren't able to log in to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
 
 OAuth can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. Our recommendation is to limit using OAuth to only where you need it, and always protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
 

docs/basics/email-security.md

@@ -2,34 +2,34 @@
 meta_title: "Why Email Isn't the Best Choice for Privacy and Security - Privacy Guides"
 title: Email Security
 icon: material/email
-description: Email is inherently insecure in many ways, and these are some of the reasons it isn't our top choice for secure communications.
+description: Email is insecure in many ways, and these are some of the reasons it isn't our top choice for secure communications.
 ---
 
-Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add End-to-End Encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications, and some email data can never be encrypted inherently due to how email is designed.
+Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add end-to-end encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications.
 
 As a result, email is best used for receiving transactional emails (like notifications, verification emails, password resets, etc.) from the services you sign up for online, not for communicating with others.
 
 ## Email Encryption Overview
 
-The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
+The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](../encryption.md#gnu-privacy-guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
 
-There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however, it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates). It has support in [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730) and [Outlook for Web or Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).
+Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if the private key of either you or the message recipient is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
 
-Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
+There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates, and often a yearly payment is required). In some cases it is more usable than PGP because it has support in popular/mainstream email applications like Apple Mail, [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730), and [Outlook](https://support.office.com/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480). However, S/MIME does not solve the issue of lack of forward secrecy, and isn't particularly more secure than PGP.
 
 ## What is the Web Key Directory standard?
 
-The Web Key Directory (WKD) standard allows email clients to discover the OpenPGP key for other mailboxes, even those hosted on a different provider. Email clients which support WKD will ask the recipient's server for a key based on the email address' domain name. For example, if you emailed `jonah@privacyguides.org`, your email client would ask `privacyguides.org` for Jonah's OpenPGP key, and if `privacyguides.org` has a key for that account, your message would be automatically encrypted.
+The [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) standard allows email clients to discover the OpenPGP key for other mailboxes, even those hosted on a different provider. Email clients which support WKD will ask the recipient's server for a key based on the email address' domain name. For example, if you emailed `jonah@privacyguides.org`, your email client would ask `privacyguides.org` for Jonah's OpenPGP key, and if `privacyguides.org` has a key for that account, your message would be automatically encrypted.
 
 In addition to the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md) which support WKD, some webmail providers also support WKD. Whether *your own* key is published to WKD for others to use depends on your domain configuration. If you use an [email provider](../email.md#openpgp-compatible-services) which supports WKD, such as Proton Mail or Mailbox.org, they can publish your OpenPGP key on their domain for you.
 
-If you use your own custom domain, you will need to configure WKD separately. If you control your domain name, you can set up WKD regardless of your email provider. One easy way to do this is to use the "[WKD as a Service](https://keys.openpgp.org/about/usage#wkd-as-a-service)" feature from keys.openpgp.org, by setting a CNAME record on the `openpgpkey` subdomain of your domain pointed to `wkd.keys.openpgp.org`, then uploading your key to [keys.openpgp.org](https://keys.openpgp.org). Alternatively, you can [self-host WKD on your own web server](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKDHosting).
+If you use your own custom domain, you will need to configure WKD separately. If you control your domain name, you can set up WKD regardless of your email provider. One easy way to do this is to use the "[WKD as a Service](https://keys.openpgp.org/about/usage#wkd-as-a-service)" feature from the `keys.openpgp.org` server: Set a CNAME record on the `openpgpkey` subdomain of your domain pointed to `wkd.keys.openpgp.org`, then upload your key to [keys.openpgp.org](https://keys.openpgp.org). Alternatively, you can [self-host WKD on your own web server](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKDHosting).
 
-If you use a shared domain from a provider which doesn't support WKD, like @gmail.com, you won't be able to share your OpenPGP key with others via this method.
+If you use a shared domain from a provider which doesn't support WKD, like `@gmail.com`, you won't be able to share your OpenPGP key with others via this method.
 
 ### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
 
-Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
+Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to decreased security if either the provider or the email client does not support [OAuth](account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth) or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
 
 ### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
 
@@ -39,14 +39,14 @@ It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smart card to avoid possib
 
 ## Email Metadata Overview
 
-Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
+Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, and `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
 
 Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.
 
 ### Who Can View Email Metadata?
 
-Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) protecting it from outside observers, but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
+Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS), but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
 
 ### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?
 
-Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as whom you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc.
+Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into standard email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt some of this email metadata required for identifying the parties communicating. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as whom you're emailing, when you're emailing, etc.

docs/basics/vpn-overview.md

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ VPNs cannot encrypt data outside the connection between your device and the VPN
 
 Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [real-life or well-known identity](common-misconceptions.md#complicated-is-better) online is unlikely to be useful. Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
 
-It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity, because the VPN provider itself will still see your real IP address, destination website information, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You can't rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data from anyone who is able to protect. If you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.
+It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity because the VPN provider itself will still have access to your real IP address, destination website information, and often a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. "No logging" policies are merely a promise; if you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.
 
 You also should not trust a VPN to secure your connection to an unencrypted, HTTP destination. In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider and other potential adversaries in between the VPN server and your destination. You should enable HTTPS-only mode in your browser (if it's supported) to mitigate attacks which try to downgrade your connection from HTTPS to HTTP.
 
@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@ Recently, some attempts have been made by various organizations to address some
 
 Multi-Party Relays (MPRs) use multiple nodes owned by different parties, such that no individual party knows both who you are and what you're connecting to. This is the basic idea behind Tor, but now there are some paid services that try to emulate this model.
 
-MPRs seek to solve a problem inherent to VPNs: the fact that you must trust them completely. They accomplish this goal by segmenting the responsibilities between two or more different companies. For example, Apple's iCloud+ Private Relay routes your traffic through two servers:
+MPRs seek to solve a problem inherent to VPNs: the fact that you must trust them completely. They accomplish this goal by segmenting the responsibilities between two or more different companies.
+
+One example of a commercially available MPR is Apple's iCloud+ Private Relay, which routes your traffic through two servers:
 
 1. Firstly, a server operated by Apple.
 
@@ -101,7 +103,7 @@ MPRs seek to solve a problem inherent to VPNs: the fact that you must trust them
 
     This server actually makes the connection to your destination website, but has no knowledge of your device. The only IP address it knows about is Apple's server's.
 
-Other MPRs run by different companies like Google or INVISV operate in a very similar manner. This protection by segmentation only exists if you trust the two companies to not collude with each other to deanonymize you.
+Other MPRs run by different companies operate in a very similar manner. This protection by segmentation only exists if you trust the two companies to not collude with each other to deanonymize you.
 
 ### Decentralized VPNs
 

docs/cloud.md

@@ -95,33 +95,36 @@ They have also received the Digital Trust Label, a certification from the [Swiss
 
 ![Peergos logo](assets/img/cloud/peergos.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Peergos** is a decentralized protocol and open-source platform for storage, social media, and applications. It provides a secure and private space where users can store, share, and view their photos, videos, documents, etc. Peergos secures your files with quantum-resistant end-to-end encryption and ensures all data about your files remains private. It is built on top of [IPFS (InterPlanetary File System)](https://ipfs.tech), a peer-to-peer architecture that protects against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.
+**Peergos** is a decentralized protocol and open-source platform for storage, social media, and applications. It provides a secure and private space where users can store, share, and view their photos, videos, documents, etc. Peergos secures your files with quantum-resistant end-to-end encryption and ensures all data about your files remains private.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://peergos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://peergos.net/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://book.peergos.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Peergos/Peergos){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/peergos/peergos#support){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
 
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
 
-- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://peergos.net)
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=peergos.android)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)
 - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)
 - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)
 - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)
+- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://peergos.net)
 
 </details>
 
 </div>
 
+Peergos is built on top of the [InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)](https://ipfs.tech), a peer-to-peer architecture that protects against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.
+
 Peergos is primarily a web app, but you can self-host the server either as a local cache for your remote Peergos account, or as a standalone storage server which negates the need to register for a remote account and subscription. The Peergos server is a `.jar` file, which means the Java 17+ Runtime Environment ([OpenJDK download](https://azul.com/downloads)) should be installed on your machine to get it working.
 
 Running a local version of Peergos alongside a registered account on their paid, hosted service allows you to access your Peergos storage without any reliance on DNS or TLS certificate authorities, and keep a copy of your data backed up to their cloud. The user experience should be the same whether you run their desktop server or just use their hosted web interface.
 
 Peergos was [audited](https://peergos.org/posts/security-audit-2024) in November 2024 by Radically Open Security and all issues were fixed. They were previously [audited](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_peergos.pdf) by Cure53 in June 2019, and all found issues were subsequently fixed.
 
-An Android app is not available, but it is [in the works](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/peergos-private-storage-sharing-social-media-and-application-platform/11825/25). The current workaround is to use the mobile [PWA](https://peergos.net) instead.
-
 ## Criteria
 
 **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.

docs/desktop-browsers.md

@@ -317,15 +317,6 @@ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave
 
 1. Disabling the V8 optimizer reduces your attack surface by disabling [*some*](https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112708049232710156) parts of JavaScript Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation.
 
-<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Sanitizing on close</p>
-
-- [x] Select **Delete data sites have saved to your device when you close all windows** under *Sites and Shields Settings* → *Content* → *Additional content settings* → *On-device site data*.
-
-If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis under the *Customized behaviors* section.
-
-</div>
-
 ##### Tor windows
 
 [**Private Window with Tor**](https://support.brave.com/hc/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity) allows you to route your traffic through the Tor network in Private Windows and access .onion services, which may be useful in some cases. However, Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser is, and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. If your threat model requires strong anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser).

docs/desktop.md

@@ -213,6 +213,25 @@ Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, et
 
 For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page.
 
