diff --git a/.all-contributorsrc b/.all-contributorsrc index 148e8eca..8aded99a 100644 --- a/.all-contributorsrc +++ b/.all-contributorsrc @@ -236,6 +236,20 @@ "blog" ] }, + { + "login": "friadev", + "name": "fria", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/138676274?v=4", + "profile": "https://friadev.github.io/", + "contributions": [ + "doc", + "review", + "research", + "question", + "bug", + "ideas" + ] + }, { "login": "actions", "name": "GitHub Actions", @@ -245,6 +259,24 @@ "infra" ] }, + { + "login": "triplebit", + "name": "Triplebit", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/178061783?v=4", + "profile": "https://www.triplebit.org/", + "contributions": [ + "infra" + ] + }, + { + "login": "magicgrants", + "name": "MAGIC Grants", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/90805358?v=4", + "profile": "https://magicgrants.org/", + "contributions": [ + "business" + ] + }, { "login": "netlify", "name": "Netlify", @@ -428,7 +460,8 @@ "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/47955724?v=4", "profile": "https://github.com/taivlam", "contributions": [ - "doc" + "doc", + "maintenance" ] }, { @@ -621,7 +654,12 @@ "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/30749146?v=4", "profile": "https://github.com/razac-elda", "contributions": [ - "doc" + "doc", + "bug", + "financial", + "promotion", + "question", + "translation" ] }, { @@ -2854,6 +2892,100 @@ "contributions": [ "doc" ] + }, + { + "login": "IDON-TEXIST", + "name": "IDON-TEXIST", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/73442356?v=4", + "profile": "https://github.com/IDON-TEXIST", + "contributions": [ + "doc" + ] + }, + { + "login": "yusuf-daglioglu", + "name": "Yusuf Daglioglu", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/90555550?v=4", + "profile": "https://github.com/yusuf-daglioglu", + "contributions": [ + "doc" + ] + }, + { + "login": "yikerman", + "name": "Yi Cao", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/32544798?v=4", + "profile": "https://ycao.net/", + "contributions": [ + "doc" + ] + }, + { + "login": "sdhlfqr", + "name": "Sayf Dhū al-Faqār", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/155405590?v=4", + "profile": "https://github.com/sdhlfqr", + "contributions": [ + "doc" + ] + }, + { + "login": "eylenburg", + "name": "eylenburg", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/84839316?v=4", + "profile": "https://github.com/eylenburg", + "contributions": [ + "doc" + ] + }, + { + "login": "PASSK3YS", + "name": "Kieran Colfer", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/54213179?v=4", + "profile": "https://github.com/PASSK3YS", + "contributions": [ + "doc" + ] + }, + { + "login": "SamsungGalaxyPlayer", + "name": "Justin Ehrenhofer", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/12520755?v=4", + "profile": "https://github.com/SamsungGalaxyPlayer", + "contributions": [ + "doc", + "business", + "fundingFinding" + ] + }, + { + "login": "bruch-alex", + "name": "Alex Bruch", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/173354246?v=4", + "profile": "https://github.com/bruch-alex", + "contributions": [ + "translation" + ] + }, + { + "login": "qiyongzheng", + "name": "qiyongzheng", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/153378707?v=4", + "profile": "https://github.com/qiyongzheng", + "contributions": [ + "doc" + ] + }, + { + "login": "hashcatHitman", + "name": "Sam K", + "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/155700084?v=4", + "profile": "https://github.com/hashcatHitman", + "contributions": [ + "doc", + "promotion", + "question" + ] } ], "contributorsPerLine": 5, diff --git a/.github/CODEOWNERS b/.github/CODEOWNERS index a33266aa..cd2ffc0e 100644 --- a/.github/CODEOWNERS +++ b/.github/CODEOWNERS @@ -1,15 +1,66 @@ -# High-traffic pages -/docs/index.md @jonaharagon @dngray -/theme/overrides/ @jonaharagon - # Org + /docs/about/ @jonaharagon CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md @jonaharagon -CITATION.cff -LICENSE @jonaharagon +CITATION.cff @jonaharagon +LICENSE @jonaharagon @dngray +LICENSE-CODE @jonaharagon README.md @jonaharagon @dngray +# Config + +/mkdocs.yml @jonaharagon +/mkdocs.blog.yml @jonaharagon +/crowdin.yml @jonaharagon +/includes/ @jonaharagon + # Ops + +Dockerfile @jonaharagon /Pipfile @jonaharagon /Pipfile.lock @jonaharagon /.github/ @jonaharagon +/run.sh @jonaharagon +/modules/ @jonaharagon + +# High-traffic pages + +/blog/index.md @jonaharagon @freddy-m +/docs/index.md @jonaharagon @dngray +/theme/home.html @jonaharagon @dngray +/theme/main.html @jonaharagon +/theme/blog-post.html @jonaharagon +/theme/partials/ @jonaharagon +/theme/layouts/ @jonaharagon + +# Financial-Related + +/docs/about/donate.md @jonaharagon @SamsungGalaxyPlayer +/docs/cryptocurrency.md @jonaharagon @SamsungGalaxyPlayer +/docs/financial-services.md @jonaharagon @SamsungGalaxyPlayer +/docs/advanced/payments.md @jonaharagon @SamsungGalaxyPlayer + +# Blog authors + +/blog/.authors.yml @jonaharagon @dngray @freddy-m +/blog/author/ @jonaharagon @dngray @freddy-m +/blog/author/dngray.md @dngray +/blog/author/freddy.md @freddy-m +/blog/author/jonah.md @jonaharagon +/blog/author/niek-de-wilde.md @blacklight447 + +# Blog posts + +/blog/posts/ @jonaharagon +/blog/posts/firefox-privacy-2021-update.md @dngray +/blog/posts/firefox-privacy.md @jonaharagon +/blog/posts/hide-nothing.md @freddy-m +/blog/posts/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates.md @jonaharagon +/blog/posts/move-fast-and-break-things.md @freddy-m +/blog/posts/mozilla-disappoints-us-yet-again-2.md @jonaharagon +/blog/posts/privacy-guides-partners-with-magic-grants-501-c-3.md @jonaharagon +/blog/posts/proton-wallet-review.md @jonaharagon +/blog/posts/restrict-act.md @jonaharagon +/blog/posts/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites.md @jonaharagon +/blog/posts/virtual-insanity.md @freddy-m +/blog/posts/welcome-to-privacy-guides.md @jonaharagon diff --git a/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md b/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md index 27427119..fc13e665 100644 --- a/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md +++ b/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md @@ -1,29 +1,14 @@ -Changes proposed in this PR: +List of changes proposed in this PR: - - - - - - -- [ ] I agree to the terms listed below: -
Contribution terms (click to expand) - 1) I am the sole author of this work. - 2) I agree to grant Privacy Guides a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, transferable, royalty-free, irrevocable license with the right to sublicense such rights through multiple tiers of sublicensees, to reproduce, modify, display, perform, relicense, and distribute my contribution as part of this project. - 3) I have disclosed any relevant conflicts of interest in my post. - 4) I agree to the Community Code of Conduct. -
- - diff --git a/.github/dependabot.yml b/.github/dependabot.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 8a1ee6c8..00000000 --- a/.github/dependabot.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -# Copyright (c) 2021-2023 Jonah Aragon - -# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy -# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to -# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the -# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or -# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is -# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: - -# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in -# all copies or substantial portions of the Software. - -# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR -# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, -# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE -# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER -# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING -# FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS -# IN THE SOFTWARE. - -version: 2 - -registries: - github-privacyguides: - type: git - url: https://github.com - username: x-access-token - password: ${{secrets.REPO_PAT}} - -updates: - # Maintain dependencies for GitHub Actions - - package-ecosystem: "github-actions" - directory: "/" - schedule: - interval: "monthly" - assignees: - - "jonaharagon" - reviewers: - - "jonaharagon" - labels: - - "fix:github_actions" - - # Maintain submodules - - package-ecosystem: "gitsubmodule" - directory: "/" - registries: - - github-privacyguides - schedule: - interval: "monthly" - labels: - - "fix:submodules" - - - package-ecosystem: "devcontainers" - directory: "/" - schedule: - interval: weekly - - - package-ecosystem: "docker" - directory: "/" - schedule: - interval: weekly -# Disabled because some updates tend to remove needed dependencies for some reason - -# # Maintain dependencies for pipenv -# - package-ecosystem: "pip" -# directory: "/" -# insecure-external-code-execution: allow -# registries: -# - github-privacyguides -# schedule: -# interval: "daily" -# assignees: -# - "jonaharagon" -# reviewers: -# - "jonaharagon" -# labels: -# - "fix:python" diff --git a/.github/workflows/build-blog.yml b/.github/workflows/build-blog.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5d39e790 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/build-blog.yml @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +name: 🛠️ Build Blog + +on: + workflow_call: + inputs: + ref: + required: true + type: string + repo: + required: true + type: string + context: + type: string + default: deploy-preview + continue-on-error: + type: boolean + default: true + privileged: + type: boolean + default: true + +permissions: + contents: read + +jobs: + build: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + continue-on-error: ${{ inputs.continue-on-error }} + permissions: + contents: read + + steps: + - name: Add GitHub Token to Environment + run: | + echo "GH_TOKEN=${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" + + - name: Download Repository + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + with: + repository: ${{ inputs.repo }} + ref: ${{ inputs.ref }} + persist-credentials: "false" + fetch-depth: 0 + + - name: Download Submodules + uses: actions/download-artifact@v4 + with: + pattern: repo-* + path: modules + + - name: Move mkdocs-material-insiders to mkdocs-material + if: inputs.privileged + run: | + rmdir modules/mkdocs-material + mv modules/repo-mkdocs-material-insiders modules/mkdocs-material + + - name: Move brand submodule to theme/assets/brand + run: | + rmdir theme/assets/brand + mv modules/repo-brand theme/assets/brand + + - name: Install Python (pipenv) + if: inputs.privileged + uses: actions/setup-python@v5 + with: + cache: "pipenv" + + - name: Install Python (no pipenv) + if: ${{ !inputs.privileged }} + uses: actions/setup-python@v5 + + - name: Install Python Dependencies + if: inputs.privileged + run: | + pip install pipenv + pipenv install + sudo apt install pngquant + + - name: Install Python Dependencies (Unprivileged) + if: ${{ !inputs.privileged }} + run: | + pip install mkdocs-material mkdocs-rss-plugin mkdocs-glightbox mkdocs-macros-plugin + sudo apt install pngquant + + - name: Build Website (Privileged) + if: inputs.privileged + run: | + pipenv run mkdocs build --config-file mkdocs.blog.yml + + - name: Build Website (Unprivileged) + if: ${{ !inputs.privileged }} + run: | + BUILD_INSIDERS=false mkdocs build --config-file mkdocs.blog.yml + + - name: Package Website + run: | + tar -czf site-build-blog.tar.gz site + + - name: Upload Site + uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 + with: + name: site-build-blog.tar.gz + path: site-build-blog.tar.gz + retention-days: 1 diff --git a/.github/workflows/build-container.yml b/.github/workflows/build-container.yml index d7b87dc5..ebc1db61 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/build-container.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/build-container.yml @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ jobs: # It uses the `context` parameter to define the build's context as the set of files located in the specified path. For more information, see "[Usage](https://github.com/docker/build-push-action#usage)" in the README of the `docker/build-push-action` repository. # It uses the `tags` and `labels` parameters to tag and label the image with the output from the "meta" step. - name: Build and push Docker image - uses: docker/build-push-action@v6.5.0 + uses: docker/build-push-action@v6.9.0 with: context: . push: true diff --git a/.github/workflows/build-pr.yml b/.github/workflows/build-pr.yml index 8d8242b0..02c52f10 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/build-pr.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/build-pr.yml @@ -19,12 +19,19 @@ jobs: env: ACTIONS_SSH_KEY: ${{ secrets.ACTIONS_SSH_KEY }} steps: + - name: Save PR metadata + run: | + mkdir -p ./metadata + echo ${{ github.event.number }} > ./metadata/NR + echo ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} > ./metadata/SHA + - name: Set submodules for fork if: env.ACTIONS_SSH_KEY == '' id: submodules-fork run: | echo 'submodules={"repo":["brand","i18n"]}' >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" echo "privileged=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + echo "false" > ./metadata/PRIVILEGED - name: Set submodules for main repo if: env.ACTIONS_SSH_KEY != '' @@ -32,12 +39,7 @@ jobs: run: | echo 'submodules={"repo":["brand","i18n","mkdocs-material-insiders"]}' >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" echo "privileged=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - - - name: Save PR metadata - run: | - mkdir -p ./metadata - echo ${{ github.event.number }} > ./metadata/NR - echo ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} > ./metadata/SHA + echo "true" > ./metadata/PRIVILEGED - name: Upload metadata as artifact uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 @@ -70,6 +72,8 @@ jobs: continue-on-error: false privileged: ${{ fromJSON(needs.metadata.outputs.privileged) }} strict: true + secrets: + RO_DISCOURSE_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.RO_DISCOURSE_API_KEY }} build_i18n: if: ${{ contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'ci:build i18n') }} @@ -87,12 +91,34 @@ jobs: privileged: ${{ fromJSON(needs.metadata.outputs.privileged) }} strict: true + build_blog: + if: ${{ contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'ci:build blog') }} + needs: [submodule, metadata] + uses: ./.github/workflows/build-blog.yml + with: + ref: ${{github.event.pull_request.head.ref}} + repo: ${{github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name}} + continue-on-error: true + privileged: ${{ fromJSON(needs.metadata.outputs.privileged) }} + + build_videos: + if: ${{ contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'ci:build videos') }} + needs: [submodule, metadata] + uses: ./.github/workflows/build-videos.yml + with: + ref: ${{github.event.pull_request.head.ref}} + repo: ${{github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name}} + continue-on-error: true + privileged: ${{ fromJSON(needs.metadata.outputs.privileged) }} + combine_build: - needs: [build_english, build_i18n] + needs: [build_english, build_i18n, build_blog, build_videos] if: | (always() && !cancelled() && !failure()) && needs.build_english.result == 'success' && - (needs.build_i18n.result == 'success' || needs.build_i18n.result == 'skipped') + (needs.build_i18n.result == 'success' || needs.build_i18n.result == 'skipped') && + (needs.build_blog.result == 'success' || needs.build_blog.result == 'skipped') && + (needs.build_videos.result == 'success' || needs.build_videos.result == 'skipped') runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: @@ -114,5 +140,5 @@ jobs: cleanup: if: ${{ always() }} - needs: [build_english, build_i18n] + needs: [build_english, build_i18n, build_blog, build_videos] uses: privacyguides/.github/.github/workflows/cleanup.yml@main diff --git a/.github/workflows/build-videos.yml b/.github/workflows/build-videos.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e8764fec --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/build-videos.yml @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +name: 🛠️ Build Videos + +on: + workflow_call: + inputs: + ref: + required: true + type: string + repo: + required: true + type: string + context: + type: string + default: deploy-preview + continue-on-error: + type: boolean + default: true + privileged: + type: boolean + default: true + +permissions: + contents: read + +jobs: + build: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + continue-on-error: ${{ inputs.continue-on-error }} + permissions: + contents: read + + steps: + - name: Add GitHub Token to Environment + run: | + echo "GH_TOKEN=${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" + + - name: Download Repository + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + with: + repository: ${{ inputs.repo }} + ref: ${{ inputs.ref }} + persist-credentials: "false" + fetch-depth: 0 + + - name: Download Submodules + uses: actions/download-artifact@v4 + with: + pattern: repo-* + path: modules + + - name: Move mkdocs-material-insiders to mkdocs-material + if: inputs.privileged + run: | + rmdir modules/mkdocs-material + mv modules/repo-mkdocs-material-insiders modules/mkdocs-material + + - name: Move brand submodule to theme/assets/brand + run: | + rmdir theme/assets/brand + mv modules/repo-brand theme/assets/brand + + - name: Install Python (pipenv) + if: inputs.privileged + uses: actions/setup-python@v5 + with: + cache: "pipenv" + + - name: Install Python (no pipenv) + if: ${{ !inputs.privileged }} + uses: actions/setup-python@v5 + + - name: Install Python Dependencies + if: inputs.privileged + run: | + pip install pipenv + pipenv install + sudo apt install pngquant + + - name: Install Python Dependencies (Unprivileged) + if: ${{ !inputs.privileged }} + run: | + pip install mkdocs-material mkdocs-rss-plugin mkdocs-glightbox mkdocs-macros-plugin + sudo apt install pngquant + + - name: Build Website (Privileged) + if: inputs.privileged + run: | + pipenv run mkdocs build --config-file mkdocs.videos.yml + + - name: Build Website (Unprivileged) + if: ${{ !inputs.privileged }} + run: | + BUILD_INSIDERS=false mkdocs build --config-file mkdocs.videos.yml + + - name: Package Website + run: | + tar -czf site-build-videos.tar.gz site + + - name: Upload Site + uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 + with: + name: site-build-videos.tar.gz + path: site-build-videos.tar.gz + retention-days: 1 diff --git a/.github/workflows/build.yml b/.github/workflows/build.yml index e8e2a4df..9468eca8 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/build.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/build.yml @@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ on: strict: type: boolean default: false + cache: + type: boolean + default: true + secrets: + RO_DISCOURSE_API_KEY: + required: false permissions: contents: read @@ -57,6 +63,12 @@ jobs: echo "BUILD_INSIDERS=true" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" echo "EXTRA_FLAGS=""$EXTRA_FLAGS" --insiders"" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" + - name: Set Metadata for International Builds + if: inputs.lang != 'en' + run: | + echo "GITREVISIONDATE=false" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" + echo "GITAUTHORS=false" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" + - name: Set Metadata for Offline Mode if: inputs.config == 'offline' run: | @@ -111,8 +123,9 @@ jobs: uses: actions/setup-python@v5 - name: Restore Privacy Plugin Cache - uses: actions/cache/restore@v4.0.2 + uses: actions/cache/restore@v4 id: privacy_cache_restore + if: inputs.cache with: key: privacy-cache-${{ inputs.repo }}-${{ hashfiles('.cache/plugin/privacy/**') }} path: | @@ -123,8 +136,9 @@ jobs: privacy-cache- - name: Restore Social Plugin Cache - uses: actions/cache/restore@v4.0.2 + uses: actions/cache/restore@v4 id: social_cache_restore + if: inputs.cache with: key: social-cache-${{ inputs.repo }}-${{ inputs.lang }}-${{ hashfiles('.cache/plugin/social/manifest.json') }} path: | @@ -135,8 +149,9 @@ jobs: social-cache-privacyguides/privacyguides.org-${{ inputs.lang }}- - name: Restore Optimize Plugin Cache - uses: actions/cache/restore@v4.0.2 + uses: actions/cache/restore@v4 id: optimize_cache_restore + if: inputs.cache with: key: optimize-cache-${{ inputs.repo }}-${{ hashfiles('.cache/plugin/optimize/manifest.json') }} path: | @@ -160,17 +175,43 @@ jobs: sudo apt install pngquant echo "EXTRA_FLAGS=""$EXTRA_FLAGS" --cmd=mkdocs"" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" + - name: Generate Donating Members List + continue-on-error: true + env: + DISCOURSE_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.RO_DISCOURSE_API_KEY }} + run: | + pip install requests + python generate-members.py > includes/members.md + - name: Build Website run: | eval ./run.sh --build --lang=${{ inputs.lang }} "$EXTRA_FLAGS" + - name: Run generate-topics.sh for top posts + if: inputs.lang == 'en' + run: | + bash generate-topics.sh \ + --source='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/top.json?period=weekly' \ + --tag="top posts" \ + --destination="./site/en/index.html" \ + --count=3 + + - name: Run generate-topics.sh for latest posts + if: inputs.lang == 'en' + run: | + bash generate-topics.sh \ + --source='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest.json' \ + --tag="latest posts" \ + --destination="./site/en/index.html" \ + --count=12 + - name: Package Website run: | tar -czf site-${{ inputs.config }}-${{ inputs.lang }}.tar.gz site - name: Find Privacy Plugin Cache - uses: actions/cache/restore@v4.0.2 - if: steps.privacy_cache_restore.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' + uses: actions/cache/restore@v4 + if: steps.privacy_cache_restore.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' && inputs.cache id: privacy_cache_test with: key: privacy-cache-privacyguides/privacyguides.org-${{ hashfiles('.cache/plugin/privacy/**') }} @@ -179,8 +220,8 @@ jobs: .cache/plugin/privacy - name: Find Social Plugin Cache - uses: actions/cache/restore@v4.0.2 - if: steps.social_cache_restore.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' + uses: actions/cache/restore@v4 + if: steps.social_cache_restore.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' && inputs.cache id: social_cache_test with: key: social-cache-privacyguides/privacyguides.org-${{ inputs.lang }}-${{ hashfiles('.cache/plugin/social/manifest.json') }} @@ -190,8 +231,8 @@ jobs: .cache/plugin/social/assets - name: Find Optimize Plugin Cache - uses: actions/cache/restore@v4.0.2 - if: steps.optimize_cache_restore.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' + uses: actions/cache/restore@v4 + if: steps.optimize_cache_restore.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' && inputs.cache id: optimize_cache_test with: key: optimize-cache-privacyguides/privacyguides.org-${{ hashfiles('.cache/plugin/optimize/manifest.json') }} @@ -200,15 +241,15 @@ jobs: .cache/plugin/optimize - name: Save Privacy Plugin Cache - uses: actions/cache/save@v4.0.2 - if: steps.privacy_cache_test.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' + uses: actions/cache/save@v4 + if: steps.privacy_cache_test.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' && inputs.cache with: key: privacy-cache-${{ inputs.repo }}-${{ hashfiles('.cache/plugin/privacy/**') }} path: .cache/plugin/privacy - name: Save Social Plugin Cache - uses: actions/cache/save@v4.0.2 - if: steps.social_cache_test.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' + uses: actions/cache/save@v4 + if: steps.social_cache_test.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' && inputs.cache with: key: social-cache-${{ inputs.repo }}-${{ inputs.lang }}-${{ hashfiles('.cache/plugin/social/manifest.json') }} path: | @@ -216,8 +257,8 @@ jobs: .cache/plugin/social/assets - name: Save Optimize Plugin Cache - uses: actions/cache/save@v4.0.2 - if: steps.optimize_cache_test.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' + uses: actions/cache/save@v4 + if: steps.optimize_cache_test.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' && inputs.cache with: key: optimize-cache-${{ inputs.repo }}-${{ hashfiles('.cache/plugin/optimize/manifest.json') }} path: .cache/plugin/optimize @@ -229,6 +270,14 @@ jobs: path: site-${{ inputs.config }}-${{ inputs.lang }}.tar.gz retention-days: 1 + - name: Upload members list + uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 + if: inputs.config == 'build' && inputs.lang == 'en' + with: + name: members.md + path: includes/members.md + retention-days: 1 + offline_package: if: inputs.config == 'offline' && inputs.lang == 'en' needs: build diff --git a/.github/workflows/publish-immediate.yml b/.github/workflows/publish-immediate.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a1f08cf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/publish-immediate.yml @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +# Copyright (c) 2021-2025 Jonah Aragon + +# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy +# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to +# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the +# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or +# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is +# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + +# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in +# all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR +# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, +# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER +# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING +# FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS +# IN THE SOFTWARE. + +name: 📦 Immediate Releases + +on: + workflow_dispatch: + push: + branches: + - "main" + paths: + - "blog/**" + - "videos/**" + +concurrency: + group: release-deployment + cancel-in-progress: false + +permissions: + contents: write + pages: write + id-token: write + deployments: write + +jobs: + submodule: + strategy: + matrix: + repo: [mkdocs-material-insiders, brand] + uses: privacyguides/.github/.github/workflows/download-repo.yml@main + with: + repo: ${{ matrix.repo }} + secrets: + ACTIONS_SSH_KEY: ${{ secrets.ACTIONS_SSH_KEY }} + + build_blog: + needs: submodule + permissions: + contents: read + uses: ./.github/workflows/build-blog.yml + with: + repo: ${{ github.repository }} + ref: ${{ github.ref }} + continue-on-error: false + + build_videos: + needs: submodule + permissions: + contents: read + uses: ./.github/workflows/build-videos.yml + with: + repo: ${{ github.repository }} + ref: ${{ github.ref }} + continue-on-error: false + + deploy: + needs: [build_blog, build_videos] + uses: privacyguides/webserver/.github/workflows/deploy-garage.yml@main + with: + environment: production + secrets: + PROD_GARAGE_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.PROD_GARAGE_KEY_ID }} + PROD_GARAGE_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.PROD_GARAGE_SECRET_KEY }} + + cleanup: + if: ${{ always() }} + needs: [build_blog, build_videos] + uses: privacyguides/.github/.github/workflows/cleanup.yml@main diff --git a/.github/workflows/publish-mirror.yml b/.github/workflows/publish-mirror.yml index 116ae80c..b5216fa1 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/publish-mirror.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/publish-mirror.yml @@ -51,14 +51,3 @@ jobs: with: source-repo: "git@github.com:privacyguides/privacyguides.org.git" destination-repo: "git@codeberg.org:privacyguides/privacyguides.org.git" - - sourcehut: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - name: Mirror to SourceHut - uses: wearerequired/git-mirror-action@v1 - env: - SSH_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.ACTIONS_SSH_KEY }} - with: - source-repo: "git@github.com:privacyguides/privacyguides.org.git" - destination-repo: "git@git.sr.ht:~jonaharagon/privacyguides.org" diff --git a/.github/workflows/publish-pr.yml b/.github/workflows/publish-pr.yml index 65f1a8ff..569b0c7b 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/publish-pr.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/publish-pr.yml @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ jobs: outputs: pr_number: ${{ steps.metadata.outputs.pr_number }} sha: ${{ steps.metadata.outputs.sha }} + privileged: ${{ steps.metadata.outputs.privileged }} steps: - name: Download Website Build Artifact @@ -86,8 +87,9 @@ jobs: unzip metadata.zip -d metadata echo "pr_number=$(cat metadata/NR)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" echo "sha=$(cat metadata/SHA)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + echo "privileged=$(cat metadata/PRIVILEGED)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - deploy: + deploy_netlify: needs: metadata permissions: contents: read @@ -99,15 +101,30 @@ jobs: secrets: NETLIFY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NETLIFY_TOKEN }} + deploy_garage: + needs: metadata + permissions: + contents: read + + uses: privacyguides/webserver/.github/workflows/deploy-garage-preview.yml@main + with: + alias: ${{ needs.metadata.outputs.pr_number }} + bucket: ${{ vars.PREVIEW_GARAGE_BUCKET }} + hostname: ${{ vars.PREVIEW_GARAGE_HOSTNAME }} + secrets: + PREVIEW_GARAGE_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.PREVIEW_GARAGE_KEY_ID }} + PREVIEW_GARAGE_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.PREVIEW_GARAGE_SECRET_KEY }} + comment: permissions: pull-requests: write - needs: [deploy, metadata] + needs: [deploy_garage, metadata] runs-on: ubuntu-latest env: - address: ${{ needs.deploy.outputs.address }} + address: ${{ needs.deploy_garage.outputs.address }} steps: - uses: thollander/actions-comment-pull-request@v2.5.0 + if: ${{ needs.metadata.outputs.privileged == 'true' }} with: pr_number: ${{ needs.metadata.outputs.pr_number }} message: | @@ -118,3 +135,18 @@ jobs: | Latest commit | ${{ needs.metadata.outputs.sha }} | | Preview | ${{ env.address }} | comment_tag: deployment + + - uses: thollander/actions-comment-pull-request@v2.5.0 + if: ${{ needs.metadata.outputs.privileged == 'false' }} + with: + pr_number: ${{ needs.metadata.outputs.pr_number }} + message: | + ### Your preview is ready! + + | Name | Link | + | :---: | ---- | + | Latest commit | ${{ needs.metadata.outputs.sha }} | + | Preview | ${{ env.address }} | + + Please note that this preview was built from an untrusted source, so it was not granted access to all mkdocs-material features. Maintainers should ensure this PR has been reviewed locally with a full build before merging. + comment_tag: deployment diff --git a/.github/workflows/publish-release.yml b/.github/workflows/publish-release.yml index d5c25113..066ac2b1 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/publish-release.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/publish-release.yml @@ -62,6 +62,29 @@ jobs: lang: ${{ matrix.lang }} context: production continue-on-error: false + cache: false + secrets: + RO_DISCOURSE_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.RO_DISCOURSE_API_KEY }} + + build_blog: + needs: submodule + permissions: + contents: read + uses: ./.github/workflows/build-blog.yml + with: + repo: ${{ github.repository }} + ref: ${{ github.ref }} + continue-on-error: false + + build_videos: + needs: submodule + permissions: + contents: read + uses: ./.github/workflows/build-videos.yml + with: + repo: ${{ github.repository }} + ref: ${{ github.ref }} + continue-on-error: false release: name: Create release notes @@ -84,12 +107,14 @@ jobs: makeLatest: true deploy: - needs: build + needs: [build, build_blog, build_videos] uses: privacyguides/webserver/.github/workflows/deploy-all.yml@main secrets: NETLIFY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NETLIFY_TOKEN }} PROD_MINIO_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.PROD_MINIO_KEY_ID }} PROD_MINIO_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.PROD_MINIO_SECRET_KEY }} + PROD_GARAGE_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.PROD_GARAGE_KEY_ID }} + PROD_GARAGE_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.PROD_GARAGE_SECRET_KEY }} CF_API_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CF_API_TOKEN }} CF_ACCOUNT_ID: ${{ secrets.CF_ACCOUNT_ID }} CLUSTER_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.CLUSTER_USERNAME }} @@ -99,5 +124,5 @@ jobs: cleanup: if: ${{ always() }} - needs: build + needs: [build, build_blog, build_videos] uses: privacyguides/.github/.github/workflows/cleanup.yml@main diff --git a/.github/workflows/test-lint.yml b/.github/workflows/test-lint.yml index affe2c37..07f57375 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/test-lint.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/test-lint.yml @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ jobs: - id: ml # You can override MegaLinter flavor used to have faster performances # More info at https://megalinter.io/flavors/ - uses: oxsecurity/megalinter/flavors/documentation@v7.13.0 + uses: oxsecurity/megalinter/flavors/documentation@v8.0.0 env: # All available variables are described in documentation # https://megalinter.io/configuration/ diff --git a/.github/workflows/update-discussions.yml b/.github/workflows/update-discussions.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3cfb99fa --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/update-discussions.yml @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +# Copyright (c) 2024 Jonah Aragon + +# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy +# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to +# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the +# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or +# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is +# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + +# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in +# all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR +# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, +# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER +# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING +# FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS +# IN THE SOFTWARE. + +name: 🔄 Update Discussions + +on: + workflow_dispatch: + schedule: + - cron: "*/30 * * * *" + +permissions: + contents: read + +jobs: + generate: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + permissions: + contents: read + environment: + name: production + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + with: + persist-credentials: "false" + fetch-depth: 1 + + - name: Create site/en directory + run: mkdir -p site/en + + - name: Update Discussions + uses: yakubique/minio-download@v1.1.1 + with: + endpoint: https://${{ vars.PROD_GARAGE_HOSTNAME }} + access_key: ${{ secrets.PROD_GARAGE_KEY_ID }} + secret_key: ${{ secrets.PROD_GARAGE_SECRET_KEY }} + bucket: ${{ vars.PROD_GARAGE_BUCKET }} + source: /en/index.html + target: ./site/en/ + + - name: Run generate-topics.sh for top posts + run: | + bash generate-topics.sh \ + --source='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/top.json?period=weekly' \ + --tag="top posts" \ + --destination="./site/en/index.html" \ + --count=3 + + - name: Run generate-topics.sh for latest posts + run: | + bash generate-topics.sh \ + --source='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest.json' \ + --tag="latest posts" \ + --destination="./site/en/index.html" \ + --count=12 + + - name: Upload modified index + uses: yakubique/minio-upload@v1.1.3 + with: + endpoint: https://${{ vars.PROD_GARAGE_HOSTNAME }} + access_key: ${{ secrets.PROD_GARAGE_KEY_ID }} + secret_key: ${{ secrets.PROD_GARAGE_SECRET_KEY }} + bucket: ${{ vars.PROD_GARAGE_BUCKET }} + source: ./site/en/index.html + target: /en/index.html diff --git a/.github/workflows/upload-crowdin.yml b/.github/workflows/upload-crowdin.yml index ed775054..49504a31 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/upload-crowdin.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/upload-crowdin.yml @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ jobs: uses: actions/checkout@v4 - name: crowdin action - uses: crowdin/github-action@v2.1.1 + uses: crowdin/github-action@v2.2.0 with: upload_sources: true upload_sources_args: "--auto-update --delete-obsolete" diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 9fdbda02..7cf59f16 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -23,3 +23,6 @@ node_modules .venv .env .mkdocs-insiders-* + +# Automatically generated +includes/members.md diff --git a/.mailmap b/.mailmap index 65aefd6f..145d381c 100644 --- a/.mailmap +++ b/.mailmap @@ -1,16 +1,22 @@ +# Please use this file to correct information in our git log. +# Format: Proper Name +# +# Privacy Guides Team Members +# =========================== Daniel Gray Daniel Gray <48640805+dngray@users.noreply.github.com> Daniel Gray Daniel Gray +Em <194856901+EmAtPrivacyGuides@users.noreply.github.com> +Freddy +Freddy +fria <138676274+friadev@users.noreply.github.com> Jonah Aragon Jonah Aragon Jonah Aragon -mfwmyfacewhen <94880365+mfwmyfacewhen@users.noreply.github.com> -mbananasynergy <> -mbananasynergy <107055883+matchboxbananasynergy@users.noreply.github.com> -rollsicecream <153316540+rollsicecream@users.noreply.github.com> -rollsicecream -Freddy -Freddy +Jordan Warne +Justin Ehrenhofer <12520755+SamsungGalaxyPlayer@users.noreply.github.com> +Mare Polaris <15004290+ph00lt0@users.noreply.github.com> Niek de Wilde Niek de Wilde +redoomed1 <161974310+redoomed1@users.noreply.github.com> diff --git a/.markdownlint.yml b/.markdownlint.yml index 08f062e0..4b5fcc62 100644 --- a/.markdownlint.yml +++ b/.markdownlint.yml @@ -27,4 +27,6 @@ code-block-style: false no-hard-tabs: true emphasis-style: style: "asterisk" -no-duplicate-header: false +no-trailing-punctuation: false +no-duplicate-heading: + siblings_only: true diff --git a/.vscode/extensions.json b/.vscode/extensions.json index 452e6030..95992a2b 100644 --- a/.vscode/extensions.json +++ b/.vscode/extensions.json @@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ "mikestead.dotenv", "redhat.vscode-yaml", "ecmel.vscode-html-css", - "yzhang.markdown-all-in-one" + "yzhang.markdown-all-in-one", + "valentjn.vscode-ltex", + "bierner.markdown-checkbox", + "bierner.markdown-emoji", + "bierner.markdown-footnotes", + "bierner.markdown-preview-github-styles", + "esbenp.prettier-vscode" ] } diff --git a/.vscode/ltex.dictionary.en-US.txt b/.vscode/ltex.dictionary.en-US.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a93eda8c --- /dev/null +++ b/.vscode/ltex.dictionary.en-US.txt @@ -0,0 +1,556 @@ +Kinect +Scanalytics +mmWave +TODO +MotionScore +GaitMetrics +Bayometric +eSIM +microSD +Cellebrite +GrapheneOS +Gboard +IMEs +Briar +Meshtastic +Gizmodo +Wickr +Gizmodo +Arel +CryptPad +itemprop +md-button +XWiki +CryptDrive +scrypt +Anytype +PeerTube +Startpage +PrivacyTools +FedResults +Brøgger +EasyOptOuts +Optery +DeleteMe +PeopleConnect +dFPI +Arkenfox +LocalCDN +fingerprintable +NeatURLs +ClearURLs +Bromite +GeckoView +Thorin-Oakenpants +customizability +DoH +DNSCrypt +eSNI +Mullvad +CalyxOS +microG +DejaVu +DroidGuard +NewPipe +WebView +linux-hardened +malloc +Malloc +ASLR +Grindr +USCCB +USCCB-owned +de-anonymize +MkDocs +privacyguides +balenaEtcher +img +thumbsup +KeePassXC +OnionShare +Exif +ExifTool +zsh +ImageOptim +SendTo +Handoff +Jailbreaking +Flatpaks +ChromeOS +Flatseal +dbus +XWayland +filesystem +Firejail +Whonix +seccomp +AppArmor +MicroOS +setuid +Bubblewrap +Krathalan +noatsecure +Seirdy +Podman +Kata +Wonderfall +Vaultwarden +LinuxServer +io +daemonless +gVisor +syscalls +Portmaster +OpenSnitch +firewalld +Netfilter +bypassable +sysctl +KickSecure +fepitre +QubesOS +COPR +GRSecurity +Kicksecure +umask +SUID +Umask +Qubes-Whonix +USBGuard +initramfs +dracut +BadUSB +chronyd +swdate +sysfs +cgroups +MathML +WebAuthn +BlockBlock +HELLOTUX +Véliz +Poitras +Anonym +ISRG +Orbot +Qubes +public‑interest +Warne +Pham +material-youtube +OpenCollective +Monero +CoinJoin +Banxa +@proton +CashApp +Samouri +Coinjoin +USDC +Stablecoins +stablecoins +IWAs +IWA +Beens +Techlore +whitehouse +ShredOS +del +OMEMO +reglock +nofollow +SecureDrop +Cwtch +OTF +SimpleX +noyb +darknet +Surfshark +ExpressVPN +PerfectPrivacy +IPVanish +CyberGhost +ibVPN +SurfShark +VPNArea +ThatOnePrivacySite +fluffily +Huxleyan +MPRs +INVISV +QUIC +Fastly +OHTTP +Appelbaum +md-button--primary +Niek +openpgp +material-github +Tweakers +fontawesome-brands-creative-commons +fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-by +fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-sa +Attribution-ShareAlike +ChatGPT +LLMs +OLMoE +MMLU-Pro +OpenLLM +GGUF +Llamafile +Ollama +cpp +fontawesome-brands-windows +simple-linux +LLaVA +fontawesome-solid-desktop +llamafiles +simple-torbrowser +simple-googleplay +eepsites +simple-firefoxbrowser +simple-googlechrome +fontawesome-brands-edge +scriptlet +Adguard +simple-appstore +Tuta +simple-flathub +Flathub +Cryptomator +Securitum +Tresorit +Computest +Peergos +InterPlanetary +IPFS +DocumentsProvider +Modmail +CipherTrace +Monero-only +Monerujo +CEX +RetoSwap +Haveno-Reto +Haveno +Guardarian +BeenVerified +CheckPeople +ClustrMaps +Dataveria +InfoTracer +PeekYou +PublicDataUSA +Radaris +USPhonebook +Whitepages +Grauer +simple-github +ExifEraser +permissionless +Accrescent +ExtendedXMP +IPTC +NoScript +cryptominers +non-proxied +Solana +PipeWire +Btrfs +openQA +NixOS +Toolbx +Nixpkgs +ProxyVM +deanonymized +qubes +Xen +pg-viridian +qube +KingsPawn +sysdiagnose +iMazing +keystore +Cleartext +DoT +DoQ +eu +NextDNS +RethinkDNS +dnscrypt-proxy +anycast +geo-steering +QNAME +PII +SimpleLogin +twemoji +addy +material-apple-ios +@addy +ProxyStore +@username +backported +FairEmail +Kontact +Mailvelope +NeoMutt +WKD +BitPay +paydirekt +Sofortüberweisung +YubiCloud +@mailbox +@secure +ActiveSync +non-Tuta +SOGo +Mailcow +OpenSMTPD +Rspamd +Mbox +JMAP +Hardenize +Subresource +cryptolib +cryptofs +siv-mode +cryptolib-swift +cryptomator-objc-cryptor +Picocrypt +VeraCrypt +TrueCrypt +cryptoprocessor +non-Bitlocker +FileVault +FDE +udiskie +Polkit +Kryptor +Minisign +Intevation +OpenKeychain +ffsend +FreedomBox +Syncthing +simple-freebsd +MySudo +Coincards +Redlib +ProxiTok +Yattee +eepsite +proxying +LibreTube +FramaTube +IVPN +Cromite +Adblock +EasyList +fontawesome-solid-ellipsis +adblock +LineageOS +NitroPhone +Nitrokey +Ente +Akregator +NewsFlash +Inoreader +Miniflux +NetNewsWire +Newsboat +Newsbeuter +Notesnook +Cryptee +Psono +KeePassX +KeePassDX +gopass +Pastebins +PrivateBin +ZeroBin +pastebin +pastebins +Stingle +PhotoPrism +UnifiedPush +simple-fdroid +Mollysocket +Olm +util-linux +uClibc +BusyBox +OPNsense +Netgate +pfSense +SearXNG +SearX +Yubico +PIV-compatibile +CCID +PIV +HOTP +YubiKeys +Nitrokeys +Obtainium +deanonymization +VpnService +torrenting +AntiTracker +VMess +DAITA +deanonymize +OTPs +SafetyNet +IDEMIA +backport +Silverblue +Šamalík +PKGBUILDs +PPAs +Linux-libre +Libre +ConfinedUsers +ZRAM +Linux-libre-based +Spectre +SWAPGS +DEs +NetworkManager +systemd-networkd +rpm-ostree-countme +countme +Hackintoshes +OCSP +XProtect +appVM +inter-qube +AppVM +vchan +qrexec +Qube +sys-net +sys-firewall +sys-proxyvm +sys-whonix +anon-whonix +ProxyVMs +NetVM +Rutkowska +AutoRun +PINs +OnTheHub +DevContainers +fullwidth +Fullwidth +OptiPNG +cwebp +Keyring +JustDeleteMe +NotPetya +EternalBlue +Technopolice +Datalogix +Cryptoprocessor +TPMs +Pluton +Buskill +BusKill +diceware +Diceware +geo-restrictions +ECH +dVPNs +dVPN +Pseudonymity +@Thorin-Oakenpants +DocumentsUI +CameraX +AFWall +AdAway +TrackerControl +loopback +Aptoide +APKPure +simple-gitlab +IzzyOnDroid +Gadgetbridge +tshark +systemd +systemd-resolved +EDNS +Chainalysis +BadExit +HSDir +deanonymizing +WebTunnel +Computerphile +namazso +HelloTux +wordmark +Bagnard +sublicensees +BurungHantu +privacytoolsIO +privacytools +trai +PrivacyGuides +@dngray +simple-youtube +simple-peertube +simple-bluesky +dngray +bsky +@freddy +Memoji +QuickType +Freeform +subprocessors +Schrems +Subprocessor +Subprocessors +Triplebit +Fediverse +Safing +YubiHSM +ykman +material-linux +yubico +material-microsoft-windows +HSMauth +PUK +TDES +ModHex +OATH-TOTPs +OATH-HOTP +OATH-HOTPs +MODHEX +HMAC-based +subkeys +subkey +keysize +Keygrip +tessera +Corbató +NordPass +Syncable +fontawesome-solid-glasses +CommonHealth +Euki +sympto-thermal +OsmAnd +Paaster +material-check-decagram +Bluesky +Codeberg +simple-codeberg +simple-reddit +fontawesome-brands-linkedin +simple-keepassxc +OnlyKey +fontawesome-solid-unlock-keyhole +KeeShare +KeePassium +MWEB +Cyd +Semiphemeral +Dangerzone diff --git a/.vscode/ltex.hiddenFalsePositives.en-US.txt b/.vscode/ltex.hiddenFalsePositives.en-US.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fb57fae9 --- /dev/null +++ b/.vscode/ltex.hiddenFalsePositives.en-US.txt @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QImage Credit: Yipeng Lu\\E$"} +{"rule":"CLOSE_SCRUTINY","sentence":"^\\QThis technology can work using only 2D footage and doesn't even require close proximity or high resolution sensors like other forms of biometrics.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QCompanies like TypingDNA claim to be able to identify users by how they type.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QImage Credit: Alireza Bilesan, Saeed Behzadipour, Teppei Tsujita, Shunsuke Komizunai, and Atsushi Konno\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QImage Credit: Yousef, R.N., Khalil, A.T., Samra, A.S. et al.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QImage Credit: clockit.io\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QExample of finger minutiae including forks (where one line splits into multiple lines), ends (where a line ends), islands (isolated dots), and inclosures (lines that split into two and then reconnect)\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QIllustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides | Photo: Jair Lázaro / Unsplash\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QIllustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides | Photo: Koshu Kunii / Unsplash\\E$"} +{"rule":"COMMA_COMPOUND_SENTENCE","sentence":"^\\QYou should also make sure your mobile plan is topped up and you have enough mobile data prior to the event.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QA good rule of thumb is that unless a post from GrapheneOS is specifically talking about GrapheneOS-specific, privacy-related functionality and not about other projects/software/etc., it is probably off-topic here.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QIn an interview with Gizmodo, Christopher Soghoian, Principal Technologist and Senior Policy Analyst at the American Civil Liberties Union said that, \"There are many Telegram users who think they are communicating in an end-to-end encrypted way, when they're not because they don't realize that they have to turn on an additional setting,\" he continued to say that while he's happy they offer the encryption, it's not useful if it's turned off.\\E$"} +{"rule":"ALL_MOST_SOME_OF_NOUN","sentence":"^\\QOpen source may be the most used phrase in all of privacy and security, and for good reason.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QIllustration: Jordan Warne / Privacy Guides | Photo: Christin Hume / Unsplash\\E$"} +{"rule":"EN_UNPAIRED_BRACKETS","sentence":"^\\QIf you need to erase this history for safety but keep the document, you can go to \"File\" > \"Make a copy\", then go back to the original document with the history you need to erase, click on \"Access\", then \"Destroy\", then click again on \"Are you sure?\".\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QWe reached out to System1 CEO Ian Weingarten for an explanation.\\E$"} +{"rule":"IF_THERE","sentence":"^\\QIn an interview with TechCrunch, Wire CEO Morten Brøgger said of privacy laws: “We are in Switzerland, which has the best privacy laws in the world” — it's subject to Europe's General Data Protection Regulation framework (GDPR) on top of its own local laws — “and Wire now belongs to a new group holding, but there no change in control.” sic\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\Qadvancedbackgroundchecks.com :white_check_mark: Removed :white_check_mark: Removed\nbeenverified.com :white_check_mark: Removed :warning: Found\ncheckpeople.com :white_check_mark: Removed :white_check_mark: Removed\nclustrmaps.com :white_check_mark: Removed :white_check_mark: Removed\ndataveria.com :white_check_mark: Removed :white_check_mark: Removed\ngladiknow.com :white_check_mark: Removed :white_check_mark: Removed\ninfotracer.com :white_check_mark: Removed :warning: Found\nintelius.com* :warning: Found :warning: Found\npeekyou.com* :warning: Found :warning: Found\npublicdatausa.com^1 :white_check_mark: Removed :white_check_mark: Removed\nradaris.com :white_check_mark: Removed :white_check_mark: Removed\nspokeo.com :white_check_mark: Removed ::white_check_mark: Removed\nthatsthem.com :white_check_mark: Removed :white_check_mark: Removed\nusphonebook.com :white_check_mark: Removed :white_check_mark: Removed\nspyfly.com :white_check_mark: Removed :white_check_mark: Removed\nRemaining Results 13% 23%\\E$"} +{"rule":"WHITESPACE_RULE","sentence":"^\\QPerson A Person B\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QCalyxOS uses the default AOSP Scudo Malloc, which is generally less effective.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QIllustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides | Photo: Aleksander Dumała / Pexels\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QDisable the option \"Anonymously report errors and usage statistics to balena.io\", then click \"OK\".\\E$"} +{"rule":"EN_UNPAIRED_BRACKETS","sentence":"^\\QThe button on the right is blue and labeled \"Flash!\".\\E$"} +{"rule":"PREPOSITION_VERB","sentence":"^\\QAdd a Receive action and set it to receive Images from Share Sheet\\E$"} +{"rule":"A_INFINITIVE","sentence":"^\\QWindows allows you to place files in a SendTo folder which then appear in the Send to context menu.\\E$"} +{"rule":"A_INFINITIVE","sentence":"^\\QRight-click a supported file and choose ExifTool.bat within the Send to context menu.\\E$"} +{"rule":"COMMA_COMPOUND_SENTENCE","sentence":"^\\QYour location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QOther technologies that were disabled include WebGL, MathML, Gamepad API, Web Audio API, RTCDataChannel, and SVG Fonts.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QOnion Browser is an open-source app created by Mike Tigas, who has worked closely with Tor Project in the past and was previously an investigative journalist at ProPublica (he is currently an advisor at the FTC).\\E$"} +{"rule":"MISSING_COMMA_AFTER_INTRODUCTORY_PHRASE","sentence":"^\\QBesides leaving it blank for the default, it comes with three built-in user agent strings you can choose from, or you can enter your own.\\E$"} +{"rule":"COMMA_COMPOUND_SENTENCE_2","sentence":"^\\QStartpage CEO Robert Beens discusses the investment from Privacy One / System1\nWhat is Startpage's relationship with Privacy One/System1 and what does this mean for my privacy protections?\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QSelect :material-dots-vertical: > Settings > Privacy\n Turn off Show Calls in Recents\\E$"} +{"rule":"COMMA_COMPOUND_SENTENCE","sentence":"^\\QWhile this change makes sense from the perspective of making it so you cannot \"hold a number hostage\" as long as you keep checking in, it is particularly important for people who've used disposable phone numbers to know this.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QPhoto: ev / Unsplash\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QEnter the-company formerly-known-as-Facebook's rival to the birdsite: Threads.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QThreads' naffness won't stop its success.\\E$"} +{"rule":"EXTREME_ADJECTIVES","sentence":"^\\QIt feels really good.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QSam is an elearning designer and privacy advocate interested in free (libre) software and how it can protect civil liberties.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QThis article was originally published on my personal blog at samhowell.uk, on February 15th, 2019.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\Q:japanese_goblin:{ .lg .middle } Kevin Pham\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\Q2022: ISO/IEC 27001:2013^1 Compliance Certification by TÜV Rheinland InterCert Kft\n2021: Penetration Testing by Computest\nThis review assessed the security of the Tresorit web client, Android app, Windows app, and associated infrastructure.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\Q2022: ISO/IEC 27001:2013^1 Compliance Certification by TÜV Rheinland InterCert Kft\n2021: Penetration Testing by Computest\nThis review assessed the security of the Tresorit web client, Android app, Windows app, and associated infrastructure.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QFirefox sends data about your Firefox version and language; device operating system and hardware configuration; memory, basic information about crashes and errors; outcome of automated processes like updates, safebrowsing, and activation to us.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QNewPipe is a free and open-source Android application for YouTube, SoundCloud, media.ccc.de, Bandcamp, and PeerTube (1).\\E$"} +{"rule":"ADD_AN_ADDITIONAL","sentence":"^\\QThis setting adds an additional Adblock Plus list that may increase the effectiveness of Cromite's content blocking.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QUncheck the autoupdate setting\\E$"} +{"rule":"CLEAN_UP","sentence":"^\\QIf your device supports it, you can use the Clean Up feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QTurn off AutoPlay: Enabled\nDisallow Autoplay for nonvolume devices: Enabled\nSet the default behavior for AutoRun: Enabled\nDefault AutoRun Behavior: Do not execute any AutoRun commands\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QLorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QNulla et euismod nulla.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QCurabitur feugiat, tortor non consequat finibus, justo purus auctor massa, nec semper lorem quam in massa.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QThe name of the Subreddit is r/PrivacyGuides or the Privacy Guides Subreddit.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QTurn off Remove the XML declaration\nx Turn on Remove metadata\nx Turn on Remove comments\nx Turn on Embedded raster images\nx Turn on Enable viewboxing\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QSource: plainlanguage.gov\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QKathy McGinty offers tongue-in-cheek instructions for bulking up your simple, direct sentences:\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QIn France, you can take a look at the Technopolice website maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QFIDO (Fast IDentity Online)\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QThe entropy per word in a diceware passphrase is calculated as log 2 ( WordsInList )\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QTo calculate the amount of possible passphrases, all we have to do is WordsInList WordsInPhrase\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QThey ultimately paid two companies (Chainalysis and Integra Fec) a combined $1.25 million to further develop tools to do so.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QWe also especially thank our dedicated community moderation team on Matrix and our forum: Austin Huang, namazso, hik, riley, and Valynor.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QPortions of this notice itself were adopted from opensource.guide on GitHub.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\Qr/redditrequest is Reddit's way of making sure communities have active moderators and is part of the Moderator Code of Conduct.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QIf you were removed as moderator from a Subreddit through Reddit request it is because your lack of response and lack of activity qualified the Subreddit for an r/redditrequest transfer.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QIf you were removed as moderator from a subreddit through Reddit request it is because your lack of response and lack of activity qualified the subreddit for an r/redditrequest transfer.\\E$"} +{"rule":"IN_OR_WITH_REGARDS_TO_OF","sentence":"^\\QRetaliation from any moderator with regards to removal requests is disallowed.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QPhoto: Dimmis Vart / Unsplash\\E$"} +{"rule":"SENT_START_CONJUNCTIVE_LINKING_ADVERB_COMMA","sentence":"^\\QFurther develop an individual story or line of coverage.\\E$"} +{"rule":"DOUBLE_PUNCTUATION","sentence":"^\\QOur readership is entitled to as much information as possible in order to judge the reliability of our sources themselves..\\E$"} +{"rule":"DOUBLE_PUNCTUATION","sentence":"^\\QOur contributors should always question the motives behind a source requesting anonymity..\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QIllustration: Em / Privacy Guides | Photo: Edward Eyer / Pexels\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QOn February 7th this year, Joseph Menn reported from the Washington Post that officials in the United Kingdom had contacted Apple to demand the company allows them to access data from any iCloud user worldwide.\\E$"} +{"rule":"DO_VBZ","sentence":"^\\QDoes Privacy Guides sell my personal information?\\E$"} +{"rule":"DO_VBZ","sentence":"^\\QDoes Privacy Guides use personal information for marketing purposes?\\E$"} +{"rule":"DO_VBZ","sentence":"^\\QWhere does Privacy Guides store data about me?\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QPrivacy Guides relies on the European Commission's standard contractual clauses for international transfers(SCCs) to legally transfer personal data out of the European Economic Area.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QIllustration: Jordan / Privacy Guides | Photo: Gowtham AGM / Unsplash\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QThunder was used specifically because it was difficult for Germans to pronounce, since the English \"th\" sound doesn't exist in German.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QAllan Scherr, a Ph.D. researcher at MIT, wanted more time for his detailed simulations.\\E$"} +{"rule":"MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US","sentence":"^\\QYou can test out passkeys at webauthn.io.\\E$"} diff --git a/.vscode/settings.json b/.vscode/settings.json index c976c71a..3aa44cac 100644 --- a/.vscode/settings.json +++ b/.vscode/settings.json @@ -20,7 +20,75 @@ { "git.ignoreLimitWarning": true, - "ltex.diagnosticSeverity": "hint", + "ltex.diagnosticSeverity": { + "COMMA_COMPOUND_SENTENCE": "information", + "COMMA_COMPOUND_SENTENCE_2": "information", + "MORFOLOGIK_RULE_EN_US": "warning", + "HE_VERB_AGR": "hint", + "WHETHER": "hint", + "MAKE_SINCE": "information", + "CLOSE_SCRUTINY": "information", + "EN_COMPOUNDS": "warning", + "ADMIT_ENJOY_VB": "hint", + "ABOUT_WHO_TO": "warning", + "MISSING_GENITIVE": "hint", + "ENGLISH_WORD_REPEAT_BEGINNING_RULE": "hint", + "EN_UNPAIRED_BRACKETS": "warning", + "MISSING_ARTICLE": "warning", + "SENT_START_CONJUNCTIVE_LINKING_ADVERB_COMMA": "warning", + "CONDITIONAL_CLAUSE": "hint", + "DAMAGE_OF_TO": "hint", + "ETC_PERIOD": "warning", + "WHITESPACE_RULE": "hint", + "UPPERCASE_SENTENCE_START": "hint", + "LARGE_NUMBER_OF": "information", + "ENGLISH_WORD_REPEAT_RULE": "hint", + "SOME_OF_THE": "hint", + "IF_OF": "warning", + "THE_JJR_THE_MORE_COMMA": "warning", + "POSSESSIVE_APOSTROPHE": "hint", + "BY_DEFAULT_COMMA": "warning", + "ADVERB_WORD_ORDER": "hint", + "E_G": "warning", + "YOUR_RE": "warning", + "TOR_FOR": "hint", + "COMMA_PARENTHESIS_WHITESPACE": "hint", + "AGREEMENT_SENT_START": "hint", + "SETUP_VERB": "warning", + "MD_NO_VB": "warning", + "CLICK_HYPHEN": "information", + "NON3PRS_VERB": "hint", + "SENTENCE_WHITESPACE": "hint", + "BE_TO_VBG": "warning", + "I_NOT_JJ": "warning", + "PROFANITY": "hint", + "AD_ADD": "hint", + "THE_SUPERLATIVE": "hint", + "PLURAL_VERB_AFTER_THIS": "hint", + "LC_AFTER_PERIOD": "hint", + "PREPOSITION_VERB": "hint", + "OTHER_OTHERS": "hint", + "ON_THE_NOVEL": "hint", + "OUTSIDE_OF": "warning", + "UNLIKELY_OPENING_PUNCTUATION": "hint", + "SMALL_NUMBER_OF": "hint", + "A_UNCOUNTABLE": "information", + "AFFORD_VB": "hint", + "AN_INVITE": "hint", + "HAVE_PART_AGREEMENT": "hint", + "PHRASE_REPETITION": "hint", + "THIS_NNS_VB": "hint", + "NNS_IN_NNP_VBZ": "hint", + "APPLE_PRODUCTS": "warning", + "OVER_TIME": "hint", + "IN_THE_MOMENT": "hint", + "ARROWS": "hint", + "AUXILIARY_DO_WITH_INCORRECT_VERB_FORM": "hint", + "MISSING_COMMA_AFTER_YEAR": "hint", + "DO_VBZ": "hint", + "NOUN_AROUND_IT": "hint", + "default": "error" + }, "editor.unicodeHighlight.ambiguousCharacters": true, "editor.unicodeHighlight.invisibleCharacters": true, "editor.defaultFormatter": "DavidAnson.vscode-markdownlint", diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile index 39c666ba..d05c98d8 100644 --- a/Dockerfile +++ b/Dockerfile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -FROM python:3.12-alpine as base +FROM python:3.13-alpine as base LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org" diff --git a/Pipfile b/Pipfile index f54b7c23..bd8c8b1b 100644 --- a/Pipfile +++ b/Pipfile @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ 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"sha256:1e61c37477a1626458e36f7b1d82aa5c9b094fa4802892072e49de9c60c4c926", - "sha256:8abb2f1d86890a2dfb989f9a77cfcfd3e47c2a354b01111771326f8aa26e0254" + "sha256:4721f391ed90541fddacab5acf947aa0d3dc7d27b2e1e8eda2be8970586c3274", + "sha256:ff70335d468e7eb6ec65b95b99d3a2836546063f63acc5171de367e834932a81" ], "markers": "python_version >= '2.7' and python_version not in '3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3'", - "version": "==1.16.0" + "version": "==1.17.0" } } } diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 7f112360..36493a37 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ -

+

@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ - - + + @@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ **Privacy Guides** is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy. Our mission is to inform the public about the value of digital privacy, and global government initiatives which aim to monitor your online activity. We are a non-profit collective operated entirely by volunteer team members and contributors. Our website is free of advertisements and not affiliated with any of the listed providers. -The current list of team members can be found [here](https://www.privacyguides.org/about/#our-team). Additionally, [many people](#contributors) have made contributions to the project, and you can too! +The current list of team members can be found [here](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/#executive-committee). Additionally, [many people](#contributors) have made contributions to the project, and you can too! -*Featured on: [Tweakers](https://tweakers.net/reviews/10568/op-zoek-naar-privacyvriendelijke-tools-niek-de-wilde-van-privacy-guides.html), [The New York Times](https://nytimes.com/wirecutter/guides/online-security-social-media-privacy), and [Wired](https://wired.com/story/firefox-mozilla-2022)* +*Featured on: [Tweakers](https://tweakers.net/reviews/10568/op-zoek-naar-privacyvriendelijke-tools-niek-de-wilde-van-privacy-guides.html), [The New York Times](https://nytimes.com/wirecutter/guides/online-security-social-media-privacy), [Wired](https://wired.com/story/firefox-mozilla-2022), and [Fast Company](https://www.fastcompany.com/91167564/mozilla-wants-you-to-love-firefox-again).* ## Contributing @@ -189,409 +189,428 @@ Privacy Guides wouldn't be possible without these wonderful people ([emoji key](
matchboxbananasynergy
📖 🔬 🤔 👀 📝 +
fria
📖 👀 🔬 💬 🐛 🤔
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Triplebit
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🚇
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💵
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📖 + +
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📖 +
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📖 +
Tai Lam
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Victorhck
📖 -
Tai Lam
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👀 📖
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📖 + +
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efb4f5ff-1298-471a-8973-3d47447115dc
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📖 - -
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📖
Zenithium
📖 + +
Jordan Gwyn
📖
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📖
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📖 - -
Kcchouette
📖
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📖 -
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📖 -
Andrew Chong
📖 -
Wok
📖 +
Leonardo Mazzon
📖 🐛 💵 📣 💬 🌍 +
Andrew Chong
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Wok
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nopeitsnothing
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📖 + +
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noClaps
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📖 - -
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📖 💬
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📖 + +
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📖 - -
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ave
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📖 - -
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📖
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Rose
📖
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📖 - -
NylaTheWolf
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Mad Scientist
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📖 - -
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wylel
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📖 - -
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📖 + +
ZH王
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ansuz
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archeite
📖 - -
asdfghjz
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ayaen
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eagerto-learn
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📖 + +
elleybean
📖
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📖
pynixis
📖 - -
Seirdy
📖
Ryan Huang
📖 + +
Sascha P.
📖
Securified
📖
Sergey Musiyenko
📖 - -
Spydar007
📖
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📖 + +
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📖
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📖 📣 💬 diff --git a/blog/.authors.yml b/blog/.authors.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5ec14be5 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/.authors.yml @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +authors: + aprilfools: + name: Anita Key + description: Government Liaison + avatar: https://github.com/privacyguides.png + contributors: + type: Organization + name: Privacy Guides + description: Various Authors + avatar: https://github.com/privacyguides.png + danarel: + name: Dan Arel + description: Former Team Member + avatar: https://github.com/danarel.png + dngray: + name: Daniel Gray + description: Team Member + avatar: https://github.com/dngray.png + em: + name: Em + description: Staff Writer + avatar: https://github.com/EmAtPrivacyGuides.png + mastodon: + username: Em0nM4stodon + instance: infosec.exchange + kevpham: + name: Kevin Pham + description: News Intern + avatar: https://github.com/kpham42.png + freddy: + name: Freddy + description: Team Member + avatar: https://github.com/freddy-m.png + mastodon: + username: freddy + instance: social.lol + twitter: m00ws + bluesky: freddy.lol + fria: + name: fria + description: Team Member + avatar: https://github.com/friadev.png + jonah: + name: Jonah Aragon + description: Project Director + avatar: https://github.com/jonaharagon.png + mastodon: + username: jonah + instance: neat.computer + twitter: jonaharagon + bluesky: jonaharagon.com + kaitebay: + name: Kai Tebay + description: Former Team Member + avatar: https://github.com/kaitebay.png + matchboxbananasynergy: + name: mbananasynergy + description: Former Team Member + avatar: https://github.com/matchboxbananasynergy.png + mfwmyfacewhen: + name: mfwmyfacewhen + description: Former Team Member + avatar: https://github.com/ghost.png + natebartram: + name: Nate Bartram + description: Guest Contributor + avatar: https://gitlab.com/uploads/-/system/user/avatar/8993331/avatar.png + niek-de-wilde: + name: Niek de Wilde + description: Team Member + avatar: https://github.com/blacklight447.png + mastodon: + username: blacklight447 + instance: mastodon.social + sam-howell: + name: Sam Howell + description: Guest Contributor + avatar: https://gitlab.com/uploads/-/system/user/avatar/5349522/avatar.png diff --git a/blog/archive/2019.md b/blog/archive/2019.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..56f6f900 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/archive/2019.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# 2019 + +!!! danger "Old Content" + + These posts are 5 years old. They may not accurately reflect the current opinion of our team. diff --git a/blog/archive/2020.md b/blog/archive/2020.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..048bcefc --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/archive/2020.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# 2020 + +!!! danger "Old Content" + + These posts are 4 years old. They may not accurately reflect the current opinion of our team. diff --git a/blog/archive/2021.md b/blog/archive/2021.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..95f7633b --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/archive/2021.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# 2021 + +!!! danger "Old Content" + + These posts are 3 years old. They may not accurately reflect the current opinion of our team. diff --git a/blog/archive/2022.md b/blog/archive/2022.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..936d66a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/archive/2022.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# 2022 + +!!! danger "Old Content" + + These posts are 2 years old. 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b/blog/assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-9-reset-oath.webp differ diff --git a/blog/author/dngray.md b/blog/author/dngray.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..624fcabb --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/author/dngray.md @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# Daniel Gray + +![Profile picture](https://github.com/dngray.png){ align=right } + +**Daniel** is a founding team member of Privacy Guides and part of its [executive committee](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/#executive-committee). + +[:simple-mastodon: @dngray@mastodon.social](https://mastodon.social/@dngray "@dngray@mastodon.social"){ .md-button rel=me } +[:simple-bluesky: dngray.bsky.social](https://bsky.app/profile/dngray.bsky.social "@dngray.bsky.social"){ .md-button rel=me } diff --git a/blog/author/em.md b/blog/author/em.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a0f6ad2a --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/author/em.md @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +--- +description: Em is a full-time journalist at Privacy Guides. +schema: + - + "@context": https://schema.org + "@type": ProfilePage + dateCreated: "2025-02-03T19:00:00Z" + dateModified: "2024-02-03T19:00:00Z" + mainEntity: + - + "@context": https://schema.org + "@type": Person + name: Em + jobTitle: Staff Writer + description: Em is a full-time journalist at Privacy Guides. + url: https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/author/em/ + image: https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/assets/external/github.com/EmAtPrivacyGuides.png.jpg + sameAs: + - https://infosec.exchange/@Em0nM4stodon + - https://emontheinternet.me/ + - https://controlaltdelete.technology/ +--- + +# Em + +![Profile picture](https://github.com/EmAtPrivacyGuides.png){ align=right } + +[**Em**](https://emontheinternet.me/) is a full-time staff writer at *Privacy Guides*. She is a public‑interest technologist and researcher who has been working on various independent projects in data privacy, information security, and software engineering since 2018. + +Em is passionate about digital rights, privacy advocacy, solid security, and code for the public good. In her free time, you can find Em on Mastodon giving privacy tips or boosting photos of cats and moss. + +[:simple-mastodon: @Em0nM4stodon@infosec.exchange](https://infosec.exchange/@Em0nM4stodon "@Em0nM4stodon@infosec.exchange"){ .md-button rel=me } diff --git a/blog/author/freddy.md b/blog/author/freddy.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..42b77d89 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/author/freddy.md @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# Freddy + +![Profile picture](https://github.com/freddy-m.png){ align=right } + +[**Freddy**](https://freddy.lol) is a founding team member of Privacy Guides and part of its [executive committee](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/#executive-committee). He writes in American English reluctantly. + +[:simple-mastodon: @freddy@social.lol](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){ .md-button rel=me } +[:simple-bluesky: @freddy.lol](https://bsky.app/profile/freddy.lol "@freddy.lol"){ .md-button rel=me } diff --git a/blog/author/jonah.md b/blog/author/jonah.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..639faa41 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/author/jonah.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +--- +description: Jonah Aragon is the Project Director and staff writer at Privacy Guides. His role includes researching and writing for this website, system administration, creating Privacy Guides Online Learning course content, reviewing the products recommended here, and most other day-to-day tasks. +schema: + - + "@context": https://schema.org + "@type": ProfilePage + dateCreated: "2019-10-31T00:00:00Z" + dateModified: "2024-09-09T00:00:00Z" + mainEntity: + - + "@context": https://schema.org + "@type": Person + name: Jonah Aragon + jobTitle: Project Director + description: Jonah Aragon is the Project Director and staff writer at Privacy Guides. + url: https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/author/jonah/ + image: https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/assets/external/github.com/jonaharagon.png.jpg + sameAs: + - https://www.jonaharagon.com + - https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah + - https://shop.jonaharagon.com + - https://jonaharagon.me + - https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah + - https://www.youtube.com/@jonaharagon + - https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q117304062 +--- + +# Jonah Aragon + +![Profile picture](https://github.com/jonaharagon.png){ align=right } + +[**Jonah Aragon**](https://www.jonaharagon.com) is the Project Director and staff writer at *Privacy Guides*. His role includes researching and writing for this website, system administration, creating Privacy Guides Online Learning course content, reviewing the products recommended here, and most other day-to-day tasks. + +He is also known for his work on the Techlore YouTube channel, including the Techlore Talks podcast he co-hosts. + +[:simple-mastodon: @jonah@neat.computer](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah "@jonah@neat.computer"){ .md-button rel=me } +[:simple-bluesky: @jonaharagon.com](https://bsky.app/profile/jonaharagon.com "@jonaharagon.com"){ .md-button rel=me } diff --git a/blog/author/niek-de-wilde.md b/blog/author/niek-de-wilde.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cbddca89 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/author/niek-de-wilde.md @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +# Niek de Wilde + +![Profile picture](https://github.com/blacklight447.png){ align=right } + +**Niek** is a founding team member of Privacy Guides and part of the [executive committee](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/#executive-committee). His day-to-day concerns for Privacy Guides entail both research and outreach. + +[:simple-mastodon: @blacklight447@mastodon.social](https://mastodon.social/@blacklight447 "@blacklight447@mastodon.social"){ .md-button rel=me } diff --git a/blog/category/announcements.md b/blog/category/announcements.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca25553b --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/category/announcements.md @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +--- +description: The latest announcements and updates from the Privacy Guides team. +--- + +# Announcements + +Follow this page for the latest updates & announcements from the Privacy Guides team, and join the [announcements category](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/announcements/5) on our forum to discuss anything you read here! diff --git a/blog/category/news.md b/blog/category/news.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2275c4f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/category/news.md @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +--- +description: Privacy Guides News presents the latest tech news about the world's best (and occasionally worst) software, hardware, and services in the privacy world. +--- + +# News + +The latest tech news about the world's best (and occasionally worst) software, hardware, and services in the privacy world. *Privacy Guides News* has you covered for any important information you might need on your privacy journey. diff --git a/blog/category/reviews.md b/blog/category/reviews.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6125ff23 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/category/reviews.md @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +--- +description: Read the latest privacy product reviews and stories from Privacy Guides contributing writers. +--- + +# Reviews + +Looking for alternatives to privacy-invasive apps you use everyday? Do you just want to know all the details behind your favorite privacy tools? *Privacy Guides Reviews* is the place to find all that and more. This is your one stop to find the latest advice and recommendations on things we use every day directly from Privacy Guides contributors. diff --git a/blog/editorial.md b/blog/editorial.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c4c61bdf --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/editorial.md @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +--- +title: Editorial Policy +--- + +This page provides transparent information about Privacy Guides, its editorial process, and how Privacy Guides creates trustworthy news, articles, and reviews. + +Moreover, it is a part of Privacy Guides' commitment to [**The Trust Project**](https://thetrustproject.org/), "an international consortium of news organizations implementing transparency standards and working with technology platforms to affirm and amplify journalism’s commitment to transparency, accuracy, inclusion and fairness so that the public can make informed news choices." Privacy Guides is not currently a news partner of the program, but wholeheartedly supports its mission and values. + +## Coverage Priorities + +First and foremost, Privacy Guides is committed to publishing content related to the personal privacy and cybersecurity industry and communities. We firmly believe that privacy is a human right, which should not be intruded upon by any corporation, government, or other entity. + +To further our beliefs, Privacy Guides strives to create coverage that promotes the ideals of personal privacy and security in online spaces, encourages companies to engage in privacy-friendly behavior, and holds privacy and security invasive entities accountable for their actions. + +## Our Philosophy + +Privacy Guides strongly believes in independent information published by independent people with varying points of view. As an organization, we are firm proponents of freedom of speech, expression, and the press. Privacy Guides contributors are free to share their own opinions, even when they are controversial. Every opinion article is clearly labeled as such at the beginning of the news content. + +## Ethics Policy + +Privacy Guides' ethical code is based in our willingness to be accurate, fair, and complete, and for all of our writers to act with honesty, transparency, and independence. + +### Truth and Accuracy + +Privacy Guides contributors are expected to be as accurate as possible. Getting facts from reliable sources is the defining principle of journalism. Privacy Guides always strives to provide all the relevant facts available, ensure those facts have been verified, and generally hold ourselves to the highest standards of accuracy and truth. When we are unable to corroborate certain information, Privacy Guides always makes that clear to readers. + +### Independence + +Privacy Guides contributors must always be independent voices in the privacy community. Privacy Guides does not act on behalf of special interests, whether corporate, political, or cultural, and whether formally or informally. Independent fact-checking is always involved in the publication process. + +### Fairness and Impartiality + +Many stories have at least two sides. While we are not obligated to present every viewpoint in every article we publish, our stories are balanced and add context. Our impartial reporting is a significant part of why our community has trust and confidence in our work. + +### Humanity + +Privacy Guides contributors do no harm. We are aware of the impact of our words on the lives of others. Private persons have privacy rights that must be balanced against the public interest in reporting information about them. Our pursuit of the news is not a license for arrogance, and we will always treat the subject of any story with respect. + +### Accountability + +As professional and responsible journalists, we will always hold ourselves accountable for our work. Corrections are published when errors are discovered, and we always listen to the concerns of our audience. + +## Corrections Policy + +Privacy Guides believes in transparency and honesty. Therefore, we will correct mistakes promptly and ensure our readers are notified. In the online world of journalism, completeness and freshness of content are huge values, and we believe accuracy is equally essential. We will ensure expediency when making corrections as needed. + +When an error is detected in an article, Privacy Guides will immediately work to find the correct information, clearly display the correction within the affected article, and include the following: + +- The correct information. +- What was originally published that was incorrect. +- The severity of the error. +- The date when the change took place. + +When errors cannot be amended within the body of an article's content, corrections are displayed in the last paragraph of the content. Rather than remove completely the content containing a mistake, we provide clarification and admittance of our mistakes to preserve transparency. + +## Verification & Fact-Checking + +Privacy Guides prides itself on the validity of its content, and therefore does whatever it can to ensure that the information presented by its contributors is accurate. As a well-known global publication, Privacy Guides understands the importance of approaching claims with skepticism, thinking critically, and upholding accuracy in whatever way possible. + +Privacy Guides encourages its writers to keep the following considerations in mind before publishing content: + +- Always credit, acknowledge, and verify the source(s) of your information. +- Consider whether you know enough about the information to qualify as a trustable source yourself. +- Think critically when addressing claims. +- Never make assumptions. + +We trust the integrity of our contributors and the accuracy of content published on this website. In the case that a mistake is made, we understand the importance of admitting to them and working diligently to provide the correct information. We always encourage our readers, sources, and other contributors to provide us with feedback on any of our content. + +## Unnamed Sources Policy + +Privacy Guides will only use unnamed sources in our news reporting if: + +1. The material is informative, not opinion or speculation. +2. The material is vital to the news report. +3. The source is reliable, and in a position to have accurate information. +4. The information provided is not available except under conditions of anonymity imposed by the source. + +Privacy Guides will always identify sources whenever possible. Our readership is entitled to as much information as possible in order to judge the reliability of our sources themselves. + +: Privacy Guides' credibility is our most important asset. If our readers don't have faith that the stories they are reading here are accurate and fair, or if they suspect content within the stories we publish is fabricated, then we would lose that credibility. For our contributors to protect their own credibility, they must use every available avenue to confirm and attribute information before relying on unnamed sources. If the only way to publish a story is to use unnamed sources, our contributors owe it to our readership to identify the sources as clearly as possible without exposing the identity of the individual granted anonymity. + +Our contributors should always question the motives behind a source requesting anonymity. + +: Always keep your promises, but clarify conditions attached to any promise made in exchange for information beforehand. You must not take information from an anonymous support without the approval of our editorial team. We only use unnamed sources to tell important stories that would otherwise go unreported. + +The decision to use an unnamed source is not a decision made solely by the writer. To use an unnamed source, a contributor must have the written consent of a member of our editorial team: [Daniel](author/dngray.md), [Freddy](author/freddy.md), [Jonah](author/jonah.md), or [Niek](author/niek-de-wilde.md). + +Our editorial team will grant consent to the use of unnamed sources if the source is considered to be accurate and reliable, and if there is substantial justification for using the source's information without attribution. Privacy Guides should never be in the position of having to verify any factors within this policy after a story has been published. + +## Actionable Feedback + +Privacy Guides is committed to engaging with our readers and taking action based on their suggestions, complaints, and other feedback. + +Readers may help us develop an individual story or line of coverage, answer questions that a story may raise, identify related or under-covered issues, and teach us about new and diverse sources, experts, and perspectives. We believe that news organizations have a responsibility to engage with the public on the values, issues, and ideas of the times, and that news organizations have much to gain in return. In fact, actionable feedback may: + +- Further develop an individual story or line of coverage. +- Help answer questions that a story may raise. +- Help identify related questions or issues that the audience, including demographic segments of that audience, is discussing or are concerned about. +- Yield new and diverse sources and experts. + +**We strongly encourage our readers to participate in our community forum: ** + +Our staff contributors are also [listed](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/) alongside verified email links and other contact information, where you can ask them questions or report a complaint. Each article within our news section also clearly lists the author's byline, including contact and social media information when available. + +When necessary, we will make updates to our articles based on our readership's comments and feedback. + +We are proud of keeping this openness a top priority, in line with the nature of our community. diff --git a/blog/index.md b/blog/index.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3441e732 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/index.md @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +--- +description: Privacy-related news stories, product reviews, opinion pieces, and other important articles from Privacy Guides contributors. +hide: + - footer +--- + +# Latest Articles + +This is our home for privacy-related news stories, product reviews, opinion pieces, and other important articles. + +Unlike the rest of our website, these articles don't represent a consensus viewpoint of our community. Instead, they present the opinions of trusted authors within our community as-is. You may even find multiple articles on the same topic with competing viewpoints, intended to further [privacy discussion](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/). diff --git a/blog/posts/.meta.yml b/blog/posts/.meta.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40956123 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/.meta.yml @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +comments: true +social: + cards_layout: blog diff --git a/blog/posts/activists-guide-securing-your-smartphone.md b/blog/posts/activists-guide-securing-your-smartphone.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..17635027 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/activists-guide-securing-your-smartphone.md @@ -0,0 +1,317 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-01-23T19:15:00Z + updated: 2025-01-27T20:00:00Z +categories: + - Tutorials +authors: + - jonah +description: Your phone is an essential tool, but it also represents a huge risk to your privacy and security. Understanding these best practices when it comes to securing your smartphone will help keep you and your data safe. +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# The Protesters' Guide to Smartphone Security + +![Article cover photo showing a phone icon over a protest](../assets/images/activists-guide-securing-your-smartphone/cover.webp) + + + +For most protesters, activists, and journalists, your smartphone is an essential tool you depend on for organizing with your peers, accessing and distributing information, and helping others. It also represents a great risk, as a tool that is easily appropriated by authorities for targeted and mass surveillance. + +The perennial question when it comes to protests is whether you should bring your phone at all. If you leave your phone at home, that is probably the safest your data will get, and you will be at very low risk of being tracked by mass surveillance tools. On the other hand, your phone is a critical resource when it comes to coordinating with others, getting updates on the protest from social media, or simply documenting what is going on with your phone's camera. + +If possible, bringing a separate device like a "burner phone," an old phone you can reset, or even a regular old-fashioned camera is a much better option than bringing your primary phone. Any data you don't bring with you can't be taken from you at the scene. + +However, getting access to or affording devices like these aren't a realistic option for many people. Whether you decide to take your smartphone or a secondary smartphone with you to the event, this guide will cover how to maximize that device's security and minimize risks to your privacy. + +**Update (2025-01-27):** This article has been updated based on some community [feedback](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/24316), notably I added the [Burner Phones](#burner-phones), [Minimize Your Stored Data](#minimize-your-stored-data), [Use Public Wi-Fi](#use-public-wi-fi), and [Check Your Keyboard](#check-your-keyboard) sections. + +## Your Risks at a Protest + +There are plenty of risks you should consider if you use your smartphone at a protest. We are going to try and cover the following in this guide: + +1. Losing your device. + +2. Authorities confiscating your smartphone. + +3. Service disruption, either due to intentional interference by authorities or caused by networks being overloaded by large groups of people. + +4. Targeted surveillance: + - Disrupting your service. + - Blocking delivery of calls/SMS to your number. + - Monitoring your unencrypted traffic. + - Monitoring communications over local radios like walkie-talkies, etc. + +5. Mass surveillance: + - Interference with web services. Popular communication platforms like Twitter or TikTok could be throttled or blocked. + - Interference with messengers and voice services like Signal or WhatsApp. + - Authorities could use public Wi-Fi networks in the area to monitor traffic and identify nearby devices. + - Cell phone companies could provide records to authorities of devices near cell towers in the area to track and identify protesters. + +Like all of our guides, we are going to cover the general best practices and provide helpful tips, but your individual situation may be different. You should always research and plan according to what you specifically are doing, and if you need legal advice you should always consult a qualified and licensed attorney. + +## "Burner Phones" + +Cell phones are generally tracked by law enforcement using two identifiers: + +1. Your **IMSI**, which uniquely identifies your SIM card +2. Your **IMEI**, which uniquely identifies your phone + +Thus, simply using a prepaid SIM in your primary/personal device is not a foolproof method of avoiding tracking, because your IMEI is still correlatable between networks. + +Buying a secondary, disposable device is an option that will provide you with much greater protection than bringing your personal device. However, if the threat you face is serious enough that you feel the need to do this, you should strongly consider not bringing a phone at all. Properly securing a disposable/burner phone is fairly challenging and may not be worth it. + +If you *do* buy a secondary device for this purpose, you should buy it in-person, with **cash**. + +**Do not activate or power it on at home**. The location of a phone is tracked by network carriers for at least a year at minimum, but you should assume that location history is just kept forever. Therefore, you should activate and set up the device in a very public place that is not significant to your daily life, then always keep it powered off at locations associated with you. You don't want the phone's location to ever be recorded at your home or workplace. + +If possible, you should try to purchase and set up this phone well in advance. This certainly depends on your plans, but spreading out your purchase, activation, and use of the device makes it less easy to detect. It also makes it less likely that the store you bought the phone from still has security footage of your purchase. + +You will also want to make sure you do not identify yourself when purchasing a cellular plan. This is highly dependent on your country, but many prepaid plans will not require any identification to activate. There are also some global eSIM providers which will accept payment without the need to identify yourself to them. + +One last thing: Your secondary device should still be a reasonably modern smartphone. The security measures we cover below regarding [hardware and software security](#consider-your-phones-security-patches) still apply. Smartphones are more secure against the sort of threats that activists are likely to face—such as someone trying to crack into your device's data—than a simple/feature/"dumb" phone will be. They also have many more options for secure & encrypted communication methods that we'll cover below as well. + +Using a secondary device only at the protest allows you to leave your primary device powered on and at home. This potentially provides some plausible deniability, if someone requests the location of your phone during the time of the event later. + +## Secure Your Device + +If your phone falls into the wrong hands, the information on it could be hugely damaging to yourself or others. Make sure you've taken the necessary steps to prevent it from being broken into. + +### Use a Strong Screen Lock + +At a bare minimum, you should use a 6-digit PIN, but ideally you should protect your phone with an alphanumeric passphrase. This prevents people from trivially accessing your data, and additionally protects your data with strong encryption. + +Barring a massive security exploit (more on this [later](#consider-your-phones-security-patches)), most law enforcement tools work by essentially brute-forcing your PIN, running tons of guesses until it gets one right. This makes a long and unique passphrase your strongest protection against your data being stolen by people in possession of your device. + +In the United States and many other countries it is legal to refuse to unlock your phone or provide your passcode to law enforcement. **Know your rights** wherever you're located before attending a protest, so you aren't blindly following orders later. + +### Disable Biometric Authentication + +We commonly recommend using biometric features like Face ID or Touch ID to prevent "shoulder surfing" attacks, where an attacker steals your PIN by discreetly watching you enter it, or where your PIN is recorded by surveillance cameras in the area. + +**However**, in this situation it may make more sense to disable biometric authentication. Authorities are trained and known to use biometrics quickly to forcefully unlock your device, so you should be mindful of this fact when deciding what to do. If you disable biometrics, be wary of shoulder surfing attacks and prying eyes by obscuring or covering your phone whenever you unlock it. + +Whatever you do, make sure you know how to quickly shut down your phone or disable biometrics at a moment's notice. Many phones have begun replacing the standard "hold down the power button" function with voice assistants or other features, so practice performing the actual shutdown method beforehand to familiarize yourself. + +Modern iPhones require you to hold down the side button and either volume button before the power-off slider appears. Even if you don't get a chance to slide to power off, getting to this screen will at least disable biometric authentication, making your phone a bit more secure than it otherwise might be. + +In the United States, it is still a legal gray area when it comes to whether law enforcement can force you to use biometrics, but many court decisions have leaned toward saying they **can** compel you to use your fingerprint. Using a passphrase and disabling biometrics gives you more robust 5th Amendment rights. In other countries you should again familiarize yourself with your rights in this scenario, so that you can make the most informed decision. + +### Hide Your Notifications + +Even with your device locked, law enforcement can see everything you're up to simply by scrolling through your notifications. Reducing the amount of information accessible on the lock screen improves your security and the security of those you're messaging, so make sure your notifications are only visible when your device is unlocked. + +On an iPhone: + +1. Open **Settings** +2. Navigate to **Notifications** +3. Navigate to **Show Previews** +4. Select **Never** (or, **When Unlocked**) + +On Android: + +1. Open **Settings** +2. Navigate to **Notifications** +3. Touch **Notifications on lock screen** + - Select **Don't show any notifications** +4. Switch **Sensitive notifications** to **off** + +### Minimize Your Stored Data + +The best way to protect your data is to not have it on your phone in the first place. If you're using a secondary device, simply don't install anything other than what will be absolutely necessary during the protest, like a secure messenger. + +Otherwise, delete any cloud storage apps you don't need access to during the protest. If you're able to delete an app and then download it later and log in without experiencing any data loss, then that app probably doesn't *need* to be on your phone all the time. + +Some [password managers](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/) have the option to temporarily remove certain vaults from your devices, 1Password calls this [Travel Mode](https://support.1password.com/travel-mode/) for example. You can do this manually as well, by having a separate password manager or vault with only the essentials you will need at the time, and removing your primary password manager from your device for the duration of the event. + +### Disable Lock Screen Actions + +In a similar vein, any functionality you have enabled while your device is unlocked can pose a security risk. It is always best practice to reduce your attack surface by disabling these options whenever possible. Even though these features are typically designed to not pose a security risk to your data, they have been known to be exploited in the past to bypass lock screens and other security features. + +On an iPhone: + +1. Open **Settings** +2. Navigate to **Face ID & Passcode** +3. Scroll to the **Allow Access When Locked** section +4. Switch all features you don't need **off** + +On Android, disabling functionality while the phone is locked will vary widely by manufacturer. Some like Samsung provide more flexible options in their lock screen settings, but others like Google do not provide the option to disable the quick settings panel or other similar features. + +### Avoid External Storage + +Your Android phone might have the option to store files or photos on a microSD card, but these cards are not always subject to the same encryption standards as your phone's built-in storage. You should check whether your microSD card can be encrypted in your phone's settings, although this will prevent it from being read by other devices like your computer later. + +Additionally, even *if* it's encrypted, it still won't benefit from the same security protections that your phone's built-in storage provides, such as advanced brute-force protections. Ideally you should remove all external storage devices from your phone during the event, and save photos, videos, and other files to your phone's encrypted internal storage. + +### Consider Your Phone's Security Patches + +Exploits against smartphones are discovered on a very regular basis, and spyware companies that work with law enforcement—like Cellebrite—abuse these exploits to crack into stolen devices. If your phone is no longer receiving regular updates from its manufacturer, you are in a very dangerous position as you may be vulnerable to the exploits used. + +In general, we consider the latest iPhone and latest Google Pixel to be the most secured against this sort of threat. You can increase your security further by using a [hardened alternative operating system](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/android/distributions/) on your Google Pixel. + +Robust security information about phones from other manufacturers is less common. If you use a different device you may still consider the risks to be worth it, but if confiscation is of *particular* concern to you, or especially if your phone no longer receives security patches, you may want to consider leaving the phone at home. + +## Protect Against Surveillance + +### Disable AirDrop + +One of the most innocuous features enabled on millions of iPhones is also one of the most dangerous for those seeking to protect their privacy in public. Apple's AirDrop protocol [uses](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21-heinrich.pdf) trivially bypassed security measures that authorities like the Chinese government have openly [bragged](https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/01/hackers-can-id-unique-apple-airdrop-users-chinese-authorities-claim-to-do-just-that/) about cracking to identify users since at least 2022. + +You should assume that any device with AirDrop enabled is constantly broadcasting your name, email address, and phone number to everyone around you, **even if** you have it set to "Contacts Only." Apple has known about this [flaw](https://www.macrumors.com/2021/04/23/airdrop-researchers-security-flaw/) since 2019 and has not issued any fix. + +1. Open the **Settings** app +2. Navigate to **General** +3. Navigate to **AirDrop** +4. Select **Receiving Off** + +### Lock Down Your Network + +Your phone signals can be used to track you even if you don't make a call or send a text. Some law enforcement agencies use "stingrays," devices which can impersonate a cell tower to track visitors to an area. It is speculated that more advanced ones can intercept unencrypted text messages and phone calls as well, making the use of an [encrypted messenger](#use-signal) during the event even more critical. + +While the capabilities of the most modern ones isn't fully known, you should definitely protect yourself from the subset of stingrays which abuse the lower security standards of older, 2G networks. + +On Android: + +1. Open **Settings** +2. Navigate to **Network & internet** +3. Navigate to **SIMs** +4. Select your carrier or SIM card +5. Switch **Allow 2G** to **off** + +You might also consider installing Privacy Cell ([F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/com.stoutner.privacycell/) / [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.stoutner.privacycell)), an app that tells you whether you are connected to a cell network using the most modern security. Even the "5G" indicator on your phone alone doesn't guarantee you are using the latest-generation protocol. + +On iPhone: + +1. Open **Settings** +2. Navigate to **Privacy & Security** +3. Navigate to **Lockdown Mode** +4. Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +Note that enabling [Lockdown Mode](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) on an iPhone will change a variety of settings to harden its security. Many of them are smart improvements, but certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/HT212650) normally, so read the previous links here for more details. + +### Use Airplane Mode Frequently + +Even after mitigating the risks of 2G networks, your cellular activity can still be tracked. If not by law enforcement then by your carrier, who will likely be responsive to law enforcement's requests for data after the fact. + +To prevent this, you should keep your phone turned off or use Airplane Mode to disable cellular connections whenever possible. Ideally you should only connect to networks in an emergency situation to communicate with others in your group, otherwise keeping messages and network transmissions to a minimum is key. + +If you absolutely need internet connectivity, and if it's possible, you should keep Airplane Mode on and connect to a public Wi-Fi network instead, which brings me to: + +### Use Public Wi-Fi + +If you're able, scope out businesses in the area that provide public Wi-Fi in advance. This is better than using cellular service, because less information about your device is shared with Wi-Fi networks as opposed to cell towers. Most modern phones support MAC address randomization, which makes it even harder to correlate your cell phone's connections between different Wi-Fi access points. + +There is a danger that public Wi-Fi services will be set up by authorities or others in the area to track protesters. You could consider using a [VPN service](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/) while connected to them to minimize the amount of metadata about your traffic that the Wi-Fi operator is able to collect. + +### Disable Location Services + +If you have to keep your device powered on and connected, you can at least minimize the number of parties who have access to your location data. Be mindful of apps that you choose to share your location with, and consider disabling location services entirely while you're at the event. + +On an iPhone: + +1. Open **Settings** +2. Navigate to **Privacy & Security** +3. Navigate to **Location Services** +4. Switch **Location Services** to **off** + +On Android: + +1. Open **Settings** +2. Navigate to **Location** +3. Switch **Use location** to **off** + +If you use an Android phone, you should also check your Google account settings to [ensure location history is disabled](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3118687). Google is frequently tapped by law enforcement to provide location data, because they don't protect your personal information with strong, zero-knowledge encryption. + +### Check Your Keyboard + +An often overlooked security risk is the software keyboard installed on your device. The best encrypted messenger in the world is no match for all of your inputs being read by third-parties as you type them. + +If you are on [GrapheneOS](#consider-your-phones-security-patches), the default keyboard from AOSP that it comes with makes no internet connections, so if you don't install a third-party keyboard you should be fine. Most other Android users are using Google's *Gboard*, which does make internet connections you may decide you don't trust, so you could consider installing an offline alternative. iOS users are able to control whether their third-party keyboard has network access in their system settings, although it may be wiser to not install a third-party keyboard in the first place. + +This is [particularly relevant](https://xcancel.com/RealSexyCyborg/status/1197695344575799296) to people typing in languages like Chinese or others where you use an Input Method Editor (IME) to convert Latin letters to characters in the target language. These IMEs are very often third-party apps that have full internet access. + +## Other Tips + +### Use Signal + +[**Signal**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#signal) is the most secure app for sending text messages and making voice calls with others. It is also impossible to configure Signal to lower its encryption security or other security standards, so you know that everyone in your group is using settings that are safe by default. + +You should turn on disappearing messages with a reasonably short interval for sensitive communications. You can do this by default in the Privacy section of Signal's app settings, and you can also do it on a per-conversation basis in each conversation's settings panel. This way there is a time limit for an attacker to crack your phone and extract your messages before they permanently disappear. + +Signal is battle-tested for this situation. [Signal has responded to 6 government requests](https://signal.org/bigbrother/) since 2016, and in each case the only information they were able to provide was at most: + +1. Whether the user was registered with Signal +2. When that user registered with Signal +3. When that user connected to Signal last + +Keep in mind that using Signal could still expose your phone's location, simply due to making a network request as we covered above. You should still keep your phone in [Airplane Mode](#use-airplane-mode-frequently) and minimize the use of Signal or any other networked app during the event. + +There *are* other [encrypted messengers](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/), some of them even making use of technologies developed by Signal. However, they all come with trade-offs that could easily compromise your security. WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger are end-to-end encrypted for example, but they collect copious amounts of *metadata* about your messages, such as whom you're sending them to, when you're sending them, your location when you're sending them, etc. Apple's iMessage service in the Messages app has strong encryption but similar metadata concerns, and only works if everyone in your group has an iPhone. + +### Protect Your Access to Information + +Phones can be easily lost, taken, broken, or they can simply run out of juice. Bring a spare mobile battery or a charged power bank with you, and try to minimize your phone usage to preserve power. You should also make sure your mobile plan is topped up and you have enough mobile data prior to the event. + +You should also write down the number of an emergency contact or a lawyer on a physical piece of paper, or [even](https://xcancel.com/madeleine_rae/status/1266528386878443522) in Sharpie on your arm. You'll want this information easily accessible if you're arrested regardless of your phone's state or location. + +### Change Your Camera Settings + +Check your camera settings for things which may draw unwanted attention, like the flash or a shutter sound. You should go through these settings in advance and configure it for the safest possible use. + +### Back Up Your Data + +You should be prepared to have your phone taken or lost during a protest. You can limit the potential costs and headache to you if this happens by making sure you have an updated, encrypted backup of your data. + +If you have an iPhone, you can make a local backup to a macOS computer or a Windows computer with iTunes. You can also back up to iCloud, but these backups are only secure if you enable [Advanced Data Protection](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/os/ios-overview/#icloud) on your iCloud account. We strongly encourage [enabling Advanced Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/en-us/108756) for all iCloud users in any case, as it protects not only device backups but most iCloud account data as well. + +The backup situation on Android is not nearly as robust unfortunately, but you can back up photos and files with a variety of services. If you use an online backup service we recommend choosing one with strong, zero-knowledge encryption so that the service provider is unable to access your data. + +- [Recommended Photo Backup Services](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/photo-management/) +- [Recommended Cloud Drive Services](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cloud/) +- [Recommended File Sync Services](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/file-sharing/) + +## At The Protest + +### Keep Your Device Locked + +You should always use your camera to take pictures or videos while your phone is locked, in case your device is taken while filming. This is easier if you've [disabled biometrics](#disable-biometric-authentication), because Face ID or similar features might unlock your device automatically when you don't want that to happen. + +On an iPhone you can hold down the camera icon on the lock screen to open the camera without unlocking your device. You could also configure the Action Button to open the camera, or use the dedicated camera button on the latest iPhone model. + +On a Google Pixel and most other Android devices, double-tapping the power button will open the camera without needing to unlock your device. + +You should learn and/or set up device shortcuts to do things quickly, ideally while the device remains locked whenever possible, and ensure you're familiar with the shortcuts before the event. + +### Have a Backup Communications Network + +In the event of an internet blackout, it might be a good idea to have a backup network prepared, organized with other attendees. Messaging apps like [Briar](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#briar) can operate in a local mesh mode, connecting to other devices in the area with Bluetooth or local Wi-Fi connections instead of relying on centralized internet services. Another newer option is [Meshtastic](https://meshtastic.org/), which uses peer-to-peer/mesh radio that is much more reliable than using either Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, but requires purchasing dedicated hardware that you connect to your phone. + +You might also want to consider local radios like walkie-talkies, although keep in mind these devices are nearly always unencrypted and can be easily monitored by others, so you won't want to use them to transmit sensitive information. + +## After The Event + +### If Your Phone Was Taken + +If you lose your phone, you may be able to locate or wipe your phone remotely depending on the model. Here are some instructions for common devices you can try: + +- [Finding a lost Android device](https://support.google.com/android/answer/3265955?hl=en) +- [Finding a lost iPhone](https://support.apple.com/en-us/104978) + +If you were logged in to any online services on your phone, you should try and get them signed out. On many social media websites for example, you can go to your account's settings to see what devices are signed in and revoke their access remotely. + +Please be aware of the **legal consequences** of these actions. Wiping your device or revoking online account access could lead to obstruction of justice or destruction of evidence charges in some jurisdictions. You should always speak with your licensed attorney before deciding how to proceed. If your phone was taken by law enforcement you may have legal recourse to get it back. + +### Be Mindful of Others + +If you post your photos online, be mindful of identifiable faces or other characteristics of your fellow protesters or bystanders. Law enforcement or vigilantes use these photos to track down other attendees and arrest or harass them. + +To prevent this, you can obscure the faces of anyone in the image. Most phones have [built-in photo editing tools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/os/ios-overview/#redacting-elements-in-images) that allow you to draw on an image. Blurring can sometimes be reversed, so blocking it out entirely is generally preferable. + +Be careful of the editing tools you use, and don't select highlighters or other semi-transparent editing tools. Even if you scribble over an area of a photo multiple times with a dark/black "highlighter" tool until it *appears* black, that can often be reversed with photo editing software by adjusting the contrast of the image. Using a shape/rectangle tool to draw a black box over areas you wish to redact is much better than trying to manually cross out image elements with drawing tools. + +The Signal app also has built-in tools for photo editing and blurring. You can send a photo to yourself in the "Notes to Self" chat, then save the edited image from that chat for sharing. Signal also automatically removes photo metadata, so if you use it you're already covered with our next section: + +### Scrub Photo Metadata + +Photos have hidden information, or *metadata*, embedded in them which include the type of phone/camera you used, the photo's location, and other potentially sensitive data. + +You should use a [metadata removal tool](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/data-redaction/) to remove this data from images before you share them with others. If you send a photo to someone using Signal, that app removes this metadata automatically. diff --git a/blog/posts/bad-faith-arguments.md b/blog/posts/bad-faith-arguments.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c156f528 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/bad-faith-arguments.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2024-09-09T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +authors: + - jonah +tags: + - Privacy Guides +license: BY-SA +--- +# Bad-Faith Arguments in the Privacy Community + +The Privacy Guides community is one of the best privacy-related communities on the internet, and I think we have generally done a good job at promoting a positive and respectful environment where people can learn and grow. + +Unfortunately, as a public forum we are not immune to the small minority of individuals who feel empowered to spread anger, hostility, and divisiveness by their anonymity and general lack of consequences on the internet. + +From now on, we are going to be strict about requiring all posts in our communities to be made in good faith. + +We will consider the following questions when reviewing posts: + +1. Is the poster presenting their criticism as informed or factual, when it's actually a matter of personal opinion, or worse, misinformation or false? +2. Has the poster failed to provide reasoning for their criticism, and demonstrated an unwillingness to learn or discuss the topic? +3. Is the poster writing something as if it is true and informed, when they're actually just speculating? +4. Is the poster simply spreading negativity instead of actually trying to improve something? +5. Is the poster engaging in ad hominem attacks against us or our community? + +If these answer to any of these questions is yes, the post will be removed and the poster will be asked to revise their statement. We will suspend posters who repeatedly engage in bad faith arguments. + +For almost everyone here, you won't see any negative impacts of this new policy. It is simply designed to allow us to remove the small number of people who occasionally join to spread unproductive negativity in the privacy space, at the expense of legitimate projects making the world a better place. Hopefully you will notice improvements in discussion quality overall. + +--- + +To give an example, there are two specific behaviors we want to discourage with this new policy. + +1. The constant use of words like "shilling," "fanboys," etc. to describe people who have a difference in opinion to your own is not acceptable. + + To "[shill](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shill)" something is to promote something you have an employer relationship or some other actual conflict of interest with. To accuse someone in our community of being a planted shill without any evidence, simply because they like something that you dislike, is both a serious accusation and a bad-faith argument. + + Even the use of terms like these informally to describe people who like a certain product more than others is disrespectful, and sows uncertainty and distrust within our community, so it will no longer be tolerated. + +2. A very small portion of GrapheneOS community members continually attempt to derail any conversations mentioning GrapheneOS with irrelevant details and confrontational attitudes. + + This is not a reflection on the GrapheneOS project itself, but unfortunately this has become a repeated situation with certain community members of this specific project more than anyone else, so we have to call it out. + + Making unfounded accusations against Privacy Guides community members of harassment towards GrapheneOS simply because they presented their criticism of the project is not a good faith argument. Similarly, presenting unverified statements from the GrapheneOS community as factual has led to misinformation being spread in the past. It is critical to always differentiate between opinions/beliefs and factual information. + + **Privacy Guides community spaces are not GrapheneOS discussion forums, and the drama from their community is not automatically on-topic in ours.** Please do not make new topics in our forum that simply link to drama posts from the GrapheneOS community. A good rule of thumb is that unless a post from GrapheneOS is specifically talking about GrapheneOS-specific, privacy-related functionality and not about other projects/software/etc., it is probably off-topic here. diff --git a/blog/posts/biometrics-explained.md b/blog/posts/biometrics-explained.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..244a17c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/biometrics-explained.md @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-02-13T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Explainers +authors: + - fria +tags: + - Biometrics +license: BY-SA +schema_type: BackgroundNewsArticle +description: | + Biometrics are a convenient and secure way to authenticate our devices. Many of us use and trust the biometrics of our devices without much thought, but are they really secure? With so many options, which ones are the best? +--- +# Biometrics Explained + +![Glowing fingerprint on glass](../assets/images/biometrics-explained/biometrics.webp) + + + +Biometrics are a convenient and secure way to authenticate our devices. Many of us use and trust the biometrics of our devices without much thought, but are they really secure? With so many [options](https://www.biometricsinstitute.org/what-is-biometrics/types-of-biometrics/), which ones are the best? + +## :material-fingerprint: Fingerprint sensors + +One of the most recognizable types of biometric authentication has to be the fingerprint reader. The idea is that everyone has a fairly unique fingerprint, so we should be able to distinguish between your fingerprint and someone else's reliably. + +There are three main types of fingerprint: loops, whorls, and arches. Fingerprint sensors categorize your finger into these groups before using other details to uniquely identify your fingerprint. You might think that you could count the number of arches/whorls/loops, but there can be many people with the same configuration and number of these. Also fingerprint sensors won't be able to see your entire fingerprint most of the time, they are designed to work at weird angles and with a partial scan, so it's not viable to use the whole fingerprint for authentication. + +![Examples of loop, whorl, and arch fingerprints](../assets/images/biometrics-explained/types-of-fingerprint.webp) + + + +[Finger minutiae](https://sites.rutgers.edu/fingerprinting/no-two-finger-prints-are-alike/) data is used to identify a fingerprint as unique. This data consists of the points on your fingerprint where lines split, abruptly end, individual dots, etc. Two people can have the same number of arches, loops, and whorls, but they won't have the exact same configurations of minutiae. (1) +{ .annotate } + +1. :material-fingerprint: It's theorized that the reason humans have fingerprints in the first place is to [enhance our sense of touch](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1166467). + +![Example of finger minutiae including forks (where one line splits into multiple lines), ends (where a line ends), islands (isolated dots), and inclosures (lines that split into two and then reconnect)](../assets/images/biometrics-explained/finger-minutiae.webp) + + + +Using these details for identification gives several advantages over trying to read the whole fingerprint. It allows the device to use less processing power, as well as providing some flexibility in case your finger is smudged or at a strange angle. The sensor doesn't even need to see your whole fingerprint. You might notice some fingerprint readers are very thin and might be located in a convenient place like a power button; finger minutiae is what allows them to still operate securely. + +There are [three](https://www.androidauthority.com/how-fingerprint-scanners-work-670934/) main ways we accomplish this in consumer devices: optical sensors, capacitive sensors, and ultrasonic sensors. + +### :material-camera: Optical + +An optical sensor works by taking a picture of your fingerprint and turning it into data. They are the cheapest and least secure option. Since optical sensors capture two-dimensional images, an attacker may gain access by simply taking a picture of your fingerprint. + +![Diagram showing a closeup of how an optical fingerprint sensor works by reflecting light off the skin](../assets/images/biometrics-explained/optical-diagram.webp) + + + +Many devices implement one of these sensors under the display. + +Optical sensors can struggle in the presence of bright sunlight, which is an issue on a mobile device that you take around with you and use wherever you are. + +### :material-lightning-bolt: Capacitive + +Capacitive sensors measure the electrical conductivity of your finger. These are much more secure than optical sensors since they can't be fooled with an image. They're also tough to fool with prosthetics as different materials will have different electrical properties. + +![Diagram showing a closeup of how a capacitive fingerprint sensor works by detecting the electrical difference in the ridges and valleys of a finger](../assets/images/biometrics-explained/capacitve-diagram.webp) + + + +Capacitive sensors won't work if the [tissue is dead](https://www.livescience.com/62393-dead-fingerprint-unlock-phone.html), since dead tissue loses all electrical charge. So morbid worries about someone using your dead body to unlock your phone can be assuaged. + +Conveniently they also don't require a light source under them to work, although they will struggle in the presence of moisture. + +### :material-volume-high: Ultrasonic + +Ultrasonic fingerprint sensors use sound to create a detailed 3D representation of your fingerprint using ultrasound waves (sound waves with a frequency greater than 20khz). It's a similar concept to what's used to map the ocean floor: sound is emitted from transducers and bounces off your skin. By measuring the time it takes for the sound to reach the microphones, your phone can create a detailed map of the ridges and valleys in your finger. + +![Diagram showing the transducers emitting ultrasound waves and reflecting off the finger tissue bouncing back and then being picked up by microphones](../assets/images/biometrics-explained/ultrasonic-diagram.webp) + + + +This is the most expensive type of sensor, but it produces the most accurate readings with the highest reliability. It doesn't matter if your finger is a bit dirty or wet, it will still work unlike optical or capacitive sensors. + +Ultrasonic sensors can't be fooled by 2D images. + +One downside is that you lose the protection against dead tissue that capacitive sensors offer, but this is not relevant for most people. + +### Additional considerations + +Fingerprint unlock will inherently be vulnerable to someone forcing you to put your finger on the sensor to unlock your device, so keep this in mind when threat modeling. + +They also won't work with gloves and sometimes screen protectors can interfere, so make sure that the sensor is uncovered and making direct contact with your actual finger, or otherwise using an OEM-approved covering. + +Fingerprint authentication will protect you against someone filming you surreptitiously while typing in your password or shoulder surfing. This is an especially relevant attack if your threat model includes thieves as a common attack is watching you type your passcode in and then stealing your phone. + +## :material-face-recognition: Face unlock + +Many devices come with the capability to unlock them using your face. The [implementations](https://www.androidauthority.com/face-unlock-smartphones-3043993/) of this technology can vary wildly between manufacturers since a secure implementation requires a lot of special hardware, so many OEMs choose to cheap out. All forms of face unlock are more likely to allow a twin or sibling into your device since their face is more similar to yours than a random person off the street, so keep that in mind in your threat model. + +### :material-camera-front: 2D camera-based + +Every phone already has a camera, so why not use it for face unlock? + +If you're relying on a plain 2D image, then there's always the possibility that it could be fooled by a [regular photo](https://www.theregister.com/2023/05/19/2d_photograph_facial_recog/). Someone getting in to your phone because they have a picture of your face is a security nightmare scenario and the only thing stopping it is the whims of whatever algorithm was programmed into your phone. + +This form of face unlock is also less likely to work in low-light conditions than infrared variants. + +### :material-heat-wave: 2D infrared-based + +The next step up in security is an infrared sensor. This requires dedicated hardware to be built into the device, which eats up space and adds cost. But what you get in return is a form of face unlock that's more reliable in low-light conditions and more resistant to photographs. + +### :material-cube-scan: 3D mapping + +The potential of this technology truly shines when 2D face unlock is combined with an infrared flood illuminator. These are able to shine thousands of invisible infrared dots on your face and record the distance of each one, creating a 3D map of your face. As you can probably imagine, this tech takes up quite a bit of space and adds yet more cost to the device, as well as likely being the main reason for the "notch" on iPhones. This drawback is well worth it though. According to [Apple](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102381): + +>The probability that a random person in the population could look at your iPhone or iPad Pro and unlock it using Face ID is less than 1 in 1,000,000 with a single enrolled appearance whether or not you're wearing a mask. + +They put the odds for Touch ID around [1 in 50,000](https://support.apple.com/en-us/105095) for comparison. + +3D face unlock is immune to 2D images and requires a 3D reconstruction of a face before it has a chance of being fooled. + +### Additional considerations + +You'll likely want an implementation with some protection against another person pointing your phone at your face to unlock it. iOS allows you to enable a setting where you need to be looking at the phone before it will unlock (called "Require Attention for Face ID"), look for a similar feature when shopping for a device. + +Some devices allow for unlocking with a facemask. This is less secure than without a facemask, so keep that in mind when enabling this setting. + +## :material-eye: Iris sensors + +A spy movie classic but newcomer in the consumer electronics field, iris sensors offer authentication via the unique properties of your eyes. The Apple Vision Pro is the most notable example with its [Optic ID](https://support.apple.com/en-us/118483). + +It uses near-infrared light to reveal highly unique patterns independent of the pigmentation of your eyes. Apple estimates the likelihood of a random person being able to unlock your Optic ID at less than 1 in 1,000,000, similar to Face ID. + +The extremely short distance this technology operates at makes it very difficult for someone to unlock your device without you noticing, and you can simply close your eyes to prevent someone from forcing you to unlock it. + +## :material-matrix: Algorithm + +Because biometric systems need to translate the physical properties of your body to data, they rely on an algorithm to determine if their reading matches closely enough. + +[Android](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/biometric) has guidelines on how OEMs should implement biometrics and how they can [test](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/biometric/measure) them for security. If you're performing your own security research, you should look here for guidance on testing methodology. + +There is also independent research into the security of biometric systems. This combination of external and internal rigor helps ensure the security of these systems, although more well known brands like Apple and Google will receive more scrutiny than lesser-known ones. + +## :material-keyboard: Typing biometrics + +Companies like [TypingDNA](https://www.typingdna.com) claim to be able to identify users by how they type. + +The stated use case is 2FA and continuous authentication for employee devices. Likely you'll only encounter this technology on work devices, especially since this type of biometrics will be affected by the type of keyboard you're using. It only really makes sense to authenticate on a specific device that you'll be using continuously and typing on a lot, such as a work laptop. + +It could also be used on websites to uniquely identify you, so type in a text editor program then copy/paste into the browser window to avoid this specific type of fingerprinting. + +## :material-walk: Gait biometrics + +Possibly the most insidious of the biometric systems in widespread use is gait recognition. Yes, you can be uniquely identified just by how you walk. + +### :material-camera: Camera + +This technology can work using only 2D footage and doesn't even require close proximity or high resolution sensors like other forms of biometrics. Combined with the huge network of cameras deployed in most cities, you can potentially be identified and tracked around even with a fully covered face. + +This type of biometric can work without your consent and when other identifiable features such as face and fingerprints are hidden. It's also very difficult to impersonate someone else's gait. + +There are two approaches for extracting biometric data from video. + +#### Model-based + +This approach attempts to model the human body in order to track the different parts of it. A well-known example of this approach is the Microsoft Kinect, which only consists of a fairly low-resolution camera. It simplifies the human body into a stick figure, which you can see in footage of the [Kinect](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=33AsuE-WP64) in action. It then uses the distances and joint angles of the model for gait recognition. + +![Diagram showing the Kinect's model of the human body, a 2D skeleton made up of various parts](../assets/images/biometrics-explained/kinect-skeleton.webp) + + + +#### Model-free + +Model-free approaches don't try to model the human body but instead use the whole motion of human silhouettes. This gives a few advantages: it works regardless of camera quality, and it takes significantly fewer resources. + +![Diagram showing the process of turning raw camera input into a silhouette useful for gait recognition](../assets/images/biometrics-explained/model-free-gait.webp) + + + +### :material-axis-arrow: Accelerometer + +Accelerometers such as those found in your smartphone can also be used for gait recognition. These need to be worn on a person's body, so they can't be used from long distance like camera-based approaches. + +Accelerometers work by measuring the accelerations in 3D space in X, Y, and Z coordinates. They tend to also utilize gyroscopes, which measure the orientation of a device. + +### :material-foot-print: Floor sensor + +It's possible to identify individuals using [sensors](https://www.amti.biz/product/bms464508/) in the floor that measure the pressure of your steps as you take them. There are already companies offering software/hardware [installations](https://www.scanalyticsinc.com/how-it-works) for tracking customers within a store using this technology. + +>Scanalytics floor sensors capture up to 100% of foot traffic through your buildings and spaces. Capturing individual footsteps and the paths they form, we are able to monitor and analyze complete space movements and usage. + +Floor sensors are especially concerning since they're completely invisible to you. + +### :material-radar: Radar + +Radar works by transmitting a signal and measuring how long it takes for that signal to return, allowing you to measure how far an object is from you. In addition, if an object is moving relative to the sensor, the reflected waves will be a different frequency than when they were transmitted due to the [Doppler effect](https://www.noaa.gov/jetstream/doppler/how-radar-works). This can be used to determine the speed of an object and whether it's moving toward or away from you. + +Using a continuous wave (CW) radar that's constantly emitting a signal, it's possible to measure the movements of all the different parts of your body during your gait to identify you uniquely. This is called a [micro-Doppler](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=SVCQDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=cqJxAh_rPv&sig=bBz1w4h-C4nDrzNwiRvZUexKbnc#v=onepage&q&f=false) signature. These sensors can even be sensitive enough that they can pick up breathing and heartbeats of humans trapped in rubble during rescue operations. + +[GaitMetrics](https://gaitmetrics.com/applications/) is a company claiming to offer mmWave gait recognition technology. + +>It is also possible to identify the intruder’s unique radio gait IDs and capture them in a database. Any intruder with an unknown radio gait ID detected within the premises will trigger an alarm, and the intruder’s location will be tracked down. + +They claim it can uniquely identify individuals as well as penetrate walls, a worrying combination. + +## What makes biometrics private? + +### :material-cloud-off: Local Storage + +As with most things, keeping everything on your device is the key to private biometrics. A secure and private biometric authentication system should store any biometric data fully on-device and further, shouldn't make it accessible at all, even to the user. Biometric data is so incredibly sensitive and uniquely identifying that it needs to be treated with the utmost care. For example, apps on your phone don't have direct access to your fingerprint or face data, they must use an [API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/localauthentication) to use biometric authentication. + +On the other end of the spectrum we have companies like [IDEMIA](https://www.idemia.com) which boast about their [Augmented Vision](https://www.idemia.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/augmented-vision-platform-idemia-brochure-202102.pdf), designed to take video data from the myriad surveillance cameras littering every US city and track you around everywhere you go. It combines facial recognition, object recognition, plate reading, and much more to create an Orwellian surveillance apparatus that stores all your data in some server somewhere, fully accessible to their customers (or any hackers that want a treasure trove of surveillance data). They also have a product called [Mobile Biometric Check](https://www.idemia.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/mobile-biometric-check-idemia-brochure-202007.pdf) that allows cops to use their phone camera to take a picture of your fingerprints and compare them to a database. This is the exact opposite of responsible biometrics. + +### :material-chip: Secure Element + +All forms of biometric authentication rely on proper hardware such as a secure element in order to be secure. The secure element provides a secure and tamper-resistant place to store your biometric data separate from the rest of the system, so it can't be easily extracted. Examples include Apple's [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/web) and Google's [Titan M](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) series of chips. You should avoid devices that lack a secure element; they won't be able to properly implement secure biometrics without one. + +### Final thoughts + +Like all technology, biometrics aren't inherently good or bad. They're used to secure our devices and make authentication smooth and easy, but they're also used for [mass surveillance](https://therecord.media/europe-gait-recognition-study-pilot-program). Especially now with the rise of AI, we've started to leave the realm of scientifically rigorous usages and into the realm of digital snake oil, with companies like Cursor Insight launching their [MotionScore](https://www.motionscore.ai) product. + +>Our patent-pending AI technology identifies hidden patterns in signatures and online or mobile user interactions. These patterns can reflect behaviors and personal characteristics relevant to creditworthiness and reliability. + +It should go without saying that making decisions about whom to give a loan to based on... how they sign their name or some other mystery movement data is ludicrous, laughable if it wasn't affecting real people's lives. Now more than ever we need to be educated about the biometric technology that we use and that's used against us. The [EFF](https://sls.eff.org/technologies/biometric-surveillance) is a great resource that documents and fights against abuses of biometric technology. + +Many of the same technologies used for mass surveillance are also used for [helpful](https://www.amti.biz/2024/08/28/amti-technology-featured-in-triple-crown-power-5-fastpitch-tournament/) purposes. It's up to us to ensure responsible use of technology going forward. diff --git a/blog/posts/choosing-the-right-messenger.md b/blog/posts/choosing-the-right-messenger.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cbf2e291 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/choosing-the-right-messenger.md @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2019-11-27T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Opinion +authors: + - danarel +links: + - Real Time Communication: https://www.privacyguides.org/real-time-communication/ + - Types of Communication Networks: https://www.privacyguides.org/real-time-communication/communication-network-types/ +tags: + - Instant Messengers +license: BY-SA +description: Choosing an instant messenger is a challenge. How can you be sure you’re using the most secure, privacy respecting platform? +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# Choosing the Right Messenger + +!["Choosing The Right Messenger" cover image](../assets/images/choosing-the-right-messenger/cover.webp) + + + +One of the most common questions users have when it comes to privacy is about messaging services. It seems almost all of them mention some level of privacy or encryption to entice the user to sign up for their service, but how can you be sure you’re using the most secure, privacy respecting platform? + +The answer actually lies in one’s [threat model](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/threat-modeling/), which is often an ignored step in choosing all privacy related apps and services, meaning a lot of users limit their internet and communication experience because they believe they need Edward Snowden level privacy settings. + +The truth is, each user needs to decide what their privacy goals are. Is your goal to stop corporations from tracking you, targeting you, and profiting from your data? Or, are you are trying to hide communications from the government or law enforcement, which is common for journalists and activists who want to protect their sources or communications from government eyes? + +Once you understand your goals you can start to look at messengers and their upsides and downsides, and it’s important to remember, there is no perfect solution. Each service, no matter how secure can be compromised, because at the end of the day, you’re dealing with other humans who can screenshot, copy, or forward your messages to parties you did not intend to see them. So, it’s also important to know who you are messaging, verifying their keys, and ensuring that you place the utmost trust in them with the content you are sending. + +If your goal is to simply avoid corporate tracking and the harvesting of your data from your communications, you can eliminate apps such as Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp, both services owned by Facebook and while offering encrypted messaging (optional in Messenger), Facebook [reads your non-encrypted messages](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190737/https://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/facebook-reads-messenger-messages/), and WhatsApp has [fallen victim](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190737/https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/05/14/whatsapps-cybersecurity-breach-phones-hit-with-israeli-spyware-over-voice-calls/#734cec155549) to security breaches. + +For this type of user, your options are much more wide as you may be more willing to share your email address or phone number at signup and can be less concerned with metadata (we will get to that shortly), and you want to look for a messenger that simply isn’t scanning your content or behavior to sell it. + +If your goal is to evade more massive state-sponsored surveillance programs, the aforementioned apps are out of the question, but so are many others. + +This is because when it comes to these apps, and other like it, you don’t own the encryption keys, the service does, so they are able to decrypt your messages, for their own use, or for the use of government officials who request it. This is something important you’ll want to remember as you choose the messenger that is right for you. + +Even Apple’s iMessage, which is encrypted, while more secure than Facebook’s offerings, still control the keys and can access your messages if necessary. Apple does also collect data based on your behavior, so while using iMessage isn’t the same as handing your data over to Facebook, you’re still messaging with a variety of privacy vulnerabilities. On Android, you’re using SMS messages which are even less secure and can be [easily hijacked](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190737/https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/18/16328172/sms-two-factor-authentication-hack-password-bitcoin) by someone with just enough know-how. + +## Metadata + +One important aspect of messaging apps you need to be sure of is what kind of [metadata](https://ssd.eff.org/en/glossary/metadata) it exposes, what is encrypted and what isn’t. + +Wire, a popular encrypted messenger app has always been criticized for its decision not to encrypt user metadata, such as the date and time of registration, IP geographical coordinates, and the date and time of creation, creator, name, and list of participants in a conversation. + +Metadata can be used to place you in a certain location, speaking to a certain person and can be used against you by law enforcement, even if they have no idea and no access to what the conversation was about. + +Apps such as Signal, or Wickr encrypt metadata, making the conversations between two or more parties more secure and harder to track individual users with. + +When it comes to avoiding corporate data mining, your metadata won’t be as useful, especially if you’re using a service that is not profiting from your data to begin with. For those avoiding state-sponsored surveillance, [metadata can be a killer](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190737/https://theintercept.com/2019/08/04/whistleblowers-surveillance-fbi-trump/). + +## Encryption + +This article will not get into the complexities of the best kinds of end-to-end encryption (E2EE), but ensuring your messenger has it, that must be discussed. + +The popular messaging app Telegram has come under fire the most for this. Telegram says on their homepage that, “Telegram messages are heavily encrypted and can self-destruct.” Yet, this statement is only partially true. Yes, you can set your messages to self-destruct, a great privacy feature for some, and yes, they do offer encryption, but what they don’t tell users is that encryption isn’t turned on by default. + +In an [interview](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190737/https://gizmodo.com/why-you-should-stop-using-telegram-right-now-1782557415) with Gizmodo, Christopher Soghoian, Principal Technologist and Senior Policy Analyst at the American Civil Liberties Union said that, "There are many Telegram users who think they are communicating in an [end-to-end] encrypted way, when they’re not because they don’t realize that they have to turn on an additional setting," he continued to say that while he’s happy they offer the encryption, it’s not useful if it’s turned off. + +Apps such as Signal, Keybase, and Wickr offer E2EE by default. Less popular but quickly growing apps such as Element, offer E2EE but like Telegram, have not made it a default setting, though the Matrix.org team has [said](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190737/https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/6779) that default encryption is on their road map. + +Ensuring your conversations and metadata are E2EE is one of the best practices you can have when choosing a messenger. + +## Registration Process + +When it comes to your goals and threat model, you will need to decide how much, if any, information you’re willing to give this company on signup. Do they require a phone number and or SIM card? Do they require an email address, or do they allow completely anonymous signups, and how anonymous is anonymous? Are they storing that info (remember the metadata) unencrypted? + +Giving up your phone number or email won’t be a big deal for many, as any good privacy policy will state they won’t use it for any purpose other than those you’ve granted permission for. Yet, for those avoiding state-sponsored surveillance, you may have a regularly changing number, no number, or would rather not risk giving that information up. The same goes for email. + +So, you will want to find a service that fits this need. While Signal is currently testing signup without a phone number, currently you’re unable to do so. Element, Wickr, many XMPP services, don’t require anything but choosing a username. + +## Source Code + +Open source may be the most used phrase in all of privacy and security, and for good reason. It’s really helpful to be able to review the source code of the product you’re trusting. Experts can look for backdoors, leaks, and other bugs. Organizations that opt to open source their code are showing good faith effort to increase trust between them and the user. + +Yet, open source can also limit your options, again, depending on your threat model and goals. Signal, Wire, and Keybase all offer open source repositories of their applications, and sometimes even the server software itself. + +Open source also doesn’t mean secure. This is often misunderstood, and people hear open source and assume it must be good. Look at the apps code you want to use, you don’t need to be able to check it, but are others? An open source app that no one follows, or contributes to is no more or less secure than a closed source app. + +Wickr, Threema, and others are closed source. They don’t offer the ability to check the source, but that doesn’t immediately rule them out either. When the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) had a comparison chart for messenger apps, it gave Wickr 5-stars. This doesn’t mean it’s perfect for someone like Snowden, but for those avoiding Facebook and Google, it could be a usable option. + +It’s also important to remember there’s no way to check that someone is always using the source code in their repository in the app or server you’re downloading from the Apple Store or Google Play. When it comes to this, reputation becomes a key player in your decision, as does trust, which we will get to next. + +If you’re unsure what to do here, it’s always a safe bet to stick with open source that has a large contributor base and strong reputation. It’s always best to use open source options when they are available and only recommend closed source when there isn’t a usable open source option. This is generally a good way to pick a messenger app as well. + +## Ownership & Trust + +An often overlooked, but increasingly important part of choosing a secure messenger is, who owns the company that’s providing your service? What would the gain or lose from selling your data, and who does the company answer to? + +Wire [recently lost](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190737/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/) a great deal of trust and standing in the privacy world because they quietly sold their company and moved it to the US. They also changed parts of their privacy policy, making it harder for users to tell when Wire would share customer data. They did all of this while never updating their current users of such changes, either to the change of the privacy policy, or the move to the US. + +Wire also took in more than $8 million in venture capital funding. So now, users wanted to know more about who owned their data and what jurisdictional rights were changing with the move from Europe to the United States? + +These are questions we must ask of all services. Wire now has investors to answer to who will want a return on their millions of dollars. + +Signal on the other hand is a [non-profit](https://signal.org/blog/signal-foundation/) which does not rely on investors and instead relies on donations, sponsorships, and grants. Because of their non-profit status in the US, they must also be highly transparent about not only where the money comes from, but how they spend it. So, users can see where this money goes, and who it’s going to. + +Matrix.org (the service Element uses) runs a similar business model as Signal, located in the UK instead of the US, they reply on donations, partnerships, and grants. Matrix.org is heavily supported by New Vector, a venture capital backed company, however, Matrix.org as a non-profit is transparent about its spending, income, and influences. + +Not all services are non-profit, and that should not rule them out immediately. You can also follow their funding goals. Wire lost credibility because instead of simply relying on user signups, they wanted to be the next Skype for Business and wanted to build a larger enough user base to get the attention of investors. Meanwhile, apps such as Wickr, while for-profit, is transparent about taking limited investors to become sustainable on subscriptions. + +This can take some time, because it’s important to know who the investors are, and what the organizational goals are. Will they eventually need to resort to data harvesting to sustain itself, if they do, and you decide to leave the platform, will you leave behind data you don’t want them to get their hands on? + +## Making Your Choice + +Now it’s time to choose a messenger and no one can do that for you. Popularity will need to play a role here, there’s no point in joining the new up and coming messenger service if you don’t have a single contact using it as well. One reason Telegram has been so popular is they have managed to convince more than 100 million people to sign up. If you sign in today, you’ll likely see a group of your friends in there. Signal isn’t as far behind, and others are catching up. + +You’ll need to decide who you trust, and who your other contacts trust, and then compare all of that with your goals and your threat model. How much information are you willing to give on signup, does metadata matter to your threat model, and is the service you’re choosing likely to sell itself to the highest bidder once enough people sign up? + +The important thing to remember is there is no one size fits all for messengers, and that each user must decide what is best for them. If someone is an avid WhatsApp or Facebook Messenger user, even Telegram is a step in the right direction. Yet, if that user is concerned with more than just giving data over to Facebook, they may need to look at more secure options. + +Ensure you keep your messenger apps up to date. You don’t want to discover you’ve been compromised because a bug found in version 1 was fixed in version 2, but you didn’t bother upgrading your apps. + +One last piece of advice is that users need to be diligent and never become complacent in their decision. You must be willing to change services if the goals and values of your messenger of choice change in a way that no longer match yours. Look for news of sales, mergers, or acquisitions that could compromise the organization. + +--- + +*Dan Arel is a journalist, author, and privacy advocate. This article was originally published to [Hacker Noon](https://hackernoon.com/choosing-the-right-messenger-mm3x2z47) on November 27th, 2019.* diff --git a/blog/posts/clearing-browsing-data.md b/blog/posts/clearing-browsing-data.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bb2857f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/clearing-browsing-data.md @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-02-13T21:00:00Z +categories: + - Tutorials +authors: + - kevpham +tags: + - Browsers + - Chrome + - Firefox + - Safari +license: BY-SA +description: A beginner's guide to clearing browsing data — such as cookies, website cache, and browsing history — on Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge, and Brave. +schema_type: BackgroundNewsArticle +--- +# How to Clear Your Browser History on Chrome, Firefox, and Other Browsers + +![Article cover photo showing baked cookies](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/dimmis-vart-JPu345g_OYM-unsplash.webp) + + + +Your browsing data — such as cache, cookies, and browsing history — can accumulate over time, potentially damaging your privacy. Whether you trying to free up storage, limit tracking, or protect yourself from digital forensics, clearing browsing data is an important first step on your privacy journey. In this guide, we will explain how to clear your browsing data on five popular web browsers: Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Brave, and Edge. + +## Understanding Browsing Data + +Cookies are [small files that a website generates and sends to a browser](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/privacy/what-are-cookies/). They associate browsing activity to a given user session, allowing people to visit websites without logging in repeatedly. Cookies also facilitate [**personalization**](https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbestechcouncil/2023/04/11/the-internet-of-you-how-web-personalization-is-shaping-the-future/), where websites "remember" your preferences and actions. Websites utilize personalization cookies to send targeted advertisements and track your location. + +Website cache data [refers to offline website data that your browser stores](https://learn.g2.com/what-is-cached-data). By preloading content like webpages and images, subsequent visits to a website becomes faster. Unlike cookies, a cache does not expire and must be manually cleared. If you are concerned about [digital forensics](https://hawkeyeforensic.com/2024/03/30/browser-forensics-examining-browser-artifacts/), consider clearing it. + +Similarly, your browsing history must be deleted. As its name suggest, your web browser keeps a record of all visited websites offline. Your [internet service provider could still view your history](https://www.androidauthority.com/isp-tracking-1167088/); however, you might want to prevent access from someone living with you. + +## Clearing Browsing Data on Google Chrome + +To start, **launch** Google Chrome. On the upper right-hand corner, click on the **three-dots icon** to see a list of options. Then, click on **Settings** + +![Screenshot: Google Home Page](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/chrome1.webp) + +You should see the following menu. + +![Screenshot: Google Chrome Settings](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/chrome2.webp) + +On the left, navigate to **Privacy and Security**. You should see the following screen. + +![Screenshot: Google Chrome Privacy and Security Settings](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/chrome3.webp) + +Click **Delete browsing data.** Here, you can check whether to clear your **browsing history**, **cookies**, and **cached images & files**. Chrome also allows you select the **time range** of the data marked for deletion. + +![Screenshot: Google Chrome browser data options](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/chrome4.webp) + +After making any necessary changes, click **Delete data**. + +## Clearing Browsing Data on Firefox + +Start by launching **Firefox**. On the upper right-hand corner, click on the **three-dot icon** to see a list of options. There, click on **Settings**. + +![Screenshot: Firefox browser with Privacy Guides Homepage](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/firefox1.webp) + +On the left, navigate to **Privacy and Security**. You should see the following screen. + +![Screenshot: Firefox Settings](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/firefox2.webp) + +Scroll down to **Cookies and Site Data**. + +![Screenshot: Firefox Settings](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/firefox3.webp) + +You have the option of either clearing your browsing data within a time range or in selected websites. Note that the latter deletes the website's cookies and cache, not history. + +![Screenshot: Firefox Settings prompt displaying browser data](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/firefox5.webp) + +Click on **Clear data** if you prefer the former. Like Google Chrome, you can chose what types of data to delete and its time range. After making your selection, click **Clear** to finalize the process. + +## Clearing Browsing Data on Safari + +Unlike Chrome and Firefox, Safari separates history settings from its privacy settings. For the purposes of this guide, we will delete browsing history first. + +After opening Safari, move your cursor to the upper left-hand corner. Click **History** once the title bar appears. + +![Screenshot: Safari with Privacy Guides Homepage](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/history1.webp) + +If you want to clear browsing history in a specified time range, select **Clear History** at the bottom and follow the prompt. Otherwise, click **Show All History**. + +![Screenshot: History Panel in Safari](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/history2.webp) + +In this menu, you can choose websites to delete from your history. Use the search bar to find the exact name of the website. You can also navigate to a specific data and time. + +![Screenshot: History Panel in Safari](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/history3.webp) + +Now, lets delete the cookies and cache data. Move your cursor to the title bar again and click **Safari** to see a drop down menu. + +![Screenshot: Safari title bar](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/safari.webp) + +Then, click **Settings** and then navigate to **Privacy**. You will see this screen. + +![Screenshot: Safari Privacy Settings](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/safariprivacy1.webp) + +Click **Manage Website Data...** + +![Screenshot: Prompt displaying website browser data](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/safariprivacy2.webp) + +Another menu will appear with a list of websites and their corresponding browsing data types. As always, you can mark specified websites for deletion. Once you are done, click **Remove**. + +## Clearing Browsing Data on Brave Browser + +As a Chromium-based browser, Brave is quite similar to Chrome. To start, **launch** Brave. On the upper right-hand corner, click on the **three-bars icon** to see a list of options. Then, click on **Settings** + +![Screenshot: Brave Home Page](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/brave2.webp) + +You should see the following menu. + +![Screenshot: Brave Settings](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/brave3.webp) + +On the left, select **Privacy and Security**. You should see the following screen. + +![Screenshot: Brave Privacy and Security Settings](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/brave4.webp) + +Click **Delete browsing data.** Here, you can check whether to clear your **browsing history**, **cookies**, and **cached images & files**. + +![Screenshot: Brave browser data options](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/brave5.webp) + +Under **Advanced**, Brave also allows you select the **time range** of the data marked for deletion. + +![Screenshot: Brave Browser data options](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/brave6.webp) + +After making any necessary changes, click **Delete data**. + +## Clearing Browsing Data on Microsoft Edge + +Finally, we will finish this tutorial with Microsoft Edge. Start by launching the browser. On the upper right-hand corner, click on the **three-dots icon**. Next, click **Settings**. + +![Screenshot: Edge Home Page](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/edge2.webp) + +In the settings page, navigate to **Privacy, Search, and Services** + +![Screenshot: Edge Settings](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/edge3.webp) + +Under **Delete Browsing Data**, click on **Choose What to Clear**. + +![Screenshot: Edge Settings ](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/edge4.webp) + +Modify the time range and data to be deleted. Afterwards, click **Clear Now**. + +![Screenshot: Edge data options](../assets/images/clearing-your-browsing-data/edge5.webp) diff --git a/blog/posts/cryptpad-review.md b/blog/posts/cryptpad-review.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e05b918d --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/cryptpad-review.md @@ -0,0 +1,393 @@ +--- +title: "CryptPad Review: Replacing Google Docs" +template: review-article.html +schema_type: ReviewNewsArticle +date: + created: 2025-02-07T19:00:00Z + updated: 2025-02-12T17:45:00Z +categories: + - Reviews +authors: + - em +description: "If you have been looking for a privacy-respectful replacement to Google Docs, now is the time to switch to the end-to-end encrypted office suite CryptPad." +preview: + logo: theme/assets/img/document-collaboration/cryptpad.svg +review: + type: WebApplication + category: BusinessApplication + subcategory: Office Suite + name: CryptPad + price: 0 + website: https://cryptpad.org/ + rating: 4.5 + pros: + - End-to-end encryption. + - No account required. + - No personal information required to create an account. + - Cloud-hosted and self-hosted options. + - Actively maintained and open source. + cons: + - Can be slow. + - No local offline application. +--- +![Article cover photo showing a phone icon over a protest](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-cover.webp) + + + +If you have been thinking about migrating to a privacy-focused replacement to Google Docs, **now is the time**. Google products, as convenient and popular as they might be, are *atrocious* for data privacy (not to mention [ethics](https://www.theverge.com/google/607012/google-dei-hiring-goals-internal-memo)). + +Google's own Privacy Policy [clearly explains](https://policies.google.com/privacy#infocollect): + +> We also collect the content you create, upload, or receive from others when using our services. This includes things like email you write and receive, photos and videos you save, docs and spreadsheets you create, and comments you make on YouTube videos. + +Firstly, no matter what Google claims to do (or not do) with your data now, there isn't much preventing Google from using it for a different purpose later on. Secondly, there isn't much preventing Google from doing what it pleases regardless of laws or their promises, and asking for forgiveness later, as demonstrated by the many [lawsuits](https://www.reuters.com/legal/google-reaches-93-million-privacy-settlement-with-california-2023-09-14/) Google has already been subjected to. [We cannot trust Google](https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2025/01/google-loses-in-court-faces-trial-for-collecting-data-on-users-who-opted-out/) with *any* sensitive or personal information. + +But you shouldn't trust anyone else either. + +**The real solution to this is end-to-end encryption.** This is what CryptPad offers. + +## Why use CryptPad instead? + +![CryptPad logo](../assets/img/document-collaboration/cryptpad.svg){ align=right itemprop="image" } + +[CryptPad](https://cryptpad.org/) is an open-source collaborative office suite that offers everything that Google Docs offers, but better. And most importantly, in private. + +It was built from the ground up respecting the principles of [Privacy by Design](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy_by_design). All content kept in CryptPad is secured using solid end-to-end encryption, meaning that only the intended recipients can access the content. CryptPad itself cannot read, scan, or utilize your content in any way. + +[:octicons-home-16: Website](https://cryptpad.org/){ .md-button } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/GcNjAWmK6YDB3EO2IipRZ0fUe89j43Ryqeb4fjkjehE/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + +CryptPad is developed by a team from the French software company [XWiki](https://www.xwiki.com). Because [CryptPad is open-source](https://github.com/cryptpad), anyone can add contributions to it, inspect its code, or submit feature recommendations. + +There are many reasons that CryptPad is a great tool and a perfect replacement to Google Docs. Let's dig into its pros and cons, why you should use it, why you can trust it, and how you can keep it secure. + +## What makes CryptPad trustworthy + +Why trust CryptPad more than Google? First, the end-to-end encryption the CryptPad software utilizes uses [strong and modern algorithms](#privacy-and-encryption). When encryption like this is well implemented, it means the content of your data can never be accessed by the CryptPad instance (server) operators. In contrast, services like Google hold the decryption keys to your data at all times, placing it at risk of being misused or compromised in a data breach. With CryptPad, if a CryptPad instance that has well implemented the software experienced a data breach and your encrypted content was stolen, your content would still be protected as long as you've used a unique, complex, and long password and protected it well. + +Second, because CryptPad's code is open, what it promises can be verified. Making source code open doesn't magically make it secure, but the CryptPad software is a project that had many eyes on in GitHub, has been around for over 10 years, and is actively maintained by a team experienced with open-source software. + +Additionally, if you decide to use CryptPad's flagship instance, your data will be hosted in France. This isn't magical either, but because European Union countries are all subjected to the GDPR most have adopted stronger data privacy practices by default. While these other factors are not technical guarantees, they all serve to increase the level of trust we feel comfortable giving CryptPad's software and flagship instance. + +Finally, if you do not trust CryptPad at all, the good news is you don't have to. If you prefer to use an instance that is not run by the CryptPad team, you can look for [other organizations](https://cryptpad.org/instances/) hosting instances of CryptPad open to the public. Of course make sure to pick an instance worthy of your trust. If you decide you do not trust anyone else, you can [download the code for yourself](https://github.com/cryptpad/cryptpad) and create your own CryptPad instance only controlled by you. + +## Starting with CryptPad + +Using CryptPad is very easy. CryptPad can be self-hosted if you prefer, but if this is not something you want to think about you can simply use CryptPad's [flagship instance](https://cryptpad.fr/) hosted in France. You can even start using it without an account. If you prefer to have an account to keep all your documents together you can create one for free, or you can have a look at CryptPad's [paid plans](https://cryptpad.org/pricing/) for users with greater needs. + +### Without an account + +Without an account, you can go to [https://cryptpad.fr/](https://cryptpad.fr/) and just click on a type of "New document" to start right away. Your username will be "Guest" and you will automatically be attributed a cute emoji for your Guest profile. + +You can create a new document, modify it, copy the URL link, then close the web page. To return to it, simply paste the same URL in a browser. To share this document, simply share the URL with someone else. + +

