docs/os: AVB does not prevent evil maid

AVB may help deter rouge firmware changes and
prevent tampering of the OS.

Signed-off-by: ignoramous <ignoramous@users.noreply.github.com>
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Key components of the Android security model include [verified boot](#verified-b
### Verified Boot
[**Verified Boot**](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
[**Verified Boot**](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It protects from boot path changes, deters firmware tampering, prevents malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based). Your data is encrypted using unique encryption keys, and the operating system files are left unencrypted.