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Split Android page into separate articles and update device recommendations (#1053)
Co-authored-by: Tad <8296104+SkewedZeppelin@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jonah Aragon
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title: "Android"
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icon: 'fontawesome/brands/android'
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---
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Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
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The main privacy concern with most Android devices is that they usually include [Google Play Services](https://developers.google.com/android/guides/overview). This component is proprietary, [closed source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proprietary_software), has a privileged role on your phone, and may collect private user information. It is neither a part of the [Android Open Source Project](https://source.android.com/) (AOSP) nor is it included with the below derivatives.
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These are the Android operating systems, devices, and apps we recommend to maximize your mobile device's security and privacy. We also have additional Android-related information:
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- [General Android Overview and Recommendations :material-arrow-right:](android/overview.md)
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- [Android Security and Privacy Features :material-arrow-right:](android/security.md)
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- [GrapheneOS vs CalyxOS Comparison :material-arrow-right:](android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.md)
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## AOSP Derivatives
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Generally speaking we recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems. If you are unable to run any of the following operating systems on your device, you are likely going to be best off sticking with your stock Android installation (as opposed to an operating system not listed here such as LineageOS), but we would recommend upgrading to a new device if at all possible.
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!!! note
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End-of-life devices (such as GrapheneOS or CalyxOS's "extended support" devices) do not have full security patches (firmware updates) due to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) discontinuing support. These devices cannot be considered completely secure regardless of installed software.
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### GrapheneOS
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!!! recommendation
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@ -25,19 +34,13 @@ Notably, GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usag
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Currently, only [Pixel phones](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support) meet its hardware security requirement and are supported.
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!!! attention
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GrapheneOS's "extended support" devices do not have full security patches (firmware updates) due to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) discontinuing support. These devices cannot be considered completely secure.
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### CalyxOS
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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**CalyxOS** is a decent alternative to GrapheneOS.
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It has some privacy features on top of AOSP, including [Datura](https://calyxos.org/docs/tech/datura-details) firewall, [Signal](https://signal.org) integration in the dialer app, and a built in panic button. CalyxOS also comes with firmware updates and signed builds, so [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is fully supported.
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**CalyxOS** is a system with some privacy features on top of AOSP, including [Datura](https://calyxos.org/docs/tech/datura-details) firewall, [Signal](https://signal.org) integration in the dialer app, and a built in panic button. CalyxOS also comes with firmware updates and signed builds, so [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is fully supported.
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[Visit calyxos.org](https://calyxos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Privacy Policy](https://calyxinstitute.org/legal/privacy-policy){ .md-button }
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@ -45,10 +48,6 @@ To accomodate users who need Google Play Services, CalyxOS optionally includes [
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Currently, CalyxOS only supports [Pixel phones](https://calyxos.org/docs/guide/device-support/).
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!!! attention
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CalyxOS's "extended support" does not have full security patches due to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) discontinuing support; therefore, they cannot be considered completely secure.
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### DivestOS
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!!! recommendation
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@ -72,41 +71,74 @@ DivestOS 16.0, 17.1, and 18.1 implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://devel
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Not all of the supported devices have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), and some perform it better than others.
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## Android security and privacy features
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## Android Devices
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### User Profiles
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Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution.
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Multiple user profiles (Settings → System → Multiple users) are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles you can limit a user from making calls, SMS or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles is a more secure method of isolation.
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Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
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### Work Profile
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A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
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[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.
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- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
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- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
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- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason, so check our [discussions](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions) page.
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A **device controller** such as [Shelter](#recommended-apps) is required, unless you're using CalyxOS which includes one.
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### Google Pixel
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The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. The user must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to the data inside of the work profile.
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!!! recommendation
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This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
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{ align=right }
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### Verified Boot
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**Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
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[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
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Beginning with the **Pixel 6** and **6 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 5 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-4 years competing OEMs typically offer.
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Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption (FDE) to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based).
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[Visit store.google.com](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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Each user's data is encrypted using their own unique encryption key, and the operating system files are left unencrypted. Verified Boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, Verified Boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon reboot of the device.
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Unless you know you have a specific need for [CalyxOS/microG features](https://calyxos.org/features/) that are unavailable on GrapheneOS, we strongly recommend GrapheneOS over other operating system choices on Pixel devices.
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Unfortunately, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom Android Verified Boot (AVB) key enrollment on their devices. Some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support Verified Boot even on hardware with Verified Boot support for third party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support Verified Boot are **not** recommended.