+

File security warning

+ +Anyone with the link will be able to see your file. Additionally, if this link includes "Edit" access, anyone with this link will be able to edit the file. Consider this when using this method. + +
+ +Whether you create an account or not, the only information that could identify you when using CryptPad on a trustworthy instance is your IP address and your browser and device information. Depending on your threat model, to mitigate this you might want to use a trustworthy [VPN service](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/) and/or the [Tor network](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tor/), coupled with a [browser](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop-browsers/) hardened to reduce [fingerprinting](https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/). + +
+

If you are at risk of targeted attacks

+ +If you would be at risk if your CryptPad usage was discovered later, and you do not want to leave any traces on your local computer that you have visited a CryptPad instance, you might want to use [Tails](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/01/29/installing-and-using-tails/). + +
+ +### Creating an account + +You will see that *Privacy by Design* starts at the account creation level with CryptPad. You do not even have to provide an email address to start. All that you need to create an account is a cool username and a [secure and unique password](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/passwords-overview/) (like all passwords should be). + +![Screenshot from the CryptPad login page showing several application choices.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-login.webp) + + + +
+

Password security

+ +Make sure you note your unique, long, and complex password and username in a safe place. Due to the nature of end-to-end encryption, if you lose your username or password, there will be **no account recovery possible** and all your files will be lost. + +
+ +### Basic security + +Once you've created an account, the first thing you should do is secure it with a [second factor of authentication](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/multi-factor-authentication/). To do this, click on your username on the upper-right, then select "Settings" > "Security & Privacy" and follow the instructions for "Two-Factor Authentication". + +On the same "Settings" page, depending on your [threat model](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/threat-modeling/), you might also want to enable "Safe Links", disable "Feedback" (disabled by default), and disable "Cache". Disabling the cache can hinder performance though, so if your local device isn't at risk it may be unnecessary. + +### Destroying data + +Another option that CryptPad offers on the "Settings" page is a quick way to "Destroy all owned documents" at once. This can be a lifesaver feature for people at particularly high risk. Take good note of where this feature is in the menu. + +You can also delete files individually. To do this, once you have created a document you can click on the "Access" button on the top menu, and you will see an option to "Destroy this document or folder permanently". After you've clicked on "Destroy" once, you will see the button change to "Are you sure?" and you'll have to click it again to confirm. This is a well-designed safeguard because this action is irrevocable. Test it with an empty document just to see how it works first. + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad document page showing the "destroy document" option.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-deletingfiles.webp) + +### Backing up data + +There are several options to back up and export your data. From a document page, you can click on the "File" button on the upper-left, then select "Export". To back up all your documents at once, you can click on your username on the upper-right, then select "Settings" > "CryptDrive" > "Backup". This will create a zip file containing all your documents in plain text (unencrypted). Be careful where you store this file if it contains sensitive information. + +### Additional settings + +Another setting you should pay attention to is your Display name. You can change it in the "Account" section. This will be shown to your contacts in CryptPad if you add any. + +Additionally, you can change the theme to either Light or Dark in "Appearance", you can change the color associated with your account and file modifications in "Cursor", you can adjust the code editor indentation spaces in "Code", and you can make many other adjustments following your preferences. + +## CryptPad's instances & hosting + +The CryptPad team offers a flagship instance at [CryptPad.fr](https://cryptpad.fr/) that makes it easy to start using CryptPad quickly. Depending on your preference and circumstances, you might choose a different instance or even choose to host an instance yourself. + +### Different instances + +For a list of third-party instances that have passed a series of checks from the CryptPad team to ensure they are up-to-date and use recommended settings, you can visit this page: [https://cryptpad.org/instances/](https://cryptpad.org/instances/) + +
+

When using third-party instances

+ +Always consider your threat model when selecting an instance. Although the content of your files will be end-to-end encrypted, the instance's owner could have access to some metadata about you, such as your IP address or other activities. Additionally, an instance administrator could technically modify the CryptPad software they run to introduce malicious code. You should trust the instance you use as much as the code. + +
+ +### Self-hosting + +To learn how to host your own CryptPad instance, you should consult [CryptPad's documentation](https://docs.cryptpad.org/en/admin_guide/index.html#admin-guide). + +## User Experience + +The user experience will likely feel pretty familiar to people who are already using Google Docs, Microsoft Office, OnlyOffice, or other similar office suites. + +### User interface + +For document creation, CryptPad's user interface is rather straightforward. However, there are a few details in the interface that might be confusing at first. For example, clicking on your username (or Display name) on the upper-right will show an important dropdown menu, so you should remember to look there as it is not always obvious. This is the menu where you will find options for your "Profile", "Calendar", "Contacts", "Settings", "Log out", and more. + +Once inside a document, click on the "File" button on the upper-left to see the file's "History", "Export", or "Print" features, and more. + +To destroy a document, you will need to click on the "Access" button at the top of a document page. + +### Export and import documents + +You can export or import documents to CryptPad in HTML format, but keep in mind there might be some formatting issues with certain document types. + +## Document Options + +Each time you create a new document, no matter which type, you will have the following options: to make it an "Owned document", which means having full control over it (you need to be the owner of a document to delete it); to pick a "Destruction date", to **make the document self-destroy** after a certain number of months, days, or even hours; and to "**Add a password"** to password-lock the document. + +### Self-destruction + +For any sensitive document, it's a great idea to enable the auto-destruction feature, even if it's far in the future. This adds a layer of security in case you lose your password, forget about an important file that shouldn't be lingering around, or for any other sensitive situations. + +### Password lock + +Because sharing the link to a document without a password makes it accessible to anyone with this link, you should add a password to any sensitive document and share this password on a secure channel only. Make sure you select a password that is different from your account password and is also unique from other passwords you use. Ideally, always prefer a *passphrase*. + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad document creation popup showing the option to add a password.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-creatingfile.webp) + +### Access control + +For any document you can control how it is accessed by clicking on the "Access" button at the top. There, you can change the document's password, delete the document, see the list of accesses and ownership. + +When you share a document by clicking on the "Share" button at the top, you can select different types of access rights, such as "View", "Edit", and "View once and self-destruct". The latter can be a particularly useful feature for people in highly sensitive situations. + +## Applications Available + +CryptPad offers a wide variety of applications, or document types, making CryptPad a complete office suite. To create a new file from your *CryptDrive* page, click on the large "+ New" button. You will see a popup menu where you can select: "Folder", "Shared folder", Upload files", "Upload folder", "New Link", "Sheet", "Document", "Presentation", "Rich text", "Kanban", "Code", "Form", "Whiteboard", "Markdown slides", and "Diagram". + +That's a lot of choice! + +![Screenshot from the CryptPad new document popup showing all the types of document that can be created.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-filetypes.webp) + +
+

New from this week!

+ +==*Document* and *Presentation* applications have just been unlocked to all users on CryptPad.fr this week!== + +This is fantastic for collaborative work because the new *Document* type allows tracking changes within a document. These two new types of document are still in testing phase however, so make sure to back up your data regularly. Improvements will likely be added slowly in the coming weeks, until the final release planned for the end of March 2025. + +
+ +Here are screenshots of each application included in CryptPad to give you a better idea of what possibilities are in there: + +### Sheet + +The usual classic spreadsheet for all your calculation needs. If you are familiar with Google Docs' spreadsheet, you will likely find this one easy to use: + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad spreadsheet document.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-sheet.webp) + +### Document + +The classic text document with advanced formatting features: + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad doc-type document.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-document.webp) + +#### Tracking changes + +If you want to enable change tracking in this application, click on the "Collaboration" tab, then click on the "Track Changes" button, and select your preferred tracking option: + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad doc-type document showing the menu option to track changes.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-trackingchanges.webp) + +### Presentation + +Another classic application to help you create slideshows: + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad presentation document.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-presentation.webp) + +### Rich text + +A basic text document type for simpler text files: + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad rich text document.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-richtext.webp) + +### Kanban + +A useful kanban organization tool to plan your projects: + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad kanban document.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-kanban.webp) + +### Code + +A light code editor with previewing feature. This is especially useful for HTML files: + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad code document.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-code.webp) + +### Form + +A form tool to create and share surveys, without sharing your survey data with unwanted third-parties: + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad form document.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-form.webp) + +### Whiteboard + +A fun whiteboard tool if you feel creative, need to draw to explain, need to write and collaborate on complex math equations, and much more: + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad whiteboard document.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-whiteboard.webp) + +### Markdown slides + +A simple application to quickly create and preview slides in Markdown format: + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad markdown slide document.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-markdown.webp) + +### Diagram + +A flexible tool to create diagrams, for all your visual explanatory needs: + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad diagram document.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-diagram.webp) + +### Calendar + +And finally, this isn't a document type per se, but you might be happy to hear CryptPad also integrates a Calendar application. This can be a fantastic tool to organize with your team and events. You can access it by clicking on your username on the upper-right, then selecting "Calendar": + +![Screenshot from the CryptPad calendar application.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-calendar.webp) + +## Privacy and Encryption + +Everything in CryptPad is designed to minimize data collection. It's also designed to minimize the data visible to the instance's operators as much as feasible. This is great for privacy and significantly improves data security. If the data isn't accessible to even the instance's operators, then it also isn't accessible to thieves or abusive authorities. + +### What encryption does CryptPad use? + +With CryptPad, all your data is encrypted on your device before it is sent to the remote server. You never have to worry about data being readable in-transit or at-rest on the server. Only authorized users, senders and intended recipients, can access the decrypted data. + +To lock your account, CryptPad creates cryptographic keys derived from your username and password together. This means CryptPad servers never even see your username or password. In fact, a normal CryptPad server cannot even know if you are using the software with an account or not. Additionally, this makes it so that multiple people could use the same username, as long as they register with a different password. + +To secure documents, CryptPad uses [symmetric encryption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symmetric-key_algorithm) with a [secret key unique to each document](https://blog.cryptpad.org/2024/03/14/Most-Secure-CryptPad-Usage/). This ensures your document is unreadable to anyone who doesn't have the corresponding key. + +Keep in mind however than when you share a link to a document, this link contains the symmetric key to encrypt and decrypt the document, and to verify and issue the signatures. This access is irrevocable. Which means that if you want to stop someone who received the link to a document from accessing it later on, you will need to make a copy of this document and destroy the original you have shared. + +### Your public key + +If you want to access your own CryptPad public key, you can click on your username on the upper-right, then select "Profile" and click on "View my profile". There you can click on "Copy public key" and this will copy your key to your device's clipboard. + +![Screenshot from a CryptPad profile page showing the copy public key button.](../assets/images/cryptpad-review/cryptpad-profile.webp) + +### Encryption algorithms + +CryptPad uses a variety of reputable algorithms for its encryption needs. Here's a summary of what type of encryption CryptPad implements: + +- For login authentication: The [scrypt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scrypt) key derivation function (KDF). +- For symmetric encryption: The [XSalsa20](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salsa20)-[Poly1305](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poly1305) algorithms. +- For public-key encryption: The [x25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519)-[XSalsa20](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salsa20)-[Poly1305](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poly1305) algorithms. +- For signatures: The [Ed25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EdDSA#Ed25519) signature scheme. +- For hashes: The [SHA-512](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-2) algorithm. +- For all other cryptographic operations: The [TweetNaCl.js](https://tweetnacl.js.org/#/) library. + +You can read more details about how CryptPad implements encryption in [CryptPad's white paper](https://blog.cryptpad.org/2023/02/02/Whitepaper/). + +You can read more on a comparison of cryptography libraries CryptPad uses in [CryptPad's Blueprints](https://blueprints.cryptpad.org/review/libraries/). + +### Post-quantum encryption + +Like many other applications using encryption, CryptPad is preparing for the [post-quantum age](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography) evaluating how quantum-resistant its current algorithms are, and following closely recommendations for standards improvement. + +This is all very new as the [National Institute of Standards and Technology](https://www.nist.gov/) (NIST) just selected newly proposed post-quantum resistant algorithms [last summer](https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards) to establish new encryption standards and recommendations. + +Preparing now to harden encryption standards against future quantum computers possibly capable of breaking currently used cryptographic algorithms is very important. The CryptPad development team is already preparing for this and [plans to transition](https://blueprints.cryptpad.org/review/agility/) towards NIST's post-quantum new standards. + +### Perfect forward secrecy + +CryptPad's team is also [planning](https://xwiki.com/en/Blog/CryptPad-overview-2024/) on implementing [perfect forward secrecy](https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/perfect-forward-secrecy/) for its next generation. This will be a great improvement to secure communication within CryptPad, because it makes each session key unique. This means that if a session key was to be compromised, this would not affect any other sessions, significantly reducing the scope and damage of an attack. + +### Keeping CryptPad secure + +Like any privacy-focused product, CryptPad isn't magical. While CryptPad offers some of the very best protections for your privacy, you still have to take certain measures to secure your CryptPad data properly. CryptPad cannot control this part. + +Here's a few things you should remember to keep your CryptPad data secure and private: + +**Trustworthy server:** It's important to select a CryptPad instance that is trustworthy. Keep in mind that the instance operators could have access to your IP address or could theoretically maliciously modify the CryptPad's code they use to make it insecure. + +**Safe device:** Your device also needs to be safe and secure. There isn't much that *any* external service can do to protect your data if your device is compromised. + +**IP address:** Don't forget that whenever you connect to a server, website, or any service online, you are sharing your IP address, which can be used to identify and locate you, more or less accurately. If this is a threat to you, consider using a trustworthy VPN or the Tor network to protect your IP address. + +**HTTPS:** Make sure the CryptPad instance's address you use starts with "HTTPS". + +**Document links:** Because CryptPad includes the keys to decrypt your document in the links you use and share, anyone who can access your browsing history could potentially read your decrypted document. This is also true for anything in your browser or device that can access your browser's history (extensions, synced accounts, screen-sharing, Windows Recall, etc.). To mitigate this, you should [enable](https://docs.cryptpad.org/en/user_guide/user_account.html#security-privacy) the option "Safe links" in "Settings" > "Security & Privacy". + +**Password:** It's important to safeguard your password properly and *choose a password that is unique, complex, and long*. No matter how good the encryption is, if someone guesses your password, it's game over. + +**Multifactor authentication:** As soon as you create an account, you should enable a second factor of authentication. This will help protect your data against account takeover, in case your password were to be guessed or leaked. This is true for any account you have. + +**Document accesses:** Be careful to reduce the document's access to the minimum access required for functionality. For example, if you share a document link publicly, make sure it's a read-only link that doesn't allow anyone to edit it. + +**File history:** By default, files keep history of document changes and who viewed or modified a document. You can see this in "File" > "History". If you need to erase this history for safety but keep the document, you can go to "File" > "Make a copy", then go back to the original document with the history you need to erase, click on "Access", then "Destroy", then click again on "Are you sure?". This will permanently destroy your original document. Be careful, there is no recovery after this. + +**Static keys:** CryptPad uses static keys to encrypt your documents. This means that once you have shared a document, and therefore its static keys, you cannot revoke this access. By default, anyone you have shared a link to your document with will retain this access indefinitely. If you wish to revoke access, you can make a copy of the document then destroy the original. This will also erase the document's history. + +To learn more about the CryptPad team's recommendations on the most secure way to use CryptPad, you can read [this article](https://blog.cryptpad.org/2024/03/14/Most-Secure-CryptPad-Usage/). + +## Downsides + +There are a few downsides in using CryptPad as your office suite. + +First, due to the nature of end-to-end encryption, it is slower. Naturally, each file needing to get decrypted before each use can slow down your workflow. The CryptPad instance you have chosen to use, your internet connection's speed, and your device's speed are all factors that can contribute in making this operation slower or faster. But remember, you are trading speed for security and privacy. + +Second, there is no mobile or desktop app available at this time. CryptPad only runs in the browser (for now). Depending on your type of usage, this can be inconvenient. Additionally, this means there is no way to access your data locally unless you create a copy of it in plain text on your device. Other end-to-end document applications such as [Standard Notes](https://standardnotes.com/) or [Anytype](https://anytype.io/) allow users to access documents offline, but they do not offer collaborative and office suite features like CryptPad does. + +## Conclusion + +Finally, if you are looking for a replacement to Google Docs, switching to CryptPad is an obvious choice. + +With solid end-to-end encryption for all your document content and minimal data collection at all steps of the registration process, CryptPad is an excellent option for your data privacy *and* your data security. + +If data privacy is important to you, **there is no reason to keep your sensitive information in the Google ecosystem**, especially with everything that we know about it now. + +Switching to CryptPad, you will benefit from the same type of applications (and more), still be able to share links with external parties without requiring them to create an account, and store information remotely in a secure way. + +But *in addition* to Google Docs, you will benefit from strong end-to-end encryption on everything you wish to keep private, true document destruction for everything that you want gone, and a complete office suite that only you and your team can access, away from intrusive Google scans or even CryptPad's knowledge. + +If you need a remote collaborative office suite that is secure and respects your privacy, there is no reason not to switch to CryptPad. + +## Support CryptPad + +If you wish to support this free and open-source project, you can help CryptPad by: + +- [Following CryptPad on Mastodon](https://fosstodon.org/@cryptpad) +- [Donating on Open Collective](https://opencollective.com/cryptpad/contribute/) +- [Contributing on GitHub](https://github.com/cryptpad) +- [Watching CryptPad's videos on PeerTube](https://peertube.xwiki.com/c/cryptpad_channel/videos) + +--- + +***Editor's Note (Feb. 12):** This article was updated to clarify the difference between CryptPad (the open source software) and instances of CryptPad like CryptPad.fr (the hosted cloud instance of CryptPad operated by CryptPad's creators) in certain contexts.* diff --git a/blog/posts/delisting-startpage.md b/blog/posts/delisting-startpage.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..81ac9a12 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/delisting-startpage.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2019-11-12T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +authors: + - niek-de-wilde +links: + - posts/relisting-startpage.md + - Search Engines: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/ +tags: + - Search Engines +description: Startpage has been removed from Privacy Guides' recommendations following their acquisition by System1. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- +# Delisting Startpage From Privacy Guides + +!["Delisting Startpage" cover image](../assets/images/delisting-startpage/cover.webp) + + + +Dear *Privacy Guides* Community, + +On the 15th of October, it was [brought to our attention](https://web.archive.org/web/20201127034309/https://www.reddit.com/r/privacy/comments/di5rn3/startpage_is_now_owned_by_an_advertising_company/) that Startpage.com was reportedly (partially?) taken over by a company called the Privacy One Group, which is in turn owned by a company called System1. We found this quite remarkable as the two companies seem to have conflicting business models. Startpage has been known for basing their advertisements on what their users enter in their search bar. System1 on the other hand, is a pay-per-click advertising company that "[has developed a pre-targeting platform that identifies and unlocks consumer intent across channels including social, native, email, search, market research and lead generation rather than relying solely on what consumers enter into search boxes.](https://web.archive.org/web/20201127034309/https://www.bizjournals.com/losangeles/news/2017/09/20/system1-raises-270-million-for-consumer-intent.html)" + +We reached out to System1 CEO [Ian Weingarten](https://web.archive.org/web/20201127034309/https://finance.yahoo.com/news/system1-appoints-ian-weingarten-ceo-185700741.html) for an explanation. We received a very general response that did not address key questions. + +Seemingly prompted by our ongoing concerns, Startpage released a public letter addressed to us from their CEO, and hosted a [Q&A](https://web.archive.org/web/20201127034309/https://www.reddit.com/r/StartpageSearch/comments/djshn3/hello_reddit_startpage_mod_team/) on their Subreddit to try and explain the situation. While some of our questions were answered, we noted that the company seemed to be evasive, essentially restating information from a previously published [blog post](https://web.archive.org/web/20201127034309/https://www.startpage.com/blog/company-updates/startpage-and-privacy-one-group/) or posting the same response to different questions. People had to really dig to get answers and puzzle all information together, instead of getting a clearly explained and comprehensive answer from the start. Requests for clarification to some important questions went ignored. + +Because of the conflicting business model and the unusual way the company reacted, claiming to be fully transparent but being evasive at the same time, we have no choice but to delist Startpage from our recommendations until it is fully transparent about its new ownership and data processing. Remaining questions include: + +- The % of Startpage and Surfboard Holding B.V. (the Startpage holding company) System1 acquired in December 2018. +- The current % ownership by System1 at the time of the audit (and any other major owners). +- Information about Privacy One Group Ltd. Where is it registered and in what city, state and country does it operate? (We have not been able to verify registration information.) +- A diagram of data flows, including flows to outside organizations, like System1, Privacy One etc. + +This delisting does not necessarily mean Startpage is violating its privacy policy. We have no evidence of that. But because there are still so many unanswered questions, we can no longer recommend the service with good confidence. If Startpage aims to be re-considered, they will have to answer the questions above, preferably along with an explanation of why it took them so long to get proper answers out to the public. + +Sincerely, +Blacklight447 +*Privacy Guides* + +--- + +**2020-05-03:** Startpage has answered all of our questions for them and has clarified their policies. We have decided to recommend their service again, and you can read our latest [announcement](relisting-startpage.md) for more details. + +**2023-10-23:** This post has been edited to reflect the team's move from [PrivacyTools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/privacytools/) to Privacy Guides. diff --git a/blog/posts/delisting-wire.md b/blog/posts/delisting-wire.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0fc1a5d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/delisting-wire.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2019-11-19T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +authors: + - danarel +links: + - Real Time Communication: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/ + - Types of Communication Networks: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/communication-network-types/ +tags: + - Instant Messengers +description: Wire has been removed from Privacy Guides' recommendations following their acquisition by a US holding company and VC investments. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- +# Delisting Wire From Privacy Guides + +!["Delisting Wire" cover image](../assets/images/delisting-wire/cover.avif) + + + +It has recently come to the attention of the *Privacy Guides* team that **Wire**, the popular end-to-end encryption messaging platform [has been sold or moved to a US company](https://web.archive.org/web/20201128215737/https://forum.privacytools.io/t/wire-swiss-gmbh-is-now-owned-by-a-usa-holding-company/1932). After a week of questioning, Wire finally confirmed they had changed holding companies and would now be a US based company in a move they called “simple and pragmatic,” as they worked to expand their foothold in the enterprise market. This also came alongside the news that Wire had accepted more than $8 million in Venture Capital (VC) funding from Morpheus Ventures, as well as other investors. + +Morpheus Ventures holds a [portfolio](https://web.archive.org/web/20201128215737/https://morpheus.com/portfolio/) including companies in healthcare, voice AI, life insurance, and retail customer data analytics: All sectors that have historically used invasive data collection methods to survive. Why would a VC with a portfolio centered on consumer data want to invest in a company whose mission claims to protect that very same information? + +Earlier this year, Wire announced they had entered a partnership with [FedResults](https://web.archive.org/web/20201128215737/https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/07/10/1880912/0/en/Wire-and-FedResults-Partner-to-Offer-End-to-End-Encrypted-Collaboration-Platform-to-Government-Agencies.html), in a move that would bring Wire's secure messaging platform to US federal agencies. This raised a few eyebrows, but did not alarm the privacy community as Wire remained Swiss based and beholden to Switzerland's strict privacy laws. Today however, while much of Wire's business will continue to be run out of their Swiss offices, with new US-based ownership it is not entirely clear how much jurisdiction the United States will have over Wire data. + +This is alarming because it is well known that Wire [stores unencrypted metadata](https://web.archive.org/web/20201128215737/https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gvzw5x/secure-messaging-app-wire-stores-everyone-youve-ever-contacted-in-plain-text) for every user. + +In an interview with [TechCrunch](https://web.archive.org/web/20201128215737/https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/13/messaging-app-wire-confirms-8-2m-raise-responds-to-privacy-concerns-after-moving-holding-company-to-the-us/), Wire CEO Morten Brøgger said of privacy laws: “We are in Switzerland, which has the best privacy laws in the world” — it’s subject to Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation framework (GDPR) on top of its own local laws — “and Wire now belongs to a new group holding, but there no change in control.” [sic] + +Even if he is correct, the move and statement do bring up further questions. With Wire now being a US company with contracts partnering it with US federal authorities, will those authorities now have leverage to compel Wire to give up metadata on users? Wire has investors to answer to and will not be able to risk losing large deals with clients like the US federal government. This is of course a hypothetical situation, but one to be considered nonetheless as we decide which services to recommend on [*Privacy Guides*](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/). + +Wire also quietly made an adjustment to its own privacy policy. A [previous version](https://web.archive.org/web/20180324221043/https://wire.com/en/legal/#privacy-7) of the policy (July 18, 2017) stated it would only share user data when required by law. Now (Updated September 1, 2018), it reads they will share user data when "necessary." What does necessary mean, and necessary to whom? Necessary to law enforcement, shareholders, or advertisers? The word "necessary" is an alarming change because "necessary" is purposefully vague terminology that could conceivably be used as a tool to justify any action. This change doesn't leave the user with much confidence as to when the company may share your data. + +Yet another red flag, and one of the more important ones to us, was that Wire decided not to disclose this policy change to its users, and when asked why, Brøgger was flippant in his response, stating: “Our evaluation was that this was not necessary. Was it right or wrong? I don’t know.” + +We feel we do know, and the answer was that it was wrong. Privacy and security are not built solely on strong technology, but on trust. Yes, we can review Wire's open source code on GitHub, but we can't ever be sure that code is the same exact code that runs on their servers in practice. Yet, we have trusted them in the past because Wire had built a trustworthy reputation for themselves. We now feel that Wire has lost this reputation. By deciding to withhold information regarding its ownership and policies from its users, Wire has broken the trust our community has placed in it, and worse yet sounds almost dismissive of the worries voiced by the privacy community that had long held them in high regard. + +Because of these ongoing concerns, and this break in trust in Wire's organization, *Privacy Guides* has made the decision to remove Wire from its recommendations. It is worth noting that does not necessarily mean Wire is unsafe, but we believe it is our duty to recommend products that we as a team feel comfortable standing behind. We need to believe in the security, privacy, and integrity of our recommendations, and we no longer feel we can do that with Wire at this time. + +--- + +**2023-10-23:** This post has been edited to reflect the team's move from [PrivacyTools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/privacytools/) to Privacy Guides. diff --git a/blog/posts/easyoptouts-review.md b/blog/posts/easyoptouts-review.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c46efc2f --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/easyoptouts-review.md @@ -0,0 +1,610 @@ +--- +title: EasyOptOuts Review & Real-World Test +description: "People-search sites represent an immense privacy risk to the majority of Americans. EasyOptOuts is a low-cost online service which automates opt-out requests on your behalf." +date: + created: 2025-02-03T16:20:00Z +categories: + - Reviews +authors: + - jonah +links: + - Data Removal Services: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/data-broker-removals/ +tags: + - People-Search Sites +license: BY-SA +template: review-article.html +schema_type: ReviewNewsArticle +review: + type: WebApplication + category: SecurityApplication + subcategory: People-Search Site Removal Tool + name: EasyOptOuts + alternateName: EasyOptOuts.com + price: 19.99 + period: yr + website: https://easyoptouts.com/ + rating: 4.5 + pros: + - Saves enormous time compared to manual opt-outs. + - Exceptional value, priced an order of magnitude lower than much of its competition. + - Searches and opts-out of all supported sites extremely quickly. + cons: + - Fairly bare-boned interface. + - The 100+ supported websites is still not close to some of the more expensive alternatives. + - No manual/human interaction. +--- +![EasyOptOuts logo](../assets/img/data-broker-removals/easyoptouts.svg){ align=right itemprop="image" } + +**EasyOptOuts.com** is a $19.99/year [people-search site removal service](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/data-broker-removals/) which will search a number of different data broker sites and automatically submit opt-out requests on your behalf. They will perform the first search and removal process immediately, and then re-run the process every 4 months in case your data shows up on new sites over time. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://easyoptouts.com){ .md-button } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://easyoptouts.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + +## Background + +People-search sites represent an immense privacy risk to the majority of Americans. For many, sensitive personal information such as your address, phone number, email, and age is a simple internet search away. While there is unfortunately no federal regulation in place to protect your data, many of these companies will remove your information from their public databases upon request. EasyOptOuts is a low-cost online service which automates these opt-out requests, saving you time and removing the need to constantly monitor new sites/databases for your personal information on a regular basis. + +*Privacy Guides* selected this service for review based on community reviews and various reporting from organizations including [Consumer Reports](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/consumer-reports-evaluating-people-search-site-removal-services/19948). In our best judgement, EasyOptOuts services consistently received the most positive feedback and results in terms of efficacy, so we prioritized its testing over other similar services due to our limited budget. + +The EasyOptOuts subscription was paid for by Privacy Guides. *Privacy Guides* did not contact EasyOptOuts regarding this review, or request free/discounted services before conducting this review. + +## Methodology + +*Privacy Guides* conducted this review with 2 volunteer subjects who agreed to allow us to use EasyOptOuts to attempt to remove their personal information from public people-search sites, then evaluate those results. Our subjects: + +- Are US citizens +- Have never used a people-search removal service +- Have never manually opted-out of people-search sites +- Are homeowners +- Do not live in a state with specific privacy regulations related to data brokers or people-search sites + +The information we provided to EasyOptOuts: + +- First and last name +- Maiden name (if applicable) +- Birth year +- Current street address +- Most recent previous address (if applicable) +- Current phone number(s) +- Current email address + +We did not provide the names of relatives as requested by EasyOptOuts, as they were not volunteers for this review. This is one potential limitation with our evaluation to keep in mind. + +!!! info "Disclaimer" + + **Please note that this review is not intended to be a comprehensive evaluation of EasyOptOuts, as we are conducting this test with a very limited sample size.** We do not consider our results to be statistically significant. Rather, this review should be taken as an additional "real-world" data point for you to consider when evaluating this service. We encourage you to seek out other independent reporting to consider as well before making any purchase decision. + +## Initial Search + +*Privacy Guides* performed an initial search for personal information for each of our subjects on Google by searching for their first and last name in quotes, plus their current city and state (for example, `"Jane Doe" Chicago IL`). We then counted the number of unique results which contained their personal information in the title or description shown in Google. + +Using standard engine search results is one of the most common methods of discovering personal information, and typically represents the greatest risk to most people, so measuring the number of search engine results that are removed as a result of the opt-out process is one of our highest priority measurements. + +
+ +
+ +**Person A (11 Google results):** + +- 411.com +- thatsthem.com +- blockshopper.com* +- fastpeoplesearch.com +- usphonebook.com +- spokeo.com +- truepeoplesearch.com +- information.com +- peoplesearch.com* +- radaris.com +- peoplefinders.com + +
+ +
+ +**Person B (10 Google results):** + +- whitepages.com +- truepeoplesearch.com +- usphonebook.com +- fastpeoplesearch.com +- spokeo.com +- radaris.com +- information.com +- thatsthem.com +- idcrawl.com* +- peekyou.com* + +
+ +
+ +We also performed a manual search for their information on 15 different "high-priority" data brokers. These brokers represent either the most commonly used people-search sites, and/or cover numerous people-search sites with their databases, so having your data removed from these companies can have an outsized positive effect on your overall privacy. + +| Service | Person A | Person B | +| ----- | ----- | ----- | +| advancedbackgroundchecks.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| beenverified.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| checkpeople.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| clustrmaps.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| dataveria.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| gladiknow.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| infotracer.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| intelius.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| peekyou.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| publicdatausa.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| radaris.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| spokeo.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| thatsthem.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| usphonebook.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| spyfly.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| **Remaining Results** | **100%** | **100%** | + +It should be noted that EasyOptOuts does not claim or advertise that they have the ability to opt you out of some websites above, so we do not expect 100% coverage. However, the site compatibility of EasyOptOuts *is* a real-world limitation of the service we think you should consider before making a decision, so we intentionally did not limit our review to only the sites they advertise support for. The sites EasyOptOuts does *not* advertise support for are marked with an asterisk (*). + +## User Experience + +Registering a new account with EasyOptOuts was a very simple and easy-to-follow process. Their website does a great job explaining what is happening and why they need the data they're requesting at every step. Many of the fields are required, including your first and last name, year of birth, and precise street address. However, including your email addresses, phone numbers, and names of relatives in the search are optional. This is to be generally expected, as your precise data is needed to perform opt-out requests in the majority of cases. However, some competitors do allow you to provide a little less information, such as only your city/state instead of your exact current address, at the expense of potentially being less effective. + +The only payment processor in use by EasyOptOuts is PayPal, but they've enabled the option to accept credit card payments without an actual PayPal account. PayPal does default to creating a new account for you with this information, so if you want to avoid that you should uncheck the "Save info & create your PayPal account" option at checkout. + +We received a notification that the opt-out process had been completed approximately 1.5 hours after payment. This is much faster than many similar services will submit opt-out requests. However, as they note in the notification email: "Some sites remove data quickly, but some take weeks," so while the initial requests have been made, it will still take some time for them to actually go into effect. + +EasyOptOuts is able to provide its service at a much lower price point than competitors like Optery or DeleteMe because they have no manual/human intervention at any point in the opt-out process. This limits the amount of websites they are able to support, however. In fact, their emailed report explicitly recommends manually opting-out of PeopleConnect (Intelius) sites at because they are not able to do so with their automated systems. + +## 1 Week + +| Service | Person A | Person B | +| ----- | ----- | ----- | +| advancedbackgroundchecks.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| beenverified.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :warning: Found | +| checkpeople.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| clustrmaps.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| dataveria.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| gladiknow.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| infotracer.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :warning: Found | +| intelius.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| peekyou.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| publicdatausa.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| radaris.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| spokeo.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| thatsthem.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| usphonebook.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| spyfly.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| **Remaining Results** | **33%** | **46%** | + +It should be noted that some of these websites included "sponsored links" to *other* data-brokers in their search results. For example, while both people's data was removed from advancedbackgroundchecks.com's own internal database, the search results on advancedbackgroundchecks.com still included a sponsored link to their data on truthfinder.com, one of the websites operated separately by PeopleConnect which EasyOptOuts does not support. This means that manual intervention is still very important when using EasyOptOuts, to cover larger services like PeopleConnect which require more complex interaction. + +On Google we saw some reduction, but many results with sensitive information remained. This is something we'll monitor for future updates, as these results drop from Google's caches. Once again, the sites EasyOptOuts does not advertise support for are marked with an asterisk (*) in all of these tables. + +
+ +
+ +**Person A (8 Google results):** + +- thatsthem.com +- blockshopper.com* +- fastpeoplesearch.com +- usphonebook.com +- information.com +- peoplesearch.com* +- radaris.com +- fastpeoplesearch.com + +
+ +
+ +**Person B (6 Google results):** + +- truepeoplesearch.com +- usphonebook.com +- information.com +- fastpeoplesearch.com +- thatsthem.com +- peekyou.com* + +
+ +
+ +## 1 Month + +| Service | Person A | Person B | +| ----- | ----- | ----- | +| advancedbackgroundchecks.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| beenverified.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :warning: Found | +| checkpeople.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| clustrmaps.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| dataveria.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| gladiknow.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| infotracer.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :warning: Found | +| intelius.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| peekyou.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| publicdatausa.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| radaris.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| spokeo.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | ::white_check_mark: Removed | +| thatsthem.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| usphonebook.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| spyfly.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| **Remaining Results** | **20%** | **33%** | + +Once again, we also searched for their information on Google, and we noticed a reduction in exposure to basic search engines as we expected: + +
+ +
+ +**Person A (4 Google results):** + +- thatsthem.com +- blockshopper.com* +- fastpeoplesearch.com +- peoplesearch.com* + +
+ +
+ +**Person B (2 Google results):** + +- thatsthem.com +- peekyou.com* + +
+ +
+ +## 3 Months + +| Service | Person A | Person B | +| ----- | ----- | ----- | +| advancedbackgroundchecks.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| beenverified.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :warning: Found | +| checkpeople.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| clustrmaps.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| dataveria.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| gladiknow.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| infotracer.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :warning: Found | +| intelius.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| peekyou.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found | +| publicdatausa.com[^1] | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| radaris.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| spokeo.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | ::white_check_mark: Removed | +| thatsthem.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| usphonebook.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| spyfly.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed | +| **Remaining Results** | **13%** | **23%** | + +[^1]: While writing this article, EasyOptOuts added support for *publicdatausa.com*. This was first applicable during the "3 month" test, where we noticed the opt-out was successful. + +Once again, the sites EasyOptOuts does not advertise support for are marked with an asterisk (*). Finally, we searched for their information on Google, and there were no results from websites supported by EasyOptOuts remaining: + +
+ +
+ +**Person A (1 Google result):** + +- blockshopper.com* + +
+ +
+ +**Person B (2 Google results):** + +- idcrawl.com* +- peekyou.com* + +
+ +
+ +## Additional Sites + +In addition to the websites we performed an [initial search](#initial-search) with, the EasyOptOuts report we received claimed to find and remove our participants' data from the following websites. While *Privacy Guides* did not search all of these sites in advance of the test to validate these results independently, searching tens or hundreds of smaller sites *is* one of the key advantages of using an automated service like EasyOptOuts. + +
+ +
+ +**Person A:** + +??? warning "We found your information and performed opt-outs for the following 112 sites" + + - 411.com + - advancedbackgroundchecks.com + - arrestwarrant.org + - backgroundcheck.run + - backgroundcheckers.net + - beenverified.com + - bumper.com, covered by beenverified.com + - centeda.com + - checkpeople.com + - checksecrets.com + - clubset.com + - clustrmaps.com + - councilon.com + - courtcasefinder.com + - curadvisor.com + - cyberbackgroundchecks.com + - dataveria.com + - familytreenow.com + - fastbackgroundcheck.com + - fastpeoplesearch.com + - findpeoplesearch.com + - freepeoplesearch.com + - gladiknow.com + - golookup.com + - goreversephone.com + - govwarrantsearch.org + - hudwayglass.com + - information.com + - infotracer.com + - inmatessearcher.com + - kidslivesafe.com + - kwold.com + - mugshotlook.com + - mylife.com + - neighbor.report + - neighborwho.com + - newenglandfacts.com + - numberguru.com + - nuwber.com + - officialusa.com + - ownerly.com + - people-background-check.com + - people-wizard.com + - peoplebyname.com + - peoplechk.com + - peoplefinders.com + - peoplelooker.com + - peoplesearch123.com + - peoplesearcher.com + - peoplesearchnow.com + - peoplesearchusa.org + - peoplesmart.com + - peopleswhizr.com + - peopleswiz.com + - peopleswizard.com + - peoplewhiz.com + - peoplewhiz.net + - peoplewhized.com + - peoplewhized.net + - peoplewhizr.com + - peoplewhizr.net + - peoplewiz.com + - peoplewizard.net + - peoplewizr.com + - personsearchers.com + - persontrust.com + - privaterecords.net + - privatereports.com + - pub360.com + - publicdatacheck.com + - publicinfoservices.com + - publicrecordreports.com + - publicsearcher.com + - quickpeopletrace.com + - radaris.com + - recordsfinder.com + - rehold.com + - reunion.com + - reverselookupaphonenumber.com + - reversephonecheck.com + - sealedrecords.net + - searchpeoplefree.com + - searchpublicrecords.com + - searchquarry.com + - secretinfo.org + - smartbackgroundchecks.com + - spydialer.com + - spyfly.com + - staterecords.org + - telephonedirectories.us + - texasarrests.org + - texasarrestwarrants.org + - thatsthem.com + - truepeoplesearch.com + - truthrecord.org + - unmask.com + - usa-people-search.com + - usatrace.com + - usphonebook.com + - usrecords.net + - uswarrants.org + - vehiclerelatedrecords.com + - verecor.com + - vericora.com + - veriforia.com + - verifyrecords.com + - veripages.com + - virtory.com + - weinform.org + - wellnut.com + - whitepages.com + - yellowbook.com + +??? info "We checked the following 10 sites, but didn't find any personal information, so we didn't perform opt-outs" + + - americaphonebook.com + - floridaresidentsdirectory.com + - freepeopledirectory.com + - northcarolinaresidentdatabase.com + - ohioresidentdatabase.com + - peoplewin.com + - selfie.network + - selfie.systems + - spokeo.com + - unitedstatesphonebook.com + +
+ +
+ +**Person B:** + +??? warning "We found your information and performed opt-outs for the following 107 sites" + + - 411.com + - advancedbackgroundchecks.com + - arrestwarrant.org + - backgroundcheck.run + - backgroundcheckers.net + - beenverified.com + - bumper.com, covered by beenverified.com + - centeda.com + - checkpeople.com + - checksecrets.com + - clubset.com + - councilon.com + - courtcasefinder.com + - curadvisor.com + - cyberbackgroundchecks.com + - dataveria.com + - familytreenow.com + - fastbackgroundcheck.com + - fastpeoplesearch.com + - findpeoplesearch.com + - freepeoplesearch.com + - gladiknow.com + - golookup.com + - goreversephone.com + - govwarrantsearch.org + - hudwayglass.com + - information.com + - infotracer.com + - inmatessearcher.com + - kidslivesafe.com + - kwold.com + - mugshotlook.com + - neighborwho.com + - newenglandfacts.com + - numberguru.com + - nuwber.com + - ownerly.com + - people-background-check.com + - people-wizard.com + - peoplebyname.com + - peoplechk.com + - peoplefinders.com + - peoplelooker.com + - peoplesearch123.com + - peoplesearcher.com + - peoplesearchnow.com + - peoplesearchusa.org + - peoplesmart.com + - peopleswhizr.com + - peopleswiz.com + - peopleswizard.com + - peoplewhiz.com + - peoplewhiz.net + - peoplewhized.com + - peoplewhized.net + - peoplewhizr.com + - peoplewhizr.net + - peoplewiz.com + - peoplewizard.net + - peoplewizr.com + - personsearchers.com + - persontrust.com + - privaterecords.net + - privatereports.com + - pub360.com + - publicdatacheck.com + - publicinfoservices.com + - publicrecordreports.com + - publicsearcher.com + - quickpeopletrace.com + - radaris.com + - recordsfinder.com + - rehold.com + - reverselookupaphonenumber.com + - reversephonecheck.com + - sealedrecords.net + - searchpeoplefree.com + - searchpublicrecords.com + - searchquarry.com + - secretinfo.org + - smartbackgroundchecks.com + - spydialer.com + - spyfly.com + - staterecords.org + - telephonedirectories.us + - texasarrests.org + - texasarrestwarrants.org + - thatsthem.com + - truepeoplesearch.com + - truthrecord.org + - unmask.com + - usa-people-search.com + - usatrace.com + - usphonebook.com + - usrecords.net + - uswarrants.org + - vehiclerelatedrecords.com + - verecor.com + - vericora.com + - veriforia.com + - verifyrecords.com + - veripages.com + - virtory.com + - weinform.org + - wellnut.com + - whitepages.com + - yellowbook.com + +??? info "We checked the following 15 sites, but didn't find any personal information, so we didn't perform opt-outs" + + - americaphonebook.com + - clustrmaps.com + - floridaresidentsdirectory.com + - freepeopledirectory.com + - mylife.com + - neighbor.report + - northcarolinaresidentdatabase.com + - officialusa.com + - ohioresidentdatabase.com + - peoplewin.com + - reunion.com + - selfie.network + - selfie.systems + - spokeo.com + - unitedstatesphonebook.com + +
+ +
+ +In addition, for all subscriptions EasyOptOuts says that "the following 10 sites aren't freely searchable. We always perform opt-outs for them:" + +- acxiom.com +- adstradata.com +- archives.com +- backgroundalert.com (searchable, but covered by lexisnexis.com, which isn't searchable) +- idtrue.com (searchable, but covered by lexisnexis.com, which isn't searchable) +- lexisnexis.com +- oracle.com +- pipl.com +- thomsonreuters.com +- us.epsilon.com + +What this means is that EasyOptOuts will send the personal information you provide to these websites *regardless* of whether they have your information in the first place. While this is an unfortunate necessity if you want to ensure your data is removed from as many databases as possible, we would like to see this provided as an *option* during EasyOptOuts' registration process for people who would like to avoid this behavior. + +## Evaluation + +For our final evaluation, we will look at how many of the initial Google search engine results are no longer listed after 3 months, how many results from the 15 data brokers we initially measured were removed, and how many results from the subset of the 15 data brokers that EasyOptOuts advertises support for (13 total) were removed. + +The first two results are intended to benchmark the "real-world efficacy" of EasyOptOuts, i.e. how much of an impact you will immediately notice while using the service. The third result is intended to benchmark how well EasyOptOuts lives up to their own marketing claims. + +| | Person A | Person B | +| ---- | ---- | ---- | +| Percentage of Google search results removed | 90% | 80% | +| Percentage of high-priority data brokers removed | 86% | 73% | +| Percentage of *compatible* high-priority data brokers removed | 100% | 84% | + +Based on these results, I consider EasyOptOuts to be well worth the money. It made a substantial difference in the amount of real-world exposure for both subjects, with relatively little effort required. The amount of data remaining publicly accessible is a very manageable amount that can be manually dealt with afterward. + +It isn't a perfect service, and even our limited testing shows that your mileage may vary depending on your individual circumstances, but any reduction in the amount of data publicly available about you is a good thing, and if you're in the United States this is certainly an option worth considering. diff --git a/blog/posts/firefox-privacy-2021-update.md b/blog/posts/firefox-privacy-2021-update.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2ef533ce --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/firefox-privacy-2021-update.md @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2021-12-01T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Reviews +authors: + - dngray +links: + - 'Desktop Browsers
Firefox': https://www.privacyguides.org/desktop-browsers/#firefox +tags: + - Browsers + - Firefox +license: CC0 +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# Firefox Privacy: 2021 Update + +![Firefox Privacy cover](../assets/images/firefox-privacy/cover.webp) + + + +A lot changed between 2019 and now, not least with regard to Firefox. Since our last post, Mozilla has [improved](https://blog.mozilla.org/en/products/firefox/latest-firefox-rolls-out-enhanced-tracking-protection-2-0-blocking-redirect-trackers-by-default/) privacy with [Enhanced Tracking Protection (ETP)](https://blog.mozilla.org/en/products/firefox/firefox-now-available-with-enhanced-tracking-protection-by-default/). Earlier this year Mozilla introduced [Total Cookie Protection](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/02/23/total-cookie-protection/) (Dynamic First Party Isolation dFPI). This was then further tightened with [Enhanced Cookie Clearing](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/08/10/firefox-91-introduces-enhanced-cookie-clearing/). We’re also looking very forward to [Site Isolation](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/05/18/introducing-site-isolation-in-firefox/) (code named Fission) being enabled by default in the coming releases. + +Now that so many privacy features are built into the browser, there is little need for extensions made by third-party developers. Accordingly, we have updated our very outdated [browser](https://www.privacyguides.org/desktop-browsers/) section. If you’ve got an old browser profile we suggest **creating a new one**. Some of the old advice may make your browser *more* unique. + +## Privacy Tweaks “about:config” + +We’re no longer recommending that users set `about:config` switches manually. Those switches need to be up-to-date and continuously maintained. They should be studied before blindly making modifications. Sometimes their behavior changes in between Firefox releases, is superseded by other keys, or gets removed entirely. We do not see any point in duplicating the efforts of the community [Arkenfox](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) project. Arkenfox has very good documentation in their [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki), and we use it ourselves. + +## LocalCDN and Decentraleyes + +These extensions aren’t required with Total Cookie Protection (TCP), which is enabled if you’ve set Enhanced Tracking Protection (ETP) to **Strict**. + +Replacing scripts on CDNs with local versions is not a comprehensive solution and is a form of [enumeration of badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). While it may work with some scripts that are included it doesn’t help with most other third-party connections. + +CDN extensions never really improved privacy as far as sharing your IP address was concerned and their usage is fingerprintable as this Tor Project developer [points out](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/22089#note_2639603). They are the wrong tool for the job and are not a substitute for a good VPN or Tor. Its worth noting the [resources](https://git.synz.io/Synzvato/decentraleyes/-/tree/master/resources) for Decentraleyes are hugely out of date and would not be likely used anyway. + +## NeatURLs and ClearURLs + +Previously we recommended ClearURLs to remove tracking parameters from URLs you might visit. These extensions are no longer needed with uBlock Origin’s [`removeparam`](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Static-filter-syntax#removeparam) feature. + +## HTTPS Everywhere + +The EFF announced back in September they were [deprecating HTTPS-Everywhere](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/09/https-actually-everywhere) as most browsers now have an HTTPS-Only feature. We are pleased to see privacy features built into the browser and Firefox 91 introduced [HTTPS by Default in Private Browsing](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/08/10/firefox-91-introduces-https-by-default-in-private-browsing/). + +## Multi Account Containers and Temporary Containers + +Container extensions aren’t as important as they used to be for privacy now that we have [Total Cookie Protection](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/02/23/total-cookie-protection/). + +Multi Account Container will still have some use if you use [Mozilla VPN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozilla_VPN) as it is going to be [integrated](https://github.com/mozilla/multi-account-containers/issues/2210) allowing you to configure specified containers to use a particular VPN server. Another use might be if you want to log in to multiple accounts on the same domain. + +## Just-In-Time Compilation (JIT) + +What is “Disable JIT” in Bromite? This option disables the JavaScript performance feature [JIT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just-in-time_compilation). It can increase security but at the cost of performance. Those trade-offs vary wildly and are explored in [this](https://microsoftedge.github.io/edgevr/posts/Super-Duper-Secure-Mode/) publication by Johnathan Norman from the Microsoft Edge team. This option is very much a security vs performance option. + +## Mozilla browsers on Android + +We don’t recommend any Mozilla based browsers on Android. This is because we don’t feel that [GeckoView](https://mozilla.github.io/geckoview) is quite as secure as it could be as it doesn’t support [site isolation](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/05/introducing-firefox-new-site-isolation-security-architecture), soon to be coming in desktop browsers or [isolated processes](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196). + +We also noticed that there isn’t an option for [HTTPS-Only mode](https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/fenix/issues/16952#issuecomment-907960218). The only way to get something similar is to install the [deprecated](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/09/https-actually-everywhere) extension [HTTPS Everywhere](https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere). + +There are places which Firefox on Android shines for example browsing news websites where you may want to *partially* load some JavaScript (but not all) using medium or hard [blocking mode](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode). The [reader view](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/view-articles-reader-view-firefox-android) is also pretty cool. We expect things will change in the future, so we’re keeping a close eye on this. + +## Fingerprinting + +Firefox has the ability to block known third party [fingerprinting resources](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2020/01/07/firefox-72-fingerprinting/). Mozilla has [advanced protection](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/firefox-protection-against-fingerprinting) against fingerprinting (RFP is enabled with Arkenfox). + +We do not recommend extensions that promise to change your [browser fingerprint](https://blog.torproject.org/browser-fingerprinting-introduction-and-challenges-ahead/). Some of those extensions [are detectable](https://www.cse.chalmers.se/~andrei/codaspy17.pdf) by websites through JavaScript and [CSS](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03152176/file/style-fingerprinting-usenix.pdf) methods, particularly those which inject anything into the web content. + +This includes **all** extensions that try to change the user agent or other browser behavior to prevent fingerprinting. We see these often recommended on Reddit and would like to say that they will likely make you more unique and can be circumvented. Arkenfox has [a good list](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/4.1-Extensions) of extensions you could use, and a list of ones you [needn't bother with](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/4.1-Extensions#-dont-bother). We also like to say testing sites which show you how unique you are in a set of users are often using hugely tainted results that are not indicative of real-world usage. + +---------- + +*Special thanks to [Thorin-Oakenpants](https://github.com/Thorin-Oakenpants) and [Tommy](https://tommytran.io) for their help with providing advice and further documentation during the research phase.* diff --git a/blog/posts/firefox-privacy.md b/blog/posts/firefox-privacy.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..087355b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/firefox-privacy.md @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2019-11-09T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Reviews +authors: + - jonah +links: + - posts/firefox-privacy-2021-update.md +tags: + - Browsers + - Firefox +license: BY-SA +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# Firefox Privacy: Tips and Tricks for Better Browsing + +!["Firefox Privacy" cover image](../assets/images/firefox-privacy/cover.webp) + + + +Mozilla Firefox is one of the most popular web browsers around, and for good reason. It's fast, secure, open-source, and it's backed by an organization that actually respects your privacy. Unlike many other Chrome alternatives and forks, it has a massive development team behind it that publishes new updates on a constant, regular basis. Regular updates don't only mean shiny new features, it means you'll also receive security updates that will keep you protected as you browse the web. + +Because of all of this, [we recommend Firefox](https://www.privacyguides.org/desktop-browsers/#firefox) as our general-purpose browser for most users. It's the best alternative to Chrome and Edge for privacy conscious individuals. + +Firefox is fantastic out of the box, but where it really shines is customizability. By adjusting Firefox privacy settings and using helpful add-ons, you can increase your privacy and security even further. Making those changes is what we're going to go over in this Firefox privacy guide. + +Before we get started, there's a couple of things that should be noted that are not only applicable to this guide, but privacy in general: + +## Considerations + +Protecting your privacy online is a tricky proposition, there are so many factors to take into consideration on an individual basis for any one guide or site to cover comprehensively. You will need to take into account things like threat modeling and your general preferences before making any changes or following any recommendations. + +### Threat Modeling + +What is [threat modeling](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/threat-modeling/)? Consider who you're trying to keep your data hidden from. Do you need to keep your information hidden from the government, or just the average stranger? Maybe you are just looking to alternatives to Big Tech like Google and Facebook. You'll also want to consider how much time and resources you want to spend hiding your data from those "threats". Some solutions might not be feasible from a financial or time standpoint, and you'll have to make compromises. Taking all those questions into account creates a basic threat model for you to work with. + +We want to publish a more complete guide on threat modeling in the future, so stay tuned to this blog for further updates. But for now, just keep those thoughts in the back of your mind as we go through this article. Not every solution might be for you, or conversely you may need to pay more attention to certain areas we aren't able to cover completely. + +### Browser Fingerprinting + +Another consideration is your browser's fingerprint. When you visit a web page, your browser voluntarily sends information about its configuration, such as available fonts, browser type, and add-ons. If this combination of information is unique, it may be possible to identify and track you without using more common tracking tools, like cookies. + +That's right, add-ons contribute to your fingerprint. Another thing a lot of people miss when they are setting up their browser is that more is not always the best solution to their problems. You don't need to use every add-on and tweak we recommend installed, and the more you configure, the greater chance there is that your browser will appear more unique to websites. Think about your specific situation and pick and choose the add-ons and tweaks we recommend only if you think they will help you. + +## Firefox Privacy Settings + +We'll start off with the easy solutions. Firefox has a number of privacy settings built in, no add-ons necessary! Open your Options page (Preferences on macOS) and we'll go through them one at a time. + +### DNS over HTTPS + +DNS (or the Domain Name System) is what your browser uses to turn domain names like `privacyguides.org` into IP addresses like `65.109.20.157`. Because computers can only make connections to IP addresses, it's necessary to use DNS every time you visit a new domain. But DNS is unencrypted by default, that means everyone on your network (including your ISP) can view what domains you're looking up, and in some situations even change the IP answers to redirect you to their own websites! Encrypting your DNS traffic can shield your queries and add some additional protection to your browsing. + +Encrypted DNS takes many forms: DNS over HTTPS (DoH), DNS over TLS, DNSCrypt, etc., but they all accomplish the same thing. They keep your DNS queries private from your ISP, and they make sure they aren't tampered with in transit between your DNS provider. Fortunately, Firefox recently added native DoH support to the browser. On the **General** page of your preferences, scroll down to and open **Network Settings**. At the bottom of the window you will be able to select "Enable DNS over HTTPS" and choose a provider. + +Keep in mind that by using DoH you're sending all your queries to a single provider, probably Cloudflare unless you choose [another provider](https://www.privacyguides.org/dns/) that supports DNS over HTTPS. While it may add some privacy protection from your ISP, you're only shifting that trust to the DoH provider. Make sure that's something you want to do. + +It should also be noted that even with DoH, your ISP will still be able to see what domain you're connecting to because of a technology called Server Name Indication (SNI). Until SNI is encrypted as well, there's no getting around it. Encrypted SNI (eSNI) is in the works — and can actually be [enabled on Firefox](https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypt-that-sni-firefox-edition/) today — but it only works with a few servers, mainly ones operated by Cloudflare, so its use is limited currently. Therefore, while DoH provides some additional privacy and integrity protections, its use as a privacy tool is limited until other supplemental tools like eSNI and [DNSSEC](https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en) are finalized and implemented. + +### Change Your Search Engine + +This is an easy one. In the **Search** tab, change your **Default Search Engine** to something other than Google. Out of the built-in options, DuckDuckGo is the most privacy respecting service, but there's a number of [search engines we would recommend](https://www.privacyguides.org/search-engines/) that can be easily installed as well. + +### Enhanced Tracking Protection + +Now we'll delve into the biggest set of options for people like us, Firefox's **Privacy & Security** tab. First up is their **Enhanced Tracking Protection**. This set of filters is set to Standard by default, but we'll want to change it to Strict for more comprehensive coverage. + +In rare occasions, Strict browsing protections might cause some of the websites you visit to not function properly. But there's no need to worry! If you suspect the Strict browsing protection is breaking a website you visit frequently, you can disable it on a site by site basis with the shield icon in the address bar. + +Disabling Enhanced Tracking Protection will of course decrease your privacy on that site, so you will have to consider whether that's something you are willing to compromise on, on a site-by-site basis. + +Another benefit of Firefox's Enhanced Tracking Protection is that it can actually speed up your browsing! Advertising networks and social media embeds can sometimes make your browser download huge files just to show an ad or a like button, and blocking those out trims the fat, in a sense. + +### Disabling Telemetry + +When you use Firefox, Mozilla collects information about what you do, what kind of extensions you have installed, and various other aspects of your browser. While they claim to do this in a privacy-respecting way, sending as little data as possible is always preferred from a privacy standpoint, so we would go ahead and uncheck all the boxes under **Firefox Data Collection and Use** just to be safe. + +### Clearing Cookies and Site Data + +This one is for more advanced users, so if you don't understand what this is doing you can skip this section. Firefox provides the option to delete all your cookies and site data every time Firefox is closed. Cookies and site data are little pieces of information sites store in your browser, and they have a myriad of uses. They are used for things like keeping you logged in and saving your website preferences, but they also can be used to track you across different websites. By deleting your cookies regularly, your browser will appear clean to websites, making you harder to track. + +This will likely log you out of websites quite often, so make sure that's an inconvenience you're willing to put up with for enhanced privacy. + +## Firefox Privacy Add-ons + +Of course, just the browser settings alone won't go quite far enough to protect your privacy. Mozilla has made a lot of compromises in order to provide a more functional browsing experience for the average user, which is completely understandable. But, we can take it even further with some browser add-ons that prevent tracking and make your experience more private and secure. + +[We recommend a number of fantastic add-ons](https://www.privacyguides.org/desktop-browsers/#ublock-origin) for Firefox, nine at the time of writing, but they aren't all necessary for everyone. Some of them provide redundant functionality to each other, and some of them accomplish similar tasks to the settings we've enabled above. + +When you are installing add-ons for Firefox, consider whether you actually need them for your personal browsing. Remember that fingerprinting warning from earlier? Adding as many extensions as possible might make you stand out more, which is not the goal. + +Keeping all that in mind, there are three add-ons I would consider necessary for virtually every user: + +- uBlock Origin +- HTTPS Everywhere +- Decentraleyes + +Out of the box, these add-ons only complement the settings we've described in this article already, and they have sane defaults that won't break the sites you visit. + +### uBlock Origin + +[**uBlock Origin**](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/ublock-origin/) is an efficient ad- and tracker-blocker that is easy on memory, and yet can load and enforce thousands more filters than competing blockers. We trust it because it is completely open-source. Additionally, unlike its competitors it has no monetization strategy: There's no "Acceptable" ads program or a similar whitelist like many other ad blockers feature. + +### HTTPS Everywhere + +HTTPS is the secure, encrypted version of HTTP. When you see an address starting with `https://` along with the padlock in your browser's address bar, you know that your connection to the website is completely secure. This is of course important when you're logging into websites and sending your passwords and emails in a form. But it also prevents people on your network and your ISP from snooping in on what you're reading, or changing the contents of an unencrypted webpage to whatever they want. + +Therefore, [**HTTPS Everywhere**](https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere) is a must-have extension, all it does is upgrade your HTTP connections to HTTPS wherever possible. And because it works silently in the background, you probably will never notice it! We trust HTTPS Everywhere because it is completely open-source, and is developed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a non-profit dedicated to private and secure technologies. + +Of course, it only works with sites that support HTTPS on the server's side, so you'll still need to keep an eye on your address bar to make sure you're securely connected. But fortunately more and more websites have implemented HTTPS thanks to the advent of free certificates from organizations like Let's Encrypt. + +### Decentraleyes + +When you connect to many websites, your browser is most likely making connections to a myriad of "Content Delivery Networks" like Google Fonts, Akamai, and Cloudflare, to download fonts and JavaScript that make the website run. This generally makes websites look and feel better, but it means you're constantly making connections to these servers, allowing them to build a fairly accurate tracking profile of you. + +[**Decentraleyes**](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/decentraleyes) works by impersonating those CDNs locally in your browser. When a website wants to download a program like jQuery, instead of connecting to a remote CDN Decentraleyes will serve the file from its own cache of files. This means that you'll won't have to make remote CDN connections for the files that Decentraleyes supports, and therefore the remote CDNs can't track your browser. Because everything is stored locally instead of on a far away server, Decentraleyes has the added benefit of speeding up your browsing as well. Everything happens instantly, and you won't see a difference in the websites you visit. + +### Additional Privacy Add-ons + +There is of course more functionality that can be achieved at the expense of more time spent configuring your browser and reduced website functionality. If you're looking for the most privacy options possible however, they may be for you. Check out our [desktop browsers recommendations page](https://www.privacyguides.org/desktop-browsers/) for further information and additional resources. + +## More Privacy Functionality + +Firefox has developed a number of other privacy tools that can be used to enhance your privacy or security. They may be worth looking into, but they have some drawbacks that would prevent me from recommending them outright. + +### Firefox Private Network + +Firefox Private Network is a new extension developed by Mozilla that serves as a [Virtual Private Network](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/vpn-overview/) (VPN), securing you on public Wi-Fi networks and other situations where you might trust Mozilla more than the ISP or network administrator. It is free in beta, but will likely be available at some subscription pricing once the test pilot ends. + +Firefox Private Network is still just a VPN, and there are a number of drawbacks you would want to consider before using it. We wrote an entire article on [choosing a VPN provider](https://www.jonaharagon.com/posts/choosing-a-vpn/) that is worth a read, but it boils down to the fact that your VPN provider will be able to see your web traffic. All you are accomplishing is shifting the trust from your network to the VPN provider, in this case *Cloudflare*, the operators behind this service. + +Additionally, unlike a traditional VPN, only data through the Firefox browser is protected, not every app on your machine. This means that it won't adequately protect you from many of the threats people typically want to protect against when they use a VPN, like IP leaks. + +And finally, Cloudflare and Mozilla are both US companies. There are a number of concerns with entrusting internet traffic to the US and other fourteen eyes countries that should not be overlooked. + +If you require a Virtual Private Network, we would look elsewhere. There are a number of [recommended providers](https://www.privacyguides.org/vpn/) like Mullvad that will provide a better experience at a low cost. + +### Multi-Account Containers + +Mozilla has an in-house add-on called [Multi-Account Containers](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers) that allows you to isolate websites from each other. For example, you could have Facebook in a container separate from your other browsing. In this situation, Facebook would only be able to set cookies with your profile on sites within the container, keeping your other browsing protected. + +A containers setup may be a good alternative to techniques like regularly deleting cookies, but requires a lot of manual intervention to set up and maintain. If you want complete control of what websites can do in your browser, it's definitely worth looking into, but we wouldn't call it a necessary addition by any means. + +## Additional Resources + +[Desktop Browsers (Privacy Guides)](https://www.privacyguides.org/desktop-browsers/) — Our comprehensive set of recommendations for browsers and tweaks you can make to enhance your privacy is a great next step for more advanced users looking to protect their privacy online. + +[Arkenfox user.js](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) — For more advanced users, the Arkenfox user.js is a "configuration file that can control hundreds of Firefox settings [...] which aims to provide as much privacy and enhanced security as possible, and to reduce tracking and fingerprinting as much as possible - while minimizing any loss of functionality and breakage". + +[Mozilla's Privacy Policy](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/) — Of course, we always recommend reading through the privacy statement of any organization you deal with, and Mozilla is no exception. + +## Firefox Privacy Summary + +In conclusion, we believe that Firefox is the most promising browser for privacy-conscious individuals. The non-profit behind it seems truly dedicated to promoting user control and privacy, and the good defaults coupled with the sheer customizability of the browser allow you to truly protect your information when you browse the web. + +For more Firefox privacy-related information, or for recommendations for non-desktop platforms, give our full page on [web browsers](https://www.privacyguides.org/desktop-browsers/) a read. diff --git a/blog/posts/grapheneos-or-calyxos.md b/blog/posts/grapheneos-or-calyxos.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7c0f3ad7 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/grapheneos-or-calyxos.md @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2022-04-21T19:00:00Z +authors: + - contributors +categories: + - Opinion +tags: + - GrapheneOS + - CalyxOS +links: + - General Android Overview: https://www.privacyguides.org/android/overview/ + - Android Recommendations: https://www.privacyguides.org/android/ +license: BY-SA +robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large +schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle +--- +# Should You Use GrapheneOS or CalyxOS? + +GrapheneOS and CalyxOS are often compared as similar options for people looking for an alternative Android OS for their Pixel devices. Below are some of the reasons why we recommend GrapheneOS over CalyxOS. + +## Update Frequency + +CalyxOS has a track record of being slower to apply security and feature updates to its OS and core applications than other custom Android operating systems. Timely security updates are one of the most important factors to consider when determining whether an OS is secure enough for regular use, which is a requirement for privacy. + +In contrast to that, GrapheneOS manages to stay close to upstream and in some cases even [deliver updates before the stock OS does](https://grapheneos.org/features#more-complete-patching). + +As an example, [GrapheneOS's first Android 12 release](https://grapheneos.org/releases#2021102020) was in October 2021, whereas [CalyxOS moved to Android 12](https://calyxos.org/news/2022/01/19/android-12-changelog/) in January 2022. + +## Sandboxed Google Play vs Privileged microG + +When Google Play Services are used on GrapheneOS, they are confined using the highly restrictive, default [`untrusted_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) domain. As a result, you have full control as to what these apps can access via permissions, just like any other app you install. Additionally, you can selectively choose which profile(s) to install the Sandboxed Google Play in. + +microG is a partially open-source re-implementation of Google Play Services.[^1] On CalyxOS, it runs in the highly privileged [`system_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) SELinux domain like regular Google Play Services, and it uses [signature spoofing](https://github.com/microg/GmsCore/wiki/Signature-Spoofing) to masquerade as Google Play Services. This is less secure than Sandboxed Google Play's approach, which does not need access to sensitive system APIs. + +When using Sandboxed Google Play, you have the option to reroute location requests to the Play Services API back to the OS location API, which uses satellite based location services. With microG, you have the option to choose between different backend location providers, including *shifting trust* to another location backend, like Mozilla; using [DejaVu](https://github.com/n76/DejaVu), a location backend that locally collects and saves RF-based location data to an offline database which can be used when GPS is not available; or to simply not use a network location backend at all. + +Network location providers like Play Services or Mozilla rely the on the MAC addresses of surrounding Wi-Fi access points and Bluetooth devices being submitted for location approximation. Choosing a network location like Mozilla to use with microG provides little to no privacy benefit over Google because you are still submitting the same data and trusting them to not profile you. + +Local RF location backends like DejaVu require that the phone has a working GPS first for the local RF data collected to be useful. This makes them less effective as location providers, as the job of a location provider is to assist location approximation when satellite based services are not working. + +If your [threat model](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/threat-modeling/) requires protecting your location or the MAC addresses of nearby devices, rerouting location requests to the OS location API is probably the best option. The benefit brought by microG's custom location backend is minimal at best when compared to Sandboxed Google Play. + +In terms of application compatibility, ==Sandboxed Google Play on GrapheneOS is always going to be more compatible== as it is the same code as what is released by Google. microG is a reimplementation of these services. As a result, it only supports the various parts that have been reimplemented, meaning some things such as [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames) and [In-app Billing API](https://developer.android.com/google/play/billing) are not yet supported. + +Larger apps, especially games, require [Play Asset Delivery](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/06/introducing-google-play-asset-delivery.html) to be installed, which is currently not implemented in microG. Authentication using [FIDO](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/multi-factor-authentication#fido-fast-identity-online) with online services on Android also relies on Play Services, and does not currently work with microG. + +[^1]: It should be noted that microG still uses proprietary Google binaries for some of its components such as DroidGuard. Push notifications, if enabled, still go through Google's servers just like with Play Services. Outside of default microG setups like on CalyxOS, it is possible to run microG in the unprivileged [`untrusted app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) SELinux domain and without the signature spoofing patch. However, microG's functionality and compatibility, which is already not nearly as broad as Sandboxed Google Play, will greatly diminish. + +## Privileged eSIM Activation Application + +Currently, eSIM activation is tied to a privileged proprietary application by Google. The app has the `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE` permission, giving Google access to your hardware identifiers such as the IMEI. + +On GrapheneOS, the app comes disabled, and you can *optionally* enable it after installing Sandboxed Google Play. + +On CalyxOS, the app comes installed by default (regardless of whether you choose to have microG or not) and you cannot opt out. This means that Google still has access to your hardware identifiers regardless of whether you need eSIM activation, and they can be accessed persistently. + +## Privileged App Extensions + +Android 12 comes with special support for seamless app updates with [third-party app stores](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/09/listening-to-developer-feedback-to.html). The popular Free and Open-Source Software (FOSS) repository [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org) doesn't implement this feature and requires a [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged) to be included with the Android distribution in order to have unattended app updates. + +CalyxOS includes the [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged), which may lower device security. + +On the other hand, GrapheneOS officially recommends [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play) instead. Many FOSS Android apps are also in Google's Play Store, but sometimes they are not (like [NewPipe](https://www.privacyguides.org/frontends#newpipe-android)). In those cases, you can [keep up with updates using RSS](https://www.privacyguides.org/android/#manually-with-rss-notifications). + +## Profiles + +GrapheneOS significantly improves [user profiles](https://www.privacyguides.org/android/overview#user-profiles) in [multiple ways](https://grapheneos.org/features#improved-user-profiles), such as increasing the limit of how many profiles you can create (32 instead of the standard 4), allowing you to log out of user profiles, disabling app installation, and notification forwarding. All of these improvements make it so that user profiles can be daily driven without sacrificing too much usability. + +CalyxOS doesn't feature any improvements to user profiles over AOSP, and instead includes a device controller app so that the [work profile](https://www.privacyguides.org/android/overview#work-profile) can be used without needing to download a third party app such as [Shelter](https://www.privacyguides.org/android/#shelter). However, work profiles are not nearly as flexible (as you're limited to only one) and don't provide the same amount of isolation and security. + +## Additional Hardening + +GrapheneOS improves upon [AOSP](https://source.android.com/) security with: + +- **Hardened WebView:** Vanadium WebView requires [64-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/64-bit_computing) processes on the [WebView](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView) process and disables legacy [32-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/32-bit_computing) processes. It uses hardened compiler options such as [`-fwrapv`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Code-Gen-Options.html) and [`-fstack-protector-strong`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.3/gcc/Optimize-Options.html), which can help protect against [stack buffer overflows](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stack_buffer_overflow). [API](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API)s such as the [battery status API](https://chromestatus.com/feature/4537134732017664) are disabled for privacy reasons. All system apps on GrapheneOS use the Vanadium WebView which means that apps which use WebView will also benefit from Vanadium's hardening. The [Vanadium patch set](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium) is a lot more comprehensive than CalyxOS's [Chromium patch set](https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/chromium-patches) which is derived from it. +- **Hardened Kernel:** GrapheneOS kernel includes some hardening from the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/linux-hardened) project and the [Kernel Self Protection Project (KSPP)](https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project). CalyxOS uses the [same kernel](https://calyxos.org/docs/development/build/kernel/) as regular Android with some minor modifications. +- **Hardened Memory Allocator:** GrapheneOS uses the [hardened malloc](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) subproject as its memory allocator. This focuses on hardening against [memory heap corruption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_corruption). CalyxOS uses the default AOSP [Scudo Malloc](https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/scudo), which is generally [less effective](https://twitter.com/danielmicay/status/1033671709197398016). Hardened Malloc has uncovered vulnerabilities in AOSP which have been [fixed](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_system_core/commit/be11b59725aa6118b0e1f0712572e835c3d50746) by GrapheneOS such as [CVE-2021-0703](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-0703). +- **Secure Exec Spawning:** GrapheneOS [spawns](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spawn_(computing)) fresh processes as opposed to using the [Zygote model](https://ayusch.com/android-internals-the-android-os-boot-process) used by AOSP and CalyxOS. The Zygote model weakens [Address Space Layout Randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization) (ASLR) and is considered [less secure](https://wenke.gtisc.gatech.edu/papers/morula.pdf). Creating [fresh processes](https://grapheneos.org/usage#exec-spawning) is safer but will have some performance penalty when launching a new application. These penalties are not really noticeable unless you have an [old device](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) with slow storage such as the Pixel 3a/3a XL as it has [eMMC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MultiMediaCard#eMMC). + +**Please note that these are just a few examples and are not an extensive list of GrapheneOS's hardening**. For a more complete list, please read GrapheneOS' [official documentation](https://grapheneos.org/features). diff --git a/blog/posts/hide-nothing.md b/blog/posts/hide-nothing.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2d5d5f08 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/hide-nothing.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2022-06-09T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Opinion +authors: + - danarel +links: + - posts/move-fast-and-break-things.md + - posts/choosing-the-right-messenger.md +tags: + - Government +license: BY-SA +description: In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States, the US government enacted laws that weakened citizen privacy in the name of national emergency. +schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle +--- +# Hide Nothing + +In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States, the US government enacted laws that weakened citizen privacy in the name of national emergency. This sent up many red flags for human rights and privacy advocates. + +These concerns were met with “if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.” The argument goes that if you're not doing anything illegal, then these violations of your privacy shouldn't bother you. If you care about privacy, you clearly can't be up to anything good. + +On the surface, this seems true to many people – but the reality is very different. We may not have had anything to hide in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, but that was not the only information being sought after by governments. Indeed, following the passage of the Patriot Act in the US, the FBI issued 192,499 [National Security Letters](https://www.aclu.org/other/national-security-letters), meaning they collected the records and online activity of nearly 200,000 people. + +In the end it only convicted one person. + +Now, many have argued that stopping one terrorist might be worth giving up some security for, but [according](https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/surveillance-under-patriot-act) to the ACLU, the conviction would have occurred without the Patriot Act. + +Many legal actions you take today could be deemed illegal by future laws or future government. In the US today there is discussion around the possibility of Roe v. Wade being overturned, allowing states to outlaw abortions. You may not currently feel the need to hide internet searches, menstrual cycle apps, or donations to women's health clinics today because it's not illegal, but tomorrow that information could be used against you. + +In countries were organizing around political dissent is legal, that doesn't mean the government is tracking those taking part and using that information to create informants or infiltrate such groups. Or worse, when or if laws change, using that surveillance to punish those involved. + +And even if you break away from the legal aspects, we all have something to hide. You may not be ready to reveal your sexual or gender identity, but your internet usage could potentially do that for you. You don't want to make your bank account public; you have that information to hide. And you can continue to list things about your life you'd just rather not make public, regardless of potential legality. + +In July 2021, a Catholic priest by the name of Jeffrey Burrill lost his job and was forced to resign after data collected through his cell phone showed that he was active on the gay dating app Grindr, and that he had visited multiple gay bars in the area. [According](https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/07/20/bishop-misconduct-resign-burrill/) to the *Washington Post*: + +> “A mobile device correlated to Burrill emitted app data signals from the location-based hookup app Grindr on a near-daily basis during parts of 2018, 2019, and 2020 —– at both his USCCB office and his USCCB-owned residence, as well as during USCCB meetings and events in other cities,” the Pillar reported. +> +> “The data obtained and analyzed by The Pillar conveys mobile app date signals during two 26-week periods, the first in 2018 and the second in 2019 and 2020. The data was obtained from a data vendor and authenticated by an independent data consulting firm contracted by The Pillar,” the site reported. It did not identify who the vendor was or if the site bought the information or got it from a third party. +> +> The Pillar story says app data “correlated” to Burrill's phone shows the priest visited gay bars, including while traveling for the USCCB. + +While it was not clear who was tracking Burrill's device, the Post went on to say that: + +> Privacy experts have long raised concerns about “anonymized” data collected by apps and sold to or shared with aggregators and marketing companies. While the information is typically stripped of obviously identifying fields, like a user's name or phone number, it can contain everything from age and gender to a device ID. It's possible for experts to de-anonymize some of this data and connect it to real people. + +While Burrill was without a doubt in violation of his work's own code of conduct, he did decide on his own to be a priest. However, his personal life was not harming others and was just that, his personal life. While the question looms about who was tracking him to begin with and why, the fact it was so easy to do is alarming. + +What if Burrill wasn't a priest, but just happened to work for someone who held anti-homosexual views who used this data to out him, humiliate him, and fire him under false pretenses? This data, which should be private could (and likely did in the real-life circumstance) ruin his life. + +That is what makes internet privacy so important. It's not hiding nefarious activity, it's that we all have an innate right to our privacy. + +You might not feel today that you have anything to hide, but you might not feel that way tomorrow and once something is public, it cannot be made private again. diff --git a/blog/posts/i18n-announcement.md b/blog/posts/i18n-announcement.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1dc21b63 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/i18n-announcement.md @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2023-02-26T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +authors: + - freddy + - dngray + - niek-de-wilde +tags: + - Privacy Guides +license: BY-SA +description: It's finally here. After countless requests, Privacy Guides now has translations. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- +# Privacy Guides Is Now Multilingual + +It's finally here. After countless requests, Privacy Guides now has translations. + +People have always asked us for translations to other languages because our team and community produces high quality, reliable, honest, and researched content. Our [previous site](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2021/09/14/welcome-to-privacy-guides) never had a system for this. All translations were done manually, and translators would quickly lose interest. Translated sites would be outdated and lay unmaintained on domains that we didn't own. Privacy Guides now has a proper system. + +Our site runs [Material for MkDocs](https://squidfunk.github.io/mkdocs-material/), which supports [internationalization](https://squidfunk.github.io/mkdocs-material/setup/changing-the-language/). This allows us to provide language specific content without the mammoth effort previously required. + +## What we're planning + +You can expect translations of this blog – and lots more content. We will add languages to the site when they near completion. That way they can be checked to make sure they maintain the high quality that people have come to expect from the rest of Privacy Guides. + +### Translators + +We'd also like to remind everyone you can stay up to date with the main site by looking at [our release page](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/releases), this will show major changes to the main content. You can subscribe with a [News Aggregator](https://www.privacyguides.org/news-aggregators): + +- [privacyguides.org (Releases)](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/releases.atom). +- [privacyguides.org (Commit log)](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main.atom) +- [blog.privacyguides.org](https://blog.privacyguides.org/feed_rss_created.xml) +- [blog.privacyguides.org (Commit log)](https://github.com/privacyguides/blog.privacyguides.org/commits/main.atom) + +The blog doesn't have releases, but articles are generally published in a complete state and only updated with minor changes. + +Feel free to check out our localization room on Matrix [#pg-i18n:aragon.sh](https://matrix.to/#/%23pg-i18n:aragon.sh) if you have any questions on getting started. You can [find us on Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides). + +Please note that the English version of the site is the primary version, meaning changes occur there first. This means it is still possible that specific languages may be behind. If you notice such an instance please help out. We cannot guarantee the accuracy of all our translations. If you have a suggestion about content specific to your region, please open an issue or pull request to our [main repository](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org). + +#### Some tips for translators + +Crowdin has good documentation, and we suggest looking at their [Getting Started](https://support.crowdin.com/crowdin-intro/) guide. Our site is in [Markdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markdown), so it should be easy to chip in. + +#### Admonitions + +Throughout the site we use MkDocs's [admonitions](https://squidfunk.github.io/mkdocs-material/reference/admonitions/#usage), to show information to readers about the products such as `example`, `warning`, `tip`, etc. + +By default, when admonitions are used they will have an English string on the site. This can be [customized](https://squidfunk.github.io/mkdocs-material/reference/admonitions/#changing-the-title), without too much effort. For example if you were translating and admonition of type [warning](https://squidfunk.github.io/mkdocs-material/reference/admonitions/#type:warning) to Dutch, this is how you would write it: + +```text +!!! warning "Waarschuwing" +``` + +Downloads are a [custom admonition](https://squidfunk.github.io/mkdocs-material/reference/admonitions/#custom-admonitions) that we use, and you would write that like: + +```text +??? downloads "Downloaden" +``` + +The same goes for other types, such as `tip`, `example` etc. Recommendations are also admonitions, but they do not need overriding, because the default has no text, so they are always: + +```text +!!! recommendation +``` + +#### Translation software + +Translation software gets the translation quite reliable. We've found [DeepL](https://www.deepl.com/en/translator) works well however, attention does need to be given that the translated string is correct. + +For example: + +```text +![Software logo](assets/img/path/to/image.svg){ align=right } +``` + +We have sometimes found that the syntax for inserting an image like above was missing the `![` or an extra space was placed between the text and the path, e.g. `](`. If a translation string is clearly not correct, we encourage you to **delete** it by pressing the trash icon [or vote](https://support.crowdin.com/enterprise/getting-started-for-volunteers/#voting-view) which one you think sounds best. When invalid strings are deleted they are removed from the organization's [translation memory](https://support.crowdin.com/enterprise/translation-memory), meaning that when the source string is seen again, it won't suggest the incorrect translation. + +We'd like to thank the [translation team](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides/reports/top-members) who spent many hours on translating the content, that we now have. We're going to launch in Dutch, French and Hebrew. diff --git a/blog/posts/installing-and-using-tails.md b/blog/posts/installing-and-using-tails.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..98f2e8b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/installing-and-using-tails.md @@ -0,0 +1,501 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-01-29T22:00:00Z +categories: + - Tutorials +authors: + - em +description: When browsing the web at home becomes dangerous to your safety, there are tools that can help minimizing your digital traces to stay safe. Tails is one of these tools. Here's why, when, and how you can install and use Tails. +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# Using Tails When Your World Doesn't Feel Safe Anymore + +![Photo of a hand plugging a USB stick into a laptop and the Tails logo under it.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/cover.webp) + + +There is a growing number of people who no longer feel safe in their own home or country. Whatever the reason, many people might not feel safe to browse certain topics online. With all the information getting collected for each internet search, it is difficult to access sometime vital information without leaving a trace. These digital footprints might not threaten your personal safety if you are living with a supportive family, and in a democratic and free country. However, there are situations where someone might be put in great danger simply for looking at a website. + +While this guide will be applicable to many, I am writing this article with these groups in mind: + +1. Victims of domestic violence, +2. Trans and queer individuals living in a hostile environment, and +3. Democracy and human rights activists located in regions adverse to their cause. + +This article will help people in such situations learn how to browse the internet and use a computer in a more protected and anonymous way, in order to stay safe from harm. + +
+

A warning for those at very high risk

+ +If you feel at very high risk in your home or country, and the device you are currently using to read this article could be accessed by a person or group meaning you harm, I recommend you ask a *trusted ally* who does not experience the same level of threat to complete this tutorial for you on their device instead. This will help with minimizing any digital traces left on your device that could endanger you. + +Then, I recommend that you [**erase your browsing history**](clearing-browsing-data.md) (ideally, delete this and related websites only) and clear your browser's cache and cookies. If you have a Google account and used Google to find this article, also make sure to [**delete your Google search history**](https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/6096136). + +Once you have securely reached out to a trusted ally to request their help, and erased your browser's data for this site, do not consult this article again *if the digital traces of it might put you in danger*. + +
+ +If you are completing this installation for someone else, or if the device you are currently using cannot put you at risk, here's why, when, and how you can install and use the portable system Tails: + +## What is Tails? + +![Illustration of the Tails logo.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-logo-flat-inverted.svg) + + + +Tails is a portable *operating system* (a type of software like Windows and macOS) that is especially designed to minimize your digital footprints while using it. + +The name is an acronym for "The Amnesic Incognito Live System". It is kept on a USB stick and resets itself entirely after each use (except if you enable its encrypted password-protected [Persistent Storage](https://tails.net/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html)). What is done on Tails does not leave any digital traces on the computer it is plugged into, hence "amnesic." + +Additionally, Tails comes with pre-installed applications that will help increase your security and privacy online. When accessing the internet from Tails, your traffic will be automatically rerouted through the [Tor network](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/). This is a special network that makes it very difficult to identify your location or the websites you access, even from your Internet Service Provider (ISP). + +However, unless you configure the [Tor bridge](https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/tor/index.en.html#hiding) option to hide this, your ISP will know you have been using Tor, although they will not know which websites in particular you have visited through Tor. It could have been anything. I personally use Tor when I have to visit Google Maps, just to protect my data from Google's advertising. + +## Why you might want to use Tails + +There are many good and legitimate reasons for using Tails. Here are a few examples from the scenarios I am considering in this article: + +1. A victim of domestic violence who needs a secure way to research and communicate with shelters or other supportive resources to plan a safe escape, without leaving traces of their activities on a device accessible to the perpetrator. + +2. A trans or queer individual who lives with an unsupportive or hostile family and wishes to research trans or queer-related topics online, find communities, or access supportive resources without leaving any digital traces of their activities on a family device. + +3. A democracy or human rights activist who organizes protests, communicate information online, or carry on any other activities that might have been declared unauthorized by an oppressive regime. + +4. Any other situations where browsing the web or using a device anonymously might be necessary to protect someone's safety. + +## When to use Tails, and when not to use Tails + +Tails protects some data very well, but it will not magically protect everything. Before using it, read carefully what it can help you with and what it cannot do. + +### When using Tails might help you + +- Browsing the web without leaving traces on your main computer. + +- Using a computer without leaving traces of your activities on your main computer. + +- Storing information and processing files in an encrypted way, away from your main computer. + +- Hiding which websites you visit from your ISP by using Tor, without leaving traces on your main computer. + +### What you should be careful about + +- Remember that unless you enable the Tor bridge, your ISP will know you have accessed the Tor network. Your government could request this information from your ISP. Be careful if this can put you in danger in your country. If you are not using Tails from a public Wi-Fi network, and if revealing to your ISP that you are using Tor could be dangerous to you, you should [enable the Tor bridge option](https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/tor/index.en.html#hiding). + +- Tails cannot protect your anonymity if while using Tails you log into an account that you have already been identified with, or have used outside of Tails. While using Tails, **do not log into anything that you have logged in outside of Tails**. + +- If you communicate with others or create an account within Tails, be mindful not to share any personal details that could identify you while using Tails. + +- If you share any files, be careful to **remove thoroughly any metadata** that could identify you from the file. + +- If you share any pictures or videos, be extremely cautious with removing metadata and examining the picture or video to make sure no reflections or other details could inadvertently identify you. + +- Do not to reuse any usernames, pseudonyms, email addresses, phone numbers, profile pictures, passwords, or any other information that you have used outside of Tails. + +- Do not do anything that could identify you while using Tails. Assume that everything you do while using Tails could be linked together. + +- Be careful with using any mobile data network to connect to the internet. Information related to [your mobile device could identify you](https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/no-wifi/index.en.html). + +- A very powerful adversary, such as a government, could potentially identify some information despite you using Tails. Read more about Tails' limitations here: [https://tails.net/doc/about/warnings/index.en.html](https://tails.net/doc/about/warnings/index.en.html) + +### When you should **not** use Tails + +- If someone finding your Tails USB stick could put you in worse danger than not using it at all. + +- If you have not enabled the Tor bridge option, and your ISP or government finding out you have accessed Tor could put you in worse danger than not using it at all. + +- When the computer you are using Tails with might be [compromised at the firmware or hardware level](https://tails.net/doc/about/warnings/computer/index.en.html). + +- When there are cameras in your environment recording your activity on this computer. + +- If your computer cannot securely boot from an external USB stick. + +## Installing Tails + +Before you start, make sure that: + +1. The device you use for the installation is free from malware or spyware. + +2. There is no recording software such as [Windows Recall](https://allthings.how/how-to-turn-off-windows-recall-ai-feature-in-windows-11-copilot-plus-pcs/) running. If there is, disable or pause it and delete your visit of this website from it. + +3. You have a USB stick with a storage capacity of at least 8 GB. Ideally, I recommend using a fresh and new USB stick, but if this is not accessible to you, make sure you can erase this USB stick entirely and that the files on it were not sensitive or revealing information. Assume your USB stick could get seized later on and these deleted files could potentially get restored. + +4. If you complete this installation for someone else, or if it is safe for you to do so (ordering online leaves a lot of digital footprints!), you may be interested in using a USB stick that looks more like a banal object. You can easily find cheap USB sticks on popular online stores that look like innocuous cartoon keychain charms, for example. + +### What you'll need + +- [x] USB stick with a storage capacity of at least 8 GB. + +- [x] A computer with a port compatible with your USB stick (both for installation and usage). + +- [x] A computer running one of these operating systems: Apple computer with *Intel* processor (not M1-M2-M3) running macOS version 10.10 or later, PC with at least 2 GB of RAM running Windows 7 or later, PC with at least 2 GB of RAM running Linux. + +- [x] Capacity to install new software on the computer you are using for the installation. + +- [x] At least 1-2 hours of free time when you are safe and free from threats. + +
+

Hardware incompatibility

+ +You might experience some hardware incompatibilities while running Tails (this is common for Linux-based software on Mac devices). If this happens, you will need to use **a wired (or dongle) mouse, a wired (or dongle) keyboard, and a Wi-Fi adapter or an internet access you can plug in directly from an [Ethernet cable](https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet)**. + +If you need a Wi-Fi adapter, you will find a list of adapters compatible with Tails at the bottom of this page: [https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/no-wifi/index.en.html](https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/no-wifi/index.en.html) + +Be very careful if you decide to use mobile phone connectivity, however. The data linked to your mobile device could de-anonymize you, even while using Tails. More information on this here: [https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/no-wifi/index.en.html](https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/no-wifi/index.en.html) + +
+ +
+

Delete your traces afterward

+ +Depending on your situation, you might want to delete the traces of this installation after. See [a to-do list](#final-notes) for this at the end of this article. + +
+ +
+

About this tutorial

+I am going to walk you through a **step-by-step through the process for an installation from macOS**. If you are using a computer running Windows or Linux, the steps will be similar, but the windows appearances and warnings will vary. The steps to boot from an external USB stick will also vary. + +You might decide to reference the [guides from the Tails website](https://tails.net/install/index.en.html) instead. Tails' installation guides are excellent. + +
+ +If you encounter any issues during the installation or running processes, you can try to find support specific to your issue here: [https://tails.net/support/index.en.html](https://tails.net/support/index.en.html) + +### Step 1: Download Tails + +Visit this website and select your installation computer's operating system: [https://tails.net/install/](https://tails.net/install/) + +![Screenshot of a browser window showing Tails' installation page.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-1.webp) + +Scroll down to the "**Download Tails**" section and click on the green download button. Make sure to save the installation file in a folder where you can find it back easily and not forget to **delete it afterwards**. + +
+

Warning

+ +Do not save this file on your USB stick! + +
+ +
+

Always install the latest version of Tails

+ +The download link is not shared directly here because you should always make sure to download and install [the most recent version of Tails](https://tails.net/doc/upgrade/). If you read this article at a later date, the version number you will be installing will likely be higher than the number shown here. + +
+ +![Screenshot of a browser window showing Tails' download step.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-2.webp) + +### Step 2: Verify the file you just downloaded + +Scroll down to "**Verify your download**" and click on "**Select your download to verify...**" + +
+

Do not skip this step!

