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README.md
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@ -1,64 +1,60 @@
<div align="center">
<a href="https://privacyguides.org">
<img src="/assets/img/layout/privacy-guides-logo.svg" width="500px" alt="Privacy Guides" />
</a>
<p>
<em>Your central privacy and security resource to protect yourself online.</em>
</p>
<p>
<a href="https://www.privacyguides.org">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/uptimerobot/status/m786935055-1117e0819f5c23c651d46a17?label=website%20status">
</a>
<a href="https://opencollective.com/privacyguides">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/opencollective/all/privacyguides">
</a>
</p>
<p>
<a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/reddit/subreddit-subscribers/PrivacyGuides?label=Subscribe%20to%20r%2FPrivacyGuides&style=social">
</a>
<a href="https://twitter.com/privacy_guides">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/twitter/follow/privacy_guides?style=social">
</a>
<a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/stargazers">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/stars/privacyguides?style=social">
</a>
</p>
<p>
<a href="https://app.netlify.com/sites/privacyguides/deploys">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/netlify/f40bcb64-a6ed-4650-9ca6-7d3ac293d2be">
</a>
<a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues-raw/privacyguides/privacyguides.org">
</a>
<a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues-closed-raw/privacyguides/privacyguides.org">
</a>
<a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulls">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues-pr-raw/privacyguides/privacyguides.org">
</a>
<a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulls?q=is%3Apr+is%3Aclosed">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues-pr-closed-raw/privacyguides/privacyguides.org">
</a>
<a href="https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/issues">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues/privacytools/privacytools.io?color=black&label=upstream%20issues">
</a>
</p>
<a href="https://privacyguides.org">
<img src="/assets/img/layout/privacy-guides-logo.svg" width="500px" alt="Privacy Guides" />
</a>
<p><em>Your central privacy and security resource to protect yourself online.</em></p>
<p><a href="https://www.privacyguides.org">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/uptimerobot/status/m786935055-1117e0819f5c23c651d46a17?label=website%20status">
</a>
<a href="https://opencollective.com/privacyguides">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/opencollective/all/privacyguides">
</a></p>
<p><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/reddit/subreddit-subscribers/PrivacyGuides?label=Subscribe%20to%20r%2FPrivacyGuides&style=social">
</a>
<a href="https://twitter.com/privacy_guides">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/twitter/follow/privacy_guides?style=social">
</a>
<a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/stargazers">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/stars/privacyguides?style=social">
</a></p>
<p><a href="https://app.netlify.com/sites/privacyguides/deploys">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/netlify/f40bcb64-a6ed-4650-9ca6-7d3ac293d2be">
</a>
<a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues-raw/privacyguides/privacyguides.org">
</a>
<a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues-closed-raw/privacyguides/privacyguides.org">
</a>
<a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulls">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues-pr-raw/privacyguides/privacyguides.org">
</a>
<a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulls?q=is%3Apr+is%3Aclosed">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues-pr-closed-raw/privacyguides/privacyguides.org">
</a>
<a href="https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/issues">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues/privacytools/privacytools.io?color=black&label=upstream%20issues">
</a></p>
</div>
## Developing
1. Install the version of [Ruby](https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/downloads/) currently specified by [`.ruby-version`](.ruby-version)
* With [rbenv](https://github.com/rbenv/rbenv) (**recommended!**): `rbenv install`
* With [RVM](https://rvm.io): `rvm install "ruby-$(cat .ruby-version)"`
* [Manually](https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/downloads/)
* With [rbenv](https://github.com/rbenv/rbenv) (**recommended!**): `rbenv install`
* With [RVM](https://rvm.io): `rvm install "ruby-$(cat .ruby-version)"`
* [Manually](https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/downloads/)
1. Install node.js and npm
1. Install [Bundler](https://bundler.io/) v2.2.5:
* `gem install bundler:2.2.5`
* `gem install bundler:2.2.5`
1. Install the required dependencies:
* `bundle install`
* `npm install`
* `bundle install`
* `npm install`
1. Build the website (the output can be found in the `_site` directory):
* `npm run build`
* `npm run build`
1. Serve the website locally with live reloading:
* `npm run serve`
* `npm run serve`

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@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ description: |
---
## AOSP Derivatives
{% for item_hash in site.data.operating-systems.android %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
@ -20,13 +19,10 @@ description: |
{% endfor %}
## Android security and privacy features
### User Profiles
Multiple user profiles (Settings → System → Multiple users) are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles you can limit a user from making calls, SMS or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles is a more secure method of isolation.
### Work Profile
[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.
A **device controller** such as [Shelter](#recommended-apps) is required, unless you're using CalyxOS which includes one.
@ -36,7 +32,6 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such
This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
### Verified Boot
[Verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [Evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption (FDE) to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based).
@ -46,15 +41,12 @@ Each user's data is encrypted using their own unique encryption key, and the ope
Unfortunately, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are only obliged to support verified boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom Android Verified Boot (AVB) key enrollment on their devices. Some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support verified boot even on hardware with verified boot support for third party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support verified boot are **not** recommended.
### VPN Killswitch
Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in ⚙️ Settings → Network & internet → VPN → ⚙️ → Block connections without VPN.
### Global Toggles
Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling [Bluetooth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth) and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until renabled.
## Recommended Apps
{% for item_hash in site.data.operating-systems.android-applications %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
@ -65,9 +57,7 @@ Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling [Bluetooth](https://en.
{% endfor %}
## General Recommendations
### Avoid Root
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that verified boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) policy bypasses.
Adblockers (AdAway) which modify the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)">hosts file</a> and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted <a href="/providers/dns/">DNS</a> or <a href="/providers/vpn/">VPN</a> server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
@ -77,7 +67,6 @@ AFWall+ works based on the <a href="#graphene-calyxos">packet filtering approach
We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
### Firmware Updates
Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)—in other words, phone manufacturers—have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
As the components of the phone such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years while cheaper products often have shorter support. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own system on chip (SoC) and they will provide 5 years of support.
@ -85,11 +74,9 @@ As the components of the phone such as the processor and radio technologies rely
Devices that have reached their end-of-life (EoL) and are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer, cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
### Android Versions
It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any user apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
### Android Permissions
[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant users control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All user installed apps are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore there is no need to install any antivirus apps. The savings you make from not purchasing or subscribing to security apps is better spent on paying for a supported device in the future.
Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about, consider using a user or work [profile](/android/#android-security-privacy).
@ -99,37 +86,34 @@ If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Pr
The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
* Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [U2F](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_password#SMS), [TOTP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-based_one-time_password), and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
* Only Google and verified third party apps can access account data
* Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
* Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
* Stricter recovery process for accounts with lost credentials
* Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [U2F](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_password#SMS), [TOTP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-based_one-time_password), and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
* Only Google and verified third party apps can access account data
* Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
* Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
* Stricter recovery process for accounts with lost credentials
For users that are using the privileged Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
* Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
* Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
* Warning the user about unverified applications
For users that are using the privileged Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
* Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
* Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
* Warning the user about unverified applications
### SafetyNet and Play Integrity API
[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) and the [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) are generally used for [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financal apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the `basicIntegrity` check, but not the certification check `ctsProfileMatch`. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.
As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
### Advertising ID
All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to ⚙️ Settings → Apps → Sandboxed Google Play → Google Settings → Ads and select **Delete advertising ID**.
On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
* ⚙️ Settings → Google → Ads
* ⚙️ Settings → Privacy → Ads
* ⚙️ Settings → Google → Ads
* ⚙️ Settings → Privacy → Ads
Depending on your system, you will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to "Opt out of interest-based ads". You should delete the advertising ID if you are given the option to, and if you are not, we recommend that you opt out of interested-based ads and then reset your advertising ID.
### Android Device Shopping
Google Pixels are known to have good security and properly support [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Some other phones such as the Fairphone and Oneplus devices also support custom Android verified boot (AVB) key enrollment. However, there have been issues with their older models. In the past they were using [test keys](https://social.coop/@dazinism/105346943304083054) or not doing proper verification, making verified boot on those devices useless.
Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution. Phones that cannot be unlocked will often have an [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity) starting with "35", that includes phones from purchased from Verizon, Telus, Rogers, EE etc.
@ -138,13 +122,13 @@ Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Al
We have these general tips:
* If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
* Consider price beating options and specials offered at [brick and mortar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brick_and_mortar) stores.
* Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
* The price per day for a device can be calculated as \\({\\text {EoL Date}-\\text{Current Date} \\over \\text{Cost}}\\). Google provides a [list](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) of their supported devices.
* Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
* Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
* In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason, so check our [discussions](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions) page.
* If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
* Consider price beating options and specials offered at [brick and mortar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brick_and_mortar) stores.
* Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
* The price per day for a device can be calculated as \\({\\text {EoL Date}-\\text{Current Date} \\over \\text{Cost}}\\). Google provides a [list](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) of their supported devices.
* Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
* Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
* In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason, so check our [discussions](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions) page.
The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company. The GrapheneOS project is not currently affiliated with any vendor and cannot ensure the quality or security of their products.
@ -171,26 +155,22 @@ To mitigate these problems, we recommend [Droidify](https://github.com/Iamlooker
{% endfor %}
#### Where to get your applications
Sometimes the official F-Droid repository may fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers reuse package ids while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it does give the F-Droid team ultimate trust. The Google Play version of some apps may contain unwanted telemetry or lack features that are available in the F-Droid version. The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for privacy. The [Aurora Store](https://auroraoss.com/download/AuroraStore/) (a Google Play Store proxy) does not always work, though it does most of the time.