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[More about GrapheneOS vs CalyxOS](android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.md){ .md-button }
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### VPN Killswitch
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The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
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Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in ⚙️ Settings → Network & internet → VPN → ⚙️ → Block connections without VPN.
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A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
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### Global Toggles
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- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
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- Consider price beating options and specials offered at [brick and mortar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brick_and_mortar) stores.
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- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
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- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EoL Date }-\text{ Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
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Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling [Bluetooth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth) and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled.
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### Other Devices
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## Recommended Apps
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!!! important
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Google Pixel phones are the only devices which are fully supported by all of our recommended Android distributions. Additionally, Pixel devices have stronger hardware security than any other Android device currently on the market, due to Google's custom Titan security chips acting as the Secure Element for secrets storage and rate limiting. Secure Elements are more limited and have a smaller attack surface than the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), which is also used to run "trusted" programs. Most other phones do not have a Secure Element and have to using the TEE for both secrets storage, rate limiting, and trusted computing."
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If you are unable to purchase a Pixel device, any device which is supported by CalyxOS should be reasonably secure and private enough for most users after installing CalyxOS.
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In any case, when purchasing a device we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
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We do not recommend the following devices over a Google Pixel device, but we do have some notes on devices from other manufacturers:
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#### OnePlus
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If you are unable to obtain a Google Pixel, recent OnePlus devices provide a good balance of security with custom operating systems and longevity, with OnePlus 8 and later devices receiving 4 years of security updates. CalyxOS has [experimental support](https://calyxos.org/news/2022/04/01/fairphone4-oneplus8t-oneplus9-test-builds/) for the **OnePlus 8T** and **9**.
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DivestOS has support for most OnePlus devices up to the **OnePlus 7T Pro**, with varying levels of support.
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#### Fairphone
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!!! danger
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Out of the box, Fairphone devices are incredibly insecure. [Fairphone's stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11), meaning any system can be installed and the phone will trust it as if it is the stock system. This essentially breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device.
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This problem is solved when you install a custom operating system such as CalyxOS or DivestOS and trust the developer's signing keys rather than the stock system's. To reiterate, **you must install a custom operating system with custom boot keys to use Fairphone devices in a secure manner.**
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CalyxOS has [experimental support](https://calyxos.org/news/2022/04/01/fairphone4-oneplus8t-oneplus9-test-builds/) for the **Fairphone 4**. DivestOS has builds available for the **Fairphone 3**.
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While Fairphone markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support, the SOC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably sooner EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
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## General Apps
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### Orbot
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@ -251,96 +283,7 @@ Main privacy features include:
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You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). If you want to redact text in an image, draw a box over the text. For this we suggest [Pocket Paint](https://github.com/Catrobat/Paintroid) or [Imagepipe](https://codeberg.org/Starfish/Imagepipe).
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## General Recommendations
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### Avoid Root
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[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) policy bypasses.
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Adblockers (AdAway) which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](dns.md) or [VPN](vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
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AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
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We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
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### Firmware Updates
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Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)—in other words, phone manufacturers—have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
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As the components of the phone such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years while cheaper products often have shorter support. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own system on chip (SoC) and they will provide 5 years of support.
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Devices that have reached their end-of-life (EoL) and are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer, cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
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### Android Versions
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It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any user apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
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### Android Permissions
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[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant users control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All user installed apps are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore there is no need to install any antivirus apps. The savings you make from not purchasing or subscribing to security apps is better spent on paying for a supported device in the future.
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Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about, consider using a user or work [profile](android/#android-security-privacy).
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### Advanced Protection Program
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If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Program](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/). It is available at no cost to anyone with two or more hardware security keys with [U2F](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor) support.
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The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
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- Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [U2F](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor) or [FIDO2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_password#SMS), [TOTP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-based_one-time_password), and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
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- Only Google and verified third party apps can access account data
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- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
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- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
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- Stricter recovery process for accounts with lost credentials
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For users that are using the privileged Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
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- Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
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- Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
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- Warning the user about unverified applications
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### SafetyNet and Play Integrity API
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[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) and the [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) are generally used for [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financal apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the `basicIntegrity` check, but not the certification check `ctsProfileMatch`. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.
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As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
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### Advertising ID
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All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
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On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to ⚙️ Settings → Apps → Sandboxed Google Play → Google Settings → Ads and select **Delete advertising ID**.
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On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
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- ⚙️ Settings → Google → Ads
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- ⚙️ Settings → Privacy → Ads
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Depending on your system, you will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to "Opt out of interest-based ads". You should delete the advertising ID if you are given the option to, and if you are not, we recommend that you opt out of interested-based ads and then reset your advertising ID.
