KB Cleanup (#1848)

Co-Authored-By: mfwmyfacewhen <94880365+mfwmyfacewhen@users.noreply.github.com>

docs/basics/common-misconceptions.en.md

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+---
+title: "Common Misconceptions"
+icon: 'material/robot-confused'
+---
+
+## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"
+
+These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
+
+Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^1]
+
+On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
+
+To avoid biased decisions, it's *vital* that you evaluate the privacy and security standards of the software you use.
+
+## "Shifting trust can increase privacy"
+
+We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP *specifically*, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties. This means that:
+
+1. You must exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to.
+2. You should still use other techniques, like E2EE, to protect your data completely. Merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not securing your data.
+
+## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
+
+Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
+
+The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
+
+## "Complicated is better"
+
+We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
+
+Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
+
+1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
+2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
+3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
+
+So, how might this look?
+
+One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. There will always be situations where you must declare your legal name and there are others where you don't need to.
+
+1. **Known identity** - A known identity is used for things where you must declare your name. There are many legal documents and contracts where a legal identity is required. This could range from opening a bank account, signing a property lease, obtaining a passport, customs declarations when importing items, or otherwise dealing with your government. These things will usually lead to credentials such as credit cards, credit rating checks, account numbers, and possibly physical addresses.
+
+    We don't suggest using a VPN or Tor for any of these things, as your identity is already known through other means.
+
+    !!! tip
+
+        When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
+
+2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. This pseudonym isn't anonymous because—if monitored for long enough—details about the owner can reveal further information, such as the way they write, their general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
+
+    You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
+
+3. **Anonymous identity** - Even with experience, anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time. They should be short-term and short-lived identities which are rotated regularly.
+
+    Using Tor can help with this. It is also worth noting that greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous communication: Real-time communication is vulnerable to analysis of typing patterns (i.e. more than a paragraph of text, distributed on a forum, via email, etc.)
+
+[^1]: One notable example of this is the [2021 incident in which University of Minnesota researchers introduced three vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel development project](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).

docs/basics/common-threats.en.md

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y
 
     Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible.
 
-Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
+Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
 
 ## Mass Surveillance Programs
 
@@ -130,68 +130,12 @@ People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](t
 
     While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
 
-    You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](basics/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
+    You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
 
 You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
 
-## Common Misconceptions
-
-:material-numeric-1-circle: **"Open-source software is always secure"** or **"Proprietary software is more secure"**
-
-These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
-
-Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^6]
-
-On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
-
-To avoid biased decisions, it's *vital* that you evaluate the privacy and security standards of the software you use.
-
-:material-numeric-2-circle: **"Shifting trust can increase privacy"**
-
-We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP *specifically*, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties. This means that:
-
-1. You must exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to.
-2. You should still use other techniques, like E2EE, to protect your data completely. Merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not securing your data.
-
-:material-numeric-3-circle: **"Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"**
-
-Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
-
-The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
-
-:material-numeric-4-circle: **"Complicated is better"**
-
-We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
-
-Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
-
-1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
-2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
-3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
-
-So, how might this look?
-
-One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. There will always be situations where you must declare your legal name and there are others where you don't need to.
-
-1. **Known identity** - A known identity is used for things where you must declare your name. There are many legal documents and contracts where a legal identity is required. This could range from opening a bank account, signing a property lease, obtaining a passport, customs declarations when importing items, or otherwise dealing with your Government. These things will usually lead to credentials such as credit cards, credit rating checks, account numbers, and possibly physical addresses.
-
-    We don't suggest using a VPN or Tor for any of these things, as your identity is already known through other means.
-
-    !!! tip
-
-        When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
-
-2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. This pseudonym isn't anonymous because—if monitored for long enough—details about the owner can reveal further information, such as the way they write, their general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
-
-    You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
-
-3. **Anonymous identity** - Even with experience, anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time. They should be short-term and short-lived identities which are rotated regularly.
-
-    Using Tor can help with this. It is also worth noting that greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous communication: Real-time communication is vulnerable to analysis of typing patterns (i.e. more than a paragraph of text, distributed on a forum, via email, etc.)
-
 [^1]: Wikipedia: [*Mass Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance) and [*Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance).
 [^2]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [*Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
 [^3]: Wikipedia: [*Surveillance capitalism*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
 [^4]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about"), as many adblockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You should also employ other mitigation techniques.
 [^5]: United Nations: [*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).
-[^6]: One notable example of this is the [2021 incident in which University of Minnesota researchers introduced three vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel development project](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).