We have these general tips:
* Check if the app developers have their own F-Droid repository first eg. [Bitwarden](https://bitwarden.com/), [Samourai Wallet](https://www.samouraiwallet.com/), or [Newpipe](https://newpipe.net/), have their own repositories with either less telemetry, additional features or faster updates. This is the ideal situation and you should be using these repositories if possible.
* Check if an app is available on the [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repository. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. We recommend that you download the GitHub builds and install them manually first, then use IzzyOnDroid for any subsequent updates. This will ensure that the signature of the applications you get from IzzyOnDroid matches that of the developer and the packages have not been tampered with.
* Check if there are any differences between the F-Droid version and the Google Play Store version. Some applications like [IVPN](https://www.ivpn.net/) do not include certain features (eg [AntiTracker](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general/antitracker-faq/)) in their Google Play Store build out of fear of censorship by Google.
* Check if the app developers have their own F-Droid repository first eg. [Bitwarden](https://bitwarden.com/), [Samourai Wallet](https://www.samouraiwallet.com/), or [Newpipe](https://newpipe.net/), have their own repositories with either less telemetry, additional features or faster updates. This is the ideal situation and you should be using these repositories if possible.
* Check if an app is available on the [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repository. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. We recommend that you download the GitHub builds and install them manually first, then use IzzyOnDroid for any subsequent updates. This will ensure that the signature of the applications you get from IzzyOnDroid matches that of the developer and the packages have not been tampered with.
* Check if there are any differences between the F-Droid version and the Google Play Store version. Some applications like [IVPN](https://www.ivpn.net/) do not include certain features (eg [AntiTracker](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general/antitracker-faq/)) in their Google Play Store build out of fear of censorship by Google.
Evaluate whether the additional features in the F-Droid build are worth the slower updates. Also think about whether faster updates from the Google Play Store are worth the potential privacy isues in your [threat model](/threat-modeling/).
## Security comparison of GrapheneOS and CalyxOS
### Profiles
CalyxOS includes a device controller app so there is no need to install a third party app like [Shelter](/android/#recommended-apps). GrapheneOS plans to introduce nested profile support with better isolation in the future.
GrapheneOS extends the [user profile](/android/#android-security-privacy) feature allowing a user to press an "End Session" button. This button clears the encryption key from memory. There are plans to add a [cross profile notifications system](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/88) in the future.
### Sandboxed Google Play vs Privileged MicroG
When Google Play services are used on GrapheneOS, they run as a user app and are contained within a user or work profile.
Sandboxed Google Play is confined using the highly restrictive, default [`untrusted_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) domain provided by [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux). Permissions for apps to use Google Play Services can be revoked at any time by the user.
@ -200,7 +180,6 @@ MicroG is a reimplementation of Google Play Services. This means it needs to be
From a usability point of view, Sandboxed Google Play also works well with far more applications than MicroG, thanks to its support for services like [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames) and [In-app Billing API](https://android-doc.github.io/google/play/billing/api.html).
### Privileged App Extensions
Android 12 comes with special support for seamless app updates with [third party app stores](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/09/listening-to-developer-feedback-to.html). The popular Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) repository [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org) doesn't implement this feature and requires a [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged) to be included with the Android distribution in order to have unattended app installation.
GrapheneOS doesn't compromise on security; therefore, they do not include the F-Droid extension. Users have to confirm all updates manually if they want to use F-Droid. Alternatively, they can use the Droidify client which does support seamless app updates in Android 12. GrapheneOS officially recommends [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play) instead. Many FOSS Android apps are also in Google Play but sometimes they are not (like [NewPipe]({% link _evergreen/video-streaming.md %})).
@ -208,12 +187,11 @@ GrapheneOS doesn't compromise on security; therefore, they do not include the F-
CalyxOS includes the [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged), which may lower device security. Seamless app updates should be possible with [Aurora Store](https://auroraoss.com) in Android 12.
### Additional hardening
GrapheneOS improves upon [AOSP](https://source.android.com/) security with:
* **Hardened WebView:** Vanadium WebView requires [64-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/64-bit_computing) processes on the [WebView](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView) process and disables legacy [32-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/32-bit_computing) processes. It uses hardened compiler options such as [`-fwrapv`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Code-Gen-Options.html) and [`-fstack-protector-strong`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.3/gcc/Optimize-Options.html), which can help protect against [stack buffer overflows](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stack_buffer_overflow). [API](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API)s such as the [battery status API](https://chromestatus.com/feature/4537134732017664) are disabled for privacy reasons. All system apps on GrapheneOS use the Vanadium WebView which means user installed apps that use WebView will also benefit from Vanadium's hardening. The [Vanadium patch set](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/tree/12/patches) is a lot more comprehensive than CalyxOS's [Chromium patch set](https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/chromium-patches) which is derived from it.
* **Hardened Kernel:** GrapheneOS kernel includes some hardening from the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/linux-hardened) project and the [Kernel Self Protection Project (KSPP)](https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project). CalyxOS uses the [same kernel](https://calyxos.org/docs/development/build/kernel/) as regular Android with some minor modifications.
* **Hardened Memory Allocator:** GrapheneOS uses the [hardened malloc](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) subproject as its memory allocator. This focuses on hardening against [memory heap corruption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_corruption). CalyxOS uses the default AOSP [Scudo Malloc](https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/scudo), which is generally [less effective](https://twitter.com/danielmicay/status/1033671709197398016). Hardened Malloc has uncovered vulnerabilities in AOSP which have been [fixed](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_system_core/commit/be11b59725aa6118b0e1f0712572e835c3d50746) by GrapheneOS such as [CVE-2021-0703](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-0703).
* **Secure Exec Spawning:** GrapheneOS [spawns](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spawn_(computing)) fresh processes as opposed to using the [Zygote model](https://ayusch.com/android-internals-the-android-os-boot-process) used by AOSP and CalyxOS. The Zygote model weakens [Address Space Layout Randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization) (ASLR) and is considered [less secure](https://wenke.gtisc.gatech.edu/papers/morula.pdf). Creating [fresh processes](https://grapheneos.org/usage#exec-spawning) is safer but will have some performance penalty when launching a new application. These penalties are not really noticeable unless you have an [old device](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) with slow storage such as the Pixel 3a/3a XL as it has [eMMC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MultiMediaCard#eMMC).
* **Hardened WebView:** Vanadium WebView requires [64-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/64-bit_computing) processes on the [WebView](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView) process and disables legacy [32-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/32-bit_computing) processes. It uses hardened compiler options such as [`-fwrapv`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Code-Gen-Options.html) and [`-fstack-protector-strong`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.3/gcc/Optimize-Options.html), which can help protect against [stack buffer overflows](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stack_buffer_overflow). [API](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API)s such as the [battery status API](https://chromestatus.com/feature/4537134732017664) are disabled for privacy reasons. All system apps on GrapheneOS use the Vanadium WebView which means user installed apps that use WebView will also benefit from Vanadium's hardening. The [Vanadium patch set](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/tree/12/patches) is a lot more comprehensive than CalyxOS's [Chromium patch set](https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/chromium-patches) which is derived from it.
* **Hardened Kernel:** GrapheneOS kernel includes some hardening from the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/linux-hardened) project and the [Kernel Self Protection Project (KSPP)](https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project). CalyxOS uses the [same kernel](https://calyxos.org/docs/development/build/kernel/) as regular Android with some minor modifications.
* **Hardened Memory Allocator:** GrapheneOS uses the [hardened malloc](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) subproject as its memory allocator. This focuses on hardening against [memory heap corruption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_corruption). CalyxOS uses the default AOSP [Scudo Malloc](https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/scudo), which is generally [less effective](https://twitter.com/danielmicay/status/1033671709197398016). Hardened Malloc has uncovered vulnerabilities in AOSP which have been [fixed](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_system_core/commit/be11b59725aa6118b0e1f0712572e835c3d50746) by GrapheneOS such as [CVE-2021-0703](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-0703).
* **Secure Exec Spawning:** GrapheneOS [spawns](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spawn_(computing)) fresh processes as opposed to using the [Zygote model](https://ayusch.com/android-internals-the-android-os-boot-process) used by AOSP and CalyxOS. The Zygote model weakens [Address Space Layout Randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization) (ASLR) and is considered [less secure](https://wenke.gtisc.gatech.edu/papers/morula.pdf). Creating [fresh processes](https://grapheneos.org/usage#exec-spawning) is safer but will have some performance penalty when launching a new application. These penalties are not really noticeable unless you have an [old device](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) with slow storage such as the Pixel 3a/3a XL as it has [eMMC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MultiMediaCard#eMMC).
**Please note that these are just a few examples and are not an extensive list of GrapheneOS's hardening**. For a more complete list, please read GrapheneOS' [official documentation](https://grapheneos.org/features).

4
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@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ description: |
---
## General Recommendations
{% for item_hash in site.data.software.browsers %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
@ -17,7 +16,6 @@ description: |
{% endfor %}
## Desktop Browser Recommendations
{% for item_hash in site.data.software.browsers-desktop %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
@ -28,7 +26,6 @@ description: |
{% endfor %}
## Mobile Browser Recommendations
On Android, Mozilla's engine [GeckoView](https://mozilla.github.io/geckoview/) has yet to support [site isolation](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/05/introducing-firefox-new-site-isolation-security-architecture) or enable [isolatedProcess](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196). Firefox on Android also doesn't yet have [HTTPS-Only mode](https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/fenix/issues/16952#issuecomment-907960218) built-in. We do not recommend Firefox or any Gecko based browsers at this time.