+### Secureblue
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Secureblue logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/secureblue.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Secureblue** is a security-focused operating system based on [Fedora Atomic Desktops](#fedora-atomic-desktops). It includes a number of [security features](https://secureblue.dev/features) intended to proactively defend against the exploitation of both known and unknown vulnerabilities, and ships with [Trivalent](https://github.com/secureblue/Trivalent), their hardened, Chromium-based web browser.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://secureblue.dev){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://secureblue.dev/install){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/secureblue/secureblue){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://secureblue.dev/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+</div>
+
+**Trivalent** is Secureblue's hardened Chromium for desktop Linux inspired by [GrapheneOS](android/distributions.md#grapheneos)'s Vanadium browser.
+
+Secureblue also provides GrapheneOS's [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) and enables it globally (including for Flatpaks).
+
 ### Kicksecure
 
 While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install.

docs/device-integrity.md

@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ These tools can trigger false-positives. If any of these tools finds indicators
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt.webp){ align=right }
+![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt.webp#only-light){ align=right }
+![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt-dark.png#only-dark){ align=right }
 
 **Mobile Verification Toolkit** (**MVT**) is a collection of utilities which simplifies and automates the process of scanning mobile devices for potential traces of targeting or infection by known spyware campaigns. MVT was developed by Amnesty International and released in 2021 in the context of the [Pegasus Project](https://forbiddenstories.org/about-the-pegasus-project).
 
@@ -186,4 +187,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
 
 No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
 
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).

docs/dns.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 title: "DNS Resolvers"
 icon: material/dns
-description: These are some encrypted DNS providers we recommend switching to, to replace your ISP's default configuration.
+description: We recommend choosing these encrypted DNS providers to replace your ISP's default configuration.
 cover: dns.webp
 global:
  - [randomize-element, "table tbody"]
@@ -16,23 +16,43 @@ Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [
 
 ## Recommended Providers
 
-These are our favorite public DNS resolvers based on their privacy and security characteristics, and their worldwide performance. Some of these services offer basic DNS-level blocking of malware or trackers depending on the server you choose, but if you want to be able to see and customize what is blocked you should use a dedicated DNS filtering product instead.
+These are our favorite public DNS resolvers based on their privacy and security characteristics, and their worldwide performance. Some of these services offer basic DNS-level blocking of malware or trackers depending on the server you choose, but if you want to be able to see and customize what is blocked, you should use a dedicated DNS filtering product instead.
 
 | DNS Provider | Protocols | Logging / Privacy Policy | [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) | Filtering | Signed Apple Profile |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|
-| [**AdGuard Public DNS**](https://adguard-dns.io/en/public-dns.html) | Cleartext   DoH/3   DoT   DoQ   DNSCrypt | Anonymized[^1] | Anonymized | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard-dns.io/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html) |
-| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setup) | Cleartext   DoH/3   DoT | Anonymized[^2] | No | Based on server choice. | No [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://community.cloudflare.com/t/requesting-1-1-1-1-signed-profiles-for-apple/571846) |
-| [**Control D Free DNS**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | Cleartext   DoH/3   DoT   DoQ | No[^3] | No | Based on server choice. | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://docs.controld.com/docs/macos-platform) |
-| [**dns0.eu**](https://dns0.eu) | Cleartext   DoH/3   DoH   DoT   DoQ | Anonymized[^4] | Anonymized | Based on server choice. | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://dns0.eu/zero.dns0.eu.mobileconfig) |
-| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | DoH   DoT | No[^5] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/profiles-to-configure-our-encrypted-dns-on-apple-devices) |
-| [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | Cleartext   DoH   DoT   DNSCrypt | Anonymized[^6] | Optional | Based on server choice, malware blocking by default. | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://quad9.net/news/blog/ios-mobile-provisioning-profiles) |
+| [**AdGuard Public DNS**](https://adguard-dns.io/en/public-dns.html) | Cleartext <br>DoH/3 <br>DoT <br>DoQ <br>DNSCrypt | Anonymized[^1] | Anonymized | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard-dns.io/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html) |
+| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setup) | Cleartext <br>DoH/3 <br>DoT | Anonymized[^2] | No | Based on server choice. | No [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://community.cloudflare.com/t/requesting-1-1-1-1-signed-profiles-for-apple/571846) |
+| [**Control D Free DNS**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | Cleartext <br>DoH/3 <br>DoT <br>DoQ | No[^3] | No | Based on server choice. | Yes <br>[:simple-apple: iOS](https://docs.controld.com/docs/ios-platform) <br>[:material-apple-finder: macOS](https://docs.controld.com/docs/macos-platform#manual-setup-profile) |
+| [**DNS0.eu**](https://dns0.eu) | Cleartext <br>DoH/3 <br>DoH <br>DoT <br>DoQ | Anonymized[^4] | Anonymized | Based on server choice. | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://dns0.eu/zero.dns0.eu.mobileconfig) |
+| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | DoH <br>DoT | No[^5] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/encrypted-dns-profiles) |
+| [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | Cleartext <br>DoH <br>DoT <br>DNSCrypt | Anonymized[^6] | Optional | Based on server choice. Malware blocking is included by default. | Yes <br>[:simple-apple: iOS](https://docs.quad9.net/Setup_Guides/iOS/iOS_14_and_later_(Encrypted)) <br>[:material-apple-finder: macOS](https://docs.quad9.net/Setup_Guides/MacOS/Big_Sur_and_later_(Encrypted)) |
 
-[^1]: AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested in within last 24 hours. "We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats." "We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters." [https://adguard-dns.io/en/privacy.html](https://adguard-dns.io/en/privacy.html)
-[^2]: Cloudflare collects and stores only the limited DNS query data that is sent to the 1.1.1.1 resolver. The 1.1.1.1 resolver service does not log personal data, and the bulk of the limited non-personally identifiable query data is stored only for 25 hours. [https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver)
-[^3]: Control D only logs for Premium resolvers with custom DNS profiles. Free resolvers do not log data. [https://controld.com/privacy](https://controld.com/privacy)
-[^4]: dns0.eu collects some data for their threat intelligence feeds, to monitor for newly registered/observed/active domains and other bulk data. That data is shared with some [partners](https://docs.dns0.eu/data-feeds/introduction) for e.g. security research. They do not collect any Personally Identifiable Information. [https://dns0.eu/privacy](https://dns0.eu/privacy)
-[^5]: Mullvad's DNS service is available to both subscribers and non-subscribers of Mullvad VPN. Their privacy policy explicitly claims they do not log DNS requests in any way. [https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy)
-[^6]: Quad9 collects some data for the purposes of threat monitoring and response. That data may then be remixed and shared, such as for the purpose of security research. Quad9 does not collect or record IP addresses or other data they deem personally identifiable. [https://quad9.net/privacy/policy](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy)
+[^1]:
+    AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested within the last 24 hours.
+    > We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats.
+    > We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters.
+
+    AdGuard DNS: [*Privacy Policy*](https://adguard-dns.io/en/privacy.html)
+[^2]:
+    Cloudflare collects and stores only the limited DNS query data that is sent to the 1.1.1.1 resolver. The 1.1.1.1 resolver service does not log personal data, and the bulk of the limited non-personally identifiable query data is stored only for 25 hours.
+
+    1.1.1.1 Public DNS Resolver: [*Cloudflare’s commitment to privacy*](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver)
+[^3]:
+    Control D only logs specific account data for Premium resolvers with custom DNS profiles. Free resolvers do not retain any data.
+
+    Control D: [*Privacy Policy*](https://controld.com/privacy)
+[^4]:
+    DNS0.eu collects some data for their threat intelligence feeds to monitor for newly registered/observed/active domains and other bulk data. That data is shared with some [partners](https://docs.dns0.eu/data-feeds/introduction) for e.g. security research. They do not collect any personally identifiable information.
+
+    DNS0.eu: [*Privacy Policy*](https://dns0.eu/privacy)
+[^5]:
+    Mullvad's DNS service is available to both subscribers and non-subscribers of Mullvad VPN. Their privacy policy explicitly claims they do not log DNS requests in any way.
+
+    Mullvad: [*No-logging of user activity policy*](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy)
+[^6]:
+    Quad9 collects some data for the purposes of threat monitoring and response. That data may then be remixed and shared for purposes like furthering their security research. Quad9 does not collect or record IP addresses or other data they deem personally identifiable.
+
+    Quad9: [*Data and Privacy Policy*](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy)
 
 ## Self-Hosted DNS Filtering
 
@@ -97,12 +117,12 @@ These DNS filtering solutions offer a web dashboard where you can customize the
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
 
-- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://docs.controld.com/docs/gui-setup-utility)
-- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://docs.controld.com/docs/gui-setup-utility)
-- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://docs.controld.com/docs/ctrld)
 - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.controld.setuputility)
 - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/1518799460)
 - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Control-D-Inc/ctrld/releases)
+- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://docs.controld.com/docs/gui-setup-utility)
+- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://docs.controld.com/docs/gui-setup-utility)
+- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://docs.controld.com/docs/ctrld)
 
 </details>
 
@@ -124,11 +144,11 @@ These DNS filtering solutions offer a web dashboard where you can customize the
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
 
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/nextdns/id1463342498)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextdns/nextdns/releases)
 - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://github.com/nextdns/nextdns/wiki/Windows)
 - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/nextdns/id1464122853)
 - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/nextdns/nextdns/wiki)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/nextdns/id1463342498)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextdns/nextdns/releases)
 
 </details>
 
@@ -136,9 +156,9 @@ These DNS filtering solutions offer a web dashboard where you can customize the
 
 When used with an account, NextDNS will enable insights and logging features by default (as some features require it). You can choose retention time and log storage location for any logs you choose to keep, or disable logs altogether.
 
-NextDNS's free plan is fully functional, but should not be relied upon for security or other critical filtering applications, because after 300,000 DNS queries in a month all filtering, logging, and other account-based functionality is disabled. It can still be used as a regular DNS provider after that point, so your devices will continue to function and make secure queries via DNS-over-HTTPS, just without your filter lists.
+NextDNS's free plan is fully functional, but should not be relied upon for security or other critical filtering applications, because after 300,000 DNS queries in a month all filtering, logging, and other account-based functionality are disabled. It can still be used as a regular DNS provider after that point, so your devices will continue to function and make secure queries via DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH), just without your filter lists.
 
