{ align=right }
-**Cryptomator** is an encryption solution designed for privately saving files to any cloud provider. It allows you to create vaults that are stored on a virtual drive, the contents of which are encrypted and synced with your cloud storage provider.
+**Cryptomator** is an encryption solution designed for privately saving files to any cloud [:material-server-network: Service Provider](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }, eliminating the need to trust that they won't access your files. It allows you to create vaults that are stored on a virtual drive, the contents of which are encrypted and synced with your cloud storage provider.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -48,6 +52,10 @@ Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.
### Picocrypt (File)
+
+
+- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+
{ align=right }
@@ -71,6 +79,10 @@ Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.
### VeraCrypt (Disk)
+
Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+
{ align=right }
@@ -102,6 +114,10 @@ Truecrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tru
## OS Full Disk Encryption
+Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+
For encrypting the drive your operating system boots from, we generally recommend enabling the encryption software that comes with your operating system rather than using a third-party tool. This is because your operating system's native encryption tools often make use of OS and hardware-specific features like the [secure cryptoprocessor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor) in your device to protect your computer against more advanced physical attacks. For secondary drives and external drives which you *don't* boot from, we still recommend using open-source tools like [VeraCrypt](#veracrypt-disk) over the tools below, because they offer additional flexibility and let you avoid vendor lock-in.
### BitLocker
@@ -226,6 +242,10 @@ cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/device --header-backup-file /mnt/backup/file.im
## Command-line
+Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+
Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script).
### Kryptor
@@ -272,6 +292,12 @@ Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](ht
## OpenPGP
+Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+
OpenPGP is sometimes needed for specific tasks such as digitally signing and encrypting email. PGP has many features and is [complex](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) as it has been around a long time. For tasks such as signing or encrypting files, we suggest the above options.
When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in your `gpg.conf` file. We recommend staying with the standard options specified in the [GnuPG user FAQ](https://gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf).
diff --git a/docs/file-sharing.md b/docs/file-sharing.md
index 9a8b94d9..60b3127d 100644
--- a/docs/file-sharing.md
+++ b/docs/file-sharing.md
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ icon: material/share-variant
description: Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online.
cover: file-sharing.webp
---
+Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+
Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online.
## File Sharing
@@ -38,7 +42,7 @@ ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE
{ align=right }
-**OnionShare** is an open-source tool that lets you securely and anonymously share a file of any size. It works by starting a web server accessible as a Tor onion service, with an unguessable URL that you can share with the recipients to download or send files.
+**OnionShare** is an open-source tool that lets you securely and [:material-incognito: anonymously](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } share a file of any size. It works by starting a web server accessible as a Tor onion service, with an unguessable URL that you can share with the recipients to download or send files.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionshare.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
@@ -56,6 +60,8 @@ ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE
+OnionShare provides the option to connect via [Tor bridges](https://docs.onionshare.org/2.6.2/en/tor.html#automatic-censorship-circumvention) to circumvent [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.
+
### Criteria
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
diff --git a/docs/language-tools.md b/docs/language-tools.md
index 500c0028..28b4e222 100644
--- a/docs/language-tools.md
+++ b/docs/language-tools.md
@@ -4,6 +4,13 @@ icon: material/alphabetical-variant
description: These language tools do not send your input text to a server and can be used offline and self-hosted.
cover: language-tools.webp
---
+
Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }
+- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }
+
Text inputted to grammar, spelling, and style checkers, as well as translation services, can contain sensitive information which may be stored on their servers for an indefinite amount of time. The language tools listed on this page do not send your submitted text to a server, and can be self-hosted and used offline for maximum control of your data.
## LanguageTool
diff --git a/docs/mobile-browsers.md b/docs/mobile-browsers.md
index 9a1e0e5c..cd6171d2 100644
--- a/docs/mobile-browsers.md
+++ b/docs/mobile-browsers.md
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ schema:
"@type": WebPage
url: "./"
---
+
Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+
These are our currently recommended **mobile web browsers** and configurations for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead.
## Android
diff --git a/docs/mobile-phones.md b/docs/mobile-phones.md
index b7bdc3e2..c8fcb807 100644
--- a/docs/mobile-phones.md
+++ b/docs/mobile-phones.md
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ schema:
"@type": Organization
name: Privacy Guides
---
+
Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+
Most **mobile phones** receive short or limited windows of security updates from OEMs; after these devices reach the end of their support period, they **cannot** be considered secure as they no longer receive firmware or driver security updates.