On iOS all web browsers use [WKWebView](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit/wkwebview), so all browsers on the App Store are essentially Safari under the hood.
@ -43,7 +40,6 @@ On iOS all web browsers use [WKWebView](https://developer.apple.com/documentatio
{% endfor %}
## Additional Resources
{% for item_hash in site.data.software.browsers-resources %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}

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@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ description: |
---
## Traditional distributions
{% for item_hash in site.data.operating-systems.linux-desktop %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
@ -18,7 +17,6 @@ description: |
{% endfor %}
## Immutable distributions
{% for item_hash in site.data.operating-systems.linux-desktop-immutable %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
@ -29,7 +27,6 @@ description: |
{% endfor %}
## Anonymity-focused distributions
{% for item_hash in site.data.operating-systems.linux-desktop-tor %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
@ -40,12 +37,11 @@ description: |
{% endfor %}
## GNU/Linux
It is often believed that [open source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn't always [the case](https://seirdy.one/2022/02/02/floss-security.html). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigour applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years.
At the moment, desktop GNU/Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g:
* A verified boot chain, unlike Apple's [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android's [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) or Microsoft Windows's [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistant tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
* A verified boot chain, unlike Apple's [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android's [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) or Microsoft Windows's [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
* Strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [MacOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go
* Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations)
@ -60,7 +56,7 @@ This page uses the term "Linux" to describe desktop GNU/Linux distributions. Oth
### Release cycle
We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don't update package versions and fall behind on security updates.
For frozen distributions, package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities (Debian is one such [example](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)) rather than bump the software to the "next version" released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) recieve a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release.
For frozen distributions, package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities (Debian is one such [example](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)) rather than bump the software to the "next version" released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release.
We don't believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this:
@ -93,7 +89,6 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu
There is often some confusion about "security-focused" distributions and "pentesting" distributions. A quick search for "the most secure Linux distribution" will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don't include any "extra security" or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
### Arch-based distributions
Arch based distributions are not recommended for new users, regardless of the distribution. Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result the user of the system must stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices.
For a secure system, the user is also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
@ -109,9 +104,7 @@ For advanced users, we only recommend Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We
We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
## General Recommendations
### Drive Encryption
Most Linux distributions have an installer option for enabling [Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_Unified_Key_Setup) encryption upon installation.
If this option isn't set at installation time, the user will have to backup their data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning) but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are [formatted](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_formatting).
@ -119,11 +112,9 @@ If this option isn't set at installation time, the user will have to backup thei
When securely erasing storage devices such as a [Solid-state drive (SSD)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solid-state_drive) you should use the [ATA Secure Erase](https://ata.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/ATA_Secure_Erase) command. This command can be issued from your UEFI setup. If the storage device is a regular [hard drive](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_disk_drive), consider using [`nwipe`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nwipe).
### Swap
Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Swap#zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM) by default.
### Wayland
We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you're using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the "Wayland" session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
@ -136,10 +127,8 @@ Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.o
We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
## Privacy tweaks
### MAC address randomization
Many desktop linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure ethernet and WiFi settings.
Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and WiFi settings.
It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on WiFi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you're connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
@ -147,43 +136,40 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges
If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
There isn't much point in randomizing the MAC address for ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing WiFi MAC addresses depends on support from the WiFi's firmware.
There isn't much point in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing WiFi MAC addresses depends on support from the WiFi's firmware.
### Other identifiers
There are other system [identifiers](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#identifiers) which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](/threat-modeling):
* [10.1 Hostnames and usernames](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#hostnames)
* [10.2 Timezones / Locales / Keymaps](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#timezones-locales-keymaps)
* [10.2 Time zones / Locales / Keymaps](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#timezones-locales-keymaps)
* [10.3 Machine ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id)
### System counting
The Fedora Project [counts](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) how many unique systems access its mirrors by using a [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) variable instead of a unique ID. Fedora does this to determine load and provision better servers for updates where necessary.
The Fedora project [counts](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) how many unique systems access its mirrors by using an ID on the system access its mirrors by counting using an ID on the system. They do this to determine load and provision better servers for updates where necessary.
This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) appears to be off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the countme option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems/) timer.
This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) is currently off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the countme option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems/) timer.
openSUSE also uses a [unique ID](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Statistics) to count systems, which can be disabled by deleting the `/var/lib/zypp/AnonymousUniqueId` file.
## Sandboxing and Application confinement
Some sandboxing solutions for desktop Linux distributions do exist, however they are not as strict as those found in MacOS or ChromeOS. Applications installed from the package manager (`dnf`, `apt`, etc.) typically have **no** sandboxing or confinement whatsoever. Below are a few projects that aim to solve this problem:
### Flatpak
[Flatpak](https://flatpak.org) aims to be a universal package manager for Linux. One of its main goals is to provide a universal package format which can be used in most Linux distributions. It provides some [permission control](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html). Madaidan [points out](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#flatpak) that Flatpak sandboxing could be improved as particular Flatpaks often have greater permission than required.
There does seem to be [some agreement](https://theevilskeleton.gitlab.io/2021/02/11/response-to-flatkill-org.html) that this is the case.
Users can restrict applications further by issuing [flatpak overrides](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/flatpak-command-reference.html#flatpak-override). This can be done with the commandline or by using [Flatseal](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.github.tchx84.Flatseal). Some sample overrides are provided by [tommytran732](https://github.com/tommytran732/Flatpak-Overrides) and [rusty-snake](https://github.com/rusty-snake/kyst/tree/main/flatpak).
Users can restrict applications further by issuing [Flatpak overrides](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/flatpak-command-reference.html#flatpak-override). This can be done with the command-line or by using [Flatseal](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.github.tchx84.Flatseal). Some sample overrides are provided by [tommytran732](https://github.com/tommytran732/Flatpak-Overrides) and [rusty-snake](https://github.com/rusty-snake/kyst/tree/main/flatpak).
We generally recommend revoking access to:
* the Network (`share=network`) socket (internet access)
* the pulse audio socket (for both audio in and out), `device=all` (access to all devices including the camera)
* the PulseAudio socket (for both audio in and out), `device=all` (access to all devices including the camera)
* `org.freedesktop.secrets` dbus (access to secrets stored on your keychain) for applications which do not need it
If an application works natively with Wayland (and not running through the [XWayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/xserver.html) compatibility layer), consider revoking its access to the X11 (`socket=x11`) and [Inter-process communications (IPC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_domain_socket) socket (`share=ipc`) as well.
We also recommend restricting broad filesystem permissions such as `filesystem=home` and `filesystem=host` which should be revoked and replaced with just the directories that the app needs to access. Some applications like [VLC](https://www.flathub.org/apps/details/org.videolan.VLC) implement the [Portals](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/portal-api-reference.html) [API](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API), which allows a file manager to pass files to the flatpak application (e.g. VLC) without direct filesystem access privileges. Security is increased because VLC is only able to access the specific file that the user wants to open, rather than any file at any time the application is open.
We also recommend restricting broad filesystem permissions such as `filesystem=home` and `filesystem=host` which should be revoked and replaced with just the directories that the app needs to access. Some applications like [VLC](https://www.flathub.org/apps/details/org.videolan.VLC) implement the [Portals](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/portal-api-reference.html) [API](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API), which allows a file manager to pass files to the Flatpak application (e.g. VLC) without direct filesystem access privileges. Security is increased because VLC is only able to access the specific file that the user wants to open, rather than any file at any time the application is open.
Hard-coded access to some kernel interfaces like [`/sys`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysfs) and [`/proc`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Procfs#Linux) and weak [seccomp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seccomp) filters unfortunately cannot be secured by the user with Flatpak.
@ -216,19 +202,17 @@ If you're running a server you may have heard of Linux Containers, Docker, or Po
[Docker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Docker_(software)) is one of the most common container solutions. It does not run a proper sandbox, and this means that there is a large kernel [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface). The [daemon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daemon_(computing)) controls everything and [typically](https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/rootless/#known-limitations) runs as root. If it crashes for some reason, all the containers will crash too. The [gVisor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GVisor) runtime which implements an application level kernel can help limit the number of [syscalls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/System_call) an application can make and can help isolate it from the host's [kernel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernel_(operating_system)).
Redhat develops [Podman](https://docs.podman.io/en/latest/) and secures it with SELinux to [isolate](https://www.redhat.com/sysadmin/apparmor-selinux-isolation) containers from each other. One of the notable differences between Docker and Podman is that Docker requires [root](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superuser) while Podman can run with [rootless containers](https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2020/09/25/rootless-containers-with-podman-the-basics) that are also [daemonless](https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2018/08/29/intro-to-podman), meaning if one crashes they don't all come down.
Red Hat develops [Podman](https://docs.podman.io/en/latest/) and secures it with SELinux to [isolate](https://www.redhat.com/sysadmin/apparmor-selinux-isolation) containers from each other. One of the notable differences between Docker and Podman is that Docker requires [root](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superuser) while Podman can run with [rootless containers](https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2020/09/25/rootless-containers-with-podman-the-basics) that are also [daemonless](https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2018/08/29/intro-to-podman), meaning if one crashes they don't all come down.
Another option is [Kata containers](https://katacontainers.io/), where virtual machines masquerade as containers. Each Kata container has its own Linux kernel and is isolated from the host.
These container technologies can be useful even for enthusiastic home users who may want to run certain web app software on their local area network (LAN) such as [vaultwarden](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden) or images provided by [linuxserver.io](https://www.linuxserver.io) to increase privacy by decreasing dependence on various web services.