docs/basics/dns-overview.en.md

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ---
-title: "Introduction to DNS"
+title: "DNS Overview"
 icon: material/dns
 ---
 

docs/basics/multi-factor-authentication.en.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-title: "Multi-factor Authentication"
+title: "Multi-Factor Authentication"
 icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
 ---
-**Multi-factor authentication** is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
+**Multi-Factor Authentication** (**MFA**) is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
 
 Normally, if a hacker (or adversary) is able to figure out your password then they’d gain access to the account that password belongs to. An account with MFA forces the hacker to have both the password (something you *know*) and a device that you own (something you *have*), like your phone.
 

docs/basics/passwords-overview.en.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 title: "Introduction to Passwords"
-icon: 'material/shield-key-outline'
+icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
 ---
 
 Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
@@ -108,4 +108,4 @@ There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose o
 
 ### Backups
 
-You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
+You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.

includes/abbreviations.en.md

@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@
 *[ADB]: Android Debug Bridge
 *[AOSP]: Android Open Source Project
 *[ATA]: Advanced Technology Attachment
+*[attack surface]: The total number of possible entry points for unauthorized access to a system
 *[AVB]: Android Verified Boot
+*[cgroups]: Control Groups
 *[CLI]: Command Line Interface
 *[CSV]: Comma-Separated Values
 *[CVE]: Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
@@ -16,11 +18,13 @@
 *[E2EE]: End-to-End Encryption/Encrypted
 *[ECS]: EDNS Client Subnet
 *[EEA]: European Economic Area
+*[entropy]: A measurement of how unpredictable something is
 *[EOL]: End-of-Life
 *[Exif]: Exchangeable image file format
 *[FCM]: Firebase Cloud Messaging
 *[FDE]: Full Disk Encryption
 *[FIDO]: Fast IDentity Online
+*[fork]: A new software project created by copying an existing project and adding to it independently
 *[GDPR]: General Data Protection Regulation
 *[GPG]: GNU Privacy Guard (PGP implementation)
 *[GPS]: Global Positioning System
@@ -30,6 +34,7 @@
 *[HOTP]: HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) based One-Time Password
 *[HTTPS]: Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
 *[HTTP]: Hypertext Transfer Protocol
+*[hypervisor]: Computer software, firmware, or hardware that splits the resources of a CPU among multiple operating systems
 *[ICCID]: Integrated Circuit Card Identifier
 *[IMAP]: Internet Message Access Protocol
 *[IMEI]: International Mobile Equipment Identity
@@ -60,6 +65,7 @@
 *[PGP]: Pretty Good Privacy (see OpenPGP)
 *[PII]: Personally Identifiable Information
 *[QNAME]: Qualified Name
+*[rolling release]: Updates which are released frequently rather than set intervals
 *[RSS]: Really Simple Syndication
 *[SELinux]: Security-Enhanced Linux
 *[SIM]: Subscriber Identity Module
@@ -83,11 +89,4 @@
 *[VoIP]: Voice over IP (Internet Protocol)
 *[W3C]: World Wide Web Consortium
 *[XMPP]: Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
-*[attack surface]: The attack surface of software or hardware is the sum of the different places an attacker can try to enter data to or extract data from.
-*[cgroups]: Control Groups
-*[fork]: In software development, a fork is created when developers take a copy of source code from one software package and start independent development on it, creating a distinct and separate piece of software.
-*[hypervisor]: A hypervisor is computer software, firmware, or hardware that allows partitioning the resource of a CPU among multiple operating systems or independent programs.
-*[rolling release]: An update release cycle in which updates are released very frequently, instead of at set intervals.
-*[walled garden]: A walled garden (or closed platform) is one in which the service provider has control over applications, content, and/or media, and restricts convenient access to non-approved applicants or content.
-*[entropy]: Password entropy is a measurement of how unpredictable a password is.
-*[PWA]: Progressive Web App
+*[PWA]: Progressive Web App

mkdocs.yml

@@ -122,12 +122,13 @@ extra_javascript:
 nav:
   - Home: 'index.md'
   - 'Knowledge Base':
-    - 'The Basics':
-      - 'basics/threat-modeling.md'
-      - 'basics/common-threats.md'
+    - 'basics/threat-modeling.md'
+    - 'basics/common-threats.md'
+    - 'basics/common-misconceptions.md'
+    - 'basics/account-deletion.md'
+    - 'Technology Introduction':
       - 'basics/passwords-overview.md'
       - 'basics/multi-factor-authentication.md'
-      - 'basics/account-deletion.md'
       - 'basics/email-security.md'
       - 'basics/vpn-overview.md'
       - 'basics/tor-overview.md'