-NextDNS also offers public DNS-over-HTTPS service at `https://dns.nextdns.io` and DNS-over-TLS/QUIC at `dns.nextdns.io`, which are available by default in Firefox and Chromium, and subject to their default no-logging [privacy policy](https://nextdns.io/privacy).
+NextDNS also offers a public DoH service at `https://dns.nextdns.io` and DNS-over-TLS/QUIC (DoT/DoQ) at `dns.nextdns.io`, which are available by default in Firefox and Chromium, and subject to their default, no-logging [privacy policy](https://nextdns.io/privacy).
 
 ## Encrypted DNS Proxies
 
@@ -151,7 +171,7 @@ Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](ad
 ![RethinkDNS logo](assets/img/android/rethinkdns.svg#only-light){ align=right }
 ![RethinkDNS logo](assets/img/android/rethinkdns-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
 
-**RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client that supports [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DNS-over-TLS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy. It also provides additional functionality such as caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries, and using the app as a firewall.
+**RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client that supports [DoH](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DoT](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy. It also provides additional functionality such as caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries, and using the app as a firewall.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -170,13 +190,13 @@ Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](ad
 
 While RethinkDNS takes up the Android VPN slot, you can still use a VPN or Orbot with the app by [adding a WireGuard configuration](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/proxy/wireguard) or [manually configuring Orbot as a Proxy server](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/firewall/orbot), respectively.
 
-### dnscrypt-proxy
+### DNSCrypt-Proxy
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![dnscrypt-proxy logo](assets/img/dns/dnscrypt-proxy.svg){ align=right }
+![DNSCrypt-Proxy logo](assets/img/dns/dnscrypt-proxy.svg){ align=right }
 
-**dnscrypt-proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
+**DNSCrypt-Proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DoH](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
 
 [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
@@ -205,14 +225,14 @@ The anonymized DNS feature does [not](advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-us
 
 **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
 
-All DNS products must support:
+All DNS products...
 
-- [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
-- [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
-- Anonymize [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) or disable it by default.
+- Must support [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
+- Must support [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
+- Must anonymize [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) or disable it by default.
 
-Additionally, all public providers:
+Additionally, all public providers...
 
-- Prefer [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast#Addressing_methods) support or geo-steering support.
-- Must not log any personal data to disk
-    - As noted in our footnotes, some providers collect query information for example, for purposes like security research, but in that case that data must not be associated with any PII such as IP address, etc.
+- Must not log any personal data to disk.
+    - As noted in the footnotes, some providers collect query information for purposes like security research, but in that case the data must not be associated with any PII such as IP address, etc.
+- Should support [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast) or geo-steering.

docs/document-collaboration.md

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_e
 
 ![CryptPad logo](assets/img/document-collaboration/cryptpad.svg){ align=right }
 
-**CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily.
+**CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily. [:material-star-box: Read our latest CryptPad review.](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/02/07/cryptpad-review/)
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptpad.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/GcNjAWmK6YDB3EO2IipRZ0fUe89j43Ryqeb4fjkjehE){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }

docs/email-aliasing.md

@@ -9,61 +9,77 @@ cover: email-aliasing.webp
 - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
 - [:material-account-search: Public Exposure](basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information){ .pg-green }
 
-An **email aliasing service** allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your [email provider](email.md). True email aliasing is better than plus addressing commonly used and supported by many providers, which allows you to create aliases like `yourname+[anythinghere]@example.com`, because websites, advertisers, and tracking networks can trivially remove anything after the `+` sign. Organizations like the [IAB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactive_Advertising_Bureau) require that advertisers [normalize email addresses](https://shkspr.mobi/blog/2023/01/the-iab-loves-tracking-users-but-it-hates-users-tracking-them) so that they can be correlated and tracked, regardless of users' privacy wishes.
-
-<div class="grid cards" markdown>
-
-- ![addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ .twemoji } [addy.io](email-aliasing.md#addyio)
-- ![SimpleLogin logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/simplelogin.svg){ .twemoji } [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin)
-
-</div>
+An **email aliasing service** allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your [email provider](email.md).
 
 Email aliasing can also act as a safeguard in case your email provider ever ceases operation. In that scenario, you can easily re-route your aliases to a new email address. In turn, however, you are placing trust in the aliasing service to continue functioning.
 
-Using a dedicated email aliasing service also has a number of benefits over a catch-all alias on a custom domain:
+## Benefits
+
+Using a service which allows you to individually manage email aliases has a number of benefits over conventional mailbox management/filtering methods:
+
+### Over Plus Addressing
+
+True email aliasing is better than plus addressing commonly used and supported by many providers, which allows you to create aliases like `yourname+[anythinghere]@example.com`, because websites, advertisers, and tracking networks can trivially remove anything after the `+` sign. Organizations like the [IAB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactive_Advertising_Bureau) require that advertisers [normalize email addresses](https://shkspr.mobi/blog/2023/01/the-iab-loves-tracking-users-but-it-hates-users-tracking-them) so that they can be correlated and tracked, regardless of users' privacy wishes.
+
+### Over Catch-All Aliases
+
+Using a dedicated email aliasing service has a number of benefits over a catch-all alias on a custom domain:
 
 - Aliases can be turned on and off individually when you need them, preventing websites from emailing you randomly.
 - Replies are sent from the alias address, shielding your real email address.
 
-They also have a number of benefits over "temporary email" services:
+### Over Temporary Email Services
+
+Email aliasing services also have a number of benefits over "temporary email" services:
 
 - Aliases are permanent and can be turned on again if you need to receive something like a password reset.
 - Emails are sent to your trusted mailbox rather than stored by the alias provider.
 - Temporary email services typically have public mailboxes which can be accessed by anyone who knows the address, while aliases are private to you.
 
-Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as on your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the at (@) sign.
+## Recommended Providers
+
+<div class="grid cards" markdown>
+
+- ![Addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ .twemoji } [Addy.io](email-aliasing.md#addyio)
+- ![SimpleLogin logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/simplelogin.svg){ .twemoji } [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin)
+
+</div>
+
+Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as on your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the `@` symbol.
 
 Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your aliasing provider with your unencrypted messages. Some providers mitigate this slightly with automatic PGP encryption[^1], which reduces the number of parties you need to trust from two to one by encrypting incoming emails before they are delivered to your final mailbox provider.
 
-### addy.io
+### Addy.io
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ align=right }
+![Addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ align=right }
 
-**addy.io** lets you create 10 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases.
+**Addy.io** lets you create 10 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited ["standard" aliases](https://addy.io/faq/#what-is-a-standard-alias).
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://addy.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://addy.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://addy.io/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://addy.io/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://addy.io/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://addy.io/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
 
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
 
-- [:simple-android: Android](https://addy.io/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
-- [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://addy.io/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://addy.io/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://addy.io/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
 - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/addy_io)
-- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/addyio-anonymous-email-fo/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
+- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
 
 </details>
 
 </div>
 
-The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @addy.io) that you can create is limited to 10 on addy.io's free plan, 50 on their $1/month plan and unlimited on the $4/month plan (billed $3 for a year). You can pay for these plans using [cryptocurrency](https://addy.io/help/subscribing-with-cryptocurrency) or purchase a voucher code from [ProxyStore](https://addy.io/help/voucher-codes), addy.io's official reseller.
+The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like `@addy.io`) that you can create depends on the [plan](https://addy.io/#pricing) you are subscribed to. You can pay for these plans using [cryptocurrency](https://addy.io/help/subscribing-with-cryptocurrency) or purchase a voucher code from [ProxyStore](https://addy.io/help/voucher-codes), Addy.io's official reseller.
 
-You can create unlimited standard aliases which end in a domain like @[username].addy.io or a custom domain on paid plans. However, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. They are useful where a shared domain might be blocked by a service. Securitum [audited](https://addy.io/blog/addy-io-passes-independent-security-audit) addy.io in September 2023 and no significant vulnerabilities [were identified](https://addy.io/addy-io-security-audit.pdf).
+You can create unlimited standard aliases which end in a domain like `@[username].addy.io` or a custom domain on paid plans. However, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. They are useful where a shared domain might be blocked by a service.
+
+Securitum [audited](https://addy.io/blog/addy-io-passes-independent-security-audit) Addy.io in September 2023 and no significant vulnerabilities [were identified](https://addy.io/addy-io-security-audit.pdf).
 
 Notable free features:
 
@@ -85,7 +101,7 @@ If you cancel your subscription, you will still enjoy the features of your paid
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplelogin.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
@@ -96,18 +112,18 @@ If you cancel your subscription, you will still enjoy the features of your paid
 - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
 - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/simplelogin)
 - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
-- [:fontawesome-brands-edge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
+- [:fontawesome-brands-edge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
 - [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id6475835429)
 
 </details>
 
 </div>
 
-SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
+SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing.
 
-You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have Proton Pass Plus, Proton Unlimited, or any multi-user Proton plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free.
+You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have Proton Pass Plus, Proton Unlimited, or any multi-user Proton plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free. You can also purchase a voucher code for SimpleLogin Premium anonymously via their official reseller [ProxyStore](https://simplelogin.io/faq).
 
-You can also purchase a voucher code for SimpleLogin Premium anonymously via their official reseller, [ProxyStore](https://simplelogin.io/faq).
+Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
 
 Notable free features:
 
@@ -120,6 +136,6 @@ When your subscription ends, all aliases you created will still be able to recei
 
 ## Criteria
 
-**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we evaluate email aliasing providers to the same standard as our regular [email provider criteria](email.md#criteria) where applicable. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an email service, and conduct your own research to ensure the provider you choose is the right choice for you.
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we evaluate email aliasing providers to the same standard as our regular [email provider criteria](email.md#criteria) where applicable. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an email aliasing service, and conduct your own research to ensure the provider you choose is the right choice for you.
 
 [^1]: Automatic PGP encryption allows you to encrypt non-encrypted incoming emails before they are forwarded to your mailbox, making sure your primary mailbox provider never sees unencrypted email content.

docs/email-clients.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ cover: email-clients.webp
 - [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
 - [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
 
-The **email clients** we recommend support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) to prevent account theft.
+The **email clients** we recommend support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](basics/account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) to prevent account theft.
 