## Additional hardening
### Firewalls
A [firewall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)) may be used to secure connections to your system. If you're on a public network, the necessity of this may be greater than if you're on a local trusted network that you control. We would generally recommend that you block incoming connections only, unless you're using an application firewall such as [OpenSnitch](https://github.com/evilsocket/opensnitch) or [Portmaster](https://safing.io/portmaster/).
Redhat distributions (such as Fedora) are typically configured through [firewalld](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewalld). Redhat has plenty of [documentation](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/configuring_and_managing_networking/using-and-configuring-firewalld_configuring-and-managing-networking) regarding this topic. There is also the [uncomplicated firewall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncomplicated_Firewall) which can be used as an alternative.
Red Hat distributions (such as Fedora) are typically configured through [firewalld](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewalld). Red Hat has plenty of [documentation](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/configuring_and_managing_networking/using-and-configuring-firewalld_configuring-and-managing-networking) regarding this topic. There is also the [Uncomplicated Firewall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncomplicated_Firewall) which can be used as an alternative.
Consider blocking all ports which are **not** [well known](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Well-known_port#Well-known_ports) or "privileged ports". That is, ports from 1025 up to 65535. Block both [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) and [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) after the operating system is installed.
@ -241,7 +225,6 @@ If you are using Flatpak packages, you can revoke their network socket access us
If you are using non-classic [Snap](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snap_(package_manager)) packages on a system with proper snap confinement support (with both AppArmor and [CGroupsv1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cgroups) present), you can use the Snap Store to revoke network permission as well. This is also not bypassable.
### Kernel hardening
There are some additional kernel hardening options such as configuring [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl#Linux) keys and [kernel command-line parameters](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html) which are described in the following pages. We don't recommend you change these options unless you learn about what they do.
* [2.2 Sysctl](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#sysctl)
@ -270,7 +253,7 @@ If you use [Toolbox](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/tool
### Linux Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM)
There is also further hardening to [PAM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_PAM) to secure authentication to your system. [14. PAM](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#pam) has some tips on this.
On Redhat distributions you can use [`authselect`](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/configuring_authentication_and_authorization_in_rhel/configuring-user-authentication-using-authselect_configuring-authentication-and-authorization-in-rhel) to configure this e.g.:
On Red Hat distributions you can use [`authselect`](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/configuring_authentication_and_authorization_in_rhel/configuring-user-authentication-using-authselect_configuring-authentication-and-authorization-in-rhel) to configure this e.g.:
```
sudo authselect select <profile_id, default: sssd> with-faillock without-nullok with-pamaccess
@ -286,7 +269,7 @@ Another alternative option if you're using the [linux-hardened](/linux-desktop/#
### Secure Boot
[Secure Boot](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface#Secure_Boot) can be used to secure the boot process by preventing the loading of [unsigned](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) [UEFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface) drivers or [boot loaders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootloader). Some guidance for this is provided in [21. Physical security](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#physical-security) and [21.4 Verified boot](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#verified-boot).
For further resources on Secure Boot we suggest taking a look at the following for instructional advice
For further resources on Secure Boot we suggest taking a look at the following for instructional advice:
* The Archwiki's [Secure Boot](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot) article. There are two main methods, the first is to use a [shim](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot#shim), the second more complete way is to [use your own keys](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot#Using_your_own_keys).
For background of how Secure Boot works on Linux:
@ -301,6 +284,6 @@ One of the problems with Secure Boot particularly on Linux is that only the [cha
* [Encrypting the boot partition](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/GRUB#Encrypted_/boot). However, this has its own issues, the first being that [GRUB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_GRUB) only supports [LUKS1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_Unified_Key_Setup) and not the newer default LUKS2 scheme. As the bootloader runs in [protected mode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protected_mode) and the encryption module lacks [SSE acceleration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streaming_SIMD_Extensions) the boot process will take minutes to complete.
* Using [TPM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module) to perform a [measured boot](https://www.krose.org/~krose/measured_boot).
After setting up Secure Boot it is crucial that you set a "firmware password" (also called a "supervisor password, "BIOS password" or "UEFI password"), otherwise an adversary can simply disable secure boot.
After setting up Secure Boot it is crucial that you set a "firmware password" (also called a "supervisor password, "BIOS password" or "UEFI password"), otherwise an adversary can simply disable Secure Boot.
These recommendations can make you a little more resistant to [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, but they not good as a proper verified boot process such as that found on [Android](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), [ChromeOS](https://support.google.com/chromebook/answer/3438631) or [Windows](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process).

6
collections/_evergreen/real-time-communication.md
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@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ description: |
---
## Encrypted Instant Messengers
{% for item_hash in site.data.software.messengers %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
@ -16,11 +15,9 @@ description: |
{% endfor %}
## Types of Communication Networks
There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between users. These networks can provide different different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat_model) when making a decision about which app to use.
### Centralized Networks
{% capture markdown_text %}
Centralized messengers are those where all participants are on the same server or network of servers controlled by the same organization.
@ -55,7 +52,6 @@ Some self-hosted messengers allow you to set up your own server. Self-hosting ca
</div>
### Federated Networks
{% capture markdown_text %}
Federated messengers use multiple, independent, decentralized servers that are able to talk to each other (email is one example of a federated service). Federation allows system administrators to control their own server and still be a part of the larger communications network.
@ -88,7 +84,6 @@ When self-hosted, users of a federated server can discover and communicate with
</div>
### Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Networks
{% capture markdown_text %}
[P2P](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer) messengers connect to a [distributed network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) of nodes to relay a message to the recepient without a third-party server.
@ -125,7 +120,6 @@ P2P networks do not use servers, as users communicate directly between each othe
</div>
### Anonymous Routing
{% capture markdown_text %}
A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.

1
collections/_evergreen/router.md
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@ -14,4 +14,3 @@ description: |
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}

29
collections/_evergreen/threat-modeling.md
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@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ By focusing on the threats that matter to you, this narrows down your thinking a
Examples of threat models
-------------------------
* An investigative journalist's threat model might be <span class="text-muted">(protecting themselves against)</span> a foreign government.
* A company's manager's threat model might be <span class="text-muted">(protecting themselves against)</span> a hacker hired by competition to do corporate espionage.
* The average citizen's threat model might be <span class="text-muted">(hiding their data from)</span> large tech corporations.
* An investigative journalist's threat model might be <span class="text-muted">(protecting themselves against)</span> a foreign government.
* A company's manager's threat model might be <span class="text-muted">(protecting themselves against)</span> a hacker hired by competition to do corporate espionage.
* The average citizen's threat model might be <span class="text-muted">(hiding their data from)</span> large tech corporations.
Creating your threat model
--------------------------
@ -33,28 +33,22 @@ To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom yo
{% capture markdown_text %}
#### Example: Protecting your belongings
* To demonstrate how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
* To demonstrate how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
##### What do you want to protect? (Or, _what do you have that is worth protecting?_)
* Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.
* Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.
##### Who do you want to protect it from?
* Your adversaries might include burglars, roommates, or guests.
* Your adversaries might include burglars, roommates, or guests.
##### How likely is it that you will need to protect it?
* Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates/guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?
* Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates/guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?
##### How bad are the consequences if you fail?
* Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace these things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?
* Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace these things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?
##### How much trouble are you willing to go through to prevent these consequences?
* Are you willing to buy a safe for sensitive documents? Can you afford to buy a high-quality lock? Do you have time to open a security box at your local bank and keep your valuables there?
* Are you willing to buy a safe for sensitive documents? Can you afford to buy a high-quality lock? Do you have time to open a security box at your local bank and keep your valuables there?
Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to assess what measures to take. If your possessions are valuable, but the probability of a break-in is low, then you may not want to invest too much money in a lock. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market, and consider adding a security system.
@ -65,13 +59,11 @@ Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique t
Now, let's take a closer look at the questions in our list:
### What do I want to protect?
An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, <mark>an asset is usually some kind of information.</mark> For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.
_Make a list of your assets: data that you keep, where it's kept, who has access to it, and what stops others from accessing it._
### Who do I want to protect it from?
To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. <mark>A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary.”</mark> Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
_Make a list of your adversaries, or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations._
@ -79,7 +71,6 @@ _Make a list of your adversaries, or those who might want to get ahold of your a
Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
### How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
<mark>Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.</mark> It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.
It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).
@ -89,7 +80,6 @@ Assessing risks is both a personal and a subjective process. Many people find ce
_Write down which threats you are going to take seriously, and which may be too rare or too harmless (or too difficult to combat) to worry about._
### How bad are the consequences if I fail?
There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For example, an adversary can read your private communications as they pass through the network, or they can delete or corrupt your data.
<mark>The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.</mark> A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
@ -99,7 +89,6 @@ Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an
_Write down what your adversary might want to do with your private data._
### How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
<mark>There is no perfect option for security.</mark> Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.

18
collections/_posts/2019-08-22-self-hosting-shadowsocks-vpn-outline.md
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@ -16,11 +16,9 @@ Please note that **like any VPN**, Outline/Shadowsocks cannot provide nearly the
Outline is developed by Jigsaw, which is a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc (Google). It is important to note that neither Jigsaw nor Google can see your internet traffic when using Outline, because you will be installing the actual Outline Server on your own machine, not Google’s. Outline is completely open source and was audited in [2017](https://s3.amazonaws.com/outline-vpn/static_downloads/ros-report.pdf) by Radically Open Security and in [2018](https://s3.amazonaws.com/outline-vpn/static_downloads/cure53-report.pdf) by Cure53, and both security firms supported Jigsaw’s security claims. For more information on the data Jigsaw is able to collect when using Outline, see their [article on data collection](https://support.getoutline.org/s/article/Data-collection).