+ +This step is important to ensure the file you just downloaded has not been tampered with or corrupted during the process. + +
+ +![Screenshot of a browser window showing Tails' verification step.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-3.webp) + +Once the verification is completed (this might take a few minutes), you should see a green checkmark with "**Verification successful!**" followed by the file name. If you do not see this, delete the file and repeat [Step 1](#step-1-download-tails) and [Step 2](#step-2-verify-the-file-you-just-downloaded). + +![Screenshot of a browser window showing Tails' successful verification with file name.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-4.webp) + +### Step 3: Download and install balenaEtcher + +You will need this free software in order to install Tails on your USB stick. + +
+

Reminder

+ +Make sure the USB stick you have has a storage capacity of at least 8 GB, and does not store any files you wish to keep. Ideally, use a fresh never-used-before USB stick. + +
+ +You can download *balenaEtcher* from this link: [https://tails.net/etcher/balenaEtcher.dmg](https://tails.net/etcher/balenaEtcher.dmg) + +Open the folder where you downloaded the *balenaEtcher* installation file (keep it open to delete this file after the installation is completed), and double-click on the "**balenaEtcher.dmg**" file. Drag the "**balenaEtcher.app**" icon over the "**Applications**" folder icon when prompted from the window below: + +![Screenshot of a macOS application installation window for balenaEtcher.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-5.webp) + +Once the file is copied to you "**Applications**" folder, go on your computer's desktop and right-click on the "**balenaEtcher**" icon. Select '**Eject "balenaEtcher"**' + +![Screenshot of a desktop showing the balenaEtcher installation icon and a macOS menu with the option to Eject balenaEtcher.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-6.webp) + +### Step 4: Install Tails on your USB stick using balenaEtcher + +4.1. Open your Mac's "**Applications**" folder and double-click on "**balenaEtcher.app**". + +Depending on your macOS version, your Mac might open a popup window saying '**Verifying "balenaEtcher.app"...**'. This is normal, let it complete its verification. Next, you will likely see another popup window with '**"balenaEtcher.app” is an app downloaded from the Internet. Are you sure you want to open it?**'. Click "**Open**". + +![Screenshot of a macOS popup with a verifying loading bar.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-7.webp) + +![Screenshot of a macOS popup with a warning message with the options to Cancel or Open.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-8.png) + +4.2. Open *balenaEtcher* and click on the settings gear button on the upper-right. Disable the option "**Anonymously report errors and usage statistics to balena.io**", then click "**OK**". + +![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing a gear icon on the upper-right, and a disabled option to share anonymous error reports.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-9.webp) + +4.3. Eject and unplug any other external USB stick(s) or external USB drive(s) that might be plugged into your computer if possible, and plug in the USB stick you wish to erase and install Tails on. + +4.4. Once it is plugged in, return to *balenaEtcher* and click on the "**Flash from file**" blue button on the left. You will be prompted to select a file. Select the Tails "**.img**" file you have downloaded and verified earlier. + +![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing 3 buttons. The button on the left is blue and labeled Flash from file.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-10.webp) + +4.5. Click on the "**Select target**" blue button in the middle, and select your USB stick. + +![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing 3 buttons. The button in the middle is blue and labeled "Select target".](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-11.webp) + +
+

Caution! Select the correct USB stick!

+ +Make sure you are not selecting a USB stick or drive different from the one you wish to erase for Tails. **All data on the USB stick or drive you select will be permanently lost. Be careful!** + +
+ +![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window inside a menu with one or more checkboxes. One checkbox is selected next to a USB stick name and description.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-12.webp) + +4.6. Once you have verified that all the information is correct, click on the "**Flash!**" blue button on the right. + +![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing 3 buttons. The button on the right is blue and labeled "Flash!".](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-13.webp) + +You will see a *balenaEtcher* popup window saying: "**balenaEtcher needs privileged access in order to flash disks. Type your password to allow this.**". Type your computer's password and click "**Ok**". + +![Screenshot of a macOS popup warning with a password field.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-14.webp) + +Depending on the version of macOS you use, you might see another popup window saying '**"balenaEtcher.app" would like to access files on a removable volume.**'. Click "**OK**" and wait for the installation to start. + +![Screenshot of a macOS popup warning with the options to "Don't Allow" or "OK".](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-15.webp) + +While Tails is getting installed, you should see a window that looks like this with "**Flashing...**". The operation might take a few minutes. Do not interrupt this process! + +![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing on the left a Flashing progression bar.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-16.png) + +4.7. Once Flashing is completed, you will see *balenaEtcher* validating the installation with "**Validating...**". This process should be quick. + +
+

Failed validation

+ +If the validation fails, close *balenaEtcher*, eject your USB stick, and try the installation process again from [Step 4](#step-4-install-tails-on-your-usb-stick-using-balenaetcher). You may also want to try with a different USB port or a different USB stick. + +
+ +![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing on the left a Validating progression bar.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-17.png) + +Once the installation is completed successfully, you should see a window like this with "**Flash Completed!**" on the left. You can now close *balenaEtcher* and unplug your USB stick. + +
+

Unreadable USB

+ +If you see a notification about a USB stick that appears to be unreadable, click "**Eject**" and unplug your USB stick. + +
+ +![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing on the left a green checkmark with "Flash Completed!".](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-18.png) + +### Step 5: Continue this tutorial from paper or from another device (if you can do so safely) + +For the rest of this tutorial, you will have to shut down the computer you will be using or testing Tails with. If this is the same computer you are currently using, you will need an alternative way to keep following along with the instructions. Make sure you either: + +- Note the rest of the instructions in advance on something that will be easy to delete/erase/destroy after. + +- Open this article on a mobile device where it is not dangerous for you to visit this page. + +### Step 6: Boot your computer from your Tails USB stick + +
+Warning: If the computer running Tails is a Mac with a T2 Security Chip (2018-2020): + +If the computer you will be using Tails with is a [Mac with a T2 Security Chip](https://support.apple.com/en-us/103265), and you receive the following message (or similar) when trying to boot your Mac from your Tails USB stick: + +`Security settings do not allow this Mac to use an external startup disk.` + +Here's how to modify options in your Mac's [Startup Security Utility](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102522) to make this works: + +1. Turn off your Mac, then turn it on again and right away press and hold **Command(⌘)+R**, this will enter your Mac's recovery mode. The startup process will take longer than usual, and you will see the screen flashing a few times, this is normal. + +2. You will see a "**Language**" menu appear, select a language then click on the arrow at the bottom-right. + +3. If your computer has multiple volumes (disks), you will be required to select one, then click "**Next**". + +4. You will need to select a user you know the password for and enter it, then click "**Next**". + +5. Once you see a window with 4 options, select none of these and instead go to the upper-left menu to select the "**Utilities**" drop-menu, then select "**Startup Security Utility**". + +6. You will see an "**Authentication Needed**" window appear, and you will need to enter your macOS user password again. + +7. Once you see the "**Startup Security Utility**" window with 5 options, in the "**Secure Boot**" section select "**No Security**" and in the "**External Boot**" or "**Allowed Boot Media**" section select "**Allow booting from external or removable media**". + +
+

Security warning!

+ +This reduces the security of your device because your computer could boot from anything else as well. You could "Turn On Firmware Password" at the top to mitigate this, however, if others use this device, I would recommend that you do not do this. Enabling a firmware password would require this new password to be entered [each time this device starts from a different disk](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102384). This could raise a lot of suspicions if there was no password before. + +Moreover, if you ever lose this password, you would be entirely locked out of this device and require an in-person service at the Apple Store to be able to keep using it. + +If you want to hide that you are using Tails from the people near you, I would recommend you do **not** turn on firmware password. However, do know this could increase some security risks for this device. + +
+ +![Screenshot of a macOS "Startup Security Utility" window from the recovery mode. In the "Secure Boot" section the option "No Security" is selected. In the "External Boot" section the option "Allow booting from external media" is selected.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/mac-startup-security-utility.png) + + + +
+

Quit Recovery Mode

+ +Once you have modified your "**Startup Security Utility**" options, click on the drop-down Apple menu (apple icon) of the upper-left, then select "**Shut Down**". + +
+ +
+ +To boot from your Tails USB stick: + +**From macOS:** + +1. Shut down your computer. +2. Plug in your Tails USB stick. +3. Turn on your Mac, then right away press and hold the "**Option**" key (⌥ or Alt key) until you see a loading bar or a disks menu. +4. When you see a disks menu, select the yellow disk called "**EFI Boot**" or "**Windows**". + +
+

No disks menu?

+ +If you do not see this disks menu, wait 2-3 minutes, shut down your computer, unplug your USB stick, plug it in another port if you can, and start the boot process over. + +
+ +**From Windows 8 or 10:** + +1. From Windows or the sign-in screen, click on the "**Start**" button. +2. While you choose "**Power**" > "**Restart**", press and hold the "**Shift**" key. +3. Once you get to the "**Choose and option**" screen, select "**Use a device**" +4. In "**Use a device**", select "**Boot Menu**" and plug in your Tails USB stick while Windows is shutting down. + +
+

Boot Step 3: No device selection menu?

+ +If you do not see this, follow these instructions from Tails: [https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/start/pc/index.en.html#boot-menu-key](https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/start/pc/index.en.html#boot-menu-key) + +
+ +
+

Boot Step 4: No boot menu?

+ +If Windows does not display a "**Boot Menu**", plug in your Tails USB stick then select it directly from the list of devices. Press "**Enter**". + +
+ +**From Linux:** + +1. Shut down your computer. +2. Plug in your Tails USB stick. +3. Identify the Boot Menu key for your specific computer manufacturer. You can see a list of the most common ones here: [https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/start/pc/index.en.html#boot-menu-key](https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/start/pc/index.en.html#boot-menu-key) +4. Turn on your computer and immediately press and hold this identified Boot Menu key. + +## Starting and using Tails + +If the installation was successful and the process of booting from the USB stick went well, you will see Tails starting. You will see some gray screens, you will see some flashes, you will see some black screen with lots of white text rolling down very quickly! + +Don't panic! This is normal :thumbsup: + +Once Tails has started, you will see a top menu bar with a blue wallpaper. It might take a few minutes before you see a window popping up there, this is also normal. Be patient. + +The first window you should see is a window saying "**Welcome to Tails!**" + +There, you will see language options, the [Persistent Storage](https://tails.net/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html) option, and Additional Settings options. + +
+

No keyboard! No mouse!

+ +At this point you might realize your mouse and/or keyboard are not working. If this happens, you can use a wired (or dongle) mouse and a wired (or dongle) keyboard to fix this problem quickly. If it is still not working after plugging one in, leave all peripherals plugged in and restart Tails (see [Step 6](#step-6-boot-your-computer-from-your-tails-usb-stick)). + +
+ +### Using Persistent Storage + +Make sure to test this feature works well multiple times before storing anything of value there. If you forget the Persistent Storage's password or if a bug occurs, you might not be able to access these files anymore. Know that you also have the option to plug in a separate (ideally encrypted) USB stick to store files on it, even while using Tails. If you encounter a problem when using Tails' Persistent Storage feature, you can troubleshoot it here: [https://tails.net/doc/persistent_storage/fsck/index.en.html](https://tails.net/doc/persistent_storage/fsck/index.en.html) + +If you decide to set up Persistent Storage: + +1. Choose a long passphrase that is **not** something known like music lyrics or movie quotes. Choose something you do not usually say/write and that you could not Google. Choose **something long and unique**, that nobody else has used before, and that you will be able to remember well. Practice this passphrase in your head regularly. + +2. After setting up Persistent Storage, you will see a window like this with additional options: + +![Screenshot of a window within Tails titled "Persistent Storage" and showing various options.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-persistentstorage.webp) + +### Connecting to the internet + +Make sure that your Wi-Fi card, Wi-Fi adapter, or Ethernet cable is plugged in and working. On the upper-right menu bar, click on the onion icon and select "**Open Tor Connection Assistant**". You will see a "**Tor Connection**" window appear with a few options. If it is not dangerous for you to have your ISP or government know you are using the Tor network, choose "**Connect to Tor automatically**" then click on "**Connect to Tor**". + +
+

Danger!

+ +If using Tor is dangerous for you, read more about the other options before deciding anything. + +
+ +![Screenshot of a window within Tails titled "Tor Connection" and showing various options.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-torconnection.webp) + +If the connection is successful, you should see this window, and you will be ready to browse the internet anonymously: + +![Screenshot of a window within Tails titled "Tor Connection" indicating the connection to Tor was successful. There is a button at the bottom labeled "Start Tor Browser".](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-torconnection-successful.webp) + +![Screenshot within Tails showing the Tor Browser application displaying the onion version of the Privacy Guides website.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-privacyguides-onion.webp) + +### Sharing files with others + +There is a lot of great applications already installed on Tails to help you! You will find them listed in the "**Applications**" drop-menu on the upper-left top bar. One of these applications is [OnionShare](https://onionshare.org/), which you can use to share files with others anonymously. + +![Screenshot within Tails showing the application OnionShare open.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-onionshare.webp) + +### Storing passwords + +If you are using the Persistent Storage with Tails, and need to store passwords, you can use the pre-installed [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/) application. This application will store your passwords encrypted, locally-only, and protected by a main password (ideally, a **passphrase**). Be careful however if you store important passwords in there. Remember that if a bug occurs or if you forget your Persistent Storage's password, you could lose access to all of it. + +![Screenshot within Tails showing the application KeePassXC open.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-keepassxc.webp) + +### Shutting down Tails + +When you are done using Tails, you should always **shut it down and unplug the USB stick** after. + +To shut Tails down, click on the upper-right menu on the top bar, the one with the battery icon. Then click on "**Power Off**" at the bottom-right of the drop-menu box. Wait for the screen to turn black, then unplug your Tails USB stick. + +
+

In Case of Emergency!

+ +In case of emergency, you can shut down Tails quickly by directly unplugging the USB stick while it is still running. This will effectively reset Tails like a normal shut down **IF** it was not in "Suspend" state. More on this here: [https://tails.net/contribute/design/memory_erasure/](https://tails.net/contribute/design/memory_erasure/) + +
+ +Shutting down Tails by physically unplugging it while it is still running [could potentially damage your Persistent Storage](https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/shutdown/index.en.html). Only use this feature in case of emergency, and shut down Tails using the "**Power Off**" menu option whenever possible. + +## Final notes + +Remember to delete the traces of this installation from the computer you used, once you have verified that everything works properly. + +**You should also remember to:** + +- [x] Delete the browsing history for these websites (this article, the Tails web pages, and any other related pages you have visited). +- [x] Delete cookies for these websites (or all cookies). +- [x] Delete the site data and cache for these websites (or all sites data). +- [x] If logged into your Google account, [delete your Google search history](https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/6096136) for these websites. +- [x] Delete *balenaEtcher*, both the software and the installation files (after verifying your Tails is operational). +- [x] Delete *balenaEtcher* from the recently used applications list. +- [x] Empty your computer's trash bin. +- [x] Once you have completed this list and verified your installation, reboot your computer. + +### Consider supporting Tails and the Tor Project + +Finally, if you are not personally at risk of harm by reading this article or by getting associated with Tails, I strongly encourage you to support this incredible project by donating to Tails or to the Tor Project. Tools like Tails and Tor help a lot of people in very vulnerable situations. Your support means a lot to non-profit organizations like the Tor Project to improve and maintain these tools. + +Thank you for helping yourself and others to stay safe :purple_heart: + +Support Tails (if it is safe for you to do so): [https://tails.net/donate/](https://tails.net/donate/) + +Support the Tor Project (if it is safe for you to do so): [https://donate.torproject.org/](https://donate.torproject.org/) + +![Screenshot within Tails showing the Tor Browser application displaying the Tails website welcome page.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-tailswebsite.png) + + diff --git a/blog/posts/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey.md b/blog/posts/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8bdc0c3e --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey.md @@ -0,0 +1,424 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-03-18T17:00:00Z +categories: + - Tutorials +authors: + - em +description: This tutorial demonstrates how to install the local-only password manager KeePassXC and secure a password database with YubiKey. +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# KeePassXC + YubiKey: How to set up a local-only password manager + +![Illustration showing a laptop computer with the KeePassXC logo on it. On the right is a green plus sign and a photo of a YubiKey.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-cover.webp) + + +If you are looking for a good remote password manager you can use from anywhere, there are plenty of excellent [options](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/) to choose from. However, if you prefer to only store your passwords locally, [KeePassXC](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/#keepassxc) is what you need. In this tutorial, we will set up KeePassXC to work with [YubiKey](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/security-keys/#yubikey) as an additional factor to secure your local-only password database. + +## :simple-keepassxc: KeePassXC summary + +KeePassXC is a free, open-source, and desktop-only password manager. The community-driven project was first released in 2012 and is a fork of both the *KeePass Password Safe* application and *KeePassX*, which is no longer actively maintained. + +In addition to having its [code](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc) available for all to see, KeePassXC also went through an independent [security review](https://keepassxc.org/blog/2023-04-15-audit-report/) in 2023. + +Because it does not automatically sync with any remote cloud service, KeePassXC works offline by default. This offers additional protections for your privacy, and potentially for your security as well, depending on your specific situation. + +### Platforms + +KeePassXC can run on Linux, macOS, and Windows computers. There is no direct option for a KeePassXC application on mobile. The KeePassXC team [suggests](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-platform-mobile) using [KeePassDX](https://www.keepassdx.com/) or [KeePass2Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=keepass2android.keepass2android) on Android phones, and [Strongbox](https://strongboxsafe.com/) or [KeePassium](https://keepassium.com/) on iPhones. + +### Database cloud backup + +KeePassXC is local-first and will not automatically back up your password database in the cloud. This can be both an advantage for security and privacy, and a disadvantage if something were to happen to your device. + +To prevent losing access to your passwords, it is recommended to regularly back up your encrypted database `.kdbx` file in a remote [cloud storage](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cloud/) of your choice, or on an encrypted external drive or USB stick. + +When copying this file to a third-party cloud service, it will [remain fully encrypted](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_storing_your_database) and only get decrypted locally on your device. That being said, it's still always best to select an end-to-end encrypted cloud storage whenever possible. + +### Feature overview + +This tutorial only covers the basic installation to get you ready using KeePassXC locally, with a main password secured with a YubiKey. However, KeePassXC offers a lot of features you might also want to have a look at. + +In addition to the features we will set up here, KeePassXC offers the following: + +- [Passkey support](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_passkeys) + +- [Password generator](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_password_generator) + +- [Command line tool](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_command_line_tool) + +- [SSH agent integration](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_ssh_agent_integration) + +- [KeeShare and groups](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_database_sharing_with_keeshare) + +- [Import password databases from 1Password, Bitwarden, Proton Pass, KeePass, CSV files](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_importing_databases) + +- [Export databases to CSV, HTML, or XML files](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_exporting_databases) + +- [And more](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_GettingStarted#_features) + +### What's new with KeePassXC 2.7.10 + +On March 4th, KeePassXC released its most recent update. This update includes the capacity to import Proton Pass databases, to generate passphrases using *mixed* case (a mix of uppercase and lowercase), and many other [useful features](https://keepassxc.org/blog/2025-03-04-2.7.10-released/). + +## :material-toolbox: Requirements and preparation + +
+

Operating systems

+ +This tutorial was completed using macOS, but your experience shouldn't be much different if you are using Linux or Windows. + +
+ +For this tutorial you will need: + +- [x] Computer running Linux, macOS, or Windows +- [x] Internet connection +- [x] Ability to install software on this computer +- [x] One or two YubiKeys (ideally two) + +## :material-download-circle: Setting up KeePassXC + +### Step 1: Download and Install KeePassXC + +Go to KeePassXC's download page and download the application version for your operating system. If the website doesn't detect your system automatically, you can change it on the top menu, or click on the "See more options" yellow button for previous versions. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC website download page.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-1-download.webp) + +
+

Verifying signatures

+ +For ideal security, you can verify the authenticity and integrity of the file you just downloaded by verifying the file's signatures. To do this, [follow the instructions](https://keepassxc.org/verifying-signatures/) from the website to guarantee the file you downloaded was created by the KeePassXC Team and has not been tampered with. + +
+ +Complete the process for your respective OS to install and open the application once verified. + +![Screenshot of the application installation window for KeePassXC on macOS.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-2-install.webp) + +On macOS, you will be prompted with a warning message saying "**“KeePassXC.app” is an app downloaded from the Internet. Are you sure you want to open it?**", click "Open". + +![Screenshot of a macOS warning popup before opening an application that was downloaded from the Internet.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-3-installwarning.webp) + +
+

KeePassXC blocks screenshots by default

+ +Interestingly, KeePassXC has a security feature that [blocks](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_screenshot_security) screenshots and recordings of the application window on macOS and Windows. + +This is a great feature to prevent accidentally sharing your decrypted password database information during a meeting presentation, for example. + +Thankfully for writing this tutorial, there is a way to disable it temporarily, but **you** should definitely keep it on. + +
+ +### Step 2: Adjust the settings + +Once you have installed and opened KeePassXC, before creating a database for your passwords, click on the "Settings" gear button on the upper-right, on the *toolbar*. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the Settings section.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-4-settings.webp) + +From there, you will see many options you can adjust to your preferences. The default settings are already good, but you might want to tweak a few things to your specific usage. + +#### Keep a previous version backup (recommended) + +Scrolling down to the "File Management" section, you might want to enable the option to "Backup database file before saving". This will ensure you always have a backup of the previous version of your database, in case you accidentally delete important information for example. + +You can store this backup in the same or a different directory. You can change this backup's name or keep the default that will append `.old` to your database filename. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the Settings General section with the Backup database file before saving checkbox checked.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-5-backupprevious.webp) + +#### Add icons specific to each service (optional) + +If you want to use icons specific to each service for your password entries, you can go to the "Security" subsection on the left-side menu, then in "Privacy" at the bottom *enable* "Use DuckDuckGo service to download website icons". This isn't enabled by default. Then click "OK" on the lower-right. + +
+

Offline only?

+ +Do not enable this if you wish to use KeePassXC offline only. You will still be able to use different default icons for you entries instead of downloading specific icons from the internet. + +
+ +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the Settings Security section with the checkbox for DuckDuckGo checked.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-6-duckduckgo.webp) + +### Step 3: Create a database + +A database in KeePassXC is an encrypted file that will contain all the passwords you register. + +You can use multiple separate databases with KeePassXC. For example, you could have a database for work, a database for your family, and a database for your personal accounts. All stored in separate files with separate main passwords. In the application, each database can be opened in its own tab. + +To create a new database, from the Welcome section click on the "Create Database" button on the lower-left. + +If you want to create a secondary database, you can also click on the dropdown Database menu on the application menu bar, then select "New Database". + +
+

Importing an existing database

+ +If you already have a password database file in the format `.kdbx`, you can import it from the Welcome page by clicking on "Import File" on the lower-right. + +
+ +You will see a window pop up with "General Database Information". Pick a name and description for your database and click on "Continue" at the bottom. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the popup to Create a new KeePassXC database.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-7-databasecreation.webp) + +For the second step, an "Encryption Settings" section will pop up. From there, you will be able to change the settings to your preferences. If you are not familiar with encryption algorithms, simply keep the defaults on and click "Continue" again. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the popup to Create a new KeePassXC database in the Encryption Settings.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-8-databaseencryption.webp) + +For the next step, a "Database Credentials" section will pop up. From there, you will be able to choose a main password to lock your entire password database. + +At this step, it is very important to [choose a password](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/passwords-overview/#best-practices) that is **unique, complex, and long**. This is the password that will protect all your other passwords. It should be easy to remember for you, but it must be *unique* and *long*. Ideally, pick a **passphrase**. + +#### Generate a main password (optional) + +If you do not feel inspired, you can use the "Generate password" dice button on the right to help you pick a strong password. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the popup to Generate Password.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-9-passwordgenerate.webp) + +No matter if you invent or generate your main password/passphrase, **make sure to remember this main password well**. You cannot rely on your password manager for this one. + +
+

This step isn't over yet!

+ +This is where you will be adding your YubiKey to further secure your database. Keep the "Database Credentials" application window open and **continue with the step below** :material-arrow-down-bold: + +
+ +## :material-shield-key: Securing your database with a YubiKey + +To add a YubiKey to secure your KeePassXC database, you will first need to prepare your YubiKey(s) for it, if it's not already ready to use with a [Challenge-Response](https://docs.yubico.com/yesdk/users-manual/application-otp/challenge-response.html) application. + +
+Using a YubiKey will not add authentication per se (read more) + +Technically speaking, adding a YubiKey to your KeePassXC database isn't a second factor of authentication because KeePassXC isn't a service, therefore it cannot "authenticate" you. + +However, adding a YubiKey to secure your KeePassXC database will make decryption of your database more secure by enhancing the encryption key of your database. + +The Challenge-Response will remain the same each time you decrypt your database, *however*, it will change each time the database is updated (each time there is a change to it, such as adding an entry, removing an entry, adding a note, etc.). Note that the previous versions of your database could get unlocked with your main password + your key's previous Challenge-Response, however. + +If your key's Challenge-Response were to become compromised, you could update your database (by adding or changing an entry for example), then fully delete all previous versions of your database. This would effectively make all previous Challenge-Response obsolete to unlock your current database. + +You can read more on this in KeePassXC's [documentation](https://keepassxc.org/docs/). + +
+ +### Step 4: Prepare your YubiKey(s) + +Because you cannot register two YubiKeys for this type of application, you should first make sure that you either have a secure backup for this Challenge-Response, or that you have cloned it to two YubiKeys, or more. This is important in case you were to lose your YubiKey. + +If you do have two YubiKeys, we have a [guide on how to reset your YubiKeys entirely and set up multiple keys as a backup](yubikey-reset-and-backup.md) which you may be interested in. + +If you only need to learn more about the Challenge-Response YubiKey application, jump to [this section](yubikey-reset-and-backup.md#step-9-create-and-clone-your-keys-challenge-response) of the tutorial directly. + +### Step 5: Add your YubiKey + +Once your YubiKey's Challenge-Response slot has been properly configured and backed up, return to the KeePassXC's "Database Credentials" window, and click on the "Add additional protection" button in the middle. + +This will open a new section with "Key File" and "Challenge-Response" options. Scroll down to "Challenge-Response". Plug in your YubiKey in your computer's port (only plug one key at the time), then click on the "Add Challenge-Response" button. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the popup to Create a new KeePassXC database in the Database Credentials section and highlighting the Add Challenge-Response button.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-10-challengeresponse.webp) + +
+

YubiKey or OnlyKey

+ +You can also use an OnlyKey to secure your KeePassXC database in the same way. + +
+ +You should see your YubiKey's model and serial number listed, and also which YubiKey slot you have stored your Challenge-Response in. Once the correct key is selected, click on "Done" at the bottom. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the popup to Create a new KeePassXC database in the Database Credentials section when a YubiKey is plugged in.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-11-selectyubikey.webp) + +A window will pop up to ask where you want to save your password database. Name your database file and save it in a secure directory on your computer. You will then be asked to touch your YubiKey. + +Touch the gold part of your YubiKey to save your database file. You will have to touch your YubiKey each time you save this database, and the file will be saved each time you make changes to it. + +
+

Important! Unlocking your database

+ +Each time you unlock your KeePassXC database, make sure to first plug in your YubiKey and verify that the "Use hardware key" checkbox is checked. Then, enter your main password and touch the gold part of your YubiKey when prompted. + +If you do not plug in your YubiKey first, an error will be triggered, and you will be unable to unlock your database. + +
+ +## :fontawesome-solid-unlock-keyhole: Using KeePassXC + +Using KeePassXC is quite simple and resembles most other password manager applications. The biggest difference is that your passwords will remain stored locally, unless you decide to back up your password database to a cloud service of your choice. + +All the options to manage and use your entries credentials will be located on the *toolbar* at the top. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing an empty database section.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-12-databasenew.webp) + +
+

Locking the database

+ +At all time when the application is open, you can click in the "Lock Database" padlock button on the toolbar to lock your database. You can also adjust the settings to lock your database each time you minimize the application window (this is disabled by default). + +Your database will already lock itself automatically when your laptop lid is closed, the session is locked, or if your switch user (unless you disabled these options manually in settings). + +
+ +### Step 6: Create a password entry + +To create a [new entry](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_GettingStarted#_entry_handling) for a password, click on the "Add a new entry" plus-shaped button on the toolbar. + +From this section, you will be able to register a "Title", "Username", "Password" (or generate one), "URL" (this is important if you use the browser extension), "Tags", "Expires" date, "Notes", and more. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the Add entry section filled with information.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-13-newentry.webp) + +
+

Keep your YubiKey plugged in when changing your database

+ +When adding/removing entries or changing your database in any other way, make sure your YubiKey is plugged in. You will have to touch it each time you save changes to your database. + +
+ +Before saving your entry by clicking "OK" on the lower-right, explore the options on the left-side menu. + +For example, in the "Advanced" section you can add additional attributes and store attachments, in the "Icon" section you can select an icon to represent your password entry (or download one from the web), in the "Auto-type" section you can enable/disable Auto-type, and in the "Properties" section you will see additional metadata for this entry. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the Add entry section in the Icon subsection.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-14-entryicons.webp) + +Once you have set up all the information you need for this password entry, click "OK" to save it to your database. You will be prompted to touch the gold part of your YubiKey to complete the operation. You should now see your entry listed in your database. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the database section with one password entry filled.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-15-entrycreated.webp) + +Each time you need this information, you can select an entry and click on the "Copy username to clipboard" character-shaped button, or the "Copy password to clipboard" key-shaped button, or the "Copy URL to clipboard" earth-shaped button on the toolbar. + +The data will stay in your computer's clipboard for 10 seconds then will get cleared (unless you changed this from the default setting). Once copied, paste this information in the appropriate field for your service. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the database section with all three buttons Username, Password, and URL for entry pointed at with arrows.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-16-useentry.webp) + +
+

Accidental deletion danger!

+ +Be careful not to mistakenly click on the dangerous "Delete Entry" trash-shaped button left to the "Copy username to clipboard" button on the toolbar! + +You would have to touch your YubiKey to confirm deletion, but remain careful. If you click on it accidentally, do NOT touch your YubiKey to confirm! + +If this accident happened to you, you might see your entry has been moved to a "Recycle Bin" directory on the left. Right-click on your entry and select "Restore Entry" at the top of the entry menu. Touch your YubiKey when prompted. You should now see your entry back in the "Root" directory on the left-side menu. + +
+ +### Step 7: Back up your database + +There are many ways to [back up](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_database_backup_options) your KeePassXC database: + +#### Automatic local backup + +If you enabled this setting on [Step 2](#step-2-adjust-the-settings), you will see a second file getting saved in the same directory with the same name but with an appended `.old` to it when you make a change to your password database. + +This is the previous version of your database. If you delete a password entry by mistake for example, you can easily restore it with this secondary database backup file. + +#### Manual backup from the application menu + +When your database is unlocked, you can click on the dropdown "Database" menu in the application menu bar (not the toolbar), then select "Save Database Backup". + +You will have the option to rename this file and choose a different location. Then, you will be prompted to touch your YubiKey to confirm. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the application menu with the Database dropdown menu rolled down and the Save Database Backup option selected.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-17-savedatabase.webp) + +#### Manual backup from copying the database file + +Another way to keep a backup of your password database is to simply copy the database `.kdbx` file somewhere else. + +You can copy this file to another local directory, an external drive (ideally encrypted), or a secure [cloud service](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cloud/) of your choice (ideally an end-to-end encrypted one). Even if your database will be encrypted, it's always better to choose secure cloud services that offer solid end-to-end encryption. + +
+

Entry history

+ +Within your database, KeePassXC also maintains a history of changes made to each of your entries. You can read more about this feature from KeePassXC's [documentation](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_history). + +
+ +### Step 8: Install the browser extension (optional) + +When you need to use KeePassXC to fill credentials in a browser or an app, you can always copy the entry field you need manually, as explained on [Step 6](#step-6-create-a-password-entry). But if you prefer, to facilitate filling credentials for web-based services, you can take advantage of KeePassXC's [browser extension](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_browser_integration). + +To install the extension, go to [this page](https://keepassxc.org/download/#browser) from the KeePassXC website and click on your browser's *category*. + +This means that for any Firefox-based browser, you can click on the Firefox logo, and for any Chromium-based browser, you can click on the Chrome logo. Some browsers might not be supported, however. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC website page to download the browser extension.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-18-downloadextension.webp) + +
+

Privacy warning

+ +Keep in mind that although browser extensions can be very convenient, they can also introduce some risk to your privacy. + +Even if the KeePassXC browser extension only [runs locally](https://keepassxc.org/privacy/), it does need to collect some information for its functionalities, and any additional extension installed has the potential to [introduce](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/browser-extensions/) a new attack surface. + +Additionally, the more unique your combination of hardware, software, and browser extensions is, the more you are vulnerable to [browser fingerprinting](https://neat.tube/w/fdszTYBKzeoE3ySQUGTzmo). Always be mindful to consider your specific threat model when installing new browser extensions. + +
+ +Once you have installed the extension for your browser, go back to the KeePassXC application and click on the "Settings" gear button on toolbar. Click on "Browser Integration" on the left-side menu and check the box for "Enable browser integration" at the top of the section. + +![Screenshot of the KeePassXC application showing the Settings section in the Browser Integration subsection with the checkbox for Enable browser integration checked.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-19-browserintegration.webp) + +From this [section](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_configure_keepassxc_browser), check the box for the browser(s) or browser type(s) you have installed the extension on. You can also enable the option "Search in all opened databases for matching credentials" if you are using multiple databases. Then click "OK" on the lower-right to save these options. + +Make sure your KeePassXC database is *unlocked*, then **restart your browser**. + +#### If you encounter an error while running the extension + +
+

You don't have to use the extension

+ +If you are not able to make the KeePassXC extension work with the browser you use, you can still use KeePassXC by manually copy-pasting your entries' credentials. It can even be a more secure and more private way to use it. + +
+ +After installing the extension and enabling it from the KeePassXC settings, you might encounter an error where the KeePassXC icon in a credential field is [marked](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_GettingStarted#_using_the_browser_extension) with a red "**X**", a red "**!**", or a padlock icon. + +If this happens, try the following: + +1. Make sure your KeePassXC application is open, and your database is *unlocked*. + +2. Check if your YubiKey is *plugged* in your computer's port. + +3. Verify that your browser is *compatible* and does not use protections that could block the extension from working. + +4. Follow KeePassXC's [instructions](https://keepassxc.org/docs/KeePassXC_UserGuide#_using_the_browser_extension) to connect your KeePassXC database to your KeePassXC browser extension. + +5. Look for possible solutions from KeePassXC's [troubleshooting guide](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc-browser/wiki/Troubleshooting-guide). + +![Screenshot of the CryptPad website login page showing in the Username field the KeePassXC logo greyed out and marked with a red "X".](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-20-errorconnection.webp) + +#### Filling credentials using the extension + +
+

The database is connected but the logo is greyed out

+ +If you do not have an entry for this website, or if you have not registered a URL (or the correct one) for this entry, your will see the KeePassXC logo greyed out. This simply means your database could not find any credentials matching this website's URL. + +
+ +Once configured and connected properly, you should see a green KeePassXC logo in the credential fields, when you have a corresponding entry in your database. + +Click on the green KeePassXC logo to populate all credential fields automatically. + +![Screenshot of the CryptPad website login page showing in the Username field the KeePassXC logo in green and both the credentials for Username and Password are filled.](../assets/images/installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey/keepassxc-21-credentialsextension.webp) + +
+

Congratulation! You're in!

+ +You are now logged in, thanks to KeePassXC! + +
+ +## :material-hand-heart: Consider supporting KeePassXC + +KeePassXC is a free and open-source project built by the community. If you use and love this application, it's always a great idea to support the project if you can. + +Here are a few ways you can help keep KeePassXC thriving: + +- [Contributing on GitHub](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/blob/develop/.github/CONTRIBUTING.md) +- [Following KeePassXC on Mastodon](https://fosstodon.org/@keepassxc) +- [Donating to KeePassXC to help with the development and maintenance of the application](https://keepassxc.org/donate/) + +For more information on KeePassXC and its many features, you can consult the official [Documentation and FAQ](https://keepassxc.org/docs/) or even have a look at KeePassXC's [code](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc) on GitHub. + + diff --git a/blog/posts/integrating-metadata-removal.md b/blog/posts/integrating-metadata-removal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2f70b597 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/integrating-metadata-removal.md @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2022-04-09T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Tutorials +authors: + - contributors +links: + - Metadata Removal Tools: https://www.privacyguides.org/data-redaction/ +tags: + - macOS + - iOS + - Windows +license: BY-SA +description: When sharing files, it's important to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include Exif data, and sometimes photos even include GPS coordinates within its metadata. +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# Removing Metadata From Your Photos, Videos, and Other Files + +When sharing files, it's important to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) data, and sometimes photos even include GPS coordinates within its metadata. + +While there are plenty of metadata removal tools, they typically aren't convenient to use. The guides featured here aim to detail how to integrate metadata removal tools in a simple fashion by utilizing easy-to-access system features. + +## macOS + +This guide uses the [Shortcuts](https://support.apple.com/guide/shortcuts-mac/intro-to-shortcuts-apdf22b0444c/mac) app to add an [ExifTool](https://www.privacyguides.org/data-redaction#exiftool) script to the *Quick Actions* context menu within Finder. Shortcuts is developed by Apple and bundled in with macOS by default. + +Shortcuts is quite intuitive to work with, so if you don't like the behavior demoed here then experiment with your own solution. For example, you could set the shortcut to take a clipboard input instead. The sky's the limit. + +![ExifTool Quick Action](../assets/images/metadata-removal/preview-macos.webp) + +### Prerequisites + +1. [Homebrew](https://brew.sh): a package manager. + + ```bash + /bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)" + ``` + +2. ExifTool is a tool for viewing and manipulating image, audio, video, and PDF metadata. + + ```bash + brew install exiftool + ``` + +!!! note + You can check if ExifTool is installed by running `exiftool -ver`. You should see a version number. + +### Creating the Shortcut + +1. Open **Shortcuts.app** and create a new shortcut + +2. In the shortcut's options, check **Use as Quick Action** and **Finder** + +3. Set up the retrieval options: + + - Receive **Images, Media, and PDFs** input from **Quick Actions** + - If there is no input select **Continue** + +4. Add the **Run Shell Script** action to the shortcut. You may need to enable **Allow Running Scripts** in Shortcut.app's settings + +5. Set up the shell script action: + - Select **zsh** from the shell list + - Set the input to **Shortcut Input** + - Select **as arguments** for the pass input + - Leave **Run as administrator** unchecked + +6. Use the following as the body of the script: + + ```bash + for f in "$@" + do + exiftool -all= "$f"; + done + ``` + +![macOS metadata removal shortcut](../assets/images/metadata-removal/shortcut-macos.webp) + +!!! tip "Worth Mentioning" + The open-source [ImageOptim](https://imageoptim.com/mac) app integrates into Finder's *Services* context menu by default. While it is primarily an image optimization app, it also removes metadata. + +### Enabling & using the Shortcut + +1. The shortcut will be accessible through **Quick Actions** context menu within Finder. + +2. If you want to reposition the shortcut within the context menu, go to:
+ **System Preferences** → **Extensions** → **Finder and drag the shortcut's position**. + +## iOS and iPadOS + +[Shortcuts](https://support.apple.com/guide/shortcuts/welcome/ios) can be made accessible through the system Share Sheet, making accessing those shortcuts very convenient. This guide will show you how to build a metadata removal shortcut and integrate it into the system *Share Sheet*. + +!!! warning + This method of metadata removal is not as comprehensive at removing metadata as utilities like [ExifTool](https://www.privacyguides.org/data-redaction#exiftool) and [mat2](https://www.privacyguides.org/data-redaction#mat2) are. + +The lack of *good* metadata removal apps on the App Store is what makes this solution worthwhile. + +![Don't preserve metadata shortcut](../assets/images/metadata-removal/preview-ios.webp) + +### Prerequisites + +1. [Shortcuts](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/shortcuts/id915249334) via the App Store. + +### Creating the Shortcut + +1. Create a new Shortcut + +2. Enter the Shortcut's settings and check **Show in Share Sheet** + +3. Add a **Receive** action and set it to receive **Images** from **Share Sheet** + +4. Add an **If** action + +5. Set the **If** action to **Shortcut Input** and **has any value** + +6. Add an **Otherwise** action + +7. Add an **End If** action + +8. Add a **Convert** action and set it to **If Result** and **Match Input** + +9. Finally, add a **Share** action and set that to **Converted Image** + +10. Make sure that you uncheck **preserve metadata** + +![iOS/iPadOS metadata removal shortcut](../assets/images/metadata-removal/shortcut-ios.webp) + +### Enabling & using the Shortcut + +1. The shortcut should be available through the system Share Sheet. If it is not, then a device restart may be required. +2. Optionally, you can add the shortcut to your home screen. + +## Windows + +Windows allows you to place files in a **SendTo** folder which then appear in the *Send to* context menu. This guide will show you how to add an [ExifTool](https://www.privacyguides.org/data-redaction#exiftool) batch script to this menu. + +![Send to metadata removal shortcut](../assets/images/metadata-removal/preview-windows.jpg) + +### Prerequisites + +1. ExifTool is a tool for viewing and manipulating image, audio, video, and PDF metadata. We suggest you read the [Installation instructions](https://exiftool.org/install.html#Windows) on the official website. + +!!! note + You can check if ExifTool is present in your [PATH](https://www.computerhope.com/issues/ch000549.htm) by running `exiftool -ver` in Command Prompt. You should see a version number. + +### Creating the shortcut + +1. Navigate to `%appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\SendTo` + +2. Right click in the **SendTo** folder and create a new **Text Document** + +3. Name the file `ExifTool.bat` (any name works, however it must end in `.bat`) + + !!! note + You may need to check if [file name extensions](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/common-file-name-extensions-in-windows-da4a4430-8e76-89c5-59f7-1cdbbc75cb01) are enabled. + +4. Open **ExifTool.bat** in Notepad + +5. Copy the following into the document: + + ```bat + exiftool -fast4 -if "$filepermissions =~ /^.w/" %* + if not errorlevel 0 ( + echo Some files are write protected + exit /b %errorlevel% + ) + exiftool -all= %* + ``` + +6. Save + +### Using the shortcut + +1. Right-click a supported file and choose **ExifTool.bat** within the *Send to* context menu. diff --git a/blog/posts/interview-with-micah-lee.md b/blog/posts/interview-with-micah-lee.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a0085928 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/interview-with-micah-lee.md @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-03-28T17:00:00Z +categories: + - News +authors: + - em +description: 'This article is an interview with Micah Lee, the creator of Cyd and OnionShare, founder of Lockdown Systems, and author of Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations: The Art of Analyzing Hacked and Leaked Data.' +schema_type: NewsArticle +preview: + cover: blog/assets/images/interview-with-micah-lee/social-preview-cover.webp +--- +# Interview with Micah Lee: Cyd, Lockdown Systems, OnionShare, and more + +![Photo of Micah Lee over a yellow and purple graphic background, and with the name Micah Lee written on the right.](../assets/images/interview-with-micah-lee/micah-lee-cover.webp) + + + +If you don't know who Micah Lee is yet, here's why you should: Micah is an information security engineer, a software engineer, a journalist, and an author who has built an impressive career developing software for the public good, and working with some of the most respected digital rights organizations in the United States. + +If you have been following software development related to data privacy and security for a while, you probably already know one of Micah's projects such as [OnionShare](https://onionshare.org/), [Dangerzone](https://dangerzone.rocks/), the [Tor Browser Launcher](https://github.com/torproject/torbrowser-launcher), and more recently [Cyd](https://cyd.social/) (a rebirth of Semiphemeral). Additionally, he is also a core contributor to the [Tor Project](https://www.torproject.org/) and a contributor to [Hush Line](https://hushline.app/). + +Besides software development, Micah is a board member for [Science & Design](https://scidsg.org/) and [Distributed Denial of Secrets](https://ddosecrets.com/), a former board member and cofounder of [Freedom of the Press Foundation](https://freedom.press), and has been a Staff Technologist for the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/). + +You might have already read some of Micah's articles when he worked at [The Intercept](https://theintercept.com/staff/micah-lee/), or even read his new [book](https://hacksandleaks.com/) Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations: The Art of Analyzing Hacked and Leaked Data. + +We spoke with Micah over email and are delighted that he decided to talk with us at Privacy Guides. Let's get into it! + +***Em:*** *Hi Micah! We're thrilled that you have accepted to give us this interview at Privacy Guides. Thank you for taking time off your busy schedule to talk with us.* + +## Cyd: The app to claw back your data from Big Tech + +***Em:*** *Let's start with your newest project. [Cyd](https://cyd.social) is an application you have created in 2024 to help people backing up and deleting their tweets on X-(Twitter). This app emerged from the ashes of [Semiphemeral](https://micahflee.com/2024/07/like-a-phoenix-semiphemeral-will-rise-from-the-ashes/), a great tool that was unfortunately rendered unusable when Twitter decided to [shut off its API](https://mashable.com/article/twitter-ending-free-api-tier-elon-musk-worst-decision). I personally loved Semiphemeral and used it to delete thousands of my tweets before eventually deleting my whole Twitter account later on. Can you tell us more about how Cyd works despite not using X's API?* + +**Micah:** + +APIs make it way simpler for programmers to interact with online services, but they're not the only way. As long as social media platforms like X still run websites, and it's still possible for you, the human, to manually scroll through your tweets and delete them, it's possible to write a program that can do this for you. + +This is basically how Cyd works. It's a desktop app that includes an embedded web browser. When you add an X account to it, you login to your account in the browser, and then Cyd takes over. You can tell it that you want to delete your tweets, or likes, or bookmarks, or unfollow everyone, or save a backup of your DMs, or plenty of other things, and it does this by automating the embedded browser on your behalf. No API required. + +Cyd uses open APIs when they're available and make sense. For example, if you want to quit X but you don't want your old tweets to disappear forever, Cyd can migrate them to Bluesky using Bluesky's API -- soon we'll add support for migrating to Mastodon too. But for closed platforms that suck (like X, and Facebook too, which we're adding support for right now), we're forced to do it the hard way. + +***Em:*** *Talking about openness, recently this year you have decided to [make Cyd open source](https://infosec.exchange/@micahflee/113885066507235250). This is fantastic news! What did you take into consideration before making this decision and what kind of [contributions](https://github.com/lockdown-systems/cyd) or feedback are you hoping to receive from the community?* + +**Micah:** + +I'm extremely happy that Cyd is now open source. I've open-sourced most code that I've ever written, so it honestly felt kind of weird starting out making Cyd proprietary. + +My biggest concern with making it open was that I want Cyd to be a sustainable business, where some of the features are free and some of the features are premium and cost money -- enough so that me, and eventually other people working on it, could get paid a decent wage. And as an open source app, it would be easy for someone to fork it and remove the bits of code that check if you've paid for premium access. + +But after talking it through with some other people who are very experienced open source devs, I decided that this isn't that big of a deal, and that the benefits of being open source far outweigh the costs. + +Now when you use Cyd, you can now *confirm* that it doesn't have access to your social media accounts or any of the data in it. Having an open issue tracker on GitHub is great too, because people in the community can open issues, post comments, and track the progress of features they're looking forward to. Also being open source means we have the ability to accept grants and donations, in addition to selling premium accounts. You can check out our Open Collective page at [https://opencollective.com/lockdown-systems](https://opencollective.com/lockdown-systems). + +I'm hoping that members of the community will discuss features we're making, or even contribute code directly to our project. Right now, Cyd is only available in English, but we're also hoping to translate it into many different languages going forward, so I'm hoping that people will eventually chip in it to help translate Cyd to their native languages. + +***Em:*** *Having access to Cyd in multiple languages would really be wonderful. Likewise for multiple social media, when additional ones will be added later on. But at the moment, Cyd definitely seems to be [focusing](https://cyd.social/want-to-quit-x-in-2025-heres-how-to-do-it-the-right-way-with-cyd/) on X. You have personally been on the receiving end of Elon Musk's vengeful whims before when your Twitter account got [banned](https://micahflee.com/2023/05/elon-banned-me-from-twitter-for-doing-journalism-good-riddance/) in 2022 for criticizing him. I would say this qualifies as a badge of honor. Do you think you could still be on his radar with Cyd focusing on [data deletion for X](https://cyd.social/delete-all-your-tweets-for-free-with-cyd/) even though X has shut off its API? Have you taken any specific measures about this?* + +**Micah:** + +I think it's actually more likely that I'll be on Elon Musk's radar because of my [recent work](https://www.youtube.com/live/APHo7bea_p4?si=stSrkmo1MWy5_iVX&t=3338) with the Tesla Takedown movement than with Cyd... Right now, Musk is spending all of his time purging the US government of critics and consolidating executive power under Trump. So maybe he's too distracted on his fascism project to care about what we're doing with deleting tweets? + +But that said, Musk is litigious and we're definitely concerned about legal threats. We've consulted lawyers and we're trying to be as safe as possible. + +## Lockdown Systems: The new organization developing Cyd + +***Em:*** *Cyd is a project of [Lockdown Systems](https://lockdown.systems), a new organization you have created with colleagues just a few months ago. Can you tell us more about the structure of this organization and who else is involved?* + +**Micah:** + +We're still finalizing the paperwork, but Lockdown Systems is a new worker-owned collective! At the moment there are five of us: + +- me +- Jen, a former SecureDrop engineer who was the technical editor of my book and, for several years, my Dungeons & Dragons dungeon master +- Saptak, a talented human-rights-focused open source developer who I work with on OnionShare +- Yael, an investigative journalist friend who, among other things, broke a story with me about how Zoom had lied about supporting end-to-end encryption just as everyone started using it during the pandemic +- Akil, a talented newsroom engineer I worked closely with at The Intercept + +Most companies are owned by investors who only care about profit. They don't care about the workers, and they definitely don't care about the end-users of the software they make. This is why it's so common for tech companies to end up spying on their users and selling that data: it's an additional way to make a profit for their investors. + +We're different. Lockdown Systems is owned by its workers, and we don't have outside investors. We have all agreed to the explicit goals of: ensuring the well-being of our members; making tools that help fight fascism and authoritarianism; and prioritizing impact over profit. + +We make decisions by coming to consensus, and everyone in the collective gets paid the same wage. Even though I started Cyd, I don't have more say than anyone else. + +***Em:*** *That is such a great organizational structure for software development. Lockdown Systems really has an impressive team of skilled and dedicated people. Presently, it seems from the website and [GitHub page](https://github.com/lockdown-systems) that Lockdown Systems is focusing on developing and growing Cyd only. Are you planning on using Lockdown Systems mainly for Cyd or are you envisaging other applications getting added to Lockdown Systems in the near (or far) future?* + +**Micah:** + +So far, Cyd is our only product. There are many features we plan on building, and we also need to get it the point where it can fund our continued work. Most likely, this will be our main project for the near future. + +That said, we're definitely open to branching out. We make software that directly empowers individuals, helping them reclaim their autonomy and privacy. So if we see an opportunity to build something that will directly help people who are facing fascist threats -- whether it's supporting abortion access, keeping immigrants safe, helping communities organize mutual aid, etc. -- we will absolutely do it. + +***Em:*** *If one day some generous millionaire (let's keep it at millionaire, we all know what happens at billionaire) decided to give Lockdown Systems a huge budget bump no string attached, how would you like to grow the organization with this money?* + +**Micah:** + +One cool thing about being a member of a collective is that if this happened, the whole collective would brainstorm together and we'd come up with ideas that are far better than what I could come up with alone. But that said, I definitely have some thoughts. + +Right now, everyone is working part time, between about 10 and 30 hours a week each. If we had the resources, many of us would work on Cyd full-time, and we'd be able to offer benefits like health care and retirement contributions. We could also increase how many people are part of the collective, and build out new features at a much faster rate. + +In my mind, future Cyd will be a single app (possible available on mobile devices, not just desktop) where you can have total control over all of your data that's currently stored by tech companies (X, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, LinkedIn, Reddit, Bluesky, Mastodon, Discord, Slack, Telegram, Amazon, Airbnb, Substack, and on and on). You can backup all your data and then have choice over where you want the rest of it: you can delete *everything*, or you can choose to keep your online presence that you're proud of. You can easily cross-post to multiple platforms, and also automatically delete your older posts from the corporate platforms, while keeping them live on the open ones. Or, however else you choose to do it. + +If we had a bigger team to pay for more labor, there's a lot that we could get done. + +***Em:*** *In the meantime, I imagine one million $1 donations could also help. If our readers would like to support the development of Lockdown Systems, they can make a [donation on this page](https://opencollective.com/lockdown-systems).* + +## OnionShare: The app to share files, host websites, and chat anonymously through Tor + +***Em:*** *Our community is likely familiar with this great application included in so many security and privacy-focused projects, including [Tails](https://tails.net/), [Qubes OS](https://www.qubes-os.org/), [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org/), and [Parrot OS](https://parrotsec.org/). What motivated you to create [OnionShare](https://onionshare.org) more than 10 years ago, and what do you think is the best way to use it now?* + +**Micah:** + +I made OnionShare in 2014 while I was helping journalists report on the Snowden documents. The big motivation was a border search: Glenn Greenwald's partner, David, traveled from Berlin, where he was visiting Laura Poitras, back to his home in Rio de Janeiro. He was carrying an encrypted hard drive, on an assignment for The Guardian. During his layover at Heathrow airport in London, UK authorities detained him and searched him. + +None of this was necessary. Using the internet, encryption, and Tor, it's possible to securely move documents around the world without putting anyone at risk at a border crossing. In fact, I was already doing something similar with journalists I was collaborating with on Snowden stories myself. To send someone secret documents, I'd first encrypt them using PGP, and then place them in a folder on my laptop. I'd start up a web server with a simple directory listing for that folder, and then make that web server accessible as a Tor onion service. + +While this wasn't too hard for me, an experienced Linux nerd, to set up, it would be very challenging for most people. I made OnionShare basically as a user-friendly way for anyone to be able to securely share files, peer-to-peer, without needing to first upload them to some third party service like Dropbox. + +Today, OnionShare has more features. It's basically like a graphical interface to do cool things with Tor onion services -- you can send files, but you can also turn your laptop into an anonymous dropbox so people can upload files to you, and you can quickly host onion websites and spin up temporary chatrooms too. And there are Android and iPhone apps! + +The last time I used OnionShare myself was last week. On my personal newsletter, I'm writing a [series of posts](https://micahflee.com/exploring-the-paramilitary-leaks/) exploring the Paramilitary Leaks, 200 GB of data from the American militia movement, obtained by an infiltrator name John Williams. While working on one of my posts, John used OnionShare to send me some additional documents. + +## Other projects and thoughts + +***Em:*** *You have been a prolific writer as a journalist for [The Intercept](https://theintercept.com/staff/micah-lee/), your own [Blog](https://micahflee.com/), and in January 2024 you [released](https://micahflee.com/2023/12/hacks-leaks-and-revelations-the-art-of-analyzing-hacked-and-leaked-data/) a book called Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations: The Art of Analyzing Hacked and Leaked Data. What is this book about, and who is it written for?* + +**Micah:** + +I spent many years reporting on hacked and leaked datasets, starting with the Snowden archive. Since then, I've seen the amount of hacked and leaked data grow exponentially. And at the same time, journalists and researchers -- the people who really need to dig through this data and find the good stories -- don't even know where to start. + +So that's what my book is, an interactive guide to downloading and exploring datasets. It doesn't require any prior knowledge, but it does get pretty technically, including two chapters teaching Python programming. If you're following along, near the beginning of the book you'll encrypt a USB hard drive and then download a copy of BlueLeaks to it -- hundreds of gigabytes of hacked police documents from the middle of the Black Lives Matter uprising in 2020. You'll use this dataset, along with several others, as examples as you learn how to make sense of data like this. + +You should definitely buy the book if you're interested and you can, but information wants to be free, so I also released the whole book under a Creative Commons license. You can read the whole thing online at [hacksandleaks.com](https://hacksandleaks.com/). + +***Em:*** *I can see how much of a valuable skill this is to learn for journalists and researchers in this day and age. Even if nothing compares to having a physical paper copy (in my opinion), it's wonderful that you share your book online for people who, for various reasons, cannot order a copy. You have worked or still work with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Freedom of the Press Foundation, Science & Design, the Tor Project, and Distributed Denial of Secrets. Your contribution and commitment to digital rights is undeniable. From your experience, what are you envisioning for the future of digital rights activism?* + +**Micah:** + +I don't have all of the answers, but I do think that it's important for digital rights activists to meet the moment. Fascist politicians are gaining power around the world. The gap between the ultra rich and everyone else is wider than it's ever been before. Elon Musk has openly bought the US government, and the Trump-supporting oligarchs control all of our critical tech infrastructure. Climate change deniers and anti-vaxxers are the ones in charge right now, at least in the US. Things are pretty bad. + +Whatever we do, we should have the goal of shifting power away from the fascists and billionaires and towards everyone else. We need alternative platforms that are not only open and democratic, but also just as easy to use as the corporate walled gardens. We need digital rights, not to mention digital security, to fully integrate itself into the rest of the mass movements going on now, whether it's to save the planet from climate change, to protect immigrants getting sent to gulags, or to stop the genocide in Gaza. + +***Em:*** *Absolutely, and digital rights advocates and organizations undeniably have a crucial role to play in these movements. Finally, is there anything else you would like to share with us that we haven't discussed yet?* + +**Micah:** + +If you want to support Lockdown Systems and you work for an organization that might be interested in offering Cyd as a benefit to their employees, check out Cyd for Teams! If we can get organizations on board this will go a long way to making sure we can continue to get paid doing this work: [https://docs.cyd.social/docs/cyd-for-teams/intro](https://docs.cyd.social/docs/cyd-for-teams/intro) + +***Em:*** *Thank you so much Micah for taking the time to answer our questions today! The new projects you are working on are fascinating, and so important in the current landscape. I'm excited for more people to discover Cyd and Lockdown Systems, and will myself be following their evolution and expansion enthusiastically.* + +## Consider supporting Micah Lee's projects + +If you would like to follow Micah Lee's work and support his projects, consider: + +- [Following Micah Lee on Mastodon](https://infosec.exchange/@micahflee) + +- [Reading Micah Lee's Blog](https://micahflee.com/) + +- [Donating to Cyd and Lockdown Systems](https://opencollective.com/lockdown-systems) + +- [Signing up for Cyd for Teams](https://docs.cyd.social/docs/cyd-for-teams/sign-up) + +- [Getting a copy of Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations](https://hacksandleaks.com/) + +- [Contributing to one of Micah Lee's software](https://github.com/micahflee) diff --git a/blog/posts/ios-configuration-guide.md b/blog/posts/ios-configuration-guide.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..890c19aa --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/ios-configuration-guide.md @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2022-10-22T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Tutorials +authors: + - mfwmyfacewhen + - jonah + - contributors +tags: + - iOS +license: BY-SA +description: There are a number of privacy and security-related settings you should consider changing in the Settings app on iOS 16. +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# iOS 16 Privacy Configuration Guide + +There are a number of privacy and security-related settings you should consider changing in the **Settings** app on iOS. + +## iCloud + +Apple uses **iCloud** to sync your settings, photos, documents, apps, etc. to your other devices. Some things synced to iCloud are end-to-end encrypted, while others are merely encrypted in transit. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303) for information on which services are E2EE; anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. You should disable anything you don't want backed up to iCloud. + +!!! warning + + Despite "Messages in iCloud" being E2EE, enabling iCloud Backup stores a key to unlock iMessage in your device backup, which is **not** E2EE. If you don't want to store a copy of your iMessage keys, disable iCloud Backup. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. For the purposes of this guide, we will only be covering first-party Apple iCloud services: + +**iCloud Backup** backs up your phone and app data to Apple's servers. Unfortunately, these backups are not E2EE,[^1] and having them enabled even removes E2EE from some other iCloud services (like iMessage). Instead of iCloud Backup, we recommend making an encrypted backup to your computer using iTunes (Windows) or Finder (macOS). + +[^1]: [Reuters - Exclusive: Apple dropped plan for encrypting backups after FBI complained](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive-idUSKBN1ZK1CT) + +Select **iCloud Backup** + +- [ ] Turn off **Back Up This iPhone** + +**Private Relay** is a paid ([**iCloud+**](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201318)) proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by Cloudflare. Because Private Relay is still in beta, and it only covers the Safari browser, we recommend you choose a proper [VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/vpn/) instead. + +Select **Private Relay** + +- [ ] Turn off **Private Relay (Beta)** + +If you already use iCloud Mail, **Hide My Email** is Apple's first-party email aliasing feature. You can use email aliases with Sign In With Apple, for free, or generate unlimited aliases with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email may be good for iCloud Mail users because it only requires trusting one party (Apple) with your emails, but if you use any other email provider, we recommend [a standalone email aliasing service](https://www.privacyguides.org/email#email-aliasing-services) instead. + +### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +## Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +## Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +## Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +## General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +## Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +## Face ID or Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make trade-offs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance, so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +## Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +**Lockdown Mode** is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Privacy/Security Tips + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](https://www.privacyguides.org/real-time-communication/) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### Installing Beta Versions of iOS + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools, and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/blog/posts/job-openings.md b/blog/posts/job-openings.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d67df81 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/job-openings.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2024-10-28T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +authors: + - niek-de-wilde +links: + - Job Openings: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/jobs/ +tags: + - Privacy Guides +description: Privacy Guides is now hiring for a video content creation position and a journalist position, as well as a 6-month internship. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- +# Privacy Guides is Hiring + +We are thrilled to announce the opening of three new job positions aimed at enhancing our mission of promoting personal privacy and informed digital choices. As a non-profit organization dedicated to empowering individuals with the knowledge and tools they need to navigate the internet in a private manner, we are excited to expand our team with talented individuals who share our vision. They will play a key role in helping us reach new audiences to spread our message in multiple formats, and make sure we are the authoritative source for trustworthy and unbiased consumer privacy resources on the internet. + +## Content Creator + +We're seeking a passionate multimedia content creator to spearhead our video production efforts on YouTube and other platforms. This role will involve creating engaging and informative video content that for example simplifies several privacy concepts and offers practical tips for protecting personal information. The ideal candidate will have experience in video production (but this is not strictly required) and a commitment to making complex topics accessible to a wide audience. + +This is your chance to enter the tech & educational content creation space, without worrying about sponsors and advertisers diluting your message. We have no commercial interests to interfere with your content, and no agenda beyond simply providing the best privacy information out there. If you're excited about using the power of video to educate and inspire, we want to hear from you! + +[Learn more and apply here :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://privacyguides.org/en/about/jobs/content-creator/) + +## Journalist + +We are also looking for a skilled journalist to join our team. This role will focus on producing in-depth articles for our blog that explore the latest trends in privacy and security, as well as the implications of emerging technologies. The ideal candidate will have a background in investigative journalism and a deep understanding of privacy issues. Your work will help inform our community and foster critical discussions about digital rights and responsibilities. + +Other tasks will be to research new subjects to cover, perform interviews, and conduct product and service reviews for our recommendations. + +[Learn more and apply here :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://privacyguides.org/en/about/jobs/journalist/) + +## News Curation Internship + +Finally, we are offering a paid internship position that will focus on staying up-to-date with the latest privacy and security news, interacting with our community, and providing overall support to our volunteers. This role will involve curating relevant articles, reports, and insights to keep our team informed and engaged with current events. This is an excellent opportunity for someone passionate about privacy issues and looking to gain hands-on experience in a non-profit environment. Ideal candidates will have strong research skills and a keen interest in digital rights. + +[Learn more and apply here :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://privacyguides.org/en/about/jobs/intern-news/) + +## Join us in making a difference + +At Privacy Guides, we believe that everyone deserves the right to privacy and security in the digital world. By joining our team, you will play a vital role in educating the public and advocating for stronger privacy protections. If you’re ready to make a difference and are excited about one of these roles, we encourage you to apply! diff --git a/blog/posts/linux-application-sandboxing.md b/blog/posts/linux-application-sandboxing.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..409e70db --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/linux-application-sandboxing.md @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2022-04-22T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Tutorials +authors: + - contributors +tags: + - Linux + - Security +license: BY-SA +description: We outline a few projects which aim to solve the poor sandboxing situation in Linux relative to operating systems like macOS and ChromeOS. +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# Sandboxing Applications on Desktop Linux + +Some sandboxing solutions for desktop Linux distributions do exist, however they are not as strict as those found in macOS or ChromeOS. Applications installed from the package manager (`dnf`, `apt`, etc.) typically have **no** sandboxing or confinement whatsoever. Below are a few projects that aim to solve this problem: + +## Flatpak + +[Flatpak](https://flatpak.org) aims to be a universal package manager for Linux. One of its main functions is to provide a universal package format which can be used in most Linux distributions. It provides some [permission control](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html). However, [it is known](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#flatpak) that Flatpak sandboxing could be improved as particular Flatpaks often have greater permission than required. There does seem to be [some agreement](https://theevilskeleton.gitlab.io/2021/02/11/response-to-flatkill-org.html) that this is the case. + +You can restrict applications further by issuing [Flatpak overrides](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/flatpak-command-reference.html#flatpak-override). This can be done with the command-line or by using [Flatseal](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.github.tchx84.Flatseal). Some sample overrides are provided by [rusty-snake](https://github.com/rusty-snake/kyst/tree/main/flatpak). + +We generally recommend revoking access to: + +- the Network (`share=network`) socket (internet access) +- the PulseAudio socket (for both audio in and out), `device=all` (access to all devices including the camera) +- `org.freedesktop.secrets` dbus (access to secrets stored on your keychain) for applications which do not need it + +If an application works natively with Wayland (and not running through the [XWayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/xserver.html) compatibility layer), consider revoking its access to the X11 (`socket=x11`) and [Inter-process communications (IPC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_domain_socket) socket (`share=ipc`) as well. + +We also recommend restricting broad filesystem permissions such as `filesystem=home` and `filesystem=host` which should be revoked and replaced with just the directories that the app needs to access. Some applications like [VLC](https://www.flathub.org/apps/details/org.videolan.VLC) implement the [Portals](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/portal-api-reference.html) [API](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API), which allows a file manager to pass files to the Flatpak application (e.g. VLC) without specific filesystem access privileges. VLC is only able to access the specific file that you want to open, rather than requiring privileges to particular locations. + +Hard-coded access to some kernel interfaces like [`/sys`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysfs) and [`/proc`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Procfs#Linux) and weak [seccomp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seccomp) filters unfortunately cannot be secured with Flatpak. + +## Firejail + +[Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) is another method of sandboxing. As it is a large [setuid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Setuid) binary, it has a large attack surface which may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation). + +[This post from a Whonix security researcher](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#firejail) provides additional details on how Firejail can worsen the security of your device. + +## Mandatory Access Control + +[Mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) systems require policy files in order to force constraints on the system. + +The two main control systems are [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) (used on Android and Fedora) and [AppArmor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AppArmor). + +Fedora includes SELinux preconfigured with some policies that will confine [system daemons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daemon_(computing)) (background processes). We don’t recommend disabling SELinux. + +openSUSE gives the choice of AppArmor or SELinux during the installation process. We recommend sticking to the default for each variant (AppArmor for [Tumbleweed](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed/) and SELinux for [MicroOS](https://microos.opensuse.org/)). openSUSE’s SELinux policies are derived from Fedora. + +Arch and Arch-based operating systems often do not come with a mandatory access control system and that must be configured manually for either [AppArmor](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AppArmor) or [SELinux](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/SELinux). + +Linux desktops don't usually include individual app confinement rules, unlike Android which sandboxes every application installed. + +## Making your own policies/profiles + +You can make your own AppArmor profiles, SELinux policies, Bubblewrap profiles, and [seccomp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seccomp) blacklist to have better confinement of applications. This is an advanced and sometimes tedious task, so we won’t go into detail about how to do it here, but we do have a few projects that you could use as reference. + +- Whonix’s [AppArmor Everything](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) +- Krathalan’s [AppArmor profiles](https://github.com/krathalan/apparmor-profiles) +- noatsecure’s [SELinux templates](https://github.com/noatsecure/hardhat-selinux-templates) +- Seirdy’s [Bubblewrap scripts](https://sr.ht/~seirdy/bwrap-scripts) + +## Securing Linux containers + +If you’re running a server, you may have heard of Linux Containers, Docker, or Podman which refer to a kind of [OS-level virtualization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OS-level_virtualization). Containers are more common in server and development environments where individual apps are built to operate independently. + +[Docker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Docker_(software)) is one of the most common container solutions. It does not run a proper sandbox, and this means that there is a large kernel attack surface. The [daemon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daemon_(computing)) controls everything and [typically](https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/rootless/#known-limitations) runs as root. If it crashes for some reason, all the containers will crash too. The [gVisor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GVisor) runtime which implements an application level kernel can help limit the number of [syscalls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/System_call) an application can make and can help isolate it from the host’s [kernel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernel_(operating_system)). + +Red Hat develops [Podman](https://docs.podman.io/en/latest/) and secures it with SELinux to [isolate](https://www.redhat.com/sysadmin/apparmor-selinux-isolation) containers from each other. One of the notable differences between Docker and Podman is that Docker requires [root](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superuser) while Podman can run with [rootless containers](https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2020/09/25/rootless-containers-with-podman-the-basics) that are also [daemonless](https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2018/08/29/intro-to-podman), meaning if one crashes they don’t all come down. + +Another option is [Kata containers](https://katacontainers.io/), where virtual machines masquerade as containers. Each Kata container has its own Linux kernel and is isolated from the host. + +The above container technologies can be useful if you want to run certain web app software on your local network, such as [Vaultwarden](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden) or images provided by [LinuxServer.io](https://www.linuxserver.io), to increase privacy by decreasing dependence on various web services. A guide on [hardening Docker and OCI](https://wonderfall.dev/docker-hardening) has been written by the author "Wonderfall." diff --git a/blog/posts/linux-system-hardening.md b/blog/posts/linux-system-hardening.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c0740272 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/linux-system-hardening.md @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2022-04-22T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Tutorials +authors: + - contributors +tags: + - Linux + - Security +license: BY-SA +robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large +description: There are a number of procedures you can follow to make your Linux desktop system more secure, some more advanced than others. We cover some general techniques here. +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# Hardening Your Desktop Linux System's Security + +There are a number of procedures you can follow to make your Linux desktop system more secure, some more advanced than others. We cover some general techniques here. + +## Firewalls + +A [firewall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)) may be used to secure connections to your system. If you’re on a public network, the necessity of this may be greater than if you’re on a local trusted network that you control. We would generally recommend that you block incoming connections only, unless you’re using an application firewall such as [OpenSnitch](https://github.com/evilsocket/opensnitch) or [Portmaster](https://safing.io/portmaster/). + +Red Hat distributions (such as Fedora) are typically configured through [firewalld](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewalld). Red Hat has plenty of [documentation](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/configuring_and_managing_networking/using-and-configuring-firewalld_configuring-and-managing-networking) regarding this topic. There is also the [Uncomplicated Firewall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncomplicated_Firewall) which can be used as an alternative. + +You could also set your default firewall zone to drop packets. If you're on a Red Hat based distribution, such as Fedora this can be done with the following commands: + +!!! Example + + ```bash + firewall-cmd --set-default-zone=drop; + firewall-cmd --add-protocol=ipv6-icmp --permanent; + firewall-cmd --add-service=dhcpv6-client --permanent; + ``` + +All these firewalls use the [Netfilter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netfilter) framework and therefore cannot protect against malicious programs running on the system. A malicious program could insert its own rules. + +If you are using Flatpak packages, you can revoke their network socket access using Flatseal and prevent those applications from accessing your network. This permission is not bypassable. + +If you are using non-classic [Snap](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snap_(package_manager)) packages on a system with proper snap confinement support (with both AppArmor and [cgroups](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cgroups) v1 present), you can use the Snap Store to revoke network permission as well. This is also not bypassable. + +## Kernel hardening + +Kernel hardening options such as configuring [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl#Linux) keys and [kernel command-line parameters](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html) can help harden your system. We suggest looking at the following [sysctl settings](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#sysctl) and [boot parameters](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#boot-parameters). + +We **strongly** recommend that you learn what these options do before applying them. There are also some methods of [kernel attack surface reduction](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#kernel-attack-surface-reduction) and [access restrictions to sysfs](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#restricting-sysfs) that can further improve security. + +!!! Note + Unprivileged [user namespaces](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#kernel) can be disabled, due to it being responsible for various privileged escalation vulnerabilities. Some software such as Docker, Podman, and LXC require unprivileged user namespaces to function. If you use these tools you should not disable `kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone`. + + Disabling access to `/sys` without a proper whitelist will lead to various applications breaking. This will unfortunately be an extremely tedious process for most users. Kicksecure, and by extension, Whonix, has an experimental [hide hardware info service](https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/hide-hardware-info.service) which does just this. From our testing, these work perfectly fine on minimal Kicksecure installations and both Qubes-Whonix Workstation and Gateway. If you are using Kicksecure or Whonix, we recommend that you follow the [Kicksecure Wiki](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Security-misc) to enable hide hardware info service. + +## Linux-Hardened + +Some distributions like Arch Linux have the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened), kernel package. It includes [hardening patches](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/security#Kernel_hardening) and more security-conscious defaults. Linux-Hardened has `kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0` disabled by default. See the [note above](#kernel-hardening) about how this might impact you. + +## Linux Kernel Runtime Guard (LKRG) + +LKRG is a kernel module that performs runtime integrity check on the kernel to help detect exploits against the kernel. LKRG works in a *post*-detect fashion, attempting to respond to unauthorized modifications to the running Linux kernel. While it is [bypassable by design](https://lkrg.org/), it does stop off-the-shelf malware that does not specifically target LKRG itself. This may make exploits harder to develop and execute on vulnerable systems. + +If you can get LKRG and maintain module updates, it provides a worthwhile improvement to security. Debian based distributions can get the LKRG DKMS package from KickSecure's secure repository and the [KickSecure documentation](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Linux_Kernel_Runtime_Guard_LKRG) has instructions. + +On Fedora, [fepitre](https://github.com/fepitre), a QubesOS developer has a [COPR repository](https://copr.fedorainfracloud.org/coprs/fepitre/lkrg/) where you can install it. Arch based systems can obtain the LKRG DKMS package via an [AUR package](https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/lkrg-dkms). + +## GRSecurity + +GRSecurity is a set of kernel patches that attempt to improve security of the Linux kernel. It requires [payment to access](https://grsecurity.net/purchase) the code and is worth using if you have a subscription. + +## Simultaneous multithreading (SMT) + +[SMT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simultaneous_multithreading) has been the cause of numerous hardware vulnerabilities, and subsequent patches for those vulnerabilities often come with performance penalties that negate most of the performance gain given by SMT. If you followed the “kernel hardening” section above, some kernel parameters already disable SMT. If the option is available to you, we recommend that you disable it in your firmware as well. + +## Hardened memory allocator + +The [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) from [GrapheneOS](https://grapheneos.org) can also be used on general Linux distributions. It is available as an [AUR package](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Security#Hardened_malloc) on Arch based distributions, and (though not enabled by default) on Whonix and Kicksecure. + +If you are using Whonix, Kicksecure or the AUR package, consider setting up `LD_PRELOAD` as described in the [Kicksecure Documentation](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Hardened_Malloc) or [Arch Wiki](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Security#Hardened_malloc). + +## Umask + +If you are not using openSUSE, consider changing the default [umask](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umask) for both regular user accounts and root to 077. Changing umask to 077 can break snapper on openSUSE and is **not** recommended. + +## Mount point hardening + +Consider adding the [following options](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/mount.8.html) `nodev`, `noexec`, and `nosuid` to [mount points](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_(computing)) which do not need them. Typically, these could be applied to `/boot`, `/boot/efi`, and `/var`. + +These flags could also be applied to `/home` and `/root` as well, however, `noexec` will prevent applications from working that require binary execution in those locations. This includes products such as Flatpak and Snap. + +If you use [Toolbox](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/toolbox/), `/var/log/journal` must not have any of those options. If you are on Arch Linux, do not apply `noexec` to `/var/tmp`. + +## Disabling SUID + +SUID allows a user to execute an application as the owner of that application, which in many cases, would be the `root` user. Vulnerable SUID executables could lead to privilege escalation vulnerabilities. + +It is desirable to remove SUID from as many binaries as possible; however, this takes substantial effort and trial and error on the user's part, as some applications require SUID to function. + +Kicksecure, and by extension, Whonix has an experimental [permission hardening service](https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/permission-hardening.service) and [application whitelist](https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/tree/master/etc/permission-hardening.d) to automate SUID removal from most binaries and libraries on the system. From our testing, these work perfectly fine on a minimal Kicksecure installation and both Qubes-Whonix Workstation and Gateway. + +If you are using Kicksecure or Whonix, we recommend that you follow the [Kicksecure Wiki](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/SUID_Disabler_and_Permission_Hardener) to enable the permission hardener. + +Users of other distributions can adapt the permission hardener to their own system based on the source code linked above. + +## Secure Time Synchronization + +Most Linux distributions by default (especially Arch based distributions with `systemd-timesyncd`) use unencrypted NTP for time synchronization. Securing NTP can be achieved by [configuring NTS with chronyd](https://fedoramagazine.org/secure-ntp-with-nts/) or by using [swdate](https://github.com/Kicksecure/sdwdate) on Debian based distributions. + +## Linux Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) + +The security of [PAM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_PAM) can be [hardened](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#pam) to allow secure authentication to your system. + +On Red Hat distributions you can use [`authselect`](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/configuring_authentication_and_authorization_in_rhel/configuring-user-authentication-using-authselect_configuring-authentication-and-authorization-in-rhel) to configure this e.g.: + +```bash +sudo authselect select with-faillock without-nullok with-pamaccess +``` + +On systems where [`pam_faillock`](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/pam_tally.8.html) is not available, consider using [`pam_tally2`](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/pam_tally.8.html) instead. + +## USB port protection + +To better protect your [USB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USB) ports from attacks such as [BadUSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BadUSB), we recommend [USBGuard](https://github.com/USBGuard/usbguard). USBGuard has [documentation](https://github.com/USBGuard/usbguard#documentation) as does the [Arch Wiki](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/USBGuard). + +Another alternative option if you’re using the [linux-hardened](#linux-hardened) is the [`deny_new_usb`](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/linux-hardened/commit/96dc427ab60d28129b36362e1577b6673b0ba5c4) sysctl. See [Preventing USB Attacks with `linux-hardened`](https://blog.lizzie.io/preventing-usb-attacks-with-linux-hardened.html). + +## Secure Boot + +[Secure Boot](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface#Secure_Boot) can be used to secure the boot process by preventing the loading of [unsigned](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) [UEFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface) drivers or [bootloaders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootloader). + +One of the problems with Secure Boot, particularly on Linux is, that only the [chain loader](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_loading#Chain_loading_in_boot_manager_programs) (shim), the [bootloader](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootloader) (GRUB), and the [kernel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernel_(operating_system)) are verified and that's where verification stops. The [initramfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initial_ramdisk) is often left unverified, unencrypted, and open up the window for an [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attack. The firmware on most devices is also configured to trust Microsoft's keys for Windows and its partners, leading to a large attacks surface. + +To eliminate the need to trust Microsoft's keys, follow the "Using your own keys" section on the [Arch Wiki](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot). The important thing that needs to be done here is to replace the OEM's key with your own Platform Key. + +- If you enroll your own keys as described above, and your distribution supports Secure Boot by default, you can add your distribution's EFI Key into the list of trusted keys (db keys). It can then be enrolled into the firmware. Then, you should move all of your keys off your local storage device. +- If you enroll your own keys as described above, and your distribution does **not** support Secure Boot out of the box (like Arch Linux), you have to leave the keys on the disk and setup automatic signing of the [kernel](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot#Signing_the_kernel_with_a_pacman_hook) and bootloader. If you are using Grub, you can install it with the `--no-shim-lock` option and remove the need for the chain loader. + +The second option is creating an [EFI Boot Stub](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_kernel_image) that contains the [kernel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernel_(operating_system)), [initramfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initial_ramdisk), and [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode). This EFI stub can then be signed. If you use [dracut](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dracut_(software)) this can easily be done with the [`--uefi-stub` switch](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/dracut.8.html) or the [`uefi_stub` config](https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/dracut.conf.5.html) option. This option also requires you to leave the keys on the disk to set up automatic signing, which weakens the security model. + +After setting up Secure Boot it is crucial that you set a “firmware password” (also called a “supervisor password”, “BIOS password” or “UEFI password”), otherwise an adversary can simply disable Secure Boot. + +These recommendations can make you a little more resistant to [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, but they are not good as a proper verified boot process such as that found on [Android](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), [ChromeOS](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), [macOS](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208198), or [Windows](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). diff --git a/blog/posts/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates.md b/blog/posts/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4de698ab --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates.md @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2022-10-27T19:00:00Z +categories: + - News +authors: + - jonah +tags: + - macOS + - Security +links: + - posts/ios-configuration-guide.md +license: BY-SA +description: We cover the improvements macOS Ventura will bring to Apple users when it comes to personal privacy and security. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- +# New Privacy and Security Features in macOS 13 Ventura + +macOS Ventura was released this week, and the Apple users among us may be interested in the improvements it brings to your personal privacy and security. We always recommend running the most up-to-date version of your operating system available. Updates add privacy and security improvements all the time—and macOS Ventura is no exception. Some notable new additions to the macOS privacy ecosystem include: + +- Lockdown Mode +- Rapid Security Responses +- Passkeys + +Let's venture in and see what these updates will mean for you. + +## Lockdown Mode + +Apple's headline security feature for macOS and iOS this year was **Lockdown Mode**, a setting which allows you to enable much stricter security protections on your device. Designed for the rare few who are actively targeted by cyberattacks, Lockdown Mode still received widespread attention in the privacy and security space as an important attack surface reduction tool. + +Enabling Lockdown Mode can be done easily in the **System Settings** app: + +1. Click **Privacy & Security** in the sidebar. +2. Scroll down to **Lockdown Mode** and click **Turn On**. +3. Click **Turn On & Restart** to restart your device in Lockdown Mode. + +Lockdown Mode needs to be enabled separately on each device. Lockdown Mode [changes your device's behavior](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) significantly in a number of ways. Its worth trying for yourself to see if it impacts your everyday usage. There is little downside to enabling it as its impact to most features is relatively minor in day-to-day use. + +### Safari + +Enabling Lockdown Mode disables a number of "complex web technologies". These can impact your device's browsing performance and battery efficiency, in some cases to a significant degree. The changes to Safari include: + +- JavaScript's Just-in-Time (JIT) compilation features are disabled. JIT allows JavaScript code to be compiled on the fly during its execution. Disabling JIT shows performance decreases by up to 95% in some browser benchmarks, though this difference is difficult to notice in everyday browsing. Unfortunately, the added performance and complexity of JIT in JavaScript comes with a [significant security cost](https://microsoftedge.github.io/edgevr/posts/Super-Duper-Secure-Mode/). An analysis [conducted](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FslzTx4b7sKZK4BR-DpO45JZNB1QZF9wuijK3OxBwr0/edit#gid=0) by Mozilla indicates that over half of Chrome exploits "in the wild" abused a JIT bug, so disabling JIT can roughly cut your attack surface in half. +- [WebAssembly](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAssembly) (WASM) support is also disabled. WASM was created to allow for high-performance applications on web pages; however, it can be used to fingerprint browsers to track people across websites and apps. +- JPEG 2000 support is disabled. Safari is the only modern browser to [support](https://caniuse.com/jpeg2000) the JPEG 2000 image format, which makes its support an easy way to identify Safari users. +- PDF previews are disabled. The PDF format has historically been subject to a number of exploits; this change means that PDF files will be downloaded and have to be opened in a dedicated PDF previewing app instead. + +Other technologies that were [disabled](https://blog.alexi.sh/posts/2022/07/lockdown-jsc/) include WebGL, MathML, Gamepad API, Web Audio API, RTCDataChannel, and SVG Fonts. Additionally, many other external web fonts are disabled, limiting websites to only the fonts pre-installed on the device. This notably breaks a lot of icons on various websites, which are often replaced by an empty square. + +Luckily, Lockdown Mode can be disabled on a per-site basis on Safari, so none of these issues should prevent you from enabling Lockdown Mode on your device. If you encounter a trusted website which breaks with Lockdown Mode enabled, you can easily add an exception for that website while keeping the rest of Lockdown Mode's protections intact. + +### Apple Services + +Lockdown Mode also changes the way a number of different Apple services are used on your device. + +- **Messages**: Most message attachments are blocked, besides certain image, video, and audio attachments. This includes most iMessage "apps" such as in-conversation games. Link previews are also disabled. +- **FaceTime**: Incoming calls are blocked, unless you have previously called that person or contact. This is likely in response to past FaceTime bugs, such as the [exploit in 2019](https://9to5mac.com/2019/01/28/facetime-bug-hear-audio/) which allowed an attacker to listen in on your microphone before you picked up the call. +- **Photos**: The new Shared Albums functionality in iCloud Photos is blocked, and invitations are automatically rejected. Shared Albums do still work on any devices without Lockdown Mode enabled. + +In addition to these, other Apple services like **Home** will reject incoming invitations unless you have previously interacted with the sender. + +### Device Changes + +Some other device functionality is limited with Lockdown Mode enabled as well. If you have a Mac with Apple Silicon, connected devices or accessories are not allowed to connect unless your Mac is unlocked and explicit approval of the device is given. Configuration profiles can no longer be installed either, and the ability to enroll in a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system is disabled. These are enterprise management features, which are occasionally abused to control or monitor devices. + +## Passkeys + +**Passkeys** are likely to be the most impactful new feature for the everyday person's security practices. Passkeys are a cross-platform standard supported by Google, Apple, and Microsoft. Based on the FIDO2 standard, passkeys are the first real effort to replace passwords as your primary mode of authentication. + +Using a passkey stored on your phone is supported by most browsers in macOS, but only Safari currently allows you to use a passkey stored on your Mac. Passkeys generated on your iPhone or Mac are stored in iCloud Keychain, which is end-to-end encrypted with your phone or computer's lock screen password. In Safari, passkeys are replacing the single-device WebAuthn registration, which allowed you to use your computer as a hardware key with Touch ID. + +The benefits of passkeys are fairly limited at the moment, until more services support the standard for primary or multifactor authentication. + +## Rapid Security Responses + +Alongside iOS 16, Apple is introducing **Rapid Security Responses** (RSR) to macOS Ventura. RSR allows Apple to ship small security fixes on the fly much faster than before. + +Previously, releasing even a small security patch meant Apple had to release a huge multi-gigabyte update package. This was required to preserve the system's cryptographic integrity, following changes to how the system volume is handled in macOS Big Sur. With RSR, updates are much smaller, so patches can be downloaded much faster and applied more reliably. + +RSR patches are applied immediately. However, [they are tied](https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/whats-new-dep950aed53e/1/web/1.0) to the macOS minor version they are released with, meaning you need to be on the latest available macOS update to receive them: they are not a replacement for regular updates. + +What [remains to be seen](https://eclecticlight.co/2022/09/22/apple-can-patch-ventura-on-the-fly-rsr-is-coming/) is which security patches will be released via RSR as opposed to standard security updates. More severe bugs, including Mach zone memory leaks and bugs which could cause kernel panics, are still likely to require a formal macOS update rather than a quick patch. + +## Gatekeeper Changes + +**Gatekeeper** is Apple's primary approach to handling malware on macOS, which has historically operated as a "scan at launch" feature for newly downloaded apps. In macOS Ventura, Gatekeeper has been updated to run signature and notarization checks upon every launch of an application, as opposed to just the first launch. This should improve its malware scanning capabilities, but could potentially [cause problems](https://eclecticlight.co/2022/09/24/why-some-apps-wont-run-in-ventura-and-how-to-fix-it/) with apps which update themselves. This practice is common with apps distributed outside the App Store, and could lead to discrepancies between the app's code signature and actual content. + +## A Bug with Malware Scanners and Monitoring Tools + +WIRED [reported](https://www.wired.com/story/apple-macos-ventura-bug-security-tools/) that a bug in the initial release of macOS Ventura cuts off third-party security products like [BlockBlock](https://objective-see.org/products/blockblock.html) from Objective-See from the access they need to perform system scans. There is a workaround to fix this access, so if you use tools like these you should manually check your security app to make sure it is working as intended. Apple should fix this problem in the next system update. + +## Final Thoughts + +If you are a Mac user, macOS Ventura brings a lot of new security and privacy features to the table. We recommend upgrading to macOS Ventura as soon as possible (I already have). We'll continue to keep an eye on how security features like these are used and improved in the future, on Apple platforms and beyond. diff --git a/blog/posts/merch-announcement.md b/blog/posts/merch-announcement.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6c5bd3f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/merch-announcement.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2023-05-31T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +authors: + - freddy + - niek-de-wilde +tags: + - Privacy Guides +license: BY-SA +description: Privacy Guides has partnered with HELLOTUX to create what we think are the finest garments in the land. +schema_type: BackgroundNewsArticle +--- +# Privacy Guides Now Has Merchandise + +Yes, you read the title correctly: we have merch now. Privacy Guides has partnered with [HELLOTUX](https://www.hellotux.com/privacyguides) to create what we think are the finest garments in the land. + +It would be ironic to sell our products on a site riddled with ads and trackers. So we weren't going to. This decision ruled out loads of providers, as our privacy-focused values and their Google Analytics just didn't quite align. Privacy Guides has a global audience, so worldwide shipping was a must. And we didn't want to be peddling tacky cheaply printed t-shirts either. This narrowed down our options considerably. + +Then we stumbled across HELLOTUX. + +HELLOTUX is a family business who have been making high quality merchandise for open source projects since 2002. Their site is tracker free, and isn't littered with irritating adverts. They seemed, pardon the pun, the perfect fit. + +We're excited to launch a range of dashing t-shirts and Polo shirts, along with our very own hoodies and jackets. Check them out at [`www.hellotux.com/privacyguides`](https://www.hellotux.com/privacyguides). + +Buying our merch is a great way to support us financially. We get between three and five dollars per garment, depending on the product. Privacy Guides is a non-profit, socially motivated website so all the money we receive will be put towards improving our site and community. Our finances can be viewed publicly via the [Open Collective](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). + +A fun fact about HELLOTUX is that they make everything with Linux: the embroidery, the website, the customer service - the whole shebang. They also offer a money-back guarantee. If you're not happy with your order, just send it back within three months, and they will sort you out with a replacement or refund. + +So go ahead: bag yourself some Privacy Guides swag today! diff --git a/blog/posts/move-fast-and-break-things.md b/blog/posts/move-fast-and-break-things.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..37ba4b06 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/move-fast-and-break-things.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2022-04-04T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Opinion +authors: + - freddy +links: + - posts/virtual-insanity.md +tags: + - Facebook +license: BY-SA +description: If someone has to tell you that they care about your privacy, they probably don’t. +schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle +--- +# Move Fast and Break Things + +Mark Zuckerberg does not look comfortable on stage. Yet, there he was proclaiming that “the future is private”. If someone has to tell you that they care about your privacy, they probably don’t. + +For someone trying not to appear like a cartoon villain, Zuckerberg doesn’t do a great job. He gives the impression of some strange cyborg algorithmically attempting to impersonate human life. His movements are not quite robotic, but he lacks the charisma you might expect from one of the most powerful people on the planet. A *New Yorker* [profile](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-zuckerberg-fix-facebook-before-it-breaks-democracy) of him revealed that he had an affinity for Emperor Augustus, an ancient Roman tyrant. ‘Through a really harsh approach, [Augustus] established two hundred years of world peace,’ he said. + +It’s the first part of that sentence that is worrying. + +Is this what Zuckerberg sees himself as: a modern-day emperor hellbent on using any means he can to gain world peace? Probably not, but it would have been reassuring if he just told us he liked doing Sudoku and dad-dancing with his daughter (interestingly named August). + +The Zuck once [joked](https://www.esquire.com/uk/latest-news/a19490586/mark-zuckerberg-called-people-who-handed-over-their-data-dumb-f/) to a friend that he could get them ‘info’ about anyone in Harvard. He had email addresses, pictures, real addresses: the lot. When the friend asked how, this was his riposte: ‘People just submitted it. I don’t know why. They trust me. Dumb fucks.’ We now live in a reality where Zuckerberg can get ‘info’ about almost anyone in the world. + +Like a depraved tabloid journalist fishing through a minor celebrity’s trash, Facebook collects everything it can about its users. Even if it means sifting through garbage, they want that data. But Facebook is not technically in the data business. It is in what author and professor Carissa Véliz [terms](https://aeon.co/essays/privacy-matters-because-it-empowers-us-all) ‘the business of power’ – which sounds rather more sinister than flogging off mildly irritating adverts. + +Véliz argues that privacy is a form of power. It is the power to influence you, show you adverts and predict your behavior. In this sense, personal data is being used to make us do things we otherwise would not do: to buy a certain product or to vote a certain way. Filmmaker Laura Poitras [described](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/10/23/snowden-filmmaker-laura-poitras-facebook-is-a-gift-to-intelligence-agencies/) Facebook as ‘a gift to intelligence agencies’. It allows governments to arrest people planning to participate in protests before they have even begun. + +The social media giant is tip-toeing ever closer into our personal lives. When Facebook encountered competition it just bought it, adding Instagram and WhatsApp to its roster. The company even tried to make its own cryptocurrency so that one day the Facebook would control all our purchases too. Earlier this year, the project was [killed](https://www.ft.com/content/a88fb591-72d5-4b6b-bb5d-223adfb893f3) by regulators. It is worth noting that when Zuckerberg purchased WhatsApp and Instagram, they had no revenue. Author Tim Wu notes in his book *The Attention Merchants* that Facebook is ‘a business with an exceedingly low ratio of invention to success’. Perhaps that is a part of Zuck’s genius. + +‘Move fast and break things’ was the old company motto. When there were a few too many scandals, they moved fast and [rebranded](https://www.privacyguides.org/blog/2021/11/01/virtual-insanity) to Meta. No one expected online privacy to be the ‘thing’ they broke. + +Before it became a global behemoth, Facebook started out as a dorm-room project. Zuckerberg sat at his keyboard after a few drinks and built it mainly because he could. It now has nearly three billion users. In the same way, Facebook [conducted](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/02/facebook-apologises-psychological-experiments-on-users) social experiments seemingly just for fun. Why he did it doesn’t really matter. As John Lanchester [put it](https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v39/n16/john-lanchester/you-are-the-product): he simply did it *because*. + +It is unfair to say that Zuckerberg does not care about privacy – he does. That’s why he [spared](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/oct/11/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-neighbouring-houses) no expense buying the houses that surrounded his home. Zuckerberg knows the power of privacy, which is painfully ironic given he has built his career on exploiting it. For Zuckerberg, at least, the future is private. It’s the rest of us that should be worried. diff --git a/blog/posts/mozilla-disappoints-us-yet-again-2.md b/blog/posts/mozilla-disappoints-us-yet-again-2.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5be61041 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/mozilla-disappoints-us-yet-again-2.md @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2024-07-14T19:00:00Z +categories: + - News +authors: + - jonah +tags: + - Firefox + - Mozilla +description: "'No shady privacy policies or back doors for advertisers' proclaims the Firefox homepage, but that's no longer true in Firefox 128." +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- + +# "Privacy-Preserving" Attribution: Mozilla Disappoints Us Yet Again + +![](../assets/images/mozilla-disappoints-us-yet-again-2/cover.webp) + + + +**"No shady privacy policies or back doors for advertisers" proclaims the Firefox homepage, but that's no longer true in Firefox 128.** + +Less than a month after [acquiring the AdTech company Anonym](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/mozilla-acquires-anonym-raising-the-bar-for-privacy-preserving-digital-advertising/18936), Mozilla has added special software co-authored by Meta and built for the advertising industry directly to the latest release of Firefox, in an experimental trial you have to opt out of manually. This "Privacy-Preserving Attribution" (PPA) API adds another tool to the arsenal of tracking features that advertisers can use, which is thwarted by traditional content blocking extensions. + +It seems that 6 years after the [Mr. Robot extension debacle](https://www.theverge.com/2017/12/16/16784628/mozilla-mr-robot-arg-plugin-firefox-looking-glass), Mozilla still hasn't learned their lesson about sneaking unwanted advertising and features onto our computers. + +We already know from Google's [Privacy Sandbox](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/08/dont-play-googles-privacy-sandbox-1) that simply adding "privacy" to the name of your feature does not make it private. While Mozilla claims that the "Privacy-Preserving" attribution aims to provide a more privacy-friendly alternative to ad tracking, there are a plethora of issues with this new (anti-)feature that are worth examining: + +## Misaligned Incentives + +Mozilla's decision to implement PPA in Firefox highlights a growing trend among user agents (browsers) to grant preferential treatment to the advertising industry over all other businesses. + +**All** websites on the internet—including ad networks!—are **guests** on our computers, and the content they provide are merely suggestions for a user agent to interpret and show us how it chooses. This has always been a fundamental truth of how the internet works, and enables many great things: from highly-accessible text-based web browsers to the ability to [block trackers](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/browser-extensions/) and other unwanted bloat on the websites you visit. By baking in software that's tailor-made for the advertising industry, Mozilla is wrongly asserting that the advertising industry has a legitimate interest in collecting your data and tracking you across the internet over all other parties, including over your own interests. + +The advertising industry and [Google](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/ublock-origin-lite/15329/11) in particular have been trying their hardest to reverse this dynamic, to turn browsers into a locked-down piece of viewing software under the total control of the servers it's accessing. Mozilla is the organization meant to protect us from the ever-encroaching desires of industry to control and track what we see online, but instead they're continually giving in to the idea that user agents should serve website operators and ad-tracking networks instead of users. + +## Lack of Consent + +Mozilla constantly fails to understand the basic concept of consent. Firefox developers seem to see their position as shepherds, herding the uninformed masses towards choices they interpret to be "good for them." Firefox users are not a captive audience that needs to be coddled, they are generally full-grown adult computer users who need to be listened to. + +One Mozilla developer claimed that explaining PPA would be too challenging, so they had to opt users in by default. + + + + + +The reality is that it isn't simply a *privileged minority* of users who care about surveillance tracking software being built in to their browsers. + +Firefox users are **fully** capable of understanding basic concepts like tracking, and can make an informed decision about whether they want their browser to track them. Mozilla refuses to acknowledge this, because it's in their best (financial) interest to get as many people as possible to use this feature. + +At the end of the day, Mozilla **knows** this feature isn't something that Firefox users want. If they truly believed this was the one path away from the constant data theft perpetuated by the advertising industry, they would've announced this loudly and proudly. They could've given the privacy and general Firefox communities ample time to scrutinize the protocol beforehand. + +Instead, they buried the announcement in a two sentence blurb at the bottom of the release notes, 5 months after they posted a very brief [blog post](https://blog.mozilla.org/en/mozilla/privacy-preserving-attribution-for-advertising/) talking about this technology which was likely ignored by the vast majority of Firefox users. + +## False Privacy + +Let's ignore all of this though, and say you don't care that Mozilla is selling out to advertisers, as long as the feature is actually more private than the current status quo. PPA still isn't the answer we are looking for. + +The simple truth is that the "Distributed Aggregation Protocol" Mozilla is using here is **not private by design.** + +The way it works is that individual browsers report their behavior to a data aggregation server (operated by Mozilla), then that server reports the aggregated data to an advertiser's server. The "advertising network" only receives aggregated data with differential privacy, but the aggregation server still knows the behavior of individual browsers! + +This is essentially a semantic trick Mozilla is trying to pull, by claiming the advertiser can't infer the behavior of individual browsers by re-defining part of the advertising network to not be the advertiser. + +It is extremely disingenuous for Mozilla to claim that Firefox is adding technical measures to protect your privacy, when the reality is that your privacy is only being protected by social measures. In this particular case, Mozilla and their partner behind this technology, the ISRG (responsible for Let's Encrypt), could trivially collude to compromise your privacy. + +## Uselessness + +Finally, there is no reason for this technology to exist in the first place, because tracking aggregate ad conversions like this **can already be done** by websites without cookies and without invading privacy, using basic web technology. + +All an advertisement has to do is link to a unique URL: Instead of linking to `example.com` one could link to `example.com/ad01`, and the website operator simply has to track how many people visit the `ad01` page on their end. + +In contrast to the amazingly complex PPA setup Mozilla is pushing, this is a perfectly viable alternative that advertisers could easily adopt today. The reason they do not is simply because they have an insatiable need for as much of your data as possible. + +## Disabling PPA + +Firefox users should disable this feature: + +1. Open Firefox's settings page at `about:preferences` +2. In the Privacy & Security panel, find the *Website Advertising Preferences* section. +3. Uncheck the box labeled **Allow websites to perform privacy-preserving ad measurement.** + +There are also plenty of other [web browsers](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop-browsers/) you could choose from, if you're growing tired of Mozilla's behavior in recent months. Between their foray into generative AI and their business acquisitions in the advertising industry itself, I certainly wouldn't blame you. + +PPA is an additional privacy attack surface that has no value for end users whatsoever, as its sole purpose is to give data to the advertising industry for nothing in return. Instead of focusing their efforts on compromising with advertisers, Mozilla could work to actively block unwanted data collection. Because they aren't blocking any of the myriad of ways advertisers currently track you, Mozilla is not acting in your best interest here. + +For a browser and organization which has built its reputation entirely on protecting user privacy, these moves are really eroding the trust of its core user base. We hope that Mozilla will listen to the overwhelming user feedback surrounding this feature and their other endeavors, and consider whether these recent actions are aligned with their core mission of putting users first. + +--- + +[Discuss this article on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/privacy-preserving-attribution-mozilla-disappoints-us-yet-again/19467/2), or leave a comment below. diff --git a/blog/posts/onion-browser-review.md b/blog/posts/onion-browser-review.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e0e8b3d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/onion-browser-review.md @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +--- +title: "Onion Browser Review: Tor on iOS" +description: "Onion Browser is our recommended way of connecting to Tor on iOS, but it does have a number of drawbacks compared to the traditional Tor Browser on other platforms you should be aware of." +template: review-article.html +schema_type: ReviewNewsArticle +date: + created: 2024-09-18T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Reviews +authors: + - jonah +links: + - Tor Recommendations: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tor/ + - Tor Overview: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/ +tags: + - Tor + - iOS +license: BY-SA +preview: + logo: theme/assets/img/self-contained-networks/onion_browser.svg +review: + type: MobileApplication + category: BrowserApplication + subcategory: Tor Network Browser + name: Onion Browser + price: 0 + website: https://onionbrowser.com/ + rating: 3.5 + pros: + - Officially endorsed way to access Tor on iOS. + cons: + - Some inconsistent and confusing settings. + - Doesn't provide the same protections as Tor Browser. +--- +![Onion Browser logo](../assets/img/self-contained-networks/onion_browser.svg){ align=right } + +Search the App Store for "Tor Browser" and you'll be flooded with a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your iPhone. However, there's only one solution officially [endorsed](https://support.torproject.org/tormobile/tormobile-3/) by the Tor Project themselves: **Onion Browser**. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionbrowser.com){ .md-button } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://onionbrowser.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/OnionBrowser/OnionBrowser){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://onionbrowser.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } + +Onion Browser is an open-source app created by Mike Tigas, who has worked closely with Tor Project in the past and was previously an investigative journalist at ProPublica (he is currently an advisor at the FTC). His company still maintains the app, although lately it is primarily [developed](https://github.com/OnionBrowser/OnionBrowser/graphs/contributors) by other maintainers. + +!!! info inline end "Side info" + + - [:simple-appstore: App Store download](https://apps.apple.com/app/id519296448) + +We already recommend Onion Browser for any iOS users out there, with the important caveat that it doesn't have all the privacy features that Tor Browser on *other* operating systems would provide. + +## Usage + +Of course installing Onion Browser is as easy as any other app on iOS, Apple ID unfortunately required. Onion Browser can be set as your default browser in system settings too, which is nice. + +When you open Onion Browser for the first time you're given the option to connect to Tor via [Orbot](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tor/#orbot), or with a built-in Tor network proxy. Using the built-in option is the easiest, it connects very quickly and doesn't require a separate app. It also allows you to [use Tor alongside another VPN app](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/#safely-connecting-to-tor), which may be helpful in certain circumstances. The Orbot app acts as its own "VPN connection" in iOS preventing the possibility of combining it with another VPN, but it is more flexible, and it extends Tor network protections to every app on your device. + +
+ ![A screenshot asking whether you want to use Orbot or built-in Tor to connect, noting the built-in Tor has security problems.](../assets/images/onion-browser-review/757A93D0-CCCB-4743-8AF2-17B001EC774A_1_102_o.webp){ width="200" } +
You're presented with a choice at startup
+
+ +Using the dedicated Orbot app also provides more robust protections against IP address leaks. Onion Browser warns in its comparison that using the built-in option could leak your IP or network information to malicious JavaScript code. + +I confirmed the built-in option works perfectly fine, in fact I occasionally had trouble connecting Orbot to Onion Browser, where it would re-prompt me to start Orbot even though it was already running until I restarted the Onion Browser app. The built-in proxy generally worked seamlessly. However, for most people using Onion Browser alongside Orbot probably still makes more sense. It's the official recommendation from Tor Project and the browser's developer themselves, so that's what I'll be sticking with for the rest of this review. + +
+ ![A screenshot of check.torproject.org that says congratulations, this browser is configured to use Tor. It shows the IP address of the exit node, then states: however, it does not appear to be Tor Browser.](../assets/images/onion-browser-review/2774018C-C4DD-419C-9D77-9BE8E5A51A19_1_102_o.webp){ width="200" } +
You can check your connection at check.torproject.org, but you'll be warned you're not using Tor Browser
+
+ +Onion Browser comes with 6 `.onion` bookmarks preinstalled: DuckDuckGo, the New York Times, the BBC, ProPublica, Freedom of the Press Foundation, and Deutsche Welle, which provides you with a good entry point into Tor network resources. + +
+ ![A screenshot of the default new tab page, purple, with 6 bookmarks pre-installed](../assets/images/onion-browser-review/D0A2D20B-5550-4C1F-8FC6-F6D84AEBDF13_1_102_o.jpeg){ width="200" } +
You can get started right away with built-in resources
+
+ +DuckDuckGo via its `.onion` address is also the default search engine. Unlike Safari, search engines in Onion Browser are completely configurable. Included by default are a few different DuckDuckGo configurations, Google, and Startpage, but you can add your own [search engine](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/) easily if you prefer another option. + +I ran into trouble with DuckDuckGo not being able to display results, however. Switching to the **DuckDuckGo HTML** search engine in settings helped, and I prefer that more lightweight version myself anyway. I'm curious whether this is a common issue or a momentary glitch with DuckDuckGo, but neither switching circuits nor reducing security levels fixed it. Speaking of... + +
+
+ ![A screenshot of DuckDuckGo saying sorry, we ran into an issue displaying these results, and asking to try again](../assets/images/onion-browser-review/8A3E82E7-128E-4B3B-B8BB-276063226D41_1_102_o.webp){ width="200" } + ![A screenshot of DuckDuckGo results loading normally when using the HTML version of the search engine](../assets/images/onion-browser-review/C3252F74-C6C1-4616-B3CD-17EA1183BE0C_1_102_o.webp){ width="200" } +
+
DuckDuckGo wouldn't work until I used their HTML-only version
+
+ +### Security Levels + +There are three configurable security levels in Onion Browser: Bronze, Silver (the default), and Gold. These levels roughly correlate to the *Safe, Safer, Safest* [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/) in regular Tor Browser. + +
+ ![A screenshot showing the security level for this site settings and three options, Gold, Silver, and Bronze](../assets/images/onion-browser-review/51B33FA1-D9B4-4EF4-82C6-259568C845EC_1_102_o.webp){ width="200" } +
You can toggle security levels on a per-site basis with two taps
+
+ +I had no issues browsing the web in the standard Silver level, which felt similar to just using Safari. Even websites which rely a bit more on JavaScript like our own [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) were unaffected, so this seems to be a sane default for most people. + +The security level toggle next to the address bar is a bit dangerous, in my opinion. It changes the security level on a per-site basis, which can lead to inconsistent settings. I ran into this when I set the security level to Gold on privacyguides.**org**, then I navigated to our forum (hosted on privacyguides.**net**) and found the security level reset itself to Silver. Changing the security level for all sites requires going into the app's settings and changing the default security, which is something to keep in mind if you don't trust the sites you're visiting. + +That being said, I also found that even the default security level setting didn't apply itself consistently after changing it. When I set the default security to Gold and opened DuckDuckGo, it opened at the lower Silver security level. I believe this is because I had manually set DuckDuckGo to Silver using the per-site toggle earlier, but changing the default setting *really* should reset those preferences. + +The Gold browsing experience definitely broke more websites. Our forum didn't load at all, despite theoretically having a non-JavaScript version available. Other pages had broken elements: I loaded the Freedom of the Press Foundation's homepage fine, but I wasn't able to open the mobile navigation menu with the button in their header without switching back to Silver. + +Something to note is that even the Gold level protections don't go nearly as far as Safest protections in Tor Browser. For example, the Safest setting on desktop Tor Browser will block resources like external fonts, which are not blocked on any level by Onion Browser. Onion Browser is meant to be a censorship circumvention tool, but it is not ready to defend your anonymity against any more dedicated adversaries. + +### Other Settings + +Onion Browser comes with reasonable defaults and a fairly sparse number of customization options, but there's some you'll probably want to change if you're using this every day. + +The **Tab Security** setting defaults to *Forget in Background*, which I found closes your tabs even if you simply check your notifications. It's certainly good that it errs on the side of caution and closes your tabs when you do literally *anything* outside the app, but I think most people will probably prefer this set to *Forget at Shutdown* where the data is only wiped when the app is actually closed. If you're really not concerned about local data storage, you can have the browser remember tabs until you close them for a more standard browser-like experience. + +In the **Default Security** settings you can choose a different user agent, or leave it blank to send the default, in which case it sends Safari's default user agent for your device. You may find this useful to change how websites present themselves, but impersonating the user agent of another browser does **not** make you blend in with that browser from a fingerprinting perspective. There are many ways a website could determine what browser you are using outside your user agent, so don't rely on this setting to make you blend in with everyone else using Tor Browser on other devices. + +Besides leaving it blank for the default, it comes with three built-in user agent strings you can choose from, or you can enter your own. You might find it useful to use Tor Browser for Android's, but if you have no idea what any of this means it's probably best to leave the user agent settings alone. + +=== "Default (on my device)" + + ``` + Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 18_1 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/18.0 Mobile/15E148 Safari/605.1.15 + ``` + +=== "Safari Desktop" + + ``` + Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/15.0 Safari/605.1.15 + ``` + +=== "Tor Browser Desktop" + + ``` + Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0 + ``` + +=== "Tor Browser Android" + + ``` + Mozilla/5.0 (Android 9; Mobile; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0 + ``` + +The other settings in the app are fairly self-explanatory, but I don't expect many people will need to change them. + +## Drawbacks + +A large part of Onion Browser's problems come down to how iOS works. Most notably the iOS requirement for third-party browsers to use the WebKit framework built in to iOS. + +This requirement means that Onion Browser has completely separate development from Tor Browser on desktop and Android, so it can't easily make use of all the advanced privacy-protecting features the Tor Project team is constantly adding to their browser. Technically it does also mean Onion Browser has historically been immune to [Firefox-related vulnerabilities](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2016/11/30/fixing-an-svg-animation-vulnerability/), but Safari is not known for its perfect security record either, and the number of eyes on Tor-related *WebKit* vulnerabilities is certainly far smaller than on *Firefox/Gecko*-related ones. + +The Tor Project [notes](https://blog.torproject.org/tor-heart-onion-browser-and-more-ios-tor/) another drawback to Onion Browser's use of WebKit as well: The WebKit APIs simply don't give browser developers the level of control they're used to over the rendering and execution of web pages. This relates to what we saw earlier with the "Gold" protection levels not quite matching what you'd see in Tor Browser on other platforms. + +The EU recently required Apple to let third-party browser developers use their own engines instead of WebKit. It's possible that—likely many years from now—a version of Onion Browser or Tor Browser could come to iOS alongside Tor's stricter protections found in their standard browsers. Even still, the mobile version of Tor Browser on Android which *does* use Firefox's mobile engine is leagues behind desktop Tor Browser in terms of privacy and security. It's safe to say that desktop Tor Browser is going to be the best way to access Tor for quite some time. + +## Lockdown Mode + +There is one more way to improve Onion Browser security, but we have to look outside the browser to find it. [Lockdown Mode](macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates.md#lockdown-mode) is a feature introduced in iOS 16 that reduces the attack surface of your device by disabling a myriad of features, including web browsing features that could potentially impact security. + +Because Onion Browser is built on Apple's WebKit, these security improvements extend to Onion Browser as well. Most notably, external web fonts *are* blocked in Onion Browser with Lockdown Mode enabled, just as they are in Safari. These are disabled in desktop Tor Browser's Safest mode due to both privacy concerns, and security concerns related to the font rendering engine on your device, so having the option to disable them here on iOS is very useful for those looking to maximize their security. + +
+ ![A screenshot of the Privacy Guides homepage with external fonts disabled](../assets/images/onion-browser-review/87651D0E-EFE0-4C0F-98E7-9898EBA74334_1_102_o.webp){ width="200" } +
External fonts and JavaScript disabled with Gold + Lockdown Mode
+
+ +However, enabling Lockdown Mode *is* detectable by websites, meaning it could potentially be used to fingerprint you. Onion Browser in any form does not really provide the same fingerprinting protections that desktop Tor Browser is able to, so this probably shouldn't stop you from using Lockdown Mode, but it is something to keep in mind. + +## Conclusion + +The decision to use Onion Browser will ultimately come down to your specific requirements. If you simply need a web browser that connects to [Tor hidden services](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/#path-building-to-onion-services), and you're not concerned with being tracked down, this is a perfectly reasonable choice on iOS. + +It's also a good way to promote and normalize the use of Tor in general. My browsing experience using Onion Browser, while still a bit slower than regular browsing, was perfectly acceptable for reading the news, searching the web, and other everyday browsing tasks most of us do on our phone. The more people that use Tor for their everyday traffic, the safer the overall network becomes for people who really need it. + +Just don't expect the same level of protection that desktop Tor Browser can provide. If you're concerned about serious adversaries targeting you, the safest way to use Tor is still to use it via [Whonix+Qubes](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop/#whonix). diff --git a/blog/posts/privacy-guides-hires-three-staff-members.md b/blog/posts/privacy-guides-hires-three-staff-members.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ea14399d --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/privacy-guides-hires-three-staff-members.md @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-01-17T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +authors: + - niek-de-wilde +tags: + - Privacy Guides +description: Privacy Guides is welcoming three new additions to the team. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- + +# Privacy Guides Hires Three Staff Members + +At Privacy Guides, we are always looking for ways to be more effective at our mission of promoting privacy and security for everyone. To help us grow, reach a broader audience, and provide more high quality educational resources, we are thrilled to announce the hiring of three talented individuals to our team! Each of them brings a strong passion to their respective roles, and we are excited about working with them. + +## Em – Journalist + +![](https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/ematprivacyguides/288/8211_2.png){ align=right } + +We’re excited to welcome Em (she/her), our new journalist, who will play an important role in taking our [articles](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/) to the next level. She will be focusing on creating in-depth, interesting posts that explore the most important topics in the world of online privacy, security, and digital rights. Em will also conduct interviews with experts in the industry, analyze reports and studies, and produce investigative news stories to keep our readers informed. + +*Em is a privacy advocate and public‑interest technologist who has been fervently defending privacy rights online (and offline) since 2018. Her work focuses on raising awareness and informing the public and organizations on data privacy tools, practices, and regulations. She is a passionate writer and thorough investigator, continuously working on ways to improve adoption of better privacy practices, and regularly creating educational material to make protective tools accessible to the groups who need them most.* + +*Em is also a human rights activist who deeply values inclusivity, diversity, accessibility, and software for the public good. In her free time, you can find Em on Mastodon sharing privacy tips or boosting photos of cats and moss.* + +[:material-mastodon: Follow Em at @Em0nM4stodon@infosec.exchange](https://infosec.exchange/@Em0nM4stodon) + +## Jordan – Content Producer + +![](https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/jordan/288/7793_2.png){ align=right } + +We also welcome Jordan Warne (they/them), our new content producer who will manage our channels on various video platforms! Jordan has a strong background in video production and content strategy, and we’re confident that they will help us expand our reach and connect with a broader audience. Through informative, easy-to-understand videos, Jordan will simplify complex privacy topics and keep our community engaged. Expect a significantly larger presence on our [PeerTube](https://neat.tube/c/privacyguides/videos) and [YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/@privacyguides) channels in the coming months! + +*Jordan is a passionate creative with an education in both cybersecurity and photography. Having completed a Diploma of Digital Imaging at Billy Blue College of Design, Jordan is equipped with the skills and experience to take Privacy Guides' video content to the next level. Having recently completed a Diploma of Information Technology (Cybersecurity) Jordan has the unique skill set to simplify complex cybersecurity topics and turn them into engaging and approachable content.* + +*Outside producing high-quality videos, Jordan enjoys exploring the Australian bush, capturing intricate details of its flora and fauna through photography.* + +[:material-mastodon: Follow Jordan at @jw@social.lol](https://social.lol/@jw) + +## Kevin – Intern + +![](https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/kevpham/288/8198_2.png){ align=right } + +Last but not least, we are excited to start working with Kevin Pham (he/him), our new intern focused on community & news, who will support both Em and Jordan in their roles while also engaging with our community across all platforms. His enthusiasm for digital privacy and his commitment to helping others make him a perfect fit for our team. He will help with managing our community, and interact with our growing online community to ensure that everyone has a voice. Kevin’s passion and eagerness to learn will no doubt contribute greatly to our mission. + +*Kevin is a senior at Tufts University studying Political Science and Science & Technology Studies. Originally from Florida, he is now freezing up in the greater Boston area. Kevin is passionate about usable security and privacy for vulnerable populations. He has previously worked with Freedom of the Press Foundation's Digital Security Team and Cornell Tech's Clinic to End Tech Abuse to help journalists and domestic violence survivors alike.* + +*Besides doom scrolling on social media, he loves cooking new recipes, reading philosophy essays, and perpetuating his caffeine addiction with Vietnamese coffee. Please feel free to reach out to him to discuss anything regarding best operational security practices and threat modeling...or just say hi!* + +[:material-mastodon: Follow Kevin at @kevpham@mastodon.social](https://mastodon.social/@kevpham) + +## What This Means for Privacy Guides + +The expansion of the Privacy Guides team continues our commitment to provide the best quality resources and information on privacy and security. With Em’s investigative work, Jordan’s video content, and Kevin’s hands-on support, we look forward to communicating easy to understand and factual information with a broader audience. + +We’re excited to see how these talented people will help Privacy Guides continue to grow, and we look forward to the amazing work they will contribute in the coming months. + +Thank you for being a part of our community, and stay tuned for the exciting new content and updates that will be coming your way soon! +Welcome aboard, Em, Jordan, and Kevin! Let’s make privacy accessible for everyone. 🚀 + +[:material-mastodon: Follow Privacy Guides at @privacyguides@neat.computer](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides) + +[:material-youtube: Subscribe to Privacy Guides on YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/@privacyguides) diff --git a/blog/posts/privacy-guides-partners-with-magic-grants-501-c-3.md b/blog/posts/privacy-guides-partners-with-magic-grants-501-c-3.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1c98037b --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/privacy-guides-partners-with-magic-grants-501-c-3.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2024-07-22T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +authors: + - jonah +description: We're excited to announce a partnership with MAGIC Grants, a Public 501(c)(3) charity with the mission of supporting privacy projects like ours and providing undergraduate scholarships for students interested in cryptocurrencies and privacy. +schema_type: BackgroundNewsArticle +--- +# Privacy Guides Partners With MAGIC Grants 501(c)(3) + +![](../assets/images/privacy-guides-partners-with-magic-grants-501-c-3/magicblog.webp) + + + +In February, the OpenCollective Foundation (OCF)—[our fiscal host of 4 years](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/10/31/weve-joined-the-open-collective-foundation/)—emailed us to [announce](https://docs.opencollective.foundation/) that they would be shutting down, and they would no longer be able to collect donations on our behalf (or for any of the hundreds of projects they provided fiscal hosting services to). We immediately began to consider multiple options for the future of this project, including forming our own non-profit or finding another [fiscal host](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_sponsorship). + +We're excited to announce a [partnership](https://magicgrants.org/2024/07/22/Privacy-Guides-Fund) with MAGIC Grants, a Public 501(c)(3) charity with the mission of supporting privacy projects like ours and providing undergraduate scholarships for students interested in cryptocurrencies and privacy. They will immediately take over all the operations previously provided by OCF, including accepting donations on our behalf, handling any of our accounting and taxes, reimbursing team members and volunteers, and taking legal ownership of assets like our domains and servers. + +This last point is important, because we want to ensure Privacy Guides is never fully reliant on a single individual like myself. This setup ensures Privacy Guides never strays from its mission of providing free and accessible privacy and security resources to protect consumers. + +Of course, all of our projects including the [open-source](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org) Privacy Guides website, our communities, and this blog remain editorially independent and volunteer led. This partnership only affects our administrative platform behind the scenes. + +MAGIC Grants was the right choice for our project for a number of reasons: + +1. They are a 501(c)(3) non-profit, which allows us to retain our tax-deductible status in the United States, and means there are legal safeguards in place to prevent Privacy Guides from being used for personal profit. +2. They've provided us with a great deal of flexibility and independence over how we run our project, and added many safeguards to ensure the current Privacy Guides team retains ultimate control over the project. This means that nothing about Privacy Guides will change, now or in the future, due to outside influence. +3. They've generously offered to provide their services to us for no fee, in support of our shared core mission of creating great educational materials. + +Finally, unlike OCF, MAGIC Grants is extremely flexible when it comes to accepting cryptocurrencies. Previously we have not been able to accept cryptocurrency donations, because OCF did not have the accounting tools in place to handle such transactions. MAGIC Grants is highly experienced in the cryptocurrency—and especially [Monero](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cryptocurrency/)—space, and we will be able to accept completely private donations through that very soon. + +Donations to Privacy Guides are considered restricted contributions which may only be used under the [Privacy Guides Fund agreement](https://magicgrants.org/funds/privacy_guides/) we have with MAGIC Grants, and not for any of MAGIC Grants’ other endeavors. You can make a general donation to MAGIC Grants on their [website](https://magicgrants.org/contribute/). + +--- + +We considered forming our own organization, but estimated that the initial costs to do so would meet or exceed our current annual budget, which wasn't financially viable. We have reserved the right to spin off as an independent non-profit, or to transfer to another fiscal host in the future, if we feel it would be beneficial to do so. + +Running this network of websites and services for free to the public is a time-consuming and costly endeavor. We do it because we believe it is the right thing to do, not because we are looking to make a profit. Any contributions have been either used to pay our expenses or saved in a reserve for expansion or times of need. + +Your support of this project will help us keep our servers running and pay for other various expenses accrued by the team while developing this community. We do not operate Privacy Guides for personal profit, and all funds will be used to further our mission in one form or another. + +If you like what we do, please consider contributing to our project at . + +--- + +Read more about the [Privacy Guides Fund announcement](https://magicgrants.org/2024/07/22/Privacy-Guides-Fund) on MAGIC Grants' blog. diff --git a/blog/posts/privacy-is-not-dead.md b/blog/posts/privacy-is-not-dead.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f6dcf964 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/privacy-is-not-dead.md @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-02-17T20:00:00Z +categories: + - Opinion +authors: + - em +description: Privacy is only dead if we let it die. Be careful about the all-or-nothing mindset in data privacy, it can do more damage than good to the cause. While striving for improvements, do not forget to cheer and celebrate each small win. +schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle +preview: + color: "#28323F" + text_color: "#FFD06F" + site_logo: privacy-guides-logo-notext-darkbg.svg +--- +# No, Privacy is Not Dead: Beware the All-or-Nothing Mindset + +![Photo of a protest with someone holding a sign saying Fight Today For a Better Tomorrow.](../assets/images/privacy-is-not-dead/cover.webp) + + + +In my work as a privacy advocate, I regularly encounter two types of discourse that I find very damaging to privacy as a whole. The first one is the idea that *privacy is dead*, implying it's not worth putting any effort to protect personal data anymore. This is the abdication mindset. This attitude is the one that scares me the most because without giving it a fight then of course the battle is lost in advance. **Like a self-fulfilling prophecy, privacy is dead if you let it die.** + +All human rights have seen advancements and improvements in history through long battles and hard-earned victories. There needs to be people willing to fight in order to win the fight. Losing a human right is easy. Protecting a human right always requires lots of effort. + +The second mindset I want to bring up might seem like the diametric opposite, but in fact often leads to the same outcome overtime, and feeds the aforementioned. It's the mindset assuming that for anything to have value in data privacy it needs to be 100% perfectly private and secure. + +While it's true we should strive to build better privacy-focused tools and practices every day, it's extremely important to keep an open mind and a nuanced approach in data privacy. + +Now to be precise, I'm absolutely *not* talking about criticisms of false claims and snake oil. There's a lot of snake oil in data privacy and every misleading information and gimmick product should be exposed and severely condemned publicly. + +What I'm talking about here is different. I'm referring to the idea that if a *good* product/tool/practice isn't perfect it isn't worth using it. This mindset is missing such an important point. The point isn't to make privacy perfect. The point here is to **reduce harm and improve privacy by small increments** at a pace that is realistically sustainable for an average person. + +Here's a concrete example: Let's say your friend just told you they moved their communications from SMS to Signal. This is something to celebrate! Your friend just improved their data privacy a lot by deciding to start [using Signal instead of SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why/). It is absolutely *not* the time to tell your friend things like "Okay, but you're not even using Firefox!" Cherish the win, encourage your friend to embrace Signal and appreciate the new protections it offers. Once your friend is comfortable with Signal, then you can slowly bring a new idea: "Hey Friend! I'm so glad we can communicate with Signal now, this is wonderful! I'd love to introduce you to this new browser now, I think you'd like it too!" + +Help people move slowly but surely in the right direction, at their own pace, and with lots of positive reinforcements. + +Another example of the same issue: Let's say someone posts on social media they just discovered (or recommend) this great PrivacyProduct™️ and love it! This is fantastic! This person just improved their privacy by starting to use a tool (or recommending a tool) that is *more* private than the previous one. Again, this is something to celebrate. It is absolutely *not* the time to reply something like "But this PrivacyProduct™️ logs your IP! Maybe it's end-to-end encrypted, but they log your IP! You should instead use this OtherPrivacyProduct™️ that is much less usable, has none of the features you need, and you will definitely hate it, but it's so much more private!" + +When someone replies things like that, it only has the effect of discouraging people from adopting new tools that improve their privacy. **This sort of reply makes them want to stop sharing their enthusiasm about data privacy and go back to their old ways.** Even worse, this often has the effect of planting doubt in the minds of everyone else around who were also thinking about migrating from BigTechProduct™️ to the better PrivacyProduct™️. **This doubt brings inertia**, and with inertia they will just stay with BigTechProduct™️, and their privacy is now *much* worse for it. + +I understand that we are all very passionate about data privacy and would love others to move so much faster to meet us here. But our impatience can sometimes create more damage to the cause. It is critical to push hard for privacy rights and practices with *governments* and *organizations*. Yes, push hard there, be relentless. Institutions only listen to the people when the people scream. But with *individuals*, when someone shares their excitement for data privacy, when someone shares their PrivacyProduct™️ recommendation that, even if imperfect, is still a great tool without misleading information, then **we should all celebrate and support this**. + +Privacy isn't just about the tools we use. Privacy is a culture we need to build. Cultures come with mindsets and customs. I would love to see the privacy community thrive and celebrate together every win we get. **Tolerate imperfection and treasure improvement.** Every little step on the path to better privacy rights and better privacy practices is a win. + +Celebrate and cheer loudly each little privacy win. This is how we all win. diff --git a/blog/posts/privacy-means-safety.md b/blog/posts/privacy-means-safety.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8b142afd --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/privacy-means-safety.md @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-03-25T20:30:00Z +categories: + - News +authors: + - em +description: Privacy is a human right that should be granted to everyone, no matter the reason. That being said, it's also important to remember that for millions of people around the world, data privacy is crucial for physical safety. For people in extreme situations, privacy can literally mean life or death. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- +# Privacy Means Safety + +![Photo of a padlock with "SOS" written on it and a drawn heart instead of an "O" letter. It is locked on a metal fence.](../assets/images/privacy-means-safety/privacy-means-safety-cover.webp) + + + +Privacy is a human right that should be granted to everyone, no matter the reason. That being said, it's also important to remember that for millions of people around the world, data privacy is crucial for physical safety. For people in extreme situations, privacy can literally mean life or death. + +Many of us have experienced moments when our privacy concerns have been minimized or even completely dismissed. + +This general hostility towards data protection is dangerous. Yes, dangerous. **Data privacy isn't a trivial matter.** + +There are many circumstances where inadvertently or maliciously exposed data can put someone in grave danger. Worse, sometimes this danger might not even be known at the time, but might become incredibly important later on. + +We should never downplay the serious risk of exposing someone's data, even if this isn't a situation we personally experience, or even understand. + +
+

Content Warning: This article contains mention of sexual assault, violence, and death.