 <details class="warning" markdown>
 <summary>Email does not provide forward secrecy</summary>
@@ -110,39 +110,6 @@ Currently, GPG Suite does [not yet](https://gpgtools.com/sonoma) have a stable r
 
 Apple Mail has the ability to load remote content in the background or block it entirely and hide your IP address from senders on [macOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/mlhl03be2866/mac) and [iOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/iphf084865c7/ios).
 
-### Canary Mail (iOS)
-
-<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
-
-![Canary Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/canarymail.svg){ align=right }
-
-**Canary Mail** is a paid email client designed to make end-to-end encryption seamless with security features such as a biometric app lock.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.io/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-
-<details class="downloads" markdown>
-<summary>Downloads</summary>
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1155470386)
-- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://canarymail.io/downloads.html)
-- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954)
-
-</details>
-
-</div>
-
-<details class="warning" markdown>
-<summary>Warning</summary>
-
-Canary Mail only recently released a Windows and Android client, though we don't believe they are as stable as their iOS and Mac counterparts.
-
-</details>
-
-Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are for email clients on iOS that support PGP E2EE.
-
 ### FairEmail (Android)
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>

docs/email.md

@@ -19,19 +19,19 @@ Email is practically a necessity for using any online service, however we do not
 
 For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustainable business models and built-in security and privacy features. Read our [full list of criteria](#criteria) for more information.
 
-| Provider | OpenPGP / WKD | IMAP / SMTP | Zero Access Encryption | Anonymous Payments |
+| Provider | OpenPGP / WKD | IMAP / SMTP | Zero-Access Encryption | Anonymous Payment Methods |
 |---|---|---|---|---|
 | [Proton Mail](#proton-mail) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Paid plans only | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Cash |
 | [Mailbox.org](#mailboxorg) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Mail only | Cash |
-| [Tuta](#tuta) | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Monero & Cash via third-party |
+| [Tuta](#tuta) | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Monero <br>Cash via third party |
 
-In addition to (or instead of) an email provider recommended here, you may wish to consider a dedicated [email aliasing service](email-aliasing.md) to protect your privacy. Among other things, these services can help protect your real inbox from spam, prevent marketers from correlating your accounts, and encrypt all incoming messages with PGP.
+In addition to (or instead of) an email provider recommended here, you may wish to consider a dedicated [email aliasing service](email-aliasing.md#recommended-providers) to protect your privacy. Among other things, these services can help protect your real inbox from spam, prevent marketers from correlating your accounts, and encrypt all incoming messages with PGP.
 
 - [More Information :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email-aliasing.md)
 
 ## OpenPGP Compatible Services
 
-These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption and the [Web Key Directory standard](basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard), allowing for provider-agnostic E2EE emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
+These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption and the [Web Key Directory (WKD) standard](basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard), allowing for provider-agnostic end-to-end encrypted emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
@@ -45,7 +45,9 @@ These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption and the [Web Key
 
 When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP your email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email, generally including the subject line! Read more about [email metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
 
-OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
+OpenPGP also does not support forward secrecy, which means if the private key of either you or the message recipient is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed.
+
+- [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
 
 </div>
 
@@ -55,7 +57,9 @@ OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the
 
 ![Proton Mail logo](assets/img/email/protonmail.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since 2013. Proton AG is based in Geneva, Switzerland. The Proton Mail Free plan comes with 500 MB of Mail storage, which you can increase up to 1 GB for free.
+**Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since 2013. Proton AG is based in Geneva, Switzerland.
+
+The Proton Free plan comes with 500 MB of Mail storage, which you can increase up to 1 GB for free.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
@@ -78,9 +82,9 @@ OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the
 
 </div>
 
-Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g. Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g., Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. If you have the Proton Unlimited plan or any multi-user Proton plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin) Premium for free.
 
-If you have the Proton Unlimited plan or any multi-user Proton plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin) Premium for free.
+A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
 
 Proton Mail has internal crash reports that are **not** shared with third parties. This can be disabled in the web app: :gear: → **All Settings** → **Account** → **Security and privacy** → **Privacy and data collection**.
 
@@ -90,7 +94,7 @@ Paid Proton Mail subscribers can use their own domain with the service or a [cat
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Private Payment Methods
 
-Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) cash by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card, [Bitcoin](advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), and PayPal payments.
+Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) **cash** by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card, [Bitcoin](advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), and PayPal payments.
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security
 
@@ -104,9 +108,9 @@ Certain information stored in [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Email Encryption
 
-Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. Proton also supports automatic external key discovery with [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This means that emails sent to other providers which use WKD will be automatically encrypted with OpenPGP as well, without the need to manually exchange public PGP keys with your contacts. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses without OpenPGP](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails), without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account.
+Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. Proton also supports automatic external key discovery with WKD. This means that emails sent to other providers which use WKD will be automatically encrypted with OpenPGP as well, without the need to manually exchange public PGP keys with your contacts. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses without OpenPGP](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails), without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account.
 
-Proton Mail also publishes the public keys of Proton accounts via HTTP from their WKD. This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Proton's own domains, like @proton.me. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](./basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
+Proton Mail also publishes the public keys of Proton accounts via HTTP from their WKD. This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Proton's own domains, like `@proton.me`. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
 
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Account Termination
 
@@ -114,9 +118,7 @@ If you have a paid account and your [bill is unpaid](https://proton.me/support/d
 
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Functionality
 
-Proton Mail's [Unlimited](https://proton.me/support/proton-plans#proton-unlimited) plan also enables access to other Proton services in addition to providing multiple custom domains, unlimited hide-my-email aliases, and 500 GB of storage.
-
-Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+Proton Mail's [Unlimited](https://proton.me/support/proton-plans#proton-unlimited) plan also enables access to other Proton services in addition to providing multiple custom domains, unlimited hide-my-email aliases, and 500 GB of storage.
 
 ### Mailbox.org
 
@@ -124,7 +126,9 @@ Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
 
 ![Mailbox.org logo](assets/img/email/mailboxorg.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with up to 2 GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
+**Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany.
+
+Accounts start with up to 2 GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -145,23 +149,23 @@ Mailbox.org lets you use your own domain, and they support [catch-all](https://k
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Private Payment Methods
 
-Mailbox.org doesn't accept any cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept cash by mail, cash payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal and a couple of German-specific processors: paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung.
+Mailbox.org doesn't accept any cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept **cash** by mail, **cash** payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal, and a couple of German-specific processors: Paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung.
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security
 
-Mailbox.org supports [two-factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/account-article/how-to-use-two-factor-authentication-2fa) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [YubiKey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [YubiCloud](https://yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) are not yet supported.
+Mailbox.org supports [two-factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/account-article/how-to-use-two-factor-authentication-2fa) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [YubiKey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [YubiCloud](https://yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) are not yet supported.
 
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Data Security
 
 Mailbox.org allows for encryption of incoming mail using their [encrypted mailbox](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/e-mail-article/your-encrypted-mailbox). New messages that you receive will then be immediately encrypted with your public key.
 
-However, [Open-Exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/security-privacy-article/encryption-of-calendar-and-address-book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that information.
+However, [Open-Xchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/security-privacy-article/encryption-of-calendar-and-address-book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that data.
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Email Encryption
 
 Mailbox.org has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/e-mail-article/send-encrypted-e-mails-with-guard) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/e-mail-article/my-recipient-does-not-use-pgp) on Mailbox.org's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox.
 
-Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Mailbox.org's own domains, like @mailbox.org. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](./basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
+Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their WKD. This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Mailbox.org's own domains, like `@mailbox.org`. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
 
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Account Termination
 
@@ -173,7 +177,7 @@ You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion servic
 
 All accounts come with limited cloud storage that [can be encrypted](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/drive-article/encrypt-files-on-your-drive). Mailbox.org also offers the alias [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/e-mail-article/ensuring-e-mails-are-sent-securely), which enforces the TLS encryption on the connection between mail servers, otherwise the message will not be sent at all. Mailbox.org also supports [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) in addition to standard access protocols like IMAP and POP3.
 
-Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address.
+Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs, providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address.
 
 ## More Providers
 
@@ -192,7 +196,9 @@ These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them gr
 ![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta.svg#only-light){ align=right }
 ![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
 
-**Tuta** (formerly *Tutanota*) is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since 2011 and is based in Hanover, Germany. Free accounts start with 1 GB of storage.
+**Tuta** (formerly *Tutanota*) is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since 2011 and is based in Hanover, Germany.
+
+Free accounts start with 1 GB of storage.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tuta.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tuta.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -223,7 +229,7 @@ Paid Tuta accounts can use either 15 or 30 aliases depending on their plan and u
 
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Private Payment Methods
 
-Tuta only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md) can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tuta.com/support/#cryptocurrency) with ProxyStore.
+Tuta only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however [**cryptocurrency**](cryptocurrency.md) can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tuta.com/support/#cryptocurrency) with ProxyStore.
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security
 
@@ -231,7 +237,7 @@ Tuta supports [two-factor authentication](https://tuta.com/support#2fa) with eit
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Data Security
 
-Tuta has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tuta.com/support#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tuta.com/support#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tuta.com/support#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
+Tuta has [zero-access encryption at rest](https://tuta.com/support#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tuta.com/support#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tuta.com/support#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
 
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Email Encryption
 
@@ -245,8 +251,6 @@ Tuta will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tuta.com/support#inactive-acco
 
 Tuta offers the business version of [Tuta to non-profit organizations](https://tuta.com/blog/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
 
-Tuta doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
-
 ## Self-Hosting Email
 
 Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable. In addition to the "all-in-one" solutions below, we've picked out a few articles that cover a more manual approach:
@@ -312,22 +316,22 @@ We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal ser
 
 **Minimum to Qualify:**
 
-- Encrypts email account data at rest with zero-access encryption.
-- Export capability as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .EML with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322) standard.
+- Must encrypt email account data at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Must be capable of exporting emails as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .EML with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322) standard.
 - Allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
-- Operates on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers.
+- Must operate on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers.
 