### Prerequisites
All you will need to complete this guide is a computer running Windows, macOS, or Linux. You will also need to know some basic commands: [How to SSH](https://www.howtogeek.com/311287/how-to-connect-to-an-ssh-server-from-windows-macos-or-linux/) in to a server you purchase. We will also assume you know how to purchase and set up a Linux server with SSH access, more info in Step 2.
### Step 1 — Download & Install Outline Manager
Outline allows you to setup and configure your servers from an easy-to-use management console called Outline Manager, which can be downloaded from [getoutline.org](https://getoutline.org). It has binaries available for Windows, macOS, and Linux.
Simply download and install the Outline Manager application to your computer.
@ -30,7 +28,6 @@ Simply download and install the Outline Manager application to your computer.
Note: getoutline.org is blocked in China and likely other countries, however you can download the releases directly from [their GitHub page](https://github.com/Jigsaw-Code/outline-server/releases) as well.
### Step 2 — Choose a Server Provider
Outline has the ability to create servers on three different providers automatically: DigitalOcean, Google Cloud, and Amazon Web Services. In some situations, Google Cloud or AWS may be preferable, because they are less likely to be blocked by hostile ISPs/governments and will therefore allow you to more likely circumvent internet censorship. However, keep in mind that the server provider you choose—like any VPN provider—will have the technical ability to read your internet traffic. This is much less likely to happen when using a cloud provider versus a commercial VPN, which is why we recommend self-hosting, but it is still possible. Choose a provider you trust.
Additionally, keep in mind that many US-based cloud providers block all network traffic to and from [countries sanctioned by the United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_sanctions#Countries), including AWS and Google Cloud. Users in or visiting those countries may wish to find a European-based hosting provider to run their Outline Server on.
@ -42,7 +39,6 @@ Finally, if you want to go with DigitalOcean you can use my affiliate link to re
For this guide we are not going to use an automatic provider in Outline Manager, rather we will manually configure a Linux server. We are using Debian 10. Other distros may work as well, but you may need to install Docker manually.
### Step 3 — Configure Your Server
First, we need to update our system and install `curl`. Connect to your server via SSH and enter the following commands:
Next open Outline Manager on your local machine and you should be given 4 options to configure a server. Select the “Set Up” button under the “Advanced, Set up Outline anywhere” option.
@ -56,15 +52,14 @@ Connect to your server over SSH and paste the code from above in the Outline Man
After it completes, it will give you a long line starting with `{"apiUrl"` (depending on your Terminal’s color support it will appear as green). Copy that line, and paste it in the second box back in Outline Manager. Then, click “Done”.
### Step 4 — Connect Your Devices
Download the Outline app on the device you want to connect. Outline has applications for the following operating systems:
- [Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.outline.android.client)
- [iOS](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1356177741)
- [Windows](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Jigsaw-Code/outline-releases/master/client/stable/Outline-Client.exe)
- [macOS](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1356178125)
- [Chrome OS](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.outline.android.client)
- [Linux](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Jigsaw-Code/outline-releases/master/client/stable/Outline-Client.AppImage)
* [Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.outline.android.client)
* [iOS](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1356177741)
* [Windows](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Jigsaw-Code/outline-releases/master/client/stable/Outline-Client.exe)
* [macOS](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1356178125)
* [Chrome OS](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.outline.android.client)
* [Linux](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Jigsaw-Code/outline-releases/master/client/stable/Outline-Client.AppImage)
You should also be able to use any [Shadowsocks client](https://shadowsocks.org/en/download/clients.html), including alternative clients for each operating system and a client for OpenWRT routers. And like with the Manager, you can download Outline releases from [their GitHub page](https://github.com/Jigsaw-Code/outline-client/releases) as well.
@ -73,7 +68,6 @@ Back in Outline Manager, select your server in the sidebar. On the far right sid
Once you add your server, that’s it! In the Outline clients it’s just a matter of pressing “Connect”, and all your traffic will be proxied through your server! You can use this connection to keep your traffic safe when you’re on public WiFi networks, or just to keep your browsing hidden from your ISP.
### Conclusion
That should be all you need to get your very own VPN up and running! **Do not share your access key with anyone**, this is the key starting with `ss://`. If you want to grant other users access to your server, click “Add a new key” in Outline Manager and give them a new, unique key. If you share a key, anyone with knowledge of that key will be able to see all the traffic of anyone else using the key. It should go without saying, but don’t send people keys over unencrypted channels: No Facebook Messenger, no emails. Stick with [Signal, Wire, or Briar]({% link _evergreen/real-time-communication.md %}) if you don’t have a secure app already.
With Outline, there is no need to worry about the security of your server. Everything is set to automatically update with no intervention required! Another thing to note: The port on your Outline server is randomly generated. This is so the port can’t be easily blocked by nation/ISP level censors, however, this VPN may not function on some networks that only allow access to port 80/443, or on servers that only allow traffic on certain ports. These are edge-cases, but something to keep in mind, and if they apply you may need to look for more technical options.

4
collections/_posts/2019-10-05-understanding-vpns.md
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@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ Furthermore, this doesn't only happen at your home. Every network you connect to
Fortunately, more and more websites are beginning to use HTTPS, thanks to free certificates from Let's Encrypt and Cloudflare. But many sites still don't (at least by default), and even HTTPS doesn't solve the problem that your ISP can see the websites you're visiting.
## How VPNs can protect us
Luckily, you can hide all this information from your ISP using a VPN. Instead of letting your ISP see all the websites you visit, VPNs only let them see that you are connected (using an **encrypted** connection) to the VPN provider's servers.
*Basically, instead of connecting directly to the Internet, you connect to one of your VPN providers’ servers, which connects you to the Internet.*
@ -29,7 +28,6 @@ Luckily, you can hide all this information from your ISP using a VPN. Instead of
So, `you <----> Internet` becomes `you <----> VPN <----> Internet` and your ISP can only see the `you <----> VPN` part.
## More ways VPNs can protect us
So VPNs are pretty handy, but hiding your traffic from your ISP isn't the only advantage a VPN provides.
Did you know that if you’re on a public Wi-Fi network, <mark>anyone connected to the same network can see as much as your ISP can</mark>? Obviously, this isn’t an issue at home, unless you have very creepy neighbors and an open Wi-Fi network. However, it is a problem in public places with Wi-Fi, such as cafés.
@ -43,7 +41,6 @@ This also provides an added side-benefit: Most VPN providers have servers in man
But even if you use a different IP address than your “normal” one, isn’t it still personally identifiable? Nope. Many people use the same server, letting the websites you visit see only that you’re using the same VPN as many other people.
## Drawbacks of a VPN
But VPNs aren't all powerful tools to protect your privacy. In fact, there are a number of glaring issues that should not be overlooked when making the decision to use one.
Most importantly, using a VPN only *shifts* the power to view your traffic from your ISP to the VPN provider itself. That means that all the traffic your ISP used to be able to see, your VPN provider will still be able to. Therefore, choosing a trustworthy VPN is important. Many will be able to find a provider that they can trust more than their ISP, but some may not.
@ -53,7 +50,6 @@ Using a commercial VPN provider is almost like entrusting your data to a black b
Finally, using a VPN will not make you anonymous in any way. Your VPN provider or especially dedicated attackers will be able to trace a connection back to you fairly trivially. Your VPN provider will also likely have a money trail leading back to you.
## So what?
If you're looking for perfect anonymity, there are better options. Software like the Tor Browser provides privacy and anonymity *by design*, whereas VPNs provide privacy based on trust alone. You cannot rely on "no logging" claims to protect you.
If you just need protection on a public Wi-Fi network, from your ISP, or just from copyright warnings in the mail, a VPN might be the solution for you.

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collections/_posts/2019-10-30-choosing-a-vpn.md
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@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ excerpt: Now you know what a VPN is, here's how you choose between them...
So [you know what a VPN is]({% link _posts/2019-10-05-understanding-vpns.md %}), but there are so many options to choose from! Well before we dive into this, let's get one thing off the bat:
## Avoid Free VPNs
Privacy-respecting VPNs can provide their service because you pay them for it. Free VPNs are **worse** than your ISP when it comes to respecting your privacy, because **selling your data is the only way they can make money**, whereas an ISP is primarily paid for by you.
> If you’re not paying for it, you’re the product.
@ -16,56 +15,49 @@ Privacy-respecting VPNs can provide their service because you pay them for it. F
This isn't to say all paid VPNs automatically become trustworthy, far from it. In fact many paid VPN providers have been known to or suspected to have sold their users' data or have done some otherwise shady things with it. Always completely evaluate the VPN provider you choose, rather than just take theirs or anyone else's word for it. The main takeaway here is that it is impossible to provide a service like a VPN — which requires servers, bandwidth, time, and energy to maintain — for free for thousands of users, without having some sort of other monetization model.
## Choosing a VPN
Alright, now we can get into it. The first thing we need to decide is _why_ exactly you need a VPN. Most people will fall into the following two camps:
### 1. Avoiding Geographical Restrictions
Maybe you want to watch BBC online, possibly avoid creeps at cafés, but don’t really care about your VPN logging your traffic — just like your ISP does.
**Therefore**: You want a VPN with servers in countries like US, UK — basically where services like Netflix work. (Tip: Netflix is continually banning VPNs, so be sure to use one that isn’t blocked. You might want to look into the [r/NetflixViaVPN](https://www.reddit.com/r/NetflixViaVPN) Subreddit for help with this one).