+ +## Leaked data can have grave consequences + +This isn't a hypothetical situation. There has been many tragic events where people have been harmed and even killed because data about them was leaked, stolen, or otherwise revealed to someone hostile. + +### Children + +The data of children is something our society should be much more invested in protecting, yet most new legislation [proposed](the-future-of-privacy.md#chat-control-wants-to-break-end-to-end-encryption) or [passed](the-future-of-privacy.md#age-verification-wants-to-collect-your-sensitive-data) to supposedly protect the children are doing the complete *opposite*, endangering everyone's data, *including* the children's. + +As for the data protection we already have, they are insufficient to protect most people's data, also including the children's. + +In 2020, the Irish child and family agency, Tusla, was fined €75,000 for a breach of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Investigation [revealed](https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/tusla-becomes-first-organisation-fined-for-gdpr-rule-breach-1.4255692) three instances where data about children had been negligently disclosed to unauthorized parties. + +In one case, the location and contact information of a mother and child was revealed to an alleged abuser. In another, the agency neglectfully [provided](https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/social-affairs/2025/03/04/abusers-using-data-protection-law-to-get-details-on-victims/) the address of a child and the mother's phone number to a man accused of child sexual abuse. + +Such data leaks should never be tolerated. Sadly, much stronger fines will be required to stop organizations from being so dangerously careless. + +In 2018, an incredibly unfortunate 12-year-old gamer and his mother were both likely [traumatized for life](https://www.pcgamesn.com/fortnite/fortnite-stream-swatting) by a violent [swatting attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swatting) when the child's home address was exposed online. The outcome of this horrible attack could have ended much more tragically. The story doesn't explain how the child's address was found. + +Swatting attacks have become such a [problem](#mistaken-identity) in the United States that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recently [created](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fbi-formed-national-database-track-prevent-swatting-rcna91722) a national database to help track and prevent such attacks. + +### Victims of stalkers + +Stalking victims are incredibly vulnerable to any data leak. People in such situation can often be gravely endangered by data broker services, data breaches, information they might have shared online recently or decades ago, and information shared about them by friends and family. + +Unfortunately, this kind of horrifying situation isn't rare. + +The danger to victims of online stalkers should never be minimized. Stalking and harassment are serious crimes that should be reported and severely punished. Overlooking these offenses is being ignorant to how quickly the consequences of such crimes can escalate. + +In 2019, a 21-year-old Japanese pop star got stalked and sexually [assaulted](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-50000234) by a man who found her location from a picture she posted online. The photo had such high definition that the perpetrator was able to see and identify a specific train station that was visible *through a reflection in the singer's eyes*. + +The aggressor also gathered information about the victim's home by examining the photos she posted from her apartment to determine the exact unit location. He then went to the train station he identified from the photo, waited for her, and followed her home. + +In 2023, a podcast host and her husband were [killed](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/podcast-host-killed-stalker-deep-seated-fear-safety-records-reveal-rcna74842) by an online stalker. Despite having requested a protection order against the murderer, and despite blocking his phone number and social media accounts, after months of intense harassment online, the man eventually found the podcaster's home address, broke in, and fatally shot her and her husband. + +### Victims of domestic violence + +Victims of domestic violence are at an elevated risk of severe or even fatal repercussions when their data gets leaked or shared. People in this extreme situation often have to take extreme measures to protect data that could allow their abuser to find their new location. + +Things as banal as exposing someone's license plate, or posting online a photo taken in a public space could literally get a person in such situation killed. + +Moreover, some abusers are [weaponizing](https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/social-affairs/2025/03/04/abusers-using-data-protection-law-to-get-details-on-victims/) subject access requests in an attempt to find the location of the victims fleeing them. + +It is imperative to ensure that data access legislation cannot be misused in such a dangerous way. Data legally shared with a subject should never lead to the harm of someone else. + +In another instance, a woman who was raped by a former partner was unable to safely receive counseling care because the notes from her counseling sessions could have been [shared](https://www.irishtimes.com/crime-law/courts/2025/01/17/calls-for-law-to-be-changed-to-end-access-to-rape-victims-counselling-notes/) in court with the perpetrator. + +Data privacy regulations should protect such sensitive data from being shared without explicit and free consent from the patient. + +### Healthcare seekers + +People seeking essential healthcare in adverse jurisdictions can be prosecuted when their private communications or locations are intercepted. + +In 2023, a mother from Nebraska (US) was arrested and criminally [charged](https://www.theverge.com/2023/7/11/23790923/facebook-meta-woman-daughter-guilty-abortion-nebraska-messenger-encryption-privacy) after she helped her 17-year-old daughter get an abortion. + +The woman was arrested partly based on the Facebook messages she exchanged with her daughter discussing medication for the abortion. Police obtained a copy of the private Facebook conversation by serving a warrant to Meta, which the company quickly complied with. + +### Whistleblowers and activists + +Whistleblowers and activists are at especially high risk of harm, particularly if they have publicly opposed or exposed oppressive regimes or criminal groups. + +Governments around the world, especially more authoritarian ones, have been increasingly [monitoring social media](https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/5337/social-media-monitoring-uk-invisible-surveillance-tool-increasingly-deployed) to track, identify, and persecute critics, activists, and journalists. + +Authorities have also been mandating direct collaboration from service providers to arrest activists. In 2021, a French climate activist was [arrested](https://techcrunch.com/2021/09/06/protonmail-logged-ip-address-of-french-activist-after-order-by-swiss-authorities/) after Proton Mail was legally [compelled](https://proton.me/blog/climate-activist-arrest) by Swiss laws to log and share the activist's IP address with authorities. + +In 2017, a 25-year-old working for the American National Security Agency (NSA) as a contractor was arrested after she was [identified](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/06/how-a-few-yellow-dots-burned-the-intercepts-nsa-leaker/) as the whistleblower who leaked a report about Russian electoral interference in the United States. + +The whistleblower had mailed the classified document to The Intercept anonymously. However, when the news organization tried to confirm the authenticity of the document with the NSA, the agency was able to determine which printer was used to print this copy, and from there deanonymized [Reality Winner](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reality_Winner). The technique used to track the document was the reading of almost invisible [printer tracking dots](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printer_tracking_dots) that many laser printers and photocopiers produce on all printed documents. + +This year on March 7th, community activist and whistleblower Pamela Mabini was [shot and killed](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/11/activist-and-whistleblower-killed-south-africa) just outside her home in South Africa. She was an activist working with the [Maro Foundation](https://www.dailydispatch.co.za/local-heroes/2023-07-10-helping-others-is-the-reason-for-pamela-mabinis-smile/), a nonprofit organization dedicated to fighting poverty and gender-based violence. + +Mabini's murder has sparked a debate on the importance of protections offered to whistleblowers [exposing criminals](https://www.citizen.co.za/news/another-high-profile-whistleblower-gunned-down-how-safe-speak-out/) to justice. Following the activist's death, organizations have been calling to fast-track the [Whistleblower Protection Bill](https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/calls-for-government-to-fast-track-protection-bill-following-activists-murder-3e8adc20-be58-4f3d-9a55-4a5818171c92) to bring more protections to those fighting for justice in South Africa. + +### Trans and queer activists + +Trans and queer activists are at elevated risk of harassment online in today's political climate. In 2022, 28-year-old trans activist Clara Sorrenti was victim of a swatting attack after police believed a fake report about violent threats made by her aggressor. + +She was arrested at gunpoint by the police, handcuffed, had her electronic devices seized, and her apartment searched for eight hours for non-existent evidence. The aggressor who made the false threats had [provided](https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/london/trans-twitch-star-arrested-at-gunpoint-fears-for-life-after-someone-sent-police-to-her-london-ont-home-1.6546015) her name and home address to police. + +### Journalists + +Journalists around the world can become vulnerable to attacks even from governments when they report on oppressive regimes. This kind of situation can be extremely dangerous, considering the almost unlimited resources state-backed attackers can have to identify, track, and persecute their victims. + +In 2018, the prominent journalist and critic of Saudi Arabia's government Jamal Khashoggi was [murdered](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-45812399). Despite being based in the United States, the journalist traveled to Istanbul's Saudi consulate in Turkey to pick up official documents. Khashoggi was killed inside the consulate a few days later on October 2nd. + +Investigations revealed that people close to Khashoggi had their devices infected by NSO's [Pegasus spyware](https://freedom.press/digisec/blog/journalists-targeted-with-pegasus-yet-again/). This likely allowed the attacker to gather information about Khashoggi traveling outside the United States. + +Many other journalists, politicians, and human rights activists have been [targeted](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-57891506) by state-backed spyware such as Pegasus. + +In 2022, Human Rights Watch [reported](https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/05/iran-state-backed-hacking-activists-journalists-politicians) that two of their staff members and at least 18 other activists, researchers, or journalists working on Middle East issues had been targeted by a phishing campaign coming from a group affiliated with the Iranian government. The entity succeeded in stealing emails and other sensitive data from at least three human rights defenders. + +### Targeted harassment + +Another danger of leaked data that shouldn't be minimized is targeted harassment. Targeted harassment can have devastating consequences ranging from silencing their victims, to suicide, to death by swatting attack. + +A well-known example of targeted harassment is Gamergate. Gamergate was a loosely organized [harassment campaign](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamergate_(harassment_campaign)) targeting women in the video game industry. It started in 2014 when Zoë Quinn's ex-partner published a blog post with false insinuation about Quinn, a video game developer. + +Quinn was subsequently subjected to an incredibly intrusive [doxxing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doxing) campaign, and even received rape threats and death threats. Attackers were able to steal an insecure password and [break into](https://time.com/4927076/zoe-quinn-gamergate-doxxing-crash-override-excerpt/) one of Quinn's account, which resulted in horrible consequences. The harassment campaign later expanded to target others who had defended Quinn online. + +In another case, targeted harassment resulted in one death and a five years prison sentence. In 2020, Mark Herring started receiving requests asking him to give up his Twitter handle, which he refused. Herring's "crime" was to have been quick enough to secure the handle "@Tennessee" shortly after Twitter came online. + +Over weeks, harassment escalated from sustained text messaging to random food delivery to his house. After Herring's harasser posted his home address in [a Discord chat room used by criminals](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/07/serial-swatter-who-caused-death-gets-five-years-in-prison/), someone used this data to direct a swatting attack at Herring's place. Police surrounded his home and demanded he crawl under a back fence, despite his health. After crawling under the fence, 60-year-old Mark Herring stoop up then collapsed from a heart attack, and died soon after. + +### Mistaken identity + +What is more, everyone can get victimized by exposed data, even people who are not online and even people who are not a whistleblower, a journalist, an activist, a victim of domestic violence, or someone who has committed the "unthinkable crime" of securing a cool Twitter handle. + +In 2017, 28-year-old Andrew Finch was [shot and killed](https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/14/us/swatting-sentence-casey-viner/index.html) by police during a swatting attack in the United States. + +The attack was conducted after the perpetrator had an argument online over a multiplayer first-person shooter game. The perpetrator, who was later sentenced, threatened another player he was upset with to "swat" him. The perpetrator then enlisted another man to call the police and conduct the attack on the player, with the home address the player provided. This address turned out to be the previous address of the player, which was now Andrew Finch's address. + +When police arrived at Andrew Finch's home and surrounded the place, Finch, completely unaware of what was happening, barely had the time to comply and get outside when the police shot and killed him at the front door. + +The man who conducted the swatting attack for the perpetrator got [sentenced](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Wichita_swatting) to 20 years in federal prison. + +In 2021, an Australian 15-year-old girl was [mistakenly targeted](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-26/canberra-family-doxxed-sent-death-threats-after-social-video/100014706) and later doxxed with her real information after she had been wrongly identified online as someone who had participated in a racist social media video posted on Facebook. + +A few hours after her name was shared online, the girl started to be inundated by hateful messages and unspeakable threats from all around the world. Her phone number and home address were eventually shared online. Her family received hateful messages from strangers as well. + +During the ordeal, her mother had to be hospitalized for heart disease. The girl, who had absolutely nothing to do with the racist video that spawned the attacks, contemplated suicide due to the violence of the harassment. She and her mother no longer felt safe. + +Digital traces of the personal data that was exposed during the attacks will likely remain online forever, even if the girl and her family were completely innocent and unrelated to what triggered the cyber-swarming. + +The 26-year-old American who incorrectly identified the Australian girl and shared her name and social media accounts online later apologized for his mistake. + +## How data finds its way to an aggressor + +### Targeted research, attack, and spyware + +For targeted attacks, aggressors will often use simple techniques to find a victim's data from what is already leaked online, or openly shared on social media. For more sophisticated attacks, perpetrators might use criminal methods such as impersonation for [SIM swap attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam). When attackers have more resources, such as a state-backed attackers, more sophisticated processes might be used, like device infection with [NSO Group's spyware](https://citizenlab.ca/tag/nso-group/). + +### Maliciously stolen or negligently leaked + +Data can be stolen maliciously in all sort of ways, but even more often and common, data is leaked online from banal *negligence*. + +Once data is leaked online, it will likely become accessible to anyone looking for it eventually. Additionally, any data breach happening now has the potential to endanger someone years down the line. Perhaps it's a home address that has not changed in years, a phone number used for a decade, a legal name, a photograph, or even a [medical file](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2024/04/man-who-mass-extorted-psychotherapy-patients-gets-six-years/). + +Unfortunately, the data broker industry thrives on bundling up all this data together in neat packages to be sold to anyone looking for it, making any attacker's job much easier. + +#### Unencrypted data + +When the data leaked or stolen is well encrypted, the [risk is reduced](https://www.maketecheasier.com/how-secure-stolen-encrypted-data/). If the leaked data cannot be decrypted easily, this will greatly mitigate the damage done by a breach. Conversely, unencrypted leaked data will always inflict maximum damage. + +This is why we should demand that all the services we use implement strong, *end-to-end* encryption wherever possible. + +### Obliviously shared without consent + +Sometimes, the data endangering someone isn't leaked negligently or stolen maliciously, but simply shared by a friend or a family member oblivious to the danger. + +This is [a cultural problem we all need to work on](the-privacy-of-others.md). + +Despite all the technological protections we can put on data, and despite all the regulations we can ask organizations to comply with, if our culture doesn't understand the danger of sharing the data of others, we will fail to protect the most vulnerable people in our society. + +## Protecting data for everyone's safety is a societal, communal, and individual responsibility + +Protecting data isn't simply a matter of preference, although it can absolutely be. But for so many people around the world, it is vital to understand how *crucial* data privacy is. + +As explicitly demonstrated above, data protection can literally mean life or death for people in vulnerable situations. Beyond that, it is unfortunately also true for anyone unlucky enough to get mistakenly targeted when their data is shared. + +In all of these situations, **data privacy means safety**. + +We must demand that governments, corporations, and organizations of all kinds do better to improve data protection practices and technologies. + +As a community, we also have a responsibility to protect the most vulnerable people from harm caused by data leaks. + +And finally, as individuals, we share this duty of care and must all work on improving the way we protect our own data, but even more importantly, the data of everyone around us. + +**Privacy means safety, for everyone.** + +--- + +
+

Resources in the United States & Canada

+ +If you or someone you know is in one of the situations described above, these additional resources may help. Make sure to take [appropriate measures](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/threat-modeling/) to protect your privacy if your situation is sensitive. If you are in a high risk situation, you might want to access these resources using [Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/) or [Tails](installing-and-using-tails.md). + +**Suicide & Crisis Support Line** :material-arrow-right-bold: [988 Lifeline](https://988lifeline.org/) Phone number: 988 (US & Canada) + +**Trans Peer Support** :material-arrow-right-bold: [Trans Lifeline Hotline](https://translifeline.org/hotline/) Phone number US: 1-877-565-8860 / Canada: 1-877-330-6366 + +**Stalking Victim Support** :material-arrow-right-bold: US: [SafeHorizon](https://www.safehorizon.org/get-help/stalking/) / Canada: [The Canadian Resource Centre for Victims of Crime](https://crcvc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Cyberstalking-_DISCLAIMER_Revised-Aug-2022_FINAL.pdf) + +**Domestic Violence Victim Support** :material-arrow-right-bold: US: [The National Domestic Violence Hotline](https://www.thehotline.org/) Phone number: 1-800-799-7233 / Canada: [Canadian resources by situation and province](https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/health-promotion/stop-family-violence/services.html) + +**Reproductive Rights & Healthcare** :material-arrow-right-bold: US: [Planned Parenthood](https://www.plannedparenthood.org/) / Canada: [Action Canada for Sexual Health & Rights](https://www.actioncanadashr.org/resources/services) + +**Journalists and Whistleblowers** :material-arrow-right-bold: US: [Freedom or the Press Foundation Guides & Resources](https://freedom.press/digisec/guides/) / Canada: [Canadian Association of Journalists](https://caj.ca/advocacy/digital-security/) + +**Protesters** :material-arrow-right-bold: [The Protesters' Guide to Smartphone Security](activists-guide-securing-your-smartphone.md) + +
+ +--- + +**Correction (Mar. 27):** This article was updated to correct a typo in a date. The previous version wrongly described the arrest of a French climate activist happening in 2012, when these events actually happened in 2021. diff --git a/blog/posts/private-european-alternatives.md b/blog/posts/private-european-alternatives.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fb0b2648 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/private-european-alternatives.md @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-03-19T21:00:00Z +categories: + - News +authors: + - jonah +description: There is a growing sentiment that the US shouldn't be relied upon for the technologies that many people and businesses use every day. These privacy-centric recommendations come from a variety of European-based companies and organizations, that you should definitely consider checking out! +schema_type: NewsArticle +preview: + color: "#003399" + text_color: "#ffffff" + site_logo: privacy-guides-logo-notext-colorbg-white.svg + icon: simple/europeanunion +--- +# Privacy-Respecting European Tech Alternatives + +![European Union flag and Privacy Guides logo side by side](../assets/images/private-european-alternatives/eu-alternatives.webp) + + + +There is a growing sentiment that the US shouldn't be relied upon for the technologies that many people and businesses use every day. Lately, the US has been unilaterally [cutting off](https://archive.ph/EJ26f) access to critical technologies to European countries, prompting [calls for "radical action"](https://techcrunch.com/2025/03/16/european-tech-industry-coalition-calls-for-radical-action-on-digital-sovereignty-starting-with-buying-local/) to bolster European tech stacks from EU lawmakers. + +At Privacy Guides, we generally value technical guarantees over matters like jurisdiction. There is simply no alternative to privacy technologies like strong *end-to-end encryption* when it comes to protecting your information. + +That being said, the United States *certainly* does not have a monopoly on the best technologies, and many of our favorite [recommended tools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) come from Europe and all over the world. Tools from the European Union also generally benefit from much stronger data protection laws, thanks to the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). + +If supporting the European tech industry is something that is important to you, here's a non-exhaustive list of some of our favorites. We have many more recommendations throughout our website if you are interested in learning more about privacy-respecting tech alternatives! + +## :material-email: Email Services + +Many people and businesses are tied to Google's Gmail or Microsoft's Outlook products, but there are *far* more secure and private [alternative email providers](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/) out there! + +### Tuta :flag_de: + +
+ +![Tuta logo](../assets/img/email/tuta.svg#only-light){ align=right } +![Tuta logo](../assets/img/email/tuta-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } + +Based in Hanover, Germany, **Tuta** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since 2011. + +Free accounts start with 1 GB of storage. + +[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/#tuta){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://tuta.com){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +### Proton Mail :flag_ch: + +
+ +![Proton Mail logo](../assets/img/email/protonmail.svg){ align=right } + +Based in Geneva, Switzerland, **Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since 2013. + +The Proton Mail Free plan comes with 500 MB of Mail storage, which you can increase up to 1 GB for free. + +[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/#proton-mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://proton.me){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +## :material-file-document-edit: Office Suites + +Of course, email isn't the only thing offered by solutions like Google Workspace and Microsoft 365. Many people use their entire suite of [productivity tools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/document-collaboration/) to manage their businesses and collaborate with others. + +Luckily, there are plenty of alternatives that incorporate strong encryption and can even be self-hosted, which will not only decrease your reliance on the traditional Big Tech companies, but keep your data far more secure as well. + +### CryptPad :flag_fr: + +Developed and hosted by *XWiki* in Paris, France, **CryptPad** is a complete online office suite with applications including Documents, Rich Text, Spreadsheets, Code/Markdown, Kanban, Slides, Whiteboard and Forms. + +
+ +![CryptPad logo](../assets/img/document-collaboration/cryptpad.svg){ align=right } + +**CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily. + +[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/document-collaboration/#cryptpad){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://cryptpad.org){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +:material-star-box: We recently did a [full review of CryptPad](cryptpad-review.md), which you should definitely check out if you might be interested in switching! + +### Nextcloud :flag_de: + +**Nextcloud** comes from German startup *Nextcloud GmbH*, and offers a complete cloud drive alternative to Google Drive or OneDrive. + +
+ +![Nextcloud logo](../assets/img/document-collaboration/nextcloud.svg){ align=right } + +**Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control. + +[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/document-collaboration/#nextcloud){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://nextcloud.com){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +### LibreOffice :flag_de: + +**LibreOffice** is developed by *The Document Foundation* based in Berlin, Germany. It's a free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality. + +
+ +![LibreOffice logo](../assets/img/office-suites/libreoffice.svg){ align=right } + +Web-based editors aren't for everyone. If you need a full-fledged office suite that runs locally on your computer, **LibreOffice** is a fantastic alternative to Microsoft Office. + +[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/office-suites/#libreoffice){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://libreoffice.org){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +## :material-search-web: Search Engines + +One of the most frequently used tools on the internet is the venerable search engine. Switching from **Google** to an [alternative](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/) is one of the biggest impact approaches to improving your privacy that you can make. + +### Startpage :flag_nl: + +Headquartered and developed in the Netherlands, Startpage is one great alternative to Google you could consider: + +
+ +![Startpage logo](../assets/img/search-engines/startpage.svg#only-light){ align=right } +![Startpage logo](../assets/img/search-engines/startpage-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } + +**Startpage** is a private search engine. One of Startpage's unique features is the [Anonymous View](https://startpage.com/en/anonymous-view), which puts forth efforts to standardize user activity to make it more difficult to be uniquely identified. The feature can be useful for hiding [some](https://support.startpage.com/hc/articles/4455540212116-The-Anonymous-View-Proxy-technical-details) network and browser properties. However, unlike the name suggests, the feature should not be relied upon for *total* anonymity. + +[:octicons-info-16: Homepage](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/#startpage){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://startpage.com){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +It is worth noting that [since 2020](relisting-startpage.md), Startpage has been a subsidiary of American company System1. Their operations and employees remain in the Netherlands, and you can choose to utilize only European servers if you wish. + +## :material-earth: Web Browsers + +Web browsers are historically very tricky to build, and the three major browser engines, Chromium, Gecko (Firefox), and WebKit (Safari) are all *primarily* developed by American companies. This is a space that could certainly use improvement. + +### Mullvad Browser :flag_se: + +One of our [recommended browsers](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop-browsers/) is spearheaded by Swedish VPN company *Mullvad*, although it's worth noting that its development is somewhat reliant on American non-profits Mozilla and the Tor Project, being a Tor Browser fork. + +
+ +![Mullvad Browser logo](../assets/img/browsers/mullvad_browser.svg){ align=right } + +**Mullvad Browser** is a version of Tor Browser with Tor network integrations removed. It aims to provide to VPN users Tor Browser's anti-fingerprinting browser technologies, which are key protections against mass surveillance programs. It is developed by the Tor Project and distributed by Mullvad, although it does *not* require the use of Mullvad's VPN. + +[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop-browsers/#mullvad-browser){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/browser){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +## :material-map: Maps & Navigation + +Mapping and location apps like Google Maps can track your every move, and that data is used by tech companies for a wide variety of purposes, including for military and defense. The best mapping apps for your privacy can be used completely offline: + +### Organic Maps :flag_ee: + +
+ +![Organic Maps logo](../assets/img/maps/organic-maps.svg){ align=right } + +Based in Estonia, **Organic Maps** is an open source, community-developed map display and satnav-style navigation app for walkers, drivers, and cyclists. The app offers worldwide offline maps based on OpenStreetMap data, and navigation with privacy — no location tracking, no data collection, and no ads. The app can be used completely offline. + +[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/maps/#organic-maps){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://organicmaps.app){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +### OsmAnd :flag_nl: + +
+ +![OsmAnd logo](../assets/img/maps/osmand.svg){ align=right } + +Based in the Netherlands, **OsmAnd** is an offline map and navigation application based on OpenStreetMap, offering turn-by-turn navigation for walking, cycling, driving, as well as public transport. It is open-source and does not collect any user data. + +[:octicons-home-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/maps/#osmand){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://osmand.net){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +## :material-form-textbox-password: Password Managers + +### KeePassXC :flag_de: + +
+ +![KeePassXC logo](../assets/img/password-management/keepassxc.svg){ align=right } + +**KeePassXC** is a community fork of KeePassX, a native cross-platform port of KeePass Password Safe, with the goal of extending and improving it with new features and bug fixes to provide a feature-rich, cross-platform, and modern open-source password manager. + +[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/#keepassxc){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://keepassxc.org){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +:material-star-box: We recently published an article on [securely using KeePassXC with a YubiKey](installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey.md)! + +### Proton Pass :flag_ch: + +
+ +![Proton Pass logo](../assets/img/password-management/protonpass.svg){ align=right } + +**Proton Pass** is an open-source, end-to-end encrypted password manager developed by the Swiss company Proton AG, the team behind Proton Mail. It securely stores your login credentials, generates unique email aliases, and supports and stores passkeys. + +[:octicons-home-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/#proton-pass){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://proton.me/pass){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +## :material-chat-processing: Instant Messengers + +Switching off of WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, or iMessage in favor of a more [private instant messenger](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/) is an excellent way to safeguard your chats. + +### Element :flag_gb: + +Element is based in the United Kingdom, which is of course no longer in the European Union. However, it is a trusted messaging platform by the [French government](https://element.io/case-studies/tchap), and the [German military](https://element.io/case-studies/bundeswehr), among many other organizations in Europe and around the world looking for sovereignty from Big Tech messaging platforms like Slack and Google Messages. + +
+ +![Element logo](../assets/img/messengers/element.svg){ align=right } + +**Element** is the flagship client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/chat_basics/matrix-for-im) protocol, an [open standard](https://spec.matrix.org/latest) for secure decentralized real-time communication. + +Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE, as are one-to-one voice and video calls. + +[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#element){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://element.io){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +### SimpleX :flag_gb: + +Another open-source option from the United Kingdom, SimpleX chat has very strong security features, and can be entirely self-hosted anywhere in the world if you prefer the assurances a [custom server](https://simplex.chat/docs/server.html) can bring. + +
+ +![Simplex logo](../assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } + +**SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against censorship. + +[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#simplex-chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplex.chat){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +### Briar :earth_africa: + +Briar is an open source project not legally incorporated in any jurisdiction, although it has received funding from European initiatives like [NGI](https://ngi.eu/) and the [NLnet Foundation](https://nlnet.nl/), and includes many Europeans in their voluntary board and team. + +
+ +![Briar logo](../assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } + +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing censorship. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. + +[:octicons-info-16: More Info](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#briar){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-home-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Homepage" } + +
+ +## More Services... + +Looking for more? Here's a short (and non-exhaustive) list of other recommendations of ours which are based in Europe: + +- [**VPN Services**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/): :flag_se: [Mullvad](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/#mullvad) and :flag_ch: [Proton VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/#proton-vpn) +- [**DNS Providers**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/dns/#recommended-providers): :flag_fr: [dns0.eu](https://dns0.eu/), :flag_se: [Mullvad DNS](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls), and :flag_ch: [Quad9](https://quad9.net/) +- [**Calendars**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/calendar/): :flag_de: [Tuta](https://tuta.com/calendar) and :flag_ch: [Proton Calendar](https://proton.me/calendar) +- [**Notes Apps**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/notebooks/): :flag_gb: [Joplin](https://joplinapp.org/) and :flag_ee: [Crypt.ee](https://crypt.ee/) +- [**Pastebins**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/pastebins/): :flag_fr: [PrivateBin](https://privatebin.info/) +- [**Linux Distros**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop/): :flag_de: [openSUSE](https://www.opensuse.org/) + +If you're in Europe and looking to build or host your *own* European technology, there are also plenty of alternatives to the typical American IT providers. Topics like cloud computing platforms, web analytics services, and content delivery networks are currently out of scope for what we cover here at Privacy Guides, but [European Alternatives](https://european-alternatives.eu/) is one great resource for finding more services like these. + +At the end of the day, we trust *all* of our [recommended privacy tools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) to keep you safe from prying eyes, but there are many valid reasons you may prefer to stick to the European market. diff --git a/blog/posts/proton-wallet-review.md b/blog/posts/proton-wallet-review.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..90e56ba7 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/proton-wallet-review.md @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +--- +title: "Proton Wallet Review: Is Proton Losing Touch?" +template: review-article.html +schema_type: ReviewNewsArticle +description: "It may well be that Proton Wallet is the easiest way to start using Bitcoin, but is a Bitcoin wallet the solution people need to improve their financial privacy?" +date: + created: 2024-09-08T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Reviews +authors: + - jonah +links: + - Cryptocurrency: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cryptocurrency/ +tags: + - Cryptocurrency +license: BY-SA +preview: + logo: theme/assets/img/cryptocurrency/proton-wallet.svg +review: + type: SoftwareApplication + category: FinanceApplication + subcategory: Cryptocurrency Wallet + name: Proton Wallet + price: 0 + website: https://proton.me/wallet + rating: 2 + pros: + - Secure, non-custodial option for Proton users. + cons: + - Only supports Bitcoin, a non-private cryptocurrency. + - No support for Lightning or CoinJoin. + - iOS app still in beta. +--- +![Proton Wallet logo](../assets/img/cryptocurrency/proton-wallet.svg){ align=right itemprop="image" } + +Proton, the Swiss creators of privacy-focused products like [Proton Mail](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/#proton-mail) and [Proton VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/#proton-vpn), recently released the latest product in their ever-growing lineup: **Proton Wallet**. [Announced](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/introducing-proton-wallet-a-safer-way-to-hold-bitcoin/19636) at the end of July 2024, it promotes itself as "an easy-to-use, self-custodial" Bitcoin wallet that will ostensibly make financial freedom more attainable for everyone. + +!!! info inline "Side info" + + - Proton Wallet's [Privacy Policy](https://proton.me/wallet/privacy-policy) + - This review was conducted with the reviewer's personal Proton Visionary account. Proton was not contacted prior to this publication. + +It may well be that Proton Wallet is the easiest way to start using Bitcoin, but is a Bitcoin wallet the solution people need to improve their financial privacy? + +## A cryptocurrency primer + +Contrary to popular belief, [cryptocurrency](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cryptocurrency/) is not an inherently private transactional system. + +The vast majority of cryptocurrency, including Bitcoin, uses a transparent and public blockchain as the ledger for all transactions. This means that anyone you've transacted with or who knows your wallet's public address can trivially trace all of your past transactions, and monitor all of your future transactions at any time. + +This is a huge problem for Proton Wallet, because Bitcoin is the **only** cryptocurrency it supports. Furthermore, Proton Wallet doesn't support the few privacy-enhancing additions to Bitcoin that do exist, like CoinJoin or even the Lightning Network. While these technologies still don't bring Bitcoin close to the levels of privacy attainable with some alternatives like Monero, to see them lacking in a product from a privacy-centric company like Proton is extremely disappointing. + +Proton has claimed in a few interviews that they chose Bitcoin because of its mass appeal, and it's certainly true that Bitcoin has the mind share and market share to beat out any other cryptocurrency, but the *most popular* option isn't always the *best* option. + +Had Proton Wallet added support for Monero or a similarly private cryptocurrency, they could have single-handedly boosted a financial system that is *actually* private by default by a significant degree. In my eyes, failing to do so in favor of the market leader is an unfortunate step back from their "privacy by default" mantra. + +## Using the app + +Proton Wallet *is* in beta, like many of Proton's products are when newly released, and available via the web, an Android app, and an iOS [TestFlight](https://testflight.apple.com/join/6OIcXtQN). + +![Proton wallet registration page](../assets/images/proton-wallet-review/1.webp) + +Creating your wallet is a simple process, after registering you'll be asked to choose a name for your wallet and a default currency. You can also optionally set a passphrase to secure your account. Note that this isn't merely a passphrase securing your account on Proton's servers beyond your usual account credentials, it's a [BIP39 extension word](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Seed_phrase#Two-factor_seed_phrases), meaning that if you lose it your wallet will be completely unrecoverable, **even if** you back up your 12 word seed phrase. + +![Proton wallet setup page](../assets/images/proton-wallet-review/2.webp) + +The default currency here isn't the currency being *stored* in Proton Wallet. It is just used to show you the current conversion rate between Bitcoin and your local currency. + +Once you're in, Proton Wallet is fairly straightforward. In fact, there's not much to explore beyond finding your wallet address and buying Bitcoin. Clicking the **Receive** button brings up a panel which shows your address and allows you to generate a new one on the fly. When you generate a new address, all of your previous addresses will continue to work, but are no longer displayed anywhere. + +![Proton wallet address QR code and text displayed in sidebar](../assets/images/proton-wallet-review/3.webp) + +Buying Bitcoin is simple as well. Proton is working with two providers, Banxa and Ramp, and if you're in the United States like I am both are available, so you can choose the one with the best exchange rate to go with. Before you purchase, Proton Wallet asks you for your current country, so that will determine which providers it's possible to use. + +There's no private payment methods though, you're stuck with credit card, Google Pay, or Apple Pay. The purchase experience isn't quite seamless either, as it redirects you to either banxa.com or ramp.network to perform the actual transaction. Everything is pre-filled with your Proton Wallet information however, so it isn't a huge problem. + +## "Bitcoin via Email" + +The flagship feature of Proton Wallet is something they call **Bitcoin via Email**, which integrates with Proton Mail to allow you to send Bitcoin to any email address. Opening your wallet settings lets you enable Proton's *Receive Bitcoin via Email* feature, which allows other Proton Wallet users to send Bitcoin to your account with just your Proton Mail address. + +![Proton wallet receive Bitcoin via email settings page](../assets/images/proton-wallet-review/4.webp) + +If you have multiple addresses on your Proton account, such as aliases or addresses on a custom domain, only one address can be linked to your wallet. This can be a bit annoying for people who have given out different Proton addresses to others in the past, like if you gave out your @protonmail.com address to some people, before later migrating to @proton.me when that domain became available. + +On the other hand, if you have aliases for different projects, this is a great way to keep Bitcoin payments to each address separate. If you have your personal email and a business alias for example, you can link your personal email to your primary wallet and create a second wallet to link your business alias to, thus keeping your personal and business transactions separate. + +Proton says that you can "create as many wallets as your Proton Wallet plan allows," but the exact limits are not very clear at the moment. This may become clearer as Proton Wallet exits its beta status. + +Sending Bitcoin to an email address is as simple as it is in mainstream payment apps like Venmo or CashApp, which is great. You can even include a memo with your transaction, and the transaction appears on the recipient's side very quickly. However, it can take a few hours or more for a transaction to actually complete and be usable by the recipient, so all they'll be able to do is monitor its progress in the meantime. This can be sped up by choosing a higher "network fee" when sending the payment, which costs more Bitcoin as the name would suggest. + +I'm not convinced this is particularly revolutionary though. Many Bitcoin wallets have streamlined the process of exchanging address information with other people with methods like QR codes, which are likely going to be more widely used than email in today's mobile-first world. Being able to replace Bitcoin addresses with emails fairly seamlessly *is* nice, but is it nice enough to warrant the entire Proton Wallet product? I'm not so sure. + +## What else sets it apart? + +There isn't much separating Proton Wallet from the existing options on the market. It is a *noncustodial* wallet, meaning that you control the private keys rather than Proton. This is a huge step-up in security compared to keeping your Bitcoin in an online exchange like Coinbase, but it isn't a big differentiator from other software wallets where noncustodial key storage is typically the norm. + +Besides that, and Bitcoin via Email, if you visit Proton's website to see how else they differentiate themselves the best third reason they could muster up is: + +> Our business is privacy: Proton isn't a crypto company — we're a privacy company that wants to empower everyone to use Bitcoin securely and privately. + +Unfortunately for Proton, this doesn't quite ring true when it comes to Proton Wallet. When it launched in 2014, Proton Mail was revolutionary in the email space. Encrypted email providers already existed, but Proton offered something different: Proton brought a good user experience to an interoperable encryption standard, PGP. While everyone else in the email space was rolling their own password-protected web portals to secure messages or simply delivering emails in plaintext, Proton built a user-friendly platform that actually improved the email ecosystem at large in the process. + +Proton's leadership thinks they can do for cryptocurrency what they once did for email, but there's a clear difference between then and now. Proton Mail had privacy and security ready to go from the beginning, but Proton Wallet simply meets the status quo. + +## Why does this exist? + +Proton Wallet is in a strange position. I've spoken to a few sources who suggest that privacy features like CoinJoin, which can mix Bitcoin in order to better anonymize transactions, were intended to be included at launch. The [crackdown](https://bitcoinmagazine.com/legal/samourai-wallet-breaking-down-dangerous-precedents) on the ill-fated Samouri Wallet project by U.S. authorities last April certainly put a damper on privacy in the Bitcoin space, and likely made Proton wary of introducing such features to the public. + +Proton suggests this themselves, stating on their [website](https://proton.me/wallet/bitcoin-guide-for-newcomers): + +> Coinjoin is considered the best solution for improving blockchain privacy. It works by mixing your BTC with other users’ BTC in a collaborative self-custodial transaction where you get back the same amount of BTC that you put in but on a different address that cannot be easily linked to your previous address. However, in 2024, in what many consider to be a regulatory overreach and attack on privacy, some of these Coinjoin services have been declared illegal in the US and EU. The future of financial privacy may therefore be decided by ongoing litigation in the next decade and privacy advocates should support these efforts. + +This situation likely soured Proton on other privacy-friendly cryptocurrencies like Monero as well. I get it, financial privacy is an extremely challenging task for any company to take on. We can't expect Proton to take on the risk of offering a completely anonymous payment service in the current legal climate, but it begs the question: why enter the financial space at all? + +Proton Wallet seems like a product that doesn't know its own place in the world. Is it meant to save us from the tyranny of payment processors like PayPal who can freeze your funds at a whim? Proton certainly thinks so, having faced that exact problem themselves during their original 2014 crowdfunding campaign. But in that case, is Bitcoin the actual solution to this problem, or is it just a stopgap fix that Proton happened to latch on to way back in 2014 when Bitcoin was more *in vogue* and there were few competitors? + +Today, there are many alternatives to Bitcoin which are safer to store your money in while remaining protected from intrusive fintech companies like PayPal. Stablecoins like USDC can be traded on multiple cryptocurrency networks without the need for middlemen payment processors, and can be exchanged at a variety of exchanges with the huge benefit of having *significantly* less risk than Bitcoin, theoretically no risk at all. Support for USDC or a similar technology would go a long way towards enabling *usable* cryptocurrency transactions for everyday users, even though USDC doesn't have any additional privacy protections either. + +Or, was Bitcoin chosen to give us independence from fiat currency, including stablecoins, entirely? Maybe so, but is that something we actually want? Prepping for a worldwide market collapse is perhaps a bit of a fool's errand. If the US Dollar and other economies failed overnight, I think we would all have a lot more problems than Bitcoin is going to solve for us. Bitcoin is a poor store of value to serve as an alternative to traditional currency anyway. Any asset which can gain or lose half its purchasing power on any given day of the week simply can't function as a viable medium of exchange, meaning it's virtually useless for day-to-day transactions. + +However, if Proton Wallet wasn't meant for all that, if it was simply meant to bring privacy to Bitcoin, then it's certainly a failure. Proton hasn't taken any risks with this product, meaning it's really only good for satisfying a singular belief: That Bitcoin is just inherently good, and anything to promote Bitcoin is inherently good as well. I don't share these fanatical beliefs of *Bitcoin maximalists*, however, when Bitcoin is demonstrably lacking in a wide variety of ways. + +## Conclusion + +Personally, I'm a bit of a cryptocurrency pessimist in general, but I can see some appeal for the technology in very specific areas. Unfortunately, Proton Wallet doesn't seem to fit in to a useful niche in any meaningful way. The functionality it does support is extremely basic, even by Bitcoin standards, and it simply doesn't provide enough value over the existing marketplace. + +If you're an existing Proton user simply looking for a place to store some Bitcoin *you already have* sitting around, Proton Wallet might be perfectly adequate. For everyone else, I don't see this product being too useful. Bitcoin is still far too volatile to be a solid investment or used as a safe store of value if you crave financial independence and sovereignty, and Proton Wallet simply isn't adequate for [paying for things privately online](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/payments/). + +There is some potential with Proton Wallet. Personally, I would like to see [support for Monero](https://protonmail.uservoice.com/forums/960668-proton-wallet/suggestions/48672359-support-monero), a cryptocurrency that has privacy features built-in by default. There is also the possibility of Proton expanding into the *traditional* finance space with features like a digital wallet for credit/debit cards, card aliasing à la [privacy.com](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/financial-services/#privacycom-us), and tap to pay within their mobile apps. A third-party alternative to Apple Pay and Google Wallet, and for the first time ever such a product could actually be viable: It's always been possible on Android, but just last month Apple announced the possibility for [iOS developers to use NFC](https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2024/08/developers-can-soon-offer-in-app-nfc-transactions-using-the-secure-element/) to facilitate payments outside of Apple Wallet. This presents a golden opportunity for Proton Wallet to be the first cross-platform digital wallet, if they can deliver. + +Alas, none of this is available in Proton Wallet today, and that's all that really counts. diff --git a/blog/posts/pwa-vs-iwa.md b/blog/posts/pwa-vs-iwa.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c1656bda --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/pwa-vs-iwa.md @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2024-11-30T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Opinion +authors: + - fria +tags: + - PWA + - IWA + - Web +license: BY-SA +--- +# State of the Web App: Current Woes and Promising Futures + +The concept of a [progressive web app](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Progressive_web_apps) is enticing: an application using web technologies that is inherently cross-platform (since it runs in a browser) and acts like a native app, even functioning offline. Support for PWAs in traditionally locked-down platforms like iOS means that PWAs can give users the freedom to install apps without having to go through Apple’s App Store. But there are problems with web content that PWAs haven't solved. + +## Current Web-Based Apps + +Attempts at similar things have been made before, the most infamous of which is [Electron](https://www.electronjs.org). Electron is a software framework that allows developers to easily create cross-platform apps by essentially bundling an entire Chromium browser in with the app. This approach has its [drawbacks](https://usa.kaspersky.com/blog/electron-framework-security-issues/28952/?srsltid=AfmBOor_UcYY-84soHz5K2ULTmhlX44-DsIfJp_StotBrusD63MweSGO), though. Browsers have huge attack surface, so it's important to keep them updated with the latest security fixes, but many Electron apps ship outdated versions, leaving those apps vulnerable. Each Electron app has its own version of Chromium with its own attack surface, amounting to a performance and security nightmare. In contrast, PWAs use the browser that you already have installed, so as long as you keep it updated, all your apps will have the latest security fixes. + +So why isn't every Electron app shipping as a PWA? The answer is an age-old problem with web content: the fact that you have to trust the server fully. You make an HTML GET request, and you're served the content (i.e., the site's HTML, CSS, and JavaScript), but if the server is compromised, you'll be served a compromised website. You also need to rely on the security of DNS name resolution and the [certificate authority](https://www.digicert.com/blog/what-is-a-certificate-authority) system. This is a huge problem for security-sensitive applications like messengers. An attacker that gains access to their server—even just temporarily—could distribute compromised clients to millions of people, potentially breaking E2EE or executing a host of other malicious actions. + +## Improving Web Apps + +A typical native app is downloaded onto your computer from some kind of trusted place like an app store and only receives updates when the developers push them out. Additionally, there's usually a process of checks and verification before that happens, like Apple's [App Review](https://developer.apple.com/distribute/app-review) and the Google Play [App Review](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9859455) process. In contrast to PWAs, with which the threat of an attacker with server access constantly looms, it's much more difficult to target a particular person. In other words, a malicious app update is much less likely to escape scrutiny than a highly targeted attack via compromised servers. + +Isolated Web Apps (IWAs) build on the work done on PWAs and [Web Packaging](https://github.com/WICG/webpackage). They are a specification that allows web content to be distributed offline outside a browser, much like a traditional app. It can be signed just like a regular app too, allowing you to verify that it came from the proper place and hasn't been modified. You could install an IWA from your favorite app store just like any other app and have the same security assurances. This would be incredibly useful in allowing for cross-platform E2EE web apps that don't need to trust a server every time you use them. + +Google [distinguishes](https://chromeos.dev/en/web/isolated-web-apps) between the drive by web, PWAs, and IWAs. The drive by web requires more conservative access to the system as the most accessible and is therefore least trusted. PWAs are a bit more trusted and can integrate a bit more deeply into the system as a result. IWAs are the most trusted and, as such, can have deeper access into the system and more powerful capabilities. + +
+ ![Diagram showing the drive by web, a PWA, and then a dotted line separating them from IWAs](../assets/images/pwa-vs-iwa/iwa-diagram.webp) +
source: chromeos.dev
+
+ +This higher security assurance from isolated and signed web applications and the inherently more trusted nature of a natively installed app will allow for IWAs to safely access APIs which wouldn't be safe to allow normal websites to access, like [Direct Sockets](https://github.com/WICG/direct-sockets/blob/main/docs/explainer.md). + +IWAs use a totally new [URL scheme](https://github.com/WICG/isolated-web-apps/blob/main/Scheme.md) since they're not relying on HTTPS certificate authorities or DNS. They're totally isolated from each other and the web using enforced Content Security Policy and Cross-Origin Isolation, hence the name. + +## Issues + +The [Worldwide Web Consortium](https://www.w3.org) currently has an open issue on their GitHub for IWAs with some interesting discussions that are worth checking out. There are some [criticisms](https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/842#issuecomment-1989631915) of IWAs, at least in their current form. A big point of contention is giving IWAs access to more powerful features like raw TCP and UDP socket access, similar to what a natively installed app might be able to do, which Martin Thomson at Mozilla argues is dangerous even with user consent. Martin wrote a nice in-depth [article](https://lowentropy.net/posts/bundles) on bundling web content that's worth checking out on their website. It'll be a long process of iterating on the design before a version of this idea that's secure and available across browsers. + +Right now, Chrome ships the feature [enabled by default](https://chromestatus.com/feature/5146307550248960) but only on ChromeOS for admin-controlled machines and select development partners of Google. Safari and Firefox haven't implemented the feature, with [Firefox](https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/799#issuecomment-2342084330) taking a stance against it. Perhaps in its trial run, the technology will prove its potential, or maybe IWAs aren't the best solution after all and another attempt at improving web apps will come along. I'll be watching with great interest either way. diff --git a/blog/posts/relisting-startpage.md b/blog/posts/relisting-startpage.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2f7da60f --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/relisting-startpage.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2020-05-03T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +authors: + - contributors +links: + - Search Engines: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/ +tags: + - Search Engines +description: Startpage has been relisted in our search engine recommendations following their open communications with the Privacy Guides community. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- +# Relisting Startpage.com + +!["Relisting Startpage" cover image](../assets/images/relisting-startpage/cover.webp) + + + +Dear *Privacy Guides* Community, + +In October 2019, we learned that System1 had become the majority shareholder in Startpage.com via a new System1 subsidiary, Privacy One Group. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the acquisition and the initial lack of clear communication from the Startpage team towards the privacy community, we were forced to delist Startpage from our [search engine recommendations](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/). In an [explanatory blog post](delisting-startpage.md), we asked for more clarity surrounding the situation, stating: + +> ...there are still so many unanswered questions, we can no longer recommend the service with good confidence. If Startpage aims to be re-considered, they will have to answer the questions above, preferably along with an explanation of why it took them so long to get proper answers out to the public. + +Shortly after this, the *Privacy Guides* team was able to get an open line of communication with Startpage.com CEO Robert Beens, who vocalized his regret for not answering our questions more quickly and providing more clarity to the community from the start. From their perspective nothing fundamental had changed due to the acquisition, except that they would now have the resources to market Startpage efficiently thanks to System1. Unfortunately, Startpage failed to put themselves in the place of their users, and understand that their lack of transparency at the beginning would erode the trust they shared with the privacy community. + +By December, Startpage had [responded](https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacytools.io/issues/1562#issue-737) to our questions. More recently they also clarified that [System1's privacy policy](https://web.archive.org/web/20201110100140/https://system1.com/terms/privacy-policy) does not relate to Startpage; Startpage's privacy policy remains [unchanged](https://web.archive.org/web/20201110100140/https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy/): + +> Having a new shareholder in the company will not change any aspect of the privacy we offer. We are a Dutch company and will continue to be so, fully complying with Dutch and EU privacy regulations (GDPR). We don’t store or share any personal data. No change either. Our clear privacy policy will stay the same. Management / founders (including myself) continue to have an important stake in the company and will continue to be fully committed to our privacy mission! + +They also created new support pages clarifying the privacy implications of System1's relationship with Startpage: + +- [Startpage CEO Robert Beens discusses the investment from Privacy One / System1](https://web.archive.org/web/20201110100140/https://support.startpage.com/index.php?/Knowledgebase/Article/View/1277/0/startpage-ceo-robert-beens-discusses-the-investment-from-privacy-one--system1) +- [What is Startpage's relationship with Privacy One/System1 and what does this mean for my privacy protections?](https://web.archive.org/web/20201110100140/https://support.startpage.com/index.php?/Knowledgebase/Article/View/1275/0/what-is-startpages-relationship-with-privacy-onesystem1-and-what-does-this-mean-for-my-privacy-protections) +- [What is the Startpage privacy-guarding data flow?](https://web.archive.org/web/20201110100140/https://support.startpage.com/index.php?/Knowledgebase/Article/View/1276/0/what-is-the-startpage-privacy-guarding-data-flow) + +Additionally, Beens joined an [interview](https://invidio.us/watch?v=h-3fW0w2ayg) with Techlore in February answering his questions and further questions from the privacy community. + +We prepared a [merge request](https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacytools.io/pulls/1592) in December for relisting Startpage in case we decided to do so, but did not have plans to merge it until the whole team felt confident (which we knew would take time). 5 months later, we sync'd up as a team, and decided to re-list them (with a warning explaining these events) which you can now find on our website [here](https://web.archive.org/web/20201110100140/https://www.privacytools.io/providers/search-engines). Our confidence and trust in Startpage has grown, and we're appreciative of Startpage's cooperation and willingness to address the concerns of our community. + +We also hope this encourages any services that may end up being delisted for one reason or another to take action and improve themselves in this same fashion. We don't like delisting the services we've previously trusted and recommended, and we are always happy to see when steps are taken to regain community trust. + +--- + +**2023-10-23:** This post has been edited to reflect the team's move from [PrivacyTools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/privacytools/) to Privacy Guides. diff --git a/blog/posts/restrict-act.md b/blog/posts/restrict-act.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7b3fb9a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/restrict-act.md @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2023-04-01T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Opinion +authors: + - jonah +tags: + - Government + - VPN + - United States +links: + - posts/hide-nothing.md +canonical: https://www.jonaharagon.com/posts/restrict-act/ +description: The RESTRICT Act would grant the government broad powers to restrict access to any site or service they claim could pose a threat to national security, akin to China's Great Firewall. +schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle +--- +# Worried About TikTok? The RESTRICT Act Is Not the Answer Americans Are Looking For + +Privacy advocates have been calling for the United States to adopt strong consumer privacy protection laws along the lines of the EU's GDPR for a long time now, but the proposed *Restricting the Emergence of Security Threats that Risk Information and Communications Technology* (RESTRICT) *Act* isn't the answer we're looking for. + +Terrible acronym aside, the RESTRICT Act claims to... + +> empower the United States government to prevent certain foreign governments from exploiting technology services operating in the United States in a way that poses risks to Americans’ sensitive data and our national security. ([whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/07/statement-from-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-the-introduction-of-the-restrict-act/)) + +In reality, this act would grant the government broad powers to restrict access to any site or service they claim could pose a threat to national security, akin to China's "[great firewall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Firewall)." + +Currently, if you go on the internet and try and find out what the RESTRICT Act *actually does*, you'll find a lot of confusing and conflicting information. This is by design, not from a lack of analysis. Simply put, the RESTRICT Act has been interpreted in so many ways because the wording is so broad that it *can* be interpreted in so many ways. This is obviously a problematic form of government overreach. + +So what does it actually do? Well, nothing! For now anyway: Like many bills lately, this bill has no immediate effects, but it does grant the White House power to create rules and regulations which will have the power of law. Section 8 grants the Secretary of Commerce the power to "establish such rules, regulations, and procedures as the Secretary considers appropriate." These rules can include almost anything as long as they are targeting an entity covered by the bill. + +To give it a little credit, the specific activities this bill targets are *relatively* narrow. Section 2 of the bill mainly defines the affected entities in terms of corporate ownership and funding in relation to specific "foreign adversaries." It would be difficult for a company to violate this bill without *actually* being a front for a foreign government. However, once a targeted company *is* identified, the powers the White House then gains to prevent their operation and access within the United States are wildly expansive. + +## How might this affect VPN providers? + +This is the question on a lot of people's mind, and the answer is of course a bit complicated. + +Right now, this bill is mainly focused on TikTok, despite them not being mentioned specifically within the bill text, so let's focus on them. If the White House determines that TikTok is covered by this act, they could implement "mitigation measures" including ordering Internet Service Providers to block access to TikTok entirely. At this point, the Act grants very broad power to block **circumvention** of those mitigation measures as well. Now, any service "which is designed or intended to evade or circumvent the application of this Act" falls under the scope of this regulation. + +> No person may cause or aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, procure, permit, or approve the doing of any act prohibited by, or the omission of any act required by any regulation, order, direction, mitigation measure, prohibition, or other authorization or directive issued under, this Act. (Section 11(a)(2)) + +A reading of this could certainly include VPN providers. Even if the White House does not declare VPN companies to be directly violating this act, they could certainly deem their services to be aiding and abetting violators, and the end result is the same: Regulations which ban the operation of VPNs entirely. + +Even more worryingly—especially for myself at [Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org)—a stricter reading of the quoted section above could make it illegal to even *share advice* (i.e. "counsel") on how to run a VPN or sideload TikTok! And all of these violations *can* be punished with criminal charges including up to 20 years in jail or up to $1,000,000 in fines. + +So what do we actually know? + +- Does this bill ban VPNs? **No.** +- Does this bill give the White House executive power to ban VPNs? **Yes!** + +Ultimately, the provisions in this bill are so broad that it is inconceivable that they will *not* be eventually abused by the White House, it would only be a matter of time. Any law like this which gives the government broad authority to ban all sorts of tools if they are even tangentially related to a foreign country they deem a threat is simply unacceptable in a purportedly free country, and we need to make sure it does not pass. + +## Is this good privacy regulation? + +Absolutely not. Fundamentally, the RESTRICT Act does nothing to address the actual privacy concerns of American citizens, it only ensures that the digital data of Americans is exploited *exclusively* by America-friendly companies. If Congress was legitimately concerned about data collection in America, they could implement strong consumer protections that enhance individuals' control and rights over their personal data on *every* platform instead of playing whack-a-mole with every foreign technology entity. + +You may still be thinking that this bill would only really impact large, foreign entities like China/TikTok, but we've seen time and time again how bills like this that are sold as attacks on huge, nebulous entities like "terrorists" and "foreign state adversaries" wind up mainly used to attack the little guy with minor infractions. + +Just like with the post-9/11 Patriot Act, the government is trying to whip people up into a panic to pass a bill under false pretexts that only serves to expand their police powers over us. Call your legislators and demand that they vote against the RESTRICT Act, don't let them take away even more freedoms. diff --git a/blog/posts/secure-data-erasure.md b/blog/posts/secure-data-erasure.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..02714e94 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/secure-data-erasure.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2022-05-25T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Tutorials +authors: + - mfwmyfacewhen + - contributors +links: + - 'Encryption
OS Full Disk Encryption': https://www.privacyguides.org/encryption#os-full-disk-encryption +tags: + - Linux +license: BY-SA +description: Erasing data from your computer may seem like a simple task, but if you want to make sure the data is truly unrecoverable, there are some things you should consider. +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# Erasing Data Securely From Your SSD or HDD + +**Erasing data** from your computer may seem like a simple task, but if you want to make sure the data is truly unrecoverable, there are some things you should consider. + +!!! tip + + You should use [full disk encryption](https://www.privacyguides.org/encryption#os-full-disk-encryption) on your storage devices. If your device is stolen or needs to be returned under warranty your privacy may be at risk. + +To erase a storage device **thoroughly**, you should securely erase the whole device and not individual files. + +## Erasing Your Entire Drive + +When you delete a file, the operating system marks the space where the deleted file was as "empty." That "empty" space can be fairly easily undeleted, yielding the original file. + +### Magnetic storage + +If the disk is a magnetic storage device, such as a spinning hard disk, we suggest using [`nwipe`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nwipe). `nwipe` can be installed in most Linux distributions. If you wish to use a complete boot environment on a system, consider using [ShredOS Disk Eraser](https://github.com/PartialVolume/shredos.x86_64). ShredOS boots straight into `nwipe` and allows you to erase available disks. To install it to a flash USB stick see the [installation methods](https://github.com/PartialVolume/shredos.x86_64/blob/master/README.md#obtaining-and-writing-shredos-to-a-usb-flash-drive-the-easy-way-). + +Once you have your boot media, enter your system's UEFI settings and boot from the USB stick. Commonly used keys to access UEFI are ++f2++, ++f12++, or ++del++. Follow the on-screen prompts to wipe your data. + +![ShredOS](../assets/images/data-erasure/shredos.png) + +### Flash Storage + +For [flash memory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_memory) (SSD, NVMe, etc.) devices we suggest the ATA Secure Erase command. Methods such as `nwipe` should not be used on flash storage devices as it may damage their performance. The "Secure Erase" feature is often accessible through the UEFI setup menu. NVMe storage can be erased using the [`nvme-cli`](https://github.com/linux-nvme/nvme-cli) tools. For that see: + +```text +nvme format /dev/nvme0 -s 2 -n 1 +``` + +It is also possible to complete a Secure Erase using the [`hdparm`](https://ata.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/ATA_Secure_Erase) command, or [Microsoft Secure Group Commands](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/storage/security-group-commands). + +Physical destruction may be necessary to securely erase devices such as memory cards, USB sticks and unusable hard disks. + +## Erasing Specific Files + +Securely shredding **individual files** is difficult if not impossible. Copies can exist in a variety of ways such as through manual, or automatic backups, [wear leveling](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wear_leveling) (on modern [flash storage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solid-state_drive)), caching and filesystem [journaling](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journaling_file_system). + +Wear leveled devices do not guarantee a fixed relationship between [logical blocks addressed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_block_addressing) through the interface. This means that the physical locations in which the data is stored may be different to where it is actually located, so shredding may not provide adequate security. diff --git a/blog/posts/security-privacy-anonymity.md b/blog/posts/security-privacy-anonymity.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..757a1c9f --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/security-privacy-anonymity.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2021-02-23T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Opinion +authors: + - natebartram +links: + - 'Threat Modeling
Creating Your Threat Model': https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/threat-modeling/ + - posts/choosing-the-right-messenger.md +tags: + - Security +license: BY +description: Privacy, security, and anonymity often complement each other, but they are not always dependent on each other, and they are definitely not the same thing. +schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle +--- +# Security, Privacy, and Anonymity + +![](../assets/images/security-privacy-anonymity/cover.jpeg) + + + +We may think that we know the differences between privacy, security and anonymity, however we often mix them up. People will often criticize a product or service as “not private” when they really mean “not anonymous.” Privacy, security, and anonymity often complement each other, but they are not always dependent on each other, and they are definitely not the same thing. A service can be private without being anonymous, or even secure without being private. Which one should you prioritize? To some extent, there are no wrong answers. It really comes down to your threat model and what your desired goal is. It is perfectly fine to pick a product that provides privacy even though it doesn't provide anonymity. Furthermore, it's okay to pick a product that doesn't provide security if it does provide one of the other features. The important thing is that you need to be aware what these products and services are and aren’t offering you so that you can use them correctly. + +There’s lots of ways to define privacy, security, and anonymity. Someone showed me [this](https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacytools.io/issues/1760#issuecomment-10452) definition and I really liked it. It seems to pretty much hit the nail on the head when applying these terms specifically to data privacy and cybersecurity: + +**Anonymity**: *The sender and/or recipient's real ID is unknown* + +In the real world this could be a secret admirer sending a Valentine's Day card. Online this could be when ones "footprints" cannot lead back to the poster: e.g. Tor. + +**Privacy**: *The contents of the message can only be seen/heard by the intended recipient(s)* + +In the real world this could be a whispered conversation between two people in the middle of Siberia. Online this could be a Signal message, which is end-to-end encrypted and only the recipient & sender can read the contents. + +**Security** (in the context of privacy/anonymity): *The parties involved are who they say they are* + +In the real world this could be something unique and verifiable such as a passport or fingerprints. Online this could be certificates or PGP signatures. + +These topics often overlap: Privacy can help your security because if people don't know information about you, they can't effectively target you. For example, an attacker that doesn't know who you bank with cannot know which bank to target. Security can protect your privacy by forcibly controlling who has access to that information about you. Let’s take a few examples: + +## Security without Privacy or Anonymity + +The most obvious example of this that comes to mind is Google. Google has had almost no major data breaches in all their years of existence, yet they know almost everything about everyone to the point that the former CEO Eric Schmidt remarked "[We can more or less know what you're thinking about.](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190743/https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-even-knows-what-youre-thinking/)" Google offers world-class security with zero privacy or anonymity. + +## Security and Some Privacy without Anonymity + +Consider the renowned encrypted messaging app Signal. Because your phone number is required, you can be unmasked by a court order or even a web search depending on the phone number you use. However, Signal is renowned for having some of the best security in the world, and the content of your messages and the information you transfer will be protected and controlled even if your identity is not. Top-notch security and privacy over the content of your messages, but anonymity cannot be guaranteed. + +## Anonymity without Security + +Cash is a great example of this. Paying for a product in cash preserves your anonymity - unless the business requires it, you don't have to give any kind of information at all. Yet, you have no security if the seller doesn't deliver the item (unless you have a receipt). You have no protection from fraud or anything like that. + +## Security with Privacy and Anonymity + +XMPP is arguably the best example of this. XMPP allows you to sign up without any real information, over a VPN or Tor connection for total anonymity. Additionally, the conversations can be protected by OMEMO encryption, meaning the data itself is also private. When used properly, this is as closed to perfect as you can get, if a bit user-unfriendly. (**Editor's note**: XMPP is not officially endorsed by Privacy Guides for the reasons listed [here](https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacytools.io/issues/1854).) + +## Closing Thoughts + +These three concepts are not necessarily dependent on each other. A secure product does not guarantee privacy, a private product does not guarantee security, and anonymity does not guarantee either. As I said before, there is nothing wrong with valuing one facet over another. It's also okay to use Signal even though it doesn't give you total anonymity. Just be sure you understand how a product is meant to be used and where it both shines and falls short. It would be awful to use Google thinking that it will give your communications total privacy and then your financial details get stolen by a [rogue employee](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190743/https://nypost.com/2020/09/23/shopify-says-rogue-employees-may-have-stolen-customer-data/). Or if you used a service like Signal to organize protests in a hostile country only to be arrested once your phone number is unmasked. Know the limitations of the services you choose and decide what features are important to you. It’s also important to know that privacy and security are sliding scales. This could be an entire blog post on its own. Think of passwords. Any password – even “password” - is technically more secure than no password at all. But a 16-character randomly-generated password is even more secure than “password.” Sometimes it’s okay to find a solution that offers a blend – less privacy in one area in exchange for more security in another, or vice versa. Once again, it all comes back to your threat model, your needs, and your resources. + +--- + +*Originally published on [The New Oil](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190743/https://thenewoil.xyz/privsecanon.html).* diff --git a/blog/posts/signal-configuration-and-hardening.md b/blog/posts/signal-configuration-and-hardening.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..940348e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/signal-configuration-and-hardening.md @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2022-07-07T19:00:00Z + updated: 2024-08-23T19:00:00Z +authors: + - contributors + - matchboxbananasynergy + - dngray +categories: + - Tutorials +tags: + - Signal + - Molly + - Instant Messengers +license: BY-SA +description: This guide details actions you can take to configure and harden Signal in accordance with your threat model. +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# Signal Configuration and Hardening Guide + +[Signal](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication#signal) is a widely regarded instant messaging service that is not only easy to use but is also private and secure. Signal's strong E2EE implementation and metadata protections provide a level of assurance that only you and your intended recipients are able to read communications. + +This guide details actions you can take to configure and harden Signal in accordance with your [threat model](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/threat-modeling/). + +## Signal Configuration + +### Signal PIN + +When you register for Signal with your phone number, you will be asked to set up a Signal PIN. This PIN can be used to recover your profile, settings, contacts and who you've blocked in case you ever lose or switch devices. + +Additionally, your Signal PIN can also double as a registration lock that prevents others from registering with your number. + +!!! attention "Registration Lock" + + The server will not enforce the registration lock after 7 days of inactivity. After that, someone will be able to reset the PIN at registration and register with your phone number. This will wipe the data stored in your Signal account, as it is encrypted by the PIN, but it won't prevent someone from registering with your number provided that they can receive a text on it. + +**Important update**: since this blog post was published, there have been changes to the registration flow for Signal. You should read about this [here](signal-number-registration-update.md). + +If you haven't set up a Signal PIN, or have previously opted out of setting one up, follow these steps on Android/iOS: + +- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Account** > **Signal PIN** +- Select **Create new PIN** + +Signal will prompt you to enter a PIN. We suggest using a strong alphanumeric PIN that can be stored in a [password manager](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/). + +Once you have done that, or if you already have set up a PIN, make sure that **Registration Lock** is also enabled. + +- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Account** > **Signal PIN** +- [x] Turn on **Registration Lock** + +!!! Important + + If you forget the PIN and have enabled a registration lock, you may be locked out of your account for up to 7 days. + +You can learn more about Signal PIN on [Signal's website](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007059792-Signal-PIN). + +### Safety Numbers + +Safety numbers are a feature in Signal that allows you to ensure that messages are delivered securely between verified devices. + +It is best practice to always compare safety numbers with your contacts. This can be done in a couple of ways: + +- Scanning your contact's QR code while viewing their safety number. +- Comparing the safety numbers on both ends, be it visually or audibly. + +!!! Important + + In order for safety numbers to also verify that the intended recipient has access to the device you're verifying, you need a secondary communication channel where you can authenticate the person that is holding the device. For example, an in-person meeting or during a video call. + +To view the safety number for a particular contact, you need to follow these steps within Signal: + +- Go to a chat with a contact. +- Select the chat header or :material-dots-vertical: > **View Safety Number** + +Once you've compared the safety numbers on both devices, you can mark that contact as **Verified**. + +A checkmark will appear in the chat header by your contact's name when the safety number is marked as verified. It will remain verified unless the safety number changes, or you manually change the verification status. + +After doing that, any time the safety number changes, you'll be notified. + +If the safety number with one of your contacts changes, we recommend asking the contact what happened (if they switched to a new device or re-installed Signal, for example) and verify the safety numbers again. + +For more demanding threat models, you should agree on a protocol with your contacts in advance on what to do in case the safety number ever changes. + +You can learn more about safety numbers on [Signal's website](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007060632-What-is-a-safety-number-and-why-do-I-see-that-it-changed-). + +### Disappearing Messages + +While communication in Signal is E2EE, the messages are still available on the devices, unless they are manually deleted. + +It is good practice to set up disappearing messages in Signal's settings so that any chats you start will disappear after a specified amount of time has passed. + +On Android/iOS: + +- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy** +- Under **Disappearing messages**, select **Default timer for new chats** +- Select the desired amount of time and select **Save** + +!!! tip "Override the global default for specific contacts" + + - Go to a chat with a contact + - Select :material-dots-vertical: on the top right + - Select **Disappearing messages** + - Select the desired amount of time and select **Save** + +We recommend setting up a reasonable timer by default, such as one week, and adjusting it per contact as you see fit. + +!!! tip "Snapchat-like Functionality" + + Signal allows you to send "view-once" media that are automatically removed from the conversation after they have been viewed. + +### Disable Link Previews + +Signal offers the ability to retrieve previews of webpages linked within a conversation. + +This means that when you send a link, a request will be sent to that website so that a preview of the website can be displayed alongside the link. Thus, we recommend disabling link previews. + +Your recipient doesn't make any requests unless they open the link on their end. + +On Android/iOS: + +- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Chats** +- [ ] Turn off **Generate link previews** + +### Screen Security + +Signal allows you to prevent a preview of the app being shown (i.e., in the app switcher) unless you explicitly open it. + +On Android: + +- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy** +- [x] Turn on **Screen Security** + +On iOS: + +- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy** +- [x] Turn on **Hide Screen in App Switcher** + +### Screen Lock + +If someone gets a hold of your device while it is unlocked, you run the risk of them being able to open the Signal app and look at your conversations. + +To mitigate this, you can leverage the Screen Lock option to require additional authentication before Signal can be accessed. + +On Android/iOS: + +- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy** +- [x] Turn on **Screen Lock** + +### Notification Privacy + +Even when your phone is locked, anyone who can lay eyes on the device can read messages and sender names from your lock screen. + +On Signal, you have the ability to hide message content and sender name, or just the message content itself. + +On Android: + +- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Notifications** +- Select **Show** +- Select **No name or message** or **Name only** respectively. + +On iOS: + +- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Notifications** +- Select **Show** +- Select **No name or Content** or **Name Only** respectively. + +### Call Relaying + +Signal allows you to relay all calls (including video calls) through the Signal server to avoid revealing your IP address to your contact. This may reduce call quality. + +On Android/iOS: + +- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy** > **Advanced** +- [x] Turn on **Always Relay Calls** + +For incoming calls from people who are not in your Contacts app, the call will be relayed through the Signal server regardless of how you've set it up. + +### Proxy Support + +If Signal is blocked in your country, Signal allows you to set up a proxy to bypass it. + +!!! Warning + + All traffic remains opaque to the proxy operator. However, the censoring party could learn that you are using Signal through a proxy because the app [fails to route all the IP connections to the proxy](https://community.signalusers.org/t/traffic-not-routed-to-tls-proxies-can-expose-users-to-censors/27479). + +You can learn more about Signal's proxy support on their [website](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360056052052-Proxy-Support). + +### Disable Signal Call History (iOS) + +Signal allows you to see your call history from your regular phone app. This allows your iOS device to sync your call history with iCloud, including whom you spoke to, when, and for how long. + +If you use iCloud and you don’t want to share call history on Signal, confirm it’s turned off: + +- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy** +- [ ] Turn off **Show Calls in Recents** + +## Signal Hardening + +### Avoid Device Linking + +While it may be tempting to link your Signal account to your desktop device for convenience, keep in mind that this extends your trust to an additional and potentially less secure operating system. + +Avoid linking your Signal account to a desktop device to reduce your attack surface, if your threat model calls for protecting against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/common-threats/#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }. + +### Molly (Android) + +If you use [Molly](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#molly-android) on Android to access the Signal network, there are many privacy and security-enhancing features that you may want to explore. + +#### Privacy and Security Features + +Molly has implemented database encryption at rest, which means that you can encrypt the app's database with a passphrase to ensure that none of its data is accessible without it. + +!!! note + + As long as Molly is locked, you will not receive notifications for any incoming messages or calls until you unlock it again. + +Once enabled, a configurable lock timer can be set, after which point Molly will lock itself if you haven't unlocked your device for that specific time period. Alternatively, you can manually lock the app whenever you want. + +For the database encryption feature to be useful, two conditions must be met: + +1. Molly has to be locked at the time an attacker gains access to the device. This can include a physical attack in which the attacker seizes your device and manages to unlock the device itself, or a remote attack, in which the device is compromised and manages to elevate privileges to root. +2. If you become aware that your device has been compromised, you should not unlock Molly's database. + +If both of the above conditions are met, the data within Molly is safe as long as the passphrase is not accessible to the attacker. + +To supplement the database encryption feature, Molly securely wipes your device's RAM once the database is locked to defend against forensic analysis. + +While Molly is running, your data is kept in RAM. When any app closes, its data remains in RAM until another app takes the same physical memory pages. That can take seconds or days, depending on many factors. To prevent anyone from dumping the RAM to disk and extracting your data after Molly is locked, the app overrides all free RAM memory with random data when you lock the database. + +There is also the ability to configure a SOCKS proxy in Molly to route its traffic through the proxy or [Tor via Orbot](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tor#orbot). When enabled, all traffic is routed through the proxy and there are no known IP or DNS leaks. When using this feature, [call relaying](#call-relaying) will always be enabled, regardless of the setting. + +Signal adds everyone who you have communicated with to its database. Molly allows you to delete those contacts and stop sharing your profile with them. + +To supplement the feature above, as well as for additional security and to fight spam, Molly offers the ability to block unknown contacts that you've never been in contact with or those that are not in your contact list without you having to manually block them. + +You can find a full list of Molly's [features](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#features) on the project's repository. diff --git a/blog/posts/signal-number-registration-update.md b/blog/posts/signal-number-registration-update.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d85fb234 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/signal-number-registration-update.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2022-11-10T19:00:00Z +categories: + - News +authors: + - matchboxbananasynergy +tags: + - PSA + - Signal + - Instant Messengers +links: + - posts/signal-configuration-and-hardening.md + - Real-Time Communication: https://www.privacyguides.org/real-time-communication/ +license: BY-SA +description: Signal has changed how it handles registration. This primarily affects people who are using a number for Signal that they don't have exclusive access to. +schema_type: ReportageNewsArticle +--- +# Important Changes to Signal Registration and Registration Lock + +**EDIT: This change has been temporarily rolled back after discussions that took place in the [Signal community](https://community.signalusers.org/t/phone-numbers-can-be-hogged-or-hijacked-permanently-using-registration-lock/6907/62). It will likely be the way things work in the future, but it seems that the old behavior is now back in place for the time being.** + +Signal has changed how it handles registration. This primarily affects people who are using a number for Signal that they don't have exclusive access to. + +## How It Used to Work + +As outlined in our [Signal Configuration & Hardening Guide](signal-configuration-and-hardening.md#signal-pin), if you registered, set up Registration Lock, and checked into the app at least once every 7 days, nobody could use the number you'd claimed and try to re-register it for themselves without knowing your Registration Lock PIN. + +## How It Works Now + +As outlined in this [issue](https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/12595#issuecomment-1310752097) on the Signal-Android GitHub repository, if someone tries to register with that number and is able to get the SMS code, they can kick you out of your Signal account. At that point, you have to re-register by receiving an SMS for that number, and inputting your Signal PIN. If you are unable to do this, the Registration Lock is not enforced after 7 days. Someone who tries to register after that will be prompted to enter the Signal PIN once more. If the correct PIN is not entered, the app will prompt you to create a new PIN, and the account is wiped allowing the number to be claimed by a person who can receive an SMS code for it. + +You can find the relevant changes in the code [here](https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server/commit/80a3a8a43c8698be9f561a42762ffafe2db1409b#diff-c99f1a5184455de55e73623642ad010e2269a2d217a911e6bcf8f6bc8a79f6eaR484). + +>If Alice registers number X and enables reglock, but Bob later proves ownership of number X (by registering and completing the SMS code), then Alice will be unregistered. However, if a reglock is present, Bob still won't be able to register immediately if he does not know the reglock code. This allows reglock to still function as a way to prevent someone else from taking over your account. +> +>However, by unregistering Alice, this starts a 7-day timer. After 7 days, if Alice doesn't re-register, then the reglock is removed and Bob will be free to register the number without needing to know the reglock. But if Alice still truly does own the number, she can simply re-prove ownership and things should go back to normal for her. +> +>This is important because phone number can (and are) re-used among cell carriers. If someone gets a new phone number from their carrier, they should not be prevented from registering with Signal indefinitely because the previous owner has reglock. +> +>The intention of reglock is to prevent hijacking of numbers you actually own, not to guarantee the number for yourself for life. + +While this change makes sense from the perspective of making it so you cannot "hold a number hostage" as long as you keep checking in, it is particularly important for people who've used disposable phone numbers to know this. + +We recommend migrating to a phone number that you own and will be able to own for the foreseeable future in order to avoid getting locked out of your account and losing your contacts. + +--- + +*Special thanks to the [Molly](https://molly.im) community who made us aware of this change soon after it went live.* diff --git a/blog/posts/staff-announcement.md b/blog/posts/staff-announcement.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4f64dccc --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/staff-announcement.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2024-08-20T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +authors: + - niek-de-wilde +tags: + - Privacy Guides +license: BY-SA +description: Privacy Guides has reached a significant milestone with today's hire of our first employee, Project Director Jonah Aragon. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- + +# Jonah Aragon Hired as Project Director + +We are thrilled to announce a significant milestone for Privacy Guides: the addition of our first paid staff member, Jonah Aragon. This achievement is a testament to the unwavering support and generous donations from our incredible community. Another major donation came from [Power Up Privacy](https://powerupprivacy.com/){ rel=nofollow }, a privacy advocacy group that funds privacy-related research and development, which helped us achieve this goal earlier than expected! + +Jonah Aragon is no stranger to Privacy Guides. As a founding member, Jonah has been instrumental in shaping our organization and its mission. With his extensive background in privacy and cybersecurity, Jonah brings a wealth of knowledge and experience to his new role. + +## A Community-Driven Success + +The journey of Privacy Guides has always been fueled by the passion and contributions of our community. From the very beginning, our mission has been to provide reliable, independent information on privacy and security. Thanks to your donations, we are now able to take a significant step forward by bringing Jonah on board as our Project Director. + +In this new position, Jonah will be working 20 hours a week to manage our day-to-day operations. His responsibilities will include overseeing various projects, ensuring smooth coordination among team members, and maintaining the high standards of our content and resources. + +One of Jonah’s focuses will be restarting *This Week in Privacy*, our weekly podcast providing updates on the latest developments in our community and the privacy world. After our initial trial run of this project, we heard your positive feedback, so we will be bringing it back! + +Another crucial aspect of Jonah’s role will be fundraising. Our goal is to make this position self-sustaining, ensuring that Privacy Guides can continue to grow and thrive. Jonah’s efforts in fundraising will help secure the necessary resources to support our ongoing projects and initiatives. + +## Thank You for Your Support + +This exciting development would not have been possible without the incredible support of our community. Your donations have made it possible for us to bring Jonah on board and continue our mission of promoting privacy and security. We are deeply grateful for your trust and generosity. + +As we embark on this new chapter, we look forward to the positive impact Jonah will have on Privacy Guides. Together, we will continue to advocate for privacy, educate the public, and provide valuable resources to help everyone protect their digital lives. + +Thank you for being a part of our journey. Stay tuned for more updates and exciting developments! diff --git a/blog/posts/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption.md b/blog/posts/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c87c92c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption.md @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-04-01T05:40:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +tags: + - April Fools +authors: + - aprilfools +license: BY-SA +description: Privacy Guides is formally taking a stand against dangerous and frightening technologies. +schema_type: SatiricalArticle +preview: + logo: blog/assets/images/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption/fire.svg +--- +# The Dangers of End-to-End Encryption + +![An image showing a burning car](../assets/images/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption/cover.webp) + + + +In the digital age, nothing is more important than convenience and easy access to data. Unfortunately, there has been an alarming trend among technologists to implement **End-to-End Encryption** (E2EE) in their applications, to the detriment of all the important work being done by countless organizations, including the best and brightest intelligence agencies and big tech companies. + +
+

April Fools!

+ +This article was published on April 1st, 2025. + +Privacy Guides supports strong encryption as a cornerstone of digital security and personal freedom. End-to-end encryption ensures that **your** communications remain **yours**, which is a principle worth preserving. + +
+ +Security-focused developers and misguided "advocates" have long attempted to convince those involved in privacy and security that E2EE is an advanced security measure designed to protect your sensitive data, and *Privacy Guides* has stood by for far too long not setting the record straight. + +In this article, we are going to explore how these "protections" actually endanger you and pose critical threats to society at large. Threats that are so grave that numerous government agencies around the world insist that we immediately limit or eliminate E2EE entirely, before our world as we know it falls apart. + +*Privacy Guides* is acutely aware of these serious concerns, and believes privacy should always be a conditional right, used *responsibly*. + +## E2EE hampers *legitimate* government surveillance + +Every day, intelligence agencies carry out perfectly legitimate surveillance activities against both their own citizens and foreigners. There is no question that these agencies are crucial to the upkeep of our national security, and it is our moral obligation to assist them in these warrantless activities, whether we know it or not. + +When services like [Signal](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/) or [Tuta](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/) keep all of their users messages locked in an impenetrable vault, how are they supposed to keep tabs on potential criminals using their services? + +The reality is that if the government is not allowed to read *every* message being sent, they might never encounter the *one* that actually warrants suspicion. + +It's true that end-to-end encryption also protects the lives of journalists, whistleblowers, and human-rights activists from those few governments which are *actually* oppressive, but these edge-cases should not be used as an excuse to hinder legitimate governments like in the US or the UK. + +## E2EE encourages crime + +With end-to-end encryption, criminals are granted a free pass for unlimited criminal activity. *Nobody* can read their messages besides them! Shocking, isn't it? + +If platforms simply removed all forms of encryption from their services, we could solve cybercrime, illegal drug dealing, dangerous hacking attempts, child exploitation, and terrorism overnight... right? + +There is plenty of historical precedent here. Platforms like Snapchat which *don't* utilize end-to-end encryption have bravely been [involved in noble arrests](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68099669), stopping criminals in their tracks before they had a chance to act. + +Users of these platforms who aren't criminals do benefit a bit from end-to-end encryption. It protects them from identity theft, surveillance, and data breaches every day. With any sort of trade-off like this, this is certainly a factor to consider. We believe it is very clear that giving up minor protections like this is a small price to pay to potentially intercept the next dangerous joke in a group text. + +## It prevents *helpful* backdoors + +Many tech companies have tried to [introduce backdoors into their end-to-end encrypted platforms](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/apples-plan-think-different-about-encryption-opens-backdoor-your-private-life), only to be lambasted by the legion of completely unreasonable "privacy advocates" out there. Our stance on privacy is far more principled, and we believe there is a middle-ground to be found in the laws of mathematics. + +The solution proposed by companies like Apple and agencies like the FBI is a sound one. They will protect your messages, *unless* they encounter something suspicious. At that point, keys to decrypt your data will be given **only to the good guys**, so that they can enforce the law. + +This approach makes a lot of sense. By carefully controlling access to these skeleton keys, it's trivial for companies to make sure they only fall into the right hands. The notion that they might be leaked, or that someone with enough resources could replicate that access, is so far into slippery slope territory that it borders on nonsense. Let's stick with what we know about the security capabilities of these companies today, instead of imagining ridiculous scenarios where they are breached. + +## It harms innovation + +Think about all the services you use online every day. The companies behind those services *rely* on collecting as much of your personal data as possible in order to constantly produce exciting new innovations. Without mass data collection, how would you get personalized ads for weeks about different new sneakers, because you bought that pair on Amazon yesterday? How else would companies emulate the real-life experience of constantly being hounded by a salesperson in a store selling you the exact thing you desperately need? + +E2EE prevents companies from truly knowing their users, stifling these massive advances in advanced user profiling! + +Big tech companies monetizing your personal data in ways that you don't need to understand nor consent to is what makes the internet such a magical place. If your private chats are protected with E2EE, companies won't be able to serve you the moment you even *think* about a new lawnmower. What do you think about that? + +## It's challenging for developers + +Another way E2EE slows down innovation even in the digital security realm is its complexity. Implementing robust cryptographic libraries and user-friendly key management systems is complicated, and software development is supposed to be a piece of cake. + +The problem of digital security has already been solved: simply store that information in a database and protect that database from anyone who isn't approved to see it. Protections beyond this tend to be complexity for the sake of complexity. If we did away with the countless developer hours wasted on protection nobody *really* needs, we'd have more time to add longer animations and innovative features like infinite scrolling to keep users happily using their apps for hours on end. + +## E2EE is a slippery slope! + +Constantly pushing E2EE sets up consumers with a wildly unreasonable expectation, that privacy should be the default. If people got comfortable communicating without tech companies and governments constantly peeking over their shoulder, it's impossible to imagine what they might start thinking next. Maybe they'd start to believe personal liberty is a right, instead of a *privilege*. + +End-to-end encryption is an insidious technology that has crept its way into some of the best instant messengers, [cloud storage providers](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cloud/), and other apps. It stands in the way of law enforcement, government security agencies, data-collecting corporations, and anyone else who might need to peek into your personal life. + +It's time we took a stand against this technology and demand a true solution from our governments: **Sensible** regulations that allow for *partial* protections while keeping the option for these entities to decrypt it when necessary intact. The sense of security is all that truly matters to most people anyway. + +[Who needs *complete* privacy](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/why-privacy-matters/) when you can have a half-baked version easily circumvented by the good guys? What is privacy in the first place, if not a convenient cover for wrongdoing? If we can't read all messages (just in case), how are we expected to keep society safe? + +--- + +This article was published on April Fools' Day. If you've made it to the end, and you haven't noticed how we buried the real benefits of end-to-end encryption in our hyperbolic worst-case scenarios, well... surprise! 😄 + +Privacy Guides supports strong encryption as a cornerstone of digital security and personal freedom. End-to-end encryption ensures that **your** communications remain **yours**, which is a principle worth preserving. + +If the "dangers" of E2EE upset you, maybe it is time to reflect on how crucial privacy is to everyone: You, me, whistleblowers, activists, and everyday people who just want to live their lives. Happy April 1st, and stay secure out there! + +*Written by: Jonah Aragon* diff --git a/blog/posts/the-future-of-privacy.md b/blog/posts/the-future-of-privacy.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ce4dae16 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/the-future-of-privacy.md @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-02-03T19:00:00Z +categories: + - News +authors: + - em +description: Privacy is intrinsically intertwined with politics. Each change in governance can have serious effects on privacy rights and privacy tools, for better or for worse. Let's examine with concrete examples how politics affect legislations that can have an immense impact on the privacy tools and features we use. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- + +# The Future of Privacy: How Governments Shape Your Digital Life + +![Black and white photo of a street post at night. The street post has some ripped stickers on it and a stencilled graffiti saying Big Data is Watching You.](../assets/images/the-future-of-privacy/cover.webp) + + +Data privacy is a vast subject that encompasses so much. Some might think it is a niche focus interesting only a few. But in reality, it is a wide-ranging field influenced by intricate relationships between politics, law, technology, and much more. Further, it affects **everyone** in one way or another, whether they care about it or not. + +I routinely read articles discussing changes in politics on the advocacy side of data privacy. Then, I read articles talking about changes in regulations on the legal side of data privacy. And then, I see all the articles and guides presenting new tools and privacy features on the tech side of data privacy. Of course, all of this is linked together. + +Let's talk about how politics, law, and technological features are intertwined, all at once. + +## Privacy laws are always one election away from getting better, or worse + +Each change in government can have a serious effect on data privacy legislation. Privacy is a politically charged field. For example, authoritarian regimes might want to remove or weaken privacy rights to exert strict control over their population. While democratic governments generally bring more freedom and protections to its citizens, including privacy rights. It's important to keep in mind who in the past has bettered citizen rights and protections, and who has actively worked to undermine civil rights. + +Each time a new government takes power, its values will be put forward and influence legislation in place, or legislation not in place yet. While the Western world has benefited from some improvements in data privacy law for the past few years, we must consider these gains are fragile and protections could get removed or lessened at any time. + +Unfortunately, it seems there is currently a political push towards deregulation, mass surveillance, and a focus on corporate gains. This is **extremely worrisome for the future of privacy rights**, human rights, and individual liberties. + +Following politics and advocating for better privacy rights and legislation is essential in improving access to privacy tools and features around the world. Privacy is never politically neutral. + +## The tools you use might depend on government funding + +Many [privacy tools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) we use depend at least partially on government funding or on other tools which depend on government funding. This is especially true for open-source nonprofit organizations needing some (usually) more stable income, in addition to donations. + +### Which privacy and security tools could be impacted + +One notable example of a privacy-related project receiving government funding is the [Tor Project](https://www.torproject.org/). If this source of funding [were cut off](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/executive-order-state-department-sideswipes-freedom-tools-threatens-censorship), the impact on Tor could be quite detrimental, not only to the Tor Project but to all projects relying on Tor as well. Many privacy-focus software are built around the [Tor network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(network)). To name only a few, whistleblowing software such as [Hush Line](https://hushline.app/) and [SecureDrop](https://securedrop.org/) both utilize the Tor network to harden privacy. [Briar](https://briarproject.org/), [Cwtch](https://cwtch.im/), and [SimpleX](https://simplex.chat/), are examples of messaging applications also using Tor to add a layer of security and privacy to communications. **Tor is critical infrastructure** in the world of data privacy. + +Another important project receiving government funding is [Let's Encrypt](https://letsencrypt.org/). Let's Encrypt is a nonprofit Certificate Authority providing [TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security) certificates to websites. It is run by the Internet Security Research Group (ISRG), which [receives funding](https://www.abetterinternet.org/sponsors/) from the Sovereign Tech Agency, [supported by](https://www.sovereign.tech/faq) the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action. The ISRG also receives funding from the [Open Technology Fund](https://www.opentech.fund/) (OTF), which receives the [majority](https://www.opentech.fund/about/about-our-funding/) of its funding from the United States government, through the U.S. Agency for Global Media. + +In current events, last month an [executive order](https://web.archive.org/web/20250131165539/https://new.nsf.gov/executive-orders) in the United States from the Trump administration led the National Science Foundation (NSF) to [freeze grant reviews](https://www.npr.org/sections/shots-health-news/2025/01/27/nx-s1-5276342/nsf-freezes-grant-review-trump-executive-orders-dei-science). This is currently impacting many important projects in the tech world, [including](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/sethmlarson_national-science-foundation-freezes-grant-activity-7290072485423656960-n2eJ/) the Python Software Foundation (PSF). **The repercussions of this freeze could be devastating for many open-source projects, in privacy and beyond.** + +### Government funding should support civil liberties and protections + +Governments funding nonprofit projects and organizations working on improving human rights, civil liberties, and technological security and safety is a good thing. This can bring an important source of stable income to nonprofit projects that could not stay afloat solely from donations. + +However, this dependency can become precarious when governments aren't working for the good of the people anymore, and when organizations rely too heavily on such support, making them vulnerable to change in power. Such a change of regime can have devastating repercussions on the privacy tools we use. + +## The GDPR gave you deletion features in your apps + +On the good side of regulatory influence, there are regulations like the [General Data Protection Regulation](https://gdpr-info.eu/) (GDPR). Saying the GDPR revolutionized the world of data privacy would not be an overstatement. While many privacy regulations pre-date the GDPR, in the Western world none had the scope nor the grit the GDPR has. + +### What is the GDPR + +The GDPR is a data privacy regulation that was adopted by the European Union (EU) in 2016 and became effective in May 2018. Its scope encompasses all the EU member states as well as all the countries part of the European Economic Area (EEA), which together count 30 countries to this day. The United Kingdom also uses an [amended version](https://www.gdpreu.org/differences-between-the-uk-and-eu-gdpr-regulations/) of the GDPR post-Brexit. + +However, the reach of the GDPR isn't limited to Europe. Every organization based *outside the EU* that is offering goods or services to, or is monitoring the behavior of, individuals located in the EU [must comply](https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection/rules-business-and-organisations/application-regulation/who-does-data-protection-law-apply_en) as well. This means that **most organizations operating worldwide, regardless of where they are located in the world, must comply** with the GDPR. + +As is often the case with data privacy laws, it took a few years before [Data Subjects](https://www.gdprsummary.com/gdpr-definitions/data-subject/) (your legal designation under the GDPR) noticed any concrete changes. One change that has become prominent in the past few years, and is likely a direct product of the GDPR, is data deletion features within apps and accounts. + +### What does the GDPR have to do with data deletion features + +An important right granted by the GDPR to Data Subjects is the [Right to Erasure](https://gdpr-info.eu/art-17-gdpr/) (or the Right to be Forgotten). Other legislation such as the [California Consumer Privacy Act](https://www.oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa) (CCPA) calls for a similar right, the *Right to Delete*. This and similar rights have existed before, but through the GDPR and its enforcement it has affected technology in a much broader and impactful way. + +Slowly since 2018, applications requiring accounts have started to implement data deletion and account deletion features within the account itself. A probable reason for this is that due to the GDPR, and a now [growing number](https://iapp.org/resources/article/us-state-privacy-legislation-tracker/) of privacy regulations from various states in the United States, organizations are obligated to respond to Data Subject [requests](https://www.gdprsummary.com/data-subject-rights/) to get their personal data deleted. Managing this can be quite cumbersome for organizations. The burden of answering and implementing each data deletion request manually is often not worth the value of the data itself. Organizations with enough resources have simply added it as an internal product feature. This makes data deletion requests manageable by each Data Subject themselves (at least partially), freeing the organization from legally having to answer each individual request. When implemented properly, this is what we can call a win-win situation. + +
+