 **Best Case:**
 
-- Encrypts all account data (Contacts, Calendars, etc.) at rest with zero-access encryption.
-- Integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption provided as a convenience.
-- Support for [WKD](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP.
-    GnuPG users can get a key by typing: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`
-- Support for a temporary mailbox for external users. This is useful when you want to send an encrypted email, without sending an actual copy to your recipient. These emails usually have a limited lifespan and then are automatically deleted. They also don't require the recipient to configure any cryptography like OpenPGP.
-- Availability of the email provider's services via an [onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion).
-- [Sub-addressing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Sub-addressing) support.
+- Should encrypt all account data (contacts, calendars, etc.) at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Should provide integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption as a convenience.
+- Should support WKD to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP. GnuPG users can get a key with this command: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`.
+- Support for a temporary mailbox for external users. This is useful when you want to send an encrypted email without sending an actual copy to your recipient. These emails usually have a limited lifespan and then are automatically deleted. They also don't require the recipient to configure any cryptography like OpenPGP.
+- Should support [sub-addressing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Sub-addressing).
+- Should allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
 - Catch-all or alias functionality for those who use their own domains.
-- Use of standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP, or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider.
+- Should use standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP, or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider.
+- Email provider's services should be available via an [onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion).
 
 ### Privacy
 
@@ -335,30 +339,30 @@ We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible.
 
 **Minimum to Qualify:**
 
-- Protect sender's IP address, which can involve filtering it from showing in the `Received` header field.
-- Don't require personally identifiable information (PII) besides a username and a password.
-- Privacy policy that meets the requirements defined by the GDPR.
+- Must protect sender's IP address, which can involve filtering it from showing in the `Received` header field.
+- Must not require personally identifiable information (PII) besides a username and a password.
+- Privacy policy must meet the requirements defined by the GDPR.
 
 **Best Case:**
 
-- Accepts [anonymous payment options](advanced/payments.md) ([cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md), cash, gift cards, etc.)
-- Hosted in a jurisdiction with strong email privacy protection laws.
+- Should accept [anonymous payment options](advanced/payments.md) ([cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md), cash, gift cards, etc.)
+- Should be hosted in a jurisdiction with strong email privacy protection laws.
 
 ### Security
 
-Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt best industry practices in order to protect their customers.
+Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt industry best practices in order to protect their customers.
 
 **Minimum to Qualify:**
 
-- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as TOTP.
-- Zero access encryption, which builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
+- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as [TOTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp).
+- Zero-access encryption, which builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
 - [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) support.
 - No TLS errors or vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://hardenize.com), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh), or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://ssllabs.com/ssltest); this includes certificate related errors and weak DH parameters, such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
-- A server suite preference (optional on TLSv1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption.
+- A server suite preference (optional on TLS 1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption.
 - A valid [MTA-STS](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461) and [TLS-RPT](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8460) policy.
 - Valid [DANE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities) records.
 - Valid [SPF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework) and [DKIM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail) records.
-- Have a proper [DMARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC) record and policy or use [ARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain) for authentication. If DMARC authentication is being used, the policy must be set to `reject` or `quarantine`.
+- Must have a proper [DMARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC) record and policy or use [ARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain) for authentication. If DMARC authentication is being used, the policy must be set to `reject` or `quarantine`.
 - A server suite preference of TLS 1.2 or later and a plan for [RFC8996](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8996).
 - [SMTPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMTPS) submission, assuming SMTP is used.
 - Website security standards such as:
@@ -368,10 +372,10 @@ Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers w
 
 **Best Case:**
 
-- Support for hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online).
+- Should support hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online).
 - [DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) in addition to DANE support.
-- Implementation of [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), which is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
-- Published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+- Should implement [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), which is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
+- Published security audits from a reputable, third-party firm.
 - Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
 - Website security standards such as:
     - [Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy)
@@ -396,18 +400,15 @@ With the email providers we recommend, we like to see responsible marketing.
 **Minimum to Qualify:**
 
 - Must self-host analytics (no Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc.).
-
-Must not have any irresponsible marketing, which can include the following:
-
-- Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
-- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily de-anonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
-
-    - Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc.) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
-    - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+- Must not have any irresponsible marketing, which can include the following:
+    - Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
+    - Guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100%, it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily de-anonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+        - Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc.) that they accessed without anonymity software such as Tor
+        - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
 
 **Best Case:**
 
-- Clear and easy to read documentation for tasks like setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc.
+- Clear and easy-to-read documentation for tasks like setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc.
 
 ### Additional Functionality
 

docs/encryption.md

@@ -367,13 +367,6 @@ gpg --quick-gen-key alice@example.com future-default
 
 ### GPG Suite
 
-<div class="admonition note" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
-
-We suggest [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios) for using PGP with email on iOS devices.
-
-</div>
-
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
 ![GPG Suite logo](assets/img/encryption-software/gpgsuite.png){ align=right }

docs/health-and-wellness.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "Privacy Respecting Health and Wellness apps for Android and iOS - P
 title: "Health and Wellness Apps"
 icon: material/heart-pulse
 description: These applications are what we currently recommend for all health and fitness-related activites on your phone.
-cover: health-cover.webp
+cover: health.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
 
@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ Keep track of your health and fitness-related goals with these apps. Unlike thei
 
 Popular menstrual trackers like [Flo](https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/13/flo-gets-ftc-slap-for-sharing-user-data-when-it-promised-privacy) are notorious for collecting and sharing your user data. Depending on your jurisdiction, this may lead to [legal consequences](https://forbes.com/sites/abigaildubiniecki/2024/11/14/post-roe-your-period-app-data-could-be-used-against-you) affecting your reproductive autonomy.
 
-### drip.
+### Drip
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![drip logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png){ align=right }
+![Drip logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png){ align=right }
 
-**drip.** is a gender-inclusive and open source menstrual cycle tracker available on all mobile platforms. It relies on the "sympto-thermal method" to predict ovulation. All user data is stored locally on your device and can be protected with a password.
+**Drip** is a gender-inclusive and open source menstrual cycle tracker available on all mobile platforms. It relies on the "sympto-thermal method" to predict ovulation. All user data is stored locally on your device and can be protected with a password.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://bloodyhealth.gitlab.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://bloodyhealth.gitlab.io/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }

docs/maps.md

@@ -25,14 +25,14 @@ Features include cycling routes, hiking trails and walking paths, turn-by-turn n
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://organicmaps.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://organicmaps.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/organicmaps/organicmaps){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://git.omaps.dev/organicmaps/organicmaps){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
 
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/organicmaps/organicmaps)
 - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.organicmaps)
 - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/organic-maps/id1567437057)
+- [:simple-forgejo: Forgejo](https://git.omaps.dev/organicmaps/organicmaps/releases)
 - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://flathub.org/apps/app.organicmaps.desktop)
 
 </details>

docs/meta/pr-comments.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+---
+title: Commenting on PRs
+description: A guide on participating in Pull Request discussions.
+---
+Please refrain from using the general **Add a comment** box in GitHub PRs when leaving a comment or performing a review.
+
+![Do not use the general "Add a comment" box in GitHub](../assets/img/meta/pr-avoid-general-comments.png)
+
+Comments that are left like this are not *threaded*, which makes it difficult to keep track of multiple conversations.
+
+Comments that are instead left in the manner described below will have a built-in reply box to keep conversations in a single thread. These comments can also be marked as resolved afterwards, so that discussion can be tracked more easily.
+
+![A screenshot of a comment in GitHub which has a built-in "reply" box, highlighted in orange.](../assets/img/meta/pr-threaded-comment.png)
+
+## Commenting
+
+To start a threaded comment, you should leave all comments under the :octicons-file-diff-16: **Files changed** tab in a PR.
+
+![Screenshot of the tabs for a pull request. The "Files changed" tab is outlined in dark orange.](https://docs.github.com/assets/cb-23571/mw-1440/images/help/pull_requests/pull-request-tabs-changed-files.webp)
+
+To leave a *general* comment on a PR, click the :octicons-comment-16: comment icon to the right of a file:
+
+![Screenshot of an image file on the "Files changed" page of a pull request. To the right of the file, a comment icon is outlined in orange.](https://docs.github.com/assets/cb-73771/mw-1440/images/help/pull_requests/pull-request-comment-on-file.webp)
+
+If the PR has multiple files changed, comment on the primary or most relevant file changed, or comment on the first file if you can't decide.
+
+To leave a comment *on a specific line* of a PR, hover over the line where you'd like to add a comment, and click the blue comment icon:
+
+![Screenshot of a diff in a pull request. Next to a line number, a blue plus icon is highlighted with an orange outline.](https://docs.github.com/assets/cb-44227/mw-1440/images/help/commits/hover-comment-icon.webp)
+
+(Optionally, you can add a comment on multiple lines. You can click the line number of the first line you want to comment on and drag down to select a range of lines, then click the blue comment icon on the last line you want to comment on. Alternatively, you can click the blue comment icon next to the first line you want to comment on, then drag down to the last line you want to comment on.)
+
+Then, type your comment and click **Add single comment**.
+
+## Reviewing
+
+When performing a review, follow the same steps as above, but click **Start a review** (and subsequently, **Add a review comment**) instead of **Add single comment**.
+
+Then, click the green **Finish your review** button at the top of the page.
+
+Do not leave any discussion comments in the *Leave a comment* box in the review finalization pop-up. You can leave it blank, or leave a short note if it will not require any follow-up. To comment on something that will require further discussion, add a comment on a file as described above instead.
+
+Then, click **Submit review**.

docs/meta/uploading-images.md

@@ -88,8 +88,8 @@ scour --set-precision=5 \
 
 ### WebP
 
-Use the [cwebp](https://developers.google.com/speed/webp/docs/using) command to convert PNG or JPEG image files to WebP format:
+Use the [`cwebp`](https://developers.google.com/speed/webp/docs/using) command to convert PNG or JPEG image files to WebP format:
 
 ```bash
-cwebp -q 70 -m 6 input_file -o output.webp
+cwebp -m 6 input_file -o output.webp
 ```

docs/os/android-overview.md

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Pr
 
 The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
 
-- Stricter two-factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
+- Stricter two-factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](../basics/account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth)
 - Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
 - Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
 - Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
@@ -153,7 +153,9 @@ If you have an EOL device shipped with Android 10 or above and are unable to run
 