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### Android Device Shopping
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Google Pixels are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Some other phones such as the Fairphone and OnePlus devices also support custom Android Verified Boot (AVB) key enrollment. However, there have been issues with their older models. In the past they were using [test keys](https://social.coop/@dazinism/105346943304083054) or not doing proper verification, making Verified Boot on those devices useless.
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Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution. Phones that cannot be unlocked will often have an [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity) starting with "35", that includes phones from purchased from Verizon, Telus, Rogers, EE, etc.
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Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
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We have these general tips:
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- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
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- Consider price beating options and specials offered at [brick and mortar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brick_and_mortar) stores.
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- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
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- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EoL Date }-\text{ Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
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- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
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- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
|
||||
- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason, so check our [discussions](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions) page.
|
||||
|
||||
The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company. The GrapheneOS project is not currently affiliated with any vendor and cannot ensure the quality or security of their products.
|
||||
|
||||
A [CalyxOS membership](https://calyxinstitute.org/membership/calyxos) also entitles you to a device preloaded with CalyxOS.
|
||||
|
||||
## Where to get your applications
|
||||
## App Stores
|
||||
|
||||
### GrapheneOS's App Store
|
||||
|
||||
@ -381,40 +324,3 @@ To mitigate these problems, we recommend [Droid-ify](https://github.com/Iamlooke
|
||||
**Downloads:**
|
||||
- [:fontawesome-brands-android: APK Download](https://android.izzysoft.de/repo/apk/com.looker.droidify)
|
||||
- [:fontawesome-brands-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Iamlooker/Droid-ify)
|
||||
|
||||
## Security comparison of GrapheneOS and CalyxOS
|
||||
|
||||
### Profiles
|
||||
|
||||
CalyxOS includes a device controller app so there is no need to install a third party app like [Shelter](#recommended-apps). GrapheneOS plans to introduce nested profile support with better isolation in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
GrapheneOS extends the [user profile](#android-security-privacy) feature allowing a user to press an "End Session" button. This button clears the encryption key from memory. There are plans to add a [cross profile notifications system](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/88) in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
### Sandboxed Google Play vs Privileged MicroG
|
||||
|
||||
When Google Play services are used on GrapheneOS, they run as a user app and are contained within a user or work profile.
|
||||
|
||||
Sandboxed Google Play is confined using the highly restrictive, default [`untrusted_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) domain provided by [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux). Permissions for apps to use Google Play Services can be revoked at any time by the user.
|
||||
|
||||
MicroG is a reimplementation of Google Play Services. This means it needs to be updated every time Android has a major version update (or the Android API changes). It also needs to run in the highly privileged [`system_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) SELinux domain like normal Google Play Services and requires access to [signature spoofing](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/android.html#microg-signature-spoofing) so this is less secure than the Sandboxed Google Play approach. We do not believe MicroG provides any privacy advantages over Sandboxed Google Play except for the option to *shift trust* of the location backend from Google to another provider such as Mozilla or DejaVu.
|
||||
|
||||
From a usability point of view, Sandboxed Google Play also works well with far more applications than MicroG, thanks to its support for services like [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames) and [In-app Billing API](https://android-doc.github.io/google/play/billing/api.html).
|
||||
|
||||
### Privileged App Extensions
|
||||
|
||||
Android 12 comes with special support for seamless app updates with [third party app stores](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/09/listening-to-developer-feedback-to.html). The popular Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) repository [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org) doesn't implement this feature and requires a [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged) to be included with the Android distribution in order to have unattended app installation.
|
||||
|
||||
GrapheneOS doesn't compromise on security; therefore, they do not include the F-Droid extension. Users have to confirm all updates manually if they want to use F-Droid. Alternatively, they can use the Droid-ify client which does support seamless app updates in Android 12. GrapheneOS officially recommends [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play) instead. Many FOSS Android apps are also in Google Play but sometimes they are not (like [NewPipe](video-streaming.md)).
|
||||
|
||||
CalyxOS includes the [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged), which may lower device security. Seamless app updates should be possible with [Aurora Store](https://auroraoss.com) in Android 12.