Request to delete

+ +Unfortunately, not all applications have integrated automatic deletion features internally (yet). Additionally, some applications and accounts will allow you to delete information only partially this way. + +If you wish to exercise or have questions related to your Right to Erasure or Right to Delete, first consult your local privacy regulation to check if you have this right as a *Data Subject*, *Individual,* or *Consumer*. Then, you can contact the organization's *Privacy Officer* with your request. You can usually find information about an organization's designated *Privacy Officer* by reading its privacy policy or privacy notice. In any case, it never hurts to ask. + +
+ +## Chat Control wants to break end-to-end encryption + +If you are not European, please bear with me. First, everyone outside of Europe should care about what is happening in Europe, regardless. But even if you don't care, you should know **this kind of mass surveillance proposition will inevitably leak west**, and if adopted will affect us all globally. + +### What is Chat Control + +In 2021, the EU [approved a derogation](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/chatcontrol-european-parliament-approves-mass-surveillance-of-private-communications/) to the [ePrivacy Directive](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPrivacy_Directive) to allow communication service providers to scan all exchanged messages to detect child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Although this first derogation was not mandatory, some policymakers kept pushing with new propositions. + +A year later, a [new regulation](https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/EDRi-Position-Paper-CSAR-short.pdf) (CSAR) was proposed by the European Commissioner for Home Affairs to make scanning messages for CSAM *mandatory* for all EU countries, and also allow them to **break end-to-end encryption**. In 2023, the UK passed a similar legislation called the [Online Safety Act](https://hackaday.com/2023/10/29/the-uk-online-safety-bill-becomes-law-what-does-it-mean/). These types of messaging mass scanning regulations have been called by critics *Chat Control*. + +### Why is Chat Control horrible for privacy, and for children + +Such legislation might sound like a noble cause at first, but consider this: Scanning all messages exchanged for any reason treats everyone like a criminal, no matter what. **This is not hunting criminals, this is mass surveillance.** Not only is this horrifying for privacy rights, but it also endangers democracy. Once a system to mass monitor all written communications is implemented to (supposedly) stop CSAM, new topics to detect, block, and report could be added anytime, and by any future governments. There is nothing that would prevent much less reasonable topics from being added to the list to be filtered out at a later date. + +Chat Control would hurt everyone, [including the children](https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol99/iss1/9/). Not only would mass scanning of all messages be [ineffective](https://volteuropa.org/news/chat-control-wont-protect-children) at reducing CSAM, but it would endanger the children even further by also scanning their communications. Because yes, children also communicate online. Parents also communicate sensitive information about their children online, with trusted family or doctors. All this data would get scanned and collected, only [one breach away](https://techcrunch.com/2025/01/28/powerschool-begins-notifying-students-and-teachers-after-massive-data-breach/) from being made public. + +*Protecting the children* is a pretext regularly used to implement abusive regulations undermining individual liberties and protections. Do not get fooled by this demagogic stratagem. **Chat Control is the opposite of protecting the children.** + +Chat Control would only lead to destroying the end-to-end encryption messaging features that are protecting us and the children so well already. Criminals exploiting children would simply move to underground channels, unbothered. + +### Who opposes Chat Control + +Thankfully, opposition from experts and advocates alike has been strong. To name only a few, Meredith Whittaker, president of the Signal Foundation which develops the messaging app [Signal](https://signal.org/), has taken [a clear stand](https://signal.org/blog/uk-online-safety-bill/) against Chat Control. The Electronic Frontier Foundation has also [firmly opposed](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/now-eu-council-should-finally-understand-no-one-wants-chat-control) Chat Control legislation. In the UK, the Open Rights Group has led [powerful campaigns](https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaign/save-encryption/) to fight against the Online Safety Act. In Europe, privacy advocacy organization [noyb](https://noyb.eu/en/noyb-files-complaint-against-eu-commission-over-targeted-chat-control-ads) and former Member of the European Parliament Patrick Breyer have both been fervent defenders of privacy rights [raising relentless resistance](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/messaging-and-chat-control/) to Chat Control. + +Harmful policies such as Chat Control are a direct example of how politics can affect laws that can cause **unimaginable damage** to the privacy-preserving technologies we use every day. + +## Age Verification wants to collect your sensitive data + +Another potent example of the *protecting-the-children stratagem* to undermine privacy rights is [Age Verification legislation](https://www.jonaharagon.com/posts/age-verification-is-incompatible-with-the-internet/). In the past few years, this idea of controlling which online content should be accessible to children has raised new proposals around the world. + +Age Verification policies generally start with the premise that some content should not be accessible to children online. Again, this could seem like a reasonable idea at first. Nobody would debate that children should be shielded from some type of content. Sadly, we have all witnessed how horrifying the internet can be at times. However, both the premise and methodology to achieve this goal are wrong. + +### Who will decide what content should be walled online? + +First, even putting aside the fact that there is plenty of disturbing content accessible *outside* the internet (newspapers, television, movies, radio, advertising, etc.), who would be [the deciders](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/impact-age-verification-measures-goes-beyond-porn-sites) of which specific content can be accessed by children or not? This can be extremely problematic, to say the least. + +There is no objective measure to decide on this, and what might be deemed appropriate by one might not be by another. More importantly in the context of our discussion, what one government might judge appropriate might be very different from the next or previous administration. + +This is again **a dangerous slippery slope opening the door wide to authoritarian policies**. + +### Age Verification undermines privacy and security + +Secondly, [how can age be verified online](https://www.woodhullfoundation.org/fact-checked/online-age-verification-is-not-the-same-as-flashing-your-id-at-a-liquor-store/)? Of course by collecting more data, on everyone. Age Verification policies don't affect only the children, they affect everyone who wants to access content online. If a website is deemed to display content that should not be accessed by children, the only way to enforce this rule would be to ask for some form of official identity verification from all adults who want to access it. + +Proponents of these regulations often refer to "age assurance processes" and suppose these processes to be undoubtedly secure. Anyone familiar with data security will understand how naive this approach is. I will not go into the details here, but you probably can already see how having each private website (or third-party processor) collect such sensitive information from each visitor is horrendous for privacy rights, and data security as well. Of course, these websites or third-party "age assurance processors" will unavoidably become a large treasure trove for thieves, and their sensitive data will be [inevitably leaked or stolen](https://www.404media.co/id-verification-service-for-tiktok-uber-x-exposed-driver-licenses-au10tix/) sooner rather than later. + +Age Verification is one of the biggest privacy threats online. Continuing in this direction could ultimately lead to the end of pseudonymous browsing. Additionally, this could also mean the end of your official ID having any value at all. After all, what unique identification value does a piece of ID keep after it has been leaked in a thousand different data breaches? Maybe even one day bought on a [darknet market](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darknet_market) by a curious teenager in need of accessing some website... + +### Age Verification is already here, sadly + +Regrettably, this is not a hypothetical scare. Age Verification legislation has already passed in [Australia](https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/what-is-australias-online-safety-amendment-about-explained/article69026251.ece), in the [UK](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/protecting-children/age-checks-to-protect-children-online/), as well as in [many U.S. states](https://action.freespeechcoalition.com/age-verification-resources/state-avs-laws/). It is also on the table federally in the [United States](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/10/eff-new-york-age-verification-threatens-everyones-speech-and-privacy), [Canada](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/09/canadas-leaders-must-reject-overbroad-age-verification-bill), [France](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-doubles-down-on-social-media-age-limit-at-15/), [Norway](https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/norwegian-government-sets-15-year-age-limit-for-using-social-media/), and [Europe](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/call-tenders-development-consultancy-and-support-age-verification-solution). + +There is some [tenacious opposition](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/12/global-age-verification-measures-2024-year-review) to Age Verification policies from digital rights and free speech advocates. Unfortunately, there is also a strong push in support of Age Verification from the rapidly growing "age assurance" and identity verification [industry](https://avpassociation.com/thought-leadership/2025-the-year-of-implementation-for-age-assurance/), and from many governments worldwide **moving towards a surveillance state**. + +Again, government values are deciding on digital features that impact our data privacy in disastrous ways. If you want to **take a stand against Age Verification**, you can join the [Stop Online ID Checks](https://www.stoponlineidchecks.org/) campaign from the nonprofit organization Fight for the Future. + +## The future of privacy + +There's a lot to be worrying about in today's privacy landscape. Unfortunately, recent political tendencies in the Western world make it difficult to stay optimistic. The trend toward authoritarian regimes and surveillance capitalism is bad news for the future of privacy around the globe. + +There is no question that privacy is intrinsically intertwined with politics, and can therefore never be politically neutral. The latest decisions taken by the new U.S. administration running full speed into deregulation and defunding, growing pressure in Europe to break end-to-end encryption in favor of a surveillance state, and invasive age verification policies to censor the web and collect even more data on every netizen is admittedly frightening. + +But one thing frightens me even more than all of this. One thing that could end privacy rights, forever. This threat to privacy is never far and always looming. + +This threat is giving up. + +Despite all the gloom menacing privacy rights, **privacy will never be dead as long as we stand up to defend it**. Governments might have the power to remove our privacy rights on paper and proclaim privacy features illegal. But the people have the power to keep pushing for better privacy rights and to keep developing even more robust and more accessible privacy tools. + +We must continue to advocate loudly for privacy rights and *all* human rights every chance we have. The fight for better privacy rights is only over when we give up. + +**Do not give up.** diff --git a/blog/posts/the-privacy-of-others.md b/blog/posts/the-privacy-of-others.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0e453be3 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/the-privacy-of-others.md @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-03-10T20:00:00Z +categories: + - Explainers +authors: + - em +description: In privacy, we talk a lot about how to protect our own data, but what about our responsibility to protect the data of others? If you care about privacy rights, you must also care for the data of the people around you. Together, we must start building a culture of data privacy where everyone cares for the data of others. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- +# Privacy is Also Protecting the Data of Others + +![Illustration from a photo of two children standing in a grass field. The taller child holds a yellow umbrella protecting the smaller child.](../assets/images/the-privacy-of-others/cover.webp) + + + +In privacy, we talk a lot about how to protect our own data, but what about our responsibility to protect the data of others? + +If you care about privacy rights, you must also care for the data of the people around you. To make privacy work, we need to develop a culture that normalizes caring for everyone's data, not just our own. Privacy cannot solely be a personal responsibility, data privacy is team work. + +Whatever measures and tools you use to protect your own data, you would never be able to protect it fully without the collaboration of others. + +In this context, the people around you might be your family or your friends, but also includes your boss, your doctor, your therapist, your school, your government, and any other person or organization that has control over some of your data. + +Conversely, you are also in control of other people's data. + +Even if you are not a boss, a doctor, or a therapist yourself, you probably have some photos of your friends, a list of contact information, and copies of sensitive conversations exchanged in private messages with your family. All of this data is under your guard too. + +Once you have control over someone else's data, **you become its guardian**. + +## Data protection is a communal responsibility + +Now to be clear, this isn't necessarily in relationship with the law, although it can be part of it. In this context, I am referring more to ethics. Do we have a moral obligation to care for and protect others to at least the same level we wish to be protected ourselves? + +As a connected society, we constantly exchange information with each other. This information is now mostly stored on digital mediums, and can be very easily duplicated and shared elsewhere. Actually, on a technical level, it's even *difficult* not to constantly involuntarily create duplicates of this data and send it elsewhere. + +This is why **we must increase our vigilance** about protecting the data of others. + +Considering the quantity of data that ends up in everyone's possession, data has become a communal responsibility. + +## We must develop a culture that normalizes data privacy + +Privacy is a human right, and a good starting point to protect any human right is legislation. Legislation is undeniably an aspect of data privacy that is in constant evolution, and we can hope that privacy laws will only get better over time. Well, let's not just hope, let's also work to make sure it does. + +That being said, **laws simply aren't enough**. + +To truly improve data privacy rights, we *must* integrate them into our *whole culture*. This might sound like an over-ambitious endeavor, but culture is flexible and evolves with people's needs. + +In the past few decades, our culture and customs have begun to shift *against* data privacy. Some of us are old enough to remember a time when everyone didn't have a camera in their pocket. At that time, it would have been considered unacceptable in most places to suddenly point a recording camera at a stranger in the street and start filming them without any explanation and without their consent. + +Now this kind of disrespectful behavior is a common occurrence, because everyone has the tool to do it. Our society evolved with technological tools, but **we neglected to course-correct our culture for it**. + +We have reached a point where we need to develop a culture of individual responsibility towards each other's data. + +This means caring not just for our own data, but **caring for everyone's data**, whether it's the data of our friends, our family, our employees, our patients, or even complete strangers in the streets, or online. + +This will take a lot of time and effort, but we owe it to the next generations to start now. + +## The principles we should consider in relation to privacy + +Our society already has adopted or improved many ethical principles in the past decades that are intimately linked to data privacy. + +Some of these principles and values have become much more prevalent in our culture recently, consent being one great example for this. + +**Consent** in privacy is incredibly important. What one person might feel comfortable sharing publicly might be completely different from another person, for example. Privacy cannot be established on a fixed basis without considering individuality and circumstances. + +Someone might be happy sharing their name on social media, and someone else might safeguard this information and only use pseudonyms. One person might feel safe sharing their home address online, yet another person could be killed for doing this. + +This is why *informed* and *explicit* individual consent (with true choices) should always be the center of such decisions, for any type of personal information. + +Other principles we must integrate in our culture of data privacy include **empathy** (my threat model isn't your threat model), **trust and respect** (secure this data properly if you must collect it), **safety** (consider someone could get severely harmed by a data breach), and **individual liberties** (sharing data must be a personal choice, even if there's no danger, it's still valid even if it's just a preference). + +Of course, these are only a few principles indispensable to build a culture of data privacy, but since most people are already familiar with these we'll start here. + +## How we can start building a better culture around data privacy + +So, what concrete actions can we take *right now* to improve our culture around data privacy? What can we do today at the individual level to start better protecting the data of others? + +Here are a few practices you can adopt in your daily life to improve the data of the people around you. However, I insist you not just demand others do this for you, but **do this for others too**. Re-shaping our culture needs to start with ourselves: + +### :material-camera-off: Ask for consent before sharing/posting photos + +Do not post photos of people online without their prior consent. Especially if there are children involved! Before sharing photos of others online, *always* ask for their consent first. + +### :material-face-recognition: Be mindful when sharing photos of protests + +Be very careful when [taking pictures during a protest](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/01/23/activists-guide-securing-your-smartphone/). There's a lot of nuance to this because it's also important to show protests and make them known (that's usually the goal!), but in some circumstances people might be put in danger if their faces are shown online associated with certain causes. + +Be mindful and make sure no one is singled out without consent in your pictures if you post them online. When possible, try to blur/block the faces of the people you couldn't ask for consent. + +### :material-car: Blur license plates + +When taking photos in the streets and posting them online, be mindful to blur license plates. This might sound extreme but imagine a situation where someone is a victim of domestic violence and their abuser sees their car parked at a shelter, or at someone's place. This information could literally get someone killed. Always keep in mind different people have different [threat models](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/threat-modeling/). + +### :material-contacts: Safeguard contact information + +Never share the contact information of someone with someone else (or something else) without their prior explicit consent. This includes email addresses, phone numbers, legal names, locations, photos, and *especially* home addresses. This information in the wrong hands could literally get someone killed. **Always ask first!** + +Additionally, be vigilant when importing your contact list in a new application. This could get it shared further than you intended. Ideally, always keep your contact list in an end-to-end encrypted application only. + +### :material-file-eye: Be careful when sharing files from and with others + +If someone trusted you with a file (photo, music, video, PDF, text file, etc.), always ask for consent before sharing this file with someone else. + +Additionally, always keep this file only locally or stored in a secure end-to-end encrypted service. If this person gives you consent to share this file, ensure that metadata has been [removed](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/data-redaction/) from it. This person might not be aware of the metadata on this file. + +### :material-heart: Keep confidences secret + +If someone trusts you enough to share something personal with you, do not betray that trust by talking about it with someone else, and *especially* not on unencrypted services such as Gmail or Twitter's DM. In doing so, you would expose this secret to even more unintended recipients. Respect people's trust in you. Do not share confidences. + +### :material-message-text: Safeguard and delete private messages on social media + +If you have private conversations on social media, be mindful not to spread this information elsewhere. If you delete your account, be mindful to also [delete](https://docs.cyd.social/docs/x/delete#delete-my-direct-messages) the information of others you have stored in your private messages. If someone wants to share sensitive information with you, always invite them to move to an end-to-end encrypted [messaging service](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/) instead. + +### :material-heart-box: Safeguard and delete intimate pictures you received + +If someone trust you enough to send you intimate photos of themselves, take this responsibility *extremely* seriously. If they use an end-to-end encrypted service, do not move the photos out of there. If you do, you could inadvertently upload them to an unencrypted service and compromise the security of these pictures. + +If your relationship with this person ends, you *should* delete all intimate pictures you have received. This is extremely important for their safety, and also possibly for *yours*. Things could get very problematic legally if your copies were to get accidentally leaked or stolen. No matter how difficult this might be emotionally, do the right thing and delete these pictures fully. + +If you are still unconvinced about this one, maybe have a look at Ted Lasso season 3, [episode 8](https://screenrant.com/ted-lasso-season-3-episode-8-keeley-story-response/) which has a great story demonstrating the dangers related to this. + +### :material-cellphone-screenshot: Avoid taking screenshot of people's posts + +Each time you take a screenshot of someone's post to repost it somewhere else, you are effectively removing this person's ability to delete their content later. This is horrible for privacy *and* for consent. Instead, use links to other people's posts. That way, if they decide later to delete their content, the link will simply not work anymore, but their right to deletion will remain intact. + +### :material-record-circle: Notify guests if you are using a smart speaker + +If you are using a smart speaker device in your home such as Amazon's Echo (Alexa), Apple's HomePod (Siri), Google's Nest, inform your guests about it when they enter your home. These devices have the [capacity](https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/alexa-amazon-echo-privacy-risk/) to record all conversations, and there has already been instances of accidental privacy invasion [reported](https://www.cnet.com/home/smart-home/alexa-sent-private-audio-to-a-random-contact-portland-family-says/) about this. Even if you don't mind yourself, offer your guests to *unplug* your smart speaker while they are visiting you. The same is valid for any voice assistant on your phone. + +### :material-eye-off: Do not use Windows Recall (or anything similar) + +If you are a Microsoft user, make sure to [*disable*](https://www.ytechb.com/how-to-uninstall-microsoft-recall-in-windows-11/) Windows Recall from your computer. If it's enabled, this application will [continuously](https://www.theverge.com/2024/6/3/24170305/microsoft-windows-recall-ai-screenshots-security-privacy-issues) take screenshots of your computer, including the faces of anyone video-chatting with you on Signal, the email content of anyone contacting your through Tuta Mail, the secrets of anyone chatting with you on Matrix. Windows Recall completely defeats the protections of anyone using end-to-end encryption to contact you. This is a huge breach of trust! If you somehow use this feature, at least be mindful to disable it each time you communicate with others. + +### :fontawesome-solid-glasses: Don't use Meta's Ray-Ban "AI" glasses! + +Don't use "smart" glasses recording people. + +Just don't. + +Ever. + +This is *extremely* creepy. + +Never buy nor use this. + +If you encounter someone in the street wearing this, run away. + +## This is only a start, but together we can do this + +Improving our culture around data privacy will take time and effort, but we have to start now. The best place to start is with yourself. + +Remember: + +"Be the change you wish to see in the world." + +**Be the data protector you wish to see in the world.** diff --git a/blog/posts/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites.md b/blog/posts/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3de250e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites.md @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2019-11-20T19:00:00Z +categories: + - News +authors: + - jonah +links: + - Choosing a VPN: https://www.jonaharagon.com/posts/choosing-a-vpn/ + - Understanding VPNs: https://www.jonaharagon.com/posts/understanding-vpns/ + - VPN Recommendations: https://www.privacyguides.org/vpn/ +tags: + - VPN +license: BY-SA +description: There’s a massive problem in the privacy world. Many shady companies are disguising advertisements as genuine reviews, to the detriment of real news sources like Privacy Guides and to potential buyers of these services. +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# The Trouble With VPN and Privacy Review Sites + +!["Unbiased Reviews" cover image](../assets/images/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/cover.webp) + + + +There’s a massive problem in the privacy world. Websites, social media accounts, and other platforms are constantly popping up out of nowhere, telling you to buy *The Greatest Service Ever* in order to solve all your privacy woes, whatever that may be. These websites often employ marketing teams to make sure their “reviews” are what you see first when you begin your research. Some of them are even operated by VPN providers themselves, operating under anonymous business entities to hide their bias, or doing it right out in the open, hoping you’ll mistake their advertising-filled press releases and blogs as insider knowledge of the VPN space. + +When a seemingly “unbiased review” on a site is merely a paid advertisement in disguise, that website is breaking their reader’s trust. From a consumer’s point of view, affiliate marketing and other paid promotional techniques like this make it near impossible to know when a review is genuine or not. + +This isn’t going to be a lengthy blog post on advertising being bad, far from it. In fact, many of the VPN providers we recommend on *Privacy Guides* engage in responsible advertising across various platforms. The key is transparency: Their advertisements should *look like advertisements*, and nothing else. + +I’m really looking to take the time here and identify “the bad” sites and resources that use these techniques to profit off a community just looking for reliable answers. Lots of sites like these will claim they’re acting in your best interest, but they’re just here to make money. + +One common thing I’ll see on these sites is a ranked list of providers that are ostensibly the best ones to choose from. These sites have supposedly done all the work for you, so you can just click and go, assured you’re making the right choices. + +So here’s my issue with ranking VPN providers: Let’s face it, VPN providers are all offering the same service, and they will either protect your information or they won’t. Ranking providers like this only serves as an easy way to guide users to a certain choice (in this case, the choice that will make the reviewers the most money). + +Let’s look at one of these “review” sites for example, which will go unnamed for the purposes of this article. On their homepage they prominently list 10 providers as the “best” VPN services, in this order: + +1. NordVPN +2. Surfshark +3. ExpressVPN +4. PerfectPrivacy +5. IPVanish +6. Mullvad +7. CyberGhost +8. Trust.Zone +9. ibVPN +10. Private Internet Access + +To their credit, this review site also helpfully included an advertising disclosure in their footer. On this fairly well hidden away page, they note that they participate in affiliate programs from 8 providers, as follows: + +- NordVPN +- SurfShark +- ExpressVPN +- Perfect-Privacy +- IPVanish +- CyberGhost +- Trust.Zone +- Private Internet Access + +*Hmm*. Look familiar? Of the 73 providers this site had reviewed at the time of writing this article, **all eight** of the VPN providers paying this review site happened to make their top 10 recommendations. In fact, you’d have to scroll down to #6 before you found a provider that wouldn’t pay them, practically buried. + +Furthermore, their list includes NordVPN, a company [notable for not disclosing security breaches](https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/21/nordvpn-confirms-it-was-hacked/) in a timely fashion, and ExpressVPN, a provider [notable for using weak 1024-bit encryption keys](https://www.goldenfrog.com/blog/some-providers-use-weak-1024-bit-keys-vyprvpn-explains-why-its-strong-keys-matter) to protect their users. By any objective standard, these providers do not deserve to be included in a top 10 recommendations list for securing anybody’s information. This review site in particular claims to have set criteria for their recommendations, but this just demonstrates that any criteria can be adjusted to fit any goal you may have. + +If these sites truly wanted to be helpful, they would consolidate all the relevant information and present it to their users without making the choice for them. A provider is going to be better or worse for every user depending on their particular situation, and encouraging making an informed choice between options presented equally is far more beneficial to putting one over the other in a largely arbitrary fashion. + +But that isn’t to say they should just throw all the providers in a big table and call it a day. Almost worse than the ranking scheme above is when sites provide out of context lists of providers, often just with pricing and a link. Sometimes they will link you to a full review (more on that in a bit), but for the most part these sites just expect you to follow their recommendations blindly. + +![Image of a review site with mostly affiliated recommendations](../assets/images/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/image1.webp "Affiliate links and discounts galore! This is a different site than before, but look at the familiar faces we’re seeing…") + +These read like advertisements, because they usually are. Once again we see the usual suspects — NordVPN, ExpressVPN… — paraded as the gold standard in the VPN space, not out of any inherent value, but based on the value of their affiliate programs. To further this point, let’s take a look at how much each of the five providers above will pay you for a referral (on a one-month plan). + +1. ExpressVPN: $13 for first month +2. NordVPN: $11.95 for first month +3. VPNArea: $4.95 for first month +4. VPN.ac: $2.90 for first month + +*Unfortunately, Perfect Privacy would not share their commission rates publicly, but if anyone has any information on that I’d be happy to receive it. What I will say is that based on the information above, I would not be surprised if it fell right between ExpressVPN and NordVPN’s rates. Their one-month plan costs $12.99, so assuming a 100% match on the first month (the standard from NordVPN and ExpressVPN) that would add up quite nicely.* + +Once again, we see a lineup of providers ordered in a way that *conveniently* pays the most to the website owner. And therein lies the issue with affiliate programs. Once you begin receiving financial compensation *on a per-signup basis*, you are now motivated to push the most users to the sites that pay more on a monthly basis, rather than the sites that will actually help the user. + +Occasionally, these recommendations are coupled with a “review” that is supposedly independent and unbiased, but in reality are simply more marketing tools to persuade you towards their opinions. In most cases, these reviewers will simply copy the VPN provider’s own press releases and even media, presenting their advertising as fact to their readers. These reviews are always hidden away as well, with main navigation links directing users towards the more affiliate-link-laden lists and tables that they’d much rather you browse. The true value of these review articles is the [Search Engine Optimization (SEO) advantage they bring](https://www.pcmag.com/news/367640/how-a-vpn-review-site-dominated-google-search-with-a-scam) in the rankings on Google, and not much more. More traffic = More clicks, at the expense of good, independent content and integrity. + +*Originally, this article contained a section about how ‘ThatOnePrivacySite’ was the last bastion of a hope in the VPN review world. However, that has since sold out to ‘Safety Detectives’, a site guilty of using all the affiliate tricks mentioned above. Goes to show, eh?* + +At [Privacy Guides](https://privacyguides.org/), we’ve developed a set list of criteria, and we make that abundantly clear when you read our list of [recommended VPN providers](https://privacyguides.org/vpn/). We also refrain from using affiliate links. As we’ve discussed, they are fundamentally flawed ways to market a service, and using them would break the trust our community has in our recommendations. + +We do have a sponsorship program, but all of our finances are handled in an incredibly transparent fashion. As a non-profit organization, the funding we receive cannot be used for private profit, and our community can see both where we receive money from and how it is being spent thanks to [Open Collective.](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides) Additionally, the recommendations on our site are handled by an entirely separate team of editors and contributors than the administrative team such as myself that handles the sponsorships and finances. The editors have sole control over our recommendations and operate entirely independently and on a volunteer-basis to ensure the choices we make are for the benefit of the privacy community over one individual. + +Ultimately, as a matter of policy our sponsors have no say over our recommendations, or whether they are recommended or a competitor is removed. We have given our community vast access to our website and internal workings to keep us in check and ensure we’re staying true to our word. This separation of management and editors is a strategy that has served the media industry well for decades, and makes all of our team and organization a more credible and trustworthy source of information. + +## Summary + +We have a lot of points we want to get across. The current landscape of privacy reviewers and “experts” weighing in on topics regarding the very companies that pay for their reviews is morally reprehensible, and just another way for big tech companies to collect all of our data more easily. + +Review sites should make it abundantly clear when their reviews are paid for by the VPN companies in any fashion, whether that be via affiliate programs or good old-fashioned sponsorships. This can’t be via a hidden-away disclosure in the footer or not published at all, but *clear* and *close in proximity* to the claims published on their site. **Customers are not expecting or seeking out these disclosures** when they visit review sites, and can’t be expected to immediately discern whether you’re speaking from a place of unbiased fact, or from a place with the greatest financial incentive. Better yet, they should reconsider their entire business model. Our site is based solely on a community donation model that still keeps us sustained. It’s the more difficult way to build a site to be sure, actually working to gain the trust of a huge community, but the difference in quality and integrity is remarkable. + +VPN providers should consider spending less money on paid reviews, and more money on securing and validating their infrastructure. Regular security audits are one fantastic way for companies to demonstrate their dedication to keeping their users secure. We strongly believe VPN services should consider our criteria, especially in regard to the ownership of their organization. Your VPN provider should not be hiding away in Panama controlled by anonymous leadership. While you *as a user* deserve privacy, transparency should be *required* of providers if you are expected to trust them. I would not give my money to some anonymous overseas investor, why would I give all of my internet traffic to some anonymous overseas administrator? + +Finally, when you’re choosing a VPN provider, do your own research. [Understand what a VPN actually does for you](https://www.jonaharagon.com/posts/understanding-vpns/). [Understand what it is a security audit proves](https://www.pcmag.com/article/371839/what-does-a-vpn-security-audit-really-prove), find out who owns and operates the VPN service you want to use, and make sure their policies and technologies reflect your values. [Ultimately gathering the information yourself](https://www.jonaharagon.com/posts/choosing-a-vpn/) and making an informed decision is the only way to make sure your privacy is being respected. diff --git a/blog/posts/threads-launch-twitter.md b/blog/posts/threads-launch-twitter.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..29402ff1 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/threads-launch-twitter.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2023-07-21T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Opinion +authors: + - freddy +links: + - posts/move-fast-and-break-things.md + - posts/virtual-insanity.md +tags: + - Twitter + - Facebook +license: BY-SA +description: The man behind Facebook has somehow managed to make the Twitter experience worse. +schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle +--- +# Threads Is the Perfect Twitter Alternative, Just Not for You + +!["Threads Cover Image" cover image](../assets/images/threads-launch-twitter/cover.webp) + +Silicon Valley could well be built on the principle of scrapping principles. Now Elon Musk, perhaps the ultimate tech bro, is shredding another well-regarded convention with an *original business strategy*. + +Generally, in business, it is sensible to provide your customers with what they want. With Twitter, the meme-makers' favorite billionaire is doing the opposite. The cyber-trucker is trying his best to [cull](https://jottings.lol/2022/12/bravo-elon) his customer base. Instead of finding gaps in the market, Musk is helping to create them. Ever the [copycat](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/04/move-fast-and-break-things/), Mark Zuckerberg wants to give these innovative tactics a try. Enter the-company formerly-known-as-Facebook's rival to the birdsite: Threads. + +The Zuck is, by all accounts, good at making social media platforms. This doesn't mean the platforms themselves are good - they [aren't](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2021/11/01/virtual-insanity/). But they are unarguably successful: Instagram and WhatsApp have comfortably over a billion users, Facebook has nearly three. If only half of these users adopt the new platform, it would instantly eclipse Twitter. As it happens, Threads allows you to import all your followers from Instagram. Of all the Twitter alternatives, Zuckerberg's looks like the most promising. + +Here, however, the promise ends. + +The man behind Facebook has somehow managed to make the Twitter experience worse. Following people, a key part of the social media mogul's earlier ventures, is meaningless on Threads. You are beholden to its algorithm and who it reckons you will interact with. (Want to see what your mates are posting about? Tough, [here's](https://jogblog.substack.com/p/facebooks-threads-is-so-depressing) an 'Epic Meme from the official Salesforce account.') Your timeline isn't chronological either. + +And this is where it gets clever. Say you tire of blue-tick brands shitposting, and want to delete your account? Hard luck. Like an ill-advised tattoo, Threads accounts are effectively permanent. If you delete your Threads account, your Instagram account goes too. You're locked in this shiny pit of brand based flimflam, and your Instagram account is hostage. + +Threads is what would happen if Twitter and Instagram made out in a bowling alley. It's all their worst parts combined - but it may well succeed. Rocket-man Musk's changes to Twitter have not exactly made it 'brand friendly'. Threads, meanwhile, is shaping up to be a paradise for in-your-face brands - and the AdTech industry would love for you to join them. As Chris Black [put it](https://www.gq.com/story/pulling-weeds-chris-black-twitter-is-better-than-ever), Threads is just 'another marketing channel masquerading as a community.' When the site inevitably introduces ads, the scared Twitter advertisers will flock. A *TechCrunch* headline [ran](https://techcrunch.com/2023/07/06/you-cant-post-ass-threads-is-doomed-meta-instagram-twitter/) 'You can’t post ass, Threads is doomed'. It should have run: 'You can't post ass, Threads will boom'. + +Despite cut-and-pasting a dying social media site, the Zuck won't be worried. If anyone knows how to transform bland technology into profit it's him. Aside from providing a platform for asinine hot-takes, Threads' main purpose is to hoover up and auction off data. Unlike Twitter, Meta's microblogging venture has strict moderation. When advertisers bore of Musk's manic antics you know where they'll go. + +Threads' naffness won't stop its success. It's data-scraping fluffily dressed up as substandard corporate twaddle. It's a cringe-inducing privacy invasion. It's not meant for users, but that doesn't really matter: you're not a user, you're a product. diff --git a/blog/posts/toward-a-passwordless-future.md b/blog/posts/toward-a-passwordless-future.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..16c7618e --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/toward-a-passwordless-future.md @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-03-08T11:00:00Z +categories: + - Explainers +authors: + - fria +tags: + - Passkeys + - Passwords +license: BY-SA +--- +# Toward a Passwordless Future + +![Article cover showing a rusted, broken lock on a door latch](../assets/images/toward-a-passwordless-future/cover.webp) + + + +Passwords are annoying, vulnerable to attack, and prone to human error. The multitude of issues with passwords has cost [millions](https://www.ibm.com/downloads/documents/us-en/107a02e94948f4ec) of dollars and forced terrible band-aid solutions in how we handle signing up for, logging in to, and securing online accounts. I'd like to break down some of these design paradigms that have entrenched themselves in our lives and how passkeys can lead to more secure and private online accounts. + +## How did we get here? + +### Ancient Rome + +Passwords are a surprisingly old concept, dating all the way back to ancient Rome. The ancient Roman historian Polybius in his *[Histories](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D6%3Achapter%3D34)* describes how the Roman military would pass around a wooden tablet, or *tessera*, inscribed with a "watchword" that would allow them to identify each other as friendly. + +### Prohibition + +During Prohibition in the 1920s US, speakeasies, or private, unlicensed bars selling illegal alcohol, would require a spoken [password](https://prohibition.themobmuseum.org/the-history/the-prohibition-underworld/the-speakeasies-of-the-1920s/) to gain entry. The name comes from how quietly you had to say the password, so law enforcement didn't overhear. + +### World War II + +The US military later used [countersigns](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countersign_(military)#cite_note-2), consisting of a challenge and a password to identify allies. On D-Day, they used the challenge "flash" and the password "thunder." Thunder was used specifically because it was difficult for Germans to pronounce, since the English "th" sound doesn't exist in German. This is an example of a shibboleth, or a way of distinguishing groups of people based on cultural differences. + +### 1960's + +It wasn't long after the dawn of the electronic computer that a solution for authentication was needed. Computers in the 1950s were expensive and slow, only able to handle one problem at a time. + +MIT's Compatible Time Sharing System (CTSS), pioneered by Fernando Corbató, aimed to solve this problem by allowing multiple users to do work at the same time, but they needed a way to authenticate specific users. "Putting a password on for each individual user as a lock seemed like a very straightforward solution" Corbató told Wired in an [interview](https://www.wired.com/2012/01/computer-password/). + +These passwords weren't designed to be very secure. Fred Schneider, a computer science professor at Cornell University, said in the same Wired article "nobody wanted to devote many machine resources to this authentication stuff." + +![Fernando Corbató standing next to the CTSS](../assets/images/toward-a-passwordless-future/ctss.webp) + + + +### First Password Breach + +The first password breach occurred not long after in 1962, detailed in a [pamphlet](https://www.multicians.org/thvv/compatible-time-sharing-system.pdf) written to commemorate the CTSS. + +Allan Scherr, a Ph.D. researcher at MIT, wanted more time for his detailed simulations. He knew that the passwords were stored in a plaintext file, so he requested it to be printed offline and that was that: he now had everyone's password and all the time he could ask for. + +A later incident in 1966 saw all users' passwords being printed at login due to the administrator accidentally swapping the master password file and the message of the day. + +### Early Attempts at Securing Passwords + +Clearly there was work to be done on securely storing passwords. A [paper](https://rist.tech.cornell.edu/6431papers/MorrisThompson1979.pdf) from 1979 by Robert Morris and Ken Thompson of Bell Laboratories outlines some requirements to bolster the security of passwords on a UNIX system. + +#### Hashing + +One of which is the need for passwords to not be stored in plaintext on the system, instead recommending storing a hash. + +A hash is a one-way function: you give a certain input, and it spits out data that can't be easily reversed back to the input, even knowing the algorithm that was used. But, given the same input, you'll get the same output, allowing you to compare an inputted user password to a stored one. + +In order to make it hard to brute force, the hashing algorithm should be fairly slow. + +#### Password Requirements + +They recommend certain requirements on the password entry program such as the classic 6-character minimum password length to prevent easily guessable passwords. + +#### Salting + +Password salting, a technique wherein a random string of characters is added to the end of the user's password before hashing, gets a mention as well. This prevents an attacker from simply pre-computing many password hashes ahead of time, and also prevents an attacker from knowing if the same password has been used on multiple systems just from comparing the hashes. + +These guidelines would remain mostly unchanged for decades, save for improved hashing and salting algorithms. + +## Unforeseen Consequences + +What was originally a system designed for a few people sharing a computer in an academic and research setting has somehow remained almost unchanged decades later. + +### Password Overload + +Instead of remembering a single password for your computer, you now have potentially hundreds of passwords for various online accounts. A recent [survey](https://nordpass.com/blog/how-many-passwords-does-average-person-have/) by NordPass estimates that the average person has around 168 personal accounts, with a nearly 70% increase in just the last three years since the survey was taken. This is an untenable number of passwords for a human to remember, so we don't. + +### Email Requirement + +With the ever-present threat of users forgetting their passwords and therefore losing access to their account irrevocably, there needed to be a way to recover the account. + +By the end of the dotcom bubble, email was fairly ubiquitous, so it made sense as a fallback way of authenticating. This had the added benefit of giving companies a way of contacting (read: spamming with ads) their customers. + +While it's hard to say when it started happening, major websites like eBay were requiring email addresses on signup as far back as [1999](http://web.archive.org/web/19991122073209/http://pages.ebay.com/services/registration/register.html). Amazon was doing it back in [2001](https://web.archive.org/web/20011107052853/http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/flex-sign-in/?opt=oa&page=recs/sign-in-secure.html&response=tg/recs/recs-post-login-dispatch/-/recs). People I interviewed said that email-based signup was commonplace by the late 90s. + +And so the precedent of requiring personal contact information to sign up for an account was born, at least partially due to the shortcomings of passwords. + +### Terrible Security + +#### Single Point of Failure + +On top of the extra personal data now required for each online account, email acts as a one-stop shop for attackers looking to hack your accounts, either by getting into your email account itself or by sending you convincing password reset emails that send you to a phishing page that looks exactly like the real page. + +With the advent of AI, phishing attacks have only gotten cheaper and easier. + +Laughably, we're told to "look for typos" or "just feel out the vibes man" in order to defend against these attacks. What hope did we ever have? + +This intersects a bit with how I think email is a terrible, outdated protocol that needs to be replaced, but that's a blog post for another day. + +What's followed as a consequence of the tech industry's refusal to adapt to the security landscape is an unprecedented cybercrime industry, stealing an estimated [$44.2 million](https://aag-it.com/the-latest-phishing-statistics/) in 2021 through phishing scams. These are people whose only contribution to society is draining grandma's bank account, and they're absolutely raking it in. + +#### Service Provider Negligence + +But even if you do everything right and never fall for a phishing email, you can still be compromised due to the negligence of any one of the hundreds of service providers you rely on. Passwords need to be stored on a server somewhere, and if a service provider doesn't hash and salt them properly, a data breach will leave your account vulnerable. + +Even if the *service provider* does everything right in terms of storing the password (which you have absolutely no way of verifying), in the event of a data breach the attackers will still have a hash of your password to attack. + +There's typically also a period between the server receiving your password from the encrypted HTTPS tunnel and storing it securely as a hash where it handles your password in plaintext in order to compare it with what it has on file. Any vulnerabilities in the hardware could be catastrophic. + +If you think this sounds like minor nitpicking, consider that in 2019, Facebook realized it had accidentally been storing [hundreds of millions of user passwords in plaintext](https://about.fb.com/news/2019/03/keeping-passwords-secure/). + +#### Human Error + +Even ignoring all of that, passwords rely on randomness to be secure, but they also rely on humans to generate them. + +Humans are very bad at generating random numbers. We're so bad at it that it's possible to [uniquely identify](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23626943/) you based on your pattern of "random" numbers. + +That doesn't even matter though, since passwords, by requiring the user to type them whenever they want to log in and requiring the user to remember them, encourage minimum randomness and minimum length. + +Most of us, even [IT experts](https://www.hipaajournal.com/92-of-it-leaders-guilty-of-password-reuse/), reuse passwords because we are so heavily incentivized to do so by how they fundamentally work. + +The strategy historically has been to shame people for using bad passwords whenever their account gets hacked, which has prevented us from seeing the fundamental issues with the way we authenticate and instead making it every individual's responsibility to somehow fight the incentives of the system they rely on. + +Imagine if every time you connected to a website with HTTPS, you had to come up with your own encryption key. Would that be a secure system? + +## Band-aid Solutions + +A common theme with passwords, and frankly many other things in the tech world, is stapling band-aid solutions on top of them to try and make them fit a modern use case they were never meant to serve. + +### Password Managers + +Password managers solve the issue of forgetting your passwords by acting as a secure repository for of all your passwords. You can even conveniently have them autofill your information for you on the login screen. They can generate strong passwords for you as well. + +#### Single Point of Failure + +Essentially, password managers try to eliminate the human error element of passwords. But in doing so, they introduce more attack surface: you now have a repository of all your login credentials conveniently located on your device, so if your device is compromised, all your accounts are also compromised. + +So a user with a password manager has to worry about passwords being guessed, potential compromise of their email, or compromise of their password manager. + +#### Security isn't Enforced + +Not to mention that many of the protections of a password manager are optional. A user isn't required to generate secure passwords, many will just continue using the same passwords they always have. + +#### Poor Phishing Protection + +Although some argue autofill protects against phishing attacks, really it doesn't since as soon as it doesn't autofill, a user will simply copy and paste their password into the field. A proper anti-phishing mitigation would make it nearly impossible to authenticate with the wrong website. Autofill can introduce its own set of [vulnerabilities](https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-mhhf-w9xw-pp9x) as well. + +### Salting and Hashing + +Salting and hashing themselves I would consider band-aid solutions, as they were stapled on top of the existing system as security concerns grew. They rely a lot on the service providers implementing them properly and even still there are gaps in security as I previously mentioned. + +### Two-Factor Authentication + +Because of the risk of compromise with passwords, most websites implement some form of two-factor authentication. + +#### Email 2FA + +By far the most common is email 2FA, which on top of all the problems with using email as an authentication method stated before, usually only happens the first time you log in to a website on each device (until you clear your cookies that is). + +#### SMS 2FA + +SMS 2FA is also common. This method is vulnerable to [SIM swap attacks](https://www.verizon.com/about/account-security/sim-swapping) in which an attacker tricks your carrier into swapping your phone number onto a new SIM card under their control. SMS is also completely unencrypted, lacking even transport encryption. + +The SS7 system underlying SMS is inherently [vulnerable to interception](https://youtu.be/wVyu7NB7W6Y?si=S8yzlWWh8zwuGraq). The idea of using SMS as a security tool is, frankly, laughable. + +#### OTP + +That brings us to [OTP](https://www.onelogin.com/learn/otp-totp-hotp) or One Time Password. This 2FA method relies on two things: a shared secret between you and the website called a "seed", and a "moving factor". + +The moving factor changes, allowing you both to generate a temporary password based on the seed that you need to type in on login. + +There are two main approaches to OTP. + +##### HOTP + +Hash-based Message Authentication Code OTP, or HOTP, increments the moving factor each time you successfully log in. + +##### TOTP + +In Time-based OTP or TOTP, the moving factor is time. The generated passwords will be valid for only about 30 to 60 seconds. The amount of time they're valid for is called a *time step*. + +Of the two, TOTP is newer and considered more secure since the passwords are constantly expiring. + +##### Issues + +While a massive step up from SMS 2FA in terms of both privacy and security, they're still lacking in phishing resistance. + +If you are sent to a fake login screen and put in your HOTP or TOTP password, the attacker can simply put that in to the real login screen. At least with TOTP there's a somewhat limited timeframe they can do it in, but these days phishing operations are fully automated, so it really doesn't matter. + +Also since both you and the website are storing the same seed, any breach of either your device or the servers will leave you compromised. You could store your secret on a separate device or on a separate app on your phone, but this leaves the risk of either not having your phone with you to log in to your accounts or losing your TOTP codes due to the file getting corrupted or a bad update. Overall, OTP is better than SMS 2FA but still leaves a lot to be desired. + +### Shoulder Surfing + +Another oft-forgotten issue with passwords is that someone could just [watch you type it](https://www.insideedition.com/thieves-are-snatching-phones-and-stealing-personal-info-after-studying-victims-passwords-81548) in and hack your account that way. Most password fields replace the characters in your password with stars or dots to combat this, but they usually still give you the option to show your password in plaintext anyway. The screen isn't the only way you can leak your password either, someone filming or watching you type it in a keyboard or on your phone screen would have your password with little effort. A human doesn't even need to be present, AI models can now work out your password just by [listening](https://www.royalholloway.ac.uk/research-and-education/departments-and-schools/information-security/news/study-suggests-that-ai-can-detect-your-password-from-the-sound-of-keys-being-pressed/#:~:text=Artificial%20Intelligence%20can%20work%20out,Royal%20Holloway%2C%20University%20of%20London.) to you type it. + +All of these are attempts, with varying success, at fixing the individual flaws with passwords rather than designing a solution from the ground up with security in mind. They add complexity, more steps in the process where either you or a service provider can screw something up. + +## Passkeys: The Password Replacement + +[Passkeys](https://fidoalliance.org/passkeys/) are FIDO credentials tied to a specific app or website that let you sign in with the same method you use to unlock your device, be that biometrics or a PIN. + + + +As long as you can remember your phone password, you can log in to your accounts. This frees you up to set a secure password on your device, since that's the only password you'd need to remember. + +You may have heard of passkeys from Apple or Google and assumed they're some proprietary feature, but they're based on FIDO standards and the word "passkey" is meant to be a common noun like "password," not tied to any platform or company. + +### No Personal Info + +You also won't need to use a username or email when logging in with passkeys, although currently most implementations still require it. Passkeys can fully replace every aspect of logging in. + +That means no email to send phishing attacks to or hack, and no SMS to be SIM swapped. + +### Phishing Resistance + +Passkeys operate using public-key cryptography just like how HTTPS works, so your private key isn't stored on the service provider's server, completely eliminating data breach issues with passwords. They were designed from the ground up to be phishing resistant and secure. + +### Privacy + +Since a unique key pair is generated for each account, you don't have to worry about being identified between accounts either. Hopefully soon you won't need to pay for that email aliasing service just to not be tracked across accounts. + +### Protection Against Losing Your Account + +You can even generate multiple passkeys per account in case you lose one somehow. Essentially this replaces the need for a recovery method; you can just add as many as you need, and they'll be available on all your devices anyway so losing your phone won't lock you out of your account. + +### Anti-Shoulder Surfing + +Passkeys fight shoulder surfing by allowing you to use biometrics on your device to sign in. Even in the event someone got your device password, they would still need the actual private key associated with your account, either through physical possession of your device or some other compromise of your password manager. Since the private key stays in your possession and is never sent anywhere unencrypted, the risk is minimal. + +### Fully Syncable + +Passkeys can be synced across devices and in the cloud as well, so you don't have to worry about losing them. And they'll be E2EE. Many password managers support passkeys, including Apple's and Google's built-in ones, so you can likely start using them right now. + +### Try It Out + +You can test out passkeys at [webauthn.io](https://webauthn.io). Even if your passkeys aren't synced to the device you're currently using, you can still login via a QR code, allowing your phone to act as a sort of wireless security key. + +### Barriers + +The main barrier to passkey adoption currently is lack of support from websites and apps. They either don't support passkeys at all, or still force you to sign up with a password, email, etc. with no way to delete them. I encourage you to contact any website or apps that don't have passkey support and request it, with the ability to signup and login without ever setting a password. diff --git a/blog/posts/uk-forced-apple-to-remove-adp.md b/blog/posts/uk-forced-apple-to-remove-adp.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b2096091 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/uk-forced-apple-to-remove-adp.md @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-02-28T17:30:00Z +categories: + - News +authors: + - em +description: The UK government has served a technical capability notice to Apple under the UK Investigatory Act. Apple's response was to remove the Advanced Data Protection feature from the UK this week. What does this mean for Apple users in the UK and for encryption rights worldwide? +schema_type: ReportageNewsArticle +--- +# The UK Government Forced Apple to Remove Advanced Data Protection: What Does This Mean for You? + +![Photo of a person reading a book. The book is George Orwell's 1984. In the upper left corner is an Apple logo with two bites taken off.](../assets/images/uk-forced-apple-to-remove-adp/cover.webp) + + + +On February 7th this year, Joseph Menn [reported](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/02/07/apple-encryption-backdoor-uk/) from the *Washington Post* that officials in the United Kingdom had contacted Apple to demand the company allows them to access data from any iCloud user [worldwide](https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/draft-investigatory-powers-bill-committee/draft-investigatory-powers-bill/written/26341.html). This included users who had activated Apple's [Advanced Data Protection](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/os/ios-overview/#icloud), effectively requesting Apple break its strong end-to-end encrypted feature. + +Sources familiar with the matter told the *BBC* and the *Washington Post* that UK's Home Office served a [technical capability notice](https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/05/investigatory-powers-act-legal-analysis/) to Apple under the UK Investigatory Powers Act. Details are scarce about exactly what happened between the UK government and Apple because [neither Apple nor the Home Office](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgj54eq4vejo) have publicly commented on the notice. + +However, [last week](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/02/cornered-uks-demand-encryption-backdoor-apple-turns-its-strongest-security-setting) apparently in response, Apple has completely removed the opt-in Advanced Data Protection feature from the UK. As of the 21st, Apple users located in the UK cannot activate Advanced Data Protection (end-to-end encryption) for their iCloud Drive, iCloud Backup, Photos, Notes, and more. + +This is terrible news for anyone in the UK, and a frightening omen for everyone worldwide. + +## Why is end-to-end encryption so important? + +**End-to-end encryption is a *crucial* technology for digital privacy and security.** When data is encrypted end-to-end, this means that only the sender(s)/owner(s) and intended recipient(s) (if any) can access it. + +For example, if data stored on Apple's servers is end-to-end encrypted, this means that even Apple could not read this data. If a government wanted to scan all the end-to-end data stored by Apple, it would be impossible to do because even Apple does not possess the keys to decrypt (read) this data. + +In the same line, if a criminal were to steal end-to-end encrypted data from Apple's servers, they would not be able to decrypt it either. **End-to-end encryption is the best defense against unauthorized access**, including data stolen by criminals or negligently leaked by organizations with poor security. + +Any proposition to implement a "backdoor" to end-to-end encryption is *tragically misinformed*. While it might at first sound appealing and a fair way to grant access to supposedly benevolent entities only, this approach is *incredibly* naive and misguided. + +Governments have repeatedly tried to propose these delusive policies, but it is simply impossible to add secret access to end-to-end encryption that would only be accessed by the intended groups no matter how good the intention. This is as absurd as poking a hole in a bowl and *demanding* only apple juice leak through it but not water or any other liquid. It's just impossible. + +End-to-end encryption with a backdoor is simply not end-to-end anymore. As Signal Foundation's President Meredith Whittaker [said so well](https://signal.org/blog/uk-online-safety-bill/): "**Encryption is either broken for everyone, or it works for everyone. There is no way to create a safe backdoor.**" + +The only way to keep the benefit of end-to-end encryption with all the protections it offers is to keep it thoroughly and strictly end-to-end, for everyone. + +## Why some governments want to break encryption? + +[Some governments](https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-encryption-war-is-on-again-and-this-time-government-has-a-new-strategy/) have been pushing really hard to demand access to end-to-end encrypted data from tech companies. While the ground for this might seem reasonable at first, it fails to consider how the technology works. **Encryption isn't magical, it is mathematical.** + +American cryptographer Bruce Schneier [explains](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2025/02/an-icloud-backdoor-would-make-our-phones-less-safe.html) this clearly, "it’s a restriction enforced by mathematics—cryptography—and not policy." + +No matter how good a reason a third-party might have to decrypt a single piece of end-to-end encrypted data, if there is a way to access it by an unauthorized entity, then it offers no protection at all against any other accesses, whether legal or criminal. + +Besides the this-is-actually-mathematically-impossible argument, let's say we were to remove end-to-end encryption protections entirely for everyone everywhere (which a backdoor would effectively do). The other problem governments and law enforcement seem to fail to understand is that **citizens' rights and safety should be the priority**. + +Removing the lock on everyone's entry door possibly *could* make it easier for law enforcement to catch *some* criminals, it's true. But this would also **expose *everyone* to home invasion**, theft, vandalism, physical harm, and worse. + +The price of removing the locks on everyone's doors is too high. Similarly, **the price of removing the locks on everyone's digital doors is also too high**. + +Moreover, these governments always seem to assume that they, all well-intended benevolent governments of course, are assuredly reasonable and will only use this access to monitor the worst of criminals. Even if that was undoubtedly true *now*, these supposedly benevolent governments fail to consider these conditions might not always stay true. + +What is a benevolent government today might very well turn into an authoritarian nightmare tomorrow. + +Once implemented into the system, **the tools for mass surveillance can quickly turn against its own citizens** and victimize its most vulnerable population. This threat is always only [one change of government away](the-future-of-privacy.md). + +## Why did Apple remove this feature from the UK? + +Apple first introduced Advanced Data Protection in 2022. At the time, there was already in [a potential conflict](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/dec/08/privacy-changes-apple-uk-government-online-safety-bill) with the UK's forthcoming Online Safety *Bill*, which despite [strong opposition](https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaign/online-safety-bill-campaign-hub/) became law in 2023 and is now the Online Safety *Act*. + +Although attacks on encryption coming from governments aren't new, policymakers in favor of mass surveillance have recently increased the pressure on tech organizations to implement and normalize systemic monitoring, even in democratic countries. This is an **extremely dangerous threat to privacy rights** and [human rights](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/02/uk-encryption-order-threatens-global-privacy-rights/) around the world. + +The giant Apple has long complied with law enforcement around the world and offers extensive [documentation](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-outside-us.pdf) to facilitate legal processes. However, when law enforcement requests access to data protected by end-to-end encryption, Apple does *not* have access to this data, by definition. + +The only way for Apple to provide law enforcement with access to end-to-end encrypted data would be to either lie to customers and secretly break the encryption, or remove the feature entirely. Apple chose the latter this week. + +This is horrifying news for anyone located in the UK losing access to this great protection. Moreover, it sets a dangerous precedent for other controlling governments to follow suit. + +It's difficult to fully judge the situation while the notice process is shrouded in secrecy, but Apple could have certainly put more pressure against it. If there is a big tech company who can afford to fight back in defense of privacy rights it's certainly Apple. Especially with all the privacy promises Apple gave to its users. + +At the risk of quoting Bruce Schneier's excellent [essay](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2025/02/an-icloud-backdoor-would-make-our-phones-less-safe.html) twice in this article: **"The companies need to resist, and—more importantly—we need to demand they do."** + +Each time a large organization like Apple gives in to oppressive requests, it increases the chance of these requests multiplying. + +## Which Apple applications are affected? + +At the moment, it's not possible for anyone located in the UK to activate Apple's opt-in Advanced Data Protection (ADP) feature anymore. + +For UK users who have already activated ADP [instructions](https://www.macrumors.com/2025/02/26/advanced-data-protection-uk-need-to-know/) should follow soon, but it's probably a good time to look for alternative options (see [below](#what-to-do-if-you-are-living-in-the-uk)). + +With ADP enabled, Apple users can benefit from end-to-end encryption on many more Apple applications. These applications include: iCloud Backup (including device and message backups), iCloud Drive, Photos, Notes, Reminders, Safari Bookmarks, Siri Shortcuts, Voice Memos, Wallet Passes, Freeform, and potentially some [third-party app data](https://support.apple.com/102651). If you cannot use ADP anymore, you will lose end-to-end encryption protections for these applications. + +Some Apple services that aren't part of ADP will remain end-to-end encrypted in the UK (for now). Regardless, considering the political climate, it's likely a good idea to start [moving to alternatives](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) that are perhaps less likely to get compromised or removed in the near future. + +Apple's applications that [still benefit](https://support.apple.com/102651) from end-to-end encryption to this day in the UK include: Passwords and Keychain, Health data, Journal data, Home data, iMessage (only if iCloud Backup is *disabled*!), Payment information, Apple Card transactions, Maps, QuickType Keyboard, Safari, Screen Time, Siri information, Wi-Fi passwords, Memoji. + +## What does this mean for people in the UK, and the rest of the world? + +For people in the UK, this is of course bad news and a very disappointing development. If this regional ADP block is maintained, it is a huge drawback for any Apple user's privacy rights, and a loss of data security as well. + +For people outside the UK, **this is a loud warning alarm**. The UK government isn't the only one that has repeatedly tried to undermine encryption and privacy rights. While this might sound obvious for some authoritarian regimes, it's sadly also true for other governments considered open and democratic. + +This push for mass surveillance seems to have gained even more force in the past few years, as end-to-end encryption features make their way more frequently into the market. + +For anyone who cares about human rights, privacy rights, and democracy worldwide, **it is essential to push back hard against these legal proposal to undermine encryption**. + +Likewise, it's not too late for UK residents to also push back and make themselves heard by their government by loudly opposing new (and old) legislation undermining encryption. + +**Systemic surveillance should never be normalized.** Human rights can be lost, but they can also be won back with [strong opposition](https://www.openrightsgroup.org/press-releases/org-response-to-apple-killing-its-data-protection-tools-for-uk-users-encryption/). + +## What to do about it? + +But what about concrete actions? What can a concerned netizen of the world do right now? + +Here are a few things that might help you protect your data better from now on, and find alternatives to the end-to-end encryption features you might have lost: + +### What to do if you are living in the UK + +- [x] Support and follow the Open Rights Group's [campaign to save encryption](https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaign/save-encryption/). + +- [x] Support [the petition](https://you.38degrees.org.uk/petitions/keep-our-apple-data-encrypted) organized by [Open Rights Group](https://www.openrightsgroup.org/) to tell your representatives you care about Apple's end-to-end encryption. + +- [x] Replace iCloud Drive with an [end-to-end encrypted cloud service](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cloud/). + +- [x] Backup your Apple device(s) *locally only* and [encrypt your backups](https://support.apple.com/108353). + +- [x] Stop syncing your photos with iCloud. Either use a recommended end-to-end encrypted [cloud service](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cloud/) to sync it, or only keep your photos locally. + +- [x] Replace Apple Notes with another [end-to-end encryption note application](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/notebooks/). + +- [x] Replace Safari with a [privacy-respecting browser](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop-browsers/). + +- [x] If you can, [disable Siri entirely](https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/how-to-turn-off-siri/). + +- [x] Go through all your Apple devices' settings, and be mindful to disable each option that could send data to Apple's servers if you do not want this data to potentially be scanned by a government or other entities. + +- [x] Look for more privacy-respectful alternatives to Apple's products by browsing our [recommendations](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) section. + +- [x] Continue to fight for privacy rights and encryption rights every chance you get! The battle isn't over. + +### What to do if you are living in or outside the UK + +Get information from and support organizations defending encryption rights like: + +- [Global Encryption Coalition](https://www.globalencryption.org/about/) (you can even [join the coalition](https://www.globalencryption.org/about/members/)!) + +- [Amnesty Tech](https://www.amnesty.org/en/tech/) + +- [Center for Democracy & Technology](https://cdt.org/insights/cdt-joins-global-encryption-coalition-letter-on-uk-governments-use-of-investigatory-powers-act-to-attack-end-to-end-encryption/) + +- [EFF](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/12/defending-encryption-us-and-abroad) + +- [Fight for the Future](https://www.makedmssafe.com/) + +- [Privacy Guides](https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacyguides) 💛 + +Use end-to-end encryption everywhere you can: + +- [x] If you are an Apple user outside the UK, [activate Advanced Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/108756) on your devices. + +- [x] Regardless of where you are and which device you use, **use end-to-end encryption features everywhere you can.** + +- [x] If you cannot find a cloud service you trust, you can [locally encrypt your data](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/encryption/) before uploading it to a cloud service of your choice. + +- [x] Look for other privacy-respectful alternatives browsing our [recommendations](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/). + +- [x] Fight for privacy rights and encryption rights every chance you get! diff --git a/blog/posts/virtual-insanity.md b/blog/posts/virtual-insanity.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1b702249 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/virtual-insanity.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2021-11-01T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Opinion +authors: + - freddy +links: + - posts/move-fast-and-break-things.md + - posts/why-i-run-a-tor-relay.md +tags: + - Facebook +license: BY-SA +description: On Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook, and the Metaverse. +schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle +--- +# Virtual Insanity + +Not so long ago, the world was predicting the end for Facebook. Now it is no more. Gone from the face of the planet – never to be seen again. Except it isn’t. + +Facebook has not disappeared. No, not even the damning ‘Facebook Papers’ can shut it down. Mark Zuckerberg stood up on stage, and announced that it had changed its name to: Meta. + +A key part of this new vision for the company is the idea of the metaverse. If it sounds like something out of a sci-fi movie or novel, that’s because it is. The term was first coined by author Neal Stephenson in his 1992 book *Snow Crash*. Zuckerberg’s only problem is that novel was dystopian. Here’s a brief snippet of Stephenson’s description of the metaverse: + +> “Your avatar can look any way you want it to, up to the limitations of your equipment. If you’re ugly, you can make your avatar beautiful. If you’ve just gotten out of bed, your avatar can still be wearing beautiful clothes and professionally applied makeup. You can look like a gorilla or a dragon or a giant talking penis in the Metaverse. Spend five minutes walking down the Street and you will see all of these.” + +In fairness, that doesn’t seem unlike the sort of content you see on Facebook today. Compare this to what Zuckerberg [wrote](https://about.fb.com/news/2021/10/founders-letter/) in his 2021 Founders Letter: + +> “In this future, you will be able to teleport instantly as a hologram to be at the office without a commute, at a concert with friends, or in your parents’ living room to catch up. This will open up more opportunity no matter where you live. You’ll be able to spend more time on what matters to you, cut down time in traffic, and reduce your carbon footprint.” + +The similarities are uncanny. + +This wouldn’t be the first time that Facebook has been described as dystopian. One *Mashable* article [called](https://mashable.com/article/facebook-dystopia) the social media giant ‘Orwellian and Huxleyan at the same time.’ Quite a feat. + +The ‘Facebook Papers’ have some pretty shocking - though not entirely surprising - revelations as well. The leaked documents demonstrate the extent to which Facebook values engagement above all else (including a good experience). For instance, we learned that the algorithm is [optimized](https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-transparency-biggest-sites-pages-links/) for low quality content, [prioritizes](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/26/facebook-angry-emoji-algorithm/) rage over happiness for profit, and [promotes](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/10/facebook-papers-democracy-election-zuckerberg/620478/) extremist content. Most alarming was that the firm [failed](https://apnews.com/article/the-facebook-papers-covid-vaccine-misinformation-c8bbc569be7cc2ca583dadb4236a0613) to reduce disinformation during the pandemic even when given the opportunity. Zuckerberg said no to this, presumably because it would reduce engagement and, in turn, Facebook’s advertising revenue. + +Let’s not forget all Facebook’s previous scandals. From the Cambridge Analytica kerfuffle to [conducting](https://www.theregister.com/2014/06/29/researchers_mess_with_facebook_users_emotions/) manipulative social experiments in secret. + +In light of this, the name change makes sense. It deceives you into thinking the company has evolved into a benevolent corporation, when it simply hasn’t. Zuckerberg would much prefer you to think about Meta as a playful universe where you can meet with friends across the globe in virtual reality. Where humans train themselves to sound like heavily discounted robots. Where Facebook is not a Horrid Company. + +Despite all this: Meta *is* Facebook, just worse. It doesn’t matter about the new name, the company has not changed. It will still be violating our privacy, daily, on an unprecedented scale. It will still be as reliably scandalous as a Carry On film. It will still be terrible. Plus it will have all the added claptrap of a sub-par holographic universe attached. diff --git a/blog/posts/warning-about-signal-proxies.md b/blog/posts/warning-about-signal-proxies.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1a50fd55 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/warning-about-signal-proxies.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2022-10-15T19:00:00Z +categories: + - News +authors: + - jonah +tags: + - PSA + - Signal + - Instant Messengers +links: + - Signal Configuration Guide: https://www.privacyguides.org/real-time-communication/signal-configuration-hardening/ + - Real-Time Communication: https://www.privacyguides.org/real-time-communication/ +license: BY-SA +description: You should be aware of a number of issues with Signal’s current proxy implementation. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- +# A Warning About Signal Proxies in Iran and Other Oppressive Countries + +People looking to use [Signal Proxies](https://www.signal.org/blog/run-a-proxy/) to bypass censorship programs should be aware of a number of issues with Signal’s current proxy implementation. Currently, Signal does not tunnel all application traffic through the specified proxy, which means authorities could still track people using Signal. + +[This has been an issue since TLS proxies were added and has not yet been fixed](https://community.signalusers.org/t/traffic-not-routed-to-tls-proxies-can-expose-users-to-censors/27479): + +> The latest version of the Android app (v5.3.12 at this time) fails to route all the traffic to the TLS proxy. There are DNS leaks in the app, and it’s trivial for the censors to learn what IP addresses are connecting to Signal. [...] +> +> When the app connects to the Signal server, it first looks up the IP of the Signal servers via DNS, and immediately after, it resolves the IP of the TLS proxy, also with DNS. This is an unexpected behavior that allows the censors to discover proxies by only monitoring the DNS traffic. [...] + +There are also a number of other problems with their TLS proxies (such as [outdated dependencies](https://privsec.dev/apps/update-your-signal-tls-proxy/)) which have not been resolved. + +Currently, we believe Signal’s TLS Proxies are an incomplete solution to the problems they try to solve. Instead, we recommend using Orbot in conjunction with Molly, an alternative Signal client which natively supports SOCKS proxies, to fully tunnel your Signal traffic over the Tor network. For more information please check out our [Signal configuration guide](https://www.privacyguides.org/real-time-communication/signal-configuration-hardening/). diff --git a/blog/posts/welcome-to-privacy-guides.md b/blog/posts/welcome-to-privacy-guides.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..27734ecf --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/welcome-to-privacy-guides.md @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2021-09-14T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +authors: + - jonah + - dngray + - freddy +links: + - 'About Privacy Guides': "https://www.privacyguides.org/about/" + - posts/weve-joined-the-open-collective-foundation.md +tags: + - Privacy Guides +license: CC0 +description: Today, Privacy Guides has officially launched by our long-standing volunteer team to carry on the legacy of the now-defunct PrivacyTools project. +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- +# Welcome to Privacy Guides + +![Privacy Guides cover image](../assets/brand/images/png/cover.png) + + + +We are excited to announce the launch of [Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org/) and [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/), and welcome the privacy community to participate in our crowdsourced software recommendations and share tips and tricks for keeping your data safe online. Our goal is to be a central resource for privacy and security-related tips that are usable by anybody, and to carry on the trusted legacy of PrivacyTools. + +As we [announced](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/) on the PrivacyTools blog in July, we made the decision to migrate off our former privacytools.io domain for various reasons, including an inability to contact the current domain holder for over a year and [growing](http://www.thedarksideof.io/) [issues](https://fortune.com/2020/08/31/crypto-fraud-io-domain-chagos-islands-uk-colonialism-cryptocurrency/) [with the .IO top-level domain](https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacytools.io/issues/1324). As attempts to regain ownership of the domain have proven fruitless, we found it necessary to make this switch sooner rather than later to ensure people would find out about this transition as soon as possible. This gives us adequate time to transition the domain name, which is currently redirecting to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org/), and it hopefully gives everyone enough time to notice the change, update bookmarks and websites, etc. + +We chose the name Privacy Guides because it represents two things for us as an organization: An expansion beyond simple recommendation lists, and a goal of acting as the trusted guides to anyone newly learning about protecting their personal data. + +As a name, it moves us past recommendations of various tools and focuses us more on the bigger picture. We want to provide more *education* — rather than *direction* — surrounding privacy-related topics. You can see the very beginnings of this work in our new page on [threat modeling](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/threat-modeling/), or our [VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/vpn) and [Email Provider](https://www.privacyguides.org/email) recommendations, but this is just the start of what we eventually hope to accomplish. + +## Website Development + +Our project has always been community-oriented and open-sourced. The source code for PrivacyTools is currently archived at [https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacytools.io](https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacytools.io). This repository will remain online as an archive of everything on PrivacyTools up to this transition. + +The source code for our new website is available at [https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org). All updates from PrivacyTools have been merged into this new repository, and this is where all future work will take place. + +## Services + +PrivacyTools also runs a number of online services in use by many users. Some of these services are federated, namely Mastodon, Matrix, and PeerTube. Due to the technical nature of federation, it is impossible for us to change the domain name on these services, and because we cannot guarantee the future of the privacytools.io domain name we will be shutting down these services in the coming months. + +We strongly urge users of these services to migrate to alternative providers in the near future. We hope that we will be able to provide enough time to make this as seamless of a transition as possible for our users. + +At this time we do not plan on launching public Matrix, Mastodon, or PeerTube instances under the Privacy Guides domain. Any users affected by this transition can get in touch with [@jonah:aragon.sh](https://matrix.to/#/@jonah:aragon.sh) on Matrix if any assistance is needed. + +Other services being operated by PrivacyTools currently will be discontinued. This includes Searx, WriteFreely, and GhostBin. + +Our future direction for online services is uncertain, but will be a longer-term discussion within our community after our work is complete on this initial transition. We are very aware that whatever direction we move from here will have to be done in a way that is sustainable in the very long term. + +## r/PrivacyGuides + +PrivacyTools has a sizable community on Reddit, but to ensure a unified image we have created a new Subreddit at [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/) that we encourage all Reddit users to join. + +In the coming weeks our current plan is to wind down discussions on r/privacytoolsIO. We will be opening r/PrivacyGuides to lots of the discussions most people are used to shortly, but encouraging general “privacy news” or headline-type posts to be posted on [r/Privacy](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacy/) instead. In our eyes, r/Privacy is the “who/what/when/where” of the privacy community on Reddit, the best place to find the latest news and information; while r/PrivacyGuides is the “how”: a place to share and discuss tools, tips, tricks, and other advice. We think focusing on these strong points will serve to strengthen both communities, and we hope the good moderators of r/Privacy agree. + +## Final Thoughts + +The former active team at PrivacyTools universally agrees on this direction towards Privacy Guides, and will be working exclusively on Privacy Guides rather than any “PrivacyTools” related projects. We intend to redirect PriavcyTools to new Privacy Guides properties for as long as possible, and archive existing PrivacyTools work as a pre-transition snapshot. + +Privacy Guides additionally welcomes back PrivacyTools’ former sysadmin [Jonah](https://twitter.com/JonahAragon), who will be joining the project’s leadership team. + +We are not accepting sponsorships or donations at this time, while we work out our financial plan. We will be in touch with existing sponsors on PrivacyTools’ OpenCollective to determine what the best way forward is soon. + +We are all very excited about this new brand and direction, and hope to have your continued support through all of this. If you have any questions, concerns, or suggestions, please reach out to us. We are always happy to receive guidance and input from our community! ❤ + +--- + +***Privacy Guides*** *is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.* + +- [Join r/PrivacyGuides on Reddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides) +- [Follow @privacy_guides on Twitter](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides) +- [Collaborate with us on GitHub](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org) +- [Join our chat on Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:aragon.sh) diff --git a/blog/posts/weve-joined-the-open-collective-foundation.md b/blog/posts/weve-joined-the-open-collective-foundation.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8d6153b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/weve-joined-the-open-collective-foundation.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2019-10-31T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Announcements +authors: + - jonah +links: + - posts/welcome-to-privacy-guides.md +tags: + - Privacy Guides +license: CC0 +schema_type: NewsArticle +--- +# We've Joined the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)(3) + +![Privacy Guides cover image](../assets/brand/images/png/cover.png) + + + +[Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org) provides knowledge, recommendations, and services to protect you against global mass surveillance programs and encourage self-control of your data online. Our website is free of advertisements and is not affiliated with any listed providers, because we believe that our ability to recommend solutions without receiving financial kickbacks is incredibly important in remaining unbiased. + +However, we have always accepted and solicited financial contributions from our community. Running this network of websites and services for free to the public is a time-consuming and costly endeavor. We do it because we believe it is the right thing to do, not because we are looking to make a profit. Any contributions have been either used to pay our expenses or saved in a reserve for expansion or times of need. + +Today we are building on our transparency efforts by joining OpenCollective, a platform which will allow us to accept contributions and create expenses completely transparently. We are being sponsored by a fiscal host, the Open Collective Foundation, a nonprofit organization whose mission is to promote access to educational resources like ours. + +The Open Collective Foundation is a 501(c)(3) organization that is collecting these contributions on our behalf. Because of this, contributions to Privacy Guides through OpenCollective are **tax-deductible** for US taxpayers. + +Your support of this project will help us keep our servers running and pay for other various expenses accrued by the team while developing this community platform. We do not operate Privacy Guides for personal profit, and all funds will be used to further our mission in one form or another. + +Please consider contributing at [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides) if you like what we do. diff --git a/blog/posts/where-are-all-the-mprs.md b/blog/posts/where-are-all-the-mprs.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..db2a2b33 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/where-are-all-the-mprs.md @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2024-11-17T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Opinion +authors: + - fria +tags: + - MPR + - VPN +license: BY-SA +--- +# Where are all the Multi-Party Relays? + +Multi-Party Relays (MPRs) are a technology that aims to provide better privacy protections than VPNs do. MPRs showed a lot of promise when they first emerged, but years later there are fewer options than ever. What happened? + +## Traditional VPNs + +The original purpose of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) was to access a network privately when you're not physically there, with encryption in between, so you can securely access your files or manage your network from wherever you are. It extends the security you'd expect from being physically at your LAN to anywhere you are. + +[Commercial VPNs](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/vpn-overview) like Proton VPN use this technology to allow you to connect to *their* network, and then connect to your destination. This keeps sites and services you connect to from knowing your real IP address and using it as a metric to track you. But there's a problem here: you now need to fully trust your VPN provider in the same way you need to trust your ISP with all your internet traffic. This "shifting trust" problem has haunted VPNs for as long as they've been marketed as a privacy product. It's clear that a better solution is needed. + +## The Alternative: Tor + +Mix networks like [Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview) have solved this problem by decoupling the sender from the destination. No relay along the path has all the information: the entry (or *guard*) relay knows who you are but not where you're going, the middle relay knows the other two relays, and the exit relay knows the destination but not the sender. There's also separate encryption between each relay. + +
+ ![Tor path showing your device connecting to an entry node, middle node, and exit node before reaching the destination website](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg#only-light) + ![Tor path showing your device connecting to an entry node, middle node, and exit node before reaching the destination website](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg#only-dark) +
Tor circuit pathway
+
+ +Tor provides great privacy properties, but the relays are run by volunteers, so they can be extremely slow and unreliable. Anyone who's tried to download a file while connected to Tor knows how painful it can be. Even normal browsing can be slow, with potentially minutes collectively wasted on loading times in any given browsing session. Tor is hands down the most private way to [browse the web](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tor), and if your threat model calls for it there is no substitute. But for VPN users who want better privacy, an obvious next step is a paid solution where you have access to fast and reliable servers like on a VPN, and *also* separation between who you are and what you're connecting to. + +## A Solution: Multi-Party Relays + +Enter Multi-Party Relays. Services like iCloud Private Relay and (the unfortunately discontinued) INVISV Multi-Party Relay take inspiration from mix networks like Tor and separate the sender from the destination using two relays operated by different parties, as the name implies. There's separate encryption between each relay as well. MPRs *do* require you to trust that the two parties don't collaborate to correlate your traffic, so keep that in mind. + +Typically, the first relay is controlled by the provider (either Apple or INVISV in the previous examples), and the second relay is controlled by another company such as Fastly or Cloudflare. These are big names, so you won't need to worry about reliability. + +
+ ![A diagram showing how your IP address is known to your ISP and Apple, and the server you're accessing is known to Cloudflare and the destination, in the case of iCloud Private Relay](../assets/images/where-are-all-the-mprs/icloud-private-relay.png) +
source: blog.cloudflare.com
+
+ +They also provide *speed*. Private Relay uses the QUIC protocol and as a result it's lightning fast. You wouldn't even know you were connecting to two servers in between your cat videos. The reliability is so good that I forget I even have it on. It even integrates with Safari and gives you a different IP address for different websites, similar to Tor's stream isolation. + +So why haven't MPRs taken off? INVISV's Pretty Good Phone Privacy service never seemed to make it out of [beta](https://invisv.com/pgpp/#pgpp-release-notes). INVISV [partnered](https://invisv.com/articles/vivaldi-privacy-guard) with Vivaldi, but I can't seem to find any mention of it in the Vivaldi settings or on their website outside the original [announcement](https://vivaldi.com/blog/desktop/privacy-guard-your-privacy-matters-vivaldi-browser-snapshot-3319-12/). INVISV ultimately [shut down](https://invisv.com/articles/service_shutdown.html) their service back in June. I hope to see more from them in the future because they were providing something that currently isn't possible to get anymore on Android. + +That leaves [iCloud Private Relay](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102602) as the only commercial offering that I'm aware of, but it's limited to Apple devices only. Great for Apple users, but everyone else is left high and dry. As is Apple's way, they didn't want any extra inconvenience from using their service, so they restrict you to your real country and timezone. You don't have the same freedom to choose a server wherever in the world you want like a [traditional VPN service](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn) would allow. + +There is one more honorary mention: [OHTTP](https://blog.cloudflare.com/stronger-than-a-promise-proving-oblivious-http-privacy-properties). It's a new protocol with a design based on the same principles as those of MPRs: two servers, a relay and a gateway, that decouple the sender from the destination. It's already seeing use by large companies to maintain user privacy for things like Google's Safe Browsing and Apple's new Safari Highlights feature. Unfortunately, it's not quite comparable to MPRs. According to Cloudflare: + +> OHTTP is not a general purpose proxy protocol: it's fit for purpose, aimed at transactional interactions between clients and servers (such as app-level APIs). + +So it can't cover all the traffic on your device. Still, it's a promising protocol and I hope it becomes more widespread. + +It really is a shame to see such a promising technology go so underutilized. Perhaps VPN companies could make their own MPR product and fill the gap in the market. Only time will tell. diff --git a/blog/posts/why-i-run-a-tor-relay.md b/blog/posts/why-i-run-a-tor-relay.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5b6a42e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/why-i-run-a-tor-relay.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2020-05-04T19:00:00Z +categories: + - Opinion +authors: + - sam-howell +links: + - 'Tor Network
Relays and Bridges': https://www.privacyguides.org/tor/#relays-and-bridges +tags: + - Tor + - Self-Hosting +license: BY-SA +description: Each Tor relay is the direct result of an individual deciding to sacrifice money, time and effort for the cause of fighting for a freer Internet. +schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle +--- +# Why I Decided to Run a Tor Relay + +![Tor graphic](../assets/images/why-i-run-a-tor-relay/cover.png) + + + +It makes me smile when I come across someone struggling with the decision of whether to get a [VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/vpn/). It makes me smile not because of the indecision and relative lack of knowledge, but because it wasn't so long ago I was in exactly the same position—perceiving VPNs to be some kind of extreme measure only the paranoid and the criminal resorted to. How wrong I was. + +In just a few months I've come to realize that something like a VPN is in fact a basic measure one might take in the effort to more freely roam the Internet—tainted as it is by censorship, surveillance and many other forms of state control. So where do you go from realizing these issues if you know them to be the threats that they are to democracy and freedom? You seek to *take control*. + +You discover the [Tor Project](https://www.torproject.org/)—or rather, you learn more about a network that's been around for years and for years has suffered the type of reputation which only blinds everyday people from its incredible potential for positive change in numerous oppressed countries around the world. + +At the time of writing there are over 6,300 Tor relays, and I like to think this number will continue to grow steadily. Each one—no matter its uptime, bandwidth or overall reputation, or whether it’s a Guard, Middle or Exit—each one is the direct result of an individual deciding to sacrifice money, time and effort for the cause of fighting for a freer Internet: enabling millions of users—journalists, bloggers, whistleblowers, activists and everyday people like you and I—to communicate anonymously, and therefore safely, wherever we are in the world. + +Like many others, at first I was unsure about running my own relay. The usual doubts and questions arose: surely it's too difficult; I don’t know much about servers, and it’s surely expensive and beyond my skill-set to configure one as a Tor relay. But then I watched this talk ([Invidious Link](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/watch?v=Wl5OQz0Ko8c), [YouTube Link](https://youtube.com/watch?v=Wl5OQz0Ko8c)) by the articulate, intelligent and passionate Tor Project developer Jacob Appelbaum (if you do nothing else today, watch it). + +Jacob couldn’t have made a better case for direct action, requesting of the audience: + +> Raise your hand if you think anonymity is something that is good, and you think is a fundamental human right that we should all have... +> Now raise your hand if you want to do something about it... +> Now keep your hand up if you’re going to run a Tor relay... +> Everybody that put your hand down, why aren’t you running a Tor relay? You can do something about it right now. + +And this is when it struck me, as I hope it struck many others at that talk: Am I doing enough? Can I claim to take this subject seriously if I’m not willing to invest the effort to really *be a part* of the solution? Not simply to donate money—which of course is still a great way to contribute—but to truly, technologically support the Tor network. + +It struck me that I have enough money, time and access to the right information to run my own relay. So it begged the question: Why *wouldn’t* I? + +At the time of writing my relay has been flagged ‘valid’, ‘running’ and ‘fast’ and is on track to have relayed around 750 GB by the end of the month. It feels good. It feels really good. + +--- + +*Sam is an elearning designer and privacy advocate interested in free (libre) software and how it can protect civil liberties. This article was [originally published](https://web.archive.org/web/20200508115203/https://samhowell.uk/dark/blog/blog-Tor_Relay.html) on my personal blog at [samhowell.uk](https://samhowell.uk), on February 15th, 2019.* diff --git a/blog/posts/yubikey-reset-and-backup.md b/blog/posts/yubikey-reset-and-backup.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9c9833be --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/posts/yubikey-reset-and-backup.md @@ -0,0 +1,1095 @@ +--- +date: + created: 2025-03-06T22:00:00Z +categories: + - Tutorials +authors: + - em +description: This tutorial demonstrates how to reset a YubiKey close to factory defaults and create a backup of most YubiKey applications on a spare key. +schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle +--- +# How to Reset Your YubiKey and Create a Backup + +![Photo of YubiKey on a table between a MacBook and a phone.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/cover.webp) + + +If you are not familiar with it already, a YubiKey is a physical [security key](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/security-keys/) produced by [Yubico](https://www.yubico.com/) that can be used for various authentication and security purposes. One common usage is to use it as a second factor of authentication for a [service or product](https://www.yubico.com/works-with-yubikey/catalog/). This tutorial explains how to reset a YubiKey to factory defaults and create a near copy of it for backup purposes. + +The biggest security *advantage* to using a physical security key is that it's something you have that cannot be accessed remotely or easily emulated. + +The biggest security *disadvantage* of using a physical security key is the risk of losing it. This is why you should always **get two** physical security keys, to use the second one as a **backup**. + +There are many brands of physical security key, but this tutorial is specifically for YubiKey, one of the [most recommended brands](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/security-keys/). + +To follow this tutorial, you will need to have **two YubiKeys** from either the series 5, 5 FIPS, 4, or 4 FIPS. Both these keys should not be currently in use with any of your accounts, as described in [Step 1](#step-1-remove-your-keys-from-all-accounts). + +
+

Danger! Reset is irreversible!

+ +Do **not** skip Step 1 below! If one or both of your YubiKey(s) are registered with any account before starting the reset, **you must** first remove the key(s) from this account's settings. +Once a YubiKey application is reset, this operation is irreversible and previous settings will be lost permanently. **Be very careful about this!** + +
+ +## :material-shield-key: Why would you need to reset your YubiKey? + +Resetting your YubiKey *isn't* something you should be doing regularly. + +If you use your key with a lot of services, it can be a laborious and even dangerous task, for example if you forget to remove an account and get permanently locked out once your key is reset. However, there are a few situations where you might want to do this: + +### You accidentally "doxxed" yourself + +When using a security key regularly, it isn't rare to accidentally touch your YubiKey and inadvertently trigger its [Challenge-response](https://docs.yubico.com/yesdk/users-manual/application-otp/challenge-response.html) in an inappropriate field. If this happens in the *wrong field*, this information could get stored in a service provider's log files for example. + +Perhaps you also just "doxxed" yourself by unintentionally texting your key's Challenge-response to a puzzled recipient in a personal unencrypted social media Direct Message (true story). + +The privacy risk of this is low but, depending on your situation, leaking your YubiKey's One-Time Password (OTP) Challenge-response in a plain text field *could* technically create a link between accounts. This is because despite the second part of the string changing every time, the first 12 characters are static, meaning this part always remains the same. This static part is the [Public ID](https://docs.yubico.com/yesdk/users-manual/application-otp/yubico-otp.html) of your YubiKey. When resetting your YubiKey, you can change this static part. + +### Your key is compromised + +Another situation that could make you want to reset your YubiKey is if you are in a very high risk situation and a sophisticated malicious actor had physical access to your key, especially if your key's firmware is [older than 5.7](https://www.yubico.com/support/security-advisories/ysa-2024-03/). If this person or group were able to physically accessed your key with older firmware, under some rare conditions, they [*could*](https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/09/yubikeys-are-vulnerable-to-cloning-attacks-thanks-to-newly-discovered-side-channel/) have cloned it. + +If you are at risk and this happens to you, you would first need to revoke access to all the services you've used your compromised key with. + +Then, to re-register a key with your services, the safest course of action would be to get an entirely new set of keys. But if this isn't possible, a second option could be to reset your key and re-register it with new credentials. + +### You need to set up a backup + +This is the most common situation we will be focusing on. You might need to reset your YubiKeys' applications simply to create a clone of it so that you have a backup. + +Keeping a backup of your key is especially important for usages such as setting up a YubiKey as a second factor of authentication with KeePassXC, for example. + +Some services will allow you to register two or more *different* keys to authenticate your account, but other services might only allow you to register one. This is when you want to make sure your have a backup of this key. + +## :material-toolbox: Requirements and preparation + +For this tutorial you will need: + +- [x] Two YubiKeys (from series 5, 5 FIPS, 4, or 4 FIPS) +- [x] Computer running Linux, macOS, or Windows +- [x] Internet connection +- [x] Ability to install software on this computer + +
+

It is recommended to follow this tutorial from a desktop computer.

+ +### Step 1: Remove your keys from all accounts + +First, make sure you are *not* using these two YubiKeys with any account, service, or product. **The importance of this cannot be stressed enough.** You do not want to realize next month you are *permanently locked out* of an account because you reset your key and forgot it was set up with that account. + +If you are using these keys with any account, remove the keys from the setting of each account and test multiple times that you are able to log in without it. Ideally, start with fresh keys. + +
+

YubiKey's applications can be reset independently

+ +Depending on your situation, you might want to reset one of your YubiKeys' application and not all. + +Except for the YubiKey Bio Series Multi-protocol Edition (which we don't cover in this tutorial), each YubiKey application can be reset independently without affecting the others. You could for example reset your OTP slots without affecting your FIDO2 settings, and vice versa. For this tutorial, we will reset every application. Skip the ones you do not need to reset. + +
+ +### Step 2: Download and install the Yubico Authenticator + +Go to this Yubico website [page](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/#h-download-yubico-authenticator), click on the link for your specific Operating System, then download and [install](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/installation.html) the **Yubico Authenticator** application on your computer. + +![Screenshot of a browser showing the page to download the Yubico Authenticator.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-1-download.webp) + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a YubiKey icon with "Insert your YubiKey".](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-2-yubicoapp.webp) + +### Step 3: Open the Yubico Authenticator and plug in your keys + +Open the **Yubico Authenticator** application. If you can, insert both your YubiKeys in your computer's ports. If you can't insert both keys at once, insert your main YubiKey first, then for each step unplug your main key once you are done, plug in your spare key, and repeat each step. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Home menu and 2 YubiKeys plugged in. The application window showing the main YubiKey is colored green.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-3-keysplugged.webp) + +From the "Home" section, you can see your keys' serial number, firmware version, as well as which applications are installed on your key. You can also set labels for each key and change the interface's color to make it easier to see which key you are configuring. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Home menu with a spare YubiKey. The application window is colored teal.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-4-keyspluggedspare.webp) + +
+

If you don't see the menu options

+ +If you do not see the menu on the left (Home, Accounts, Passkeys, Certificates, Slots), make the **Yubico Authenticator** window wider or click on the 3-bar button on the upper-left. If you do not see the menu on the right (Device, Application), click on the 3-dot button on the upper-right. + +
+ +## :material-key-alert: Resetting your YubiKey to factory defaults + +
+

Disabling applications

+ +From the "Device" menu, you can click on "Toggle applications" to enable or disable applications independently. Note that disabling a YubiKey application doesn't reset it, all credentials and settings will be [preserved](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/settings.html#toggle-yubikey-applications-on-off). + +
+ +### Step 4: Delete your YubiKey's One-Time Password (OTP) application + +This step will not reset your YubiKey's OTP application to exact factory defaults, but it will emulate a factory reset very closely once you have added new credentials in the following sections. + +#### 4.1. From the Yubico Authenticator + +Click on the "Slots" button in the left-side menu. You will see 2 slots listed there labeled as "Short touch" and "Long touch" slots. If these slots are configured already, under the label you will see "Slot is configured". Click on each configured slot. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Slots section.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-5-slots.webp) + +#### 4.2. Delete credential + +This will open a new menu on the right. Click on "Delete credential" (if you cannot see this option, it could be because your program window isn't big enough, scroll down to see more options). + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Slots section with the Short touch slot selected.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-6-deletecredential.webp) + +A "Delete credential" message will pop up with a warning, click "Delete" on the lower-right. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Delete credential popup.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-7-deletepopup.webp) + +Verify that you see both slots labeled with "Slot is empty" in the Slots section. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Slots section with the two slots labeled empty.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-8-slotsempty.webp) + +### Step 5: Reset your YubiKey's FIDO2, OATH, and PIV applications + +
+

Compatibility:

+ +This step might not work fully with models older than YubiKey 5 and 5 FIPS Series + +
+ +#### 5.1. Reset OATH + +From the **Yubico Authenticator**, in the "Device" menu on the right, click on "Factory reset". On the "Factory reset" popup section, click on "OATH". You will see a checkmark appear over "OATH", then click on "Reset" on the lower-right. + +
+

Danger! This step is irreversible!

+ +**Reset cannot be reversed!** Make sure you have properly unpaired all your accounts from this key before clicking "Reset". + +
+ +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Factory reset popup with the OATH option selected.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-9-reset-oath.webp) + +#### 5.2. Reset FIDO2 + +From the "Device" menu, click on "Factory reset" again. This time click on "FIDO2". You will see a checkmark appear over "FIDO2", then click on "Reset" on the lower-right. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing Factory reset popup with the FIDO2 option selected.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-10-reset-fido2.webp) + +You will be prompted to unplug your YubiKey from your computer. Unplug it, wait for the Status message to change with "Reinsert your YubiKey" then plug it in again. + +When prompted to "Touch the button on your YubiKey now", touch the gold part of your key. + +You will see a confirmation message saying "FIDO application reset". You can now click on "Close" on the lower-right. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing Factory reset popup with a warning before reset.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-11-reset-fido2close.webp) + +#### 5.3. Reset PIV + +From the "Device" menu again, click on "Factory reset" again. This time click on "PIV". You will see a checkmark appear over "PIV", then click on "Reset" on the lower-right. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing Factory reset popup with the PIV option selected.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-12-reset-piv.webp) + +
+

Reset your spare key too!

+ +If you inserted both of your keys at once, click on your spare key on the left-side key menu. Repeat the 3 steps above for your spare key. If you inserted only one key at the time, insert your second key and repeat this process. + +
+ +### Step 6: Reset your YubiKey's OpenPGP and YubiHSM Auth applications + +
+

Compatibility for YubiHSM Auth

+ +The YubiHSM Auth application is only available for YubiKeys with firmware version 5.4 or higher. Use the **Yubico Authenticator** to determine your YubiKey's firmware version. + +
+ +To reset the OpenPGP and YubiHSM Auth applications of your YubiKey, you will need to install a Yubico CLI program called [**ykman CLI**](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/ykman/Using_the_ykman_CLI.html) and use a terminal application. + +You can install **ykman CLI** using a package manager such as **pip** or **brew**, or by downloading the package from the Yubico developer's website: + +#### 6.1. Install ykman CLI + +:material-monitor: From any OS, using the **pip** package manager: + +Open a terminal application and type: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +pip install --user yubikey-manager +``` + +
+

For Linux users

+ +Yubico makes the **ykman CLI** Python program files available on its [website](https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-manager/Releases/) and on its [GitHub repository](https://github.com/Yubico/yubikey-manager). Consult the documentation provided to ensure you have all the programs required for the installation. Certain third-party package maintainers might also offer **ykman CLI** (also called YubiKey Manager CLI) for several Linux distributions other than Ubuntu. + +
+ +:material-linux: From Linux (Ubuntu), using the Yubico developer's website: + +On [this page](https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-manager/Releases/), download the latest **`tar.gz`** file and decompress it. Run the **ykman** Python program using the command line from the directory you have installed it in. + +:material-linux: From Linux (Ubuntu), using Yubico's **yubico/stable PPA** type: + +Open a terminal application and type: + +``` console title="Terminal" +sudo apt-add-repository ppa:yubico/stable +sudo apt update +sudo apt install yubikey-manager +``` + +:material-apple: From macOS, using the [Homebrew](https://brew.sh/) package manager: + +Open a terminal application and type: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +brew install ykman +``` + +:material-apple: From macOS, using the Yubico developer's website: + +On [this page](https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-manager/Releases/), download the latest **`mac.pkg`** file, then double-click on it to complete the installation. + +:material-microsoft-windows: From Windows, using the Yubico developer's website: + +On [this page](https://developers.yubico.com/yubikey-manager/Releases/), download the latest **`win64.msi`** file, then double-click on it to complete the installation. + +#### 6.2. Navigate to the application directory + +You might need to navigate to the application's directory first: + +
+

Installation path

+ +If you have chosen a different installation path from default, you will need to navigate to this installation path instead. + +
+ +:material-apple: From macOS, in the terminal navigate to: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +cd /Applications/Yubico\ Authenticator.app/Contents/MacOS/ +``` + +:material-microsoft-windows: From Windows, in the command prompt navigate to: + +64-bit Systems: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +"C:\Program Files\Yubico\YubiKey Manager CLI\ykman.exe " +``` + +32-bit Systems: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +"C:\Program Files (x86)\Yubico\YubiKey Manager CLI\ykman.exe " +``` + +#### 6.3. Reset the applications + +To make sure you reset both keys properly in this step, **only plug one key at the time** in your computer. Complete all the operations, unplug your main key then plug in your *spare* key and repeat. + +Once your main key is plugged in, in the terminal or command prompt type this line: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +ykman openpgp reset +``` + +When prompted with this warning, type ++y++: + +``` console +"WARNING! This will delete all stored OpenPGP keys and data and restore factory settings. Proceed? [y/N]:" +``` + +You should see this confirmation message: + +``` console +"Reset complete. OpenPGP data has been cleared and default PINs are set." +``` + +
+

Security warning

+ +This operation will set default PINs for your YubiKey's OpenPGP application. + +If you need to use this application later, you will need the default PINs. After reset, you should set up a new unique PIN and Admin PIN for this application, as explained on [Step 11](#step-11-generate-and-copy-an-openpgp-key-and-subkeys-to-your-yubikeys). + +You can see more setting commands for this application in Yubico's [documentation](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/ykman/OpenPGP_Commands.html). + +
+ +From the terminal, type this line: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +ykman hsmauth reset +``` + +When prompted with this warning, type ++y++: + +``` console +"WARNING! This will delete all stored YubiHSM Auth data and restore factory setting. Proceed? [y/N]:" +``` + +You should see this confirmation message: + +``` console +"Reset complete. All YubiHSM Auth data has been cleared from the YubiKey." +``` + +![Screenshot of a terminal window showing the two commands for the OpenPGP and HSMauth resets.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-13-reset-cli.webp) + +
+

Reset your spare key too!

+ +Don't forget to unplug your *main* key, plug in your *spare* key, and repeat the process from [Step 6.3](#63-reset-the-applications) to reset your spare key as well. + +
+ +
+

The ykman CLI program

+ +You can use the **ykman CLI** program to do a lot more with your YubiKey. If you want to explore this program further, you can consult Yubico's [documentation](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/ykman/Using_the_ykman_CLI.html). + +
+ +## :material-key-change: Setting up and backing up of your YubiKeys + +Now that you have a set of two freshly reset YubiKeys, we will set up your main key while creating a backup of each application that allows it to your spare key. The goal here is to create a spare key that you can safely keep as a backup, in the unfortunate event that you were to lose your main key. + +Keep in mind that your accounts and services will be only as protected as your *least* secured key. Make sure to **protect both keys** well. + +### Step 7: Secure your keys + +Before starting to use your keys, Yubico [recommends](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/piv-certificates.html) changing the default [PIN](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/piv-certificates.html#changing-the-pin), [PUK](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/piv-certificates.html#changing-the-puk), and [Management Key](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/piv-certificates.html#changing-the-management-key) from their factory values. If you are using a YubiKey from the 5 FIPS Series with firmware 5.7 or later, changing this is required to enter the [FIPS approved mode](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/settings.html#settings-home-fips-status). + +#### 7.1. From the Yubico Authenticator + +On the left-side menu, click on the "Certificates" button. You will see a section for various certificates in the center and in the right-side "Manage" menu, buttons to "Change PIN", "Change PUK", and "Management key". + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Certificates section.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-14-config-certificates.webp) + +#### 7.2. Change the default PIN + +Click on the "Change PIN" button and a section will pop up. Enter a new PIN that is between 6 and 8 characters long, then click "Save". + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Change PIN popup.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-15-config-certificatespin.webp) + +#### 7.3. Change the default PUK + +Click on the "Change PUK" button and a section will pop up. Enter a new PUK number that is between 6 and 8 characters long, then click "Save". + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Change PUK popup.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-16-config-certificatespuk.webp) + +#### 7.4. Change the default Management key + +Click on the "Management key" button and a section will pop up. Enter or generate a "New management key" with a maximum of 64 characters. You can also change the encryption algorithm to "TDES", "AES128", "AES192", or "AES256" and add a pin protection by clicking on "Protect with PIN". Then click "Save". + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Change management key popup.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-17-config-certificateskey.webp) + +
+

Secure your spare key too! Don't forget to repeat all of these steps for your spare key!

+ +### Step 8: Create and register each key's OTP + +First, you will need to set up your keys' OTP and register them with [YubiCloud](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubicloud/). For security reasons, this setup [cannot be cloned](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016614880-Can-I-duplicate-a-YubiKey) on your spare key. For services using OTP, you will need to register both of your keys which each service or product. + +
+

Add both keys

+ +Each time you secure a new account with your YubiKey, make sure to add both keys right at the start. This will save you the complication of going back to add your spare key to your accounts later on. + +
+ +#### 8.1. From the Yubico Authenticator + +Click on the "Slots" button in the left-side menu. You will see 2 slots listed there labeled as "Short touch" and "Long touch" slots, both slots should be empty after the reset. + +Click on the first "Short touch" slot, then on the right-side menu, click on the "Yubico OTP" button in "Setup". A "Yubico OTP" section will pop up with three text fields. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Slots section with the Yubico OTP button selected on the right.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-18-config-otp.webp) + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Yubico OTP popup.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-19-config-otpfields.webp) + +#### 8.2. For the Public ID field + +The [**Public ID**](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) of your YubiKey will be the first 12 characters of your key's OTP string. This is the static part that *could* technically create a link between your accounts if you leak it somewhere inappropriate. + +You can click on the "Use serial" star button on the right to generate a [ModHex](https://docs.yubico.com/yesdk/users-manual/application-otp/modhex.html) string from your key's serial number, or you can type your own manually. + +
+

If you decide to manually type your Public ID

+ +- Remember the string must be **12-characters** long + +- You must only choose characters comprised within: **`bcdefghijklnrtuv`** + +- Because this string remains constant, to increase your privacy, favor a random string that isn't recognizable or specifically interesting. For example, resist the temptation to choose something irresistibly cool like "`vvbetterdude`" or "`vvfiercenerd`". + +
+ +#### 8.3. For the Private ID field + +The [**Private ID**](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) of your YubiKey will also be 12-characters long but will not show in your key's OTP string. This **Private ID** can be used to store a private identity that can be accessed by a remote validation server holding the AES key used to encrypt the OTP. + +You can click on the "Generate random" circle-arrow button on the right to generate a random ID, or you can type your own manually. + +
+

If you decide to manually type your Private ID

+ +- Remember the string must be **12-characters** long + +- You must only choose characters comprised within: **`abcdef0123456789`** + +- If you want to increase your privacy, again favor a random string that isn't recognizable or specifically interesting. For example, resist the overwhelming temptation to choose something unbearably cool like "`c0de1337cafe`" or "`bada55babe42`" + +
+ +#### 8.4. For the Secret key field + +The **Secret key** of your YubiKey's OTP is a 32-character long random string. Again, you can click on the "Generate random" circle-arrow button on the right to generate a random Secret key, or you can type your own manually. If you decide to use your own Secret key, characters must be comprised within the allowed **`abcdef0123456789`**. + +
+

To remove automatic carriage return

+ +Automatically once you have filled all the fields, the option "Append" will get a checkmark. This means that each time you trigger your key's OTP, a carriage return will be added so that you will not have to press ++return++ each time. If you do not wish this to happen, you can click on "Append" to disable it. + +
+ +#### 8.5. Save your OTP credentials + +On the drop-down menu next to Append at the bottom, click on "No export file" and select "Select file". This will allow you to save this information locally and create a backup. You will need this information to register your keys later in [Step 8.7](#87-register-your-keys). + +
+

Caution! Safeguard this file properly!

+ +This text file contains sensitive information in plain text. Make sure to pick a location to store it that is secure and encrypted. For example, do **not** store this file in a cloud service that isn't end-to-end encrypted. Ideally, only keep this file offline on an encrypted drive. + +
+ +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Yubico OTP popup with all text fields filled.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-20-config-otpfieldsfilled.webp) + +![Screenshot of a popup Choose File Name window to save a file.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-21-config-otpfile.webp) + +Once all the information is filled, click on "Save" at the lower-right. The file you save will have the following coma-separated format: + +``` console +[serial_number],[public_id],[private_id],,[secret_key],[date], +``` + +#### 8.6. Set up the OTP credentials for your spare key + +To set up the OTP for your spare key, go back to the "Slots" section and click on your *spare* key listed on the upper-left key menu. If you were only able to plug one key at the time, unplug your *main* key and plug in your *spare* key. Repeat Steps 8.1 to 8.5 with your spare key. Make sure to select a different file name for [Step 8.5](#85-save-your-otp-credentials) to not overwrite your main key's credential file. + +#### 8.7. Register your keys + +Now you will need to upload your keys' OTP credentials to the YubiCloud validation service. To avoid confusion, unplug one of your key and only keep one key plugged in at the time during the registration process. + +Go to Yubico's [validation page](https://upload.yubico.com/) from a secure browser. Open the credentials file you have saved on [Step 8.5](#85-save-your-otp-credentials) and copy each field in the corresponding section. + +![Screenshot of a browser window showing the Yubico OTP key upload web page.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-22-config-register.webp) + +For the "OTP from YubiKey" field, click on the text field and touch your key's gold part to generate it. Then click on "I'm not a robot", solve the annoying CAPTCHA, and click on "Upload". + +On the next page, you should see "Yubico OTP key upload" and under it the confirmation: "Success!" and "Key upload successful". + +Under you key's Public ID, you will see 3 steps validating your key. This can take some time, be patient and do not close this page. + +Once your key's OTP credentials are fully uploaded to YubiCloud's validation server, you will see a "Try it out" green button appear. Click on it. + +![Screenshot of a browser window showing the Yubico OTP key upload web page validating a key registration.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-23-config-registersuccess.webp) + +On this testing page, you can verify that your key's OTP slot works properly. Click on the "Yubico OTP" text field and touch the gold part of your key. You should see a small popup message on the lower-left confirming "OTP is valid". Try it a few times, then you can close this page. + +![Screenshot of a browser window showing the Yubico OTP testing web page.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-24-config-tryitout.webp) + +Finally, unplug your main key, plug in your *spare* key, and repeat this step using your spare key's saved credentials. It's important to **register both your main and spare keys**. + +### Step 9: Create and clone your key's Challenge-response + +
+

For use with KeePassXC

+ +This step is not necessary for all services, but is important for some services and products that will only allow you to register one key. For example, this is important if you wish to use YubiKey as a second factor to unlock your KeePassXC password database. + +
+ +#### 9.1. From the Yubico Authenticator + +If you can, insert both your main and spare keys at once, and start configuring your main key on the upper-left key menu. + +Click on the "Slots" button in the left-side menu. You will see 2 slots listed there labeled as "Short touch" and "Long touch" slots. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Slots section with the Long touch slot selected and the Challenge-response button selected on the right.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-25-config-challenge.webp) + +
+

Verify configuration

+ +If you have configured your keys' OTP in the previous step, the "Short touch" slot should now be labeled with "Slot is configured" and the "Long touch" slot should be empty. + +
+ +Click on the "Long touch" slot, and on the right-side menu click on the "Challenge-response" button in "Setup". A "Challenge-response" section will pop up with a "Secret key" text field. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Challenge-response popup.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-26-config-challengepopup.webp) + +#### 9.2. Generate a Secret key and save it + +Click on the "Generate random" circle-arrow button on the right to generate a key. Before clicking save, you must copy this **Secret key** at least temporarily somewhere safe. This is how you will be able to clone your key's [Challenge-response](https://docs.yubico.com/yesdk/users-manual/application-otp/challenge-response.html) to your spare key. + +
+

Caution! Safeguard this Secret key properly!

+ +This **Secret key** can be used to clone your YubiKey's Challenge-response on any other keys. + +If you only want to create one spare key, only copy this Secret key to a local text file and delete it fully once the configuration is completed and tested. + +If you want to keep it to create more spare keys later on, make sure to choose a location to store it that is secure and encrypted. For example, do **not** store this Secret key in a cloud service that isn't end-to-end encrypted. Do **not** store this Secret key in the same password manager you will unlock it with. Ideally, only keep this Secret key locally, offline, on an encrypted drive. + +
+ +Click on "Require touch" if you wish to have to touch your YubiKey each time your key's Challenge-response is solicited. This is recommended as it will limit your key's Challenge-response being triggered unintentionally. Then, click on "Save" on the lower-right. + +#### 9.3. Clone your key's Challenge-response to your spare key + +Back to the "Slots" section, click on your *spare* key in the upper-left key menu. The click on "Long touch" and on "Challenge-response" again. Make sure you have selected your *spare key* this time. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Slots section with the spare key selected. The Long touch is labeled empty.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-27-config-challengespare.webp) + +In the "Challenge-response" text field for your "Secret key", instead of generating a random one, paste the Secret key you have copied from your main key in the previous step. Click again on "Require touch" to enable it if you wish (optional), then click "Save". You should now see both your spare key's "Short touch" and "Long touch" labeled as configured. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Slots section with the spare key selected. The Long touch is labeled configured.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-28-config-spareconfigured.webp) + +
+

Make a note of which application is in each slot

+ +Although you can swap your YubiKey's slots, make a note of which application you have set up in which slot. If later on you need to delete an application to configure a different one, you want to make sure you delete the right one. + +
+ +### Step 10: Register and copy your key's OATH-TOTPs, Passkeys, Static passwords, and OATH-HOTPs + +
+

YubiKey only has 2 configurable slots

+ +You can only set up 2 YubiKey slot applications at the time. + +If you have already configured the 2 slots for the **Yubico OTP** and **Challenge-response** applications, and want to keep it that way, you will have no space to add a Static password or OATH-HOTP codes. + +In this case, you might want to skip the optional Steps 10.3, 10.4, and 10.5. You will still be able to add OATH-TOTP codes and Passkeys, because these applications are not stored in slots. + +
+ +#### 10.1. Register and copy OATH Time-based One-Time Password (OATH-TOTP) codes + +To copy the OATH-TOTP authentication codes to your spare key, you will need to [use the same QR code](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/tips.html#oath-accounts) your were provided when originally registering an account on your main key. + +When you [add a new account](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/oath.html#oath-add-an-account) to your YubiKey's OATH-TOTPs, keep a copy of the QR code provided by the service or product to be able to register it again with your spare key. Ideally, register both keys at once. Make sure to **secure this QR code properly**, as it could be used to register it with any other authenticator. + +
+

If you have already registered an account

+ +If you have already registered an account and have not kept the QR code for your spare key, you can deregister your main key from this account and start the process over to add an authenticator app to this account. This time, use the QR code provided to register both keys at once, or securely keep a copy of the QR code to add it later. + +
+ +Once you have registered a new OATH-TOTP code on your main key, you will not need to provide another time-based one-time password to this account when registering your spare key. You will only need to configure your spare key's OATH-TOTP code in the **Yubico Authenticator** application. + +If you successfully completed the setup for both your main and spare keys, the OATH-TOTP code generated should be the same on both keys. You will be able to see all the OATH-TOTP codes registered on your keys from the **Yubico Authenticator**. For this, click on the "Accounts" button on the left-side menu. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Accounts section.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-29-config-oathtotp.webp) + +To keep your accounts secure, delete the copy of the QR code you have kept once you have completed the registration setup for a new OATH-TOTP account on both your main and spare key (unless you need to keep a backup for other purposes). + +Additionally, always make sure to note and secure well any account recovery information provided when adding a second factor of authentication. This is important to avoid getting locked out permanently of services or products. + +#### 10.2. Register and copy Passkeys + +To copy your [**Passkeys**](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/fido2.html#fido2) to your spare key, simply repeat the same setup process that was used to register the Passkey to your main YubiKey. To see a list of all the Passkeys stored on your key, in the **Yubico Authenticator** click on the "Passkeys" button on the left-side menu. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Passkeys section.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-30-config-passkeys.webp) + +From the "Passkeys" section, you can also click on the "Set PIN" button the on right to [set up a password](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/fido2.html#creating-and-managing-the-fido2-pin) protection for your Passkeys. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Set PIN popup.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-31-config-passkeyspin.webp) + +#### 10.3. Optional: Delete YubiKey's slot(s) to install other application(s) + +If you are not using the **Yubico OTP** and/or **Challenge-response** applications installed and copied in the previous steps, you might want to delete one or both slots to install either the **Static password** or the **OATH-HOTP** application instead. YubiKeys only have 2 slots, so you cannot use them all at once. + +To delete a slot, click on the "Slots" button on the left-side menu, then select the slot you wish to delete. On the right-side menu, scroll down the "Setup" menu and click on "Delete credential". + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Slots section with the Long touch selected and the Delete credential button selected on the right.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-32-deleteslot.webp) + +You will be prompted with a warning message, then select "Delete". **Be careful however**, once deleted, there will be no way to restore the credentials you had stored there unless you have noted it elsewhere. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Delete credential popup.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-33-deleteslotpopup.webp) + +#### 10.4. Optional: Setup and copy Static passwords + +To set up the [**Static password**](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/yubico-otp.html#static-passwords) application on your key, you must first allocate a slot to it. Click on the "Slots" button on the left-side menu, select the slot you wish to use, then click on "Static password" in the right-side menu. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Slots section with the Long touch slot selected, and the Static password button selected on the right.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-34-config-static.webp) + +A section will pop up with a text field, click on the "Generate random" circle-arrow button on the right to generate a **Password**. You can click on "Append" to deselect the carriage return if you prefer it removed from the end of your Password. This means you will have to press ++return++ manually to confirm each entry. + +By default, the "Keyboard MODHEX" will be selected, but you can select a different "keyboard" if you prefer. This will change the type of characters used in your random Password. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Static password popup with a keyboard selection drop-down menu.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-35-config-statickeyboards.webp) + +Before confirming, copy this Password in a secure local text file temporarily. Then click "Save". Back to the "Slots" section, click on your *spare* key in the upper-left key menu. Then click on the same slot you have used with you main key and select again "Static password" on the right. When prompted with the text field again, paste the Password you have copied (make sure to select the same "keyboard" type). Then, click on "Save". + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing a Static Password popup with a Password field filled.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-36-config-staticspare.webp) + +
+

If you forgot to note your Static password

+ +You can trigger your **Static password** from your main key by opening a secure local text file and touch the gold part of your YubiKey. If you have configured your **Static password** in the "Short touch" slot, only touch the key for a second. If you have configured it in the "Long touch" slot, touch your key for about 3 seconds until a string is generated (make sure not to trigger a different application). You can then copy this Static password string to your spare key. + +
+ +#### 10.5. Optional: Setup and copy OATH HMAC-based One-Time Password (OATH-HOTP) codes + +To set up [**OATH-HOTP**](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/yubico-otp.html#yubico-otp-hotp) 6 or 8 digits counter-based codes on your YubiKeys, you must first allocate a slot to it. Click on the "Slots" button on the left-side menu, select the slot you wish to use, then click on "OATH-HOTP" in the right-side menu. + +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing the Slots section with the Long touch slot selected, and the OATH-HOTP button selected in the right.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-37-config-hotp.webp) + +An "OATH-HOTP" section will pop up with a "Secret key" text field. Enter a unique and secure Secret key of your choice. + +Make sure the Secret key you choose has: + +- **A maximum of 32 characters** + +- An **even** number of characters (ex: not 31, but 32 will work) + +- Only uses characters comprised within: letters from a to z, numbers from 2 to 7 + +
+

If you are asked for an Access code

+ +If you type a Secret key that is longer than 32 characters, you might encounter a bug where an "Access code" window will pop up, even if your key doesn't have any access code set up. If this happens, verify that your Secret key has 32 or fewer characters, and an even number of characters. + +
+ +![Screenshot of the Yubico Authenticator application showing an OATH-HOTP popup with a Secret key field filled.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-38-config-oathhotppopup.webp) + +Keep a **secure copy of this Secret key in a local text file**. You will need it to register with the validation server for each account, and for your spare key. + +You can click on "Append" to deselect it if you prefer the carriage return not be included at the end of your Secret key. This means you will have to press ++return++ manually to confirm each entry. Select either "6 digits" or "8 digits" for your OATH-HOTP codes, then click "Save". + +To configure your spare key for the [OATH-HOTP](https://www.yubico.com/resources/glossary/oath-hotp/) counter-based codes, you will need to repeat this step with your *spare* key and use the [same](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/tips.html#register-a-spare-yubikey) OATH-HOTP Secret key and OTP length as your main key's configuration. + +### Step 11: Generate and copy an OpenPGP key and subkeys to your YubiKeys + +
+

Default PINs

+ +If you have reset the **OpenPGP application** on [Step 6.3](#63-reset-the-applications), you will need both default PINs to set up new ones. After a factory reset of the OpenPGP application, the default PIN is "123456", and the default Admin PIN is "12345678". + +
+ +#### 11.1. Secure your YubiKeys' OpenPGP application with a new PIN and Admin PIN + +To secure this application after a reset, you should first set up new unique PINs for it. To do so, you will need to use the **ykman CLI** program you have installed on [Step 6.1](#61-install-ykman-cli) from a terminal application. + +First, navigate to the application directory as described on [Step 6.2](#62-navigate-to-the-application-directory). + +To change the first **default PIN**, type the following command in the terminal: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +ykman openpgp access change-pin +``` + +When prompted, enter the default PIN: **123456**. + +Then, enter a **new unique 6-127 digits PIN**, and confirm this new PIN. + +Your terminal should confirm with the message "User PIN has been changed." Note this new PIN somewhere secure where you will find it back easily, you will need it for the next steps. + +To change the **default Admin PIN**, type the following command in the terminal: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +ykman openpgp access change-admin-pin +``` + +When prompted, enter the default PIN: **12345678**. + +Then, enter a **new unique 8-127 digits PIN**, and confirm this new Admin PIN. + +Your terminal should confirm with the message "Admin PIN has been changed." Note this new Admin PIN somewhere secure where you will find it back easily, you will need it for the next steps. + +![Screenshot of a terminal window showing the commands to change the OpenPGP PIN and Admin PIN.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-39-config-pgppins.webp) + +
+

Secure your spare key as well!

+ +Unplug your *main* YubiKey and plug in your *spare* YubiKey. Repeat these steps to secure your spare key as well. + +
+ +#### 11.2. Open or install the appropriate GPG application for your OS + +Use the pre-installed software (Linux), or download and install a third-party software such as [GPG Suite](https://gpgtools.org/gpgsuite.html) (macOS) or [GPG4Win](https://www.gpg4win.org/download.html) (Windows) to generate and manage an OpenPGP key. + +
+

Security recommendation

+ +Yubico strongly [recommends](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) to generate OpenPGP keys on an offline system, such as a live Linux distribution. + +
+ +#### 11.3. Generate an OpenPGP key externally + +Open a terminal application and type the following command: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +gpg --expert --full-gen-key +``` + +When prompted to select the type of key you wish to generate, enter `1` for "RSA and RSA (default)". + +When asked "What keysize do you want?", type `4096`. Type `4096` as well for the subkey. + +![Screenshot of a terminal window showing an OpenPGP key generation.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-40-config-pgpgeneratekey.webp) + +Follow the instructions to choose an expiration date for your OpenPGP key, and confirm with ++y++. + +When prompted with "GnuPG needs to construct a user ID to identify your key", enter the **name** and **email address** you wish to use with this key. Finally, enter a **comment** you want associated with this key (optional), and confirm with `O` for Okay. + +Once confirmed, a dialogue box should pop up from your **GPG software**. Create a **passphrase** to protect your OpenPGP key. + +![Screenshot of a GPG software application asking to set up a passphrase.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-41-config-pgppassphrase.webp) + +Go back to your terminal application, and type this command to find your OpenPGP key's ID: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +gpg --list-keys --keyid-format=long +``` + +If you have multiple keys already stored on your computer, this command will list all of your keys. + +Only look at the last "key block" listed, and note its **key ID**. Each "key block" starts with a **`pub`** line, followed by a **`uid`** line(s), with potentially one or more **sub** lines (for subkeys). + +Your OpenPGP **key ID** will be a string of numbers and uppercase letters on the **`pub`** line, after the "rsa4096" key type, and separated by a **/** character as follows: + +``` console +pub rsa4096/[key_id] +``` + +Note this **[key_id]** for the next steps. + +#### 11.4. Add subkeys + +You do not need to have any of your YubiKeys plugged in yet for this step. + +
+

You might not need to add each subkey type

+ +For this step, we will add one subkey for each of the 3 YubiKey OpenPGP application slots: **Signature key**, **Encryption key**, and **Authentication key**. + +Depending on your usage, you might only need a specific type and not the others. Pick and choose what you need and ignore instructions for the others, if they're not relevant to you. + +
+ +In a terminal application, type: + +``` console +gpg --expert --edit-key [key_id] +``` + +This will start a **`gpg`** program prompt in your terminal. From there, type: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +addkey +``` + +![Screenshot of a terminal window showing the command to edit and add subkeys.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-42-config-pgpaddkeys.webp) + +When prompted with "Please select what kind of key you want" type `8`. + +You will be asked to toggle on or off some subkey options. Here, we will generate all 3 subkeys at once, but adjust this step to your required usage. You might also need different encryption algorithms for different subkeys (see options available from the previous **`gpg`** program question). + +
+

To generate subkeys separately

+ +To add a **Signature subkey**: Toggle `E` to *disable* encrypt. + +To add an **Encryption subkey**: Toggle `S` to *disable* sign. + +To add an **Authentication subkey**: Toggle `S`, then toggle `E`, then toggle `A` to keep only Authenticate *enable*. + +
+ +To generate all 3 subkeys, type ++a++ to *enable* Authenticate as well (Sign and Encrypt will already be enabled). On the line above the options, you should now see "Current allowed actions: Sign Encrypt Authenticate". + +The type ++q++ to confirm your selection (Finished). + +![Screenshot of a terminal window showing the option for subkey types.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-43-config-pgp3subkeys.webp) + +You will then be asked to choose a keysize, type `4096`. + +Select an **expiration date** again (it should be the **same as the main OpenPGP key**). Confirm with ++y++ then ++y++ again. + +When prompted by your GPG software, enter your OpenPGP key's passphrase, then click "OK". + +Once the **`gpg`** prompt is back in your terminal, exit the program by typing `quit`, then save the changes with ++y++. + +
+

For more options on subkeys

+ +You might want to consult Yubico's [documentation](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) for more information on OpenPGP keys and subkeys. + +
+ +#### 11.5. Backup your OpenPGP Private Key and subkeys + +
+

Security warning

+ +Be careful to store your PGP Private Key securely. This information is very sensitive and should never be shared or stored on an unencrypted volume. For better security, store it externally offline on a fully encrypted USB stick. + +
+ +If it is reasonably secure to store your private key and subkeys locally on your current device, type the following lines in your terminal (replace `[key_id]` with your specific key's ID). + +
+

Change de default path

+ +Unless you change the path, this command will create a backup of your private key located in the directory you currently are in your terminal. + +If you wish to store your private key backup elsewhere, navigate to another directory or add a specific path before the `backup_private_key.asc`. For example: `/Volumes/[secure_volume]/[secure_directory]/backup_private_key.asc` + +
+ +``` console +gpg --armor --output backup_private_key.asc --export-secret-key [key_id] +``` + +You will be prompted by your GPG software to enter your OpenPGP key's passphrase, enter it then click "OK". + +To also keep a copy of your subkeys, type the following line: + +``` console +gpg --armor --output backup_private_subkeys.asc --export-secret-subkeys [key_id] +``` + +You will be prompted by your GPG software again to enter your OpenPGP key's passphrase, enter it then click "OK". + +#### 11.6. Move your OpenPGP key and subkeys to your YubiKeys + +**Insert your YubiKey** in your computer's port, then type: + +``` console +gpg --edit-key [key_id] +``` + +This will show the details for the OpenPGP key (**`sec`**) you just created and its subkeys (**`ssb`**). + +In the terminal **`gpg`** prompt, type the command: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +keytocard +``` + +![Screenshot of a terminal window showing details of the OpenPGP key and its subkeys.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-44-config-pgpimportsubkeys.webp) + +When prompted with "Really move the primary key? (y/N)" type ++y++. + +
+

If you encounter an error

+ +If you encounter a problem at this step, you might want to exit the terminal **`gpg`** program with `quit`, unplug your YubiKey from your computer, plug it in again, then start [Step 11.6](#116-move-your-openpgp-key-and-subkeys-to-your-yubikeys) over. + +
+ +Assuming you have created all 3 subkey types in the previous step, when prompted with "Your selection?", type `1` to move the **Signature subkey** to your YubiKey: + +``` console title="Terminal" hl_lines="1 2 6" +gpg> keytocard +Really move the primary key? (y/N) y +Please select where to store the key: + (1) Signature key + (3) Authentication key +Your selection? 1 +``` + +Your GPG software will pop up and require you enter your OpenPGP key's passphrase. There will then be 2 more popups requiring you enter the OpenPGP application's **Admin PIN** you have just setup on [Step 11.1](#111-secure-your-yubikeys-openpgp-application-with-a-new-pin-and-admin-pin). You will be asked for your Admin PIN *twice*. + +![Screenshot of a GPG software popup window requiring to enter an Admin PIN.](../assets/images/yubikey-reset-and-backup/yubikey-45-config-pgpadminpin.webp) + +Back to the terminal **`gpg`** prompt, type `key 1` then `keytocard` again. This time select `2` to move the **Encryption subkey** to your YubiKey: + +``` console title="Terminal" hl_lines="1 5 8" +gpg> key 1 + +---- [key_information] ---- + +gpg> keytocard +Please select where to store the key: + (2) Encryption key +Your selection? 2 +``` + +Again, enter your OpenPGP key's passphrase and your OpenPGP application's Admin PIN when prompted by your GPG software. + +Back to the terminal **`gpg`** prompt, type `key 1` then `key 2` then `keytocard` again. This time select `3` to move the **Authentication subkey** to your YubiKey: + +``` console title="Terminal" hl_lines="1 5 9 14" +gpg> key 1 + +---- [key_information] ---- + +gpg> key 2 + +---- [key_information] ---- + +gpg> keytocard +Please select where to store the key: + (1) Signature key + (2) Encryption key + (3) Authentication key +Your selection? 3 +``` + +Enter your OpenPGP key passphrase and your OpenPGP application's Admin PIN when prompted by your GPG software. + +Finally, type `quit`, then ++y++ to save the changes before exiting the **`gpg`** terminal program. + +#### 11.7. Verify that all your subkeys are stored properly to your YubiKey + +From the terminal, type: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +gpg --card-edit +``` + +This will display the information stored inside your YubiKey's OpenPGP application. + +From the information displayed in the terminal, you can see your YubiKey's serial number, version, some attributes, your OpenPGP key information, and the 3 subkey slots. + +If you have completed the steps above properly, above "General key info" you should see the lines "Signature key", "Encryption key", and "Authentication key" all have information stored in it. Otherwise, instead of a string of uppercase letters and numbers you will see "[none]". + +If all 3 slots are filled as expected, type `quit` to leave this **card** program. + +#### 11.8. Copy your OpenPGP key and subkeys to your spare YubiKey + +To make this operation work, you will have to delete your local key and subkeys and restore them from your backups. + +First, **unplug your main YubiKey**. For the next step, you will need your OpenPGP key's and subkeys' *grip* strings. Type the following command in your terminal: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +gpg --list-secret-keys --with-keygrip +``` + +If you have multiple keys listed, only look at the last block for OpenPGP key and subkeys you just created. + +Note carefully the **Keygrip** string for each key and subkeys. + +For your OpenPGP key, look at the lines starting with "`sec>`" on the left. The **Keygrip** string will be just above "Card serial no". + +For the subkeys, look at each block starting with "`ssb>`" on the left. The **Keygrip** string will be on the second line for each. It should look something like this: + +``` console title="Terminal" hl_lines="3 7 9" +sec> rsa4096 2025-03-04 [SC] [expires: 2025-03-06] + ABC42ABC42ABC42ABC42ABC42[key_id] + Keygrip = [key_grip] + Card serial no. = 0000 [yubikey_serial_number] +uid [ultimate] Name (Comment) +ssb> rsa4096 2025-03-04 [E] [expires: 2025-03-06] + Keygrip = [subkey_grip] +ssb> rsa4096 2025-03-04 [SEA] [expires: 2025-03-06] + Keygrip = [subkey_grip] +``` + +Send a delete command for each key and subkeys: + +
+

Danger! Make sure to delete the right key!

