Fix typos in Sandboxed play services/microg (#792)

Co-Authored-By: mfwmyfacewhen <94880365+mfwmyfacewhen@users.noreply.github.com>
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Daniel Gray 2022-03-26 15:08:59 +00:00
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2 changed files with 10 additions and 10 deletions

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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: |
GrapheneOS provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)) and privacy improvements. It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security features](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is fully supported.
Notably, GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Play Services](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-play-services). Google Play Services can be run fully sandboxed like a regular user app and contained in a work profile or user [profile](/android/#android-security-privacy) of your choice. This means that you can run apps dependant on Play Services, such as those that require push notifications using Google's [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/) service. GrapheneOS allows you to take advantage of most [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) whilst having full user control over their permissions and access.
Notably, GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play). Google Play Services can be run fully sandboxed like a regular user app and contained in a work profile or user [profile](/android/#android-security-privacy) of your choice. This means that you can run apps dependant on Play Services, such as those that require push notifications using Google's [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/) service. GrapheneOS allows you to take advantage of most [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) whilst having full user control over their permissions and access.
Currently, only [Pixel phones](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support) meet its hardware security requirement and are supported.

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@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
* Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
* Stricter recovery process for accounts with lost credentials
For users that are using the privileged Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
For users that are using the privileged Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
* Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
* Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
* Warning the user about unverified applications
@ -118,11 +118,11 @@ As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](http
### Advertising ID
All devices with Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Play Services](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-play-services), go to ⚙️ Settings → Apps → Sandboxed Google Play → Google Settings → Ads and select **Delete advertising ID**.
On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to ⚙️ Settings → Apps → Sandboxed Google Play → Google Settings → Ads and select **Delete advertising ID**.
On Android distributions with privileged Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
* ⚙️ Settings → Google → Ads
* ⚙️ Settings → Privacy → Ads
@ -189,21 +189,21 @@ CalyxOS includes a device controller app so there is no need to install a third
GrapheneOS extends the [user profile](/android/#android-security-privacy) feature allowing a user to press an "End Session" button. This button clears the encryption key from memory. There are plans to add a [cross profile notifications system](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/88) in the future.
### Sandboxed Play Services vs Privileged MicroG
### Sandboxed Google Play vs Privileged MicroG
When Google Play services are used on GrapheneOS, they run as a user app and are contained within a user or work profile.
Sandboxed Play Services are confined using the highly restrictive, default [`untrusted_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) domain provided by [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux). Permissions for apps to use Play Services can be revoked at any time by the user.
Sandboxed Google Play is confined using the highly restrictive, default [`untrusted_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) domain provided by [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux). Permissions for apps to use Google Play Services can be revoked at any time by the user.
MicroG is a reimplementation of Google Play Services. This means it needs to be updated every time Android has a major version update (or the Android API changes). It also needs to run in the highly privileged [`system_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) SELinux domain like the normal Play Services and require access to [signature spoofing](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/android.html#microg-signature-spoofing). This less secure than the Sandboxed Play Service approach and we do not believe MicroG provides any privacy advantages over Sandboxed Play Services except for the option to _shift trust_ of the location backend from Google to another provider such as Mozilla or DejaVu.
MicroG is a reimplementation of Google Play Services. This means it needs to be updated every time Android has a major version update (or the Android API changes). It also needs to run in the highly privileged [`system_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) SELinux domain like normal Google Play Services and requires access to [signature spoofing](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/android.html#microg-signature-spoofing) so this is less secure than the Sandboxed Google Play approach. We do not believe MicroG provides any privacy advantages over Sandboxed Google Play except for the option to _shift trust_ of the location backend from Google to another provider such as Mozilla or DejaVu.
From a usability point of view, the Sandboxed Play Services also works well with far more applications than MicroG, thanks to its support for services like [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames) and [In-app Billing API](https://android-doc.github.io/google/play/billing/api.html).
From a usability point of view, Sandboxed Google Play also works well with far more applications than MicroG, thanks to its support for services like [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames) and [In-app Billing API](https://android-doc.github.io/google/play/billing/api.html).
### Privileged App Extensions
Android 12 comes with special support for seamless app updates with [third party app stores](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/09/listening-to-developer-feedback-to.html). The popular Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) repository [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org) doesn't implement this feature and requires a [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged) to be included with the Android distribution in order to have unattended app installation.
GrapheneOS doesn't compromise on security, therefore they do not include the F-Droid extension therefore, users have to confirm all updates manually if they want to use F-Droid. Alternatively, they can use the Droidify client which does support seamless app updates in Android 12. GrapheneOS officially recommends [Sandboxed Play Services](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-play-services) instead. Many FOSS Android apps are also in Google Play but sometimes they are not (like [NewPipe]({% link _evergreen/video-streaming.md %})).
GrapheneOS doesn't compromise on security; therefore, they do not include the F-Droid extension. Users have to confirm all updates manually if they want to use F-Droid. Alternatively, they can use the Droidify client which does support seamless app updates in Android 12. GrapheneOS officially recommends [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play) instead. Many FOSS Android apps are also in Google Play but sometimes they are not (like [NewPipe]({% link _evergreen/video-streaming.md %})).
CalyxOS includes the [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged), which may lower device security. Seamless app updates should be possible with [Aurora Store](https://auroraoss.com) in Android 12.