|
||||
|
||||
### Additional hardening
|
||||
|
||||
GrapheneOS improves upon [AOSP](https://source.android.com/) security with:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Hardened WebView:** Vanadium WebView requires [64-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/64-bit_computing) processes on the [WebView](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView) process and disables legacy [32-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/32-bit_computing) processes. It uses hardened compiler options such as [`-fwrapv`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Code-Gen-Options.html) and [`-fstack-protector-strong`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.3/gcc/Optimize-Options.html), which can help protect against [stack buffer overflows](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stack_buffer_overflow). [API](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API)s such as the [battery status API](https://chromestatus.com/feature/4537134732017664) are disabled for privacy reasons. All system apps on GrapheneOS use the Vanadium WebView which means user installed apps that use WebView will also benefit from Vanadium's hardening. The [Vanadium patch set](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/tree/12/patches) is a lot more comprehensive than CalyxOS's [Chromium patch set](https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/chromium-patches) which is derived from it.
|
||||
- **Hardened Kernel:** GrapheneOS kernel includes some hardening from the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/linux-hardened) project and the [Kernel Self Protection Project (KSPP)](https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project). CalyxOS uses the [same kernel](https://calyxos.org/docs/development/build/kernel/) as regular Android with some minor modifications.
|
||||
- **Hardened Memory Allocator:** GrapheneOS uses the [hardened malloc](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) subproject as its memory allocator. This focuses on hardening against [memory heap corruption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_corruption). CalyxOS uses the default AOSP [Scudo Malloc](https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/scudo), which is generally [less effective](https://twitter.com/danielmicay/status/1033671709197398016). Hardened Malloc has uncovered vulnerabilities in AOSP which have been [fixed](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_system_core/commit/be11b59725aa6118b0e1f0712572e835c3d50746) by GrapheneOS such as [CVE-2021-0703](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-0703).
|
||||
- **Secure Exec Spawning:** GrapheneOS [spawns](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spawn_(computing)) fresh processes as opposed to using the [Zygote model](https://ayusch.com/android-internals-the-android-os-boot-process) used by AOSP and CalyxOS. The Zygote model weakens [Address Space Layout Randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization) (ASLR) and is considered [less secure](https://wenke.gtisc.gatech.edu/papers/morula.pdf). Creating [fresh processes](https://grapheneos.org/usage#exec-spawning) is safer but will have some performance penalty when launching a new application. These penalties are not really noticeable unless you have an [old device](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) with slow storage such as the Pixel 3a/3a XL as it has [eMMC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MultiMediaCard#eMMC).
|
||||
|
||||
**Please note that these are just a few examples and are not an extensive list of GrapheneOS's hardening**. For a more complete list, please read GrapheneOS' [official documentation](https://grapheneos.org/features).
|
||||
|
||||
38
docs/android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.md
Normal file
38
docs/android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "GrapheneOS vs CalyxOS"
|
||||
icon: 'material/cellphone-cog'
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Profiles
|
||||
|
||||
CalyxOS includes a device controller app so there is no need to install a third party app like Shelter.
|
||||
|
||||
GrapheneOS extends the user profile feature allowing a user to press an "End Session" button. This button clears the encryption key from memory. There are plans to add a [cross profile notifications system](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/88) in the future. GrapheneOS plans to introduce nested profile support with better isolation in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
## Sandboxed Google Play vs Privileged MicroG
|
||||
|
||||
When Google Play services are used on GrapheneOS, they run as a user app and are contained within a user or work profile.
|
||||
|
||||
Sandboxed Google Play is confined using the highly restrictive, default [`untrusted_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) domain provided by [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux). Permissions for apps to use Google Play Services can be revoked at any time by the user.
|
||||
|
||||
MicroG is a reimplementation of Google Play Services. This means it needs to be updated every time Android has a major version update (or the Android API changes). It also needs to run in the highly privileged [`system_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) SELinux domain like normal Google Play Services and requires access to [signature spoofing](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/android.html#microg-signature-spoofing) so this is less secure than the Sandboxed Google Play approach. We do not believe MicroG provides any privacy advantages over Sandboxed Google Play except for the option to *shift trust* of the location backend from Google to another provider such as Mozilla or DejaVu.
|
||||
|
||||
From a usability point of view, Sandboxed Google Play also works well with far more applications than MicroG, thanks to its support for services like [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames) and [In-app Billing API](https://android-doc.github.io/google/play/billing/api.html).
|
||||
|
||||
## Privileged App Extensions
|
||||
|
||||
Android 12 comes with special support for seamless app updates with [third party app stores](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/09/listening-to-developer-feedback-to.html). The popular Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) repository [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org) doesn't implement this feature and requires a [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged) to be included with the Android distribution in order to have unattended app installation.