+ +If you have multiple keys stored on this computer, when noting the **Keygrip** make sure to note the correct one for the OpenPGP key you have just created and all its subkeys. You would not want to delete *another* important key you need. + +For safety, it is recommended to keep a backup of your other keys as well before running the deletion commands below. + +
+ +You will need to send a delete command to the GPG agent in order to be able to restore and copy your subkeys to your spare YubiKey. Type the following command and replace `[key_grip]` with the string you have noted above: + +``` console +gpg-connect-agent "DELETE_KEY [key_grip]" /bye +``` + +Once you see the "OK", type the following command for your subkeys and replace `[subkey_grip]` with the strings you have noted above. + +
+

Repeat this command for each subkey with their respective Keygrip string.

+ +``` console +gpg-connect-agent "DELETE_KEY [subkey_grip]" /bye +``` + +Restore your key and subkeys: + +To restore your OpenPGP key and subkeys from your backup, type the following command (add the specific directory path you used, if any): + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +gpg --import backup_private_key.asc +``` + +Enter your OpenPGP key's passphrase when prompted by your GPG software. Then, for your subkeys type: + +``` console { .yaml .copy } +gpg --import backup_private_subkeys.asc +``` + +Enter your OpenPGP key's passphrase again if prompted by your GPG software. + +Copy your OpenPGP key and subkeys to your spare YubiKey: + +**Plug in your *spare* YubiKey** in your computer's port. Make sure your main YubiKey is *unplugged*. + +Repeat all the operations from [Step 11.6](#116-move-your-openpgp-key-and-subkeys-to-your-yubikeys) for your *spare* YubiKey. Use the same OpenPGP **[key_id]** you have used with your main YubiKey. + +Again, verify that all your YubiKey's OpenPGP application slots have been filled properly by repeating [Step 11.7](#117-verify-that-all-your-subkeys-are-stored-properly-to-your-yubikey) with your spare YubiKey. + +You can now `quit` this **card** program, unplug your *spare* YubiKey, plug in your main YubiKey again, and type `gpg --card-edit` again to verity that both your main and spare YubiKeys have the exact same "Signature key", "Encryption key", and "Authentication key" registered. + +Following this procedure correctly, each of these subkey slots should be identical on your main and spare YubiKeys. The "General key info" should also be identical between your YubiKeys, but each "Serial number" should be different. + +
+

The gpg-card program

+ +From this command, you can change other parameters for your YubiKey's OpenPGP application if needed. To see more options, you can consult Yubico's [documentation](https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/PGP_Walk-Through.html). + +
+ +
+

Troubleshooting

+ +If you need additional help to troubleshoot, reset, setup, or copy information to your spare YubiKey, you can contact Yubico's Customer Support service from [this form](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/requests/new). + +
+ +## :material-key-chain: Review your configuration + +Once you have fully reset and reconfigured your 2 YubiKeys, make sure that you have: + +- [x] Registered both keys with the YubiCloud validation server. + +- [x] Tested each YubiKey application you will use on both keys before registering them with any service or product. + +- [x] Configured properly all the protections and pins available to secure your keys. + +- [x] Deleted the temporary files containing secrets that you no longer need for backup purposes. + +- [x] Stored your spare key in a different secure location, once it's registered with your services and accounts. + +Finally, do not forget to register your freshly re-programmed YubiKey(s) with the services and accounts you had to remove it from. Do not leave your accounts unprotected! + +
+

More information

+ +This tutorial only covers a few features and usages possible with YubiKeys, consult **Yubico Authenticator**'s [complete documentation](https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/authenticator/auth-guide/) and [guides](https://www.yubico.com/setup/) for more information. + +
+ + diff --git a/blog/tags.md b/blog/tags.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..98e6010a --- /dev/null +++ b/blog/tags.md @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +# Tags + + diff --git a/docs/about.md b/docs/about.md index d0884aa3..98fdc5fc 100644 --- a/docs/about.md +++ b/docs/about.md @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ schema: - https://twitter.com/privacy_guides - https://github.com/privacyguides - https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q111710163 - - https://opencollective.com/privacyguides - https://www.youtube.com/@privacyguides - https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides --- @@ -20,23 +19,42 @@ schema: **Privacy Guides** is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy. We are a non-profit project with a mission to inform the public about the value of digital privacy, and about global government initiatives which aim to monitor your online activity. Our website is free of advertisements and not affiliated with any of the listed providers. -[:octicons-heart-16:{.pg-red} Make a Donation](about/donate.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:material-heart:{.pg-red} Make a Donation](https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacyguides){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-home-16:](https://www.privacyguides.org){ .card-link title=Homepage } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -## Executive Committee +Privacy Guides is built by volunteers and staff members around the world. All changes to our recommendations and resources are reviewed by at least two [trusted](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u?group=team&order=solutions&period=all) individuals, and we work diligently to ensure our content is updated as quickly as possible to adapt to the ever-changing cybersecurity threat landscape. + +In addition to our core team, [many other people](about/contributors.md) have made contributions to the project. You can too! We're open source on GitHub, and accepting translation suggestions on [Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides). + +[Job Openings :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](about/jobs.md) + +## :material-email-edit: Contact Us + +[:simple-discourse: Join the Privacy Guides forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + +The best way to get individual help is from our community on Discourse. If you notice an issue with our website, please open a discussion in the [Site Development](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/site-development/7) category on our forum. If you have a question about anything we cover, please ask it in the [Questions](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/privacy/questions/8) category on our forum. + +![Signal contact QR code](assets/img/layout/signal-contact-qr.png){ align=right } + +Have a tip for us, or need to share some sensitive information? The best way to get in touch with us securely is via `@privacyguides.01` on Signal. This group account is monitored by [Jonah](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah), [Niek](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/niek-de-wilde), [Em](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/ematprivacyguides), and [Jordan](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jordan). + +[:simple-signal: Chat on Signal](https://signal.me/#eu/zg9xcrIv5w-EtXt2FmTJgfWv01LmyTed8rpr7RDv35Mizq8ISZ9NJLmYtzsxI0Z4){ .md-button } + +You may also email the entire team at . This is a shared inbox that could be read by any [team member](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u?group=team&order=solutions&period=all), so please consider what sensitive information you share via email accordingly. + +We will do our best to respond to all queries within 3 business days, but please understand we are unable to provide individualized advice to everyone who asks. If you have a question about privacy, you will receive a much more detailed and timely response from the Privacy Guides community by [asking on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/privacy/questions/8). + +You can also use OpenPGP to contact us via email, if you feel comfortable with your client's security settings. You can discover the PGP keys of our team members using WKD if your client supports it. If it doesn't, or you don't know what that means, you can also find the public key for any Privacy Guides email account by searching on [keys.openpgp.org](https://keys.openpgp.org). We do not have PGP for the shared team inbox, only individual mailboxes which can be found in our team directory below. + +If you need an alternative secure channel, please request one via any contact method including social media, and we will work with you to establish one. Please do not share any sensitive information with us before we have established an appropriately secure discussion channel. + +## :material-account-tie: Executive Committee The project executive committee consists of five volunteers charged with management of the [MAGIC Privacy Guides Fund](https://magicgrants.org/funds/privacy_guides), making most critical project-related decisions.
- - :polar_bear:{ .lg .middle } **Daniel Gray** @@ -46,8 +64,8 @@ The project executive committee consists of five volunteers charged with managem [:material-account: Profile](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/dngray) - [:simple-github:]( "GitHub") - [:simple-mastodon:](https://mastodon.social/@dngray "@dngray@mastodon.social"){rel=me} + [:material-github:]( "GitHub") + [:material-mastodon:](https://mastodon.social/@dngray "@dngray@mastodon.social"){rel=me} [:material-email:](mailto:dngray@privacyguides.org "Email") - :detective:{ .lg .middle } **Freddy** @@ -58,20 +76,21 @@ The project executive committee consists of five volunteers charged with managem [:material-account: Profile](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/freddy) - [:simple-github:](https://github.com/freddy-m "GitHub") - [:simple-mastodon:](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){rel=me} + [:material-github:](https://github.com/freddy-m "GitHub") + [:material-mastodon:](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){rel=me} [:material-email:](mailto:freddy@privacyguides.org "Email") - :robot:{ .lg .middle } **Jonah Aragon** --- - :material-text-account: Founder + :material-text-account: Founder, Director [:material-account: Profile](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah) - [:simple-github:](https://github.com/jonaharagon "GitHub") - [:simple-mastodon:](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah "@jonah@neat.computer"){rel=me} + [:material-home:](https://www.jonaharagon.com "Homepage") + [:material-github:](https://github.com/jonaharagon "GitHub") + [:material-mastodon:](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah "@jonah@neat.computer"){rel=me} [:material-email:](mailto:jonah@privacyguides.org "Email") - :cactus:{ .lg .middle } **Niek de Wilde** @@ -82,8 +101,8 @@ The project executive committee consists of five volunteers charged with managem [:material-account: Profile](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/Niek-de-Wilde) - [:simple-github:](https://github.com/blacklight447 "GitHub") - [:simple-mastodon:](https://mastodon.social/@blacklight447 "@blacklight447@mastodon.social"){rel=me} + [:material-github:](https://github.com/blacklight447 "GitHub") + [:material-mastodon:](https://mastodon.social/@blacklight447 "@blacklight447@mastodon.social"){rel=me} [:material-email:](mailto:niekdewilde@privacyguides.org "Email") - :smirk_cat:{ .lg .middle } **Olivia** @@ -94,30 +113,81 @@ The project executive committee consists of five volunteers charged with managem [:material-account: Profile](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/olivia) - [:simple-github:](https://github.com/hook9 "GitHub") - [:simple-mastodon:](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me} + [:material-github:](https://github.com/hook9 "GitHub") + [:material-mastodon:](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me}
-## Volunteer Team +## :material-account-edit: Staff -A number of other contributors have volunteered their time to review and approve changes to this website, and keep the website up to date. Changes require 2+ approvals from team members before they can be merged. In addition to the executive committee members above, volunteers [trusted](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/people) to review pull requests include: +Our staff are paid to contribute to supplemental content at Privacy Guides, like [video production](https://www.youtube.com/@privacyguides), [news articles and tutorials](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles), and our discussion communities and social media. Most are available and paid on a full-time basis to assist the organization.
-- [:simple-github: **kimg45**](https://github.com/kimg45) -- [:simple-github: **ph00lt0**](https://github.com/ph00lt0) -- [:simple-github: **redoomed1**](https://github.com/redoomed1) +- :jack_o_lantern:{ .lg .middle } **Em** + + --- + + :material-text-account: Journalist + + [:material-account: Profile](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/ematprivacyguides) + + [:material-github:](https://github.com/EmAtPrivacyGuides "GitHub") + [:material-mastodon:](https://infosec.exchange/@Em0nM4stodon "@Em0nM4stodon@infosec.exchange"){rel=me} + [:material-email:](mailto:em@privacyguides.org "Email") + +- :full_moon_with_face:{ .lg .middle } **Jordan Warne** + + --- + + :material-text-account: Content Producer + + [:material-account: Profile](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/Jordan) + + [:material-github:](https://github.com/jordan-warne "GitHub") + [:material-mastodon:](https://social.lol/@jw "@jw@social.lol"){rel=me} + [:material-email:](mailto:jordan@privacyguides.org "Email") + +- :japanese_goblin:{ .lg .middle } **Kevin Pham** + + --- + + :material-text-account: Community & News Intern + + [:material-account: Profile](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/kevpham) + + [:material-github:](https://github.com/kevpham123 "GitHub") + [:material-mastodon:](https://mastodon.social/@kevpham "@kevpham@mastodon.social"){rel=me} + [:material-email:](mailto:kevin@privacyguides.org "Email")
-We also especially thank our dedicated moderation team on Matrix and our forum: *Austin Huang*, *namazso*, *hik*, *riley*, and *Valynor*. +## :material-check-decagram: Social Media -Additionally, [many other people](about/contributors.md) have made contributions to the project. You can too! We're open source on GitHub, and accepting translation suggestions on [Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides). +We have a general policy of avoiding links to centralized social media profiles and other websites outside our control. This means that in places like our website footer and other areas, we only link to platforms we fully control, such as our Mastodon and PeerTube accounts or Matrix channels. -Our team members review all changes made to the website and direct the course of the project as a whole. They do not personally profit from any contributions made to this site. Donations to Privacy Guides are generally tax-deductible in the United States. +However, Privacy Guides *does* have social media accounts on a wide variety of platforms, in the hope of reaching new users who aren't yet familiar with our content. We try to make this a "one-way street" where those accounts link to privacyguides.org, and not the other way around. However, this creates some confusion about which accounts are actually run by the Privacy Guides team. For reference, we will list all of our accounts here: -## In The Media +
+ +- [:simple-discourse: **Forum**](https://discuss.privacyguides.net) +- [:simple-matrix: **Matrix Space**](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org) +- [:simple-mastodon: **Mastodon**](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides) +- [:simple-peertube: **PeerTube**](https://neat.tube/c/privacyguides) +- [:simple-bluesky: Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/privacyguides.org) +- [:simple-codeberg: Codeberg](https://codeberg.org/privacyguides) +- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/privacyguides) +- [:simple-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/privacyguides) +- [:fontawesome-brands-linkedin: LinkedIn](https://linkedin.com/company/privacyguides) +- [:simple-reddit: Reddit](https://reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides) +- [:simple-x: X (Twitter)](https://x.com/privacy_guides) +- [:simple-youtube: YouTube](https://youtube.com/@privacyguides) + +
+ +To reiterate, this is not an endorsement of any platform, and we generally discourage following us on most social media platforms. + +## :material-newspaper: In The Media > To find [privacy-focused alternative] apps, check out sites like Good Reports and **Privacy Guides**, which list privacy-focused apps in a variety of categories, notably including email providers (usually on paid plans) that aren’t run by the big tech companies. @@ -127,9 +197,9 @@ Our team members review all changes made to the website and direct the course of — [Tweakers.net](https://tweakers.net/reviews/10568/op-zoek-naar-privacyvriendelijke-tools-niek-de-wilde-van-privacy-guides.html) [Translated from Dutch] -Also featured on: [Ars Technica](https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2022/02/is-firefox-ok), [Wirecutter](https://nytimes.com/wirecutter/guides/practical-guide-to-securing-windows-pc) [[2](https://nytimes.com/wirecutter/guides/practical-guide-to-securing-your-mac)], [NPO Radio 1](https://nporadio1.nl/nieuws/binnenland/8eaff3a2-8b29-4f63-9b74-36d2b28b1fe1/ooit-online-eens-wat-doms-geplaatst-ga-jezelf-eens-googlen-en-kijk-dan-wat-je-tegenkomt), [Wired](https://wired.com/story/firefox-mozilla-2022) and [Fast Company](https://fastcompany.com/91167564/mozilla-wants-you-to-love-firefox-again). +Also featured on: [Ars Technica](https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2022/02/is-firefox-ok), [Wirecutter](https://nytimes.com/wirecutter/guides/practical-guide-to-securing-windows-pc) [[2](https://nytimes.com/wirecutter/guides/practical-guide-to-securing-your-mac)], [NPO Radio 1](https://nporadio1.nl/nieuws/binnenland/8eaff3a2-8b29-4f63-9b74-36d2b28b1fe1/ooit-online-eens-wat-doms-geplaatst-ga-jezelf-eens-googlen-en-kijk-dan-wat-je-tegenkomt), [Wired](https://wired.com/story/firefox-mozilla-2022), [Fast Company](https://fastcompany.com/91167564/mozilla-wants-you-to-love-firefox-again) and [404 Media](https://404media.co/privacy-service-optery-faces-backlash-after-plan-to-send-openai-user-data). -## History +## :material-history: History Privacy Guides was launched in September 2021 as a continuation of the [defunct](about/privacytools.md) "PrivacyTools" open-source educational project. We recognized the importance of independent, criteria-focused product recommendations and general knowledge in the privacy space, which is why we needed to preserve the work that had been created by so many contributors since 2015 and make sure that information had a stable home on the web indefinitely. @@ -137,9 +207,9 @@ In 2022, we completed the transition of our main website framework from Jekyll t We additionally launched our new discussion forum at [discuss.privacyguides.net](https://discuss.privacyguides.net) as a community platform to share ideas and ask questions about our mission. This augments our existing community on Matrix, and replaced our previous GitHub Discussions platform, decreasing our reliance on proprietary discussion platforms. -In 2023, we launched international translations of our website in [French](https://www.privacyguides.org/fr/), [Hebrew](https://www.privacyguides.org/he/), [Dutch](https://www.privacyguides.org/nl/), and more languages, made possible by our excellent translation team on [Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides). We plan to continue carrying forward our mission of outreach and education, and finding ways to more clearly highlight the dangers of a lack of privacy awareness in the modern digital age, and the prevalence and harms of security breaches across the technology industry. +In 2023, we launched international translations of our website in [French](https://www.privacyguides.org/fr), [Hebrew](https://www.privacyguides.org/he), [Dutch](https://www.privacyguides.org/nl), and more languages, made possible by our excellent translation team on [Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides). We plan to continue carrying forward our mission of outreach and education, and finding ways to more clearly highlight the dangers of a lack of privacy awareness in the modern digital age, and the prevalence and harms of security breaches across the technology industry. -## Site License +## :material-license: Site License
diff --git a/docs/about/contributors.md b/docs/about/contributors.md index 58995f63..0aa861b2 100644 --- a/docs/about/contributors.md +++ b/docs/about/contributors.md @@ -2,19 +2,20 @@ title: Contributors hide: - toc +description: A complete list of contributors who have collectively made an enormous impact on the Privacy Guides project. --- -This project follows the [all-contributors](https://github.com/all-contributors/all-contributors) specification. Contributions of **any** kind are welcome to be added to [this list](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/.all-contributorsrc), including contributions to Privacy Guides outside of this repo, and contributions that aren't content related (like sharing ideas for Privacy Guides, promoting the project, answering questions on the forum, etc.). +This project follows the [all-contributors](https://github.com/all-contributors/all-contributors) specification. Contributions of **any** kind are welcome to be added to [this list](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/.all-contributorsrc), including contributions to Privacy Guides outside this repo, and contributions that aren't content related (like sharing ideas for Privacy Guides, promoting the project, answering questions on the forum, etc.). | Emoji | Type | Description | --- | --- | --- -| 📖 | `doc` | A contributor to the content on [privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/). +| 📖 | `doc` | A contributor to the content on [privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org/en). | 👀 | `review` | Someone who has taken the time to review [pull requests](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulls) to the site. | 📝 | `blog` | Someone who has written a [blog](https://blog.privacyguides.org) post for us. | 💬 | `question` | Someone who has been helpful when answering questions on our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net) or Matrix channels. | 🌍 | `translation` | Someone who has contributed on [Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides). -A huge thank you from Privacy Guides to these wonderful people ([full emoji key](https://allcontributors.org/docs/en/emoji-key)): +A huge thank you from Privacy Guides to the following wonderful people ([full emoji key](https://allcontributors.org/docs/en/emoji-key)). We also especially thank our dedicated community moderation team on Matrix and our forum: *Austin Huang*, *namazso*, *hik*, *riley*, and *Valynor*. --8<-- "includes/contributors.md" diff --git a/docs/about/criteria.md b/docs/about/criteria.md index d7a6af77..d8f08fc7 100644 --- a/docs/about/criteria.md +++ b/docs/about/criteria.md @@ -1,14 +1,15 @@ --- title: General Criteria +description: A list of general priorities we consider for all submissions to Privacy Guides. --- Below are some general priorities we consider for all submissions to Privacy Guides. Each category will have additional requirements for inclusion. -- **Security**: Tools should follow security best-practices wherever applicable. +- **Security**: Tools should follow security best practices wherever applicable. - **Source Availability**: Open-source projects are generally preferred over equivalent proprietary alternatives. -- **Cross-Platform Availability**: We typically prefer recommendations to be cross-platform, to avoid vendor lock-in. -- **Active Development**: The tools that we recommend should be actively developed, unmaintained projects will be removed in most cases. -- **Usability**: Tools should be accessible to most computer users, an overly technical background should not be required. +- **Cross-Platform Availability**: We typically prefer recommendations to be cross-platform to avoid vendor lock-in. +- **Active Development**: The tools that we recommend should be actively developed. Unmaintained projects will be removed in most cases. +- **Usability**: Tools should be accessible to most computer users. An overly technical background should not be required. - **Documentation**: Tools should have clear and extensive documentation for use. ## Financial Disclosure @@ -19,14 +20,16 @@ We do not make money from recommending certain products, we do not use affiliate We have these requirements in regard to developers which wish to submit their project or software for consideration. +- Must undergo our [self-submission process](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/about-the-project-showcase-category/114) as a way to engage with our community, address any potential concerns, and elicit any feedback that can help improve your project. + - Must disclose affiliation, i.e. your position within the project being submitted. -- Must have a security whitepaper if it is a project that involves handling of sensitive information like a messenger, password manager, encrypted cloud storage, etc. - - Third party audit status. We want to know if you have one, or have one planned. If possible please mention who will be conducting the audit. +- Must have a security white paper if it is a project that involves the handling of sensitive information like a messenger, password manager, encrypted cloud storage, etc. + - Regarding third party audit status, we want to know if you have undergone one, or have requested one. If possible please mention who will be conducting the audit. - Must explain what the project brings to the table in regard to privacy. - - Does it solve any new problem? + - What new problem(s), if any, does it solve? - Why should anyone use it over the alternatives? - Must state what the exact threat model is with their project. - - It should be clear to potential users what the project can provide, and what it cannot. + - It should be clear to potential users what the project can provide, and what it cannot. Ideally, a developer should be able to identify what [common threat(s)](../basics/common-threats.md) their project protects against. diff --git a/docs/about/donate.md b/docs/about/donate.md index f15d852c..4bbf099a 100644 --- a/docs/about/donate.md +++ b/docs/about/donate.md @@ -1,30 +1,112 @@ --- title: Donate +description: The charitable mission of Privacy Guides relies on contributions from visitors like yourself. Anything you can do to support the project is hugely appreciated. --- -Donate to Privacy Guides and support our mission to defend digital rights and spread the word about mass surveillance programs and other daily privacy invasions. You can help Privacy Guides researchers, activists, and maintainers create informative content, host private digital services, and protect privacy rights at a time when the world needs it most. +Support our mission to defend digital rights and spread the word about mass surveillance programs and other daily privacy invasions. You can help Privacy Guides researchers, activists, and maintainers create informative content, host private digital services, and protect privacy rights at a time when the world needs it most. -Privacy Guides has been a nonstop effort for over 5 years to stay up to date with the world of cybersecurity and privacy, and to promote the benefits of privacy overall. This is a **non-profit, community-driven** project that would not be possible without the generous support of all our [contributors](contributors.md). +[:material-heart:{ .pg-red } Become a Member](https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacyguides/membership){ class="md-button md-button--primary" } +[:material-hand-coin: Make a Donation](https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacyguides/donate/privacyguides){ class="md-button md-button--primary" } -## Donate + -Currently, the best way to support our work is to send a monthly or one-time contribution via GitHub Sponsors. We will be able to accept donations via alternate payment platforms very soon. +MAGIC Grants is our fiscal host, and their custom, open-source donation platform allows you to donate to our project with **Monero**, **Litecoin (MWEB)**, **Bitcoin**, or **debit/credit card**. You can also donate using [:simple-github: GitHub Sponsors](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides). -[:material-heart:{ .pg-red } Sponsor us on GitHub](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides){ class="md-button md-button--primary" } + -A new donation platform we control to make donating easier will be deployed soon. In the meantime, if you'd like to arrange a donation (including with cryptocurrency), please reach out to [info@magicgrants.org](mailto:info@magicgrants.org). +## Foundations & Organizations -## How We Use Donations +=== "Current Supporters" -Privacy Guides is a **non-profit** organization. We use donations for a variety of purposes, including: + Thank you to these organizations who significantly support Privacy Guides. (1) + { .annotate } -**Web Hosting** + 1. Please contact to inquire about giving. Privacy Guides reserves the right to rescind the membership of those who are unaligned with our mission or organization at any time. Organizational members have no ability to influence what content is recommended on the Privacy Guides website. Learn more about our [donation acceptance policy](donation-acceptance-policy.md). -: Traffic to this website uses hundreds of gigabytes of data per month, we use a variety of service providers to keep up with this traffic. +
-**Domain Registrations** + [![Power Up Privacy]](https://powerupprivacy.com){ rel=nofollow target=_blank title="Power Up Privacy" } + [![DeleteMe]](https://joindeleteme.com){ rel=nofollow target=_blank title="DeleteMe" } -: We have a few domain names like `privacyguides.org` which cost us around $10 yearly to maintain their registration. + [Power Up Privacy]: ../assets/img/donors/power-up-privacy.webp + [DeleteMe]: ../assets/img/donors/deleteme.webp + +
+ +=== "Past Supporters" + + Thank you to these organizations who have substantially supported our project in the past. + + - [Safing](https://safing.io){ rel=nofollow target=_blank }: 2019 – 2021 + +## Active Members + +Privacy Guides would not be possible without these individuals who generously donate on a monthly or yearly basis. (1) +{ .annotate } + +1. If you [become a member](https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacyguides/membership) and [link your donation](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/getting-your-member-flair-on-the-forum/25453) to your forum account, you're automatically added here with a link to your profile and avatar to show your support for Privacy Guides. If you don't make your membership public on the forum, you'll be a silent +1. You can change your visibility any time. This chart is updated upon each website release. + +
+
+ +--8<-- "includes/members.md" + +
+
+ + + +This is a list of our **active** [members](https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacyguides/membership), plus donors on GitHub, who have chosen to make their donation public. Hundreds more have donated in the past or privately, and their support is hugely appreciated as well. + + + +## Merchandise + +You can support us and share your passion for privacy by buying our merchandise from HelloTux. + +[Buy on HelloTux.com](https://hellotux.com/privacyguides){ class="md-button" } + +## Non-Financial Support + +It takes a lot of [people](contributors.md) and [work](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulse/monthly) to keep Privacy Guides up to date and spread the word about privacy and mass surveillance. If you're looking for other ways to help out, consider getting involved by [editing the site](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org), [joining our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net), or [contributing translations](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides). + +## FAQ + +### What is an organizational membership? + +Organizational membership to Privacy Guides is open to any company, private foundation, or organization that donates at least $5,000 per year. While Privacy Guides does not endorse private companies or their products, we're grateful for their contributions. Your donation may be tax-deductible, and we will provide you with a receipt. + +You can become an organizational member by reaching out to for more information. + +### How are organizational members recognized? + +Organizational members that choose to be recognized publicly are included in our organizational members section (above), and occasionally at other opportunities where appropriate. Organizational member links include the `rel="nofollow"` attribute: We adopted this policy to screen out potential abuse of our program and site to raise the rank of third parties in search algorithms. Unfortunately, this is a growing problem for nonprofits. This was a complex decision since we know many of the sincere supporters behind these companies, but we decided that it was the best choice for us. + +Organizational members have no ability to influence what content is recommended on the Privacy Guides website. Learn more about our [donation acceptance policy](donation-acceptance-policy.md). + +### What is an active membership? + +Your monthly or yearly membership sustains Privacy Guides's services and public activism for privacy and cybersecurity year round. If you become a member, we will recognize your support here on our website, our community forum, and occasionally in other areas like our videos if you choose to make your membership publicly known. + +Our membership program is brand new, and we are still exploring other ways that we can share a token of our appreciation with you, while maintaining sustainable and ethical boundaries. Stay tuned! + +### How does Privacy Guides use donations? + +Privacy Guides has been a nonstop effort for over 5 years to stay up to date with the world of cybersecurity and privacy, and to promote the benefits of privacy overall. This is a **non-profit, community-driven** project that would not be possible without the generous support of all our [contributors](contributors.md), in addition to our regularly donating members above. + +Your donation go to a [dedicated fund](https://magicgrants.org/funds/privacy_guides) within [MAGIC Grants](https://magicgrants.org), a 501(c)(3) organization and our fiscal host. The funds will **only** be used for this project specifically. + +You may qualify for a tax deduction. When you donate to us [here](https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacyguides) with cryptocurrency or card you have the option to receive a receipt from MAGIC Grants for this purpose. If you have questions about other transactions please email . + +We use donations for a variety of purposes, including: + +**Payroll** + +: We have journalists, writers, and video creators on payroll to review products and create more educational content on a regular basis. This is a significant expense, and we are only able to create our quantity of content with your support. + +**Web Hosting and Infrastructure** + +: Traffic to this website uses hundreds of gigabytes of data per month; we use a variety of service providers to keep up with this traffic. **Online Services** @@ -34,18 +116,6 @@ Privacy Guides is a **non-profit** organization. We use donations for a variety : We occasionally purchase products and services for the purposes of testing our [recommended tools](../tools.md). -Your donation will go to a [dedicated fund](https://magicgrants.org/funds/privacy_guides) within [MAGIC Grants](https://magicgrants.org), a 501(c)(3) organization. The funds will only be used for this project specifically. You may qualify for a tax deduction. If you need a donation receipt, please email . - Thank you to all those who support our mission! :material-heart:{ .pg-red } -We strictly **cannot** use donations to support political campaigns/candidates or attempt to influence legislation. Earnings also will **not** inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. - -## Merchandise - -Another option to support us is by buying our merchandise from HelloTux. We get a small commission for each item sold, and you get a quality product to show for it. - -[Buy on HelloTux.com](https://hellotux.com/privacyguides){ class="md-button" } - -## Non-Financial Support - -It takes a lot of [people](contributors.md) and [work](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulse/monthly) to keep Privacy Guides up to date and spread the word about privacy and mass surveillance. If you're looking for other ways to help out, consider getting involved by [editing the site](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org), [joining our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net), or [contributing translations](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides). +We strictly **do not** use donations to support political campaigns/candidates or attempt to influence legislation. Earnings will **not** inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. diff --git a/docs/about/donation-acceptance-policy.md b/docs/about/donation-acceptance-policy.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..890a8cb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/about/donation-acceptance-policy.md @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +--- +title: Donation Acceptance Policy +description: Privacy Guides aspires to obtain funding from a wide variety of sources to reduce our dependency on any single donor. Please consider donating! +--- + +Privacy Guides takes the ethical responsibility of making unbiased recommendations on its website very seriously. + +Privacy Guides aspires to obtain funding from a wide variety of sources to reduce our dependency on any single donor. Please consider [donating](donate.md)! + +## What we **can** accept + +In the course of our regular fundraising activities... + +- Donations and other forms of support will generally be accepted from individuals, corporations, foundations, or other entities, without limitations. + - This includes cash, cash equivalents (checks, money orders, credit/debit card payments), and cryptocurrency. +- Gifts of Real Property, Personal Property, or Securities may only be accepted upon approval of the MAGIC Grants board of directors. + +Privacy Guides will only accept such gifts that are legal and consistent with our policies. Gifts must not interfere with Privacy Guides' mission, purpose, and procedures. + +## Things we do **not** do + +- Accept sponsorships. +- Offer to recommend a product or service in exchange for a donation or other incentive. +- Threaten to remove a recommendation for a product or service unless we receive a donation or other incentive. +- Offer to expedite a review of a product or service in exchange for a donation or other incentive. +- Write sponsored content or feature sponsored components in our content. + +## Things we **may** do + +- Accept donations from privacy-related companies and non-profits. +- Apply for grant programs. +- Accept free versions of software or hardware to test and review, while being mindful of possible differences in versions that could differ from a regular customer experience. ([More details](executive-policy.md#ep1-freely-provided-product-samples)) +- Accept discounted versions of software or hardware that assist our operations (for example, discounted software costs made available to non-profits). + +## Restrictions on gifts + +Privacy Guides accepts unrestricted gifts, and we appreciate the flexibility to apply your gift to our programs where they are most needed. + +We also accept and appreciate gifts for specified programs or purposes, provided that such gifts are consistent with our program's stated mission, purpose, and priority. Privacy Guides will not accept gifts which are too restrictive in purpose. + +Examples of gifts which are too restrictive include: + +- Those which fund the research and review of a specific product category or specific product. +- Those which violate our existing policies. +- Those which are too difficult for us to administer. +- Those that are for purposes outside our general mission. + +An example of an acceptable restriction could be a gift towards funding our [video](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/) production, or hosting our website and forum. + +Final decisions on the restrictive nature of a gift and its acceptance or refusal will be made by our executive committee. + +## Additional terms + +Privacy Guides generally does not pay "finder's fees" or commissions to third parties in connection with any gift to Privacy Guides. We may, however, pay commissions and fees to properly negotiate and receive assets when appropriate. + +No officer, committee member, employee, or other agent of Privacy Guides will be compensated in a manner which is dependent on the size or nature of gifts made to Privacy Guides by any person. If we engage with legal, accounting, or other professionals, their fees and expenses will be determined by the time they spend engaged with our work, and not by reference to any particular gift in connection to their retainer. + +Privacy Guides always follows the MAGIC Grants Gift Acceptance Policy, available on their website: diff --git a/docs/about/executive-policy.md b/docs/about/executive-policy.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..176c4795 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/about/executive-policy.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +--- +title: Executive Policy +description: These are policies formally adopted by our executive committee, and take precedence over all other statements expressed on this website. +--- + +These are policies formally adopted by Privacy Guides' executive committee, and take precedence over all other statements expressed on this website. + +The keywords **must**, **must not**, **required**, **shall**, **shall not**, **should**, **should not**, **recommended**, **may**, and **optional** are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2119). + +## EP1: Freely-Provided Product Samples + +*Our policy on accepting product samples for review was adopted September 7, 2024.* + +=== "Current Version (1)" + + - Privacy Guides **shall not** proactively reach out to vendors asking for product samples or review accounts. + - Privacy Guides **shall not** accept test/review accounts for subscription cloud services. + - Privacy Guides **may** accept freely-provided product samples for one-time purchase software applications which run locally, given they don't require a subscription for continued operation. + - Privacy Guides **may** accept freely-provided samples of hardware products. + - Privacy Guides **may** accept a freely-provided subscription service associated with a hardware product, if such a subscription/license is necessary to use the product. + - Privacy Guides **must not** enter into an agreement pertaining to our editorial opinion with the vendor in order to receive a sample or publish a review. All freely-provided items must be strictly "no strings attached." + - We **may** agree to return the product to the vendor following the review if requested. + - We **may** agree to a reasonable NDA, provided it has a clear embargo date that is lifted no more than 6 months in the future where the NDA completely no longer applies. + - We **should not** enter into any other agreement with the vendor not described here. Potential agreements not described here **must** be approved by the executive committee beforehand. + + In all cases, whether we paid for the product independently or received a free sample from a vendor, how we obtained the product **must** be clearly documented in the background section of every article associated with the product. diff --git a/docs/about/jobs.md b/docs/about/jobs.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..598c21d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/about/jobs.md @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +--- +title: Job Openings +description: Privacy Guides has a small, remote team of privacy researchers and advocates. Any open positions we may have in the future will be posted here. +--- + +Privacy Guides has a small, remote team of privacy researchers and advocates working to further our mission of protecting free expression and promoting privacy-respecting technology. As a non-profit, we are expanding very slowly to ensure the project is sustainable in the long term. All of our team members are listed [here](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u?group=team&order=solutions&period=all). Please consider [donating](https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacyguides) to support our cause. + +We are occasionally looking for strong journalistic writers, product reviewers, and privacy experts to help us out, and any open positions will be posted below. + +--- + +## Open Positions + +There are no open positions at this time. diff --git a/docs/about/jobs/content-creator.md b/docs/about/jobs/content-creator.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c6e55258 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/about/jobs/content-creator.md @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +--- +title: Content Creator +description: Privacy Guides is looking for a video producer and host for informative privacy-related content on YouTube and other platforms. +--- + +[:material-arrow-left-drop-circle: Job Openings](../jobs.md) + +
+

Position Closed

+ +Thank you for your interest in this position at Privacy Guides. At this time we are no longer accepting new applications, but please follow our [job openings](../jobs.md) page to learn about future opportunities. + +
+ +Are you passionate about privacy and cybersecurity? + +Privacy Guides is an international nonprofit dedicated to producing top-tier, unbiased educational content and journalism, and to fostering safe and informative online communities to discuss technical topics around improving personal privacy and cybersecurity. + +Privacy Guides is looking for a focused and motivated individual to be responsible for our social media presence from end to end, with a particular emphasis on video content. You must be comfortable being on camera to succeed in this role. + +This is a unique opportunity. Your primary goal will be to create and share privacy-based educational materials, without any motive to sell a product. If you truly value being able to create the best content that you can, and if you are passionate about privacy, then this position is for you! + +Your responsibilities will include, but aren’t limited to: + +- Scripting and hosting educational video content to be posted across various social media platforms. +- Video editing, production, and other backend work required to make successful content. +- Researching new topics to cover. +- Regular, daily posting to text-based social media platforms like Mastodon. +- Regular posting of highly educational video content to social media platforms. +- Compiling news sources for and hosting a weekly news recap (livestreamed) podcast on our YouTube channel. +- Regularly communicating with the Privacy Guides committee and other team members. + +This is a highly individualized role, and we are extremely interested in hearing your ideas on how you’ll find success and make this role your own. You will be responsible for handling virtually every aspect of this role without regular supervision, so being highly self-motivated is a must. + +As a guideline, we expect your video output to be roughly 1 video and 1 *This Week In Privacy* livestream per week, since we think most videos which meet our quality standards will be a multi-day process to research and script, in addition to a day for recording and editing. We realize some videos can be completed more quickly, while others may take multiple weeks or longer before publishing. You will be empowered to use your best judgement and prioritize your work accordingly. + +Job requirements: + +- Excellent organization and communication skills. +- Flexibility to set and respond to varying priorities and deadlines. +- Proactive, results-driven mindset with a strong sense of initiative. +- Comfortable being on camera, and working with video production equipment. +- Personal interest in consumer privacy, cybersecurity, and technology. +- Skeptical nature and drive to investigate difficult, often niche, technologies. You will need to evaluate the truthfulness of claims. + +The following qualifications will be an asset to your application. However, we are looking for the best candidate (which isn’t always apparent on paper!), so please apply even if you don’t meet any/many of these qualifications. + +- Previous YouTube or other video creation experience. +- Previous social media management experience. +- Education in English, journalism, media production, or any other related fields. +- Fluency in Spanish, French, Portuguese, or other languages. +- Familiarity with Privacy Guides' communities, culture, and mission. +- A solid understanding of the latest trends/culture on YouTube & TikTok. +- Located between UTC-08:00 and UTC-04:00 time zones. +- At least basic familiarity with GitHub, including pull requests, branches, reviews, and issues. + +The ideal candidate can commit to this role on a full-time basis (40 hours / week), but we are open to discussing a schedule you suggest. + +For this position, our hiring pay range falls between \$20-$25 / hour USD. The base pay may vary depending on job related qualifications such as knowledge, skills, and experience. Our compensation structure is rooted in a performance and merit based approach that acknowledges performance of both the individual and the project as a whole. + +--- + +
+

Position Closed

+ +Thank you for your interest in this position at Privacy Guides. At this time we are no longer accepting new applications, but please follow our [job openings](../jobs.md) page to learn about future opportunities. + +
+ +Privacy Guides is fiscally hosted by [MAGIC Grants](https://magicgrants.org), a 501(c)(3) public charity. MAGIC Grants is an equal opportunity employer. MAGIC Grants does not discriminate against any applicant or employee because of age, color, sex, disability, national origin, race, religion, sexual orientation, sexual identity, veteran status, or other protected characteristic. + +We respect your privacy. After this position is filled, your application will be deleted. Your application will not be shared with third parties. diff --git a/docs/about/jobs/intern-news.md b/docs/about/jobs/intern-news.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0ee6965c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/about/jobs/intern-news.md @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +--- +title: Intern (Community & News) +description: Privacy Guides is looking for an intern to discover and promote relevant news content on our platform, and to moderate and engage with our online communities. +--- + +[:material-arrow-left-drop-circle: Job Openings](../jobs.md) + +
+

Position Closed

+ +Thank you for your interest in this position at Privacy Guides. At this time we are no longer accepting new applications, but please follow our [job openings](../jobs.md) page to learn about future opportunities. + +
+ +Are you passionate about privacy and cybersecurity? + +Privacy Guides is an international nonprofit dedicated to producing top-tier, unbiased educational content and journalism, and to fostering safe and informative online communities to discuss technical topics around improving personal privacy and cybersecurity. + +This role is focused on interacting with our community members and answering their questions, keeping our online communities safe and constructive, and sharing thoughtful and informative news stories from around the internet for community discussion. + +Responsibilities will include: + +- Regularly interacting with our forum and other communities. +- Responding to moderation complaints/flags within our communities. +- Reading news stories from a variety of publications and generally staying up to date with the latest news in the privacy and cybersecurity space. +- Regularly posting interesting news stories and other topics you discover in our communities for discussion. +- Assisting our other staff and volunteers with research, writing, video production, and editing. +- Assisting with Privacy Guides' advocacy efforts. +- Remaining polite and fact-focused. + +No prior experience is necessary. We are looking for people passionate about privacy, cybersecurity, journalism, and community management regardless of your GPA or background. + +The following will be assets to your application, but please submit an application even if they don't apply to you: + +- Familiarity with Privacy Guides' communities, culture, and mission. +- Previous experience with social media management and/or journalism. +- Located between UTC-08:00 and UTC-04:00 time zones. + +This is a part-time, 10-20 hour per week role depending on your availability. We can work around your schedule and other obligations. + +This is a 6-month contract paying $15 / hour USD, with the optional opportunity for renewal or a longer-term role depending on your personal goals and the project's outcome. The specific starting and ending dates are flexible. + +--- + +
+

Position Closed

+ +Thank you for your interest in this position at Privacy Guides. At this time we are no longer accepting new applications, but please follow our [job openings](../jobs.md) page to learn about future opportunities. + +
+ +Privacy Guides is fiscally hosted by [MAGIC Grants](https://magicgrants.org), a 501(c)(3) public charity. MAGIC Grants is an equal opportunity employer. MAGIC Grants does not discriminate against any applicant or employee because of age, color, sex, disability, national origin, race, religion, sexual orientation, sexual identity, veteran status, or other protected characteristic. + +We respect your privacy. After this position is filled, your application will be deleted. Your application will not be shared with third parties. diff --git a/docs/about/jobs/journalist.md b/docs/about/jobs/journalist.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e577fa89 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/about/jobs/journalist.md @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +--- +title: Journalist +description: Privacy Guides is looking for a determined and focused journalist to research and write stories from the privacy and cybersecurity space on a regular basis. +--- + +[:material-arrow-left-drop-circle: Job Openings](../jobs.md) + +
+

Position Closed

+ +Thank you for your interest in this position at Privacy Guides. At this time we are no longer accepting new applications, but please follow our [job openings](../jobs.md) page to learn about future opportunities. + +
+ +Are you passionate about privacy and cybersecurity? + +Privacy Guides is an international nonprofit dedicated to producing top-tier, unbiased educational content and journalism, and to fostering safe and informative online communities to discuss technical topics around improving personal privacy and cybersecurity. + +We are looking for a determined and focused journalist to join our team. As a reporter for our organization, you will conduct research, interview sources, and write engaging stories in the field of consumer privacy and cybersecurity. + +Our ideal candidate is committed to combating misinformation and clearly communicating stories on a timely basis, and dedicated to producing top-tier, unbiased journalism. + +Privacy Guides is a small, largely volunteer-driven nonprofit media organization, and we do not currently have a dedicated writing and editing team. As such, you will be expected to take charge of the entire writing process from beginning to publication. You will have the freedom to choose which topics to cover and set a schedule to release articles on our main website. + +==Our primary mission is to publish the highest quality content surrounding consumer privacy and cybersecurity on the internet==, not the highest quantity of stories. You will be empowered to dive deep into the topics you are writing about, and expected to meet our high quality and editorial standards. + +Your responsibilities will include, but aren’t limited to: + +- Creating high-quality articles for our [knowledge base](../../basics/why-privacy-matters.md). +- Performing product reviews for our [reviews](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/category/reviews) section and [tool recommendations](../../tools.md). +- Researching new topics to cover. +- Interviewing and fact-checking all relevant sources. +- Regular posting of high-quality, unbiased journalistic content across our platforms. + +As a guideline, we expect roughly 3-5 articles a week that meet our quality standards, since we believe a well-researched article will take at least 8 hours to research and write on average. We realize some articles can be completed quickly, while others may take weeks or longer before publishing. You will be empowered to use your best judgement and prioritize your work accordingly. + +We are much more interested in articles that deeply cover a subject area than articles that cover the news of the day. + +Job requirements: + +- Excellent organization and communication skills. +- Expertise in English and writing. +- Flexibility to set and respond to varying priorities and deadlines. +- Proactive, results-driven mindset with a strong sense of initiative. +- Personal interest in consumer privacy, cybersecurity, and technology. +- Regular communication with the Privacy Guides committee and other team members. +- Skeptical nature and drive to investigate difficult, often niche, technologies. You will need to evaluate the truthfulness of claims. + +The following qualifications will be an asset to your application. However, we are looking for the best candidate (which isn’t always apparent on paper!), so please apply even if you don’t meet any/many of these qualifications. + +- Previous writing or journalism experience. +- Previous product review experience. +- Education in English, journalism, media production, or any other related fields. +- Familiarity with Privacy Guides' communities, culture, and mission. +- Located between UTC-08:00 and UTC-04:00 time zones. +- At least basic familiarity with GitHub, including pull requests, branches, reviews, and issues. + +The ideal candidate can commit to this role on a full-time basis (40 hours / week), but we are open to discussing a schedule you suggest. + +For this position, our hiring pay range falls between \$20-$25 / hour USD. The base pay may vary depending on job related qualifications such as knowledge, skills, and experience. Our compensation structure is rooted in a performance and merit based approach that acknowledges performance of both the individual and the project as a whole. + +--- + +
+

Position Closed

+ +Thank you for your interest in this position at Privacy Guides. At this time we are no longer accepting new applications, but please follow our [job openings](../jobs.md) page to learn about future opportunities. + +
+ +Privacy Guides is fiscally hosted by [MAGIC Grants](https://magicgrants.org), a 501(c)(3) public charity. MAGIC Grants is an equal opportunity employer. MAGIC Grants does not discriminate against any applicant or employee because of age, color, sex, disability, national origin, race, religion, sexual orientation, sexual identity, veteran status, or other protected characteristic. + +We respect your privacy. After this position is filled, your application will be deleted. Your application will not be shared with third parties. diff --git a/docs/about/notices.md b/docs/about/notices.md index 6fd3d785..a98db0bb 100644 --- a/docs/about/notices.md +++ b/docs/about/notices.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: "Notices and Disclaimers" +description: Information about our website license, acceptable use policy, and other important details. --- ## Legal Disclaimer @@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ This does not include third-party code embedded in the Privacy Guides code repos * The [Public Sans](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand/tree/67166ed8b641d8ac1837d0b75329e02ed4056704/fonts/Public%20Sans) font used for most text on the site is licensed under the terms detailed [here](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand/blob/67166ed8b641d8ac1837d0b75329e02ed4056704/fonts/Public%20Sans/LICENSE.txt). * The [DM Mono](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand/tree/67166ed8b641d8ac1837d0b75329e02ed4056704/fonts/DM%20Mono) font used for monospaced text on the site is licensed under the [SIL Open Font License 1.1](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand/blob/67166ed8b641d8ac1837d0b75329e02ed4056704/fonts/DM%20Mono/LICENSE.txt). -We believe that the logos and other images in `assets` obtained from third-party providers are either in the public domain or **fair use**. In a nutshell, legal [fair use doctrine](https://copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html) allows the use of copyrighted images in order to identify the subject matter for purposes of public comment. However, these logos and other images may still be subject to trademark laws in one or more jurisdictions. Before using this content, please ensure that it is used to identify the entity or organization that owns the trademark and that you have the right to use it under the laws which apply in the circumstances of your intended use. *When copying content from this website, you are solely responsible for ensuring that you do not infringe someone else's trademark or copyright.* +We believe that the logos and other images in `assets` obtained from third-party providers are either in the public domain or **fair use**. In a nutshell, legal [fair use doctrine](https://copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html) allows the use of copyrighted images in order to identify the subject for purposes of public comment. However, these logos and other images may still be subject to trademark laws in one or more jurisdictions. Before using this content, please ensure that it is used to identify the entity or organization that owns the trademark and that you have the right to use it under the laws which apply in the circumstances of your intended use. *When copying content from this website, you are solely responsible for ensuring that you do not infringe someone else's trademark or copyright.* When you contribute to our website you are doing so under the above licenses, and you are granting Privacy Guides a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, transferable, royalty-free, irrevocable license with the right to sublicense such rights through multiple tiers of sublicensees, to reproduce, modify, display, perform and distribute your contribution as part of our project. diff --git a/docs/about/privacy-policy.md b/docs/about/privacy-policy.md deleted file mode 100644 index 47677953..00000000 --- a/docs/about/privacy-policy.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: "Privacy Policy" ---- -Privacy Guides is a community project operated by a number of active volunteer contributors. The public list of team members [can be found on GitHub](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/people). - -## Data We Collect From Visitors - -The privacy of our website visitors is important to us, so we do not track any individual people. As a visitor to our website: - -- No personal information is stored -- No information is shared with, sent to or sold to third-parties -- No information is shared with advertising companies -- No information is mined and harvested for personal and behavioral trends -- No information is monetized - -You can view the data we collect on our [statistics](statistics.md) page. - -We run a self-hosted installation of [Umami](https://umami.is) to collect some anonymous usage data for statistical purposes. The goal is to track overall trends in our website traffic, it is not to track individual visitors. All the data is in aggregate only, and no personal data is stored. - -The only data which is collected is data sent in a standard web request, which includes referral sources, the page you're visiting, your user agent, your IP address, and your screen resolution. The raw data is immediately discarded after statistics have been generated, for example if we collect your screen resolution as `1125x2436`, the only data we retain is "mobile device" and not your specific resolution. - -## Data We Collect From Account Holders - -If you register for an account on one of our services, we may collect any information you provide us (such as your email, password, profile information, etc.) and use that information to provide you with the service. We never share or sell this data. - -Some services we host have separate privacy policies which supersede this document. For example, the privacy policy of our forum can be found at [discuss.privacyguides.net/privacy](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/privacy). - -## Contacting Us - -Even in the limited cases where your data is collected, our volunteers and most members of the Privacy Guides team have no access to that information. Some information (such as your email address) may be accessible to moderators via limited control panels for the purposes of moderating our communities. - -Thus, inquiries regarding your personal information should be sent directly to: - -```text -Jonah Aragon -Services Administrator -jonah@privacyguides.org -``` - -For all other inquiries, you can contact any member of our team. - -For complaints under GDPR more generally, you always have the option to lodge complaints with your local data protection supervisory authorities. - -## About This Policy - -We will post any new versions of this statement [here](privacy-policy.md). We may change how we announce changes in future versions of this document. In the meantime we may update our contact information at any time without announcing a change. Please refer to the [Privacy Policy](privacy-policy.md) for the latest contact information at any time. - -A full revision [history](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main/docs/about/privacy-policy.md) of this page can be found on GitHub. diff --git a/docs/about/privacytools.md b/docs/about/privacytools.md index 6189b82e..31b1ef51 100644 --- a/docs/about/privacytools.md +++ b/docs/about/privacytools.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: "PrivacyTools FAQ" +description: The real story behind the team transition from privacytools.io to privacyguides.org --- In September 2021, every active contributor unanimously agreed to move from PrivacyTools to work on this site: Privacy Guides. This decision was made because PrivacyTools’ founder and controller of the domain name had disappeared for an extended period of time and could not be contacted. @@ -35,9 +36,9 @@ At the end of July 2021, we [informed](https://web.archive.org/web/2021072918442 ## Control of r/privacytoolsIO -Simultaneously with the ongoing website issues at privacytools.io, the r/privacytoolsIO moderation team was facing challenges with managing the subreddit. The subreddit had always been operated mostly independently of the website's development, but BurungHantu was the primary moderator of the subreddit as well, and he was the only moderator granted "Full Control" privileges. u/trai_dep was the only active moderator at the time, and [posted](https://reddit.com/comments/o9tllh) a request to Reddit's administrators on June 28, 2021, asking to be granted the primary moderator position and full control privileges, in order to make necessary changes to the Subreddit. +Simultaneously with the ongoing website issues at privacytools.io, the r/privacytoolsIO moderation team was facing challenges with managing the Subreddit. The Subreddit had always been operated mostly independently of the website's development, but BurungHantu was the primary moderator of the Subreddit as well, and he was the only moderator granted "Full Control" privileges. u/trai_dep was the only active moderator at the time, and [posted](https://reddit.com/comments/o9tllh) a request to Reddit's administrators on June 28, 2021, asking to be granted the primary moderator position and full control privileges, in order to make necessary changes to the Subreddit. -Reddit requires that subreddits have active moderators. If the primary moderator is inactive for a lengthy period of time (such as a year) the primary moderation position can be re-appointed to the next moderator in line. For this request to have been granted, BurungHantu had to have been completely absent from all Reddit activity for a long period of time, which was consistent with his behaviors on other platforms. +Reddit requires that Subreddits have active moderators. If the primary moderator is inactive for a lengthy period of time (such as a year) the primary moderation position can be re-appointed to the next moderator in line. For this request to have been granted, BurungHantu had to have been completely absent from all Reddit activity for a long period of time, which was consistent with his behaviors on other platforms. > If you were removed as moderator from a subreddit through Reddit request it is because your lack of response and lack of activity qualified the subreddit for an r/redditrequest transfer. > @@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ This change [entailed:](https://reddit.com/comments/pnhn4a) - Redirecting `www.privacytools.io` to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). - Archiving the source code on GitHub to preserve our past work and issue tracker, which we continued to use for months of future development of this site. -- Posting announcements to our subreddit and various other communities informing people of the official change. +- Posting announcements to our Subreddit and various other communities informing people of the official change. - Formally closing privacytools.io services, like Matrix and Mastodon, and encouraging existing users to migrate as soon as possible. Things appeared to be going smoothly, and most of our active community made the switch to our new project exactly as we hoped. @@ -64,11 +65,11 @@ Roughly a week following the transition, BurungHantu returned online for the fir At this point, BurungHantu claimed he wanted to continue working on privacytools.io on his own and requested that we remove the redirect from `www.privacytools.io` to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). We obliged and requested that he keep the subdomains for Matrix, Mastodon, and PeerTube active for us to run as a public service to our community for at least a few months, in order to allow users on those platforms to easily migrate to other accounts. Due to the federated nature of the services we provided, they were tied to specific domain names making it very difficult to migrate (and in some cases impossible). -Unfortunately, because control of the r/privacytoolsIO subreddit was not returned to BurungHantu at his demand (further information below), those subdomains were [cut off](https://reddit.com/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps) at the beginning of October, ending any migration possibilities to any users still using those services. +Unfortunately, because control of the r/privacytoolsIO Subreddit was not returned to BurungHantu at his demand (further information below), those subdomains were [cut off](https://reddit.com/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps) at the beginning of October, ending any migration possibilities to any users still using those services. Following this, BurungHantu made false accusations about Jonah stealing donations from the project. BurungHantu had over a year since the alleged incident occurred, and yet he never made anyone aware of it until after the Privacy Guides migration. BurungHantu has been repeatedly asked for proof and to comment on the reason for his silence by the team [and the community](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153536962281474), and has not done so. -BurungHantu also made a [twitter post](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status/1510560676967710728) alleging that an "attorney" had reached out to him on Twitter and was providing advice, in another attempt to bully us into giving him control of our subreddit, and as part of his smear campaign to muddy the waters surrounding the launch of Privacy Guides while pretending to be a victim. +BurungHantu also made a [twitter post](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status/1510560676967710728) alleging that an "attorney" had reached out to him on Twitter and was providing advice, in another attempt to bully us into giving him control of our Subreddit, and as part of his smear campaign to muddy the waters surrounding the launch of Privacy Guides while pretending to be a victim. ## PrivacyTools.io Now @@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ As of September 25th 2022 we are seeing BurungHantu's overall plans come to frui ## r/privacytoolsIO Now -After the launch of [r/PrivacyGuides](https://reddit.com/r/privacyguides), it was impractical for u/trai_dep to continue moderating both subreddits, and with the community on-board with the transition, r/privacytoolsIO was [made](https://reddit.com/comments/qk7qrj) a restricted sub in a post on November 1st, 2021: +After the launch of [r/PrivacyGuides](https://reddit.com/r/privacyguides), it was impractical for u/trai_dep to continue moderating both Subreddits, and with the community on-board with the transition, r/privacytoolsIO was [made](https://reddit.com/comments/qk7qrj) a restricted sub in a post on November 1st, 2021: > [...] The growth of this Sub was the result of great effort, across several years, by the PrivacyGuides.org team. And by every one of you. > @@ -86,11 +87,11 @@ After the launch of [r/PrivacyGuides](https://reddit.com/r/privacyguides), it wa Subreddits do not belong to anybody, and they especially do not belong to brand-holders. They belong to their communities, and the community and its moderators made the decision to support the move to r/PrivacyGuides. -In the months since, BurungHantu has threatened and begged for returning subreddit control to his account in [violation](https://reddit.com/r/redditrequest/wiki/top_mod_removal) of Reddit rules: +In the months since, BurungHantu has threatened and begged for returning Subreddit control to his account in [violation](https://reddit.com/r/redditrequest/wiki/top_mod_removal) of Reddit rules: > Retaliation from any moderator with regards to removal requests is disallowed. -For a community with many thousands of remaining subscribers, we feel that it would be incredibly disrespectful to return control of that massive platform to the person who abandoned it for over a year, and who now operates a website that we feel provides very low-quality information. Preserving the years of past discussions in that community is more important to us, and thus u/trai_dep and the rest of the subreddit moderation team has made the decision to keep r/privacytoolsIO as-is. +For a community with many thousands of remaining subscribers, we feel that it would be incredibly disrespectful to return control of that massive platform to the person who abandoned it for over a year, and who now operates a website that we feel provides very low-quality information. Preserving the years of past discussions in that community is more important to us, and thus u/trai_dep and the rest of the Subreddit moderation team has made the decision to keep r/privacytoolsIO as-is. ## OpenCollective Now diff --git a/docs/about/services.md b/docs/about/services.md index 9f4e8e0b..389746b9 100644 --- a/docs/about/services.md +++ b/docs/about/services.md @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ +--- +description: We run a number of web services to test out features and promote cool decentralized, federated, and/or open-source projects. +--- + # Privacy Guides Services We run a number of web services to test out features and promote cool decentralized, federated, and/or open-source projects. Many of these services are available to the public and are detailed below. @@ -13,15 +17,13 @@ We run a number of web services to test out features and promote cool decentrali ## Gitea - Domain: [code.privacyguides.dev](https://code.privacyguides.dev) -- Availability: Invite-Only -Access may be granted upon request to any team working on *Privacy Guides*-related development or content. +- Availability: Invite-Only. Access may be granted upon request to any team working on *Privacy Guides*-related development or content. - Source: [snapcraft.io/gitea](https://snapcraft.io/gitea) ## Matrix - Domain: [matrix.privacyguides.org](https://matrix.privacyguides.org) -- Availability: Invite-Only -Access may be granted upon request to Privacy Guides team members, Matrix moderators, third-party Matrix community administrators, Matrix bot operators, and other individuals in need of a reliable Matrix presence. +- Availability: Invite-Only. Access may be granted upon request to Privacy Guides team members, Matrix moderators, third-party Matrix community administrators, Matrix bot operators, and other individuals in need of a reliable Matrix presence. - Source: [github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy](https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy) ## SearXNG @@ -29,10 +31,3 @@ Access may be granted upon request to Privacy Guides team members, Matrix modera - Domain: [search.privacyguides.net](https://search.privacyguides.net) - Availability: Public - Source: [github.com/searxng/searxng-docker](https://github.com/searxng/searxng-docker) - -## Invidious - -- Domain: [invidious.privacyguides.net](https://invidious.privacyguides.net) -- Availability: Semi-Public -We host Invidious primarily to serve embedded YouTube videos on our website, this instance is not intended for general-purpose use and may be limited at any time. -- Source: [github.com/iv-org/invidious](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious) diff --git a/docs/about/statistics.md b/docs/about/statistics.md index 1dc31186..e7d91ba7 100644 --- a/docs/about/statistics.md +++ b/docs/about/statistics.md @@ -1,14 +1,15 @@ --- title: Traffic Statistics +description: We self-host Umami to create a nice visualization of our traffic statistics, which are made public here. --- We self-host [Umami](https://umami.is) to create a nice visualization of our traffic statistics, which are public at the link below. -[View Statistics](https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/nVWjyd2QfgOPBhMF/www.privacyguides.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[View Statistics](https://stats.triplebit.net/share/S80jBc50hxr5TquS/www.privacyguides.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } With this process: -- Your information is never shared with a third-party, it stays on servers we control +- Your information is never shared with a third party, it stays on servers we control - Your personal data is never saved, we only collect data in aggregate - No client-side JavaScript is used diff --git a/docs/advanced/communication-network-types.md b/docs/advanced/communication-network-types.md index 863b23de..a7f488ea 100644 --- a/docs/advanced/communication-network-types.md +++ b/docs/advanced/communication-network-types.md @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ description: An overview of several network architectures commonly used by insta There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) when deciding which app to use. [Recommended Instant Messengers](../real-time-communication.md){ .md-button } +[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why/){ .md-button } ## Centralized Networks @@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate wit - Allows for greater control over your own data when running your own server. - Allows you to choose whom to trust your data with by choosing between multiple "public" servers. - Often allows for third-party clients which can provide a more native, customized, or accessible experience. -- Server software can be verified that it matches public source code, assuming you have access to the server or you trust the person who does (e.g., a family member). +- Server software can be verified that it matches public source code, assuming you have access to the server, or you trust the person who does (e.g., a family member). **Disadvantages:** @@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate wit P2P messengers connect to a [distributed network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) of nodes to relay a message to the recipient without a third-party server. -Clients (peers) usually find each other through the use of a [distributed computing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_computing) network. Examples of this include [Distributed Hash Tables](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table) (DHT), used by [torrents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_(protocol)) and [IPFS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System) for example. Another approach is proximity based networks, where a connection is established over WiFi or Bluetooth (for example, Briar or the [Scuttlebutt](https://scuttlebutt.nz) social network protocol). +Clients (peers) usually find each other through the use of a [distributed computing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_computing) network. Examples of this include [Distributed Hash Tables](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table) (DHT), used by [torrents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_(protocol)) and [IPFS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System) for example. Another approach is proximity based networks, where a connection is established over Wi-Fi or Bluetooth (for example, Briar or the [Scuttlebutt](https://scuttlebutt.nz) social network protocol). Once a peer has found a route to its contact via any of these methods, a direct connection between them is made. Although messages are usually encrypted, an observer can still deduce the location and identity of the sender and recipient. @@ -85,9 +86,9 @@ P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each othe A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three. -There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) different ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](tor-overview.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers." +There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](tor-overview.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers." -Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the hoster with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit. +Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the host with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit. **Advantages:** diff --git a/docs/advanced/dns-overview.md b/docs/advanced/dns-overview.md index 8b90154c..489e3343 100644 --- a/docs/advanced/dns-overview.md +++ b/docs/advanced/dns-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: material/dns description: The Domain Name System is the "phonebook of the internet," helping your browser find the website it's looking for. --- -The [Domain Name System](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System) is the 'phonebook of the Internet'. DNS translates domain names to IP addresses so browsers and other services can load Internet resources, through a decentralized network of servers. +The [Domain Name System](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System) is the 'phone book of the Internet'. DNS translates domain names to IP addresses so browsers and other services can load Internet resources, through a decentralized network of servers. ## What is DNS? @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ When you visit a website, a numerical address is returned. For example, when you DNS has existed since the [early days](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System#History) of the Internet. DNS requests made to and from DNS servers are **not** generally encrypted. In a residential setting, a customer is given servers by the ISP via [DHCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_Host_Configuration_Protocol). -Unencrypted DNS requests are able to be easily **surveilled** and **modified** in transit. In some parts of the world, ISPs are ordered to do primitive [DNS filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking). When you request the IP address of a domain that is blocked, the server may not respond or may respond with a different IP address. As the DNS protocol is not encrypted, the ISP (or any network operator) can use [DPI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) to monitor requests. ISPs can also block requests based on common characteristics, regardless of which DNS server is used. Unencrypted DNS always uses [port](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_(computer_networking)) 53 and always uses UDP. +Unencrypted DNS requests are able to be easily **surveilled** and **modified** in transit. In some parts of the world, ISPs are ordered to do primitive [DNS filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking). When you request the IP address of a domain that is blocked, the server may not respond or may respond with a different IP address. As the DNS protocol is not encrypted, the ISP (or any network operator) can use [DPI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) to monitor requests. ISPs can also block requests based on common characteristics, regardless of which DNS server is used. Below, we discuss and provide a tutorial to prove what an outside observer may see using regular unencrypted DNS and [encrypted DNS](#what-is-encrypted-dns). @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Below, we discuss and provide a tutorial to prove what an outside observer may s tshark -w /tmp/dns.pcap udp port 53 and host 1.1.1.1 or host 8.8.8.8 ``` -2. We can then use [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, MacOS, etc.) or [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) to send the DNS lookup to both servers. Software such as web browsers do these lookups automatically, unless they are configured to use encrypted DNS. +2. We can then use [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, macOS, etc.) or [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) to send the DNS lookup to both servers. Software such as web browsers do these lookups automatically, unless they are configured to use encrypted DNS. === "Linux, macOS" @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Below, we discuss and provide a tutorial to prove what an outside observer may s nslookup privacyguides.org 8.8.8.8 ``` -3. Next, we want to [analyse](https://wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChapterIntroduction.html#ChIntroWhatIs) the results: +3. Next, we want to [analyze](https://wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChapterIntroduction.html#ChIntroWhatIs) the results: === "Wireshark" @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Encrypted DNS can refer to one of a number of protocols, the most common ones be ### DNSCrypt -[**DNSCrypt**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCrypt) was one of the first methods of encrypting DNS queries. DNSCrypt operates on port 443 and works with both the TCP or UDP transport protocols. DNSCrypt has never been submitted to the [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Engineering_Task_Force) nor has it gone through the [Request for Comments (RFC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Request_for_Comments) process, so it has not been used widely outside of a few [implementations](https://dnscrypt.info/implementations). As a result, it has been largely replaced by the more popular [DNS over HTTPS](#dns-over-https-doh). +[**DNSCrypt**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCrypt) was one of the first methods of encrypting DNS queries. DNSCrypt operates on port 443 and works with both the TCP or UDP transport protocols. DNSCrypt has never been submitted to the [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Engineering_Task_Force) nor has it gone through the [Request for Comments (RFC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Request_for_Comments) process, so it has not been used widely outside a few [implementations](https://dnscrypt.info/implementations). As a result, it has been largely replaced by the more popular [DNS over HTTPS](#dns-over-https-doh). ### DNS over TLS (DoT) @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ In this example we will record what happens when we make a DoH request: 3. After making the request, we can stop the packet capture with CTRL + C. -4. Analyse the results in Wireshark: +4. Analyze the results in Wireshark: ```bash wireshark -r /tmp/dns_doh.pcap @@ -136,13 +136,13 @@ When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Be The simplest way to determine browsing activity might be to look at the IP addresses your devices are accessing. For example, if the observer knows that `privacyguides.org` is at `198.98.54.105`, and your device is requesting data from `198.98.54.105`, there is a good chance you're visiting Privacy Guides. -This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc.). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet. +This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. GitHub Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc.). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet. ### Server Name Indication (SNI) -Server Name Indication is typically used when a IP address hosts many websites. This could be a service like Cloudflare, or some other [Denial-of-service attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack) protection. +Server Name Indication is typically used when an IP address hosts many websites. This could be a service like Cloudflare, or some other [Denial-of-service attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack) protection. -1. Start capturing again with `tshark`. We've added a filter with our IP address so you don't capture many packets: +1. Start capturing again with `tshark`. We've added a filter with our IP address, so you don't capture many packets: ```bash tshark -w /tmp/pg.pcap port 443 and host 198.98.54.105 @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ graph TB ispDNS --> | No | nothing(Do nothing) ``` -Encrypted DNS with a third-party should only be used to get around redirects and basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences or you're interested in a provider that does some rudimentary filtering. +Encrypted DNS with a third party should only be used to get around redirects and basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences, or you're interested in a provider that does some rudimentary filtering. [List of recommended DNS servers](../dns.md){ .md-button } diff --git a/docs/advanced/payments.md b/docs/advanced/payments.md index 75df2e5c..f8128a3b 100644 --- a/docs/advanced/payments.md +++ b/docs/advanced/payments.md @@ -1,34 +1,35 @@ --- title: Private Payments icon: material/hand-coin +description: Your buying habits are the holy grail of ad targeting, but you still have plenty of options when it comes to making payments privately. --- -There's a reason data about your buying habits is considered the holy grail of ad targeting: your purchases can leak a veritable treasure trove of data about you. Unfortunately, the current financial system is anti-privacy by design, enabling banks, other companies, and governments to easily trace transactions. Nevertheless, you have plenty of options when it comes to making payments privately. +Data about your buying habits is considered the holy grail of ad targeting: your purchases can leak a veritable treasure trove of data about you. Unfortunately, the current financial system is anti-privacy by design, enabling banks, other companies, and governments to easily trace transactions. Nevertheless, you have plenty of options when it comes to making payments privately. ## Cash -For centuries, **cash** has functioned as the primary form of private payment. Cash has excellent privacy properties in most cases, is widely accepted in most countries, and is **fungible**, meaning it is non-unique and completely interchangable. +For centuries, **cash** has functioned as the primary form of private payment. Cash has excellent privacy properties in most cases, is widely accepted in most countries, and is **fungible**, meaning it is non-unique and completely interchangeable. -Cash payment laws vary by country. In the United States, special disclosure is required for cash payments over $10,000 to the IRS on [Form 8300](https://irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/form-8300-and-reporting-cash-payments-of-over-10000). The receiving business is required to ID verify the payee’s name, address, occupation, date of birth, and Social Security Number or other TIN (with some exceptions). Lower limits without ID such as $3,000 or less exist for exchanges and money transmission. Cash also contains serial numbers. These are almost never tracked by merchants, but they can be used by law enforcement in targeted investigations. +Cash payment laws vary by country. In the United States, special disclosure is required for cash payments over $10,000 to the IRS on [Form 8300](https://irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/form-8300-and-reporting-cash-payments-of-over-10000). The receiving business is required to ID verify the payee’s name, address, occupation, date of birth, and Social Security Number or other TIN (with some exceptions). Regulated exchanges, banks, and money services businesses must collect an ID for transactions exceeding $3,000. Cash contains serial numbers to assist law enforcement in targeted investigations. -Despite this, it’s typically the best option. +Despite the above, cash is typically the best option when available. ## Prepaid Cards & Gift Cards -It’s relatively simple to purchase gift cards and prepaid cards at most grocery stores and convenience stores with cash. Gift cards usually don’t have a fee, though prepaid cards often do, so pay close attention to these fees and expiry dates. Some stores may ask to see your ID at checkout to reduce fraud. +You can easily purchase gift cards and prepaid cards at most grocery stores and convenience stores with cash. Gift cards usually don’t have a fee, though prepaid cards often do, so pay close attention to these fees and expiry dates. Some stores may ask to see your ID at checkout in an effort to reduce fraud. Gift cards usually have limits of up to $200 per card, but some offer limits of up to $2,000 per card. Prepaid cards (e.g.: from Visa or Mastercard) usually have limits of up to $1,000 per card. Gift cards have the downside of being subject to merchant policies, which can have terrible terms and restrictions. For example, some merchants don’t accept payment in gift cards exclusively, or they may cancel the value of the card if they consider you to be a high-risk user. Once you have merchant credit, the merchant has a strong degree of control over this credit. -Prepaid cards don’t allow cash withdrawals from ATMs or “peer-to-peer” payments in Venmo and similar apps. +Prepaid cards usually don’t allow cash withdrawals from ATMs or “peer-to-peer” payments in Venmo and similar apps. -Cash remains the best option for in-person purchases for most people. Gift cards can be useful for the savings they bring. Prepaid cards can be useful for places that don’t accept cash. Gift cards and prepaid cards are easier to use online than cash, and they are easier to acquire with cryptocurrencies than cash. +Cash remains the best option for in-person purchases for most people. Gift cards are often sold at a discount, which make them attractive. Prepaid cards can be useful for places that don’t accept cash. Gift cards and prepaid cards are easier to use online than cash, and they are easier to acquire with cryptocurrencies than cash. ### Online Marketplaces -If you have [cryptocurrency](../cryptocurrency.md), you can purchase gift cards with an online gift card marketplace. Some of these services offer ID verification options for higher limits, but they also allow accounts with just an email address. Basic limits start at $5,000-10,000 a day for basic accounts, and significantly higher limits for ID verified accounts (if offered). +If you have [cryptocurrency](../cryptocurrency.md), you can purchase gift cards with an online gift card marketplace. Some of these services offer high limits (with ID verification), but they usually allow basic, low-limit accounts with just an email address. Expect limits under $10,000 for basic accounts and significantly higher limits for ID verified accounts (if offered). -When buying gift cards online, there is usually a slight discount. Prepaid cards are usually sold online at face value or with a fee. If you buy prepaid cards and gift cards with cryptocurrencies, you should strongly prefer to pay with Monero which provides strong privacy, more on this below. Paying for a gift card with a traceable payment method negates the benefits a gift card can provide when purchased with cash or Monero. +When buying gift cards online, there is usually a slight discount. Prepaid cards are usually sold online at face value or with a fee. If you buy prepaid cards and gift cards with cryptocurrencies, you should strongly prefer to pay with Monero which provides strong privacy (more on this below). Paying for a gift card with a traceable payment method negates the benefits a gift card can provide when purchased with cash or Monero. - [Online Gift Card Marketplaces :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../financial-services.md#gift-card-marketplaces) @@ -42,14 +43,14 @@ These tend to be good options for recurring/subscription payments online, while ## Cryptocurrency -Cryptocurrencies are a digital form of currency designed to work without central authorities such as a government or bank. While *some* cryptocurrency projects can allow you to make private transactions online, many use a public blockchain which does not provide any transaction privacy. Cryptocurrencies also tend to be very volatile assets, meaning their value can change rapidly and significantly at any time. As such, we generally don't recommend using cryptocurrency as a long-term store of value. If you decide to use cryptocurrency online, make sure you have a full understanding of its privacy aspects beforehand, and only invest amounts which would not be disastrous to lose. +Cryptocurrencies are a digital form of currency designed to work without central authorities such as a government or bank. While *some* cryptocurrency projects can allow you to make private transactions online, many use a transparent blockchain which does not provide any transaction privacy. Cryptocurrencies also tend to be very volatile assets, meaning their value can change rapidly and significantly. As such, we generally don't recommend using cryptocurrency as a long-term store of value. If you decide to use cryptocurrency online, make sure you have a full understanding of its privacy aspects beforehand, and only invest amounts which would not be disastrous to lose.

Danger

-The vast majority of cryptocurrencies operate on a **public** blockchain, meaning that every transaction is public knowledge. This includes even most well-known cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Transactions with these cryptocurrencies should not be considered private and will not protect your anonymity. +The vast majority of cryptocurrencies operate on a **transparent** blockchain, meaning that every transaction's details are public knowledge. This includes most well-known cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Transactions with these cryptocurrencies should not be considered private and will not protect your anonymity. -Additionally, many if not most cryptocurrencies are scams. Make transactions carefully with only projects you trust. +Additionally, many if not most cryptocurrencies are scams. Make transactions carefully with only projects you trust. Transactions are irreversible and do not include any consumer protections.
@@ -59,23 +60,25 @@ There are a number of cryptocurrency projects which purport to provide privacy b - [Recommended Cryptocurrency :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../cryptocurrency.md#monero) -Privacy coins have been subject to increasing scrutiny by government agencies. In 2020, [the IRS published a $625,000 bounty](https://forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2020/09/14/irs-will-pay-up-to-625000-if-you-can-crack-monero-other-privacy-coins/?sh=2e9808a085cc) for tools which can break Bitcoin Lightning Network and/or Monero's transaction privacy. They ultimately [paid two companies](https://sam.gov/opp/5ab94eae1a8d422e88945b64181c6018/view) (Chainalysis and Integra Fec) a combined $1.25 million for tools which purport to do so (it is unknown which cryptocurrency network these tools target). Due to the secrecy surrounding tools like these, ==none of these methods of tracing cryptocurrencies have been independently confirmed.== However, it is quite likely that tools which assist targeted investigations into private coin transactions exist, and that privacy coins only succeed in thwarting mass surveillance. +Privacy coins have been subject to increasing scrutiny by government agencies. In 2020, [the IRS published a $625,000 bounty](https://forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2020/09/14/irs-will-pay-up-to-625000-if-you-can-crack-monero-other-privacy-coins/?sh=2e9808a085cc) for tools which can trace (at least to some extent) Bitcoin Lightning Network and/or Monero transactions. They ultimately [paid two companies](https://sam.gov/opp/5ab94eae1a8d422e88945b64181c6018/view) (Chainalysis and Integra Fec) a combined $1.25 million to further develop tools to do so. Due to the secrecy surrounding tools like these, ==none of these methods of tracing cryptocurrencies have been independently confirmed.== However, it is quite likely that tools which assist targeted investigations into private coin transactions exist, and that privacy coins in their current form only succeed in thwarting mass surveillance. ### Other Coins (Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.) -The vast majority of cryptocurrency projects use a public blockchain, meaning that all transactions are both easily traceable and permanent. As such, we strongly discourage the use of most cryptocurrency for privacy-related reasons. +The vast majority of cryptocurrency projects use a transparent blockchain, meaning that all transactions are both easily traceable and permanent. As such, we strongly discourage the use of most cryptocurrency for privacy-related reasons. -Anonymous transactions on a public blockchain are *theoretically* possible, and the Bitcoin wiki [gives one example of a "completely anonymous" transaction](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Privacy#Example_-_A_perfectly_private_donation). However, doing so requires a complicated setup involving Tor and "solo-mining" a block to generate completely independent cryptocurrency, a practice which has not been practical for nearly any enthusiast for many years. +Anonymous transactions on a transparent blockchain are *theoretically* possible, and the Bitcoin wiki [gives one example of a "completely anonymous" transaction](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Privacy#Example_-_A_perfectly_private_donation). However, this example requires a complicated setup involving Tor and "solo-mining" a block to generate completely independent cryptocurrency, a practice which has not been practical (even for enthusiasts) for many years. ==Your best option is to avoid these cryptocurrencies entirely and stick with one which provides privacy by default.== Attempting to use other cryptocurrency is outside the scope of this site and strongly discouraged. ### Wallet Custody -With cryptocurrency there are two forms of wallets: custodial wallets and noncustodial wallets. Custodial wallets are operated by centralized companies/exchanges, where the private key for your wallet is held by that company, and you can access them anywhere typically with a regular username and password. Noncustodial wallets are wallets where you control and manage the private keys to access it. Assuming you keep your wallet's private keys secured and backed up, noncustodial wallets provide greater security and censorship-resistance over custodial wallets, because your cryptocurrency can't be stolen or frozen by a company with custody over your private keys. Key custody is especially important when it comes to privacy coins: Custodial wallets grant the operating company the ability to view your transactions, negating the privacy benefits of those cryptocurrencies. +With cryptocurrency there are two forms of wallets: custodial wallets and self-custody wallets. Custodial wallets are operated by centralized companies/exchanges, where the private key for your wallet is held by that company, and you can access them anywhere typically with a regular username and password. Self-custody wallets are wallets where you control and manage the private keys to access it. Assuming you keep your wallet's private keys secured and backed up, self-custody wallets provide greater security and censorship-resistance over custodial wallets, because your cryptocurrency can't be stolen or frozen by a company with custody over your private keys. Key custody is especially important when it comes to privacy coins: Custodial wallets grant the operating company the ability to view your transactions, negating the privacy benefits of those cryptocurrencies. ### Acquisition -Acquiring [cryptocurrencies](../cryptocurrency.md) like Monero privately can be difficult. P2P marketplaces, platforms which facilitate trades between people, are one option that can be used. If using an exchange which requires KYC is an acceptable risk for you as long as subsequent transactions can't be traced, a much easier option is to purchase Monero on an exchange like [Kraken](https://kraken.com), or purchase Bitcoin/Litecoin from a KYC exchange which can then be swapped for Monero. Then, you can withdraw the purchased Monero to your own noncustodial wallet to use privately from that point forward. +Acquiring [cryptocurrencies](../cryptocurrency.md) like Monero privately can be difficult. P2P marketplaces (platforms which facilitate trades between people) are one option, though the user experience typically suffers. If using an exchange which requires KYC is acceptable for you as long as subsequent transactions can't be traced, it's much easier to purchase Monero on a centralized exchange or purchase Bitcoin/Litecoin from a KYC exchange which can then be swapped for Monero. Then, you can withdraw the purchased Monero to your own self-custody wallet to use privately from that point forward. + +[Recommended places to buy Monero](../cryptocurrency.md#buying-monero){ .md-button } If you go this route, make sure to purchase Monero at different times and in different amounts than where you will spend it. If you purchase $5000 of Monero at an exchange and make a $5000 purchase in Monero an hour later, those actions could potentially be correlated by an outside observer regardless of which path the Monero took. Staggering purchases and purchasing larger amounts of Monero in advance to later spend on multiple smaller transactions can avoid this pitfall. @@ -84,3 +87,10 @@ If you go this route, make sure to purchase Monero at different times and in dif When you're making a payment in-person with cash, make sure to keep your in-person privacy in mind. Security cameras are ubiquitous. Consider wearing non-distinct clothing and a face mask (such as a surgical mask or N95). Don’t sign up for rewards programs or provide any other information about yourself. When purchasing online, ideally you should do so over [Tor](tor-overview.md). However, many merchants don’t allow purchases with Tor. You can consider using a [recommended VPN](../vpn.md) (paid for with cash, gift card, or Monero), or making the purchase from a coffee shop or library with free Wi-Fi. If you are ordering a physical item that needs to be delivered, you will need to provide a delivery address. You should consider using a PO box, private mailbox, or work address. + +
+

Important notices

+ +The content here is not legal or financial advice. We do not endorse or encourage illicit activities, and we do not endorse or encourage anything which violates a company's terms of service. Check with a professional to confirm that these recommendations are legal and available in your jurisdiction. [See all notices](../about/notices.md). + +
diff --git a/docs/advanced/tor-overview.md b/docs/advanced/tor-overview.md index 2004520b..474196f2 100644 --- a/docs/advanced/tor-overview.md +++ b/docs/advanced/tor-overview.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ description: Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the [**Tor**](../alternative-networks.md#tor) is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool. +[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Why You Need Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/02/why-you-need-tor/){ .md-button } + Tor works by routing your internet traffic through volunteer-operated servers, instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity. [:octicons-home-16:](https://torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage } @@ -20,7 +22,7 @@ Tor works by routing your internet traffic through volunteer-operated servers, i Before connecting to Tor, you should carefully consider what you're looking to accomplish by using Tor in the first place, and who you're trying to hide your network activity from. -If you live in a free country, are accessing mundane content via Tor, aren't worried about your ISP or local network administrators having the knowledge that you're using Tor, and want to help [de-stigmatize](https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en) Tor usage, you can likely connect to Tor directly via standard means like [Tor Browser](../tor.md) without worry. +If you live in a free country, are accessing mundane content via Tor, aren't worried about your ISP or local network administrators having the knowledge that you're using Tor, and want to help [destigmatize](https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en) Tor usage, you can likely connect to Tor directly via standard means like [Tor Browser](../tor.md) without worry. If you have the ability to access a trusted VPN provider and **any** of the following are true, you almost certainly should connect to Tor through a VPN: @@ -204,5 +206,5 @@ It is [possible](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/clarify-tors-weaknesses-wit ## Additional Resources - [Tor Browser User Manual](https://tb-manual.torproject.org) -- [How Tor Works - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/QRYzre4bf7I?local=true) (YouTube) -- [Tor Onion Services - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/lVcbq_a5N9I?local=true) (YouTube) +- [How Tor Works - Computerphile](https://youtube.com/watch?v=QRYzre4bf7I) (YouTube) +- [Tor Onion Services - Computerphile](https://youtube.com/watch?v=lVcbq_a5N9I) (YouTube) diff --git a/docs/ai-chat.md b/docs/ai-chat.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..5a5bdeb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/ai-chat.md @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +--- +meta_title: "Recommended AI Chat: Private ChatGPT Alternatives - Privacy Guides" +title: "AI Chat" +icon: material/assistant +description: Unlike OpenAI's ChatGPT and its Big Tech competitors, these AI tools run locally so your data never leaves your desktop device. +cover: ai-chatbots.webp +--- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } +- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } + +Since the release of ChatGPT in 2022, interactions with Large Language Models (LLMs) have become increasingly common. LLMs can help us write better, understand unfamiliar subjects, or answer a wide range of questions. They can statistically predict the next word based on a vast amount of data scraped from the web. + +## Privacy Concerns About LLMs + +Data used to train AI models, however, includes a massive amount of publicly available data scraped from the web, which can include sensitive information like names and addresses. Cloud-based AI software often [collects your inputs](https://openai.com/policies/row-privacy-policy), meaning your chats are not private from them. This practice also introduces a risk of data breaches. Furthermore, there is a real possibility that an LLM will leak your private chat information in future conversations with other users. + +If you are concerned about these practices, you can either refuse to use AI, or use [truly open-source models](https://proton.me/blog/how-to-build-privacy-first-ai) which publicly release and allow you to inspect their training datasets. One such model is [OLMoE](https://allenai.org/blog/olmoe-an-open-small-and-state-of-the-art-mixture-of-experts-model-c258432d0514) made by [Ai2](https://allenai.org/open-data). + +Alternatively, you can run AI models locally so that your data never leaves your device and is therefore never shared with third parties. As such, local models are a more private and secure alternative to cloud-based solutions and allow you to share sensitive information to the AI model without worry. + +## AI Models + +### Hardware for Local AI Models + +Local models are also fairly accessible. It's possible to run smaller models at lower speeds on as little as 8 GB of RAM. Using more powerful hardware such as a dedicated GPU with sufficient VRAM or a modern system with fast LPDDR5X memory offers the best experience. + +LLMs can usually be differentiated by the number of parameters, which can vary between 1.3B to 405B for open-source models available for end users. For example, models below 6.7B parameters are only good for basic tasks like text summaries, while models between 7B and 13B are a great compromise between quality and speed. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities are generally around 70B. + +For consumer-grade hardware, it is generally recommended to use [quantized models](https://huggingface.co/docs/optimum/en/concept_guides/quantization) for the best balance between model quality and performance. Check out the table below for more precise information about the typical requirements for different sizes of quantized models. + +| Model Size (in Parameters) | Minimum RAM | Minimum Processor | +|---|---|---| +| 7B | 8 GB | Modern CPU (AVX2 support) | +| 13B | 16 GB | Modern CPU (AVX2 support) | +| 70B | 72 GB | GPU with VRAM | + +To run AI locally, you need both an AI model and an AI client. + +### Choosing a Model + +There are many permissively licensed models available to download. [Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models) is a platform that lets you browse, research, and download models in common formats like [GGUF](https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/en/gguf). Companies that provide good open-weights models include big names like Mistral, Meta, Microsoft, and Google. However, there are also many community models and 'fine-tunes' available. As mentioned above, quantized models offer the best balance between model quality and performance for those using consumer-grade hardware. + +To help you choose a model that fits your needs, you can look at leaderboards and benchmarks. The most widely-used leaderboard is the community-driven [LM Arena](https://lmarena.ai). Additionally, the [OpenLLM Leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/open-llm-leaderboard/open_llm_leaderboard) focuses on the performance of open-weights models on common benchmarks like [MMLU-Pro](https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.01574). There are also specialized benchmarks which measure factors like [emotional intelligence](https://eqbench.com), ["uncensored general intelligence"](https://huggingface.co/spaces/DontPlanToEnd/UGI-Leaderboard), and [many others](https://www.nebuly.com/blog/llm-leaderboards). + +## AI Chat Clients + +| Feature | [Kobold.cpp](#koboldcpp) | [Ollama](#ollama-cli) | [Llamafile](#llamafile) | +|---|---|---|---| +| GPU Support | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | +| Image Generation | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-close:{ .pg-red } | :material-close:{ .pg-red } | +| Speech Recognition | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-close:{ .pg-red } | :material-close:{ .pg-red } | +| Auto-download Models | :material-close:{ .pg-red } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Few models available | +| Custom Parameters | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-close:{ .pg-red } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | +| Multi-platform | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Size limitations on Windows | + +### Kobold.cpp + +
+ +![Kobold.cpp Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/kobold.png){align=right} + +Kobold.cpp is an AI client that runs locally on your Windows, Mac, or Linux computer. It's an excellent choice if you are looking for heavy customization and tweaking, such as for role-playing purposes. + +In addition to supporting a large range of text models, Kobold.cpp also supports image generators such as [Stable Diffusion](https://stability.ai/stable-image) and automatic speech recognition tools such as [Whisper](https://github.com/ggerganov/whisper.cpp). + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-lock-16:](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp/blob/2f3597c29abea8b6da28f21e714b6b24a5aca79b/SECURITY.md){ .card-link title="Security Policy" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp/releases) +- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp/releases) +- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp/releases) + +
+ +
+ +
+

Compatibility Issues

+ +Kobold.cpp might not run on computers without AVX/AVX2 support. + +
+ +Kobold.cpp allows you to modify parameters such as the AI model temperature and the AI chat's system prompt. It also supports creating a network tunnel to access AI models from other devices such as your phone. + +### Ollama (CLI) + +
+ +![Ollama Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/ollama.png){align=right} + +Ollama is a command-line AI assistant that is available on macOS, Linux, and Windows. Ollama is a great choice if you're looking for an AI client that's easy-to-use, widely compatible, and fast due to its use of inference and other techniques. It also doesn't involve any manual setup. + +In addition to supporting a wide range of text models, Ollama also supports [LLaVA](https://github.com/haotian-liu/LLaVA) models and has experimental support for Meta's [Llama vision capabilities](https://huggingface.co/blog/llama32#what-is-llama-32-vision). + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://ollama.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/ollama/ollama#readme){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ollama/ollama){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-lock-16:](https://github.com/ollama/ollama/blob/a14f76491d694b2f5a0dec6473514b7f93beeea0/SECURITY.md){ .card-link title="Security Policy" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://ollama.com/download/windows) +- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://ollama.com/download/mac) +- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://ollama.com/download/linux) + +
+ +
+ +Ollama simplifies the process of setting up a local AI chat by downloading the AI model you want to use automatically. For example, running `ollama run llama3.2` will automatically download and run the Llama 3.2 model. Furthermore, Ollama maintains their own [model library](https://ollama.com/library) where they host the files of various AI models. This ensures that models are vetted for both performance and security, eliminating the need to manually verify model authenticity. + +### Llamafile + +
+ +![Llamafile Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.svg){align=right} + +Llamafile is a lightweight single-file executable that allows users to run LLMs locally on their own computers without any setup involved. It is [backed by Mozilla](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2023/11/introducing-llamafile) and available on Linux, macOS, and Windows. + +Llamafile also supports LLaVA. However, it doesn't support speech recognition or image generation. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#llamafile){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-lock-16:](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#security){ .card-link title="Security Policy" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:fontawesome-solid-desktop: Desktop](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart) + +
+ +
+ +Mozilla has made llamafiles available for only some Llama and Mistral models, while there are few third-party llamafiles available. Moreover, Windows limits `.exe` files to 4 GB, and most models are larger than that. + +To circumvent these issues, you can [load external weights](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#using-llamafile-with-external-weights). + +## Securely Downloading Models + +If you use an AI client that maintains their own library of model files (such as [Ollama](#ollama-cli) and [Llamafile](#llamafile)), you should download it from there. However, if you want to download models not present in their library, or use an AI client that doesn't maintain its library (such as [Kobold.cpp](#koboldcpp)), you will need to take extra steps to ensure that the AI model you download is safe and legitimate. + +We recommend downloading model files from Hugging Face since it provides several features to verify that your download is genuine and safe to use. + +To check the authenticity and safety of the model, look for: + +- Model cards with clear documentation +- A verified organization badge +- Community reviews and usage statistics +- A "Safe" badge next to the model file (Hugging Face only) +- Matching checksums[^1] + - On Hugging Face, you can find the hash by clicking on a model file and looking for the **Copy SHA256** button below it. You should compare this checksum with the one from the model file you downloaded. + +A downloaded model is generally safe if it satisfies all the above checks. + +## Criteria + +Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend. In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. + +### Minimum Requirements + +- Must be open-source. +- Must not transmit personal data, including chat data. +- Must be multi-platform. +- Must not require a GPU. +- Must support GPU-powered fast inference. +- Must not require an internet connection. + +### Best-Case + +Our best-case criteria represent what we *would* like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. + +- Should be easy to download and set up, e.g. with a one-click installation process. +- Should have a built-in model downloader option. +- The user should be able to modify the LLM parameters, such as its system prompt or temperature. + +[^1]: A file checksum is a type of anti-tampering fingerprint. A developer usually provides a checksum in a text file that can be downloaded separately, or on the download page itself. Verifying that the checksum of the file you downloaded matches the one provided by the developer helps ensure that the file is genuine and wasn't tampered with in transit. You can use commands like `sha256sum` on Linux and macOS, or `certutil -hashfile file SHA256` on Windows to generate the downloaded file's checksum. diff --git a/docs/alternative-networks.md b/docs/alternative-networks.md index d15a984f..0524177f 100644 --- a/docs/alternative-networks.md +++ b/docs/alternative-networks.md @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ You can enable Snowflake in your browser by opening it in another tab and turnin Snowflake does not increase your privacy in any way, nor is it used to connect to the Tor network within your personal browser. However, if your internet connection is uncensored, you should consider running it to help people in censored networks achieve better privacy themselves. There is no need to worry about which websites people are accessing through your proxy—their visible browsing IP address will match their Tor exit node, not yours. -Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even more so than running a Tor relay or bridge which are already not particularly risky endeavours. However, it does still proxy traffic through your network which can be impactful in some ways, especially if your network is bandwidth-limited. Make sure you understand [how Snowflake works](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home) before deciding whether to run a proxy. +Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even more so than running a Tor relay or bridge which are already not particularly risky endeavors. However, it does still proxy traffic through your network which can be impactful in some ways, especially if your network is bandwidth-limited. Make sure you understand [how Snowflake works](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home) before deciding whether to run a proxy. ### I2P (The Invisible Internet Project) @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even more so than running a Tor relay or ![I2P logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/i2p.svg#only-light){ align=right } ![I2P logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/i2p-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } -**I2P** is an network layer which encrypts your connections and routes them via a network of computers distributed around the world. It is mainly focused on creating an alternative, privacy-protecting network rather than making regular internet connections anonymous. +**I2P** is a network layer which encrypts your connections and routes them via a network of computers distributed around the world. It is mainly focused on creating an alternative, privacy-protecting network rather than making regular internet connections anonymous. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://geti2p.net/en){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-info-16:](https://geti2p.net/en/about/software){ .card-link title=Documentation } @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ You can try connecting to *Privacy Guides* via I2P at [privacyguides.i2p](http:/
-Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default, instead of relying on dedicated relay volunteers to run nodes. There are approximately [10,000](https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html) relays and bridges on the Tor network compared to ~50,000 on I2P, meaning there is potentially more ways for your traffic to be routed to maximize anonymity. I2P also tends to be more performant than Tor, although this is likely a side-effect of Tor being more focused on regular "clearnet" internet traffic and thus using more bottlenecked exit nodes. Hidden service performance is generally considered to be much better on I2P compared to Tor. While running P2P applications like BitTorrent is challenging on Tor (and can massively impact Tor network performance), it is very easy and performant on I2P. +Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default, instead of relying on dedicated relay volunteers to run nodes. There are approximately [10,000](https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html) relays and bridges on the Tor network compared to ~50,000 on I2P, meaning there is potentially more ways for your traffic to be routed to maximize anonymity. I2P also tends to be more performant than Tor, although this is likely a side effect of Tor being more focused on regular "clearnet" internet traffic and thus using more bottle necked exit nodes. Hidden service performance is generally considered to be much better on I2P compared to Tor. While running P2P applications like BitTorrent is challenging on Tor (and can massively impact Tor network performance), it is very easy and performant on I2P. There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard). diff --git a/docs/android/distributions.md b/docs/android/distributions.md index 38783363..a2ca2248 100644 --- a/docs/android/distributions.md +++ b/docs/android/distributions.md @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ --- -meta_title: "The Best Custom Android OSes (aka Custom ROMs) - Privacy Guides" +meta_title: "The Best Android Operating Systems - Privacy Guides" title: "Alternative Distributions" description: You can replace the operating system on your Android phone with these secure and privacy-respecting alternatives. schema: @@ -19,27 +19,22 @@ schema: "@context": http://schema.org "@type": WebPage url: "./" - - - "@context": http://schema.org - "@type": CreativeWork - name: Divest - image: /assets/img/android/divestos.svg - url: https://divestos.org/ - sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DivestOS - subjectOf: - "@context": http://schema.org - "@type": WebPage - url: "./" +robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large --- -[:material-target-account:](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } [:material-bug-outline:](../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } +Protects against the following threat(s): -A **custom Android-based operating system** (often known as a **custom ROM**) is a popular way to achieve higher levels of privacy and security on your device. This is in contrast to the "stock" version of Android which comes with your phone from the factory, and is often deeply integrated with Google Play Services. +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } -We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems. +A **custom Android-based operating system** (sometimes referred to as a **custom ROM**) can be a way to achieve a higher level of privacy and security on your device. This is in contrast to the "stock" version of Android which comes with your phone from the factory, and is often deeply integrated with Google Play Services as well as other vendor software. -## AOSP Derivatives +We recommend installing GrapheneOS if you have a Google Pixel as it provides improved security hardening and additional privacy features. The reasons we don't list other operating systems or devices are as follows: -### GrapheneOS +- They often have [weaker security](index.md#install-a-custom-distribution). +- Support is frequently dropped when the maintainer loses interest or upgrades their device, which is in contrast to the predictable [support cycle](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-lifetime) that GrapheneOS follows. +- They generally have few or no notable privacy or security improvements that make installing them worthwhile. + +## GrapheneOS
@@ -58,43 +53,13 @@ GrapheneOS provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wik
-GrapheneOS supports [sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](../os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](../os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice. +GrapheneOS supports [sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs Google Play Services fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as push notifications, while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](../os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](../os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice. [Google Pixel phones](../mobile-phones.md#google-pixel) are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices). -### DivestOS +By default, Android makes many network connections to Google to perform DNS connectivity checks, to sync with current network time, to check your network connectivity, and for many other background tasks. GrapheneOS replaces these with connections to servers operated by GrapheneOS and subject to their privacy policy. This hides information like your IP address [from Google](../basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers), but means it is trivial for an admin on your network or ISP to see you are making connections to `grapheneos.network`, `grapheneos.org`, etc. and deduce what operating system you are using. -
- -![DivestOS logo](../assets/img/android/divestos.svg){ align=right } - -**DivestOS** is a soft-fork of [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org). -DivestOS inherits many [supported devices](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) from LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) on some non-Pixel devices. - -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:simple-torbrowser:](http://divestoseb5nncsydt7zzf5hrfg44md4bxqjs5ifcv4t7gt7u6ohjyyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=faq){ .card-link title=Documentation} -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/pages/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } - -
- -DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, and a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), and receives out-of-band updates. -DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled. - -DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://grapheneos.org/usage#exec-spawning), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, [automatic reboot](https://grapheneos.org/features#auto-reboot), and Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features#attack-surface-reduction). - -DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. We normally [recommend avoiding F-Droid](obtaining-apps.md#f-droid), but doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repository, [DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [F-Droid Basic](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.basic) **with the DivestOS repository enabled** to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended [methods of obtaining them](obtaining-apps.md) still apply. - -
-

Warning

- -DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) and quality control varies across the devices it supports. We still recommend GrapheneOS depending on your device's compatibility. For other devices, DivestOS is a good alternative. - -Not all of the supported devices have verified boot, and some perform it better than others. - -
+If you want to hide information like this from an adversary on your network or ISP, you **must** use a [trusted VPN](../vpn.md) in addition to changing the connectivity check setting to **Standard (Google)**. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **Internet connectivity checks**. This option allows you to connect to Google's servers for connectivity checks, which, alongside the usage of a VPN, helps you blend in with a larger pool of Android devices. ## Criteria diff --git a/docs/android/general-apps.md b/docs/android/general-apps.md index 7444196e..646f86e1 100644 --- a/docs/android/general-apps.md +++ b/docs/android/general-apps.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: "General Apps" +description: The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality. schema: - "@context": http://schema.org @@ -24,11 +25,18 @@ schema: name: Secure PDF Viewer applicationCategory: Utilities operatingSystem: Android +robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } + We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality. ### Shelter +If your device is on Android 15 or greater, we recommend using the native [Private Space](../os/android-overview.md#private-space) feature instead, which provides nearly the same functionality without needing to place trust in and grant powerful permissions to a third-party app. +
![Shelter logo](../assets/img/android/shelter.svg){ align=right } @@ -46,14 +54,18 @@ Shelter supports blocking contact search cross profiles and sharing files across

Warning

-Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular) and [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) as it supports [contact search blocking](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html). - When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer, as Shelter acts as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) to create the Work Profile, and it has extensive access to the data stored within the Work Profile.
+Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular) and [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) as it supports [contact search blocking](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html). + ### Secure Camera +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-search: Public Exposure](../basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information){ .pg-green } +
![Secure camera logo](../assets/img/android/secure_camera.svg#only-light){ align=right } @@ -86,7 +98,7 @@ Main privacy features include:

Note

-Metadata is not currently deleted from video files but that is planned. +Metadata is not currently deleted from video files, but that is planned. The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure Camera) that **won't** be deleted either. If you want to delete that later you will need to use an external app such as [ExifEraser](../data-redaction.md#exiferaser-android). @@ -97,7 +109,6 @@ The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure Protects against the following threat(s): - [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } -- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
diff --git a/docs/android/index.md b/docs/android/index.md index 9cfab672..63ac6364 100644 --- a/docs/android/index.md +++ b/docs/android/index.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: "Android" +description: Our advice for replacing privacy-invasive default Android features with private and secure alternatives. icon: 'simple/android' cover: android.webp schema: @@ -21,16 +22,48 @@ schema: The **Android Open Source Project** (AOSP) is an open-source mobile operating system led by Google which powers the majority of the world's mobile devices. Most phones sold with Android are modified to include invasive integrations and apps such as Google Play Services, so you can significantly improve your privacy on your mobile device by replacing your phone's default installation with a version of Android without these invasive features. -[:octicons-home-16:](https://source.android.com){ .card-link title=Homepage } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation} -[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[General Android Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../os/android-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -We recommend the following Android-specific tools to maximize your mobile device's security and privacy. +## Our Advice -- [Alternative Distributions](distributions.md) -- [General Apps](general-apps.md) -- [Obtaining Applications](obtaining-apps.md) +### Replace Google Services -To learn more about Android: +There are many methods of obtaining apps on Android while avoiding Google Play. Whenever possible, try using one of these methods before getting your apps from non-private sources: -[General Android Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../os/android-overview.md){ .md-button } +[Obtaining Applications :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](obtaining-apps.md){ .md-button } + +There are also many private alternatives to the apps that come pre-installed on your phone, such as the camera app. Besides the Android apps we recommend throughout this site in general, we've created a list of system utilities specific to Android which you might find useful. + +[General App Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](general-apps.md){ .md-button } + +### Install a Custom Distribution + +When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. + +This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a *custom ROM*, that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model. + +Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria: + +[Recommended Distributions :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](distributions.md){ .md-button } + +### Avoid Root + +[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. + +Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md). + +AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations. + +We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. + +### Install Updates Regularly + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android receive not only security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Use Built-in Sharing Features + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. diff --git a/docs/android/obtaining-apps.md b/docs/android/obtaining-apps.md index c27f0ef5..7122ccea 100644 --- a/docs/android/obtaining-apps.md +++ b/docs/android/obtaining-apps.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: "Obtaining Applications" +description: We recommend these methods for obtaining applications on Android without interacting with Google Play Services. --- There are many ways to obtain Android apps privately, even from the Play Store, without interacting with Google Play Services. We recommend the following methods of obtaining applications on Android, listed in order of preference. @@ -113,13 +114,13 @@ If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature wi Due to their process of building apps, apps in the *official* F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust. Additionally, the requirements for an app to be included in the official F-Droid repo are less strict than other app stores like Google Play, meaning that F-Droid tends to host a lot more apps which are older, unmaintained, or otherwise no longer meet [modern security standards](https://developer.android.com/google/play/requirements/target-sdk). -Other popular third-party repositories for F-Droid such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can fully recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that repository if they are later added to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates. +Other popular third-party repositories for F-Droid such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from code forges (GitHub, GitLab, etc.) and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. They also offer [reproducible builds](https://android.izzysoft.de/articles/named/iod-rbs-mirrors-clients) for hundreds of applications and have developers who verify the reproducibility of developer-signed APKs. Furthermore, the IzzyOnDroid team conducts [additional security scans](https://android.izzysoft.de/articles/named/iod-scan-apkchecks) of apps housed in the repo, which usually result in [deliberations](https://github.com/gouravkhunger/QuotesApp/issues/22) between them and app developers toward privacy improvements in their apps. Note that apps may be removed from the IzzyOnDroid repo in [certain circumstances](https://gitlab.com/IzzyOnDroid/repo#are-apps-removed-from-the-repo--and-when-does-that-happen). -That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through other means such as the Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method, and keep an eye on how frequently the app is updated. Outdated apps may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. +The [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be useful places to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through other means such as the Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. You should use your best judgment when looking for new apps via this method, and keep an eye on how frequently the app is updated. Outdated apps may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk.

F-Droid Basic

-In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using the newer [F-Droid Basic](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.basic) client instead of the original F-Droid app to obtain it. F-Droid Basic supports automatic background updates without privileged extension or root, and has a reduced feature set (limiting attack surface). +In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](../health-and-wellness.md#gadgetbridge) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using the newer [F-Droid Basic](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.basic) client instead of the original F-Droid app to obtain it. F-Droid Basic supports automatic background updates without privileged extension or root, and has a reduced feature set (limiting attack surface).
diff --git a/docs/assets/img/ios/contact-permissions-dark.png b/docs/assets/img/ios/contact-permissions-dark.png new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f7279408 Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/assets/img/ios/contact-permissions-dark.png differ diff --git a/docs/assets/img/ios/contact-permissions-light.png b/docs/assets/img/ios/contact-permissions-light.png new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c49046ad Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/assets/img/ios/contact-permissions-light.png differ diff --git a/docs/assets/img/ios/photo-permissions-dark.png b/docs/assets/img/ios/photo-permissions-dark.png new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a5e11c54 Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/assets/img/ios/photo-permissions-dark.png differ diff --git a/docs/assets/img/ios/photo-permissions-light.png b/docs/assets/img/ios/photo-permissions-light.png new file mode 100644 index 00000000..80e46c45 Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/assets/img/ios/photo-permissions-light.png differ diff --git a/docs/assets/img/ios/private-access-dark.png b/docs/assets/img/ios/private-access-dark.png new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b7126d32 Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/assets/img/ios/private-access-dark.png differ diff --git a/docs/assets/img/ios/private-access-light.png b/docs/assets/img/ios/private-access-light.png new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9ba36f06 Binary files /dev/null and b/docs/assets/img/ios/private-access-light.png differ diff --git a/docs/basics/account-creation.md b/docs/basics/account-creation.md index 22b11db6..9fc569f0 100644 --- a/docs/basics/account-creation.md +++ b/docs/basics/account-creation.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ icon: 'material/account-plus' description: Creating accounts online is practically an internet necessity, take these steps to make sure you stay private. --- -Often people sign up for services without thinking. Maybe it's a streaming service so you can watch that new show everyone's talking about, or an account that gives you a discount for your favorite fast food place. Whatever the case may be, you should consider the implications for your data now and later on down the line. +Often people sign up for services without thinking. Maybe it's a streaming service to watch that new show everyone's talking about, or an account that gives you a discount for your favorite fast food place. Whatever the case may be, you should consider the implications for your data now and later on down the line. There are risks associated with every new service that you use. Data breaches; disclosure of customer information to third parties; rogue employees accessing data; all are possibilities that must be considered when giving your information out. You need to be confident that you can trust the service, which is why we don't recommend storing valuable data on anything but the most mature and battle-tested products. That usually means services which provide E2EE and have undergone a cryptographic audit. An audit increases assurance that the product was designed without glaring security issues caused by an inexperienced developer. @@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [ove ## Terms of Service & Privacy Policy -The ToS are the rules that you agree to follow when using the service. With larger services these rules are often enforced by automated systems. Sometimes these automated systems can make mistakes. For example, you may be banned or locked out of your account on some services for using a VPN or VOIP number. Appealing such bans is often difficult, and involves an automated process too, which isn't always successful. This would be one of the reasons why we wouldn't suggest using Gmail for email as an example. Email is crucial for access to other services you might have signed up for. +The ToS are the rules that you agree to follow when using the service. With larger services these rules are often enforced by automated systems. Sometimes these automated systems can make mistakes. For example, you may be banned or locked out of your account on some services for using a VPN or VoIP number. Appealing such bans is often difficult, and involves an automated process too, which isn't always successful. This would be one of the reasons why we wouldn't suggest using Gmail for email as an example. Email is crucial for access to other services you might have signed up for. -The Privacy Policy is how the service says they will use your data and it is worth reading so that you understand how your data will be used. A company or organization might not be legally obligated to follow everything contained in the policy (it depends on the jurisdiction). We would recommend having some idea what your local laws are and what they permit a provider to collect. +The Privacy Policy is how the service says they will use your data, and it is worth reading so that you understand how your data will be used. A company or organization might not be legally obligated to follow everything contained in the policy (it depends on the jurisdiction). We would recommend having some idea what your local laws are and what they permit a provider to collect. -We recommend looking for particular terms such as "data collection", "data analysis", "cookies", "ads" or "3rd-party" services. Sometimes you will be able to opt-out from data collection or from sharing your data, but it is best to choose a service that respects your privacy from the start. +We recommend looking for particular terms such as "data collection", "data analysis", "cookies", "ads" or "3rd-party" services. Sometimes you will be able to opt out from data collection or from sharing your data, but it is best to choose a service that respects your privacy from the start. Keep in mind you're also placing your trust in the company or organization and that they will comply with their own privacy policy. @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, #### Email aliases -If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to. +If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign-up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to. Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked. @@ -74,9 +74,9 @@ Malicious applications, particularly on mobile devices where the application has ### Phone number -We recommend avoiding services that require a phone number for sign up. A phone number can identity you across multiple services and depending on data sharing agreements this will make your usage easier to track, particularly if one of those services is breached as the phone number is often **not** encrypted. +We recommend avoiding services that require a phone number for sign up. A phone number can identify you across multiple services and depending on data sharing agreements this will make your usage easier to track, particularly if one of those services is breached as the phone number is often **not** encrypted. -You should avoid giving out your real phone number if you can. Some services will allow the use of VOIP numbers, however these often trigger fraud detection systems, causing an account to be locked down, so we don't recommend that for important accounts. +You should avoid giving out your real phone number if you can. Some services will allow the use of VoIP numbers, however these often trigger fraud detection systems, causing an account to be locked down, so we don't recommend that for important accounts. In many cases you will need to provide a number that you can receive SMS or calls from, particularly when shopping internationally, in case there is a problem with your order at border screening. It's common for services to use your number as a verification method; don't let yourself get locked out of an important account because you wanted to be clever and give a fake number! diff --git a/docs/basics/account-deletion.md b/docs/basics/account-deletion.md index 59568b55..0173f47d 100644 --- a/docs/basics/account-deletion.md +++ b/docs/basics/account-deletion.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Desktop platforms also often have a password manager which may help you recover ### Email -If you didn't use a password manager in the past or you think you have accounts that were never added to your password manager, another option is to search the email account(s) that you believe you signed up on. On your email client, search for keywords such as "verify" or "welcome." Almost every time you make an online account, the service will send a verification link or an introductory message to your email. This can be a good way to find old, forgotten accounts. +If you didn't use a password manager in the past, or you think you have accounts that were never added to your password manager, another option is to search the email account(s) that you believe you signed up on. On your email client, search for keywords such as "verify" or "welcome." Almost every time you make an online account, the service will send a verification link or an introductory message to your email. This can be a good way to find old, forgotten accounts. ## Deleting Old Accounts @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ When attempting to regain access, if the site returns an error message saying th ### GDPR (EEA residents only) -Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in [Article 17](https://gdpr-info.eu/art-17-gdpr) of the GDPR. If it's applicable to you, read the privacy policy for any given service to find information on how to exercise your right to erasure. Reading the privacy policy can prove important, as some services have a "Delete Account" option that only disables your account and for real deletion you have to take additional action. Sometimes actual deletion may involve filling out surveys, emailing the data protection officer of the service or even proving your residence in the EEA. If you plan to go this way, do **not** overwrite account information—your identity as an EEA resident may be required. Note that the location of the service does not matter; GDPR applies to anyone serving European users. If the service does not respect your right to erasure, you can contact your national [Data Protection Authority](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) and you may be entitled to monetary compensation. +Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in [Article 17](https://gdpr-info.eu/art-17-gdpr) of the GDPR. If it's applicable to you, read the privacy policy for any given service to find information on how to exercise your right to erasure. Reading the privacy policy can prove important, as some services have a "Delete Account" option that only disables your account and for real deletion you have to take additional action. Sometimes actual deletion may involve filling out surveys, emailing the data protection officer of the service or even proving your residence in the EEA. If you plan to go this way, do **not** overwrite account information—your identity as an EEA resident may be required. Note that the location of the service does not matter; GDPR applies to anyone serving European users. If the service does not respect your right to erasure, you can contact your national [Data Protection Authority](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) and may be entitled to monetary compensation. ### Overwriting Account information diff --git a/docs/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/docs/basics/common-misconceptions.md index c17c9d2f..3fc5e21c 100644 --- a/docs/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/docs/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -63,13 +63,13 @@ The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very imp ## "Complicated is better" -We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?" +We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like multiple email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?" Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips: 1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions. 2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember. -3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight. +3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily deanonymized by a simple oversight. So, how might this look? @@ -94,4 +94,4 @@ One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one Using Tor can help with this. It is also worth noting that greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous communication: Real-time communication is vulnerable to analysis of typing patterns (i.e. more than a paragraph of text, distributed on a forum, via email, etc.) -[^1]: A notable supply chain attack occurred in March 2024, when a malicious maintainer added a obfuscated backdoor into `xz`, a popular compression library. The backdoor ([CVE-2024-3094](https://cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-3094)) was intended to give an unknown party remote access to most Linux servers via SSH, but it was discovered before it had been widely deployed. +[^1]: A notable supply chain attack occurred in March 2024, when a malicious maintainer added an obfuscated backdoor into `xz`, a popular compression library. The backdoor ([CVE-2024-3094](https://cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-3094)) was intended to give an unknown party remote access to most Linux servers via SSH, but it was discovered before it had been widely deployed. diff --git a/docs/basics/common-threats.md b/docs/basics/common-threats.md index 88f940ca..5f5380cd 100644 --- a/docs/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/docs/basics/common-threats.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: 'material/eye-outline' description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the things many visitors to this site care about. --- -Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. +Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. :material-incognito: **Anonymity** @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-mo :material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** -: Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. +: Typically, a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. :material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-mo :material-account-search: **Public Exposure** -: Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. +: Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the public. :material-close-outline: **Censorship** @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources. -Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../desktop.md#qubes-os). +Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../desktop.md#qubes-os).
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible
-Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all. +Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as whom you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all. ## Mass Surveillance Programs @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ Mass surveillance is the intricate effort to monitor the "behavior, many activit If you want to learn more about surveillance methods and how they're implemented in your city you can also take a look at the [Atlas of Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org) by the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://eff.org). -In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net. +In France, you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies lik For many people, tracking and surveillance by private corporations is a growing concern. Pervasive ad networks, such as those operated by Google and Facebook, span the internet far beyond just the sites they control, tracking your actions along the way. Using tools like content blockers to limit network requests to their servers, and reading the privacy policies of the services you use can help you avoid many basic adversaries (although it can't completely prevent tracking).[^4] -Additionally, even companies outside of the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you. +Additionally, even companies outside the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you. ## Limiting Public Information diff --git a/docs/basics/email-security.md b/docs/basics/email-security.md index 0661723a..60513510 100644 --- a/docs/basics/email-security.md +++ b/docs/basics/email-security.md @@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ If you use a shared domain from a provider which doesn't support WKD, like @gmai ### What Email Clients Support E2EE? -Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multi-factor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication. +Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication. ### How Do I Protect My Private Keys? -A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device. +A smart card (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smart card and the decrypted content is sent back to the device. -It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device. +It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smart card to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device. ## Email Metadata Overview @@ -49,4 +49,4 @@ Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](http ### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE? -Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as who you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc. +Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as whom you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc. diff --git a/docs/basics/hardware.md b/docs/basics/hardware.md index 20834f6e..293f58ba 100644 --- a/docs/basics/hardware.md +++ b/docs/basics/hardware.md @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Most implementations of face authentication require you to be looking at your ph

Warning

-Some devices do not have the proper hardware for secure face authentication. There's two main types of face authentication: 2D and 3D. 3D face authentication makes use of a dot projector that lets the device create a 3D depth map of your face. Make sure that your device has this capability. +Some devices do not have the proper hardware for secure face authentication. There are two main types of face authentication: 2D and 3D. 3D face authentication makes use of a dot projector that lets the device create a 3D depth map of your face. Make sure that your device has this capability.
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ A dead man's switch stops a piece of machinery from operating without the presen Some laptops are able to [detect](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/managing-presence-sensing-settings-in-windows-11-82285c93-440c-4e15-9081-c9e38c1290bb) when you're present and can lock automatically when you aren't sitting in front of the screen. You should check the settings in your OS to see if your computer supports this feature. -You can also get cables, like [Buskill](https://buskill.in), that will lock or wipe your computer when the cable is disconnected. +You can also get cables, like [BusKill](https://buskill.in), that will lock or wipe your computer when the cable is disconnected. ### Anti-Interdiction/Evil Maid Attack diff --git a/docs/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md b/docs/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md index 6fe9eab1..73979b18 100644 --- a/docs/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md +++ b/docs/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ --- -title: "Multi-Factor Authentication" +title: "Multifactor Authentication" icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication' description: MFA is a critical security mechanism for securing your online accounts, but some methods are stronger than others. --- -**Multi-Factor Authentication** (**MFA**) is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app. +**Multifactor Authentication** (**MFA**) is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app. Normally, if a hacker (or adversary) is able to figure out your password then they’d gain access to the account that password belongs to. An account with MFA forces the hacker to have both the password (something you *know*) and a device that you own (something you *have*), like your phone. @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ The security of push notification MFA is dependent on both the quality of the ap ### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP) -TOTP is one of the most common forms of MFA available. When you set up TOTP, you are generally required to scan a [QR Code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code) which establishes a "[shared secret](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)" with the service that you intend to use. The shared secret is secured inside of the authenticator app's data, and is sometimes protected by a password. +TOTP is one of the most common forms of MFA available. When you set up TOTP, you are generally required to scan a [QR Code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code) which establishes a "[shared secret](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)" with the service that you intend to use. The shared secret is secured inside the authenticator app's data, and is sometimes protected by a password. The time-limited code is then derived from the shared secret and the current time. As the code is only valid for a short time, without access to the shared secret, an adversary cannot generate new codes. @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ This presentation discusses the history of password authentication, the pitfalls FIDO2 and WebAuthn have superior security and privacy properties when compared to any MFA methods. -Typically for web services it is used with WebAuthn which is a part of the [W3C recommendations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#W3C_recommendation_(REC)). It uses public key authentication and is more secure than shared secrets used in Yubico OTP and TOTP methods, as it includes the origin name (usually, the domain name) during authentication. Attestation is provided to protect you from phishing attacks, as it helps you to determine that you are using the authentic service and not a fake copy. +Typically, for web services it is used with WebAuthn which is a part of the [W3C recommendations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#W3C_recommendation_(REC)). It uses public key authentication and is more secure than shared secrets used in Yubico OTP and TOTP methods, as it includes the origin name (usually, the domain name) during authentication. Attestation is provided to protect you from phishing attacks, as it helps you to determine that you are using the authentic service and not a fake copy. Unlike Yubico OTP, WebAuthn does not use any public ID, so the key is **not** identifiable across different websites. It also does not use any third-party cloud server for authentication. All communication is completed between the key and the website you are logging into. FIDO also uses a counter which is incremented upon use in order to prevent session reuse and cloned keys. @@ -115,15 +115,15 @@ If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new ## More Places to Set Up MFA -Beyond just securing your website logins, multi-factor authentication can be used to secure your local logins, SSH keys or even password databases as well. +Beyond just securing your website logins, multifactor authentication can be used to secure your local logins, SSH keys or even password databases as well. ### macOS -macOS has [native support](https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/intro-to-smart-card-integration-depd0b888248/web) for authentication with smart cards (PIV). If you have a smartcard or a hardware security key that supports the PIV interface such as the YubiKey, we recommend that you follow your smartcard/hardware security vendor's documentation and set up second factor authentication for your macOS computer. +macOS has [native support](https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/intro-to-smart-card-integration-depd0b888248/web) for authentication with smart cards (PIV). If you have a smart card or a hardware security key that supports the PIV interface such as the YubiKey, we recommend that you follow your smart card or hardware security vendor's documentation and set up second factor authentication for your macOS computer. Yubico have a guide [Using Your YubiKey as a Smart Card in macOS](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360016649059) which can help you set up your YubiKey on macOS. -After your smartcard/security key is set up, we recommend running this command in the Terminal: +After your smart card/security key is set up, we recommend running this command in the Terminal: ```text sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow DisableFDEAutoLogin -bool YES @@ -158,4 +158,4 @@ SSH MFA can also be set up using TOTP. DigitalOcean has provided a tutorial [How ### KeePass (and KeePassXC) -KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using Challenge-Response or HOTP as a second-factor authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website. +KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using HOTP or Challenge-Response as a second-factor of authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website. diff --git a/docs/basics/passwords-overview.md b/docs/basics/passwords-overview.md index ae5f5f1d..2ca9ae28 100644 --- a/docs/basics/passwords-overview.md +++ b/docs/basics/passwords-overview.md @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ All of our [recommended password managers](../passwords.md) include a built-in p You should avoid changing passwords that you have to remember (such as your password manager's master password) too often unless you have reason to believe it has been compromised, as changing it too often exposes you to the risk of forgetting it. -When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multi-factor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage. +When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multifactor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.