 All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
 
-On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **Ads**, and select *Delete advertising ID*.
+On Android distributions with [sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **All services** → **Ads**.
+
+- [x] Select **Delete advertising ID**
 
 On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (which includes the stock installation on most devices), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
 

docs/os/linux-overview.md

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Distros which use atomic updates, on the other hand, apply updates in full or no
 
 The atomic update method can achieve reliability with this model and is used for [distributions](../desktop.md#atomic-distributions) like Silverblue and NixOS. [Adam Šamalík](https://twitter.com/adsamalik) provides a presentation on how `rpm-ostree` works with Silverblue:
 
-- [Let's try Fedora Silverblue — an immutable desktop OS! - Adam Šamalík](https://youtu.be/aMo4ZlWznao) <small>(YouTube)</small>
+- [Let's try Fedora Silverblue — an immutable desktop OS! - Adam Šamalík](https://youtu.be/-hpV5l-gJnQ) <small>(YouTube)</small>
 
 ### “Security-focused” distributions
 

docs/os/macos-overview.md

@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ Just because one of an app's processes is sandboxed doesn't mean they all are.
 Alternatively, you can check apps before you run them by running this command in the terminal:
 
 ``` zsh
-% codesign -dvvv --entitlements - <path to your app>
+codesign -dvvv --entitlements - <path to your app>
 ```
 
 If an app is sandboxed, you should see the following output:
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ The [Hardened Runtime](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/harden
 You can check if an app uses the Hardened Runtime using this command:
 
 ``` zsh
-codesign --display --verbose /path/to/bundle.app
+codesign -dv <path to your app>
 ```
 
 If Hardened Runtime is enabled, you will see `flags=0x10000(runtime)`. The `runtime` output means Hardened Runtime is enabled. There might be other flags, but the runtime flag is what we're looking for here.

docs/passwords.md

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ schema:
   -
     "@context": http://schema.org
     "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: gopass
+    name: Gopass
     image: /assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg
     url: https://gopass.pw
     applicationCategory: Password Manager
@@ -363,13 +363,13 @@ KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-se
 
 </div>
 
-### gopass (CLI)
+### Gopass (CLI)
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![gopass logo](assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg){ align=right }
+![Gopass logo](assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg){ align=right }
 
-**gopass** is a minimal password manager for the command line written in Go. It can be used within scripting applications and works on all major desktop and server operating systems.
+**Gopass** is a minimal password manager for the command line written in Go. It can be used within scripting applications and works on all major desktop and server operating systems.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gopass.pw){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass/tree/master/docs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }

docs/photo-management.md

@@ -15,10 +15,9 @@ Most cloud **photo management solutions** like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg#only-light){ align=right }
-![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Ente Photos** is an end-to-end encrypted photo backup service which supports automatic backups on iOS and Android. Their code is fully open-source, both on the client side and on the server side. It is also [self-hostable](https://github.com/ente-io/ente/tree/main/server#self-hosting). The free plan offers 5 GB of storage as long as you use the service at least once a year.
+**Ente Photos** is an end-to-end encrypted photo backup service which supports automatic backups on iOS and Android. Their code is fully open-source, both on the client side and on the server side. It is also [self-hostable](https://github.com/ente-io/ente/tree/main/server#self-hosting). The free plan offers 10 GB of storage as long as you use the service at least once a year.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://ente.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://ente.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }

docs/search-engines.md

@@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ Brave Search includes unique features such as [Discussions](https://search.brave
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://search.brave.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 
-</details>
-
 </div>
 
 Note that if you use Brave Search while logged in to a Premium account, it may make it easier for Brave to correlate queries with specific users.
@@ -67,8 +65,6 @@ DuckDuckGo is the default search engine for the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.duckduckgo.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 
-</details>
-
 </div>
 
 DuckDuckGo offers two [other versions](https://help.duckduckgo.com/features/non-javascript) of their search engine, both of which do not require JavaScript. These versions do lack features, however. These versions can also be used in conjunction with their Tor hidden address by appending [/lite](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/lite) or [/html](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/html) for the respective version.
@@ -87,8 +83,6 @@ DuckDuckGo offers two [other versions](https://help.duckduckgo.com/features/non-
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://startpage.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startpage.com/hc/categories/4481917470356-Startpage-Search-Engine){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 
-</details>
-
 </div>
 
 Startpage's majority shareholder is System1 who is an adtech company. We don't believe that to be an issue as they have a distinctly separate [privacy policy](https://system1.com/terms/privacy-policy). The Privacy Guides team reached out to Startpage [back in 2020](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2020/05/03/relisting-startpage) to clear up any concerns with System1's sizeable investment into the service, and we were satisfied with the answers we received.
@@ -111,8 +105,6 @@ A [metasearch engine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metasearch_engine) aggregate
 [:octicons-server-16:](https://searx.space){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/searxng/searxng){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 
-</details>
-
 </div>
 
 SearXNG is a proxy between you and the search engines it aggregates from. Your search queries will still be sent to the search engines that SearXNG gets its results from.

docs/social-networks.md

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+---
+title: Social Networks
+icon: material/account-supervisor-circle-outline
+description: Find a new social network that doesn’t pry into your data or monetize your profile.
+cover: social-networks.webp
+---
+<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
+
+- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }
+- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+
+These privacy-respecting **social networks** allow you to participate in online communities without giving up your personal information, like your full name, phone number, and other data commonly requested by tech companies.
+
+A growing problem among social media platforms is censorship in two different forms. First, they often acquiesce to illegitimate censorship requests, either from malicious governments or their own internal policies.
+
+Second, they often require accounts to access walled-off content that would otherwise be published freely on the open internet. This effectively censors the browsing activities of privacy-conscious users who are unable to pay the privacy cost of opening an account on these networks.
+
+The social networks we recommend solve the issue of censorship by operating atop an open and decentralized social networking protocol. While it is possible for your account to be banned or silenced by an individual server, there is no central authority which can censor your account across the entire network. They also don't require an account merely to view publicly available content.
+
+You should note that **no** social networks are appropriate for private or sensitive communications. For chatting directly with others, you should use a recommended [instant messenger](real-time-communication.md) with strong end-to-end encryption, and only use direct messages on social media in order to establish a more private and secure chat platform with your contacts.
+
+## Mastodon
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Mastodon logo](assets/img/social-networks/mastodon.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Mastodon** is a social network based on open web protocols and free, open-source software. It uses the **:simple-activitypub: ActivityPub** protocol, which is decentralized like email: users can exist on different servers or even different platforms but still communicate with each other.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://joinmastodon.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.joinmastodon.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+
+</div>
+
+There are many software platforms which use ActivityPub as their backend social networking protocol, meaning they can talk to servers even when they are running different software. For example, PeerTube is a video publishing software that uses ActivityPub, meaning you can follow channels on PeerTube either with another PeerTube account, *or* with a Mastodon account because Mastodon also uses ActivityPub.
+
+We chose to recommend Mastodon over other ActivityPub software as your primary social media platform for these reasons:
+
+1. Mastodon has a solid history of security updates. In the handful of circumstances where major security vulnerabilities have been found, they coordinate patch releases quickly and cleanly. Historically they have also backported these security patches to older feature branches. This makes it easier for less experienced server hosts who may not feel comfortable upgrading to the latest releases right away to keep their instances secure. Mastodon also has an update notification system built in to the web interface, making it much more likely for server administrators to be aware of critical security patches available for their instance.
+
+2. Mastodon is largely usable with most content types. While it is primarily a microblogging platform, Mastodon easily handles longer posts, image posts, video posts, and most other posts you might encounter when following ActivityPub users who aren't on Mastodon. This makes your Mastodon account an ideal "central hub" for following anyone regardless of the platform they chose to use. In contrast, if you were only using a PeerTube account, you would *only* be able to follow other video channels, for example.
+
+3. Mastodon has fairly comprehensive privacy controls. It has many built-in features which allow you to limit how and when your data is shared, some of which we'll cover below. They also develop new features with privacy in mind. For example, while other ActivityPub software quickly implemented "quote posts" by merely handling links to other posts with a slightly different embed modal, Mastodon is [developing](https://blog.joinmastodon.org/2025/02/bringing-quote-posts-to-mastodon/) a quote post feature which will give you more fine-grained control when your post is quoted.
+
+### Choosing an Instance
+
+To benefit the most from Mastodon, it is critical to choose a server, or "instance," which is well aligned with the type of content you want to post or read about. While censorship in Mastodon does not exist on a network level, it is very possible to experience censorship on a server level depending on your server's administrator.
+
+It is critical to understand that Mastodon is not a single, unified service in the way that X (Twitter) or Facebook are. Each server is its own legal entity, with its own privacy policy, terms of use, administration team, and moderators. While many of these servers are far *less* restrictive and more privacy-respecting than traditional social media platforms, some can be far *more* restrictive or potentially *worse* for your privacy. The Mastodon software does not discriminate between these administrators or place any limitations on their powers.
+
+We do not currently recommend any specific instances, but you may find advice within our communities. We recommend avoiding *mastodon.social* and *mastodon.online* because they are operated by the same company which develops Mastodon itself. From the perspective of decentralization, it is better in the long term to separate software developers and server hosts so that no one party can exert too much control over the network as a whole.
+
+If you are greatly concerned about an existing server censoring your content or the content you can view, you generally have two options:
+
+1. **Host Mastodon yourself.** This approach gives you the exact same censorship resistance as any other website you can host yourself, which is fairly high. Mastodon even [integrates with the Tor network](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/admin/optional/tor) for more extreme scenarios where even your underlying hosting provider is subject to censorship, but this may limit who can access your content to only other servers which integrate with Tor, like most other hidden services.
+
+    Mastodon benefits greatly from a large and active self-hosting community, and its administration is comprehensively documented. While many other ActivityPub platforms can require extensive technical knowledge to run and troubleshoot, Mastodon has very stable and tested releases, and it can generally be run securely without issue by anyone who can use the Linux command line and follow [step-by-step instructions](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/admin/prerequisites).
+
+2. **Use a managed hosting service.** We don't have any specific recommendations, but there are a variety of Mastodon hosting services which will create a brand-new Mastodon server on your own domain (or occasionally a subdomain of their domain, but we recommend against this unless registering your own domain presents too much of a burden to your privacy).
+
+    Typically, Mastodon hosting providers will handle the *technical* side of your instance, but they completely leave the *moderation* side up to you. This means that you will be able to follow any content you like, although it may expose you to more spam or unwanted content because you will not have the dedicated moderation team many larger instances will have.
+
+    This often represents a better approach than self-hosting for most people, because you can benefit from greater control over your own instance without worrying about technical problems or unpatched security vulnerabilities.
+
+    You should look closely at your hosting provider's terms of service and acceptable use policies before registering. These are often far more broad than typical hosted instance rules, and they are far less likely to be enforced without recourse, but they can still be restrictive in undesirable ways.
+
+### Recommended Privacy Settings
+
+From Mastodon's web interface, click the **Administration** link in the right sidebar. Within the administration control panel, you'll find these sections in the left sidebar:
+
+#### Public Profile
+
+There are a number of privacy controls under the **privacy and reach** tab here. Most notably, pay attention to these:
+
+- [ ] **Automatically accept new followers**: You should consider unchecking this box to have a private profile. This will allow you to review who can follow your account before accepting them.
+
+    In contrast to most social media platforms, if you have a private profile you still have the *option* to publish posts which are publicly visible to non-followers, and which can still be boosted and seen by non-followers. Therefore, unchecking this box is the only way to have the *choice* to publish to either the entire world or a select group of people.
+
+- [ ] **Show follows and followers on profile**: You should uncheck this box to hide your social graph from the public. It is fairly uncommon for the list of people you follow to have some genuine benefit to others, but that information can present a risk to you.
+
+- [ ] **Display from which app you sent a post**: You should uncheck this box to prevent revealing information about your personal computing setup to others unnecessarily.
+
+The other privacy controls on this page should be read through, but we would stress that they are **not** technical controls—they are merely requests that you make to others. For example, if you choose to hide your profile from search engines on this page, **nothing** is actually stopping a search engine from reading your profile. You are merely requesting search engine indexes not publish your content to their users.
+
+You will likely still wish to make these requests because they can practically reduce your digital footprint. However, they should not be *relied* upon. The only effective way to hide your posts from search engines and others is to post with non-public (followers only) visibility settings *and* limit who can follow your account.
+
+#### Preferences
+
+You should change your **posting privacy** setting from public to: **Followers-only - Only show to followers**.
+
+Note that this only changes your default settings to prevent accidental over-sharing. You can always adjust your visibility level when composing a new post.
+
+#### Automated post deletion
+
+- [x] Check the **Automatically delete old posts** box.
+
+The default settings here are fine, and will delete any posts you make after 2 weeks, unless you favorite (star) them. This gives you an easy way to control which posts stick around forever, and which ones are only ephemeral. Many settings about how long and when posts are kept can be adjusted here to suit your own needs, however.
+
+It is very rare for social media posts older than a few weeks to be read or relevant to others. These older posts are often ignored because they are challenging to deal with in bulk, but they can build a fairly comprehensive profile about you over time. You should always strive to publish content ephemerally by default, and only keep posts around for longer than that very intentionally.
+
+### Posting Content
+
+When publishing a new post, you will have the option to choose from one of these visibility settings:
+
+- **Public**, which publishes your content to anyone on the internet.
+- **Quiet public**, which you should consider equivalent to publicly posting! This is not a technical guarantee, merely a request you are making to other servers to hide your post from some feeds.
+- **Followers**, which publishes your content only to your followers. If you did not follow our recommendation of restricting your followers, you should consider this equivalent to publicly posting!
+- **Specific people**, which only shares the post with people who are specifically mentioned within the post. This is Mastodon's version of direct messages, but should never be relied on for private communications as we covered earlier, since Mastodon has no E2EE.
+
+If you used our recommended configuration settings above, you should be posting to **Followers** by default, and only posting to **Public** on an intentional and case-by-case basis.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+- Must be free and open source software.
+- Must use a federated protocol to communicate with other instances of the social networking software.
+- Must not have non-technical restrictions on who can be federated with.
+- Must be usable within a standard [web browser](desktop-browsers.md).
+- Must make public content accessible to visitors without an account.
+- Must allow you to limit who can follow your profile.
+- Must allow you to post content visible only to your followers.
+- Must support modern web application security standards/features (including [multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md)).