|
||||
|
||||
GrapheneOS doesn't compromise on security; therefore, they do not include the F-Droid extension. Users have to confirm all updates manually if they want to use F-Droid. Alternatively, they can use the Droid-ify client which does support seamless app updates in Android 12. GrapheneOS officially recommends [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play) instead. Many FOSS Android apps are also in Google Play but sometimes they are not (like [NewPipe](../video-streaming.md)).
|
||||
|
||||
CalyxOS includes the [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged), which may lower device security. Seamless app updates should be possible with [Aurora Store](https://auroraoss.com) in Android 12.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional hardening
|
||||
|
||||
GrapheneOS improves upon [AOSP](https://source.android.com/) security with:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Hardened WebView:** Vanadium WebView requires [64-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/64-bit_computing) processes on the [WebView](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView) process and disables legacy [32-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/32-bit_computing) processes. It uses hardened compiler options such as [`-fwrapv`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Code-Gen-Options.html) and [`-fstack-protector-strong`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.3/gcc/Optimize-Options.html), which can help protect against [stack buffer overflows](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stack_buffer_overflow). [API](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API)s such as the [battery status API](https://chromestatus.com/feature/4537134732017664) are disabled for privacy reasons. All system apps on GrapheneOS use the Vanadium WebView which means user installed apps that use WebView will also benefit from Vanadium's hardening. The [Vanadium patch set](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/tree/12/patches) is a lot more comprehensive than CalyxOS's [Chromium patch set](https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/chromium-patches) which is derived from it.
|
||||
- **Hardened Kernel:** GrapheneOS kernel includes some hardening from the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/linux-hardened) project and the [Kernel Self Protection Project (KSPP)](https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project). CalyxOS uses the [same kernel](https://calyxos.org/docs/development/build/kernel/) as regular Android with some minor modifications.
|
||||
- **Hardened Memory Allocator:** GrapheneOS uses the [hardened malloc](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) subproject as its memory allocator. This focuses on hardening against [memory heap corruption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_corruption). CalyxOS uses the default AOSP [Scudo Malloc](https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/scudo), which is generally [less effective](https://twitter.com/danielmicay/status/1033671709197398016). Hardened Malloc has uncovered vulnerabilities in AOSP which have been [fixed](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_system_core/commit/be11b59725aa6118b0e1f0712572e835c3d50746) by GrapheneOS such as [CVE-2021-0703](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-0703).
|
||||
- **Secure Exec Spawning:** GrapheneOS [spawns](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spawn_(computing)) fresh processes as opposed to using the [Zygote model](https://ayusch.com/android-internals-the-android-os-boot-process) used by AOSP and CalyxOS. The Zygote model weakens [Address Space Layout Randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization) (ASLR) and is considered [less secure](https://wenke.gtisc.gatech.edu/papers/morula.pdf). Creating [fresh processes](https://grapheneos.org/usage#exec-spawning) is safer but will have some performance penalty when launching a new application. These penalties are not really noticeable unless you have an [old device](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) with slow storage such as the Pixel 3a/3a XL as it has [eMMC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MultiMediaCard#eMMC).
|
||||
|
||||
**Please note that these are just a few examples and are not an extensive list of GrapheneOS's hardening**. For a more complete list, please read GrapheneOS' [official documentation](https://grapheneos.org/features).
|
||||
72
docs/android/overview.md
Normal file
72
docs/android/overview.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Android Overview
|
||||
icon: material/cellphone-check
|
||||
---
|
||||
Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
|
||||
|
||||
The main privacy concern with most Android devices is that they usually include [Google Play Services](https://developers.google.com/android/guides/overview). This component is proprietary, [closed source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proprietary_software), has a privileged role on your phone, and may collect private user information. It is neither a part of the [Android Open Source Project](https://source.android.com/) (AOSP) nor is it included with the below derivatives.
|
||||
|
||||
## Avoid Root
|
||||
|
||||
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) policy bypasses.
|
||||
|
||||
Adblockers (AdAway) which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or [VPN](../vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
|
||||
|
||||
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
|
||||
|
||||
We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
|
||||
|
||||
## Firmware Updates
|
||||
|
||||
Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)—in other words, phone manufacturers—have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
|
||||
|
||||
As the components of the phone such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years while cheaper products often have shorter support. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own system on chip (SoC) and they will provide 5 years of support.