Checking for data breaches

@@ -54,13 +54,13 @@ To generate a diceware passphrase using real dice, follow these steps:

Note

-These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large wordlist](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other wordlists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy. +These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other word lists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy.
1. Roll a six-sided die five times, noting down the number after each roll. -2. As an example, let's say you rolled `2-5-2-6-6`. Look through the [EFF's large wordlist](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) for the word that corresponds to `25266`. +2. As an example, let's say you rolled `2-5-2-6-6`. Look through the [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) for the word that corresponds to `25266`. 3. You will find the word `encrypt`. Write that word down. @@ -75,12 +75,12 @@ You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appea If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords. -We recommend using [EFF's large wordlist](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [other wordlists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English. +We recommend using [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [word lists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases -To demonstrate how strong diceware passphrases are, we'll use the aforementioned seven word passphrase (`viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`) and [EFF's large wordlist](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) as an example. +To demonstrate how strong diceware passphrases are, we'll use the aforementioned seven word passphrase (`viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`) and [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) as an example. One metric to determine the strength of a diceware passphrase is how much entropy it has. The entropy per word in a diceware passphrase is calculated as @@ -132,19 +132,19 @@ Therefore, each word in the aforementioned list results in ~12.9 bits of entropy ). -The [EFF's large wordlist](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) contains 7776 unique words. To calculate the amount of possible passphrases, all we have to do is +The [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) contains 7776 unique words. To calculate the amount of possible passphrases, all we have to do is WordsInList WordsInPhrase , or in our case, 77767. -Let's put all of this in perspective: A seven word passphrase using [EFF's large wordlist](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) is one of ~1,719,070,799,748,422,500,000,000,000 possible passphrases. +Let's put all of this in perspective: A seven word passphrase using [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) is one of ~1,719,070,799,748,422,500,000,000,000 possible passphrases. On average, it takes trying 50% of all the possible combinations to guess your phrase. With that in mind, even if your adversary is capable of ~1,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take them ~27,255,689 years to guess your passphrase. That is the case even if the following things are true: - Your adversary knows that you used the diceware method. -- Your adversary knows the specific wordlist that you used. +- Your adversary knows the specific word list that you used. - Your adversary knows how many words your passphrase contains.
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose o

Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager

-When using [TOTP codes as multi-factor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md). +When using [TOTP codes as multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md). Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager. diff --git a/docs/basics/threat-modeling.md b/docs/basics/threat-modeling.md index 1fa25d79..80dc58ac 100644 --- a/docs/basics/threat-modeling.md +++ b/docs/basics/threat-modeling.md @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of dig To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network. -*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.* +*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get hold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.* Depending on who your adversaries are, this list might be something you want to destroy after you've finished developing your threat model. diff --git a/docs/basics/vpn-overview.md b/docs/basics/vpn-overview.md index d604e719..64ea348b 100644 --- a/docs/basics/vpn-overview.md +++ b/docs/basics/vpn-overview.md @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ description: Virtual Private Networks shift risk away from your ISP to a third-p Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. +[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Do you need a VPN?](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2024/12/12/do-you-need-a-vpn/){ .md-button } + Normally, an ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem). Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns). Using a VPN hides even this information from your ISP, by shifting the trust you place in your network to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing through it. @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ VPNs encrypt your traffic between your device and a server owned by your VPN pro ``` mermaid flowchart LR 763931["Your Device
(with VPN Client)
"] ===|"VPN Encryption"| 404512{"VPN Server"} - 404512 -.-|"No VPN Encryption"| 593753((("The Internet\n(Your Destination)"))) + 404512 -.-|"No VPN Encryption"| 593753(("The Internet
(Your Destination)
")) subgraph 763931["Your Device
(with VPN Client)
"] end ``` diff --git a/docs/basics/why-privacy-matters.md b/docs/basics/why-privacy-matters.md index ea4f0537..04191c08 100644 --- a/docs/basics/why-privacy-matters.md +++ b/docs/basics/why-privacy-matters.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Why Privacy Matters" icon: 'material/shield-account' +description: In the modern age of digital data exploitation, your privacy has never been more critical, and yet many believe it is already a lost cause. It is not. --- In the modern age of digital data exploitation, your privacy has never been more critical, and yet many believe it is already a lost cause. It is not. ==Your privacy is up for grabs==, and you need to care about it. Privacy is about power, and it is so important that this power ends up in the right hands. @@ -10,6 +11,8 @@ Privacy is ultimately about human information, and this is important because we Many people get the concepts of **privacy**, **security**, and **anonymity** confused. You'll see people criticize various products as "not private" when really they mean it doesn't provide anonymity, for example. On this website, we cover all three of these topics, but it is important you understand the difference between them, and when each one comes into play. +[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Stop Confusing Privacy, Anonymity, and Security](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/14/stop-confusing-privacy-anonymity-and-security/){ .md-button } + **Privacy** @@ -49,6 +52,8 @@ Take cookie consent forms, for example. You may encounter these dozens of times Privacy is something we need to have baked into the [software and services](../tools.md) we use by default, you can't bend most apps into being private on your own. +[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: 5 Steps to Improve Your Privacy](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/02/14/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online/){ class="md-button" } + ## Sources - [Why Privacy Matters](https://amazon.com/dp/0190939044) (2021) by Neil Richards diff --git a/docs/browser-extensions.md b/docs/browser-extensions.md index 5cda2b5d..3b3102f7 100644 --- a/docs/browser-extensions.md +++ b/docs/browser-extensions.md @@ -69,7 +69,6 @@ uBlock Origin also has a "Lite" version of their extension, which offers a very
Downloads -- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/addon/ublock-origin-lite) - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ublock-origin-lite/ddkjiahejlhfcafbddmgiahcphecmpfh)
@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@ uBlock Origin Lite only receives block list updates whenever the extension is up ### AdGuard -We recommend [Safari](mobile-browsers.md#safari) for iOS users, which unfortunately is not supported by uBlock Origin. Luckily, Adguard provides an adequate alternative: +We recommend [Safari](mobile-browsers.md#safari-ios) for iOS users, which unfortunately is not supported by uBlock Origin. Luckily, AdGuard provides an adequate alternative:
diff --git a/docs/calendar.md b/docs/calendar.md index 62e414b9..427d7389 100644 --- a/docs/calendar.md +++ b/docs/calendar.md @@ -18,15 +18,15 @@ cover: calendar.webp ![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta.svg#only-light){ align=right } ![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } -**Tuta** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tuta.com/calendar-app-comparison). +**Tuta** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multifactor authentication, and [more](https://tuta.com/calendar-app-comparison). Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tuta.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tuta.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://tuta.com/support){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://tuta.com/support){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tuta.com/community){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tuta.com/community){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscri **Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide). Those on the free tier gain access to 3 calendars, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 25 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/calendar){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/calendar/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/calendar){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscri
-Unfortunately, as of May 2024 Proton has [still](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/proton-calendar-is-not-open-source-mobile/14656/8) not released the source code for their mobile Calendar app on Android or iOS, and only the former has been [audited](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps). Proton Calendar's web client is open source, however, and has been [audited](https://proton.me/community/open-source). +Unfortunately, as of August 2024 Proton has [still](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/proton-calendar-is-not-open-source-mobile/14656/8) not released the source code for their mobile Calendar app on Android or iOS, and only the former has been [audited](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps). Proton Calendar's web client is open source, however, and has been [audited](https://proton.me/community/open-source). ## Criteria diff --git a/docs/cloud.md b/docs/cloud.md index 91a4d568..333234d4 100644 --- a/docs/cloud.md +++ b/docs/cloud.md @@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](document-collaboration.md#nextcloud) for ![Proton Drive logo](assets/img/cloud/protondrive.svg){ align=right } -**Proton Drive** is an encrypted cloud storage provider from the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](email.md#proton-mail). The initial free storage is limited to 2GB, but with the completion of certain steps, additional storage can be obtained up to 5GB. +**Proton Drive** is an encrypted cloud storage provider from the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](email.md#proton-mail). The initial free storage is limited to 2 GB, but with the completion of [certain steps](https://proton.me/support/more-free-storage-existing-users), additional storage can be obtained up to 5 GB. -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ class="md-button md-button--primary" } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/drive){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/drive/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/drive){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ Proton Drive's brand new mobile clients have not yet been publicly audited by a **Tresorit** is a Swiss-Hungarian encrypted cloud storage provider founded in 2011. Tresorit is owned by the Swiss Post, the national postal service of Switzerland. -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tresorit.com){ class="md-button md-button--primary" } +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tresorit.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tresorit.com/legal/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.tresorit.com){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.tresorit.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
Downloads @@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ Peergos is primarily a web app, but you can self-host the server either as a loc Running a local version of Peergos alongside a registered account on their paid, hosted service allows you to access your Peergos storage without any reliance on DNS or TLS certificate authorities, and keep a copy of your data backed up to their cloud. The user experience should be the same whether you run their desktop server or just use their hosted web interface. -Peergos was [audited](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_peergos.pdf) by Cure53 in September 2019, and all found issues were subsequently fixed. +Peergos was [audited](https://peergos.org/posts/security-audit-2024) in November 2024 by Radically Open Security and all issues were fixed. They were previously [audited](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_peergos.pdf) by Cure53 in June 2019, and all found issues were subsequently fixed. -Also, the Android app is not available but it is [in the works](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/peergos-private-storage-sharing-social-media-and-application-platform/11825/25). The current workaround is to use the mobile [PWA](https://peergos.net) instead. +An Android app is not available, but it is [in the works](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/peergos-private-storage-sharing-social-media-and-application-platform/11825/25). The current workaround is to use the mobile [PWA](https://peergos.net) instead. ## Criteria @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ Also, the Android app is not available but it is [in the works](https://discuss. - Must enforce end-to-end encryption. - Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing. -- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication, or passkey logins. +- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multifactor authentication, or passkey logins. - Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality. - Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents. diff --git a/docs/cryptocurrency.md b/docs/cryptocurrency.md index 7ac7523b..ba599419 100644 --- a/docs/cryptocurrency.md +++ b/docs/cryptocurrency.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- meta_title: "Private Cryptocurrency Blockchains - Privacy Guides" +description: Unlike most cryptocurrencies, these ones provide transaction privacy by default. Monero is our top choice for obfuscating transaction information. title: Cryptocurrency icon: material/bank-circle cover: cryptocurrency.webp @@ -39,15 +40,8 @@ Many if not most cryptocurrency projects are scams. Make transactions carefully With Monero, outside observers cannot decipher addresses trading Monero, transaction amounts, address balances, or transaction histories. -For optimal privacy, make sure to use a noncustodial wallet where the view key stays on the device. This means that only you will have the ability to spend your funds and see incoming and outgoing transactions. If you use a custodial wallet, the provider can see **everything** you do; if you use a “lightweight” wallet where the provider retains your private view key, the provider can see almost everything you do. Some noncustodial wallets include: - -- [Official Monero client](https://getmonero.org/downloads) (Desktop) -- [Cake Wallet](https://cakewallet.com) (iOS, Android, macOS) - - Cake Wallet supports multiple cryptocurrencies. A Monero-only version of Cake Wallet for iOS and Android is available at [Monero.com](https://monero.com). -- [Feather Wallet](https://featherwallet.org) (Desktop) -- [Monerujo](https://monerujo.io) (Android) - -For maximum privacy (even with a noncustodial wallet), you should run your own Monero node. Using another person’s node will expose some information to them, such as the IP address that you connect to it from, the timestamps that you sync your wallet, and the transactions that you send from your wallet (though no other details about those transactions). Alternatively, you can connect to someone else’s Monero node over Tor or [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project). +
+Monero's resilience to mass surveillance In August 2021, CipherTrace [announced](https://web.archive.org/web/20240223224846/https://ciphertrace.com/enhanced-monero-tracing) enhanced Monero tracing capabilities for government agencies. Public postings show that the US Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network [licensed](https://sam.gov/opp/d12cbe9afbb94ca68006d0f006d355ac/view) CipherTrace's "Monero Module" in late 2022. @@ -55,8 +49,45 @@ Monero transaction graph privacy is limited by its relatively small ring signatu Ultimately, Monero is the strongest contender for a privacy-friendly cryptocurrency, but its privacy claims have **not** been definitively proven one way or the other. More time and research is needed to assess whether Monero is resilient enough to attacks to always provide adequate privacy. +
+ +### Monero wallets + +For optimal privacy, make sure to use a self-custody wallet where the [view key](https://getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/viewkey.html) stays on the device. This means that only you will have the ability to spend your funds and see incoming and outgoing transactions. If you use a custodial wallet, the provider can see **everything** you do; if you use a “lightweight” wallet where the provider retains your view key, the provider can see almost everything you do (but not spend your funds). Some self-custody wallets where the view key does not leave your device include: + +- [Official Monero client](https://getmonero.org/downloads) (Desktop) +- [Cake Wallet](https://cakewallet.com) (iOS, Android, Desktop) + - Cake Wallet supports multiple cryptocurrencies. A Monero-only version of Cake Wallet for iOS and Android is available at [Monero.com](https://monero.com). +- [Feather Wallet](https://featherwallet.org) (Desktop) +- [Monerujo](https://monerujo.io) (Android) + +### Monero nodes + +For maximum privacy (even with a self-custody wallet), you should run your own Monero node called the [Monero daemon](https://docs.getmonero.org/interacting/monerod-reference), which is included in the [CLI wallet](https://getmonero.org/downloads/#cli). Using another person’s node will expose some information to them, such as the IP address that you connect to it from, the timestamps that you sync your wallet, and the transactions that you send from your wallet (though no other details about those transactions). Alternatively, you can connect to someone else’s Monero node over [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor), [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project), or a [VPN](vpn.md). + +### Buying Monero + +[General tips for acquiring Monero](advanced/payments.md#acquisition){ .md-button } + +There are numerous centralized exchanges (CEX) as well as P2P marketplaces where you can buy and sell Monero. Some of them require identifying yourself (KYC) to comply with anti-money laundering regulations. However, due to Monero's privacy features, the only thing known to the seller is *that* you bought Monero, but not how much you own or where you spend it (after it leaves the exchange). Some reputable places to buy Monero include: + +- [Kraken](https://kraken.com): A well-known CEX. Registration and KYC are mandatory. Card payments and bank transfers accepted. Make sure not to leave your newly purchased Monero on Kraken's platform after the purchase; withdraw them to a self-custody wallet. Monero is not available in all jurisdictions that Kraken operates in.[^1] +- [Cake Wallet](https://cakewallet.com): A self-custody cross-platform wallet for Monero and other cryptocurrencies. You can buy Monero directly in the app using card payments or bank transfers (through third-party providers such as [Guardarian](https://guardarian.com) or [DFX](https://dfx.swiss)).[^2] KYC is usually not required, but it depends on your country and the amount you are purchasing. In countries where directly purchasing Monero is not possible, you can also use a provider within Cake Wallet to first buy another cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, or Litecoin and then exchange it to Monero in-app. + - [Monero.com](https://monero.com) is an associated website where you can buy Monero and other cryptocurrencies without having to download an app. The funds will simply be sent to the wallet address of your choice. +- [RetoSwap](https://retoswap.com) (formerly known as Haveno-Reto) is a self-custody, decentralized P2P exchange platform based on the [Haveno](https://haveno.exchange) project which is available for Linux, Windows, and macOS. Monero can be bought and sold with maximum privacy, since most trading counterparties do not require KYC, trades are made directly between users (P2P), and all connections run through the Tor network. It is possible to buy Monero via bank transfer, PayPal, or even by paying in cash (meeting in person or sending by mail). Arbitrators can step in to resolve disputes between buyer and seller, but be careful when sharing your bank account or other sensitive information with your trading counterparty. Trading with some accounts may be against those accounts' terms of service. + ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. - Cryptocurrency must provide private/untraceable transactions by default. + +
+

Important notices

+ +The content here is not legal or financial advice. We do not endorse or encourage illicit activities, and we do not endorse or encourage anything which violates a company's terms of service. Check with a professional to confirm that these recommendations are legal and available in your jurisdiction. [See all notices](about/notices.md). + +
+ +[^1]: You may refer to the following pages for up-to-date information on countries in which Kraken does **not** allow the purchase of Monero: [Where is Kraken licensed or regulated?](https://support.kraken.com/hc/en-us/articles/where-is-kraken-licensed-or-regulated) and [Support for Monero (XMR) in Europe](https://support.kraken.com/hc/en-us/articles/support-for-monero-xmr-in-europe). +[^2]: You may refer to the following pages for up-to-date information on countries in which Cake Wallet and Monero.com **only** allow the direct purchase of Monero (through third-party providers): [Which countries are served by DFX?](https://docs.dfx.swiss/en/faq.html#which-countries-are-served-by-dfx) and [What are the supported countries/regions? (Guardarian)](https://guardarian.freshdesk.com/support/solutions/articles/80001151826-what-are-the-supported-countries-regions). diff --git a/docs/data-broker-removals.md b/docs/data-broker-removals.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9a2432c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/data-broker-removals.md @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +--- +title: Data Removal Services +icon: material/database-off +description: Our recommended methods for removing your personal information from data brokers and people search sites. +cover: data-broker-removals.webp +--- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-search: Public Exposure](basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information){ .pg-green } + +"People search sites" operated by data brokers represent an immense privacy risk to the majority of Americans. For many, sensitive personal information such as your address, phone number, email, and age is a simple internet search away. While there is unfortunately no federal regulation in place to protect your data, many of these companies will remove your information from their *public* databases upon request. + +:flag_us: **Note:** Many of these tools are only available in the United States, and data brokers collecting, sharing, and selling information from public records and other resources is largely a US-centric issue. In many other regions, your data is already protected via regulations like the GDPR. We will always advocate for similarly strong privacy protections in the United States, but those affected today may still benefit from these "stop-gap" solutions. + +Counterintuitively, removing your personal data on these sites from the internet generally requires *providing* these companies with your personal data for them to comply with the request. Unfortunately, in most cases it is still worth doing so to minimize the amount of personal data about you which is publicly accessible. + +
+

Try it out

+ +Use your favorite [search engine](search-engines.md) to see if your data is trivially exposed by searching for your name in quotes, plus your general location. For example, search for `"Jane Smith" Chicago IL`. In many cases, you may find your personal information makes up many of the first results. Even if results about you aren't readily available though, you may still be affected. The list of data brokers linked below will provide more places to check whether your data is in any public databases. + +
+ +## Manual Opt-Outs Free + +The quickest, most effective, and most private way to remove yourself from people search sites is to submit opt-out requests manually to each site. This can *seem* like a daunting task, because there are hundreds of people search sites, but the reality is that the vast majority of these sites are operated by a small handful of companies. + +You should search for your information on these sites first, and submit an opt-out request if your information is found. Removing your data from these providers typically removes your data from many smaller sites at the same time. + +- Advanced Background Checks ([Search](https://advancedbackgroundchecks.com), [Opt-Out](https://advancedbackgroundchecks.com/removal)) +- BeenVerified ([Search](https://beenverified.com/app/optout/search), [Opt-Out](https://beenverified.com/app/optout/address-search)) +- CheckPeople ([Search](https://checkpeople.com/do-not-sell-info), select *Remove Record* to opt-out) +- ClustrMaps ([Search](https://clustrmaps.com), [Opt-Out](https://clustrmaps.com/bl/opt-out)) +- Dataveria ([Search](https://dataveria.com), [Opt-Out](https://dataveria.com/ng/control/privacy)) +- InfoTracer ([Search](https://infotracer.com), [Opt-Out](https://infotracer.com/optout)) +- Intelius ([Search](https://intelius.com), [Opt-Out](https://suppression.peopleconnect.us/login)) +- PeekYou ([Search](https://peekyou.com), [Opt-Out](https://peekyou.com/about/contact/optout)) +- PublicDataUSA ([Search](https://publicdatausa.com), [Opt-Out](https://publicdatausa.com/remove.php)) +- Radaris ([Search](https://radaris.com), [Opt-Out](https://radaris.com/page/how-to-remove)) +- Spokeo ([Search](https://spokeo.com/search), [Opt-Out](https://spokeo.com/optout)) +- That's Them ([Search](https://thatsthem.com), [Opt-Out](https://thatsthem.com/optout)) +- USPhonebook ([Search and Opt-Out](https://usphonebook.com/opt-out)) +- Whitepages ([Search](https://whitepages.com), [Opt-Out](https://whitepages.com/suppression_requests)) + +
+

A tip on opt-out strategy

+ +Be sure to avoid burning out or becoming overwhelmed with this process. Unless you're in immediate danger, you can take breaks and avoid doing them all at once.[^1] + +One strategy could be to look at a single website from the list above every week, starting from the top. Next week you move on to the following website on the list, and so on. When you reach the end of the list, you can start again from the beginning. + +This sets you up on a nice schedule to re-review each website approximately every 3-4 months, and breaks down the process into simple 5 minute tasks you can easily add to your weekly routine. + +
+ +Once you have opted-out of all of these sites for the first time, it's best to wait a week or two for the requests to propagate to all their sites. Then, you can start to search and opt-out of any remaining sites you find. It can be a good idea to use a web crawler like [Google's *Results about you*](#google-results-about-you-free) tool to help find any data that remains on the internet. + +Otherwise, privacy journalist Yael Grauer has compiled an excellent list of data broker sites with direct links to their search tools and opt-out pages. You can take some time to go through each site to determine whether they have your information, and remove it: + +[:simple-github: Big Ass Data Broker Opt-Out List](https://github.com/yaelwrites/Big-Ass-Data-Broker-Opt-Out-List){ .md-button } + +If you don't use an automatic scanner to find results about you, consider setting a reminder to re-do this process every 3, 6, or 12 months depending on your risk level and the amount of personal data you have out there. Unfortunately, it is common for your data to re-appear over time or show up on brand-new people search sites even after you opt out. + +## EasyOptOuts Paid + +
+ +![EasyOptOuts logo](assets/img/data-broker-removals/easyoptouts.svg){ align=right } + +**EasyOptOuts** is a $20/year service which will search a number of different data broker sites and automatically submit opt-out requests on your behalf. They will perform the first search and removal process immediately, and then re-run the process every 4 months in case your data shows up on new sites over time. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://easyoptouts.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://easyoptouts.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + +
+ +Some websites supported by EasyOptOuts are publicly searchable. In those cases EasyOptOuts will perform a search and only submit an opt-out request if your personal data is already found, to prevent sending your data in an opt-out request to sites that didn't have it already. However, they do support some sites which are not publicly searchable, and in those cases your data will be sent to them in an opt-out request regardless, in case you are in their private databases. + +Our [testing](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/02/03/easyoptouts-review) indicates that EasyOptOuts provides the best value out of any data removal service we've tested, with a very affordable price and high effectiveness. Independent [findings from Consumer Reports](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/consumer-reports-evaluating-people-search-site-removal-services/19948) also indicate that EasyOptOuts is one of the top performing data removal services. + +
+

High priority sites not supported by EasyOptOuts

+ +EasyOptOuts does not cover the following sites we consider to be "high priority," so you should still manually opt-out of: + +- Intelius ([Search](https://intelius.com), [Opt-Out](https://suppression.peopleconnect.us/login)) +- PeekYou ([Search](https://peekyou.com), [Opt-Out](https://peekyou.com/about/contact/optout)) + +
+ +## Google *Results About You* Free + +
+

Google is a data collector themselves

+ +This method will require you to submit your personal information to Google for them to periodically monitor their search results for. Google claims to not use the information provided to this tool to "personalize your experiences" across other Google products. + +While Google is not a data broker themselves *per se*, as they don't sell or share your data with outside parties, some may find this relationship unacceptable. You should always decide whether the benefits of this tool outweigh the drawbacks for your individual situation. + +
+ +
+ +![Google logo](assets/img/data-broker-removals/google.svg){ align=right } + +**Results about you** is a free tool which helps you discover whether your personal contact information, including your home address, phone number, and email address, appears in Google search results. If any personal information is found, you can request its removal. + +[:octicons-globe-16: Open Web Tool](https://myactivity.google.com/results-about-you){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/12719076){ .card-link title=Documentation} + +
+ +In many cases, a Google search is the first place a potential stalker or abuser would look to find your personal information, which could make using it a worthwhile trade-off. However, this tool does not remove your information from the discovered websites themselves, only their listings on Google. You should still consider manually opting out from the results which are discovered, or using another service which automatically opts you out from those sites directly. + +You can add up to 3 addresses, 3 phone numbers, and 3 email addresses to your Google account to monitor for. The service is only available in select markets (initially the US and UK) to users over 18. + +When results are found, they will be available for review in this web tool. You can also optionally receive an email notification delivered to the account's Gmail address that lets you know when new results are found. You will then be able to click **Request to remove** on each discovered listing, and Google will review the request. + +In our testing, this tool worked to reliably remove people search sites from Google search results, but was not effective against websites that showed *corporate* filing information, even if you used your personal address to register a company, nor was it effective against social media profiles. + +## Criteria + +**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing a data removal service, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. + +Our picks for removal services are primarily based on independent professional testing from third-parties as noted in the sections above, our own internal testing, and aggregated reviews from our community. + +- Must not be a white labeled service or reseller of another provider. +- Must not be affiliated with the data broker industry or purchase advertising on people search sites. +- Must only use your personal data for the purposes of opting you out of data broker databases and people search sites. + +[^1]: If you *are* immediately threatened by stalkers or other threats, you should strongly consider an automated tool like [EasyOptOuts](#easyoptouts-paid), at least for the initial "purge." When things are more manageable in the future you can come back to the manual process. Of course, in a dangerous situation your first priority should always be to seek professional help [from police](https://onlineharassmentfieldmanual.pen.org/involving-law-enforcement) or others before tackling it on your own. diff --git a/docs/data-redaction.md b/docs/data-redaction.md index bcef3d72..cec0a88b 100644 --- a/docs/data-redaction.md +++ b/docs/data-redaction.md @@ -5,22 +5,29 @@ icon: material/tag-remove description: Use these tools to remove metadata like GPS location and other identifying information from photos and files you share. cover: data-redaction.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-search: Public Exposure](basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information){ .pg-green } + When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) data. Photos sometimes even include GPS coordinates in the file metadata. -## Desktop +
+

Warning

-### MAT2 +You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). If you want to redact text in an image, you should draw a box over the text. + +
+ +## MAT2
![MAT2 logo](assets/img/data-redaction/mat2.svg){ align=right } -**MAT2** is free software, which allows the metadata to be removed from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an extension for [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org). - -On Linux, a third-party graphical tool [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmnvgr/metadata-cleaner) powered by MAT2 exists and is [available on Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/fr.romainvigier.MetadataCleaner). +**MAT2** is free, cross-platform software which allows you to remove metadata from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an extension for [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org). [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/blob/master/README.md){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/blob/master/README.md){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -35,9 +42,7 @@ On Linux, a third-party graphical tool [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmn
-## Mobile - -### ExifEraser (Android) +## ExifEraser (Android)
@@ -48,7 +53,7 @@ On Linux, a third-party graphical tool [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmn It currently supports JPEG, PNG and WebP files. [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -78,72 +83,30 @@ The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely: - It allows you to drag photos from another app into ExifEraser when they are both open in split-screen mode. - Lastly, it allows you to paste an image from your clipboard. -### Metapho (iOS) +## Shortcuts (iOS & macOS) -
+On iOS and macOS, you can remove image metadata without using any third-party apps by creating a [**shortcut**](https://apps.apple.com/app/id915249334) for this purpose. Here is an example shortcut you can download to use as is: -![Metapho logo](assets/img/data-redaction/metapho.jpg){ align=right } +[:material-tag-minus: Clean Image Metadata](https://icloud.com/shortcuts/fb774ddb7b5b4296871776c67ac0fff9){ .md-button } -**Metapho** is a simple and clean viewer for photo metadata such as date, file name, size, camera model, shutter speed, and location. +You can also use it as a model for your own shortcut; just make sure that the **Preserve Metadata** option under the **Convert** action is unchecked. Once added, you can access the shortcut in the share sheet that appears when you select the :octicons-share-24: Share button. You can select multiple images and invoke the shortcut to remove their metadata all at once. -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://zininworks.com/metapho){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://zininworks.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +This shortcut removes metadata such as location, device model, lens model, and other camera information. It also sets the image creation date to the time the shortcut was used. -
-Downloads - -- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id914457352) - -
- -
- -### PrivacyBlur - -
- -![PrivacyBlur logo](assets/img/data-redaction/privacyblur.svg){ align=right } - -**PrivacyBlur** is a free app which can blur sensitive portions of pictures before sharing them online. - -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privacyblur.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://privacyblur.app/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation} -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur){ .card-link title="Source Code" } - -
-Downloads - -- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.mathema.privacyblur) -- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1536274106) - -
- -
- -
-

Warning

- -You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). If you want to redact text in an image, draw a box over the text. For this, we suggest apps like [Pocket Paint](https://github.com/Catrobat/Paintroid). - -
- -## Command-line - -### ExifTool +## ExifTool (CLI)
![ExifTool logo](assets/img/data-redaction/exiftool.png){ align=right } -**ExifTool** is the original perl library and command-line application for reading, writing, and editing meta information (Exif, IPTC, XMP, and more) in a wide variety of file formats (JPEG, TIFF, PNG, PDF, RAW, and more). +**ExifTool** is the original Perl library and command-line application for reading, writing, and editing meta information (Exif, IPTC, XMP, and more) in a wide variety of file formats (JPEG, TIFF, PNG, PDF, RAW, and more). -It's often a component of other Exif removal applications and is in most Linux distribution repositories. +It is often a component of other Exif removal applications and in most Linux distribution repositories. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://exiftool.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://exiftool.org/faq.html){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://exiftool.org/faq.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/exiftool/exiftool){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://exiftool.org/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://exiftool.org/#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads diff --git a/docs/desktop-browsers.md b/docs/desktop-browsers.md index 74b84145..4348234d 100644 --- a/docs/desktop-browsers.md +++ b/docs/desktop-browsers.md @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) ins [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mullvad.net/en/browser){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/tag/mullvad-browser){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/tag/mullvad-browser){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/mullvad-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -108,7 +108,9 @@ This is required to prevent advanced forms of tracking, but does come at the cos ### Mullvad Leta -Mullvad Browser comes with DuckDuckGo set as the default [search engine](search-engines.md), but it also comes preinstalled with **Mullvad Leta**, a search engine which requires an active Mullvad VPN subscription to access. Mullvad Leta queries Google's paid search API directly, which is why it is limited to paying subscribers. However, it is possible for Mullvad to correlate search queries and Mullvad VPN accounts because of this limitation. For this reason we discourage the use of Mullvad Leta, even though Mullvad collects very little information about their VPN subscribers. +Mullvad Browser comes with [**Mullvad Leta**](https://leta.mullvad.net) as the default search engine, which functions as a proxy to either Google or Brave search results (configurable on the Mullvad Leta homepage). + +If you are a Mullvad VPN user, there is some risk in using services like Mullvad Leta which are offered by your VPN provider themselves. This is because Mullvad theoretically has access to your true IP address (via their VPN) and your search activity (via Leta), which is information a VPN is typically intended to separate. Even though Mullvad collects very little information about their VPN subscribers or Leta users, you should consider a different [search engine](search-engines.md) if this risk concerns you. ## Firefox @@ -120,9 +122,9 @@ Mullvad Browser comes with DuckDuckGo set as the default [search engine](search- [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://firefox.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mozilla.org/privacy/firefox){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/products/firefox){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/products/firefox){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.mozilla.org){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.mozilla.org){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -184,9 +186,11 @@ This protects you from persistent cookies, but does not protect you against cook - [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to install and run studies** - [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send backlogged crash reports on your behalf** +According to Mozilla's privacy policy for Firefox, + > Firefox sends data about your Firefox version and language; device operating system and hardware configuration; memory, basic information about crashes and errors; outcome of automated processes like updates, safebrowsing, and activation to us. When Firefox sends data to us, your IP address is temporarily collected as part of our server logs. -Additionally, the Mozilla Accounts service collects [some technical data](https://mozilla.org/privacy/mozilla-accounts). If you use a Mozilla Account you can opt-out: +Additionally, the Mozilla Accounts service collects [some technical data](https://mozilla.org/privacy/mozilla-accounts). If you use a Mozilla Account you can opt out: 1. Open your [profile settings on accounts.firefox.com](https://accounts.firefox.com/settings#data-collection) 2. Uncheck **Data Collection and Use** > **Help improve Firefox Accounts** @@ -201,7 +205,7 @@ With the release of Firefox 128, a new setting for [privacy-preserving attributi - [x] Select **Enable HTTPS-Only Mode in all windows** -This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day to day browsing. +This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day-to-day browsing. ##### DNS over HTTPS @@ -226,7 +230,7 @@ Max Protection enforces the use of DNS over HTTPS, and a security warning will s The [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) provides a set of carefully considered options for Firefox. If you [decide](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/1.1-To-Arkenfox-or-Not) to use Arkenfox, a [few options](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.2-Overrides-[Common]) are subjectively strict and/or may cause some websites to not work properly—which you can [easily change](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.1-Overrides) to suit your needs. We **strongly recommend** reading through their full [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki). Arkenfox also enables [container](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/containers#w_for-advanced-users) support. -Arkenfox only aims to thwart basic or naive tracking scripts through canvas randomization and Firefox's built-in fingerprint resistance configuration settings. It does not aim to make your browser blend in with a large crowd of other Arkenfox users in the same way Mullvad Browser or Tor Browser do, which is the only way to thwart advanced fingerprint tracking scripts. Remember you can always use multiple browsers, for example, you could consider using Firefox+Arkenfox for a few sites that you want to stay logged in on or otherwise trust, and Mullvad Browser for general browsing. +Arkenfox only aims to thwart basic or naive tracking scripts through canvas randomization and Firefox's built-in fingerprint resistance configuration settings. It does not aim to make your browser blend in with a large crowd of other Arkenfox users in the same way Mullvad Browser or Tor Browser do, which is the only way to thwart advanced fingerprint tracking scripts. Remember that you can always use multiple browsers, for example, you could consider using Firefox+Arkenfox for a few sites that you want to stay logged in on or otherwise trust, and Mullvad Browser for general browsing. ## Brave @@ -241,7 +245,7 @@ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -294,8 +298,8 @@ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave
-1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode). -2. If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis by clicking on the Shield icon in the address bar. +1. This option disables JavaScript, which will break a lot of sites. To fix them, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis by clicking on the Shield icon in the address bar and unchecking this setting under *Advanced controls*. +2. If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis by clicking on the Shield icon in the address bar and unchecking this setting under *Advanced controls*. #### Privacy and security @@ -303,7 +307,7 @@ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave - [x] Select **Don't allow sites to use the V8 optimizer** under *Security* → *Manage V8 security* (1) - [x] Select **Automatically remove permissions from unused sites** under *Sites and Shields Settings* -- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings#webrtc) +- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [*WebRTC IP Handling Policy*](https://support.brave.com/hc/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings#webrtc) - [ ] Uncheck **Use Google services for push messaging** - [x] Select **Auto-redirect AMP pages** - [x] Select **Auto-redirect tracking URLs** @@ -324,7 +328,7 @@ If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set ##### Tor windows -[**Private Window with Tor**](https://support.brave.com/hc/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity) allows you to route your traffic through the Tor network in Private Windows and access .onion services, which may be useful in some cases. However, Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. If your threat model requires strong anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser). +[**Private Window with Tor**](https://support.brave.com/hc/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity) allows you to route your traffic through the Tor network in Private Windows and access .onion services, which may be useful in some cases. However, Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser is, and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. If your threat model requires strong anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser). ##### Data Collection @@ -338,12 +342,17 @@ Brave's Web3 features can potentially add to your browser fingerprint and attack - Select **Extensions (no fallback)** under *Default Ethereum wallet* - Select **Extensions (no fallback)** under *Default Solana wallet* -- Set *Method to resolve IPFS resources* to **Disabled** #### Extensions - [ ] Uncheck all built-in extensions you don't use +#### Search engine + +We recommend disabling search suggestions in Brave for the same reason we recommend disabling this feature in [Firefox](#search). + +- [ ] Uncheck **Show search suggestions** + #### System
@@ -364,8 +373,6 @@ Brave's Web3 features can potentially add to your browser fingerprint and attack **Brave Wallet** operates locally on your computer, but does not support any private cryptocurrencies, so we would discourage using this feature as well. -## Additional Resources - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -386,8 +393,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should include built-in content blocking functionality. - Should support cookie compartmentalization (à la [Multi-Account Containers](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/containers)). -- Should support Progressive Web Apps. - PWAs enable you to install certain websites as if they were native apps on your computer. This can have advantages over installing Electron-based apps, because PWAs benefit from your browser's regular security updates. +- Should support Progressive Web Apps (PWAs). PWAs enable you to install certain websites as if they were native apps on your computer. This can have advantages over installing Electron-based apps because PWAs benefit from your browser's regular security updates. - Should not include add-on functionality (bloatware) that does not impact user privacy. - Should not collect telemetry by default. - Should provide an open-source sync server implementation. diff --git a/docs/desktop.md b/docs/desktop.md index 583f1759..3b88a2a9 100644 --- a/docs/desktop.md +++ b/docs/desktop.md @@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom. cover: desktop.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } + Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom. If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying out, as well as some general privacy and security improvement tips that are applicable to many Linux distributions. - [General Linux Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/linux-overview.md) @@ -68,7 +72,7 @@ Arch Linux has a rolling release cycle. There is no fixed release schedule and p Being a DIY distribution, you are [expected to set up and maintain](os/linux-overview.md#arch-based-distributions) your system on your own. Arch has an [official installer](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Archinstall) to make the installation process a little easier. -A large portion of [Arch Linux’s packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) are [reproducible](https://reproducible-builds.org). +A large portion of [Arch Linux’s packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) are [reproducible](https://reproducible-builds.org)[^1]. ## Atomic Distributions @@ -92,11 +96,11 @@ A large portion of [Arch Linux’s packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) [Fedora Atomic Desktops](https://fedoramagazine.org/introducing-fedora-atomic-desktops) come in a variety of flavors depending on the desktop environment you prefer. As with the recommendation to avoid X11 in our [criteria](#criteria) for Linux distributions, we recommend avoiding flavors that support only the legacy X11 window system. -These operating systems differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/quick-docs/dnf) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/latest/system-administrators-guide/package-management/rpm-ostree). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image. +These operating systems differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/quick-docs/dnf) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://coreos.github.io/rpm-ostree). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image. After the update is complete, you will reboot the system into the new deployment. `rpm-ostree` keeps two deployments of the system so that you can easily roll back if something breaks in the new deployment. There is also the option to pin more deployments as needed. -[Flatpak](https://flatpak.org) is the primary package installation method on these distributions, as `rpm-ostree` is only meant to overlay packages that cannot stay inside of a container on top of the base image. +[Flatpak](https://flatpak.org) is the primary package installation method on these distributions, as `rpm-ostree` is only meant to overlay packages that cannot stay inside a container on top of the base image. As an alternative to Flatpaks, there is the option of [Toolbx](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/toolbox) to create [Podman](https://podman.io) containers which mimic a traditional Fedora environment, a [useful feature](https://containertoolbx.org) for the discerning developer. These containers share a home directory with the host operating system. @@ -118,13 +122,13 @@ NixOS is an independent distribution based on the Nix package manager with a foc NixOS’s package manager keeps every version of every package in a different folder in the **Nix store**. Due to this you can have different versions of the same package installed on your system. After the package contents have been written to the folder, the folder is made read-only. -NixOS also provides atomic updates. It first downloads (or builds) the packages and files for the new system generation and then switches to it. There are different ways to switch to a new generation: you can tell NixOS to activate it after reboot or you can switch to it at runtime. You can also *test* the new generation by switching to it at runtime, but not setting it as the current system generation. If something in the update process breaks, you can just reboot and automatically and return to a working version of your system. +NixOS also provides atomic updates. It first downloads (or builds) the packages and files for the new system generation and then switches to it. There are different ways to switch to a new generation: you can tell NixOS to activate it after reboot, or you can switch to it at runtime. You can also *test* the new generation by switching to it at runtime, but not setting it as the current system generation. If something in the update process breaks, you can just reboot and automatically and return to a working version of your system. The Nix package manager uses a purely functional language—which is also called Nix—to define packages. [Nixpkgs](https://github.com/nixos/nixpkgs) (the main source of packages) are contained in a single GitHub repository. You can also define your own packages in the same language and then easily include them in your config. -Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in the binary cache, Nix will just build the package from source using its definition. It builds each package in a sandboxed *pure* environment, which is as independent of the host system as possible. Binaries built with this method are reproducible, which can be useful as a safeguard against [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }. +Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in the binary cache, Nix will just build the package from source using its definition. It builds each package in a sandboxed *pure* environment, which is as independent of the host system as possible. Binaries built with this method are reproducible[^1]. ## Anonymity-Focused Distributions @@ -134,7 +138,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } -**Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). +**Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and [:material-incognito: Anonymity](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://whonix.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -157,7 +161,7 @@ Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Wh ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ align=right } -**Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and anonymity while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off. +**Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and [:material-incognito: Anonymity](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tails.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.net/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title=Documentation} @@ -182,6 +186,10 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ## Security-focused Distributions +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } + ### Qubes OS
@@ -201,7 +209,7 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte
-Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate *qubes*. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the *qubes* and the core system. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate *qubes*. Should one part of the system be compromised via an exploit in a [:material-target-account: Targeted Attack](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the *qubes* and the core system. For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. @@ -241,3 +249,5 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** + +[^1]: Reproducibility entails the ability to verify that packages and binaries made available to the end user match the source code, which can be useful against potential [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }. diff --git a/docs/device-integrity.md b/docs/device-integrity.md index d2bf1c36..da20688c 100644 --- a/docs/device-integrity.md +++ b/docs/device-integrity.md @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ title: "Device Integrity" icon: material/security description: These tools can be used to check your devices for compromise. cover: device-integrity.webp +robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large --- These tools can be used to validate the integrity of your mobile devices and check them for indicators of compromise by spyware and malware such as Pegasus, Predator, or KingsPawn. This page focuses on **mobile security**, because mobile devices typically have read-only systems with well-known configurations, so detecting malicious modifications is easier than on traditional desktop systems. We may expand the focus of this page in the future. @@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ This means an attacker would have to regularly re-infect your device to retain a If any of the following tools indicate a potential compromise by spyware such as Pegasus, Predator, or KingsPawn, we advise that you contact: - If you are a human rights defender, journalist, or from a civil society organization: [Amnesty International's Security Lab](https://securitylab.amnesty.org/contact-us) -- If a business or government device is compromised: the appropriate security liason at your enterprise, department, or agency +- If a business or government device is compromised: the appropriate security liaison at your enterprise, department, or agency - Local law enforcement **We are unable to help you directly beyond this.** We are happy to discuss your specific situation or circumstances and review your results in our [community](https://discuss.privacyguides.net) spaces, but it is unlikely we can assist you beyond what is written on this page. @@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ MVT allows you to perform deeper scans/analysis if your device is jailbroken. Un
-iMazing automates and interactively guides you through the process of using [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit) to scan your device for publicly-accessible indicators of compromise published by various threat researchers. All of the information and warnings which apply to MVT apply to this tool as well, so we suggest you also familiarize yourself with the notes on MVT in the sections above. +iMazing automates and interactively guides you through the process of using [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit) to scan your device for publicly-accessible indicators of compromise published by various threat researchers. All the information and warnings which apply to MVT apply to this tool as well, so we suggest you also familiarize yourself with the notes on MVT in the sections above. ## On-Device Verification @@ -186,72 +187,3 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring. If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service. - -## On-Device Scanners - -Protects against the following threat(s): - -- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } - -These are apps you can install on your device which scan your device for signs of compromise. - -
-

Warning

- -Using these apps is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool. - -
- -### Hypatia (Android) - -
- -![Hypatia logo](assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia.svg#only-light){ align=right } -![Hypatia logo](assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } - -**Hypatia** is an open source real-time malware scanner for Android, from the developer of [DivestOS](android/distributions.md#divestos). It accesses the internet to download signature database updates, but does not upload your files or any metadata to the cloud (scans are performed entirely locally). - -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org/pages/our_apps#hypatia){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/pages/privacy_policy#hypatia){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile/hypatia){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/pages/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } - -
-Downloads - -- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/us.spotco.malwarescanner) - -
- -
- -Hypatia is particularly good at detecting common stalkerware: If you suspect you are a victim of stalkerware, you should [visit this page](https://stopstalkerware.org/information-for-survivors) for advice. - -### iVerify Basic (iOS) - -
- -![iVerify logo](assets/img/device-integrity/iverify.webp){ align=right } - -**iVerify Basic** is an iOS app which can scan your device to check configuration settings, patch level, and other areas of security. It also checks your device for indicators of compromise by jailbreak tools or of [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } such as [Pegasus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus_(spyware)). - -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://iverify.io/products/basic){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://iverify.io/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://iverify.io/frequently-asked-questions#iVerify-General){ .card-link title=Documentation} - -
-Downloads - -- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1466120520) - -
- -
- -Previously, iVerify would scan your device for threats automatically in the background and notify you if one is found, but this is [no longer the case](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/iverify-basic-is-now-available-on-android/18458/11) following their rebrand of the consumer app to *iVerify Basic* in May 2024. You can still run manual scans within the app. Automatic background scanning is now only available in iVerify's enterprise product which is unavailable to consumers. - -Like all iOS apps, iVerify Basic is restricted to what it can observe about your device from within the iOS App Sandbox. It will not provide nearly as robust analysis as a full-system analysis tool like [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit). Its primary function is to detect whether your device is jailbroken, which it is effective at, however a hypothetical threat which is *specifically* designed to bypass iVerify's checks would likely succeed at doing so. - -iVerify Basic is **not** an "antivirus" tool, and will not detect non-system-level malware such as malicious custom keyboards or malicious Wi-Fi Sync configurations, for example. - -In addition to device scanning, iVerify Basic also includes a number of additional security utilities which you may find useful, including device [reboot reminders](os/ios-overview.md#before-first-unlock), iOS update notifications (which are often faster than Apple's staggered update notification rollout), and some basic privacy and security guides. diff --git a/docs/dns.md b/docs/dns.md index aad010ef..6c98b95b 100644 --- a/docs/dns.md +++ b/docs/dns.md @@ -20,14 +20,14 @@ These are our favorite public DNS resolvers based on their privacy and security | DNS Provider | Protocols | Logging / Privacy Policy | [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) | Filtering | Signed Apple Profile | |---|---|---|---|---|---| -| [**AdGuard Public DNS**](https://adguard-dns.io/en/public-dns.html) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DoQ DNSCrypt | Anonymized[^1] | Anonymized | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html) | +| [**AdGuard Public DNS**](https://adguard-dns.io/en/public-dns.html) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DoQ DNSCrypt | Anonymized[^1] | Anonymized | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard-dns.io/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html) | | [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setup) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Anonymized[^2] | No | Based on server choice. | No [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://community.cloudflare.com/t/requesting-1-1-1-1-signed-profiles-for-apple/571846) | | [**Control D Free DNS**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DoQ | No[^3] | No | Based on server choice. | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://docs.controld.com/docs/macos-platform) | | [**dns0.eu**](https://dns0.eu) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoH DoT DoQ | Anonymized[^4] | Anonymized | Based on server choice. | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://dns0.eu/zero.dns0.eu.mobileconfig) | | [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | DoH DoT | No[^5] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/profiles-to-configure-our-encrypted-dns-on-apple-devices) | | [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | Cleartext DoH DoT DNSCrypt | Anonymized[^6] | Optional | Based on server choice, malware blocking by default. | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://quad9.net/news/blog/ios-mobile-provisioning-profiles) | -[^1]: AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested in within last 24 hours. "We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats." "We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters." [https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) +[^1]: AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested in within last 24 hours. "We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats." "We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters." [https://adguard-dns.io/en/privacy.html](https://adguard-dns.io/en/privacy.html) [^2]: Cloudflare collects and stores only the limited DNS query data that is sent to the 1.1.1.1 resolver. The 1.1.1.1 resolver service does not log personal data, and the bulk of the limited non-personally identifiable query data is stored only for 25 hours. [https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver) [^3]: Control D only logs for Premium resolvers with custom DNS profiles. Free resolvers do not log data. [https://controld.com/privacy](https://controld.com/privacy) [^4]: dns0.eu collects some data for their threat intelligence feeds, to monitor for newly registered/observed/active domains and other bulk data. That data is shared with some [partners](https://docs.dns0.eu/data-feeds/introduction) for e.g. security research. They do not collect any Personally Identifiable Information. [https://dns0.eu/privacy](https://dns0.eu/privacy) @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ AdGuard Home features a polished web interface to view insights and manage block ## Cloud-Based DNS Filtering -These DNS filtering solutions offer a web dashboard where you can customize the blocklists to your exact needs, similarly to a Pi-hole. These services are usually easier to set up and configure than self-hosted services like the ones above, and can be used more easily across multiple networks (self-hosted solutions are typically restricted to your home/local network unless you set up a more advanced configuration). +These DNS filtering solutions offer a web dashboard where you can customize the block lists to your exact needs, similarly to a Pi-hole. These services are usually easier to set up and configure than self-hosted services like the ones above, and can be used more easily across multiple networks (self-hosted solutions are typically restricted to your home/local network unless you set up a more advanced configuration). ### Control D @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](ad
-While RethinkDNS takes up the Android VPN slot, you can still use a VPN or Orbot with the app by [adding a Wireguard configuration](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/proxy/wireguard) or [manually configuring Orbot as a Proxy server](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/firewall/orbot), respectively. +While RethinkDNS takes up the Android VPN slot, you can still use a VPN or Orbot with the app by [adding a WireGuard configuration](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/proxy/wireguard) or [manually configuring Orbot as a Proxy server](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/firewall/orbot), respectively. ### dnscrypt-proxy diff --git a/docs/document-collaboration.md b/docs/document-collaboration.md index 7f909d92..839c011b 100644 --- a/docs/document-collaboration.md +++ b/docs/document-collaboration.md @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_e ![CryptPad logo](assets/img/document-collaboration/cryptpad.svg){ align=right } -**CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily. +**CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily. [:material-star-box: Read our latest CryptPad review.](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/02/07/cryptpad-review/) [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptpad.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/GcNjAWmK6YDB3EO2IipRZ0fUe89j43Ryqeb4fjkjehE){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -85,4 +85,4 @@ In general, we define collaboration platforms as full-fledged suites which could Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. - Should store files in a conventional filesystem. -- Should support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication support, or passkey logins. +- Should support TOTP or FIDO2 multifactor authentication support, or passkey logins. diff --git a/docs/email-aliasing.md b/docs/email-aliasing.md index 6c546724..60bcb01a 100644 --- a/docs/email-aliasing.md +++ b/docs/email-aliasing.md @@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ They also have a number of benefits over "temporary email" services: - Emails are sent to your trusted mailbox rather than stored by the alias provider. - Temporary email services typically have public mailboxes which can be accessed by anyone who knows the address, while aliases are private to you. -Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the at (@) sign. +Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as on your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the at (@) sign. -Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your aliasing provider with your unencrypted messages. Some providers mitigate this slightly with Automatic PGP Encryption, which reduces the number of parties you need to trust from two to one by encrypting incoming emails before they are delivered to your final mailbox provider. +Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your aliasing provider with your unencrypted messages. Some providers mitigate this slightly with automatic PGP encryption[^1], which reduces the number of parties you need to trust from two to one by encrypting incoming emails before they are delivered to your final mailbox provider. ### addy.io @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your al ![addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ align=right } -**addy.io** lets you create 10 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases which are less anonymous. +**addy.io** lets you create 10 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://addy.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://addy.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -62,7 +62,9 @@ Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your al
-The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @addy.io) that you can create is limited to 10 on addy.io's free plan, 50 on their $1/month plan and unlimited on the $4/month plan (billed $3 for a year). You can create unlimited standard aliases which end in a domain like @[username].addy.io or a custom domain on paid plans. However, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. They are useful where a shared domain might be blocked by a service. Securitum [audited](https://addy.io/blog/addy-io-passes-independent-security-audit) addy.io in September 2023 and no significant vulnerabilities [were identified](https://addy.io/addy-io-security-audit.pdf). +The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @addy.io) that you can create is limited to 10 on addy.io's free plan, 50 on their $1/month plan and unlimited on the $4/month plan (billed $3 for a year). You can pay for these plans using [cryptocurrency](https://addy.io/help/subscribing-with-cryptocurrency) or purchase a voucher code from [ProxyStore](https://addy.io/help/voucher-codes), addy.io's official reseller. + +You can create unlimited standard aliases which end in a domain like @[username].addy.io or a custom domain on paid plans. However, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. They are useful where a shared domain might be blocked by a service. Securitum [audited](https://addy.io/blog/addy-io-passes-independent-security-audit) addy.io in September 2023 and no significant vulnerabilities [were identified](https://addy.io/addy-io-security-audit.pdf). Notable free features: @@ -70,13 +72,15 @@ Notable free features: - [x] Unlimited Standard Aliases - [ ] No Outgoing Replies - [x] 1 Recipient Mailbox -- [x] Automatic PGP Encryption +- [x] Automatic PGP Encryption[^1] + +If you cancel your subscription, you will still enjoy the features of your paid plan until the billing cycle ends. After the end of your current billing cycle, most paid features (including any custom domains) will be [deactivated](https://addy.io/faq/#what-happens-if-i-have-a-subscription-but-then-cancel-it), paid account settings will be reverted to their defaults, and catch-all will be enabled if it was previously disabled. ### SimpleLogin
-![Simplelogin logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/simplelogin.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleLogin logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/simplelogin.svg){ align=right } **SimpleLogin** is a free service which provides email aliases on a variety of shared domain names, and optionally provides paid features like unlimited aliases and custom domains. @@ -102,17 +106,21 @@ Notable free features: SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf). -You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free. +You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have Proton Pass Plus, Proton Unlimited, or any multi-user Proton plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free. + +You can also purchase a voucher code for SimpleLogin Premium anonymously via their official reseller, [ProxyStore](https://simplelogin.io/faq). Notable free features: - [x] 10 Shared Aliases - [x] Unlimited Replies - [x] 1 Recipient Mailbox -- [ ] Automatic PGP Encryption is only available on paid plans +- [ ] Automatic PGP Encryption[^1] is only available on paid plans + +When your subscription ends, all aliases you created will still be able to receive and send emails. However, you cannot create any new aliases that would exceed the free plan limit, nor can you add a new domain, directory, or mailbox. ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we evaluate email aliasing providers to the same standard as our regular [email provider criteria](email.md#criteria) where applicable. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an email service, and conduct your own research to ensure the provider you choose is the right choice for you. -*[Automatic PGP Encryption]: Allows you to encrypt non-encrypted incoming emails before they are forwarded to your mailbox, making sure your primary mailbox provider never sees unencrypted email content. +[^1]: Automatic PGP encryption allows you to encrypt non-encrypted incoming emails before they are forwarded to your mailbox, making sure your primary mailbox provider never sees unencrypted email content. diff --git a/docs/email-clients.md b/docs/email-clients.md index 4deb063c..90db2b0b 100644 --- a/docs/email-clients.md +++ b/docs/email-clients.md @@ -4,7 +4,12 @@ icon: material/email-open description: These email clients are privacy-respecting and support OpenPGP email encryption. cover: email-clients.webp --- -The **email clients** we recommend support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) and prevent account theft. +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } +- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } + +The **email clients** we recommend support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) to prevent account theft.
Email does not provide forward secrecy @@ -29,12 +34,14 @@ OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fo [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://thunderbird.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mozilla.org/privacy/thunderbird){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/products/thunderbird){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/products/thunderbird){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/comm-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
Downloads +- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.thunderbird.android) +- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/thunderbird/thunderbird-android/releases) - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://thunderbird.net) - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://thunderbird.net) - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://thunderbird.net) @@ -44,16 +51,29 @@ OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fo
+
+

Warning

+ +When replying to someone on a mailing list in Thunderbird Mobile, the "reply" option may also include the mailing list. For more information see [thunderbird/thunderbird-android #3738](https://github.com/thunderbird/thunderbird-android/issues/3738). + +
+ #### Recommended Configuration -We recommend changing some of these settings to make Thunderbird a little more private. +
+ +We recommend changing some of these settings to make Thunderbird Desktop a little more private. These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**. ##### Web Content - [ ] Uncheck **Remember websites and links I've visited** -- [ ] Uncheck **Accept cookies from sites** +- [ ] Uncheck **Accept cookies from sites** (1) + +
+ +1. You may need to keep this setting checked when you're logging in to some providers such as Gmail, or via an institution’s SSO. You should uncheck it once you log in successfully. ##### Telemetry @@ -61,7 +81,7 @@ These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & S #### Thunderbird-user.js (advanced) -[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js) is a set of configurations options that aims to disable as many of the web-browsing features within Thunderbird as possible in order to reduce attack surface and maintain privacy. Some of the changes are backported from the [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js). +[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js) is a set of configuration options that aims to disable as many of the web-browsing features within Thunderbird Desktop as possible in order to reduce attack surface and maintain privacy. Some of the changes are backported from the [Arkenfox project](desktop-browsers.md#arkenfox-advanced). ## Platform Specific @@ -81,6 +101,13 @@ These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & S
+
+

For those using macOS Sonoma

+ +Currently, GPG Suite does [not yet](https://gpgtools.com/sonoma) have a stable release for macOS Sonoma. + +
+ Apple Mail has the ability to load remote content in the background or block it entirely and hide your IP address from senders on [macOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/mlhl03be2866/mac) and [iOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/iphf084865c7/ios). ### Canary Mail (iOS) @@ -93,7 +120,7 @@ Apple Mail has the ability to load remote content in the background or block it [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.io/help){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.io/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
Downloads @@ -122,13 +149,13 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f ![FairEmail logo](assets/img/email-clients/fairemail.svg){ align=right } -**FairEmail** is a minimal, open-source email app, using open standards (IMAP, SMTP, OpenPGP) with a low data and battery usage. +**FairEmail** is a minimal, open-source email app which uses open standards (IMAP, SMTP, OpenPGP) and minimizes data and battery usage. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://email.faircode.eu){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/FAQ.md){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/FAQ.md){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://email.faircode.eu/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://email.faircode.eu/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -150,9 +177,9 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution/PrivacyPolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://gnome.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://gnome.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -163,52 +190,19 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
-### K-9 Mail (Android) - -
- -![K-9 Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/k9mail.svg){ align=right } - -**K-9 Mail** is an independent mail application that supports both POP3 and IMAP mailboxes, but only supports push mail for IMAP. - -In the future, K-9 Mail will be the [officially branded](https://k9mail.app/2022/06/13/K-9-Mail-and-Thunderbird.html) Thunderbird client for Android. - -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.k9mail.app){ .card-link title=Documentation} -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://k9mail.app/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute } - -
-Downloads - -- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9) -- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/releases) - -
- -
- -
-

Warning

- -When replying to someone on a mailing list the "reply" option may also include the mailing list. For more information see [thundernest/k-9 #3738](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/issues/3738). - -
- ### Kontact (KDE)
![Kontact logo](assets/img/email-clients/kontact.svg){ align=right } -**Kontact** is a personal information manager (PIM) application from the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It provides a mail client, address book, organizer and RSS client. +**Kontact** is a personal information manager (PIM) application from the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It provides a mail client, address book, RSS client, and an organizer. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://kontact.kde.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://kontact.kde.org/users){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://kontact.kde.org/users){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/kmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -230,7 +224,7 @@ When replying to someone on a mailing list the "reply" option may also include t [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailvelope.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailvelope.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailvelope.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailvelope.com/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailvelope/mailvelope){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -250,9 +244,9 @@ When replying to someone on a mailing list the "reply" option may also include t ![NeoMutt logo](assets/img/email-clients/mutt.svg){ align=right } -**NeoMutt** is an open-source command line mail reader (or MUA) for Linux and BSD. It's a fork of [Mutt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt_(email_client)) with added features. +**NeoMutt** is an open-source command line email reader for Linux and BSD. It's a fork of [Mutt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt_(email_client)) with added features. -NeoMutt is a text-based client that has a steep learning curve. It is however, very customizable. +NeoMutt is a text-based client that has a steep learning curve. It is, however, very customizable. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://neomutt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-info-16:](https://neomutt.org/guide){ .card-link title=Documentation} diff --git a/docs/email.md b/docs/email.md index 47ff74e0..cc69a969 100644 --- a/docs/email.md +++ b/docs/email.md @@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ cover: email.webp global: - [randomize-element, "table tbody"] --- - +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } + Email is practically a necessity for using any online service, however we do not recommend it for person-to-person conversations. Rather than using email to contact other people, consider using an instant messaging medium that supports forward secrecy. [Recommended Instant Messengers](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button } @@ -54,12 +57,12 @@ OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the ![Proton Mail logo](assets/img/email/protonmail.svg){ align=right } -**Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since **2013**. Proton AG is based in Genève, Switzerland. The Proton Mail Free plan comes with 500MB of Mail storage, which you can increase up to 1GB for free. +**Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since 2013. Proton AG is based in Geneva, Switzerland. The Proton Mail Free plan comes with 500 MB of Mail storage, which you can increase up to 1 GB for free. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/mail/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -79,7 +82,7 @@ OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g. Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com). -If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, Family, or Visionary plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin) Premium for free. +If you have the Proton Unlimited plan or any multi-user Proton plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin) Premium for free. Proton Mail has internal crash reports that are **not** shared with third parties. This can be disabled in the web app: :gear: → **All Settings** → **Account** → **Security and privacy** → **Privacy and data collection**. @@ -93,7 +96,7 @@ Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) cash by mail in #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security -Proton Mail supports TOTP [two factor authentication](https://proton.me/support/two-factor-authentication-2fa) and [hardware security keys](https://proton.me/support/2fa-security-key) using FIDO2 or U2F standards. The use of a hardware security key requires setting up TOTP two factor authentication first. +Proton Mail supports TOTP [two-factor authentication](https://proton.me/support/two-factor-authentication-2fa) and [hardware security keys](https://proton.me/support/2fa-security-key) using FIDO2 or U2F standards. The use of a hardware security key requires setting up TOTP two-factor authentication first. #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Data Security @@ -113,7 +116,7 @@ If you have a paid account and your [bill is unpaid](https://proton.me/support/d #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Functionality -Proton Mail's [Unlimited](https://proton.me/support/proton-plans#proton-unlimited) plan also enables access to other Proton services in addition to providing multiple custom domains, unlimited hide-my-email aliases, and 500GB of storage. +Proton Mail's [Unlimited](https://proton.me/support/proton-plans#proton-unlimited) plan also enables access to other Proton services in addition to providing multiple custom domains, unlimited hide-my-email aliases, and 500 GB of storage. Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature. @@ -123,11 +126,11 @@ Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature. ![Mailbox.org logo](assets/img/email/mailboxorg.svg){ align=right } -**Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with up to 2GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed. +**Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with up to 2 GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
Downloads @@ -144,11 +147,11 @@ Mailbox.org lets you use your own domain, and they support [catch-all](https://k #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Private Payment Methods -Mailbox.org doesn't accept any cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept cash by mail, cash payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal and couple of German-specific processors: paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung. +Mailbox.org doesn't accept any cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept cash by mail, cash payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal and a couple of German-specific processors: paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung. #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security -Mailbox.org supports [two factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/account-article/how-to-use-two-factor-authentication-2fa) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [YubiKey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [YubiCloud](https://yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) are not yet supported. +Mailbox.org supports [two-factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/account-article/how-to-use-two-factor-authentication-2fa) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [YubiKey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [YubiCloud](https://yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) are not yet supported. #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Data Security @@ -168,7 +171,7 @@ Your account will be set to a restricted user account when your contract ends. I #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Functionality -You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion service](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/faq-article/the-tor-exit-node-of-mailbox-org). However, their webmail interface cannot be accessed via their .onion service and you may experience TLS certificate errors. +You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion service](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/faq-article/the-tor-exit-node-of-mailbox-org). However, their webmail interface cannot be accessed via their .onion service, and you may experience TLS certificate errors. All accounts come with limited cloud storage that [can be encrypted](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/drive-article/encrypt-files-on-your-drive). Mailbox.org also offers the alias [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/e-mail-article/ensuring-e-mails-are-sent-securely), which enforces the TLS encryption on the connection between mail servers, otherwise the message will not be sent at all. Mailbox.org also supports [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) in addition to standard access protocols like IMAP and POP3. @@ -259,13 +262,13 @@ These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them gr ![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta.svg#only-light){ align=right } ![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } -**Tuta** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Free accounts start with 1GB of storage. +**Tuta** (formerly *Tutanota*) is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since 2011 and is based in Hanover, Germany. Free accounts start with 1 GB of storage. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tuta.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tuta.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://tuta.com/support){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://tuta.com/support){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tuta.com/community){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tuta.com/community){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -290,11 +293,11 @@ Paid Tuta accounts can use either 15 or 30 aliases depending on their plan and u #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Private Payment Methods -Tuta only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md) can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tuta.com/support/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore. +Tuta only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md) can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tuta.com/support/#cryptocurrency) with ProxyStore. #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security -Tuta supports [two factor authentication](https://tuta.com/support#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F. +Tuta supports [two-factor authentication](https://tuta.com/support#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F. #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Data Security @@ -316,23 +319,47 @@ Tuta doesn't offer a digital legacy feature. ## Self-Hosting Email -Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable. +Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable. In addition to the "all-in-one" solutions below, we've picked out a few articles that cover a more manual approach: -### Combined software solutions +- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd) (2019) +- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide) (August 2017) + +### Stalwart + +
+ +![Stalwart logo](assets/img/email/stalwart.svg){ align=right } + +**Stalwart** is a newer mail server written in Rust which supports JMAP in addition to the standard IMAP, POP3, and SMTP. It has a wide variety of configuration options, but it also defaults to very reasonable settings (in terms of both security and features) making it easy to use immediately. It has web-based administration with TOTP 2FA support, and it allows you to enter your public PGP key to encrypt **all** incoming messages. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://stalw.art){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://stalw.art/docs/get-started){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/stalwartlabs){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/stalwartlabs){ .card-link title="Contribute" } + +
+ +Stalwart's [PGP implementation](https://stalw.art/docs/encryption/overview) is unique among our self-hosted recommendations, and allows you to operate your own mail server with zero-knowledge message storage. If you additionally configure Web Key Directory on your domain, and if you use an email client which supports PGP and Web Key Directory for outgoing mail (like Thunderbird), then this is the easiest way to get self-hosted E2EE compatibility with all [Proton Mail](#proton-mail) users. + +Stalwart does **not** have an integrated webmail, so you will need to use it with a [dedicated email client](email-clients.md) (or find an open-source webmail to self-host, like Nextcloud's Mail app). We use Stalwart for our own internal email at *Privacy Guides*. + +### Mailcow
![Mailcow logo](assets/img/email/mailcow.svg){ align=right } -**Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: A mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support. +**Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: a mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.mailcow.email){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.mailcow.email){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+### Mail-in-a-Box +
![Mail-in-a-Box logo](assets/img/email/mail-in-a-box.svg){ align=right } @@ -340,16 +367,11 @@ Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. M **Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-For a more manual approach we've picked out these two articles: - -- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd) (2019) -- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide) (August 2017) - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any email provider wishing to be recommended, including implementing industry best practices, modern technology and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an email provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the email provider you choose is the right choice for you. @@ -361,7 +383,7 @@ We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal ser **Minimum to Qualify:** - Encrypts email account data at rest with zero-access encryption. -- Export capability as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .eml with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322) standard. +- Export capability as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .EML with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322) standard. - Allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy. - Operates on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers. @@ -374,8 +396,8 @@ We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal ser - Support for a temporary mailbox for external users. This is useful when you want to send an encrypted email, without sending an actual copy to your recipient. These emails usually have a limited lifespan and then are automatically deleted. They also don't require the recipient to configure any cryptography like OpenPGP. - Availability of the email provider's services via an [onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion). - [Sub-addressing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Sub-addressing) support. -- Catch-all or alias functionality for those who own their own domains. -- Use of standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider. +- Catch-all or alias functionality for those who use their own domains. +- Use of standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP, or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider. ### Privacy @@ -383,7 +405,7 @@ We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible. **Minimum to Qualify:** -- Protect sender's IP address. Filter it from showing in the `Received` header field. +- Protect sender's IP address, which can involve filtering it from showing in the `Received` header field. - Don't require personally identifiable information (PII) besides a username and a password. - Privacy policy that meets the requirements defined by the GDPR. @@ -394,12 +416,12 @@ We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible. ### Security -Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt best industry practices in order to protect their members. +Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt best industry practices in order to protect their customers. **Minimum to Qualify:** - Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as TOTP. -- Zero access encryption, builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server. +- Zero access encryption, which builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server. - [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) support. - No TLS errors or vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://hardenize.com), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh), or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://ssllabs.com/ssltest); this includes certificate related errors and weak DH parameters, such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)). - A server suite preference (optional on TLSv1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption. @@ -412,13 +434,14 @@ Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers w - Website security standards such as: - [HTTP Strict Transport Security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security) - [Subresource Integrity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subresource_Integrity) if loading things from external domains. -- Must support viewing of [Message headers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header), as it is a crucial forensic feature to determine if an email is a phishing attempt. +- Must support viewing of [message headers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header), as it is a crucial forensic feature to determine if an email is a phishing attempt. **Best Case:** -- Support for hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn). U2F and WebAuthn are more secure as they use a private key stored on a client-side hardware device to authenticate people, as opposed to a shared secret that is stored on the web server and on the client side when using TOTP. Furthermore, U2F and WebAuthn are more resistant to phishing as their authentication response is based on the authenticated [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). +- Support for hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online). - [DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) in addition to DANE support. -- Implementation of [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), this is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617). +- Implementation of [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), which is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617). +- Published security audits from a reputable third-party firm. - Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process. - Website security standards such as: - [Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) @@ -434,28 +457,27 @@ You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust t **Best Case:** -- Public-facing leadership. - Frequent transparency reports. ### Marketing -With the email providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing. +With the email providers we recommend, we like to see responsible marketing. **Minimum to Qualify:** -- Must self-host analytics (no Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc.). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for those who wish to opt-out. +- Must self-host analytics (no Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc.). -Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible: +Must not have any irresponsible marketing, which can include the following: - Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it. -- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.: +- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily de-anonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.: - Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc.) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.) - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint) **Best Case:** -- Clear and easy to read documentation. This includes things like, setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc. +- Clear and easy to read documentation for tasks like setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc. ### Additional Functionality diff --git a/docs/encryption.md b/docs/encryption.md index 8ccae76f..17efe69b 100644 --- a/docs/encryption.md +++ b/docs/encryption.md @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ cover: encryption.webp ## Multi-platform -The options listed here are multi-platform and great for creating encrypted backups of your data. +The options listed here are available on multiple platforms and great for creating encrypted backups of your data. ### Cryptomator (Cloud) @@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ The options listed here are multi-platform and great for creating encrypted back [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptomator.org){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptomator.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptomator){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://cryptomator.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://cryptomator.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ The options listed here are multi-platform and great for creating encrypted back Cryptomator uses AES-256 encryption to encrypt both files and filenames. Cryptomator cannot encrypt metadata such as access, modification, and creation timestamps, nor the number and size of files and folders. +Cryptomator is free to use on all desktop platforms, as well as on iOS in "read only" mode. Cryptomator offers [paid](https://cryptomator.org/pricing) apps with full functionality on iOS and Android. The Android version can be purchased anonymously via [ProxyStore](https://cryptomator.org/coop/proxystore). + Some Cryptomator cryptographic libraries have been [audited](https://community.cryptomator.org/t/has-there-been-a-security-review-audit-of-cryptomator/44) by Cure53. The scope of the audited libraries includes: [cryptolib](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib), [cryptofs](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptofs), [siv-mode](https://github.com/cryptomator/siv-mode) and [cryptomator-objc-cryptor](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptomator-objc-cryptor). The audit did not extend to [cryptolib-swift](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib-swift), which is a library used by Cryptomator for iOS. Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/security-target), [security architecture](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/architecture), and [best practices](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/best-practices) for use in further detail. @@ -64,7 +66,7 @@ Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs. [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Picocrypt/Picocrypt){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Picocrypt/Picocrypt){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/picocrypt){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/picocrypt){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -77,6 +79,8 @@ Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.
+Picocrypt has been [audited](https://github.com/Picocrypt/storage/blob/main/Picocrypt.Audit.Report.pdf) by Radically Open Security in August 2024, and [most](https://github.com/Picocrypt/Picocrypt/issues/32#issuecomment-2329722740) of the issues found in the audit were subsequently fixed. + ### VeraCrypt (Disk) Protects against the following threat(s): @@ -91,9 +95,9 @@ Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs. **VeraCrypt** is a source-available freeware utility used for on-the-fly encryption. It can create a virtual encrypted disk within a file, encrypt a partition, or encrypt the entire storage device with pre-boot authentication. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://veracrypt.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -110,15 +114,15 @@ VeraCrypt is a fork of the discontinued TrueCrypt project. According to its deve When encrypting with VeraCrypt, you have the option to select from different [hash functions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#Encryption_scheme). We suggest you **only** select [SHA-512](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-512) and stick to the [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) block cipher. -Truecrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Security_audits), and VeraCrypt has also been [audited separately](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#VeraCrypt_audit). +TrueCrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Security_audits), and VeraCrypt has also been [audited separately](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#VeraCrypt_audit). -## OS Full Disk Encryption +## Operating System Encryption Protects against the following threat(s): - [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } -For encrypting the drive your operating system boots from, we generally recommend enabling the encryption software that comes with your operating system rather than using a third-party tool. This is because your operating system's native encryption tools often make use of OS and hardware-specific features like the [secure cryptoprocessor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor) in your device to protect your computer against more advanced physical attacks. For secondary drives and external drives which you *don't* boot from, we still recommend using open-source tools like [VeraCrypt](#veracrypt-disk) over the tools below, because they offer additional flexibility and let you avoid vendor lock-in. +Built-in OS encryption solutions generally leverage hardware security features such as a [secure cryptoprocessor](basics/hardware.md#tpmsecure-cryptoprocessor). Therefore, we recommend using the built-in encryption solutions for your operating system. For cross-platform encryption, we still recommend [cross-platform tools](#multi-platform) for additional flexibility and to avoid vendor lock-in. ### BitLocker @@ -126,15 +130,15 @@ For encrypting the drive your operating system boots from, we generally recommen ![BitLocker logo](assets/img/encryption-software/bitlocker.png){ align=right } -**BitLocker** is the full volume encryption solution bundled with Microsoft Windows. The main reason we recommend it for encrypting your boot drive is because of its [use of TPM](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). ElcomSoft, a forensics company, has written about this feature in [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection). +**BitLocker** is the full volume encryption solution bundled with Microsoft Windows that uses the Trusted Platform Module ([TPM](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm)) for hardware-based security. -[:octicons-info-16:](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/BitLocker/BitLocker-overview){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/BitLocker/BitLocker-overview){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-BitLocker is [only supported](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) on Pro, Enterprise and Education editions of Windows. It can be enabled on Home editions provided that they meet the prerequisites. +BitLocker is [officially supported](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) on the Pro, Enterprise, and Education editions of Windows. It can be enabled on Home editions provided that they meet the following prerequisites.
Enabling BitLocker on Windows Home @@ -184,15 +188,15 @@ Backup `BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt` on your Desktop to a separate storage device ![FileVault logo](assets/img/encryption-software/filevault.png){ align=right } -**FileVault** is the on-the-fly volume encryption solution built into macOS. FileVault is recommended because it [leverages](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/volume-encryption-with-filevault-sec4c6dc1b6e/web) hardware security capabilities present on an Apple silicon SoC or T2 Security Chip. +**FileVault** is the on-the-fly volume encryption solution built into macOS. FileVault takes advantage of the [hardware security capabilities](os/macos-overview.md#hardware-security) present on an Apple Silicon SoC or T2 Security Chip. -[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/encrypt-mac-data-with-filevault-mh11785/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/encrypt-mac-data-with-filevault-mh11785/mac){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to using your iCloud account for recovery. +We advise against using your iCloud account for recovery; instead, you should securely store a local recovery key on a separate storage device. ### Linux Unified Key Setup @@ -203,7 +207,7 @@ We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to using **LUKS** is the default FDE method for Linux. It can be used to encrypt full volumes, partitions, or create encrypted containers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/README.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup){ .card-link title="Source Code" } @@ -258,9 +262,9 @@ Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](ht [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://kryptor.co.uk){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kryptor.co.uk/features#privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://kryptor.co.uk/tutorial){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://kryptor.co.uk/tutorial){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/samuel-lucas6/Kryptor){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://kryptor.co.uk/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://kryptor.co.uk/#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -282,9 +286,9 @@ Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](ht **Tomb** is a command-line shell wrapper for LUKS. It supports steganography via [third-party tools](https://dyne.org/software/tomb/#advanced-usage). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://dyne.org/software/tomb){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://dyne.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://dyne.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
@@ -323,7 +327,7 @@ gpg --quick-gen-key alice@example.com future-default [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gnupg.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gnupg.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://gnupg.org/documentation/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://gnupg.org/documentation/index.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -348,9 +352,9 @@ gpg --quick-gen-key alice@example.com future-default [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpg4win.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpg4win.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://gpg4win.org/documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://gpg4win.org/documentation.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=summary){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://gpg4win.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://gpg4win.org/donate.html){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -374,13 +378,13 @@ We suggest [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios) for using PGP with em ![GPG Suite logo](assets/img/encryption-software/gpgsuite.png){ align=right } -**GPG Suite** provides OpenPGP support for [Apple Mail](email-clients.md#apple-mail-macos) and macOS. +**GPG Suite** provides OpenPGP support for [Apple Mail](email-clients.md#apple-mail-macos) and other email clients on macOS. -We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) and [Knowledge base](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) for support. +We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) and [Knowledge Base](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) for support. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpgtools.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpgtools.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GPGTools){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -392,17 +396,19 @@ We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com +Currently, GPG Suite does [not yet](https://gpgtools.com/sequoia) have a stable release for macOS Sonoma and later. + ### OpenKeychain
![OpenKeychain logo](assets/img/encryption-software/openkeychain.svg){ align=right } -**OpenKeychain** is an Android implementation of GnuPG. It's commonly required by mail clients such as [K-9 Mail](email-clients.md#k-9-mail-android) and [FairEmail](email-clients.md#fairemail-android) and other Android apps to provide encryption support. Cure53 completed a [security audit](https://openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) of OpenKeychain 3.6 in October 2015. Technical details about the audit and OpenKeychain's solutions can be found [here](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015). +**OpenKeychain** is an implementation of GnuPG for Android. It's commonly required by mail clients such as [Thunderbird](email-clients.md#thunderbird), [FairEmail](email-clients.md#fairemail-android), and other Android apps to provide encryption support. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://openkeychain.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://openkeychain.org/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://openkeychain.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://openkeychain.org/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -414,6 +420,8 @@ We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com
+Cure53 completed a [security audit](https://openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) of OpenKeychain 3.6 in October 2015. The published audit and OpenKeychain's solutions to the issues raised in the audit can be found [here](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015). + ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. diff --git a/docs/file-sharing.md b/docs/file-sharing.md index 60b3127d..4ff921aa 100644 --- a/docs/file-sharing.md +++ b/docs/file-sharing.md @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your frien ## File Sharing +If you already use [Proton Drive](cloud.md#proton-drive)[^1] or have a [Bitwarden](passwords.md#bitwarden) Premium[^2] subscription, consider using the file sharing capabilities that they each offer, both of which use end-to-end encryption. Otherwise, the standalone options listed here ensure that the files you share are not read by a remote server. + ### Send
@@ -55,6 +57,7 @@ ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://onionshare.org/#download) - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://onionshare.org/#download) - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://onionshare.org/#download) +- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/org.onionshare.OnionShare)
@@ -140,7 +143,6 @@ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_e
Downloads -- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nutomic.syncthingandroid) - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://syncthing.net/downloads) - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://syncthing.net/downloads) - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://syncthing.net/downloads) @@ -150,7 +152,6 @@ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_e - ### Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -165,5 +166,8 @@ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_e Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. -- Has mobile clients for iOS and Android, which at least support document previews. -- Supports photo backup from iOS and Android, and optionally supports file/folder sync on Android. +- Should have mobile clients for iOS and Android which at least support document previews. +- Should support photo backups from iOS and Android, and optionally support file/folder sync on Android. + +[^1]: Proton Drive allows you to [share files or folders](https://proton.me/support/drive-shareable-link) by generating a shareable public link or sending a unique link to a designated email address. Public links can be protected with a password, set to expire, and completely revoked, while links shared via email can have custom permissions and be similarly revoked. Per Proton Drive's [privacy policy](https://proton.me/drive/privacy-policy), file contents, file and folder names, and thumbnail previews are end-to-end encrypted. +[^2]: With a [premium](https://bitwarden.com/help/about-bitwarden-plans/#compare-personal-plans) subscription, [Bitwarden Send](https://bitwarden.com/products/send) allows you to share files and text securely with [end-to-end encryption](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-encryption). A [password](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-privacy/#send-passwords) can be required along with the Send link. Bitwarden Send also features [automatic deletion](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-lifespan). diff --git a/docs/financial-services.md b/docs/financial-services.md index 878abbc2..02c38e0c 100644 --- a/docs/financial-services.md +++ b/docs/financial-services.md @@ -2,7 +2,11 @@ title: Financial Services icon: material/bank cover: financial-services.webp +description: These services can assist you in protecting your privacy from merchants and other trackers, which is one of the biggest challenges to privacy today. --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } Making payments online is one of the biggest challenges to privacy. These services can assist you in protecting your privacy from merchants and other trackers, provided you have a strong understanding of how to make private payments effectively. We strongly encourage you first read our payments overview article before making any purchases: @@ -10,6 +14,10 @@ Making payments online is one of the biggest challenges to privacy. These servic ## Payment Masking Services +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-search: Public Exposure](basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information){ .pg-green } + There are a number of services which provide "virtual debit cards" which you can use with online merchants without revealing your actual banking or billing information in most cases. It's important to note that these financial services are **not** anonymous and are subject to "Know Your Customer" (KYC) laws and may require your ID or other identifying information. These services are primarily useful for protecting you from merchant data breaches, less sophisticated tracking or purchase correlation by marketing agencies, and online data theft; and **not** for making a purchase completely anonymously.
@@ -26,7 +34,7 @@ Many banks and credit card providers offer native virtual card functionality. If ![Privacy.com logo](assets/img/financial-services/privacy_com.svg#only-light){ align=right } ![Privacy.com logo](assets/img/financial-services/privacy_com-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } -**Privacy.com**'s free plan allows you to create up to 12 virtual cards per month, set spend limits on those cards, and shut off cards instantly. Their paid plans provide higher limits on the number of cards that can be created each month and the option to hide transaction information from your bank. +**Privacy.com**'s free plan allows you to create up to 12 virtual cards per month, set spend limits on those cards, and shut off cards instantly. Their paid plans provide higher limits on the number of cards that can be created each month. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privacy.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://privacy.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -36,7 +44,7 @@ Many banks and credit card providers offer native virtual card functionality. If
-Privacy.com gives information about the merchants you purchase from to your bank by default. Their paid "discreet merchants" feature hides merchant information from your bank, so your bank only sees that a purchase was made with Privacy.com, but not where that money was spent. However, that is not foolproof, and of course, Privacy.com still has knowledge about the merchants you are spending money with. +Privacy.com gives information about the merchants you purchase from to your bank by [default](https://support.privacy.com/hc/en-us/articles/360012407533-What-will-I-see-on-my-bank-statement-when-I-make-a-purchase-with-Privacy). Their "[private spend mode](https://support.privacy.com/hc/en-us/articles/26732314558487-What-is-Private-Spend-Mode)" feature hides merchant information from your bank, so your bank only sees that a purchase was made with Privacy.com, but not where that money was spent. However, that is not foolproof, and of course, Privacy.com still has knowledge about the merchants you are spending money with. ### MySudo (US, Paid) @@ -66,6 +74,10 @@ MySudo's virtual cards are currently only available via their iOS app. ## Gift Card Marketplaces +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue } + These services allow you to purchase gift cards for a variety of merchants online with [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md). Some of these services offer ID verification options for higher limits, but they also allow accounts with just an email address. Basic limits typically start at $5,000-10,000 a day for basic accounts, with significantly higher limits for ID verified accounts (if offered). ### Coincards @@ -84,10 +96,16 @@ These services allow you to purchase gift cards for a variety of merchants onlin - ### Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. - Accepts payment in [a recommended cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md). - No ID requirement. + +
+

Important notices

+ +The content here is not legal or financial advice. We do not endorse or encourage illicit activities, and we do not endorse or encourage anything which violates a company's terms of service. Check with a professional to confirm that these recommendations are legal and available in your jurisdiction. [See all notices](about/notices.md). + +
diff --git a/docs/frontends.md b/docs/frontends.md index 022c156f..20d25318 100644 --- a/docs/frontends.md +++ b/docs/frontends.md @@ -4,12 +4,15 @@ icon: material/flip-to-front description: These open-source frontends for various internet services allow you to access content without JavaScript or other annoyances. cover: frontends.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): -Sometimes services will try to force you to sign up for an account by blocking access to content with annoying popups. They might also break without JavaScript enabled. These frontends can allow you to get around these restrictions. +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } + +Sometimes services will try to force you to sign up for an account by blocking access to content with annoying popups. They might also break without JavaScript enabled. These frontends can allow you to circumvent these restrictions. If you choose to self-host these frontends, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting. -When you are using an instance run by someone else, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. They can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Some instances have [Tor](tor.md) .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII. +When you are using an instance run by someone else, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance (if available). They can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Some instances have [Tor](tor.md) .onion addresses, which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain personally identifiable information. ## Reddit @@ -19,13 +22,11 @@ When you are using an instance run by someone else, make sure to read the privac ![Redlib logo](assets/img/frontends/redlib.svg){ align=right } -**Redlib** is an open-source frontend to the [Reddit](https://reddit.com) website that is also self-hostable. - -There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](tor.md) onion services support. +**Redlib** is an open-source frontend to the [Reddit](https://reddit.com) website that is also self-hostable. You can access Redlib through a number of public instances. [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/redlib-org/redlib){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/redlib-org/redlib-instances/blob/main/instances.md){ .card-link title="Public Instances"} -[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/redlib-org/redlib?tab=readme-ov-file#table-of-contents){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/redlib-org/redlib-instances/blob/main/instances.md){ .card-link title="Public Instances" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/redlib-org/redlib?tab=readme-ov-file#table-of-contents){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/redlib-org/redlib){ .card-link title="Source Code" } @@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ The [Old Reddit](https://old.reddit.com) website doesn't require as much JavaScr

Tip

Redlib is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) on the Safest security level. + ## TikTok @@ -53,11 +55,11 @@ Redlib is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor **ProxiTok** is an open-source frontend to the [TikTok](https://tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable. -There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](tor.md) onion services support. +There are a number of public instances, with some that offer a [Tor](tor.md) onion service or an [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project) eepsite. [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Public-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"} -[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Public-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -73,144 +75,7 @@ ProxiTok is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [T ## YouTube -### FreeTube - -
- -![FreeTube logo](assets/img/frontends/freetube.svg){ align=right } - -**FreeTube** is a free and open-source desktop application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using FreeTube, your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your device. - -By default, FreeTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, FreeTube optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. - -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freetubeapp.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://freetubeapp.io/privacy.php){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.freetubeapp.io){ .card-link title=Documentation} -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/FreeTube){ .card-link title=Contribute } - -
-Downloads - -- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://freetubeapp.io/#download) -- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://freetubeapp.io/#download) -- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://freetubeapp.io/#download) -- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/io.freetubeapp.FreeTube) - -
- -
- -
-

Warning

- -When using FreeTube, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address. - -
- -### Yattee - -
- -![Yattee logo](assets/img/frontends/yattee.svg){ align=right } - -**Yattee** is a free and open-source privacy oriented video player for iOS, tvOS, and macOS for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using Yattee, your subscription list is saved locally on your device. - -You will need to take a few [extra steps](https://web.archive.org/web/20230330122839/https://gonzoknows.com/posts/Yattee) before you can use Yattee to watch YouTube, due to App Store restrictions. - -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://r.yattee.stream/docs/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation} -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki/Donations){ .card-link title=Contribute } - -
-Downloads - -- [:simple-apple: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1595136629) -- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/releases) - -
- -
- -
-

Warning

- -When using Yattee, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances), or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address. - -
- -By default, Yattee blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, Yattee optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. - -### LibreTube (Android) - -
- -![LibreTube logo](assets/img/frontends/libretube.svg#only-light){ align=right } -![LibreTube logo](assets/img/frontends/libretube-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } - -**LibreTube** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) which uses the [Piped](#piped) API. - -LibreTube allows you to store your subscription list and playlists locally on your Android device, or to an account on your Piped instance of choice, which allows you to access them seamlessly on other devices as well. - -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://libretube.dev){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube/blob/master/PRIVACY_POLICY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://libretube.dev/#faq){ .card-link title=Documentation} -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } - -
-Downloads - -- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube/releases) - -
- -
- -
-

Warning

- -When using LibreTube, your IP address will be visible to the [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) instance you choose and/or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address. - -
- -By default, LibreTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. Additionally, LibreTube uses [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. You are able to fully configure the types of segments that SponsorBlock will skip, or disable it completely. There is also a button on the video player itself to disable it for a specific video if desired. - -### NewPipe (Android) - -
- -![Newpipe logo](assets/img/frontends/newpipe.svg){ align=right } - -**NewPipe** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com), [SoundCloud](https://soundcloud.com), [media.ccc.de](https://media.ccc.de), [Bandcamp](https://bandcamp.com), and [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org) (1). - -Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device. - -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newpipe.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://newpipe.net/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://newpipe.net/FAQ){ .card-link title=Documentation} -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://newpipe.net/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } - -
-Downloads - -- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe/releases) - -
- -
- -1. The default instance is [FramaTube](https://framatube.org), however more can be added via **Settings** → **Content** → **PeerTube instances** - -
-

Warning

- -When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address. - -
+**Note:** YouTube has gradually rolled out changes to its video player and API that have thwarted some of the methods used by third-party frontends for extracting YouTube data. If you experience reliability issues with one YouTube frontend, consider trying out another that uses a different extraction method. ### Invidious @@ -221,13 +86,13 @@ When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. **Invidious** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable. -There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](tor.md) onion services support. +There are a number of public instances, with some that offer a [Tor](tor.md) onion service or an [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project) eepsite. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://invidious.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-server-16:](https://instances.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Public Instances"} -[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-server-16:](https://instances.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Public Instances" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://invidious.io/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://invidious.io/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
@@ -258,10 +123,10 @@ Invidious is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [ Piped requires JavaScript in order to function and there are a number of public instances. [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"} -[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.piped.video/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.piped.video/docs){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
@@ -270,7 +135,148 @@ Piped requires JavaScript in order to function and there are a number of public

Tip

-Piped is useful if you want to use [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) without installing an extension or to access age-restricted content without an account. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts. +Piped is useful if you want to use [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) without installing an extension. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts. + +
+ +### FreeTube + +
+ +![FreeTube logo](assets/img/frontends/freetube.svg){ align=right } + +**FreeTube** is a free and open-source desktop application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). FreeTube extracts data from YouTube using its built-in API based on [YouTube.js](https://github.com/LuanRT/YouTube.js) or the [Invidious](#invidious) API. You can configure either as the default, with the other serving as a fallback. + +When using FreeTube, your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your device. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freetubeapp.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://freetubeapp.io/privacy.php){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.freetubeapp.io){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Contribute" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://freetubeapp.io/#download) +- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://freetubeapp.io/#download) +- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://freetubeapp.io/#download) +- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/io.freetubeapp.FreeTube) + +
+ +
+ +
+

Warning

+ +When using FreeTube, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address. + +
+ +By default, FreeTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, FreeTube optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. + +### Yattee + +
+ +![Yattee logo](assets/img/frontends/yattee.svg){ align=right } + +**Yattee** is a free and open-source privacy oriented video player for iOS, tvOS, and macOS for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). Due to App Store restrictions, you will need to take a few [extra steps](https://web.archive.org/web/20230330122839/https://gonzoknows.com/posts/Yattee) before you can use Yattee to watch YouTube. Yattee allows you to connect to instances of [Invidious](#invidious) or [Piped](#piped). + +When using Yattee, your subscription list is saved locally on your device. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://r.yattee.stream/docs/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki/Donations){ .card-link title="Contribute" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:simple-apple: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1595136629) +- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/releases) + +
+ +
+ +
+

Warning

+ +When using Yattee, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances), or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address. + +
+ +By default, Yattee blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, Yattee optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. + +### LibreTube (Android) + +
+ +![LibreTube logo](assets/img/frontends/libretube.svg#only-light){ align=right } +![LibreTube logo](assets/img/frontends/libretube-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } + +**LibreTube** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) which uses the [Piped](#piped) API. + +Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://libretube.dev){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube/blob/master/PRIVACY_POLICY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://libretube.dev/#faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube/releases) + +
+ +
+ +
+

Warning

+ +When using LibreTube, your IP address will be visible to YouTube, [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances), or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address. + +
+ +By default, LibreTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. Additionally, LibreTube uses [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. You are able to fully configure the types of segments that SponsorBlock will skip, or disable it completely. There is also a button on the video player itself to disable it for a specific video if desired. + +### NewPipe (Android) + +
+ +![NewPipe logo](assets/img/frontends/newpipe.svg){ align=right } + +**NewPipe** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com), [SoundCloud](https://soundcloud.com), [media.ccc.de](https://media.ccc.de), [Bandcamp](https://bandcamp.com), and [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org) (1). + +Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newpipe.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://newpipe.net/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://newpipe.net/FAQ){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://newpipe.net/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe/releases) + +
+ +
+ +1. The default instance is [FramaTube](https://framatube.org), however more can be added via **Settings** → **Content** → **PeerTube instances**. + +
+