docs/tools.md

@@ -114,7 +114,6 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![Orbot logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/orbot.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
 - ![Onion Browser logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/onion_browser.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
 
 </div>
@@ -215,7 +214,7 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [addy.io](email-aliasing.md#addyio)
+- ![Addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Addy.io](email-aliasing.md#addyio)
 - ![SimpleLogin logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/simplelogin.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin)
 
 </div>
@@ -241,7 +240,6 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec
 
 - ![Thunderbird logo](assets/img/email-clients/thunderbird.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Thunderbird](email-clients.md#thunderbird)
 - ![Apple Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/applemail.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Apple Mail (macOS)](email-clients.md#apple-mail-macos)
-- ![Canary Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/canarymail.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Canary Mail (iOS)](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios)
 - ![FairEmail logo](assets/img/email-clients/fairemail.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [FairEmail (Android)](email-clients.md#fairemail-android)
 - ![GNOME Evolution logo](assets/img/email-clients/evolution.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [GNOME Evolution (Linux)](email-clients.md#gnome-evolution-gnome)
 - ![Kontact logo](assets/img/email-clients/kontact.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Kontact (Linux)](email-clients.md#kontact-kde)
@@ -290,7 +288,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
 - ![RethinkDNS logo](assets/img/android/rethinkdns.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![RethinkDNS logo](assets/img/android/rethinkdns-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [RethinkDNS](dns.md#rethinkdns)
-- ![dnscrypt-proxy logo](assets/img/dns/dnscrypt-proxy.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [dnscrypt-proxy](dns.md#dnscrypt-proxy)
+- ![DNSCrypt-Proxy logo](assets/img/dns/dnscrypt-proxy.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [DNSCrypt-Proxy](dns.md#dnscrypt-proxy)
 
 </div>
 
@@ -334,7 +332,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Ente Photos](photo-management.md#ente-photos)
+- ![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Ente Photos](photo-management.md#ente-photos)
 - ![Stingle logo](assets/img/photo-management/stingle.png#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Stingle logo](assets/img/photo-management/stingle-dark.png#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Stingle](photo-management.md#stingle)
 - ![PhotoPrism logo](assets/img/photo-management/photoprism.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [PhotoPrism](photo-management.md#photoprism)
 
@@ -362,7 +360,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
 - ![Kobold logo](assets/img/ai-chat/kobold.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Kobold.cpp](ai-chat.md#koboldcpp)
-- ![Llamafile logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Llamafile](ai-chat.md#llamafile)
+- ![Llamafile logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Llamafile](ai-chat.md#llamafile)
 - ![Ollama logo](assets/img/ai-chat/ollama.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Ollama (CLI)](ai-chat.md#ollama-cli)
 
 </div>
@@ -486,7 +484,7 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![drip. logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [drip.](health-and-wellness.md#drip)
+- ![Drip logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Drip](health-and-wellness.md#drip)
 - ![Euki logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/euki.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Euki](health-and-wellness.md#euki)
 - ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy }[Apple Health](health-and-wellness.md#apple-health)
 - ![Gadgetbridge logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Gadgetbridge logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Gadgetbridge](health-and-wellness.md#gadgetbridge)
@@ -581,7 +579,7 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 - ![Psono logo](assets/img/password-management/psono.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Psono](passwords.md#psono)
 - ![KeePassXC logo](assets/img/password-management/keepassxc.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [KeePassXC](passwords.md#keepassxc)
 - ![KeePassDX logo](assets/img/password-management/keepassdx.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [KeePassDX (Android)](passwords.md#keepassdx-android)
-- ![gopass logo](assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [gopass (CLI)](passwords.md#gopass-cli)
+- ![Gopass logo](assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Gopass (CLI)](passwords.md#gopass-cli)
 
 </div>
 
@@ -612,6 +610,16 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 
 [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](real-time-communication.md)
 
+### Social Networks
+
+<div class="grid cards" markdown>
+
+- ![Mastodon logo](assets/img/social-networks/mastodon.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mastodon](social-networks.md#mastodon)
+
+</div>
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](social-networks.md)
+
 ## Hardware
 
 ### Security Keys
@@ -685,6 +693,7 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 - ![NixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos)
 - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix)
 - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails)
+- ![Secureblue logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/secureblue.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Secureblue](desktop.md#secureblue)
 - ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
 
 </div>
@@ -710,9 +719,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![I2P logo](./assets/img/self-contained-networks/i2p.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![I2P logo](./assets/img/self-contained-networks/i2p-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- ![Tor logo](./assets/img/self-contained-networks/tor.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- ![Snowflake logo](assets/img/browsers/snowflake.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Snowflake logo](assets/img/browsers/snowflake-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- ![I2P logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/i2p.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![I2P logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/i2p-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- ![Tor logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/tor.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- ![Orbot logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/orbot.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- ![Snowflake logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/snowflake.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Snowflake logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/snowflake-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
 
 </div>
 
@@ -722,7 +732,7 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt.webp){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mobile Verification Toolkit](device-integrity.md#mobile-verification-toolkit)
+- ![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt.webp#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt-dark.png#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mobile Verification Toolkit](device-integrity.md#mobile-verification-toolkit)
 - ![iMazing logo](assets/img/device-integrity/imazing.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [iMazing (iOS)](device-integrity.md#imazing-ios)
 - ![Auditor logo](assets/img/device-integrity/auditor.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Auditor logo](assets/img/device-integrity/auditor-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Auditor (Android)](device-integrity.md#auditor-android)
 

docs/tor.md

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
 
 There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } browsing for desktop computers and Android.
 