|
||||
|
||||
Devices that have reached their end-of-life (EoL) and are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer, cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Android Versions
|
||||
|
||||
It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any user apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
|
||||
|
||||
## Android Permissions
|
||||
|
||||
[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant users control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All user installed apps are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore there is no need to install any antivirus apps. The savings you make from not purchasing or subscribing to security apps is better spent on paying for a supported device in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about, consider using a user or work [profile](android/#android-security-privacy).
|
||||
|
||||
## Advanced Protection Program
|
||||
|
||||
If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Program](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/). It is available at no cost to anyone with two or more hardware security keys with [FIDO](/security/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) support.
|
||||
|
||||
The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
|
||||
|
||||
- Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](/security/multi-factor-authentication/#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](/security/multi-factor-authentication/#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](/security/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp), and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
|
||||
- Only Google and verified third party apps can access account data
|
||||
- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
|
||||
- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
|
||||
- Stricter recovery process for accounts with lost credentials
|
||||
|
||||
For users that are using the privileged Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
|
||||
|
||||
- Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
|
||||
- Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
|
||||
- Warning the user about unverified applications
|
||||
|
||||
## SafetyNet and Play Integrity API
|
||||
|
||||
[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) and the [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) are generally used for [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financal apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the `basicIntegrity` check, but not the certification check `ctsProfileMatch`. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.
|
||||
|
||||
As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
|
||||
|
||||
## Advertising ID
|
||||
|
||||
All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
|
||||
|
||||
On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to ⚙️ Settings → Apps → Sandboxed Google Play → Google Settings → Ads and select **Delete advertising ID**.
|
||||
|
||||
On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
|
||||
|
||||
- ⚙️ Settings → Google → Ads
|
||||
- ⚙️ Settings → Privacy → Ads
|
||||
|
||||
Depending on your system, you will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to "Opt out of interest-based ads". You should delete the advertising ID if you are given the option to, and if you are not, we recommend that you opt out of interested-based ads and then reset your advertising ID.
|
||||
36
docs/android/security.md
Normal file
36
docs/android/security.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Android Security and Privacy Features"
|
||||
icon: 'material/cellphone-lock'
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## User Profiles
|
||||
|
||||
Multiple user profiles (Settings → System → Multiple users) are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles you can limit a user from making calls, SMS or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles is a more secure method of isolation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Work Profile
|
||||
|
||||
[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.
|
||||
|
||||
A **device controller** such as [Shelter](#recommended-apps) is required, unless you're using CalyxOS which includes one.
|
||||
|
||||
The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. The user must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to the data inside of the work profile.
|
||||
|
||||
This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verified Boot
|
||||
|
||||
[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
|
||||
|
||||
Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption (FDE) to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based).
|
||||
|
||||
Each user's data is encrypted using their own unique encryption key, and the operating system files are left unencrypted. Verified Boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, Verified Boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon reboot of the device.
|
||||
|
||||
Unfortunately, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom Android Verified Boot (AVB) key enrollment on their devices. Some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support Verified Boot even on hardware with Verified Boot support for third party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support Verified Boot are **not** recommended.
|
||||
|
||||
## VPN Killswitch
|
||||
|
||||
Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in ⚙️ Settings → Network & internet → VPN → ⚙️ → Block connections without VPN.
|
||||
|
||||
## Global Toggles
|
||||
|
||||
Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling [Bluetooth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth) and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled.
|
||||
BIN
docs/assets/img/android/google-pixel.png
Normal file
BIN
docs/assets/img/android/google-pixel.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 53 KiB |
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "What are threat models?"
|
||||
title: "Threat Modeling"
|
||||
icon: 'material/target-account'
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
13
mkdocs.yml
13
mkdocs.yml
@ -104,13 +104,16 @@ extra_javascript:
|
||||
|
||||
nav:
|
||||
- Home: 'index.md'
|
||||
- 'Privacy Introduction':
|
||||
- 'threat-modeling.md'
|
||||
- 'Technology Basics':
|
||||
- 'Knowledge Base':
|
||||
- 'The Basics':
|
||||
- 'threat-modeling.md'
|
||||
- 'technology/dns.md'
|
||||
- 'Security Basics':
|
||||
- 'security/multi-factor-authentication.md'
|
||||
- 'Setup Guides':
|
||||
- 'Mobile Devices':
|
||||
- 'android/overview.md'
|
||||
- 'android/security.md'
|
||||
- 'android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.md'
|
||||
- 'Advanced':
|
||||
- 'setup/integrating-metadata-removal.md'
|
||||
- 'Recommendations':
|
||||
- 'tools.md'
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user