### 2. Maximizing Your Privacy Online
Being **Privacy** Guides, this is the big one for us. If you really care about your privacy, you'll want to look for a provider that at the very least does the following:
- Supports modern technologies like OpenVPN or WireGuard.
- Accepts anonymous payments like cash, gift cards, or cryptocurrencies.
- Provides strong, future-proof encryption for their connections.
- And, is public about their leadership and ownership.
* Supports modern technologies like OpenVPN or WireGuard.
* Accepts anonymous payments like cash, gift cards, or cryptocurrencies.
* Provides strong, future-proof encryption for their connections.
* And, is public about their leadership and ownership.
These 4 points should always be considered when you're evaluating a VPN provider. Additionally, note what jurisdiction the provider is incorporated in, and where their servers are located. This is probably the most important factor to consider, and also the most time-consuming, as privacy laws in various countries vary wildly.
Let me explain what these points mean exactly in more detail, so you know what to look for.
## Modern Technology
You should be able to connect to your VPN with any **OpenVPN** client. L2TP, PPTP, and IPSec are all insecure technologies that should not be used. A new technology called **WireGuard** looks very promising, but is still in active development and not recommended for use.
While we're looking at technology, take a look at whether your provider has their own client for you to download and connect with. These applications usually make using your VPN a lot simpler, and sometimes safer. If they do, ask the following questions:
- **Is this client open-source?** Having an open-source client is important because it allows you or anyone else to audit the code and see exactly what's happening. Closed source clients are essentially a black box you'd be putting all your data into, not the best idea!
- **Does the client have a killswitch?** Not many generic OpenVPN clients come with this functionality, but many custom VPN clients will. A killswitch option allows you to completely disable your internet connection when the VPN is disconnected. This will make sure that you don't accidentally connect to the internet with your ISP's connection.
* **Is this client open-source?** Having an open-source client is important because it allows you or anyone else to audit the code and see exactly what's happening. Closed source clients are essentially a black box you'd be putting all your data into, not the best idea!
* **Does the client have a killswitch?** Not many generic OpenVPN clients come with this functionality, but many custom VPN clients will. A killswitch option allows you to completely disable your internet connection when the VPN is disconnected. This will make sure that you don't accidentally connect to the internet with your ISP's connection.
## Anonymous Payments
This one's an easy one. Take a look at how you're able to pay for your provider's subscription. Some providers will take cash in the mail as payment, a great way to pay without leaving a digital money trail. Others will allow you to pay with gift cards from major retailers like Amazon, Target, and Wal-Mart (which you can hopefully obtain anonymously with cash, replacing the mail middleman from before). Still others will accept various cryptocurrencies.
If not leaving a money trail is important, you'll want to make sure you aren't paying with something linked to you financially, like a credit or debit card, or PayPal. If your provider doesn't accept the payment forms above, you aren't entirely out of luck however. You can still use a prepaid debit card to pay for things as anonymously as possible. But consider: If your provider isn't dedicated to making easy, anonymous payment alternatives available to you, how focused are they on your privacy?
## Strong Security
Most providers using OpenVPN will also be using strong encryption methods, but still make sure you double-check before choosing a provider. What you'll want to look for from your provider at a minimum is:
- **RSA-2048 encryption.** Ideally, they should support RSA-4096 connections, for maximum security.
- **Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).** This technology makes each VPN session use a different key every time, so that if an attacker manages to decrypt one of your connections, they won't also be able to see all your other data.
* **RSA-2048 encryption.** Ideally, they should support RSA-4096 connections, for maximum security.
* **Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).** This technology makes each VPN session use a different key every time, so that if an attacker manages to decrypt one of your connections, they won't also be able to see all your other data.
In addition, look into whether your provider has ever had their security practices audited by an independent third-party. For example, TunnelBear [publishes](https://cure53.de/summary-report_tunnelbear_2018.pdf) yearly audits of their entire service, or Mullvad, which has [published](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_v2.pdf) a comprehensive security audit of their client applications.
Independent audits are important because, while ultimately the actual security of the service will come down to _trusting_ the providers, a successful security audit demonstrates that the provider at least has the _capability_ to provide you with a secure connection, instead of just taking their claims at face value.
## Public Trust
You want to remain private, but your provider shouldn't. If your provider is hiding their ownership information and their leadership from you behind some Panamanian shell company, what other business practices might they be hiding?
> You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your internet data?
@ -75,7 +67,6 @@ Find out where your choice is incorporated. Who owns it? What other companies ha
Frequent transparency reports are a huge plus too. They should publish information related to government requests, so you know what their responses look like. All VPN providers will need to respond to legitimate legal requests, but does your choice reject or counter as many as possible?
## So what next?
If you're currently using a commercial VPN, use this information to evaluate their business. Do they seem trustworthy?
At Privacy Guides we've [evaluated]({% link legacy_pages/providers/vpn.html %}) a huge number of VPN providers along similar criteria to these. In our opinion, as of October 2019, Mullvad leads the pack with respect to all these criteria, with IVPN and ProtonVPN falling just slightly behind but catching up quickly. There are still a huge number of providers out there, however. The way to find the best solution for you, is by researching providers with _your_ criteria in mind.

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collections/_posts/2019-11-09-firefox-privacy.md
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@ -20,27 +20,22 @@ Firefox is fantastic out of the box, but where it really shines is customizabili
Before we get started, there's a couple things that should be noted that are not only applicable to this guide, but privacy in general:
## Considerations
Protecting your privacy online is a tricky proposition, there are so many factors to take into consideration on an individual basis for any one guide or site to cover comprehensively. You will need to take into account things like threat modeling and your general preferences before making any changes or following any recommendations.
### Threat Modeling
*What is [threat modeling](/threat-modeling/)?* Consider who you're trying to keep your data hidden from. Do you need to keep your information hidden from the government, or just the average stranger? Maybe you're just looking for alternatives to Big Tech Corporations like Google and Facebook. You'll also want to consider how much time and resources you want to spend hiding your data from those "threats". Some solutions might not be feasible from a financial or time standpoint and you'll have to make compromises. Taking all those questions into account creates a basic *threat model* for you to work with.
We want to publish a more complete guide on threat modeling in the future, so stay tuned to this blog for further updates. But for now, just keep those thoughts in the back of your mind as we go through this article. Not every solution might be for you, or conversely you may need to pay more attention to certain areas we aren't able to cover completely.
### Browser Fingerprinting
Another consideration is your browser's fingerprint. When you visit a web page, your browser voluntarily sends information about its configuration, such as available fonts, browser type, and add-ons. If this combination of information is unique, it may be possible to identify and track you without using more common tracking tools, like cookies.
That's right, add-ons contribute to your fingerprint. Another thing a lot of people miss when they are setting up their browser is that <mark>more is not always the best solution to your problems</mark>. You don't need to use every add-on and tweak that offers privacy, and the more you configure the greater chance there is that your browser will appear more unique to websites. Think about your specific situation and pick and choose the add-ons and tweaks we recommend only if you think they will help *you*.
## Firefox Privacy Settings
We'll start off with the easy solutions. Firefox has a number of privacy settings built in, no add-ons necessary! Open your *Options* page (*Preferences* on macOS) and we'll go through them one at a time.
### DNS over HTTPS
DNS (or the Domain Name System) is what your browser uses to turn domain names like `privacyguides.org` into IP addresses like `145.239.169.56`. Because computers can only make connections to IP addresses, it's necessary to use DNS every time you visit a new domain. But DNS is unencrypted by default, that means everyone on your network (including your ISP) can view what domains you're looking up, and in some situations even change the IP answers to redirect you to their own websites! Encrypting your DNS traffic can shield your queries and add some additional protection to your browsing.
Encrypted DNS takes many forms: DNS over HTTPS (DoH), DNS over TLS, DNSCrypt, etc., but they all accomplish the same thing. They keep your DNS queries private from your ISP, and they make sure they aren't tampered with in transit between your DNS provider. Fortunately, Firefox recently added native DoH support to the browser. On the **General** page of your preferences, scroll down to and open **Network Settings**. At the bottom of the window you will be able to select "Enable DNS over HTTPS" and choose a provider:
@ -52,7 +47,6 @@ Keep in mind that by using DoH you're sending all your queries to a single provi
It should also be noted that even with DoH, your ISP will still be able to see what domain you're connecting to because of a technology called Server Name Indication (SNI). Until SNI is encrypted as well, there's no getting around it. Encrypted SNI (eSNI) is in the works — and can actually be [enabled on Firefox](https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypt-that-sni-firefox-edition/) today — but it only works with a small number of servers, mainly ones operated by Cloudflare, so its use is limited currently. Therefore, while DoH provides some additional privacy and integrity protections, its use as a privacy tool is limited until other supplemental tools like eSNI and [DNSSEC](https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en) are finalized and implemented.
### Change Your Search Engine
This is an easy one. In the Search tab, change your Default Search Engine to something other than Google.
![Screenshot of the search engine preferences](/assets/img/blog/firefox-privacy-2.png){:.img-fluid .w-75 .mx-auto .d-block}
@ -60,7 +54,6 @@ This is an easy one. In the Search tab, change your Default Search Engine to som
Out of the built-in options, DuckDuckGo is the most privacy respecting service, but there's a number of [search engines we would recommend](https://privacyguides.org/providers/search-engines/) that can be easily installed as well.
### Enhanced Tracking Protection
Now we'll delve into the biggest set of options for people like us, Firefox's Privacy & Security tab. First up is their Enhanced Tracking Protection. This set of filters is set to *Standard* by default, but we'll want to change it to *Strict* for more comprehensive coverage.