The mobile devices listed here provide a long lifespan of guaranteed security updates and allow you to install a custom operating system without violating the Android security model.
diff --git a/docs/multi-factor-authentication.md b/docs/multi-factor-authentication.md
index 6155ae93..da5ebb32 100644
--- a/docs/multi-factor-authentication.md
+++ b/docs/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
description: These tools assist you with securing your internet accounts with Multi-Factor Authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party.
cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
---
+
Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
Hardware Keys
diff --git a/docs/notebooks.md b/docs/notebooks.md
index 28246a4d..9a7058b1 100644
--- a/docs/notebooks.md
+++ b/docs/notebooks.md
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ icon: material/notebook-edit-outline
description: These encrypted note-taking apps let you keep track of your notes without giving them to a third-party.
cover: notebooks.webp
---
+
Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
Keep track of your notes and journalings without giving them to a third-party.
diff --git a/docs/os/ios-overview.md b/docs/os/ios-overview.md
index 2fdef159..14fe987a 100644
--- a/docs/os/ios-overview.md
+++ b/docs/os/ios-overview.md
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first
A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email-aliasing.md) just for these features alone.
-**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari.
+[**Private Relay**](https://apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/icloud-relay) is a proxy service which relays all of your Safari traffic, your DNS queries, and unencrypted traffic on your device through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic that's already encrypted.
**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support.
diff --git a/docs/passwords.md b/docs/passwords.md
index da619a1a..b33b1f48 100644
--- a/docs/passwords.md
+++ b/docs/passwords.md
@@ -131,6 +131,12 @@ schema:
"@type": WebPage
url: "./"
---
+
Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+
**Password managers** allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials with the use of a master password.
[Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./basics/passwords-overview.md)
diff --git a/docs/photo-management.md b/docs/photo-management.md
index fc709dbb..542b28f2 100644
--- a/docs/photo-management.md
+++ b/docs/photo-management.md
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@ icon: material/image
description: Photo management tools to keep your personal photos safe from the prying eyes of cloud storage providers and other unauthorized access.
cover: photo-management.webp
---
+
Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+
Most cloud **photo management solutions** like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon Photos don't secure your photos against being accessed by the cloud storage provider themselves. These options keep your personal photos private, while allowing you to share them only with family and trusted people.
## Ente Photos
diff --git a/docs/real-time-communication.md b/docs/real-time-communication.md
index 4bd1f966..cac9a74b 100644
--- a/docs/real-time-communication.md
+++ b/docs/real-time-communication.md
@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@ icon: material/chat-processing
description: Other instant messengers make all of your private conversations available to the company that runs them.
cover: real-time-communication.webp
---
+
Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }
+- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
These are our recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication**.
@@ -67,7 +73,7 @@ We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installati
{ align=right }
-**SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that is decentralized and doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations.
+**SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/stable/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -98,7 +104,7 @@ SimpleX Chat supports basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, and
{ align=right }
-**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
+**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
diff --git a/docs/security-keys.md b/docs/security-keys.md
index df1761a0..9a55bb25 100644
--- a/docs/security-keys.md
+++ b/docs/security-keys.md
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@ icon: 'material/key-chain'
description: These tools assist you with securing your internet accounts with Multi-Factor Authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party.
cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
---
+
Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+
A physical **security key** adds a very strong layer of protection to your online accounts. Compared to [authenticator apps](multi-factor-authentication.md), the FIDO2 security key protocol is immune to phishing, and cannot be compromised without physical possession of the key itself. Many services support FIDO2/WebAuthn as a multi-factor authentication option for securing your account, and some services allow you to use a security key as a strong single-factor authenticator with passwordless authentication.
## Yubico Security Key
diff --git a/docs/tools.md b/docs/tools.md
index 673afaa2..151677d9 100644
--- a/docs/tools.md
+++ b/docs/tools.md
@@ -37,6 +37,15 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
+
+
Threat Model Labels
+
+You may find any of the following icons on some of the recommendation pages:
:material-incognito: :material-target-account: :material-package-variant-closed-remove: :material-bug-outline: :material-server-network: :material-eye-outline: :material-account-cash: :material-account-search: :material-close-outline:
+
+We are testing a new feature that allows readers to better identify and understand the kinds of threats that privacy tools best defend against. Let us know what you think about this feature by replying to this dedicated forum [thread](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/implement-threat-model-labels/18659)!
+
+
+
## Private Web Browsers
diff --git a/docs/tor.md b/docs/tor.md
index fafc7272..81f7f0c5 100644
--- a/docs/tor.md
+++ b/docs/tor.md
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ schema:
"@type": WebPage
url: "./"
---
+Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }
+- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }
**Tor** is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool.
@@ -34,11 +39,11 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
-There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for anonymous browsing for desktop computers and Android.
+There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } browsing for desktop computers and Android.
Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
-If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
+If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against de-anonymization.
## Tor Browser
diff --git a/docs/vpn.md b/docs/vpn.md
index b8cbc74e..d86959c2 100644
--- a/docs/vpn.md
+++ b/docs/vpn.md
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ cover: vpn.webp
global:
- [randomize-element, "table tbody"]
---
-
+
Protects against the following threat(s):
+
+- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
If you're looking for additional *privacy* from your ISP, on a public Wi-Fi network, or while torrenting files, a **VPN** may be the solution for you.