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
 
 If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
 
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based
 
 In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
 
-## Orbot
-
-<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
-
-![Orbot logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/orbot.svg){ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-<details class="downloads" markdown>
-<summary>Downloads</summary>
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-</details>
-
-</div>
-
-We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Tips for Android</p>
-
-Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-</div>
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
 ## Onion Browser (iOS)
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
@@ -149,6 +109,6 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
 
 Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
 
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
 
 [^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.

docs/vpn.md

@@ -108,6 +108,15 @@ Unfortunately, it does not work very well in countries where sophisticated filte
 
 Proton VPN has published [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1437005085) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android) clients, both supporting an easy-to-use interface as opposed to requiring you to manually configure your WireGuard connection. The Android client is also available on [GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases).
 
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">How to opt out of sharing telemetry</p>
+
+On Android, Proton hides telemetry settings under the misleadingly labeled "**Help us fight censorship**" menu in the settings panel. On other platforms these settings can be found under the "**Usage statistics**" menu.
+
+We are noting this because while we don't necessarily recommend against sharing anonymous usage statistics with developers, it is important that these settings are easily found and clearly labeled.
+
+</div>
+
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Notes
 
 Proton VPN clients support two-factor authentication on all platforms. Proton VPN has their own servers and datacenters in Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden. They offer content blocking and known-malware blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) for this purpose.

includes/abbreviations.en.txt

@@ -107,3 +107,5 @@
 *[W3C]: World Wide Web Consortium
 *[XMPP]: Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
 *[PWA]: Progressive Web App
+*[PWAs]: Progressive Web Apps
+*[WKD]: Web Key Directory

mkdocs.yml

@@ -428,6 +428,7 @@ nav:
           - "passwords.md"
           - "pastebins.md"
           - "real-time-communication.md"
+          - "social-networks.md"
       - !ENV [NAV_HARDWARE, "Hardware"]:
           - "mobile-phones.md"
           - "security-keys.md"
@@ -473,6 +474,7 @@ nav:
               - "meta/uploading-images.md"
               - "meta/git-recommendations.md"
               - "meta/commit-messages.md"
+              - "meta/pr-comments.md"
 
 validation:
   nav:

theme/assets/brand

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-Subproject commit db75785763ddcbf2790000a5a18b9d937dbdfeb7
+Subproject commit e567eb3f0e6cb54242a809661d78d884caa05b72

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+<path transform="translate(272,216)" d="m0 0h332l26 3 21 5 21 8 12 6v3l5 1 6 5 3 1v2l3 2-1 2-4-2v-2l-7-2-19-10-13-5-9-2-8-3-15-3-11-1-1-1-15-1h-319l-4 1-2 6-1 35-2 14 1 1v9l-2 1-1 7h3v9l-2-1-1 27 2 1-1 2-1 48-2 2-1-106v-55l5-6z" fill="#5378FD"/>
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+<path transform="translate(284,345)" d="m0 0 3 1v2h-2v2l3-1 3 6-4 2-1 3 1 4-4 5 1 8-4 10-1 5-1 19-2 7-1 7h-2l1-15 1-4v-18l1-16 4-10 1-12h3v-2l-3-1h3z" fill="#496CFE"/>
+<path transform="translate(639,430)" d="m0 0h1l-1 11-5 17-3 3v-2l-5 2h-3l-1 4-2-1 5-11 3-9 1-5 5-3 3-5z" fill="#496CFE"/>
+<path transform="translate(622,232)" d="m0 0h13l15 2 11 5 12 4 13 4 4 2-1 2-6-1-11-2-12-6-8-1-7-3-4-1-10-2h-15l-4 1-6-2v-1z" fill="#4A6DFF"/>
+<path transform="translate(651,225)" d="m0 0 9 2 23 10 1 4 5 1 6 5 3 1v2l3 2-1 2-4-2v-2l-7-2-19-10-13-5 4-1 9 3v-2l-5-1-13-5z" fill="#496CFE"/>
+<path transform="translate(266,679)" d="m0 0 2 1v48l1 2v6l2 1 1 7-3 2-1 2h-2z" fill="#4A6DFF"/>
+<path transform="translate(266,728)" d="m0 0 3 1v7l2 1 1 7-3 2-1 2h-2z" fill="#4568FE"/>
+<path transform="translate(726,270)" d="m0 0 7 6 10 12 5 8-5-2-6-10-11-12z" fill="#0A20B6"/>
+<path transform="translate(351,259)" d="m0 0 5 1v2l2 1h-5l1 3-4 1v-2l-4-2-1-2z" fill="#4A6DFF"/>
+<path transform="translate(651,225)" d="m0 0 9 2 14 6-4 1-16-6z" fill="#4163FD"/>
+<path transform="translate(270,749)" d="m0 0h1v9h-3l-1 9h-1v-17l2 3z" fill="#496BFE"/>
+<path transform="translate(417,508)" d="m0 0h7l-2 2-6 1-1 2h-8l1-3z" fill="#4A6DFF"/>
+<path transform="translate(276,406)" d="m0 0 2 1-1 5-2 13h-2l1-15z" fill="#4A6DFF"/>
+<path transform="translate(580,235)" d="m0 0 4 1v2l-10 4-1-3 4-2z" fill="#4A6DFF"/>
+<path transform="translate(684,239)" d="m0 0 6 2 8 5-4 2-2-4-5-2-3-1z" fill="#3C5DFD"/>
+</svg>

theme/assets/img/photo-management/ente-dark.svg

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theme/assets/img/social-networks/mastodon.svg

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<svg width="75" height="79" viewBox="0 0 75 79" fill="none" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
+<path d="M73.8393 17.4898C72.6973 9.00165 65.2994 2.31235 56.5296 1.01614C55.05 0.797115 49.4441 0 36.4582 0H36.3612C23.3717 0 20.585 0.797115 19.1054 1.01614C10.5798 2.27644 2.79399 8.28712 0.904997 16.8758C-0.00358524 21.1056 -0.100549 25.7949 0.0682394 30.0965C0.308852 36.2651 0.355538 42.423 0.91577 48.5665C1.30307 52.6474 1.97872 56.6957 2.93763 60.6812C4.73325 68.042 12.0019 74.1676 19.1233 76.6666C26.7478 79.2728 34.9474 79.7055 42.8039 77.9162C43.6682 77.7151 44.5217 77.4817 45.3645 77.216C47.275 76.6092 49.5123 75.9305 51.1571 74.7385C51.1797 74.7217 51.1982 74.7001 51.2112 74.6753C51.2243 74.6504 51.2316 74.6229 51.2325 74.5948V68.6416C51.2321 68.6154 51.2259 68.5896 51.2142 68.5661C51.2025 68.5426 51.1858 68.522 51.1651 68.5058C51.1444 68.4896 51.1204 68.4783 51.0948 68.4726C51.0692 68.4669 51.0426 68.467 51.0171 68.4729C45.9835 69.675 40.8254 70.2777 35.6502 70.2682C26.7439 70.2682 24.3486 66.042 23.6626 64.2826C23.1113 62.762 22.7612 61.1759 22.6212 59.5646C22.6197 59.5375 22.6247 59.5105 22.6357 59.4857C22.6466 59.4609 22.6633 59.4391 22.6843 59.422C22.7053 59.4048 22.73 59.3929 22.7565 59.3871C22.783 59.3813 22.8104 59.3818 22.8367 59.3886C27.7864 60.5826 32.8604 61.1853 37.9522 61.1839C39.1768 61.1839 40.3978 61.1839 41.6224 61.1516C46.7435 61.008 52.1411 60.7459 57.1796 59.7621C57.3053 59.7369 57.431 59.7154 57.5387 59.6831C65.4861 58.157 73.0493 53.3672 73.8178 41.2381C73.8465 40.7606 73.9184 36.2364 73.9184 35.7409C73.9219 34.0569 74.4606 23.7949 73.8393 17.4898Z" fill="url(#paint0_linear_549_34)"/>
+<path d="M61.2484 27.0263V48.114H52.8916V27.6475C52.8916 23.3388 51.096 21.1413 47.4437 21.1413C43.4287 21.1413 41.4177 23.7409 41.4177 28.8755V40.0782H33.1111V28.8755C33.1111 23.7409 31.0965 21.1413 27.0815 21.1413C23.4507 21.1413 21.6371 23.3388 21.6371 27.6475V48.114H13.2839V27.0263C13.2839 22.7176 14.384 19.2946 16.5843 16.7572C18.8539 14.2258 21.8311 12.926 25.5264 12.926C29.8036 12.926 33.0357 14.5705 35.1905 17.8559L37.2698 21.346L39.3527 17.8559C41.5074 14.5705 44.7395 12.926 49.0095 12.926C52.7013 12.926 55.6784 14.2258 57.9553 16.7572C60.1531 19.2922 61.2508 22.7152 61.2484 27.0263Z" fill="white"/>
+<defs>
+<linearGradient id="paint0_linear_549_34" x1="37.0692" y1="0" x2="37.0692" y2="79" gradientUnits="userSpaceOnUse">
+<stop stop-color="#6364FF"/>
+<stop offset="1" stop-color="#563ACC"/>
+</linearGradient>
+</defs>
+</svg>

theme/layouts/blog.yml

@@ -14,7 +14,10 @@ definitions:
     {% endif %}
 
   - &page_icon >-
-    {%- if not page.meta.preview or not page.meta.preview.logo -%}
+    {%- if page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.icon -%}
+      {{- page.meta.preview.icon -}}
+    {%- elif page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.logo -%}
+    {%- else -%}
       material/book-open-page-variant
     {%- endif -%}
 
@@ -74,6 +77,11 @@ definitions:
       {{- "@privacy_guides" -}}
     {%- endif -%}
 
+  - &replacement_image >-
+    {%- if page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.cover -%}
+      {{- page.meta.preview.cover -}}
+    {%- endif -%}
+
 # Meta tags
 tags:
   # Open Graph
@@ -158,3 +166,6 @@ layers:
       font:
         family: Bagnard
         style: Bold
+
+  - background:
+      image: *replacement_image