![Screenshot of strict tracking protection enabled](/assets/img/blog/firefox-privacy-3.png){:.img-fluid .w-75 .mx-auto .d-block}
@ -74,13 +67,11 @@ Disabling Enhanced Tracking Protection will of course decrease your privacy on t
Another benefit of Firefox's Enhanced Tracking Protection is that it can actually speed up your browsing! Advertising networks and social media embeds can sometimes make your browser download huge files just to show an ad or a like button, and blocking those out trims the fat, in a sense.
### Disabling Telemetrics
When you use Firefox, Mozilla collects information about what you do, what kind of extensions you have installed, and various other aspects of your browser. While they claim to do this in a privacy-respecting way, sending as little data as possible is always preferred from a privacy standpoint, so we would go ahead and uncheck all the boxes under **Firefox Data Collection and Use** just to be safe.
![Screenshot of Firefox data collection checkboxes](/assets/img/blog/firefox-privacy-5.png){:.img-fluid .w-75 .mx-auto .d-block}
### Clearing Cookies and Site Data
This one is for more advanced users, so if you don't understand what this is doing you can skip this section. Firefox provides the option to delete all your cookies and site data every time Firefox is closed. Cookies and site data are little pieces of information sites store in your browser, and they have a myriad of uses. They are used for things like keeping you logged in and saving your website preferences, but they also can be used to track you across different websites. By deleting your cookies regularly, your browser will appear clean to websites, making you harder to track.
![Screenshot of cookies and site data](/assets/img/blog/firefox-privacy-6.png){:.img-fluid .w-75 .mx-auto .d-block}
@ -88,7 +79,6 @@ This one is for more advanced users, so if you don't understand what this is doi
This will likely log you out of websites quite often, so make sure that's an inconvenience you're willing to put up with for enhanced privacy.
## Firefox Privacy Add-ons
Of course, just the browser settings alone won't go quite far enough to protect your privacy. Mozilla has made a lot of compromises in order to provide a more functional browsing experience for the average user, which is completely understandable. But, we can take it even further with some browser add-ons that prevent tracking and make your experience more private and secure.
There are a number of [fantastic add-ons for Firefox](https://privacyguides.org/browsers/#addons), but they aren't all necessary for everyone. Some of them provide redundant functionality to each other, and some of them accomplish similar tasks to the settings we've enabled above.
@ -97,18 +87,16 @@ When you are installing add-ons for Firefox, consider whether you actually need
Keeping all that in mind, there are three add-ons I would consider necessary for virtually every user:
- uBlock Origin
- HTTPS Everywhere
- Decentraleyes
* uBlock Origin
* HTTPS Everywhere
* Decentraleyes
Out of the box, these add-ons only complement the settings we've described in this article already, and they have sane defaults that won't break the sites you visit.
### uBlock Origin
[**uBlock Origin**](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/ublock-origin/) is an efficient ad- and tracker-blocker that is easy on memory, and yet can load and enforce thousands more filters than competing blockers. We trust it because it is completely open-source. Additionally, unlike its competitors it has no monetization strategy: There's no "Acceptable" ads program or a similar whitelist like many other adblockers feature.
### HTTPS Everywhere
HTTPS is the secure, encrypted version of HTTP. When you see an address starting with https:// along with the padlock in your browser's address bar, you know that your connection to the website is completely secure. This is of course important when you're logging into websites and sending your passwords and emails in a form. But it also prevents people on your network and your ISP from snooping in on what you're reading, or changing the contents of an unencrypted webpage to whatever they want.
Therefore, [**HTTPS Everywhere**](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/https-everywhere) is a must-have extension, all it does is upgrade your HTTP connections to HTTPS wherever possible. And because it works silently in the background, you probably will never notice it! We trust HTTPS Everywhere because it is completely open-source, and is developed by the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere), a non-profit dedicated to private and secure technologies.
@ -116,21 +104,17 @@ Therefore, [**HTTPS Everywhere**](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon
Of course, it only works with sites that support HTTPS on the server's side, so you'll still need to keep an eye on your address bar to make sure you're securely connected. But fortunately more and more websites have implemented HTTPS, thanks to the advent of free certificates from organizations like Let's Encrypt.
### Decentraleyes
When you connect to many websites, your browser is most likely making connections to a myriad of "Content Delivery Networks" like Google Fonts, Akamai, and Cloudflare, to download fonts and Javascript that make the website run. This generally makes websites look and feel better, but it means you're constantly making connections to these servers, allowing them to build a fairly accurate tracking profile of you.
[**Decentraleyes**](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/decentraleyes) works by impersonating those CDNs locally in your browser. When a website wants to download a program like jQuery, instead of connecting to a remote CDN Decentraleyes will serve the file from its own cache of files. This means that you'll won't have to make remote CDN connections for the files that Decentraleyes supports, and therefore the remote CDNs can't track your browser. Decentraleyes may even speed up your browsing, because everything is stored locally instead of on a far-away server. Everything happens instantly, and you won't see a difference in the websites you visit.
### Additional Firefox Privacy Add-ons
There is of course more functionality that can be achieved at the expense of more time spent configuring your browser and reduced website functionality. If you're looking for the most privacy options possible however, they may be for you. Check out the page on [Browser add-ons at Privacy Guides](https://privacyguides.org/browsers/#addons) for further information and additional resources.
## More Privacy Functionality
Firefox has developed a number of other privacy tools that can be used to enhance your privacy or security. They may be worth looking into, but they have some drawbacks that would prevent me from recommending them outright.
### Firefox Private Network
**Firefox Private Network** is a new extension developed by Mozilla that serves as a [Virtual Private Network](/blog/2019/10/05/understanding-vpns) (VPN), securing you on public WiFi networks and other situations where you might trust Mozilla more than the ISP or network administrator. It is free in beta, but will likely be available at some subscription pricing once the test pilot ends.
Firefox Private Network is still just a VPN, and there are a number of drawbacks you would want to consider before using it. Ultimately, your VPN provider of choice will be able to see your web traffic. All you are accomplishing is shifting the trust from your network to the VPN provider, in this case *Cloudflare*, the operators behind this service.
@ -142,17 +126,14 @@ And finally, Cloudflare and Mozilla are both US companies. There are a number of
If you require a Virtual Private Network, we would look elsewhere. There are a number of [good VPN providers](https://privacyguides.org/providers/vpn/) like Mullvad that will provide a better experience at a low cost.
### Multi-Account Containers
Mozilla has an in-house add-on called [**Multi-Account Containers**](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers) that allows you to isolate websites from each other. For example, you could have Facebook in a container separate from your other browsing. In this situation, Facebook would only be able to set cookies with your profile on sites within the container, keeping your other browsing protected.
A containers setup may be a good alternative to techniques like regularly deleting cookies, but requires a lot of manual intervention to setup and maintain. If you want complete control of what websites can do in your browser, it's definitely worth looking into, but we wouldn't call it a necessary addition by any means.
## Additional Resources
[ghacks user.js](https://github.com/ghacksuserjs/ghacks-user.js) — For more advanced users, the ghacks user.js is a "configuration file that can control hundreds of Firefox settings [...] which aims to provide as much privacy and enhanced security as possible, and to reduce tracking and fingerprinting as much as possible - while minimizing any loss of functionality and breakage".
[Mozilla's Privacy Policy](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/) — Of course, we always recommend reading through the privacy statement of any organization you deal with, and Mozilla is no exception.
## Firefox Privacy Summary
In conclusion, we believe that Firefox is the most promising browser for privacy-conscious individuals. The non-profit behind it seems truly dedicated to promoting user control and privacy, and the good defaults coupled with the sheer customizability of the browser allow you to truly protect your information when you browse the web.

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collections/_posts/2021-09-14-welcome-to-privacy-guides.md
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@ -17,13 +17,11 @@ We chose the name Privacy Guides because it represents two things for us as an o
As a name, it moves us past recommendations of various tools and focuses us more on the bigger picture. We want to provide more _education_ — rather than _direction_ — surrounding privacy-related topics. You can see the very beginnings of this work in our new page on [threat modeling](https://privacyguides.org/threat-modeling/), or our [VPN](https://privacyguides.org/providers/vpn/) and [Email Provider](https://privacyguides.org/providers/email/) recommendations, but this is just the start of what we eventually hope to accomplish.
### Website Development
Our project has always been community-oriented and open-sourced. The source code for PrivacyTools is currently archived at [https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io). This repository will remain online as an archive of everything on PrivacyTools up to this transition.
The source code for our new website is available at [https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org). All updates from PrivacyTools have been merged into this new repository, and this is where all future work will take place.
### Services
PrivacyTools also runs a number of online services in use by many users. Some of these services are federated, namely Mastodon, Matrix, and PeerTube. Due to the technical nature of federation, it is impossible for us to change the domain name on these services, and because we cannot guarantee the future of the privacytools.io domain name we will be shutting down these services in the coming months.
We strongly urge users of these services to migrate to alternative providers in the near future. We hope that we will be able to provide enough time to make this as seamless of a transition as possible for our users.
@ -35,13 +33,11 @@ Other services being operated by PrivacyTools currently will be discontinued. Th
Our future direction for online services is uncertain, but will be a longer-term discussion within our community after our work is complete on this initial transition. We are very aware that whatever direction we move from here will have to be done in a way that is sustainable in the very long term.
### r/PrivacyGuides
PrivacyTools has a sizable community on Reddit, but to ensure a unified image we have created a new Subreddit at [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/) that we encourage all Reddit users to join.
In the coming weeks our current plan is to wind down discussions on r/privacytoolsIO. We will be opening r/PrivacyGuides to lots of the discussions most people are used to shortly, but encouraging general “privacy news” or headline-type posts to be posted on [r/Privacy](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacy/) instead. In our eyes, r/Privacy is the “who/what/when/where” of the privacy community on Reddit, the best place to find the latest news and information; while r/PrivacyGuides is the “how”: a place to share and discuss tools, tips, tricks, and other advice. We think focusing on these strong points will serve to strengthen both communities, and we hope the good moderators of r/Privacy agree :)
### Final Thoughts
The former active team at PrivacyTools universally agrees on this direction towards Privacy Guides, and will be working exclusively on Privacy Guides rather than any “PrivacyTools” related projects. We intend to redirect PriavcyTools to new Privacy Guides properties for as long as possible, and archive existing PrivacyTools work as a pre-transition snapshot.
Privacy Guides additionally welcomes back PrivacyTools’ former sysadmin [Jonah](https://twitter.com/JonahAragon), who will be joining the project’s leadership team.
@ -54,9 +50,9 @@ We are all very excited about this new brand and direction, and hope to have you
**_Privacy Guides_** _is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy._
- [Join r/PrivacyGuides on Reddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides)
- [Follow @privacy_guides on Twitter](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides)
- [Collaborate with us on GitHub](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org)
- [Join our chat on Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:aragon.sh)
* [Join r/PrivacyGuides on Reddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides)
* [Follow @privacy_guides on Twitter](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides)
* [Collaborate with us on GitHub](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org)
* [Join our chat on Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:aragon.sh)
The contact for this story is Jonah, who is reachable on Twitter [@JonahAragon](https://twitter.com/JonahAragon), Matrix [@jonah:aragon.sh](https://matrix.to/#/@jonah:aragon.sh), or Signal 763-308-5533.

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collections/_posts/2021-12-01-firefox-privacy-2021-update.md
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@ -12,11 +12,9 @@ A lot changed between 2019 and now, not least in regards to Firefox. Since our l
Now that so many privacy features are built into the browser, there is little need for extensions made by third-party developers. Accordingly, we have updated our very outdated [browser](https://privacyguides.org/browsers/) section. If you've got an old browser profile we suggest **creating a new one**. Some of the old advice may make your browser *more* unique.
#### Privacy Tweaks "about:config"
We're no longer recommending that users set `about:config` switches manually. Those switches need to be up to date and continuously maintained. They should be studied before blindly making modifications. Sometimes their behaviour changes in between Firefox releases, is superseded by other keys or they are removed entirely. We do not see any point in duplicating the efforts of the community [Arkenfox](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) project. Arkenfox has very good documentation in their [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki) and we use it ourselves.
#### LocalCDN and Decentraleyes
These extensions aren't required with Total Cookie Protection (TCP), which is enabled if you've set Enhanced Tracking Protection (ETP) to **Strict**.
Replacing scripts on CDNs with local versions is not a comprehensive solution and is a form of [enumeration of badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). While it may work with some scripts that are included it doesn't help with most other third-party connections.
@ -24,25 +22,20 @@ Replacing scripts on CDNs with local versions is not a comprehensive solution an
CDN extensions never really improved privacy as far as sharing your IP address was concerned and their usage is fingerprintable as this Tor Project developer [points out](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/22089#note_2639603). They are the wrong tool for the job and are not a substitute for a good VPN or Tor. Its worth noting the [resources](https://git.synz.io/Synzvato/decentraleyes/-/tree/master/resources) for Decentraleyes are hugely out of date and would not be likely used anyway.
#### NeatURLs and ClearURLS
Previously we recommended ClearURLs to remove tracking parameters from URLs you might visit. These extensions are no longer needed with uBlock Origin's [`removeparam`](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Static-filter-syntax#removeparam) feature.
#### HTTPS Everywhere
The EFF announced back in September they were [deprecating HTTPS-Everywhere](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/09/https-actually-everywhere) as most browsers now have an HTTPS-Only feature. We are pleased to see privacy features built into the browser and Firefox 91 introduced [HTTPS by Default in Private Browsing](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/08/10/firefox-91-introduces-https-by-default-in-private-browsing/).
#### Multi Account Containers and Temporary Containers
Container extensions aren't as important as they used to be for privacy now that we have [Total Cookie Protection](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/02/23/total-cookie-protection/).
Multi Account Container will still have some use if you use [Mozilla VPN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozilla_VPN) as it is going to be [integrated](https://github.com/mozilla/multi-account-containers/issues/2210) allowing you to configure specified containers to use a particular VPN server. Another use might be if you want to login to multiple accounts on the same domain.
#### Just-In-Time Compilation (JIT)
What is "Disable JIT" in Bromite? This option disables the JavaScript performance feature [JIT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just-in-time_compilation). It can increase security but at the cost of performance. Those trade-offs vary wildly and are explored in [this](https://microsoftedge.github.io/edgevr/posts/Super-Duper-Secure-Mode/) publication by Johnathan Norman from the Microsoft Edge team. This option is very much a security vs performance option.
#### Mozilla browsers on Android
We don't recommend any Mozilla based browsers on Android. This is because we don't feel that [GeckoView](https://mozilla.github.io/geckoview) is quite as secure as it could be as it doesn't support [site isolation](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/05/introducing-firefox-new-site-isolation-security-architecture), soon to be coming in desktop browsers or [isolated processes](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196).
We also noticed that there isn't an option for [HTTPS-Only mode](https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/fenix/issues/16952#issuecomment-907960218). The only way to get something similar is to install the [deprecated](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/09/https-actually-everywhere) extension [HTTPS Everywhere](https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere).
@ -50,7 +43,6 @@ We also noticed that there isn't an option for [HTTPS-Only mode](https://github.
There are places which Firefox on Android shines for example browsing news websites where you may want to *partially* load some JavaScript (but not all) using medium or hard [blocking mode](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode). The [reader view](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/view-articles-reader-view-firefox-android) is also pretty cool. We expect things will change in the future, so we're keeping a close eye on this.
#### Fingerprinting
Firefox has the ability to block known third party [fingerprinting resources](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2020/01/07/firefox-72-fingerprinting/). Mozilla has [advanced protection](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/firefox-protection-against-fingerprinting) against fingerprinting (RFP is enabled with Arkenfox).
We do not recommend extensions that promise to change your [browser fingerprint](https://blog.torproject.org/browser-fingerprinting-introduction-and-challenges-ahead/). Some of those extensions [are detectable](https://www.cse.chalmers.se/~andrei/codaspy17.pdf) by websites through JavaScript and [CSS](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03152176/file/style-fingerprinting-usenix.pdf) methods, particularly those which inject anything into the web content.

19
notices.md
View File

@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ description: "Privacy Guides is provided with good intentions on an &quot;as-is&
---
<span class="badge rounded-pill bg-secondary mt-5">Section 1</span>
# Legal Disclaimer
# Legal Disclaimer
<span class="lead">Privacy Guides is not a law firm. As such, the Privacy Guides website and contributors are not providing legal advice. The material and recommendations in our website and guides do not constitute legal advice nor does contributing to the website or communicating with Privacy Guides or other contributors about our website create an attorney-client relationship.</span>
Running this website, like any human endeavor, involves uncertainty and trade-offs. We hope this website helps, but it may include mistakes and can’t address every situation. If you have any questions about your situation, we encourage you to do your own research, seek out other experts, and engage in discussions with the Privacy Guides community. If you have any legal questions, you should consult with your own legal counsel before moving forward.
@ -17,13 +17,13 @@ Privacy Guides is an open source project contributed to under licenses that incl
Privacy Guides additionally does not warrant that this website will be constantly available, or available at all.
<span class="badge rounded-pill bg-secondary mt-5">Section 2</span>
# Licenses
# Licenses
<span class="lead">Unless otherwise noted, all content on this website is made freely available under the terms of the [Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE).</span>
This does not include third-party code embedded in this repository, or code where a superseding license is otherwise noted. The following are notable examples, but this list may not be all-inclusive:
- [Sortable](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/assets/js/sortable.min.js) is under the MIT license. See: [github.com/HubSpot/sortable/raw/master/LICENSE](https://github.com/HubSpot/sortable/raw/master/LICENSE)
* [Sortable](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/assets/js/sortable.min.js) is under the MIT license. See: [github.com/HubSpot/sortable/raw/master/LICENSE](https://github.com/HubSpot/sortable/raw/master/LICENSE)
Portions of this notice itself were adopted from [opensource.guide](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/notices.md) on GitHub. That resource and this page itself are released under [CC-BY-4.0](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/LICENSE).
@ -34,14 +34,13 @@ We believe that the logos and other images in `assets` obtained from third-party
When you contribute to this repository you are doing so under the above licenses.
<span class="badge rounded-pill bg-secondary mt-5">Section 3</span>
# Acceptable Use
# Acceptable Use
<span class="lead">You may not use this website in any way that causes or may cause damage to the website or impairment of the availability or accessibility of Privacy Guides, or in any way which is unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, harmful, or in connection with any unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful purpose or activity.</span>
You must not conduct any systematic or automated data collection activities on or in relation to this website without express written consent from Aragon Ventures LLC, including:
* Excessive Automated Scans
* Denial of Service Attacks
* Scraping
- Data Mining
- ‘Framing’ (IFrames)
* Excessive Automated Scans
* Denial of Service Attacks
* Scraping
* Data Mining
* 'Framing' (IFrames)