Warning

+ +When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
@@ -278,14 +284,14 @@ Piped is useful if you want to use [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) with **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. -Recommended frontends... - -- Must be open-source software. -- Must be self-hostable. -- Must provide all basic website functionality available to anonymous users. - We only consider frontends if one of the following is true for a platform: - Normally only accessible with JavaScript enabled. - Normally only accessible with an account. - Blocks access from commercial [VPNs](vpn.md). + +Recommended frontends... + +- Must be open-source software. +- Must be self-hostable. +- Must provide all basic website functionality available to anonymous users. diff --git a/docs/health-and-wellness.md b/docs/health-and-wellness.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ec8b9bc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/health-and-wellness.md @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +--- +meta_title: "Privacy Respecting Health and Wellness apps for Android and iOS - Privacy Guides" +title: "Health and Wellness Apps" +icon: material/heart-pulse +description: These applications are what we currently recommend for all health and fitness-related activites on your phone. +cover: health-cover.webp +--- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } + +Keep track of your health and fitness-related goals with these apps. Unlike their mainstream alternatives, your personal health information will be kept private. + +## Menstrual Cycle Tracking + +Popular menstrual trackers like [Flo](https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/13/flo-gets-ftc-slap-for-sharing-user-data-when-it-promised-privacy) are notorious for collecting and sharing your user data. Depending on your jurisdiction, this may lead to [legal consequences](https://forbes.com/sites/abigaildubiniecki/2024/11/14/post-roe-your-period-app-data-could-be-used-against-you) affecting your reproductive autonomy. + +### drip. + +
+ +![drip logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png){ align=right } + +**drip.** is a gender-inclusive and open source menstrual cycle tracker available on all mobile platforms. It relies on the "sympto-thermal method" to predict ovulation. All user data is stored locally on your device and can be protected with a password. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://bloodyhealth.gitlab.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://bloodyhealth.gitlab.io/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://bloodyhealth.gitlab.io/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/bloodyhealth/drip){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.drip) +- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/drip/id1584564949) +- [:simple-android: Android](https://bloodyhealth.gitlab.io) + +
+ +
+ +### Euki + +
+ +![Euki logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/euki.svg){ align=right } + +**Euki** is a nonprofit-backed menstrual cycle tracker that also doubles as a medication tracker and sexual wellness knowledge base. It allows you to schedule the automatic deletion of your personal data in the app. All user data is stored locally on your device and can be protected with a password. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://eukiapp.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://eukiapp.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Euki-Inc/Euki-Android){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://every.org/euki-app){ .card-link title="Contribute" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kollectivemobile.euki) +- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/euki/id1469213846) + +
+ +
+ +## Fitness Trackers + +These general purpose apps can do everything from counting steps and tracking sleep to measuring your heartbeat. + +### Apple Health + +
+ +![Apple logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ align=right }![Apple logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } + +**Apple Health** is the default health and fitness app for iOS. Apple Health always uses end-to-end encryption when syncing across multiple devices. Additionally, almost all measured data is processed on your device. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://apple.com/health){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://apple.com/legal/privacy/consumer-health-personal-data/en-ww){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-health/id1242545199) + +
+ +
+ +### Gadgetbridge + +
+ +![Gadgetbridge logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge.svg#only-light){ align=right }![Gadgetbridge logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } + +**Gadgetbridge** is an open-source Android application which allows you to pair and manage your Bluetooth device without relying on the vendor’s application. When paired with a compatible smartwatch, it can mimic the health and wellness functionality of these watches without third-party data collection. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gadgetbridge.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://gadgetbridge.org/basics){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://codeberg.org/Freeyourgadget/Gadgetbridge){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/Gadgetbridge/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:simple-android: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/nodomain.freeyourgadget.gadgetbridge) + +
+ +
+ +Gadgetbridge's app functionality includes, but is not limited to: step counting, sleep tracking, heart rate monitoring, etc. + +Make sure to review the smartwatch [compatibility list](https://gadgetbridge.org/gadgets) before purchasing a device. Some devices require you to download the vendor's app and connect the smartwatch to their servers prior to installing Gadgetbridge. + +## Health Records + +These apps help you collect and manage personal health data and share it with health providers, organizations, and other apps. + +### Apple Health Records + +
+ +![Apple logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ align=right }![Apple logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } + +**Apple Health Records** is a built-in feature within [Apple Health](#apple-health) that allows you to view, store, and share your health records. It shares the security and privacy features of Apple Health. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://apple.com/health){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://apple.com/legal/privacy/consumer-health-personal-data/en-ww){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-health/id1242545199) + +
+ +
+ +### CommonHealth + +
+ +![CommonHealth logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/commonhealth.png){ align=right } + +**CommonHealth** is a privacy-respecting Android app that allows people to access their electronic health records and securely share it to providers. All health data is stored on your device and can be protected with a passcode or biometric authentication. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://commonhealth.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://commonhealth.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thecommonsproject.android.phr) + +
+ +
+ +CommonHealth is only available in the United States. Although the app itself is closed source, the [developer SDK is open source](https://github.com/the-commons-project). + +## Criteria + +**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. + +### Minimum Requirements + +- Must support automatic updates. +- Must not store unencrypted data outside the device. +- Must function offline. diff --git a/docs/index.md b/docs/index.md index d8f7b490..04876f84 100644 --- a/docs/index.md +++ b/docs/index.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- -meta_title: "Privacy Guides: Your Independent Privacy and Security Resource" -description: "The most popular & trustworthy non-profit website to find privacy tools and learn about protecting your digital life. Ad & affiliate free, high quality reviews." +meta_title: "Privacy Guides: Independent Privacy & Security Resources" +description: "Established in 2021, Privacy Guides is the most popular & trustworthy non-profit resource to find privacy tools and learn about protecting your digital life." template: home.html social: cards_layout: home @@ -14,13 +14,12 @@ schema: "@type": Organization "@id": https://www.privacyguides.org/ name: Privacy Guides - url: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/ + url: https://www.privacyguides.org/ logo: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/assets/brand/logos/png/square/pg-yellow.png sameAs: - https://twitter.com/privacy_guides - https://github.com/privacyguides - https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q111710163 - - https://opencollective.com/privacyguides - https://www.youtube.com/@privacyguides - https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides - @@ -71,7 +70,8 @@ Trying to protect all your data from everyone all the time is impractical, expen
**Privacy Guides** has a dedicated [community](https://discuss.privacyguides.net) independently reviewing various *privacy tools* and services. Each of our recommendations comply with a strict set of criteria to ensure they provide the most value to most people, and provide the best balance of privacy, security, and convenience. As part of a non-profit **public charity**, Privacy Guides has strict **journalistic standards** and policies to ensure our recommendations are free of conflict of interest, and we do not partner with providers or affiliate programs that could sway our reviews and recommendations. -[:material-heart:{.pg-red} Support Our Work](about/donate.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:material-heart:{.pg-red} Support Our Work](about/donate.md){ class="md-button md-button--primary" } +
- [x] **Ad-Free Recommendations** @@ -83,87 +83,11 @@ Trying to protect all your data from everyone all the time is impractical, expen -### Top 3 Private Email Providers - -
- -- ![Proton Mail logo](assets/img/email/protonmail.svg){ .lg .middle .twemoji } **Proton Mail** - - --- - - Proton Mail is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since 2013. Proton AG is based in Genève, Switzerland. The Proton Mail Free plan comes with 500MB of Mail storage, which you can increase up to 1GB for free. - - [:octicons-arrow-right-24: Read Full Review](email.md#proton-mail) - -- ![Mailbox.org logo](assets/img/email/mailboxorg.svg){ .lg .middle .twemoji } **Mailbox.org** - - --- - - Mailbox.org is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with up to 2GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed. - - [:octicons-arrow-right-24: Read Full Review](email.md#mailboxorg) - -- ![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta.svg#only-light){ .lg .middle .twemoji }![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta-dark.svg#only-dark){ .lg .middle .twemoji } **Tuta** - - --- - - Tuta (formerly *Tutanota*) is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since 2011 and is based in Hanover, Germany. Free accounts start with 1GB of storage. - - [:octicons-arrow-right-24: Read Full Review](email.md#tuta) - -
- -
-
-### Best VPN Services - -
- -- ![Proton VPN logo](assets/img/vpn/protonvpn.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Proton VPN](vpn.md#proton-vpn) -- ![IVPN logo](assets/img/vpn/mini/ivpn.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [IVPN](vpn.md#ivpn) -- ![Mullvad logo](assets/img/vpn/mullvad.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mullvad](vpn.md#mullvad) - -
-
- -
-### Secure Cloud Storage Services - -
- -- ![Proton Drive logo](assets/img/cloud/protondrive.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Proton Drive](cloud.md#proton-drive) -- ![Tresorit logo](assets/img/cloud/tresorit.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tresorit](cloud.md#tresorit) -- ![Peergos logo](assets/img/cloud/peergos.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Peergos](cloud.md#peergos) - -
-
- -
-### Best Web Browsers - -
- -- ![Mullvad Browser logo](assets/img/browsers/mullvad_browser.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mullvad Browser](desktop-browsers.md#mullvad-browser) -- ![Firefox logo](assets/img/browsers/firefox.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Firefox](desktop-browsers.md#firefox) -- ![Brave logo](assets/img/browsers/brave.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Brave](desktop-browsers.md#brave) - -
-
-
- -[:material-format-list-checkbox: More Recommended **Privacy Tools**](tools.md){ class="md-button md-button--primary" } -[Best Mobile Browsers](mobile-browsers.md){ .md-button } -[Top Browser Extensions](browser-extensions.md){ .md-button } -[DNS Servers](dns.md){ .md-button } -[Email Aliasing Services](email-aliasing.md){ .md-button } -[Photo Organization Tools](photo-management.md){ .md-button } -[PC Operating Systems](desktop.md){ .md-button } - --- ## About Privacy Guides -![Privacy Guides logo](assets/brand/logos/png/square/pg-yellow.png){ align=right } +![Privacy Guides logo](assets/brand/logos/png/square/pg-yellow.png){ align=right loading=lazy } Established in 2021 due to the difficulty of finding unbiased reviewers in the VPN and privacy space, **Privacy Guides** is the most popular, trustworthy, non-profit website that provides information about protecting your *personal* data security and privacy. Our crowdsourced recommendations and reviews of **privacy tools** and our community dedicated to helping others set us apart from other blogs and content creators. The team behind this project has been researching privacy and security in the open-source space for over 5 years, originally with a now-defunct web resource that eventually became the *Privacy Guides* millions of readers trust. @@ -171,13 +95,13 @@ Established in 2021 due to the difficulty of finding unbiased reviewers in the V As seen in **WIRED**, **Tweakers.net**, **The New York Times**, and many other publications as a reliable source for privacy and security knowledge. -[:material-information: More About Who We Are](about.md){ class="md-button md-button--primary" } [:material-email: Join our Newsletter](https://blog.privacyguides.org/#/portal/signup){ .md-button } +[:material-information: More About Who We Are](about.md){ class="md-button" }
## What are privacy tools? -We recommend a wide variety of **privacy tools** (a.k.a. *privacy apps*, *privacy utilities*, *privacy software*) spanning software and hardware that you can adopt to improve your privacy. Many of the tools we recommend are completely free to use and open-source software, while some are commercial services available for purchase. Switching from mainstream data-hungry software like Google Chrome and Windows to privacy-focused tools like [Brave](desktop-browsers.md#brave) and [Linux](desktop.md) can go a long way towards controlling the information you share with companies and others. +We recommend a wide variety of **privacy tools** (a.k.a. *privacy apps*, *privacy utilities*, *privacy software*) spanning software and hardware that you can use to improve your privacy. Many of the tools we recommend are completely free to use and open-source software, while some are commercial services available for purchase. Switching from mainstream data-hungry software like Google Chrome and Windows to privacy-focused tools like [Brave](desktop-browsers.md#brave) and [Linux](desktop.md) can go a long way towards controlling the information you share with companies and others. [:material-check-all: Our General Criteria](about/criteria.md){ class="md-button" }
@@ -189,6 +113,6 @@ In the modern age of digital data exploitation, your privacy has never been more Many people get the concepts of privacy, security, and anonymity confused. You'll see people criticize various products as "not private" when really they mean it doesn't provide anonymity, for example. On this website, we cover all three of these topics, but it is important you understand the difference between them, and when each one comes into play. -[Privacy vs Security vs Anonymity](basics/why-privacy-matters.md#what-is-privacy){ class="md-button" } +[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: 5 Steps to Improve Your Privacy](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/02/14/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online/){ class="md-button" }
diff --git a/docs/language-tools.md b/docs/language-tools.md index 28b4e222..160d8923 100644 --- a/docs/language-tools.md +++ b/docs/language-tools.md @@ -7,11 +7,9 @@ cover: language-tools.webp Protects against the following threat(s): - [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } -- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue } - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } -- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } -Text inputted to grammar, spelling, and style checkers, as well as translation services, can contain sensitive information which may be stored on their servers for an indefinite amount of time. The language tools listed on this page do not send your submitted text to a server, and can be self-hosted and used offline for maximum control of your data. +Text inputted to grammar, spelling, and style checkers, as well as translation services, can contain sensitive information which may be stored on their servers for an indefinite amount of time and sold to third parties. The language tools listed on this page do not store your submitted text to a server, and can be self-hosted and used offline for maximum control of your data. ## LanguageTool @@ -20,9 +18,7 @@ Text inputted to grammar, spelling, and style checkers, as well as translation s ![LanguageTool logo](assets/img/language-tools/languagetool.svg#only-light){ align=right } ![LanguageTool logo](assets/img/language-tools/languagetool-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } -**LanguageTool** is a multilingual grammar, style and spell checker that supports more than 20 languages. The software is [self-hostable](https://dev.languagetool.org/http-server), and the extensions do not send your input text to their server. - -LanguageTool offers integration with a variety of [office suites](https://languagetool.org/services#text_editors) and [email clients](https://languagetool.org/services#mail_clients). +**LanguageTool** is a multilingual grammar, style, and spell checker that supports more than 20 languages. According to their privacy policy, they do not store any content sent to their service for review, but for higher assurance the software is [self-hostable](https://dev.languagetool.org/http-server). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://languagetool.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://languagetool.org/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -44,6 +40,8 @@ LanguageTool offers integration with a variety of [office suites](https://langua +LanguageTool offers integration with a variety of [office suites](https://languagetool.org/services#text_editors) and [email clients](https://languagetool.org/services#mail_clients). + ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. diff --git a/docs/maps.md b/docs/maps.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f4ea2295 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/maps.md @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +--- +meta_title: "Recommended Maps and Navigation Apps - Privacy Guides" +title: "Maps and Navigation" +icon: material/map +description: Privacy-respecting map providers and navigation apps which don't build an advertising profile based on your searches and locations. +cover: maps.webp +--- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } + +Use a **map and navigation app** that doesn't build an advertising profile based on your searches and location history. Instead of using Google Maps, Apple Maps, or Waze, we recommend these privacy-respecting alternatives. + +The recommendations here either do not collect any user data or at least do not collect personally identifying information (PII) based on each service's privacy policy. There is **no guarantee** that these privacy policies are honored. + +## Organic Maps + +
+ +![Organic Maps logo](assets/img/maps/organic-maps.svg){ align=right } + +**Organic Maps** is an open source, community-developed map display and satnav-style navigation app for walkers, drivers, and cyclists. The app offers worldwide offline maps based on OpenStreetMap data, and navigation with privacy — no location tracking, no data collection, and no ads. The app can be used completely offline. + +Features include cycling routes, hiking trails and walking paths, turn-by-turn navigation with voice guidance, and public transport route planning (only available in supported regions and cities). + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://organicmaps.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://organicmaps.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/organicmaps/organicmaps){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/organicmaps/organicmaps) +- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.organicmaps) +- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/organic-maps/id1567437057) +- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://flathub.org/apps/app.organicmaps.desktop) + +
+ +
+ +Please note that Organic Maps is a simple, basic app that lacks certain features many users might expect, such as satellite images, street view images, and real-time traffic information. + +## OsmAnd + +
+ +![OsmAnd logo](assets/img/maps/osmand.svg){ align=right } + +**OsmAnd** is an offline map and navigation application based on OpenStreetMap, offering turn-by-turn navigation for walking, cycling, driving, as well as public transport. It is open-source and does not collect any user data. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://osmand.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://osmand.net/docs/legal/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://osmand.net/docs/intro){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/osmandapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.osmand) +- [:simple-android: Android](https://osmand.net/docs/versions/free-versions) +- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/osmand-maps-travel-navigate/id934850257) + +
+ +
+ +Compared to Organic Maps, OsmAnd has more [features](https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/OsmAnd#Features) but is also more complicated to use. One noteworthy feature is the ability to overlay or underlay external map data, such as satellite images from Microsoft or [traffic data](https://web.archive.org/web/20211203063453/http://themm.net/public/osmand_traffic) from Google, although the latter is ignored by the automatic route planning. OsmAnd also has an optional integration of street view images provided by [Mapillary](https://mapillary.com). + +## Criteria + +**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. + +### Minimum Requirements + +- Must not collect PII per their privacy policy. +- Must not require users to create an account with them. +- Must not require users to share location data. If the user opts in to sharing their location, this data must be anonymized. +- Must retain core functionality when offline and allow users to download maps for offline use. + +### Best-Case + +Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. + +- Apps should be open source. +- Should have route planning for public transport. +- Should have real-time traffic information for route planning. +- Should support advanced features such as detailed shop/point of interest (POI) information and reviews, topographic maps, and satellite and street view images. diff --git a/docs/meta/admonitions.md b/docs/meta/admonitions.md index a3039243..af1ab973 100644 --- a/docs/meta/admonitions.md +++ b/docs/meta/admonitions.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: Admonitions +description: A guide for website contributors on creating admonitions. --- **Admonitions** (or "call-outs") are a choice writers can use to include side content in an article without interrupting the document flow. diff --git a/docs/meta/brand.md b/docs/meta/brand.md index 349d9a51..3afe36ff 100644 --- a/docs/meta/brand.md +++ b/docs/meta/brand.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: Branding Guidelines +description: A guide for journalists and website contributors on proper branding of the Privacy Guides wordmark and logo. --- The name of the website is **Privacy Guides** and should **not** be changed to: @@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ The name of the website is **Privacy Guides** and should **not** be changed to: - PG.org -The name of the subreddit is **r/PrivacyGuides** or **the Privacy Guides Subreddit**. +The name of the Subreddit is **r/PrivacyGuides** or **the Privacy Guides Subreddit**. Additional branding guidelines can be found at [github.com/privacyguides/brand](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand) diff --git a/docs/meta/commit-messages.md b/docs/meta/commit-messages.md index 0b2f484d..be6fd9d6 100644 --- a/docs/meta/commit-messages.md +++ b/docs/meta/commit-messages.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: Commit Messages +description: A guide for website contributors on using useful Git commit messages when making website change requests. --- For our commit messages we follow the style provided by [Conventional Commits](https://conventionalcommits.org). Not all of those suggestions are appropriate for Privacy Guides, so the main ones we use are: diff --git a/docs/meta/git-recommendations.md b/docs/meta/git-recommendations.md index 110617ec..d3638781 100644 --- a/docs/meta/git-recommendations.md +++ b/docs/meta/git-recommendations.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: Git Recommendations +description: A guide for website contributors on using Git effectively. --- If you make changes to this website on GitHub.com's web editor directly, you shouldn't have to worry about this. If you are developing locally and/or are a long-term website editor (who should probably be developing locally!), consider these recommendations. diff --git a/docs/meta/translations.md b/docs/meta/translations.md index 5fddd290..1f67cd98 100644 --- a/docs/meta/translations.md +++ b/docs/meta/translations.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: Translations +description: A guide for website contributors on adding translations to our website. --- Crowdin has good documentation, and we suggest looking at their [Getting Started](https://support.crowdin.com/crowdin-intro) guide. Our site is largely written in [Markdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markdown), so it should be easy to contribute. This page contains some helpful pointers for translating some specific syntax you may encounter on our site. @@ -26,8 +27,8 @@ For examples like the above admonitions, quotation marks, e.g.: `" "` must be us ## Fullwidth alternatives and Markdown syntax -CJK writing systems tend to use alternative "fullwidth" variants of common symbols. These are different characters and cannot be used for markdown syntax. +CJK writing systems tend to use alternative "fullwidth" variants of common symbols. These are different characters and cannot be used for Markdown syntax. -- Links must use regular parenthesis ie `(` (Left Parenthesis U+0028) and `)` (Right Parenthesis U+0029) and not `（` (Fullwidth Left Parenthesis U+FF08) or `）` (Fullwidth Right Parenthesis U+FF09) +- Links must use regular parenthesis i.e. `(` (Left Parenthesis U+0028) and `)` (Right Parenthesis U+0029) and not `（` (Fullwidth Left Parenthesis U+FF08) or `）` (Fullwidth Right Parenthesis U+FF09) - Indented quoted text must use `:` (Colon U+003A) and not `：` (Fullwidth Colon U+FF1A) - Pictures must use `!` (Exclamation Mark U+0021) and not `！` (Fullwidth Exclamation Mark U+FF01) diff --git a/docs/meta/uploading-images.md b/docs/meta/uploading-images.md index fdd3c568..5ea9570f 100644 --- a/docs/meta/uploading-images.md +++ b/docs/meta/uploading-images.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: Uploading Images +description: A guide for website contributors on uploading images in the proper format and location. --- If you make changes to this website that involve adding new images or replacing existing ones, here are a couple of general recommendations: @@ -8,10 +9,7 @@ If you make changes to this website that involve adding new images or replacing - We **prefer** SVG images, but if those do not exist we can use PNG images. Additionally, for cover images, we prefer that they are obtained from [Unsplash](https://unsplash.com) and are in the WebP format. -Company logos have canvas size of: - -- 128x128px -- 384x128px +Company logos should be square if possible, and at least 200x200px if they are PNGs (non-vector images). ## Optimization @@ -31,8 +29,8 @@ optipng -o7 file.png In Inkscape: -1. File Save As.. -2. Set type to Optimized SVG (*.svg) +1. File > Save As... +2. Set type to: Optimized SVG (*.svg) In the **Options** tab: @@ -50,7 +48,7 @@ In the **SVG Output** tab under **Document options**: - [ ] Turn off **Remove the XML declaration** - [x] Turn on **Remove metadata** - [x] Turn on **Remove comments** -- [x] Turn on **Embeded raster images** +- [x] Turn on **Embedded raster images** - [x] Turn on **Enable viewboxing** In the **SVG Output** under **Pretty-printing**: diff --git a/docs/meta/writing-style.md b/docs/meta/writing-style.md index 3399a5df..38094598 100644 --- a/docs/meta/writing-style.md +++ b/docs/meta/writing-style.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: Writing Style +description: Our official writing style handbook for website contributors. --- Privacy Guides is written in American English, and you should refer to [APA Style guidelines](https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/grammar) when in doubt. @@ -8,7 +9,7 @@ In general the [United States federal plain language guidelines](https://plainla ## Writing for our audience -Privacy Guides' intended [audience](https://plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience) is primarily average, technology using adults. Don't dumb down content as if you are addressing a middle-school class, but don't overuse complicated terminology about concepts average computer users wouldn't be familiar with. +Privacy Guides' intended [audience](https://plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience) is primarily adults who use technology. Don't dumb down content as if you are addressing a middle-school class, but don't overuse complicated terminology about concepts average computer users wouldn't be familiar with. ### Address only what people want to know @@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ We should try to avoid abbreviations where possible, but technology is full of a ## Be concise -> Unnecessary words waste your audience’s time. Great writing is like a conversation. Omit information that the audience doesn’t need to know. This can be difficult as a subject matter expert so it’s important to have someone look at the information from the audience’s perspective. +> Unnecessary words waste your audience’s time. Great writing is like a conversation. Omit information that the audience doesn’t need to know. This can be difficult as a subject-matter expert, so it’s important to have someone look at the information from the audience’s perspective. Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/concise) diff --git a/docs/mobile-browsers.md b/docs/mobile-browsers.md index cd6171d2..b72863ca 100644 --- a/docs/mobile-browsers.md +++ b/docs/mobile-browsers.md @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ --- -meta_title: "Privacy Respecting Mobile Web Browsers for Android and iOS - Privacy Guides" +meta_title: "Privacy Respecting Web Browsers for Android and iOS - Privacy Guides" title: "Mobile Browsers" icon: material/cellphone-information description: These browsers are what we currently recommend for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing on your phone. @@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ schema: image: /assets/img/browsers/brave.svg url: https://brave.com applicationCategory: Web Browser + operatingSystem: + - Android + - iOS + subjectOf: + "@type": WebPage + url: "./" + - + "@context": http://schema.org + "@type": MobileApplication + name: Cromite + image: /assets/img/browsers/cromite.svg + url: https://cromite.org + applicationCategory: Web Browser operatingSystem: - Android subjectOf: @@ -42,9 +55,7 @@ schema: These are our currently recommended **mobile web browsers** and configurations for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. -## Android - -### Brave +## Brave
@@ -57,188 +68,297 @@ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
Downloads - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.brave.browser) +- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1052879175) - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
-#### Recommended Brave Configuration +### Recommended Brave Configuration Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another. -These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Brave Shields & privacy** +=== "Android" -##### Shields + These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Brave Shields & privacy**. + +=== "iOS" + + These options can be found in :fontawesome-solid-ellipsis: → **Settings** → **Shields & Privacy**. + +#### Brave shields global defaults Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings) across all pages that you visit. -##### Brave shields global defaults - Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following: -
+=== "Android" -- [x] Select **Aggressive** under **Block trackers & ads** +
-
-Use default filter lists + - [x] Select **Aggressive** under *Block trackers & ads* + - [x] Select **Auto-redirect AMP pages** + - [x] Select **Auto-redirect tracking URLs** + - [x] Select **Require all connections to use HTTPS (strict)** under *Upgrade connections to HTTPS* + - [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1) + - [x] Select **Block third-party cookies** under *Block Cookies* + - [x] Select **Block Fingerprinting** + - [x] Select **Prevent fingerprinting via language settings** -Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use. +
+ Use default filter lists -
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the **Content Filtering** menu or the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use. -- [x] Select **Auto-redirect AMP pages** -- [x] Select **Auto-redirect tracking URLs** -- [x] Select **strict** under **Upgrade connections to HTTPS** -- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1) -- [x] Select **Block third-party cookies** under **Block Cookies** -- [x] Select **Block fingerprinting** -- [x] Select **Prevent fingerprinting via language settings** +
-
+ - [x] Select **Forget me when I close this site** -1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net) extension. +
-##### Clear browsing data + 1. This option disables JavaScript, which will break a lot of sites. To unbreak them, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis by tapping on the Shield icon in the address bar and unchecking this setting under *Advanced controls*. + +=== "iOS" + +
+ + - [x] Select **Aggressive** under *Trackers & Ads Blocking* + - [x] Select **Strict** under *Upgrade Connections to HTTPS* + - [x] Select **Auto-Redirect AMP pages** + - [x] Select **Auto-Redirect Tracking URLs** + - [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1) + - [x] Select **Block Fingerprinting** + - [x] Select **Site Tabs Closed** under *Auto Shred* + +
+ Use default filter lists + + Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the **Content Filtering** menu. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use. + +
+ +
+ + 1. This option disables JavaScript, which will break a lot of sites. To unbreak them, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis by tapping on the Shield icon in the address bar and unchecking this setting under *Advanced controls*. + +##### Clear browsing data (Android only) - [x] Select **Clear data on exit** -##### Social Media Blocking +##### Social Media Blocking (Android only) - [ ] Uncheck all social media components -##### Other privacy settings +#### Other privacy settings -
+=== "Android" -- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP handling policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings#webrtc) -- [x] (Optional) Select **No protection** under **Safe Browsing** (1) -- [ ] Uncheck **Allow sites to check if you have payment methods saved** -- [ ] Uncheck **IPFS Gateway** (2) -- [x] Select **Close tabs on exit** -- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)** -- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports** -- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave** +
-
+ - [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [*WebRTC IP handling policy*](https://support.brave.com/hc/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings#webrtc) + - [x] (Optional) Select **No protection** under *Safe Browsing* (1) + - [ ] Uncheck **Allow sites to check if you have payment methods saved** + - [ ] Uncheck **V8 Optimizer** under *Manage V8 security* + - [x] Select **Close tabs on exit** + - [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)** + - [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports** + - [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave** -1. Brave's [implementation of Safe Browsing](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/15222663599629-Safe-Browsing-in-Brave) on Android **does not** proxy [Safe Browsing network requests](https://developers.google.com/safe-browsing/v4/update-api#checking-urls) like its desktop counterpart. This means that your IP address may be seen (and logged) by Google. Note that Safe Browsing is not available for Android devices without Google Play Services. -2. InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it. +
+ + 1. Brave's [implementation of Safe Browsing](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/15222663599629-Safe-Browsing-in-Brave) on Android **does not** proxy [Safe Browsing network requests](https://developers.google.com/safe-browsing/v4/update-api#checking-urls) like its desktop counterpart. This means that your IP address may be seen (and logged) by Google. Note that Safe Browsing is not available for Android devices without Google Play Services. + +=== "iOS" + + - [ ] Uncheck **Allow Privacy-Preserving Product Analytics (P3A)** + - [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave** #### Leo -These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Leo** +These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Leo**. -- [ ] Uncheck **Show autocomplete suggestions in address bar** +
+ +- [ ] Uncheck **Show autocomplete suggestions in address bar** (1) + +
+ +1. This option is not present in Brave's iOS app. + +#### Search engines + +These options can be found in :material-menu:/:fontawesome-solid-ellipsis: → **Settings** → **Search engines**. + +- [ ] Uncheck **Show search suggestions** #### Brave Sync [Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE. -### Mull +## Cromite (Android)
-![Mull logo](assets/img/browsers/mull.svg){ align=right } +![Cromite logo](assets/img/browsers/cromite.svg){ align=right } -**Mull** is a privacy oriented and deblobbed Android browser based on Firefox. Compared to Firefox, it offers much greater fingerprinting protection out of the box, and disables JavaScript Just-in-Time (JIT) compilation for enhanced security. It also removes all proprietary elements from Firefox, such as replacing Google Play Services references. +**Cromite** is a Chromium-based browser with built-in ad blocking, fingerprinting protections, and other [privacy and security enhancements](https://github.com/uazo/cromite/blob/master/docs/FEATURES.md). It is a fork of the discontinued **Bromite** browser. -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org/pages/our_apps#mull){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/pages/privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/pages/browsers#tuningFenix){ .card-link title=Documentation } -[:octicons-code-16:](https://codeberg.org/divested-mobile/mull-fenix){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cromite.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/uazo/cromite/blob/master/docs/PRIVACY_POLICY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/uazo/cromite?tab=readme-ov-file#docs){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/uazo/cromite){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
Downloads -- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/us.spotco.fennec_dos) +- [:simple-android: F-Droid](https://cromite.org/fdroid/repo/?fingerprint=49F37E74DEE483DCA2B991334FB5A0200787430D0B5F9A783DD5F13695E9517B) +- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/uazo/cromite/releases/latest)
-
-

Danger

+### Recommended Configuration -Firefox (Gecko)-based browsers on Android [lack](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1610822) [site isolation](https://wiki.mozilla.org/Project_Fission),[^1] a powerful security feature that protects against a malicious site performing a [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability))-like attack to gain access to the memory of another website you have open.[^2] Chromium-based browsers like [Brave](#brave) will provide more robust protection against malicious websites. +These options can be found in :material-menu: → :gear: **Settings** → **Privacy and security**. -
+#### Browsing data -[^1]: This should not be mistaken for [state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning) (or dynamic [first party isolation](https://2019.www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#identifier-linkability)), where website data such as cookies and cache is restricted so that a third-party embedded in one top-level site cannot access data stored under another top-level site. This is an important privacy feature to prevent cross-site tracking and **is** supported by Firefox on Android. -[^2]: GeckoView also [does not](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196) take advantage of Android's native process sandboxing by using the [isolatedProcess](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/service-element#isolated) flag, which normally allows an app to safely run less trusted code in a separate process that has no permissions of its own. +- [x] Select **Close all open tabs on exit** -Enable DivestOS's [F-Droid repository](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official) to receive updates directly from the developer. Downloading Mull from the default F-Droid repo will mean your updates could be delayed by a few days or longer. +#### Incognito mode -Mull enables many features upstreamed by the [Tor uplift project](https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Tor_Uplift) using preferences from [Arkenfox](desktop-browsers.md#arkenfox-advanced). Proprietary blobs are removed from Mozilla's code using the scripts developed for Fennec F-Droid. +- [x] Select **Open external links in incognito** -#### Recommended Mull Configuration +#### Security -We would suggest installing [uBlock Origin](browser-extensions.md#ublock-origin) as a content blocker if you want to block trackers within Mull. +- [x] Select **Always use secure connections** -Mull comes with privacy protecting settings configured by default. You might consider configuring the **Delete browsing data on quit** options in Mull's settings if you want to close all your open tabs when quitting the app automatically, or clear other data such as browsing history and cookies automatically. +This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. HTTP is extremely uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day-to-day browsing. -Because Mull has more advanced and strict privacy protections enabled by default compared to most browsers, some websites may not load or work properly unless you adjust those settings. You can consult this [list of known issues and workarounds](https://divestos.org/pages/broken#mull) for advice on a potential fix if you do encounter a broken site. Adjusting a setting in order to fix a website could impact your privacy/security, so make sure you fully understand any instructions you follow. +#### Adblock Plus settings -## iOS +These options can be found in :material-menu: → :gear: **Settings** → **Adblock Plus settings**. -On iOS, any app that can browse the web is [restricted](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines) to using an Apple-provided [WebKit framework](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit), so there is little reason to use a third-party web browser. +Cromite contains a customized version of Adblock Plus with EasyList enabled by default, as well as options to select more filter lists within the **Filter lists** menu. -### Safari +Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Cromite users and may also increase attack surface if a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use. + +- [x] (Optional) Select **Enable anti-circumvention and snippets** + +This setting adds an additional Adblock Plus list that may increase the effectiveness of Cromite's content blocking. The warnings about standing out and potentially increasing attack surface apply. + +#### Legacy Adblock settings + +These options can be found in :material-menu: → :gear: **Settings** → **Legacy Adblock settings**. + +- [ ] Uncheck the autoupdate setting + +This disables update checks for the unmaintained Bromite adblock filter. + +## Safari (iOS) + +On iOS, any app that can browse the web is [restricted](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines) to using an Apple-provided [WebKit framework](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit), so a browser like [Brave](#brave) does not use the Chromium engine like its counterparts on other operating systems.
![Safari logo](assets/img/browsers/safari.svg){ align=right } -**Safari** is the default browser in iOS. It includes [privacy features](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/browse-the-web-privately-iphb01fc3c85/ios) such as [Intelligent Tracking Prevention](https://webkit.org/blog/7675/intelligent-tracking-prevention), Privacy Report, isolated and ephemeral Private Browsing tabs, fingerprinting protection (by presenting a simplified version of the system configuration to websites so more devices look identical), and Private Relay for those with a paid iCloud+ subscription. It also allows you to separate your browsing with different profiles and lock private tabs with your biometrics/PIN. +**Safari** is the default browser in iOS. It includes [privacy features](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/browse-the-web-privately-iphb01fc3c85/ios) such as [Intelligent Tracking Prevention](https://webkit.org/blog/7675/intelligent-tracking-prevention), isolated and ephemeral Private Browsing tabs, fingerprinting protection (by presenting a simplified version of the system configuration to websites, so more devices look identical), and fingerprint randomization, as well as Private Relay for those with a paid iCloud+ subscription. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://apple.com/safari){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/safari){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/browse-the-web-iph1fbef4daa/ios){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/browse-the-web-iph1fbef4daa/ios){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-#### Recommended Safari Configuration +### Recommended Safari Configuration -We would suggest installing [AdGuard](browser-extensions.md#adguard) as a content blocker if you want to block trackers within Safari. +We would suggest installing [AdGuard](browser-extensions.md#adguard) if you want a content blocker in Safari. -The following privacy/security-related options can be found in the :gear: **Settings** app → **Safari** +The following privacy/security-related options can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Safari**. -##### Profiles +#### Allow Safari to Access -All of your cookies, history, and website data will be separate for each profile. You should use different profiles for different purposes e.g. Shopping, Work, or School. +Under **Siri**: -##### Privacy & Security +- [ ] Disable **Learn from this App** +- [ ] Disable **Show in App** +- [ ] Disable **Show on Home Screen** +- [ ] Disable **Suggest App** + +This prevents Siri from using content from Safari for Siri suggestions. + +#### Search + +- [ ] Disable **Search Engine Suggestions** + +This setting sends whatever you type in the address bar to the search engine set in Safari. Disabling search suggestions allows you to more precisely control what data you send to your search engine provider. + +#### Profiles + +Safari allows you to separate your browsing with different profiles. All of your cookies, history, and website data are separate for each profile. You should use different profiles for different purposes e.g. Shopping, Work, or School. + +#### Privacy & Security - [x] Enable **Prevent Cross-Site Tracking** - This enables WebKit's [Intelligent Tracking Protection](https://webkit.org/tracking-prevention/#intelligent-tracking-prevention-itp). The feature helps protect against unwanted tracking by using on-device machine learning to stop trackers. ITP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to not interfere with website usability. +This enables WebKit's [Intelligent Tracking Protection](https://webkit.org/tracking-prevention/#intelligent-tracking-prevention-itp). The feature helps protect against unwanted tracking by using on-device machine learning to stop trackers. ITP protects against many common threats, but does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to not interfere with website usability. -- [x] Enable **Require Face ID to Unlock Private Browsing** +- [x] Enable **Require Face ID/Touch ID to Unlock Private Browsing** - This setting allows you to lock your private tabs behind biometrics/PIN when not in use. +This setting allows you to lock your private tabs behind biometrics/PIN when not in use. -##### Advanced → Privacy +- [ ] Disable **Fraudulent Website Warning** + +This setting uses Google Safe Browsing (or Tencent Safe Browsing for users in mainland China or Hong Kong) to protect you while you browse. As such, your IP address may be logged by your Safe Browsing provider. Disabling this setting will disable this logging, but you might be more vulnerable to known phishing sites. + +- [x] Enable **Not Secure Connection Warning** + +This setting shows a warning screen if your connection to a website isn't using HTTPS. Safari will automatically try to upgrade the site to HTTPS, so you should only see this when there is no HTTPS connection available. + +- [ ] Disable **Highlights** + +Apple's privacy policy for Safari states: + +> When visiting a webpage, Safari may send information calculated from the webpage address to Apple over OHTTP to determine if relevant highlights are available. + +#### Settings for Websites + +Under **Camera** + +- [x] Select **Ask** + +Under **Microphone** + +- [x] Select **Ask** + +Under **Location** + +- [x] Select **Ask** + +These settings ensure that websites can only access your camera, microphone, or location after you explicitly grant them access. + +#### Other Privacy Settings + +These options can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Safari** → **Advanced**. + +##### Fingerprinting Mitigations The **Advanced Tracking and Fingerprinting Protection** setting will randomize certain values so that it's more difficult to fingerprint you: - [x] Select **All Browsing** or **Private Browsing** -##### Privacy Report - -Privacy Report provides a snapshot of cross-site trackers currently prevented from profiling you on the website you're visiting. It can also display a weekly report to show which trackers have been blocked over time. - -Privacy Report is accessible via the Page Settings menu. - ##### Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement - [ ] Disable **Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement** @@ -247,25 +367,25 @@ Ad click measurement has traditionally used tracking technology that infringes o The feature has little privacy concerns on its own, so while you can choose to leave it on, we consider the fact that it's automatically disabled in Private Browsing to be an indicator for disabling the feature. -##### Always-on Private Browsing +#### Always-on Private Browsing -Open Safari and tap the Tabs button, located in the bottom right. Then, expand the Tab Groups list. +Open Safari and tap the Tabs button, located in the bottom right. Then, expand the :material-format-list-bulleted: Tab Groups list. - [x] Select **Private** -Safari's Private Browsing mode offers additional privacy protections. Private Browsing uses a new [ephemeral](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/urlsessionconfiguration/1410529-ephemeral) session for each tab, meaning tabs are isolated from one another. There are also other smaller privacy benefits with Private Browsing, such as not sending a webpage’s address to Apple when using Safari's translation feature. +Safari's Private Browsing mode offers additional privacy protections. Private Browsing uses a new [ephemeral](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/urlsessionconfiguration/1410529-ephemeral) session for each tab, meaning tabs are isolated from one another. There are other smaller privacy benefits with Private Browsing too, such as not sending a webpage’s address to Apple when using Safari's translation feature. -Do note that Private Browsing does not save cookies and website data, so it won't be possible to remain signed into sites. This may be an inconvenience. +Do note that Private Browsing does not save cookies and website data, so it won't be possible to remain signed in to sites. This may be an inconvenience. -##### iCloud Sync +#### iCloud Sync Synchronization of Safari History, Tab Groups, iCloud Tabs and saved passwords are E2EE. However, by default, bookmarks are [not](https://support.apple.com/HT202303). Apple can decrypt and access them in accordance with their [privacy policy](https://apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww). -You can enable E2EE for your Safari bookmarks and downloads by enabling [Advanced Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). Go to your **Apple ID name → iCloud → Advanced Data Protection**. +You can enable E2EE for your Safari bookmarks and downloads by enabling [Advanced Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). Go to :gear: **Settings** → **iCloud** → **Advanced Data Protection**. -- [x] Turn On **Advanced Data Protection** +- [x] Turn on **Advanced Data Protection** -If you use iCloud with Advanced Data Protection disabled, we also recommend checking to ensure Safari's default download location is set to locally on your device. This option can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **General** → **Downloads**. +If you use iCloud with Advanced Data Protection disabled, we also recommend setting Safari's default download location to a local folder on your device. This option can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Safari** → **General** → **Downloads**. ## Criteria diff --git a/docs/mobile-phones.md b/docs/mobile-phones.md index c8fcb807..6e9db482 100644 --- a/docs/mobile-phones.md +++ b/docs/mobile-phones.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Mobile Phones" icon: material/cellphone-check -description: These mobile devices have proper Android Verified Boot support for custom operating systems. +description: These mobile devices provide the best hardware security support for custom Android operating systems. cover: android.webp schema: - @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ schema: author: "@type": Organization name: Privacy Guides +robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large --- Protects against the following threat(s): @@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ Most **mobile phones** receive short or limited windows of security updates from The mobile devices listed here provide a long lifespan of guaranteed security updates and allow you to install a custom operating system without violating the Android security model. -[Recommended Custom OSes :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](android/distributions.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Details about Android Security :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md#security-protections){ .md-button } +[Recommended Android Distributions :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](android/distributions.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Details about Android Security :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md#security-protections){ .md-button }

Warning

diff --git a/docs/multi-factor-authentication.md b/docs/multi-factor-authentication.md index da5ebb32..87987e8c 100644 --- a/docs/multi-factor-authentication.md +++ b/docs/multi-factor-authentication.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ --- -title: "Multi-Factor Authentication" +title: "Multifactor Authentication" icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication' -description: These tools assist you with securing your internet accounts with Multi-Factor Authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party. +description: These tools assist you with securing your internet accounts with Multifactor Authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party. cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp --- Protects against the following threat(s): @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
-**Multi-Factor Authentication Apps** implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called **Time-based One-time Passwords**, or **TOTP**. This is a method where websites share a secret with you which is used by your authenticator app to generate a six (usually) digit code based on the current time, which you enter while logging in for the website to check. Typically these codes are regenerated every 30 seconds, and once a new code is generated the old one becomes useless. Even if a hacker gets one six-digit code, there is no way for them to reverse that code to get the original secret or otherwise be able to predict what any future codes might be. +**Multifactor Authentication Apps** implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called **Time-based One-time Passwords**, or **TOTP**. This is a method where websites share a secret with you which is used by your authenticator app to generate a six (usually) digit code based on the current time, which you enter while logging in for the website to check. Typically, these codes are regenerated every 30 seconds, and once a new code is generated the old one becomes useless. Even if a hacker gets one six-digit code, there is no way for them to reverse that code to get the original secret or otherwise be able to predict what any future codes might be. We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternatives as Android and iOS have better security and app isolation than most desktop operating systems. @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative ![Ente Auth logo](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/ente-auth.svg){ align=right } -**Ente Auth** is a free and open-source app which stores and generates TOTP tokens. It can be used with an online account to backup and sync your tokens across your devices (and access them via a web interface) in a secure, end-to-end encrypted fashion. It can also be used offline on a single device with no account necessary. +**Ente Auth** is a free and open-source app which stores and generates TOTP tokens. It can be used with an online account to back up and sync your tokens across your devices (and access them via a web interface) in a secure, end-to-end encrypted fashion. It can also be used offline on a single device with no account necessary. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://ente.io/auth){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://ente.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } diff --git a/docs/news-aggregators.md b/docs/news-aggregators.md index 1da82042..54c755d8 100644 --- a/docs/news-aggregators.md +++ b/docs/news-aggregators.md @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ icon: material/rss description: These news aggregator clients let you keep up with your favorite blogs and news sites using internet standards like RSS. cover: news-aggregators.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online newspapers, blogs, podcasts, and other resources to one location for easy viewing. Using one can be a great way to keep up with your favorite content. @@ -15,13 +18,13 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n ![Akregator logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/akregator.svg){ align=right } -**Akregator** is a news feed reader that is a part of the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It comes with a fast search, advanced archiving functionality and an internal browser for easy news reading. +**Akregator** is a news feed reader that is a part of the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It comes with a fast search, advanced archiving functionality, and an internal browser for easy news reading. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://apps.kde.org/akregator){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.kde.org/?application=akregator){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.kde.org/?application=akregator){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/akregator){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -38,7 +41,7 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n ![NewsFlash logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/newsflash.png){ align=right } -**NewsFlash** is an open-source, modern, simple and easy to use GTK4 news feed reader for Linux. It can be used offline or used with services like [NextCloud News](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/news) or [Inoreader](https://inoreader.com). It has a search feature and even a pre-defined list of sources like [TechCrunch](https://techcrunch.com) that you can add directly. It is only available as a Flatpak (on the Flathub repository). +**NewsFlash** is an open-source, modern, and easy-to-use news feed reader for Linux. It can be used offline or used with services like [Nextcloud News](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/news) or [Inoreader](https://inoreader.com). It has a search feature and a pre-defined list of sources that you can add directly. [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/news-flash/news_flash_gtk){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/news-flash/news_flash_gtk){ .card-link title="Source Code" } @@ -58,11 +61,11 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n ![Feeder logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/feeder.png){ align=right } -**Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed). +**Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML), and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed). [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://ko-fi.com/spacecowboy){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://ko-fi.com/spacecowboy){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -74,30 +77,6 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n -### Fluent Reader - -
- -![Fluent Reader logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/fluent-reader.svg){ align=right } - -**Fluent Reader** is a secure cross-platform news aggregator that has useful privacy features such as deletion of cookies on exit, strict [content security policies (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) and proxy support, meaning you can use it over [Tor](tor.md). - -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/Privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation} -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/yang991178){ .card-link title=Contribute } - -
-Downloads - -- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader) -- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1520907427) - -
- -
- ### Miniflux
@@ -105,12 +84,12 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n ![Miniflux logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux.svg#only-light){ align=right } ![Miniflux logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } -**Miniflux** is a web-based news aggregator that you can self-host. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed). +**Miniflux** is a web-based news aggregator that you can self-host. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML), and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://miniflux.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/miniflux/v2){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://miniflux.app/#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://miniflux.app/#donations){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
@@ -123,8 +102,8 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n **NetNewsWire** is a free and open-source feed reader for macOS and iOS with a focus on a native design and feature set. It supports the typical feed formats alongside built-in support for Reddit feeds. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://netnewswire.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://netnewswire.com/privacypolicy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://netnewswire.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://netnewswire.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://netnewswire.com/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Ranchero-Software/NetNewsWire){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -143,10 +122,10 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n ![Newsboat logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/newsboat.svg){ align=right } -**Newsboat** is an RSS/Atom feed reader for the text console. It's an actively maintained fork of [Newsbeuter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newsbeuter). It is very lightweight, and ideal for use over [Secure Shell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell). +**Newsboat** is an RSS/Atom feed reader for the text console. It's an actively maintained fork of [Newsbeuter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newsbeuter). It is very lightweight and ideal for use over [Secure Shell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newsboat.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://newsboat.org/releases/2.27/docs/newsboat.html){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://newsboat.org/releases/2.37/docs/newsboat.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/newsboat/newsboat){ .card-link title="Source Code" } @@ -160,16 +139,16 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n ## Social Media RSS Support -Some social media services also support RSS although it's not often advertised. +Some social media services also support RSS, although it's not often advertised. ### Reddit -Reddit allows you to subscribe to subreddits via RSS. +Reddit allows you to subscribe to Subreddits via RSS.

Example

-Replace `[SUBREDDIT]` with the subreddit you wish to subscribe to. +Replace `[SUBREDDIT]` with the Subreddit you wish to subscribe to. ```text https://reddit.com/r/[SUBREDDIT]/new/.rss @@ -179,12 +158,12 @@ https://reddit.com/r/[SUBREDDIT]/new/.rss ### YouTube -You can subscribe YouTube channels without logging in and associating usage information with your Google account. +You can subscribe to YouTube channels without logging in and associating usage information with your Google account.

Example

-To subscribe to a YouTube channel with an RSS client, first look for its [channel code](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6180214). The channel code can be found on the about page of the YouTube channel you wish to subscribe to, under: **About** > **Share** > **Copy channel ID**. Replace `[CHANNEL ID]` below: +To subscribe to a YouTube channel with an RSS client, first look for its [channel code](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6180214). The channel code can be found on the about page of the YouTube channel you wish to subscribe to, under: **About** → **Share** → **Copy channel ID**. Replace `[CHANNEL ID]` below: ```text https://youtube.com/feeds/videos.xml?channel_id=[CHANNEL ID] diff --git a/docs/notebooks.md b/docs/notebooks.md index 9a7058b1..21cf57b5 100644 --- a/docs/notebooks.md +++ b/docs/notebooks.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ cover: notebooks.webp - [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } -Keep track of your notes and journalings without giving them to a third-party. +Keep track of your notes and journals without giving them to a third party. If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microsoft OneNote, we suggest you pick an alternative here that supports E2EE. @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Standard Notes has [joined Proton AG](https://standardnotes.com/blog/joining-for ![Joplin logo](assets/img/notebooks/joplin.svg){ align=right } -**Joplin** is a free, open-source, and fully-featured note-taking and to-do application which can handle a large number of markdown notes organized into notebooks and tags. It offers E2EE and can sync through Nextcloud, Dropbox, and more. It also offers easy import from Evernote and plain-text notes. +**Joplin** is a free, open-source, and fully-featured note-taking and to-do application which can handle numerous markdown notes organized into notebooks and tags. It offers E2EE and can sync through Nextcloud, Dropbox, and more. It also offers easy import from Evernote and plain-text notes. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://joplinapp.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://joplinapp.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ Since January 2023, Joplin [supports biometrics](https://github.com/laurent22/jo
-Cryptee offers 100MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Sign-up doesn't require an e-mail or other personally identifiable information. +Cryptee offers 100 MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Sign-up doesn't require an e-mail or other personally identifiable information. ## Local notebooks diff --git a/docs/office-suites.md b/docs/office-suites.md index f4198721..4d769922 100644 --- a/docs/office-suites.md +++ b/docs/office-suites.md @@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ icon: material/file-edit-outline description: These office suites offer their full functionality without an account and can be used offline. cover: office-suites.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } + Choose an **office suite** that does not require logging in to an account to access its full functionality. The tools listed here can be used offline and could reasonably act as a replacement for Microsoft Office for most needs. ## LibreOffice diff --git a/docs/os/android-overview.md b/docs/os/android-overview.md index 32c1ddb0..329fb23d 100644 --- a/docs/os/android-overview.md +++ b/docs/os/android-overview.md @@ -2,44 +2,17 @@ title: Android Overview icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. +robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large --- ![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. -## Our Advice +[:octicons-home-16:](https://source.android.com){ .card-link title=Homepage } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -### Choosing an Android Distribution - -When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. - -This problem could be solved by using a custom Android distribution that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model. - -Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria. - -[Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android/distributions.md){ .md-button } - -### Avoid Rooting - -[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. - -Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md). - -AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations. - -We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. - -### Install Updates - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android receive not only security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. - -For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -### Sharing Media - -You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. - -For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. +[Our Android Advice :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android/index.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } ## Security Protections @@ -61,7 +34,7 @@ Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be a **Firmware updates** are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). -As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC, and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support. With the introduction of the Pixel 8 series, Google increased that support window to 7 years. +As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC, and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support. With the introduction of the Pixel 8 series, Google increased that support window to 7 years. EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed. @@ -110,7 +83,7 @@ If an app is mostly a web-based service, the tracking may occur on the server si

Note

-Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. +Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics.
@@ -118,21 +91,29 @@ Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/ ### User Profiles -Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. +Multiple **user profiles** can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **System** → **Users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. -With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. +With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. ### Work Profile -[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. +[**Work Profiles**](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](../android/general-apps.md#shelter) is required to create a Work Profile without an enterprise MDM, unless you're using a custom Android OS which includes one. The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. You must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to your data inside the work profile. -This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. +This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the owner profile and work profile simultaneously. -### VPN Killswitch +### Private Space + +**Private Space** is a feature introduced in Android 15 that adds another way of isolating individual apps. You can set up a private space in the owner profile by navigating to :gear: **Settings** → **Security & privacy** → **Private space**. Once set up, your private space resides at the bottom of the app drawer. + +Like user profiles, a private space is encrypted using its own encryption key, and you have the option to set up a different unlock method. Like work profiles, you can use apps from both the owner profile and private space simultaneously. Apps launched from a private space are distinguished by an icon depicting a key within a shield. + +Unlike work profiles, Private Space is a feature native to Android that does not require a third-party app to manage it. For this reason, we generally recommend using a private space over a work profile, though you can use a work profile alongside a private space. + +### VPN kill switch Android 7 and above supports a VPN kill switch, and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. @@ -142,7 +123,7 @@ Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location ## Google Services -If you are using a device with Google services—whether with the stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS—there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. +If you are using a device with Google services—whether with the stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS—there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play Services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. ### Advanced Protection Program @@ -174,7 +155,7 @@ All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [adver On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **Ads**, and select *Delete advertising ID*. -On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check +On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (which includes the stock installation on most devices), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check - :gear: **Settings** → **Google** → **Ads** - :gear: **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Ads** diff --git a/docs/os/index.md b/docs/os/index.md index fdcdea6c..9bf23b11 100644 --- a/docs/os/index.md +++ b/docs/os/index.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: Operating Systems +description: An overview of our operating system-related recommendations for all major computing hardware. --- We publish configuration guides for the major operating systems, because you can generally improve the amount of data that is collected about you on any option, especially if you use privacy tools like our [recommended web browsers](../desktop-browsers.md) in place of native tools where appropriate. However, some operating systems will be more privacy-respecting inherently, and it will be much harder to achieve an equivalent level of privacy on other choices. diff --git a/docs/os/ios-overview.md b/docs/os/ios-overview.md index 14fe987a..dc609d82 100644 --- a/docs/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/docs/os/ios-overview.md @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. -We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android/distributions.md#aosp-derivatives) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android/distributions.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. ### Activation Lock @@ -17,16 +17,24 @@ All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when the ### Mandatory App Store -The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple Account to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. ### Invasive Telemetry -Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). +Apple has historically had problems with properly disassociating their telemetry from Apple Accounts on iOS. In [2019](https://theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. Though Apple temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the company rolled out a switch to [**opt out** of uploading conversations with Siri](https://theguardian.com/technology/2019/oct/30/apple-lets-users-opt-out-of-having-siri-conversations-recorded) a few months later in the succeeding iOS update. Moreover, in 2021, [Apple reworked Siri](https://theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance) so that it processes voice recordings locally rather than sending it to their servers. -More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. +More recently, Apple has been found to transmit analytics [even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being decoupled from Apple Accounts. + +### Traffic Outside Active VPN Connections + +Apple's [privacy policy regarding VPNs](https://apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/vpns) states: + +> Even when a VPN is active, some traffic that is necessary for essential system services will take place outside the VPN so that your device can function properly. ## Recommended Configuration +**Note:** This guide assumes that you're running the latest version of iOS. + ### iCloud The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. @@ -47,7 +55,7 @@ A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some p #### Media & Purchases -At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple Account. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** → **View Account**. - [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** @@ -60,7 +68,7 @@ At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. -At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple Account. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. ### Settings @@ -72,9 +80,9 @@ Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You wil #### Wi-Fi -You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: +You can enable [hardware address randomization](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102509#triswitch) to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks, and on the same network over time. On the network you are currently connected to, tap the :material-information: button: -- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** +- [x] Set **Private Wi-Fi Address** to **Fixed** or **Rotating** You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. @@ -84,25 +92,27 @@ You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iC - [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** +Note that Bluetooth is automatically turned on after every system update. + #### General -Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** → **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. -It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** → **Automatic Updates**: - [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** - [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** - [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** -**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. +**AirDrop** is commonly used to easily share files, but it represents a significant privacy risk. The AirDrop protocol constantly broadcasts your personal information to your surroundings, with [very weak](https://usenix.org/system/files/sec21-heinrich.pdf) security protections. Your identity can easily be discovered by attackers even with limited resources, and the Chinese government has [openly acknowledged](https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/01/hackers-can-id-unique-apple-airdrop-users-chinese-authorities-claim-to-do-just-that) using such techniques to identify AirDrop users in public since 2022. -- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** +- [x] Select **AirDrop** → **Receiving Off** -**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Continuity** → **Automatically AirPlay**: - [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** -**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. @@ -114,21 +124,21 @@ If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is l #### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode -Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make trade-offs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. -Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](../basics/passwords-overview.md). +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** → **Passcode Options** → **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](../basics/passwords-overview.md). If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. -On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID, you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance, so you know which method works for your device. -**Stolen Device Protection** is a new feature in iOS 17.3 which adds additional security intended to protect your personal data if your device is stolen while unlocked. If you use biometrics and the Find My Device feature in your Apple ID settings, we recommend enabling this new protection: +**Stolen Device Protection** adds additional security intended to protect your personal data if your device is stolen while unlocked. If you use biometrics and the Find My Device feature in your Apple Account settings, we recommend enabling this new protection: - [x] Select **Turn On Protection** -After enabling Stolen Device Protection, [certain actions](https://support.apple.com/HT212510) will require biometric authentication without a password fallback (in the event that a shoulder surfer has obtained your PIN), such as using password autofill, accessing payment information, and disabling Lost Mode. It also adds a security delay to certain actions performed away from your home or another "familiar location," such as requiring a 1-hour timer to reset your Apple ID password or sign out of your Apple ID. This delay is intended to give you time to enable Lost Mode and secure your account before a thief can reset your device. +After enabling Stolen Device Protection, [certain actions](https://support.apple.com/HT212510) will require biometric authentication without a password fallback (in the event that a shoulder surfer has obtained your PIN), such as using password autofill, accessing payment information, and disabling Lost Mode. It also adds a security delay to certain actions performed away from your home or another "familiar location," such as requiring a 1-hour timer to reset your Apple Account password or sign out of your Apple Account. This delay is intended to give you time to enable Lost Mode and secure your account before a thief can reset your device. **Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. @@ -185,6 +195,8 @@ You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select - [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** - [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** - [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Assistive Voice Features** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve AR Location Accuracy** Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising**: @@ -202,22 +214,66 @@ Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Adve ### E2EE Calls -Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE. Alternatively, you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal for E2EE calls. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The [color of the message bubble](https://support.apple.com/en-us/104972) in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates the other party is using either the outdated SMS and MMS protocols or RCS. RCS on iOS is **not** E2EE. Currently, the only way to have E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations like Signal's (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Photo Permissions + +When an app prompts you for access to your device's photo library, iOS provides you with options to limit what an app can access. + +Rather than allow an app to access all the photos on your device, you can allow it to only access whichever photos you choose by tapping the "Select Photos..." option in the permission dialog. You can change photo access permissions at any time by navigating to **Settings** → **Privacy & Security** → **Photos**. + +![Photo Permissions](../assets/img/ios/photo-permissions-light.png#only-light) ![Photo Permissions](../assets/img/ios/photo-permissions-dark.png#only-dark) + +**Add Photos Only** is a permission that only gives an app the ability to download photos to the photo library. Not all apps which request photo library access provide this option. + +![Private Access](../assets/img/ios/private-access-light.png#only-light) ![Private Access](../assets/img/ios/private-access-dark.png#only-dark) + +Some apps also support **Private Access**, which functions similarly to the **Limited Access** permission. However, photos shared to apps using Private Access include their location by default. We recommend unchecking this setting if you do not [remove photo metadata](../data-redaction.md) beforehand. + +### Contact Permissions + +Similarly, rather than allow an app to access all the contacts saved on your device, you can allow it to only access whichever contacts you choose. You can change contact access permissions at any time by navigating to **Settings** → **Privacy & Security** → **Contacts**. + +![Contact Permissions](../assets/img/ios/contact-permissions-light.png#only-light) ![Contact Permissions](../assets/img/ios/contact-permissions-dark.png#only-dark) + +### Require Biometrics and Hide Apps + +iOS offers the ability to lock most apps behind Touch ID/Face ID or your passcode, which can be useful for protecting sensitive content in apps which do not provide the option themselves. You can lock an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Any app locked in this way requires biometric authentication whenever opening it or accessing its contents in other apps. Also, notification previews for locked apps will not be shown. + +In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that they don't appear on the Home Screen, App Library, the app list in **Settings**, etc. While hiding apps may be useful in situations where you have to hand your unlocked phone to someone else, the concealment provided by the feature is not absolute, as a hidden app is still visible in some places such as the battery usage list. Moreover, one notable trade off of hiding an app is that you will not receive any of its notifications. + +You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. + +### Redacting Elements in Images + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. + +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + +- Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated, and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right +- Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle +- On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. + +**Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, as its opacity is not quite 100%. ### Avoid Jailbreaking Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. -### Encrypted iMessage - -The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates the other party is using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. - -If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. - -### Blacking Out Faces/Information - -If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. - ### iOS Betas Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. @@ -226,4 +282,4 @@ Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to h ### Before First Unlock -If your threat model includes forensic tools, and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. +If your threat model includes [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } that involve forensic tools, and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/docs/os/linux-overview.md b/docs/os/linux-overview.md index c752cc3c..3697ff00 100644 --- a/docs/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/docs/os/linux-overview.md @@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux di [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md){ .md-button } -## Privacy Notes +## Security Notes -There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: +There are some notable security concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: - Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems - Maintain [software freedom](https://gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedo - **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020) which permit most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. -Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages such as Rust and Swift, respectively. ## Choosing your distribution @@ -51,11 +51,11 @@ We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good Traditionally, Linux distributions update by sequentially updating the desired packages. Traditional updates such as those used in Fedora, Arch Linux, and Debian-based distributions can be less reliable if an error occurs while updating. -Atomic updating distributions, on the other hand, apply updates in full or not at all. On an atomic distribution, if an error occurs while updating (perhaps due to a power failure), nothing is changed on the system. +Distros which use atomic updates, on the other hand, apply updates in full or not at all. On an atomic distribution, if an error occurs while updating (perhaps due to a power failure), nothing is changed on the system. The atomic update method can achieve reliability with this model and is used for [distributions](../desktop.md#atomic-distributions) like Silverblue and NixOS. [Adam Šamalík](https://twitter.com/adsamalik) provides a presentation on how `rpm-ostree` works with Silverblue: -- [Let's try Fedora Silverblue — an immutable desktop OS! - Adam Šamalik](https://youtu.be/aMo4ZlWznao) (YouTube) +- [Let's try Fedora Silverblue — an immutable desktop OS! - Adam Šamalík](https://youtu.be/aMo4ZlWznao) (YouTube) ### “Security-focused” distributions @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes securit ### Mandatory access control -Mandatory access control is a set of additional security controls which help to confine parts of the system such as apps and system services. The two common forms of mandatory access control found in Linux distributions are [SELinux](https://github.com/SELinuxProject) and [AppArmor](https://apparmor.net). While Fedora uses SELinux by default, Tumbleweed [defaults](https://en.opensuse.org/Portal:SELinux) to AppArmor in the installer, with an option to [choose](https://en.opensuse.org/Portal:SELinux/Setup) SELinux instead. +Mandatory access control is a set of additional security controls which help to confine parts of the system such as apps and system services. The two common forms of mandatory access control found in Linux distributions are [SELinux](https://github.com/SELinuxProject) and [AppArmor](https://apparmor.net). Fedora and Tumbleweed use SELinux by default, with Tumbleweed offering an option in its installer to choose AppArmor instead. SELinux on [Fedora](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/quick-docs/selinux-getting-started) confines Linux containers, virtual machines, and service daemons by default. AppArmor is used by the snap daemon for [sandboxing](https://snapcraft.io/docs/security-sandboxing) snaps which have [strict](https://snapcraft.io/docs/snap-confinement) confinement such as [Firefox](https://snapcraft.io/firefox). There is a community effort to confine more parts of the system in Fedora with the [ConfinedUsers](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/SIGs/ConfinedUsers) special interest group. @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SELinux on [Fedora](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/quick-docs/selinux-gett ### Drive Encryption -Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE. If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to backup your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted. We also suggest securely erasing your storage device: +Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE. If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to back up your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted. We also suggest securely erasing your storage device: - [Secure Data Erasure :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure) @@ -158,6 +158,6 @@ There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You s The Fedora Project [counts](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) how many unique systems access its mirrors by using a [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) variable instead of a unique ID. Fedora does this to determine load and provision better servers for updates where necessary. -This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) is currently off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the countme option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems) timer. +This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) is currently off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the `countme` option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems) timer. openSUSE also uses a [unique ID](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Statistics) to count systems, which can be disabled by emptying the `/var/lib/zypp/AnonymousUniqueId` file. diff --git a/docs/os/macos-overview.md b/docs/os/macos-overview.md index 8c651052..f5c6e9ae 100644 --- a/docs/os/macos-overview.md +++ b/docs/os/macos-overview.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: macOS is Apple's desktop operating system that works with their har --- **macOS** is a Unix operating system developed by Apple for their Mac computers. To enhance privacy on macOS, you can disable telemetry features and harden existing privacy and security settings. -Older Intel-based Macs and Hackintoshes do not support all the security features that macOS offers. To enhance data security, we recommend using a newer Mac with [Apple silicon](https://support.apple.com/HT211814). +Older Intel-based Macs and Hackintoshes do not support all the security features that macOS offers. To enhance data security, we recommend using a newer Mac with [Apple Silicon](https://support.apple.com/HT211814). ## Privacy Notes @@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ There are a few notable privacy concerns with macOS that you should consider. Th ### Activation Lock -Brand new Apple silicon devices can be set up without an internet connection. However, recovering or resetting your Mac will **require** an internet connection to Apple's servers to check against the Activation Lock database of lost or stolen devices. +Brand-new Apple Silicon devices can be set up without an internet connection. However, recovering or resetting your Mac will **require** an internet connection to Apple's servers to check against the Activation Lock database of lost or stolen devices. ### App Revocation Checks macOS performs online checks when you open an app to verify whether an app contains known malware, and whether the developer’s signing certificate is revoked. -Previously, these checks were performed via an unencrypted OCSP protocol which could leak information about the apps you ran to your network. Apple upgraded their OCSP service to use HTTPS encryption in 2021, and [posted information](https://support.apple.com/HT202491) about their logging policy for this service. They additionally promised to add a mechanism for people to opt-out of this online check, but this has not been added to macOS as of July 2023. +Apple's OCSP service uses HTTPS encryption, so only they are able to see which apps you open. They've [posted information](https://support.apple.com/HT202491) about their logging policy for this service. They additionally [promised](http://lapcatsoftware.com/articles/2024/8/3.html) to add a mechanism for people to opt-out of this online check, but this has not been added to macOS. While you [can](https://eclecticlight.co/2021/02/23/how-to-run-apps-in-private) manually opt out of this check relatively easily, we recommend against doing so unless you would be badly compromised by the revocation checks performed by macOS, because they serve an important role in ensuring compromised apps are blocked from running. @@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ However, exploits in protective utilities like `sudo` have been [discovered in t If you do use a second account, it is not strictly required to ever log in to your original Administrator account from the macOS login screen. When you are doing something as a Standard user which requires Administrator permissions, the system should prompt you for authentication, where you can enter your Administrator credentials as your Standard user on a one-time basis. Apple provides [guidance](https://support.apple.com/HT203998) on hiding your Administrator account if you prefer to only see a single account on your login screen. -Alternatively, you can use a utility like [macOS Enterprise Privileges](https://github.com/SAP/macOS-enterprise-privileges) to escalate to Administrator rights on-demand, but this may be vulnerable to some undiscovered exploit, like all software-based protections. - ### iCloud -The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their *cloud services*, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys *which Apple has access to* by default. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. +When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys *which Apple has access to* by default. This is called [Standard Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651) by Apple. Therefore, if you use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. +If you want to be able to install apps from the App Store but don't want to enable iCloud, you can sign in to your Apple Account from the App Store instead of **System Settings**. + ### System Settings There are a number of built-in settings you should confirm or change to harden your system. Open the **Settings** app: @@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ Depending on if you are using **Wi-Fi** or **Ethernet** (denoted by a green dot Click on the "Details" button by your network name: +- [x] Select **Rotating** under **Private Wi-Fi address** + - [x] Check **Limit IP address tracking** ##### Firewall @@ -119,7 +121,7 @@ Decide whether you want personalized ads based on your usage. ##### FileVault -On modern devices with a Secure Enclave (Apple T2 Security Chip, Apple silicon), your data is always encrypted, but is decrypted automatically by a hardware key if your device doesn't detect it's been tampered with. Enabling FileVault additionally requires your password to decrypt your data, greatly improving security, especially when powered off or before the first login after powering on. +On modern devices with a Secure Enclave (Apple T2 Security Chip, Apple Silicon), your data is always encrypted, but is decrypted automatically by a hardware key if your device doesn't detect it's been tampered with. Enabling [FileVault](../encryption.md#filevault) additionally requires your password to decrypt your data, greatly improving security, especially when powered off or before the first login after powering on. On older Intel-based Mac computers, FileVault is the only form of disk encryption available by default, and should always be enabled. @@ -133,21 +135,13 @@ On older Intel-based Mac computers, FileVault is the only form of disk encryptio ### MAC Address Randomization -macOS uses a randomized MAC address when performing Wi-Fi scans while disconnected from a network. However, when you connect to a preferred Wi-Fi network, the MAC address used is never randomized. Full MAC address randomization is an advanced topic, and most people don't need to worry about performing the following steps. +macOS uses a randomized MAC address when performing Wi-Fi scans while disconnected from a network. -Unlike iOS, macOS doesn't give you an option to randomize your MAC address in the settings, so if you wish to change this identifier, you'll need to do it with a command or a script. To set a random MAC address, first disconnect from the network if you're already connected, then open **Terminal** and enter this command to randomize your MAC address: +You can set your MAC address to be randomized per network and rotate occasionally to prevent tracking between networks and on the same network over time. -``` zsh -openssl rand -hex 6 | sed 's/^\(.\{1\}\)./\12/; s/\(..\)/\1:/g; s/.$//' | xargs sudo ifconfig en0 ether -``` +Go to **System Settings** → **Network** → **Wi-Fi** → **Details** and set **Private Wi-Fi address** to either **Fixed** if you want a fixed but unique address for the network you're connected to, or **Rotating** if you want it to change over time. -`en0` is the name of the interface you're changing the MAC address for. This might not be the right one on every Mac, so to check you can hold the option key and click the Wi-Fi symbol at the top right of your screen. "Interface name" should be displayed at the top of the dropdown menu. - -This command sets your MAC address to a randomized, "locally administered" address, matching the behavior of iOS, Windows, and Android's MAC address randomization features. This means that every character in the MAC address is fully randomized except the second character, which denotes the MAC address as *locally administered* and not in conflict with any actual hardware. This method is most compatible with modern networks. An alternative method is to set the first six characters of the MAC address to one of Apple's existing *Organizational Unique Identifiers*, which we'll leave as an exercise to the reader. That method is more likely to conflict with some networks, but may be less noticeable. Given the prevalence of randomized, locally administered MAC addresses in other modern operating systems, we don't think either method has significant privacy advantages over the other. - -When you connect to the network again, you'll connect with a random MAC address. This will be reset on reboot. - -Your MAC address is not the only unique information about your device which is broadcast on the network, your hostname is another piece of information which could uniquely identify you. You may wish to set your hostname to something generic like "MacBook Air", "Laptop", "John's MacBook Pro", or "iPhone" in **System Settings** > **General** > **Sharing**. Some [privacy scripts](https://github.com/sunknudsen/privacy-guides/tree/master/how-to-spoof-mac-address-and-hostname-automatically-at-boot-on-macos#guide) allow you to easily generate hostnames with random names. +Consider changing your hostname as well, which is another device identifier that's broadcast on the network you're connected to. You may wish to set your hostname to something generic like "MacBook Air", "Laptop", "John's MacBook Pro", or "iPhone" in **System Settings** → **General** → **Sharing**. Some [privacy scripts](https://github.com/sunknudsen/privacy-guides/tree/master/how-to-spoof-mac-address-and-hostname-automatically-at-boot-on-macos#guide) allow you to easily generate hostnames with random names. ## Security Protections @@ -178,31 +172,72 @@ System Integrity Protection makes critical file locations read-only to protect a ##### App Sandbox -macOS apps submitted to the App Store after June 1, 2012 are required to be sandboxed using the [App Sandbox](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/app_sandbox). +On macOS, whether an app is sandboxed is determined by the developer when they sign it. The App Sandbox protects against vulnerabilities in the apps you run by limiting what a malicious actor can access in the event that the app is exploited. The App Sandbox *alone* can't protect against [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian } by malicious developers. For that, sandboxing needs to be enforced by someone other than the developer themselves, as it is on the App Store.

Warning

-Software downloaded from outside the official App Store is not required to be sandboxed. You should avoid non-App Store software as much as possible. +Software downloaded from outside the official App Store is not required to be sandboxed. If your threat model prioritizes defending against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }, then you may want to check if the software you download outside the App Store is sandboxed, which is up to the developer to *opt in*.
+You can check if an app uses the App Sandbox in a few ways: + +You can check if apps that are already running are sandboxed using the [Activity Monitor](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/protecting-user-data-with-app-sandbox#Verify-that-your-app-uses-App-Sandbox). + +
+

Warning

+ +Just because one of an app's processes is sandboxed doesn't mean they all are. + +
+ +Alternatively, you can check apps before you run them by running this command in the terminal: + +``` zsh +% codesign -dvvv --entitlements - +``` + +If an app is sandboxed, you should see the following output: + +``` zsh + [Key] com.apple.security.app-sandbox + [Value] + [Bool] true +``` + +If you find that the app you want to run is not sandboxed, then you may employ methods of [compartmentalization](../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy) such as virtual machines or separate devices, use a similar app that is sandboxed, or choose to not use the non-sandboxed app altogether. + +##### Hardened Runtime + +The [Hardened Runtime](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/hardened_runtime) is an extra form of protection for apps that prevents certain classes of exploits. It improves the security of apps against exploitation by disabling certain features like JIT. + +You can check if an app uses the Hardened Runtime using this command: + +``` zsh +codesign --display --verbose /path/to/bundle.app +``` + +If Hardened Runtime is enabled, you will see `flags=0x10000(runtime)`. The `runtime` output means Hardened Runtime is enabled. There might be other flags, but the runtime flag is what we're looking for here. + +You can enable a column in Activity Monitor called "Restricted" which is a flag that prevents programs from injecting code via macOS's [dynamic linker](https://pewpewthespells.com/blog/blocking_code_injection_on_ios_and_os_x.html). Ideally, this should say "Yes". + ##### Antivirus macOS comes with two forms of malware defense: -1. Protection against launching malware in the first place is provided by the App Store's review process for App Store applications, or *Notarization* (part of *Gatekeeper*), a process where third-party apps are scanned for known malware by Apple before they are allowed to run. +1. Protection against launching malware in the first place is provided by the App Store's review process for App Store applications, or *Notarization* (part of *Gatekeeper*), a process where third-party apps are scanned for known malware by Apple before they are allowed to run. Apps are required to be signed by the developers using a key given to them by Apple. This ensures that you are running software from the real developers. Notarization also requires that developers enable the Hardened Runtime for their apps, which limits methods of exploitation. 2. Protection against other malware and remediation from existing malware on your system is provided by *XProtect*, a more traditional antivirus software built-in to macOS. -We recommend against installing third-party antivirus software as they typically do not have the system-level access required to properly function anyways, because of Apple's limitations on third-party apps, and because granting the high levels of access they do ask for often poses an even greater security and privacy risk to your computer. +We recommend against installing third-party antivirus software as they typically do not have the system-level access required to properly function anyway, because of Apple's limitations on third-party apps, and because granting the high levels of access they do ask for often poses an even greater security and privacy risk to your computer. ##### Backups -macOS comes with automatic backup software called [Time Machine](https://support.apple.com/HT201250), so you can create encrypted backups to an external or network drive in the event of corrupted/deleted files. +macOS comes with automatic backup software called [Time Machine](https://support.apple.com/HT201250), so you can create encrypted backups to an external drive or a network drive in the event of corrupted/deleted files. ### Hardware Security -Many modern security features in macOS—such as modern Secure Boot, hardware-level exploit mitigation, OS integrity checks, and file-based encryption—rely on Apple silicon, and Apple's newer hardware always has the [best security](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/apple-soc-security-sec87716a080/1/web/1). We only encourage the use of Apple silicon, and not older Intel-based Mac computers or Hackintoshes. +Many modern security features in macOS—such as modern Secure Boot, hardware-level exploit mitigation, OS integrity checks, and file-based encryption—rely on Apple Silicon, and Apple's newer hardware always has the [best security](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/apple-soc-security-sec87716a080/1/web/1). We only encourage the use of Apple Silicon, and not older Intel-based Mac computers or Hackintoshes. Some of these modern security features are available on older Intel-based Mac computers with the Apple T2 Security Chip, but that chip is susceptible to the *checkm8* exploit which could compromise its security. @@ -220,7 +255,7 @@ Mac computers can be configured to boot in three security modes: *Full Security* #### Secure Enclave -The Secure Enclave is a security chip built into devices with Apple silicon which is responsible for storing and generating encryption keys for data at rest as well as Face ID and Touch ID data. It contains its own separate boot ROM. +The Secure Enclave is a security chip built into devices with Apple Silicon which is responsible for storing and generating encryption keys for data at rest as well as Face ID and Touch ID data. It contains its own separate boot ROM. You can think of the Secure Enclave as your device's security hub: it has an AES encryption engine and a mechanism to securely store your encryption keys, and it's separated from the rest of the system, so even if the main processor is compromised, it should still be safe. @@ -232,7 +267,7 @@ Your biometric data never leaves your device; it's stored only in the Secure Enc #### Hardware Microphone Disconnect -All laptops with Apple silicon or the T2 chip feature a hardware disconnect for the built-in microphone whenever the lid is closed. This means that there is no way for an attacker to listen to your Mac's microphone even if the operating system is compromised. +All laptops with Apple Silicon or the T2 chip feature a hardware disconnect for the built-in microphone whenever the lid is closed. This means that there is no way for an attacker to listen to your Mac's microphone even if the operating system is compromised. Note that the camera does not have a hardware disconnect, since its view is obscured when the lid is closed anyway. @@ -251,7 +286,7 @@ When it is necessary to use one of these processors, Apple works with the vendor #### Direct Memory Access Protections -Apple silicon separates each component that requires direct memory access. For example, a Thunderbolt port can't access memory designated for the kernel. +Apple Silicon separates each component that requires direct memory access. For example, a Thunderbolt port can't access memory designated for the kernel. ## Sources diff --git a/docs/os/windows/group-policies.md b/docs/os/windows/group-policies.md index 0e508b85..56e1047b 100644 --- a/docs/os/windows/group-policies.md +++ b/docs/os/windows/group-policies.md @@ -1,9 +1,10 @@ --- title: Group Policy Settings +description: A quick guide to configuring Group Policy to make Windows a bit more privacy respecting. --- -Outside of modifying the registry itself, the **Local Group Policy Editor** is the most powerful way to change many aspects of your system without installing third-party tools. Changing these settings requires [Pro Edition](index.md#windows-editions) or better. +Outside modifying the registry itself, the **Local Group Policy Editor** is the most powerful way to change many aspects of your system without installing third-party tools. Changing these settings requires [Pro Edition](index.md#windows-editions) or better. -These settings should be set on a brand new installation of Windows. Setting them on your existing installation should work, but may introduce unpredictible behavior and is done at your own risk. +These settings should be set on a brand-new installation of Windows. Setting them on your existing installation should work, but may introduce unpredictable behavior and is done at your own risk. All of these settings have an explanation attached to them in the Group Policy editor which explains exactly what they do, usually in great detail. Please pay attention to those descriptions as you make changes, so you know exactly what we are recommending here. We've also explained some of our choices below whenever the explanation included with Windows is inadequate. @@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ Setting the cipher strength for the Windows 7 policy still applies that strength - Require additional authentication at startup: **Enabled** - Allow enhanced PINs for startup: **Enabled** -Despite the names of these policies, this doesn't *require* you to do anything by default, but it will unlock the *option* to have a more complex setup (such as requiring a PIN at startup in addition to the TPM) in the Bitlocker setup wizard. +Despite the names of these policies, this doesn't *require* you to do anything by default, but it will unlock the *option* to have a more complex setup (such as requiring a PIN at startup in addition to the TPM) in the BitLocker setup wizard. #### Cloud Content diff --git a/docs/os/windows/index.md b/docs/os/windows/index.md index fb729faf..bc5dcb5e 100644 --- a/docs/os/windows/index.md +++ b/docs/os/windows/index.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ --- title: Windows Overview icon: material/microsoft-windows +description: Microsoft Windows is a common operating system which is extremely non-private out of the box. Our guide covers making some improvements to your computer without replacing your OS. --- **Microsoft Windows** is a common OS shipped with many PCs by default. The following guides aim to provide some ways to improve privacy and reduce the default telemetry and data stored by disabling some unnecessary features. Over time, Microsoft adds features to the OS which can sometimes rely on cloud-based services. These features will often require certain types of [optional data](https://privacy.microsoft.com/data-collection-windows) that is sometimes sent to remote servers for processing. @@ -19,13 +20,13 @@ You can enhance your privacy and security on Windows without downloading any thi

This section is new

-This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and effort to make a Windows installation more privacy friendly than other operating systems. +This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and effort to make a Windows installation more privacy-friendly than other operating systems.
## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_(virtual_assistant)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy-friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_(virtual_assistant)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: @@ -41,11 +42,11 @@ Microsoft often uses the automatic updates feature to add new functionality to y ## Windows Editions -Many critical privacy and security features are unfortunately locked away behind higher-cost editions of Windows, instead of being available in Windows **Home**. Some features missing from **Home** include Bitlocker Drive Encryption, Hyper-V, and Windows Sandbox. In our Windows guides we will cover how to use all of these features appropriately, so having a premium edition of Windows will be necessary. +Many critical privacy and security features are unfortunately locked away behind higher-cost editions of Windows, instead of being available in Windows **Home**. Some features missing from **Home** include BitLocker Drive Encryption, Hyper-V, and Windows Sandbox. In our Windows guides we will cover how to use all of these features appropriately, so having a premium edition of Windows will be necessary. Windows **Enterprise** provides the most flexibility when it comes to configuring privacy and security settings built in to Windows. For example, they are the only editions that allow you to enable the highest level of restrictions on data sent to Microsoft via telemetry tools. Unfortunately, Enterprise is not available for retail purchase, so it may not be available to you. -The best version available for *retail* purchase is Windows **Pro** as it has nearly all of the features you'll want to use to secure your device, including Bitlocker, Hyper-V, etc. The only thing missing is some of the most restrictive limitations on Microsoft's telemetry unfortunately. +The best version available for *retail* purchase is Windows **Pro** as it has nearly all the features you'll want to use to secure your device, including BitLocker, Hyper-V, etc. The only thing missing is some of the most restrictive limitations on Microsoft's telemetry, unfortunately. Students and teachers may be able to obtain a Windows **Education** (equivalent to Enterprise) or **Pro Education** license (equivalent to Pro) for free, including on personal devices, from their educational institution. Many schools partner with Microsoft via OnTheHub or Microsoft Azure for Education, so you can check those sites or your school's benefits page to see if you qualify. Whether or not you are able to get these licenses depends entirely on your institution. This may be the best way for many people to obtain an Enterprise-level edition of Windows for personal use. There are no additional privacy or security risks associated with using an Education license compared to the retail versions. @@ -57,6 +58,6 @@ Currently, only Windows 11 license keys are available for purchase, but these ke The official [Media Creation Tool](https://microsoft.com/software-download/windows11) is the best way to put a Windows installer on a USB flash drive. Third-party tools like Rufus or Etcher may unexpectedly modify the files, which could lead to boot issues or other troubles when installing. -This tool only lets you install a **Home** or **Pro** installation, as there are no publicly available downloads for Windows **Enterprise** edition. If you have an **Enterprise** license key, you can easily upgrade a **Pro** installation. To do this, install Windows **Pro** without entering a license key during setup, then enter your **Enterprise** key in the Settings app after completing the install. Your **Pro** install will be upgraded to **Enterprise** automatically after entering a valid license key. +This tool only lets you install a **Home** or **Pro** installation, as there are no publicly available downloads for Windows **Enterprise** edition. If you have an **Enterprise** license key, you can easily upgrade a **Pro** installation. To do this, install Windows **Pro** without entering a license key during setup, then enter your **Enterprise** key in the Settings app after completing the installation. Your **Pro** install will be upgraded to **Enterprise** automatically after entering a valid license key. If you are installing an **Education** license then you will typically have a private download link that will be provided alongside your license key when you obtain it from your institution's benefits portal. diff --git a/docs/passwords.md b/docs/passwords.md index b33b1f48..e5b65b28 100644 --- a/docs/passwords.md +++ b/docs/passwords.md @@ -102,18 +102,6 @@ schema: "@context": http://schema.org "@type": WebPage url: "./" - - - "@context": http://schema.org - "@type": SoftwareApplication - name: Strongbox - image: /assets/img/password-management/strongbox.svg - url: https://strongboxsafe.com - applicationCategory: Password Manager - operatingSystem: iOS - subjectOf: - "@context": http://schema.org - "@type": WebPage - url: "./" - "@context": http://schema.org "@type": SoftwareApplication @@ -144,7 +132,7 @@ schema:

Info

-Built-in password managers in software like browsers and operating systems are sometimes not as good as dedicated password manager software. The advantage of a built-in password manager is good integration with the software, but it can often be very simple and lack privacy and security features standalone offerings have. +Built-in password managers in software like browsers and operating systems are sometimes not as good as dedicated password manager software. The advantage of a built-in password manager is good integration with the software, but it can often be very simple and lack privacy and security features that standalone offerings have. For example, the password manager in Microsoft Edge doesn't offer E2EE at all. Google's password manager has [optional](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/11350823) E2EE, and [Apple's](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) offers E2EE by default. @@ -164,7 +152,7 @@ These password managers sync your passwords to a cloud server for easy accessibi [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://bitwarden.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://bitwarden.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://bitwarden.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://bitwarden.com/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/bitwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -172,8 +160,9 @@ These password managers sync your passwords to a cloud server for easy accessibi - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.x8bit.bitwarden) - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1137397744) -- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile/releases) +- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/bitwarden/android/releases) - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://bitwarden.com/download) +- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://bitwarden.com/download) - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://bitwarden.com/download) - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.bitwarden.desktop) - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/bitwarden-password-manager) @@ -185,18 +174,18 @@ These password managers sync your passwords to a cloud server for easy accessibi
-Bitwarden also features [Bitwarden Send](https://bitwarden.com/products/send), which allows you to share text and files securely with [end-to-end encryption](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-encryption). A [password](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-privacy/#send-passwords) can be required along with the send link. Bitwarden Send also features [automatic deletion](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-lifespan). +Bitwarden uses [PBKDF2](https://bitwarden.com/help/kdf-algorithms/#pbkdf2) as its key derivation function (KDF) algorithm by default. It also offers [Argon2](https://bitwarden.com/help/kdf-algorithms/#argon2id), which is more secure, as an alternative. You can change your account's KDF algorithm in the web vault. -You need the [Premium Plan](https://bitwarden.com/help/about-bitwarden-plans/#compare-personal-plans) to be able to share files. The free plan only allows text sharing. +- [x] Select **Settings > Security > Keys > KDF algorithm > Argon2id** Bitwarden's server-side code is [open source](https://github.com/bitwarden/server), so if you don't want to use the Bitwarden cloud, you can easily host your own Bitwarden sync server. **Vaultwarden** is an alternative implementation of Bitwarden's sync server written in Rust and compatible with official Bitwarden clients, perfect for self-hosted deployment where running the resource-heavy official service might not be ideal. If you are looking to self-host Bitwarden on your own server, you almost certainly want to use Vaultwarden over Bitwarden's official server code. [:octicons-repo-16: Vaultwarden Repository](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden){ .md-button } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dani-garcia){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dani-garcia){ .card-link title="Contribute" } ### Proton Pass @@ -208,7 +197,7 @@ Bitwarden's server-side code is [open source](https://github.com/bitwarden/serve [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/pass){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/pass/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/pass){ .card-link title="Documentation"} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/pass){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/protonpass){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -228,9 +217,7 @@ Bitwarden's server-side code is [open source](https://github.com/bitwarden/serve With the acquisition of SimpleLogin in April 2022, Proton has offered a "hide-my-email" feature that lets you create 10 aliases (free plan) or unlimited aliases (paid plans). -Proton Pass currently doesn't have any "master password" functionality, which means that your vault is protected with the password for your Proton account and any of their supported [two factor authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) methods. - -The Proton Pass mobile apps and browser extension underwent an audit performed by Cure53 throughout May and June of 2023. The security analysis company concluded: +The Proton Pass mobile apps and browser extension underwent an audit performed by Cure53 throughout May and June 2023. The security analysis company concluded: > Proton Pass apps and components leave a rather positive impression in terms of security. @@ -242,11 +229,11 @@ All issues were addressed and fixed shortly after the [report](https://res.cloud ![1Password logo](assets/img/password-management/1password.svg){ align=right } -**1Password** is a password manager with a strong focus on security and ease-of-use, which allows you to store passwords, passkeys, credit cards, software licenses, and any other sensitive information in a secure digital vault. Your vault is hosted on 1Password's servers for a [monthly fee](https://1password.com/sign-up). 1Password is [audited](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments) on a regular basis and provides exceptional customer support. 1Password is closed source; however, the security of the product is thoroughly documented in their [security white paper](https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf). +**1Password** is a password manager with a strong focus on security and ease-of-use that allows you to store passwords, passkeys, credit cards, software licenses, and any other sensitive information in a secure digital vault. Your vault is hosted on 1Password's servers for a [monthly fee](https://1password.com/sign-up). 1Password is [audited](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments) on a regular basis and provides exceptional customer support. 1Password is closed source; however, the security of the product is thoroughly documented in their [security white paper](https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://1password.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://1password.com/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.1password.com){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.1password.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
Downloads @@ -266,7 +253,7 @@ All issues were addressed and fixed shortly after the [report](https://res.cloud
-Traditionally, 1Password has offered the best password manager user experience for people using macOS and iOS; however, it has now achieved feature-parity across all platforms. 1Password's clients boast many features geared towards families and less technical people, such as an intuitive UI for ease of use and navigation, as well as advanced functionality. Notably, nearly every feature of 1Password is available within its native mobile or desktop clients. +Traditionally, 1Password has offered the best password manager user experience for people using macOS and iOS; however, it has now achieved feature parity across all platforms. 1Password's clients boast many features geared towards families and less technical people, such as an intuitive UI for ease of use and navigation, as well as advanced functionality. Notably, nearly every feature of 1Password is available within its native mobile or desktop clients. Your 1Password vault is secured with both your master password and a randomized 34-character security key to encrypt your data on their servers. This security key adds a layer of protection to your data because your data is secured with high entropy regardless of your master password. Many other password manager solutions are entirely reliant on the strength of your master password to secure your data. @@ -280,7 +267,7 @@ Your 1Password vault is secured with both your master password and a randomized [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://psono.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://psono.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.psono.com){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.psono.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/psono){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -308,7 +295,7 @@ In April 2024, Psono added [support for passkeys](https://psono.com/blog/psono-i - Must utilize strong, standards-based/modern E2EE. - Must have thoroughly documented encryption and security practices. -- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party. +- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third party. - All non-essential telemetry must be optional. - Must not collect more PII than is necessary for billing purposes. @@ -329,13 +316,13 @@ These options allow you to manage an encrypted password database locally. ![KeePassXC logo](assets/img/password-management/keepassxc.svg){ align=right } -**KeePassXC** is a community fork of KeePassX, a native cross-platform port of KeePass Password Safe, with the goal of extending and improving it with new features and bugfixes to provide a feature-rich, cross-platform, and modern open-source password manager. +**KeePassXC** is a community fork of KeePassX, a native cross-platform port of KeePass Password Safe, with the goal of extending and improving it with new features and bug fixes to provide a feature-rich, cross-platform, and modern open-source password manager. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://keepassxc.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://keepassxc.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://keepassxc.org/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://keepassxc.org/docs){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassxc.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassxc.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -351,7 +338,7 @@ These options allow you to manage an encrypted password database locally. -KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-separated_values) files. This may mean data loss if you import this file into another password manager. We advise you check each record manually. +KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-separated_values) files. You may encounter data loss if you import this file into another password manager. We advise you check each record manually. ### KeePassDX (Android) @@ -359,12 +346,12 @@ KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-se ![KeePassDX logo](assets/img/password-management/keepassdx.svg){ align=right } -**KeePassDX** is a lightweight password manager for Android; it allows for editing encrypted data in a single file in KeePass format and can fill in forms in a secure way. The [pro version](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) of the app allows you to unlock cosmetic content and non-standard protocol features, but more importantly, it helps and encourages development. +**KeePassDX** is a lightweight password manager for Android; it allows for editing encrypted data in a single file in KeePass format and can fill in forms securely. The [pro version](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) of the app allows you to unlock cosmetic content and non-standard protocol features, but more importantly, it helps and encourages development. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://keepassdx.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassdx.com/#donation){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassdx.com/#donation){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -376,43 +363,18 @@ KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-se -### Strongbox (iOS & macOS) - -
- -![Strongbox logo](assets/img/password-management/strongbox.svg){ align=right } - -**Strongbox** is a native password manager for iOS and macOS. Supporting both KeePass and Password Safe formats, Strongbox can be used in tandem with other password managers, like KeePassXC, on non-Apple platforms. By employing a [freemium model](https://strongboxsafe.com/pricing), Strongbox offers most features under its free tier, with more convenience-oriented [features](https://strongboxsafe.com/comparison)—such as biometric authentication—locked behind a subscription or perpetual license. - -[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://strongboxsafe.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/getting-started){ .card-link title=Documentation} -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox#supporting-development){ .card-link title=Contribute } - -
-Downloads - -- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id897283731) - -
- -
- -Additionally, there is an offline-only version offered: [Strongbox Zero](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1581589638). This version is stripped down in an attempt to reduce attack surface. - ### gopass (CLI)
![gopass logo](assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg){ align=right } -**gopass** is a minimal password manager for the command line written in Go. It can be used within scripting applications and works on all major desktop and server operating systems (Linux, macOS, BSD, Windows). +**gopass** is a minimal password manager for the command line written in Go. It can be used within scripting applications and works on all major desktop and server operating systems. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gopass.pw){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass/tree/master/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass/tree/master/docs){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dominikschulz){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dominikschulz){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -426,7 +388,6 @@ Additionally, there is an offline-only version offered: [Strongbox Zero](https:/
- ### Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. diff --git a/docs/pastebins.md b/docs/pastebins.md index 05ce1f57..4f4e37d0 100644 --- a/docs/pastebins.md +++ b/docs/pastebins.md @@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ icon: material/content-paste description: These tools allow you to have full control of any pasted data you share to other parties. cover: pastebins.webp --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal } + [**Pastebins**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pastebin) are online services most commonly used to share large blocks of code in a convenient and efficient manner. The pastebins listed here employ client-side encryption and password protection for pasted content; both of these features prevent the website or server operator from reading or accessing the contents of any paste. ## PrivateBin @@ -21,6 +25,22 @@ cover: pastebins.webp +## Paaster + +
+ +![Paaster logo](assets/img/pastebins/paaster.svg){ align=right } + +**Paaster** is a secure and user-friendly pastebin application that prioritizes privacy and simplicity. With end-to-end encryption and paste history, Paaster ensures that your pasted code remains confidential and accessible. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://paaster.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://paaster.io/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/WardPearce/paaster#security){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/WardPearce/paaster){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/WardPearce){ .card-link title="Contribute" } + +
+ ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. diff --git a/docs/photo-management.md b/docs/photo-management.md index 542b28f2..4bf2fc0e 100644 --- a/docs/photo-management.md +++ b/docs/photo-management.md @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Most cloud **photo management solutions** like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon ![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg#only-light){ align=right } ![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } -**Ente Photos** is an end-to-end encrypted photo backup service which supports automatic backups on iOS and Android. Their code is fully open-source, both on the client side and on the server side. It is also [self-hostable](https://github.com/ente-io/ente/tree/main/server#self-hosting). The free plan offers 5GB of storage as long as you use the service at least once a year. +**Ente Photos** is an end-to-end encrypted photo backup service which supports automatic backups on iOS and Android. Their code is fully open-source, both on the client side and on the server side. It is also [self-hostable](https://github.com/ente-io/ente/tree/main/server#self-hosting). The free plan offers 5 GB of storage as long as you use the service at least once a year. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://ente.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://ente.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Ente Photos underwent an [audit by Cure53](https://ente.io/blog/cryptography-aud ![Stingle logo](assets/img/photo-management/stingle.png#only-light){ align=right } ![Stingle logo](assets/img/photo-management/stingle-dark.png#only-dark){ align=right } -**Stingle** is a gallery and camera application with built-in, end-to-end encrypted backup and sync functionality for your photos and videos. Storage starts at 1GB for free accounts on their cloud, or you can host your own Stingle API server for total independence. +**Stingle** is a gallery and camera application with built-in, end-to-end encrypted backup and sync functionality for your photos and videos. Storage starts at 1 GB for free accounts on their cloud, or you can host your own Stingle API server for total independence. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://stingle.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://stingle.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Ente Photos underwent an [audit by Cure53](https://ente.io/blog/cryptography-aud - Cloud-hosted providers must enforce end-to-end encryption. - Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing. -- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication, or passkey logins. +- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multifactor authentication, or passkey logins. - Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality. - Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents. - Must be open source. diff --git a/docs/privacy.md b/docs/privacy.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6b481d91 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/privacy.md @@ -0,0 +1,324 @@ +--- +title: "Privacy Policy" +description: We do not sell or share your data with any third-parties. +--- +## What is Privacy Guides? + +Privacy Guides is a community project operated by a number of active contributors. The public list of team members [can be found on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u?group=team&order=solutions&period=all). Privacy Guides is legally administered by [MAGIC Grants](https://magicgrants.org/), a 501(c)(3) public charity acting as our fiscal host. + +As a project, we make available to the public: + +- [privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org), this website +- [discuss.privacyguides.net](https://discuss.privacyguides.net), our community forum +- [code.privacyguides.dev](https://code.privacyguides.dev), public source code repositories + +This privacy notice covers all Privacy Guides projects authorized and operated by the MAGIC Privacy Guides Fund executive committee. + +Please note that when you make a donation to us on [donate.magicgrants.org](https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacyguides), MAGIC Grants has published a [separate privacy policy](https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacy) covering that platform. + +## How does Privacy Guides collect data about me? + +Privacy Guides collects data about you: + +- When you visit our websites +- When you create and use an account on our websites +- When you post, send private messages, and otherwise participate in a community that Privacy Guides hosts +- When you sign up for a mailing list, email notifications, or announcements +- When you make a donation to us on GitHub Sponsors +- When you become a donating member and link your MAGIC Grants account to your Privacy Guides forum account +- When you contribute to our website or other open-source projects +- When you contact us + +Privacy Guides does not buy or receive data about you from data brokers. + +## Does Privacy Guides sell my personal information? + +No. Privacy Guides does not sell personal information. Additionally, Privacy Guides does not share personal information with third parties for the purpose of advertising. + +## What personal information does Privacy Guides collect, and why? + +### Privacy Guides collects information about visits to its websites + +When you visit one of our websites, whether you have an account or not, we use server logs and other methods to collect data about what pages you visit and when. + +We use this data to: + +- Optimize our websites, so they are quick and easy to use. +- Diagnose and debug technical errors. +- Defend our websites from abuse and technical attacks. +- Compile statistics on page/topic popularity. +- Compile statistics on the type of browser and devices our visitors use. + +We generally store the above information for just a few weeks. In special circumstances, such as during an ongoing technical attack or a subsequent investigation, we may preserve some log data longer for analysis. + +Privacy Guides stores aggregated statistics for as long as we host our websites, but those statistics do not contain data identifiable to you personally. + +### Privacy Guides collects account data + +Many features on our forum or other account-based services require an account. For example, you are required to have an account in order to post and reply to topics. + +To sign up for an account, Privacy Guides requires your email address, a username, and a password. + +We use this account data in order to identify you on the website, and to create pages specific to you, such as your profile page. We publish your account data to your public profile in accordance to your profile's configuration. + +Privacy Guides uses your email address to: + +- Notify you about posts and other activity on our website. +- Reset your password and help keep your account secure. +- Contact you in special circumstances related to your account. +- Contact you about legal requests, like DMCA takedown requests. + +You may optionally provide additional details about your account, like your name, a short biography, your location, or your birthday, on the profile settings page for your account. Privacy Guides makes that information available to others who have access to the forum. You don’t have to provide this additional information, and you can erase it at any time. + +Privacy Guides stores this account data as long as your account remains open. + +### Privacy Guides collects data about posts and other activity on our forum + +Privacy Guides collects the content of your posts, plus data about bookmarks, likes, and links you follow in order to share that data with others, through the forum. We also publish this activity to the public. + +Privacy Guides also collects data about private messages that you send through the forum. Privacy Guides makes private messages available to senders and their recipients, and also to forum moderators and administrators. + +Privacy Guides stores your posts and other activity as long as your account remains open. + +### Privacy Guides collects data you give to sign up for mailing lists and announcements + +When you fill out and submit a web form to sign up for mailing lists or announcements, Privacy Guides collects the information you put in the form, such as your e-mail address. + +Privacy Guides stores this information until you unsubscribe from the mailing list. + +### Privacy Guides does not collect sensitive personal information + +Privacy Guides does not intentionally collect sensitive personal information, such as government identification numbers, information on racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, genetic data, biometric data, health data, or any of the special categories of personal data specified by the GDPR. + +### Privacy Guides collects data about open source contributors + +Contributors to Privacy Guides' website may be asked to provide identifying and contact information such as your name and email address. + +Privacy Guides uses this information to maintain the integrity of our website, software, and license agreements, both our own licenses and the license between Privacy Guides and our contributors. Privacy Guides stores this information for as long as your contributions are incorporated into our open source software, including this website. + +### Privacy Guides collects data when you donate to us + +When you donate to us on GitHub Sponsors, we collect your GitHub username and profile picture. Your payment information is also collected by our subprocessors GitHub and Stripe in order to facilitate the transaction. + +If you choose to make your donation public during or after the checkout process on GitHub, Privacy Guides will share your username and profile picture on our websites for the purposes of fulfilling your request. You may revoke this consent at any time, and we will no longer share your donation status publicly. It may take until the next website release for your data to be removed from public visibility. + +When you donate to us on [donate.magicgrants.org](https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacyguides), a [separate privacy policy](https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacy) applies as noted at the beginning of this document. + +However, if you optionally link your `donate.magicgrants.org` account to your Privacy Guides forum account, our forum collects some personal data which is covered by this notice: namely your forum username and whether you have an active membership. + +We process that information in order to grant you special perks on the forum. Additionally, if you choose to make this status public by setting a members-only title or flair, we will share the status of your active membership on our websites. + +This information is stored for as long as your membership is active, or until you unlink your forum and MAGIC Grants donation accounts in your profile settings. It may take until the next website release for your data to be fully removed from public visibility. + +### Privacy Guides collects data when you contact us + +When you contact Privacy Guides via email, Signal, or any of our other contact methods, we collect the information you submit to us, and any identifying information associated with the account you use to contact us. For example, when you contact us via Signal we will collect your Signal profile information. When you contact us via email we will collect your email address, name, and mail server IP address. + +In this case we limit the processing of any personal data you provide us to what is strictly necessary to communicate with you and organize our messages. + +Privacy Guides stores this data for as long as we are in contact with you, or for up to 1 year after your last contact with us. You have the right to request all data related to your private communication with us be deleted at any time, and we will generally do so within 7 days. + +### The Privacy Guides website stores local data + +Our website uses Local Storage in your browser to store your color scheme preference. This data is only used by client-side JavaScript to change the color scheme of this website according to your preference. + +Our website also uses Session Storage to cache the current version number of this website and the number of stars/forks of our GitHub repository. This data is fetched once per session from GitHub, and is only used by client-side JavaScript to display that information at the top of each page. + +No locally stored data on this website is transmitted to Privacy Guides, and it can not be used to identify you. + +### The Privacy Guides forum uses cookies + +Our forum is built on Discourse, which uses the following cookies: + +| Name | Essential | Expires | Purpose | +| ------------------- | --------- | -------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | +| email | Yes | Session | remembers your e-mail as you create an account | +| destination_url | Yes | Session | helps redirect you to your requested page after logging in | +| sso_destination_url | Yes | Session | helps redirect you to your request page after single sign on | +| sso_payload | Yes | Session | used during SSO authentication when two-factor authentication is enabled | +| authentication_data | Yes | Next Page View | temporarily stores user information during login flows | +| theme_ids | Yes | 1 year | remembers your theme personalization if you don’t tick “Make this my default theme on all my devices” | +| color_scheme_id | Yes | 1 year | remembers your color personalization if you don’t tick “Set default color scheme(s) on all my devices” | +| dark_scheme_id | Yes | 1 year | remembers your color personalization if you don’t tick “Set default color scheme(s) on all my devices” | +| cn | Yes | Session | temporarily stores notification read state | +| _bypass_cache | Yes | Session | allows the server-side cache to be bypassed during login flows | +| _t | Yes | 1440 Hours | remembers who you are when you log in | +| _forum_session | Yes | Session | associates an ID, and other security-related information, with your browsing session | +| dosp | Yes | Next Page View | enables client denial of service protection, a security protection | +| text_size | Yes | 1 year | remembers default text size when a user wants to change it on only one device | +| cookietest | Yes | Session | checks if cookies are enabled when authentication fails | +| __profilin | No | Session | used by software developers to bypass rack-mini-profiler | + +Your web browser can show you the cookies you have for any website and help you manage them. + +### Privacy Guides makes regular backups of all data + +Privacy Guides keeps automated backups of **all** data it collects. These backups are stored for up to 30 days. Any time you delete personal data from our websites, a copy may be retained in backup archives until those archives are pruned. + +## Does Privacy Guides use personal information for marketing purposes? + +Privacy Guides may use personal data about our users in order to directly promote our own resources, such as for sharing new resources or when fundraising. We also use the information you give us when signing up for our mailing lists and announcements to send those messages. + +You can always opt out of marketing communications from us, and you have the right to object to any processing of your information for marketing purposes. + +Privacy Guides never provides or sells your data to third-parties for marketing purposes. + +## How can I make choices about data collection? + +Your account on our websites has a settings page which provides you with options about how your data is used. + +Most web browsers let you make choices about whether to accept cookies, for specific websites or more generally. + +Privacy Guides does not respond to the (now deprecated) [Do Not Track HTTP header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track). + +## Where does Privacy Guides store data about me? + +Most data is hosted by [Triplebit](https://www.triplebit.org/) web services in the United States. + +Some publicly accessible data may be hosted by Content Delivery Networks with servers in other jurisdictions. For example, your profile picture may be stored on multiple servers around the world in order to improve the performance for visitors to our website. + +## Does Privacy Guides comply with the EU General Data Protection Regulation? + +Privacy Guides respects rights under the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Information that GDPR requires Privacy Guides to give can be found throughout this privacy notice, including information on the rights of data subjects. + +### What are my rights under the GDPR? + +The GDPR provides you with the following rights with respect to personal information about you that we collect or process: + +- the right to [access](#where-can-i-access-data-about-me) your personal data +- the right to [rectification](#how-can-i-change-or-erase-data-about-me) of inaccurate or incomplete personal data +- the right to [erasure](#how-can-i-change-or-erase-data-about-me) of your personal data +- the right to [data portability](#where-can-i-access-data-about-me) +- the right to restrict the processing of your personal data +- the right to object to certain processing of your information, including [automated decision-making](#does-privacy-guides-make-automated-decisions-based-on-my-data) and [direct marketing](#does-privacy-guides-use-personal-information-for-marketing-purposes) +- the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority + +Information about how to exercise these rights is provided throughout this notice and linked above. We try to make exercising all of these rights easy to do on your own through your account settings, but for more complicated inquiries the best option will be to [contact](#how-can-i-contact-privacy-guides-about-privacy) us. + +### What is the lawful basis for data collection and processing? + +Privacy Guides generally processes your data using 3 of the 6 lawful bases for processing set out in Article 6 of the GDPR: + +- **Consent**: When you give us clear consent for us to process your personal data. This consent can be easily withdrawn at any time in your account settings, or you may always contact us for assistance with privacy-related matters. +- **Contract**: When you give us your personal data in order to participate on services we operate according to our terms of service, or when we require personal data in order to take steps prior to entering a contract or to fulfill a contract. +- **Legitimate interest**: When we process your personal data for fraud prevention, network and information security, or other reasons where the processing is required for our own legitimate interests or for those of a third party we work with. + +The lawful basis for our processing determines what rights are available to you under the GDPR. This table may be used as a reference: + +| Activity | Data Collected | Lawful Basis | Explanation | +| -------- | -------------- | ------------ | ----------- | +| [Website visits](#privacy-guides-collects-information-about-visits-to-its-websites) | IP Address, User Agent, Pages Visited | **Legitimate interest** | Required for defending our website from abuse and technical attacks, diagnosing and debugging technical errors, optimizing our websites, and compiling aggregated non-personal statistics for long-term analysis | +| [Account data](#privacy-guides-collects-account-data) | Email Address, IP Address | **Legitimate interest** | Required to defend our website against spam and abuse | +| [Account data](#privacy-guides-collects-account-data) | Email Address, Username, Password | **Contract** | Required to make our services available to you according to our terms of service | +| [Account data](#privacy-guides-collects-account-data) | Optional profile information (name, location, etc.) | **Consent** | Required to publish the information you provide to your public or internal profile, according to your preferences | +| [Posts & activity](#privacy-guides-collects-data-about-posts-and-other-activity-on-our-forum) | Content of your posts, activity data like bookmarks, likes, and links you follow | **Contract** | Required to make our services available to you according to our terms of service | +| [Posts & activity](#privacy-guides-collects-data-about-posts-and-other-activity-on-our-forum) | Content of your private messages | **Contract** | Required to make our services available to you according to our terms of service | +| [Posts & activity](#privacy-guides-collects-data-about-posts-and-other-activity-on-our-forum) | Email Address | **Contract** | Our forum is an email-based platform, and email notifications about forum activity are an integral component required to make our services available to you according to our terms of service | +| [Mailing lists](#privacy-guides-collects-data-you-give-to-sign-up-for-mailing-lists-and-announcements) | Email Address | **Consent** | Required for sending you messages you subscribe to | +| [Open source contributions](#privacy-guides-collects-data-about-open-source-contributors) | Email address, name, GitHub profile information, other information provided via Git | **Legitimate interest** | We have a legitimate interest in tracking the provenance of contributions to our open source projects to prevent abuse and ensure intellectual property rights are respected | +| [Donations](#privacy-guides-collects-data-when-you-donate-to-us) | Payment information including billing address and email, GitHub profile information | **Legitimate interest** | We have a legitimate interest in processing this data to prevent payment abuse and fraud, and for facilitating your transaction | +| [Donations](#privacy-guides-collects-data-when-you-donate-to-us) | GitHub profile information | **Consent** | We process this information to display your donation status publicly in accordance to your wishes | +| [Donations](#privacy-guides-collects-data-when-you-donate-to-us) | Forum username and membership status | **Consent** | When you link your forum account to your MAGIC Grants donation account, you can optionally display your membership status to the public | +| [Contacting us](#privacy-guides-collects-data-when-you-contact-us) | Email address, mail server IP, message content | **Legitimate interest** | We have a legitimate interest in processing incoming email information to prevent spam and network abuse | +| [Contacting us](#privacy-guides-collects-data-when-you-contact-us) | Email address, message headers and content | **Contract** | We store your messages and process your data in order to provide a response to your communication | +| [Backups](#privacy-guides-makes-regular-backups-of-all-data) | All personal information we collect | **Legitimate interest** | We store complete backups to ensure organizational continuity and security for up to 30 days | + +### Does Privacy Guides make international data transfers? + +Currently: + +- Privacy Guides [processes personal data on servers outside the European Union](#where-does-privacy-guides-store-data-about-me). +- Privacy Guides uses [subprocessors](#subprocessors-used-by-privacy-guides) with personnel and computers outside the European Union. +- Privacy Guides has [personnel](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u?group=team&order=solutions&period=all) in the United States, Australia, and other non-EU countries without EU adequacy decisions under GDPR. These people need access to forum personal data in order to keep forums running, address security concerns, respond to privacy-related requests from users, field technical support requests, and otherwise assist users. +- Privacy Guides is very likely subject to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in the United States, a law that the European Court of Justice has found inadequately protects the rights and freedoms of data subjects. +- Privacy Guides has never received any order or request for personal data under FISA 702 or any similar national security or surveillance law of any other country. Privacy Guides is not subject to any court order or legal obligation that would prevent it from disclosing the existence or non-existence of such an order or request. +- Privacy Guides has a policy for how we will respond to those orders and requests, in case we ever receive one. Privacy Guides will suspend processing, notify any affected user, minimize disclosure, and resist disclosure of personal data, all as the law allows. + +Because national security and surveillance laws may be in conflict with European data protection rules, Privacy Guides continually reassesses the practical reach of these laws to ensure our data transfers are adequately safeguarded. + +## Does Privacy Guides comply with the California Consumer Privacy Act and other US state comprehensive privacy laws? + +Privacy Guides is not a "business" for the purposes of the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) or a “controller” directly subject to other US state comprehensive privacy laws. + +Privacy Guides **never** sells your personal information. + +## Where can I access data about me? + +You can see your account data by visiting your profile page on any websites where we offer accounts. Your account profile will also list your posts and other activity on the website. + +On the forum, your [profile settings](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/my/preferences/account) include a link to download all of your activity in standard Comma Separated Values format. + +If you do not have an account with us but have a data access request, please [contact us](about.md). + +## How can I change or erase data about me? + +You can change your account data at any time by visiting the profile settings page for your account. You also have the option to delete your profile on the settings page of your account. Utilizing this option begins the process of erasing or anonymizing Privacy Guides' records of data you provided for your account. Forum administrators and moderators also have the option to erase and anonymize accounts. + +You may also be able to edit, anonymize, or erase your posts. When you edit posts, Privacy Guides will keep all versions of your posts. These old versions of posts are not public, but may be accessed by forum moderators or administrators. + +## Does Privacy Guides make automated decisions based on my data? + +### The Privacy Guides forum classifies posts as spam automatically + +We use data about your posts and other posts on many forums to make automated decisions about whether your posts to our websites are likely spam. + +If you think a post has been wrongfully blocked or removed, please contact a forum moderator who can override this decision. + +### The Privacy Guides forum uses data about your posts and activity to set trust levels + +We use data about your posts and activity on our forum to award you badges and calculate a trust level for your account. Your trust level may affect how you can participate in the forum, such as whether you can upload images, as well as give you access to moderation and management powers in the forum. Your trust level therefore reflects forum administrators’ confidence in you, and their willingness to delegate community management functions, like moderation. + +If you think your trust level has been set incorrectly, contact an administrator of your forum. They can manually adjust the trust level of your account. + +### The Privacy Guides forum uses community flags to take automated actions + +Your posts may be automatically hidden, or your ability to post may be automatically suspended, as a result of your posts being flagged by other users. + +These decisions are later reviewed by moderators, who can override these decisions at their discretion. + +## Does Privacy Guides share data about me with others? + +Privacy Guides shares account data with others as described in [the section about account data](#privacy-guides-collects-account-data). + +Privacy Guides shares data about your posts and other activity as described in [the section about forum data](#privacy-guides-collects-data-about-posts-and-other-activity-on-our-forum). + +### Subprocessors used by Privacy Guides + +Privacy Guides uses the following subprocessors, and may share personal data with the service providers we use in order to host our website, deliver content, secure our services, store data, host and manage our open source website, and provide user support. + +| Subprocessor | Service | Function | Processing | Links | +| ------------ | ------- | -------- | ---------- | ----- | +| [Bunny.net](https://bunny.net/) (Slovenia) | [Bunny CDN](https://bunny.net/cdn/) | Content Delivery Network services for distributing images and other static assets. | Slovenia, Global | [Privacy Notice](https://bunny.net/privacy/), [GDPR Center](https://bunny.net/gdpr/) | +| [Cloudflare](https://www.cloudflare.com/) (USA) | [Authoritative DNS](https://www.cloudflare.com/application-services/products/dns/) | Authoritative DNS services for our domain names. | USA, Global | [Privacy Notice](https://www.cloudflare.com/privacypolicy/), [GDPR Center](https://www.cloudflare.com/trust-hub/gdpr/) | +| [Fediverse Communications LLC](https://fediverse.us) (USA) | PeerTube | For hosting public videos produced by Privacy Guides which are shared or embedded on this website. | USA | [More information](https://neat.tube/about/instance) | +| [GitHub](https://github.com/) (USA) | Git Repositories | *For visitors to this website*: sharing information with our visitors about the current release, repo star count, etc. | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/privacy-policies/github-general-privacy-statement) | +| [GitHub](https://github.com/) (USA) | Git Repositories, Issues, Pull Requests | *For contributors to this website*: hosting our source code and communications platforms such as our issues tracker. | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/privacy-policies/github-general-privacy-statement) | +| [GitHub](https://github.com/) (USA) | [Sponsors](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides) | For collecting payments for gifts to Privacy Guides | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/privacy-policies/github-general-privacy-statement) | +| [Stripe](https://stripe.com) (USA) | Connect | *For certain donations via GitHub Sponsors*: payment processing for donations | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://stripe.com/privacy), [GDPR Center](https://stripe.com/legal/privacy-center) | +| [Triplebit](https://www.triplebit.org/) (USA) | Object Storage | For hosting static websites and static media content, and distributing static content | USA, Poland | [Privacy Notice](https://www.triplebit.org/privacy/) | +| [Triplebit](https://www.triplebit.org/) (USA) | [Umami Statistics](https://stats.triplebit.net/share/S80jBc50hxr5TquS/www.privacyguides.org) | For compiling aggregated statistics of our website visitor data based on server-side visitor info submissions | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://www.triplebit.org/privacy/) | +| [Triplebit](https://www.triplebit.org/) (USA) | Virtual Private Servers | For hosting our dynamic websites, storing and processing personal data. | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://www.triplebit.org/privacy/) | + +## Does Privacy Guides delete inactive accounts? + +Privacy Guides deletes accounts that have no public activity when they have gone unused for 3 years. If the account has public activity, we will not delete it regardless of inactivity because your profile data is required to continue to publish your activity per your original request. + +You can always request the deletion of your data at any time regardless of this policy. + +## How can I contact Privacy Guides about privacy? + +You can send questions, requests, and complaints via email to us at . You may also use Signal or another contact method detailed [here](about.md#contact-us) to contact us more securely. + +For complaints under GDPR more generally, you always have the option to lodge complaints with your local data protection supervisory authorities. + +## Where do I find out about changes? + +This version of Privacy Guides' privacy notice took effect on March 6, 2025. + +Privacy Guides will post the next version here: . + +In future versions, Privacy Guides may change how it announces changes. In the meantime, Privacy Guides may update its contact information without announcing a change. Please refer to for the latest contact information at any time. + +A full revision [history](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main/docs/privacy.md) of this page can be found on GitHub. + +In the event that a translated copy of this document conflicts with the English copy, the English copy of this document takes precedence. diff --git a/docs/real-time-communication.md b/docs/real-time-communication.md index cac9a74b..c30235d5 100644 --- a/docs/real-time-communication.md +++ b/docs/real-time-communication.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ meta_title: "The Best Private Instant Messengers - Privacy Guides" title: "Real-Time Communication" icon: material/chat-processing -description: Other instant messengers make all of your private conversations available to the company that runs them. +description: Encrypted messengers like Signal and SimpleX keep your sensitive communications secure from prying eyes. cover: real-time-communication.webp --- Protects against the following threat(s): @@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue } - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } -These are our recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication**. +These are our recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication**. These come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). -[Types of Communication Networks :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./advanced/communication-network-types.md) +[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why/){ .md-button } ## Encrypted Messengers @@ -30,15 +30,16 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms) - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id874139669) +- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/releases) - [:simple-android: Android](https://signal.org/android/apk) - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://signal.org/download/windows) - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://signal.org/download/macos) @@ -67,17 +68,54 @@ We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installati [Signal Configuration and Hardening :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening) +#### Molly (Android) + +If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } you may consider using this alternative app, which features a number of security and usability improvements, to access the Signal network. + +
+ +![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } + +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. + +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/mollyim){ .card-link title="Contribute" } + +
+Downloads + +- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://molly.im/fdroid) +- [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/im.molly.app) +- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/releases) + +
+ +
+ +Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes from Signal. The exception is security issues, which are patched as soon as possible. That said, you should be aware that there might be a slight delay compared to upstream, which may affect actions such as [migrating from Signal to Molly](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/wiki/Migrating-From-Signal#migrating-from-signal). + +Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. + +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). + +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. + +Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. + ### SimpleX Chat
![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } -**SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations. +**SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/stable/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/tree/stable/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplex.chat/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://simplex.chat/docs/simplex.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -94,9 +132,13 @@ We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installati
-SimpleX Chat [was audited](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website.html) by Trail of Bits in October 2022. +SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. -SimpleX Chat supports basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, and editing of messages and markdown. E2EE Audio and Video calls are also supported. Your data can be exported, and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. +To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. + +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. + +SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). ### Briar @@ -108,7 +150,7 @@ SimpleX Chat supports basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, and [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } @@ -147,13 +189,13 @@ These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain ![Element logo](assets/img/messengers/element.svg){ align=right } -**Element** is the reference [client](https://matrix.org/ecosystem/clients) for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/chat_basics/matrix-for-im) protocol, an [open standard](https://spec.matrix.org/latest) for secure decentralized real-time communication. +**Element** is the flagship client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/chat_basics/matrix-for-im) protocol, an [open standard](https://spec.matrix.org/latest) for secure decentralized real-time communication. -Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE as are one to one voice and video calls. +Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE, as are one-to-one voice and video calls. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/element-hq){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -173,7 +215,7 @@ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are b Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted. -Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings. +With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default. The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history. @@ -191,7 +233,7 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to s [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation} +[:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -208,13 +250,15 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to s -Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design. +Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1] -Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.” +Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021: -Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol. +> The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people. + +Session has a [white paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol. ## Criteria @@ -232,12 +276,12 @@ Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. -- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1] +- Supports forward secrecy[^1] - Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2] - Has open-source servers. - Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Uses E2EE for all messages by default. - Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. -[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. +[^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/docs/router.md b/docs/router.md index b780d7d4..6fc316e1 100644 --- a/docs/router.md +++ b/docs/router.md @@ -1,10 +1,15 @@ --- title: "Router Firmware" icon: material/router-wireless -description: These alternative operating systems can be used to secure your router or Wi-Fi access point. +description: Alternative operating systems for securing your router or Wi-Fi access point. cover: router.webp --- -Below are a few alternative operating systems, that can be used on routers, Wi-Fi access points, etc. +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } +- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } + +Below are a few alternative operating systems that can be used on routers, Wi-Fi access points, etc. ## OpenWrt @@ -13,7 +18,7 @@ Below are a few alternative operating systems, that can be used on routers, Wi-F ![OpenWrt logo](assets/img/router/openwrt.svg#only-light){ align=right } ![OpenWrt logo](assets/img/router/openwrt-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } -**OpenWrt** is a Linux-based operating system; it's primarily used on embedded devices to route network traffic. It includes util-linux, uClibc, and BusyBox. All of the components have been optimized for home routers. +**OpenWrt** is a Linux-based operating system; it's primarily used on embedded devices to route network traffic. It includes util-linux, uClibc, and BusyBox. All the components have been optimized for home routers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://openwrt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-info-16:](https://openwrt.org/docs/start){ .card-link title=Documentation} diff --git a/docs/search-engines.md b/docs/search-engines.md index f1e75511..80f71afc 100644 --- a/docs/search-engines.md +++ b/docs/search-engines.md @@ -2,11 +2,15 @@ meta_title: "Recommended Search Engines: Anonymous Google Alternatives - Privacy Guides" title: "Search Engines" icon: material/search-web -description: These privacy-respecting search engines don't build an advertising profile based on your searches. +description: Privacy-respecting search engines which don't build an advertising profile based on your searches. cover: search-engines.webp global: - [randomize-element, "table tbody"] --- +Protects against the following threat(s): + +- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown } + Use a **search engine** that doesn't build an advertising profile based on your searches. ## Recommended Providers @@ -40,8 +44,6 @@ Brave Search includes unique features such as [Discussions](https://search.brave [:octicons-eye-16:](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://search.brave.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation} -
- Note that if you use Brave Search while logged in to a Premium account, it may make it easier for Brave to correlate queries with specific users. @@ -56,15 +58,13 @@ We recommend you disable [Anonymous usage metrics](https://search.brave.com/help **DuckDuckGo** is one of the more mainstream private search engine options. Notable DuckDuckGo search features include [bangs](https://duckduckgo.com/bang) and a variety of [instant answers](https://help.duckduckgo.com/duckduckgo-help-pages/features/instant-answers-and-other-features). The search engine uses numerous [sources](https://help.duckduckgo.com/results/sources) other than Bing for instant answers and other non-primary results. -DuckDuckGo is the default search engine for the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) and is one of the few available options on Apple’s [Safari](mobile-browsers.md#safari) browser. +DuckDuckGo is the default search engine for the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) and is one of the few available options on Apple’s [Safari](mobile-browsers.md#safari-ios) browser. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://duckduckgo.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.duckduckgo.com){ .card-link title=Documentation} -
- DuckDuckGo offers two [other versions](https://help.duckduckgo.com/features/non-javascript) of their search engine, both of which do not require JavaScript. These versions do lack features, however. These versions can also be used in conjunction with their Tor hidden address by appending [/lite](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/lite) or [/html](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/html) for the respective version. @@ -83,8 +83,6 @@ DuckDuckGo offers two [other versions](https://help.duckduckgo.com/features/non- [:octicons-eye-16:](https://startpage.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startpage.com/hc/categories/4481917470356-Startpage-Search-Engine){ .card-link title=Documentation} -
- Startpage's majority shareholder is System1 who is an adtech company. We don't believe that to be an issue as they have a distinctly separate [privacy policy](https://system1.com/terms/privacy-policy). The Privacy Guides team reached out to Startpage [back in 2020](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2020/05/03/relisting-startpage) to clear up any concerns with System1's sizeable investment into the service, and we were satisfied with the answers we received. @@ -107,8 +105,6 @@ A [metasearch engine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metasearch_engine) aggregate [:octicons-server-16:](https://searx.space){ .card-link title="Public Instances"} [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/searxng/searxng){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -
- SearXNG is a proxy between you and the search engines it aggregates from. Your search queries will still be sent to the search engines that SearXNG gets its results from. diff --git a/docs/security-keys.md b/docs/security-keys.md index 9a55bb25..10566671 100644 --- a/docs/security-keys.md +++ b/docs/security-keys.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ --- title: "Security Keys" icon: 'material/key-chain' -description: These tools assist you with securing your internet accounts with Multi-Factor Authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party. +description: Secure your internet accounts with Multi-Factor Authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party. cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp --- Protects against the following threat(s): @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp - [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } - [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } -A physical **security key** adds a very strong layer of protection to your online accounts. Compared to [authenticator apps](multi-factor-authentication.md), the FIDO2 security key protocol is immune to phishing, and cannot be compromised without physical possession of the key itself. Many services support FIDO2/WebAuthn as a multi-factor authentication option for securing your account, and some services allow you to use a security key as a strong single-factor authenticator with passwordless authentication. +A physical **security key** adds a very strong layer of protection to your online accounts. Compared to [authenticator apps](multi-factor-authentication.md), the FIDO2 security key protocol is immune to phishing, and cannot be compromised without physical possession of the key itself. Many services support FIDO2/WebAuthn as a multifactor authentication option for securing your account, and some services allow you to use a security key as a strong single-factor authenticator with passwordless authentication. ## Yubico Security Key @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ The **YubiKey** series from Yubico are among the most popular security keys. The The [comparison table](https://yubico.com/store/compare) shows the features and how the YubiKeys compare to each other and to Yubico's [Security Key](#yubico-security-key) series. One of the benefits of the YubiKey series is that one key can do almost everything you could expect from a hardware security key. We encourage you to take their [quiz](https://yubico.com/quiz) before purchasing in order to make sure you make the right choice. -The Yubikey 5 series has FIDO Level 1 certification, which is the most common. However, some governments or other organizations may require a key with Level 2 certification, in which case you'll have to purchase a [Yubikey 5 **FIPS** series](https://yubico.com/products/yubikey-fips) key, or a [Yubico Security Key](#yubico-security-key). Most people do not have to worry about this distinction. +The YubiKey 5 series has FIDO Level 1 certification, which is the most common. However, some governments or other organizations may require a key with Level 2 certification, in which case you'll have to purchase a [YubiKey 5 **FIPS** series](https://yubico.com/products/yubikey-fips) key, or a [Yubico Security Key](#yubico-security-key). Most people do not have to worry about this distinction. YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator). All of Yubico's clients are open source. diff --git a/docs/tools.md b/docs/tools.md index 151677d9..abbff243 100644 --- a/docs/tools.md +++ b/docs/tools.md @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ --- -meta_title: "The Best Privacy Tools, Services, and Ad-Free Recommendations - Privacy Guides" +meta_title: "Ad-Free Privacy Tool/Service Recommendations - Privacy Guides" title: "Privacy Tools" icon: material/tools hide: - toc -description: Privacy Guides is the most transparent and reliable website for finding software, apps, and services that protect your personal data from mass surveillance programs and other internet threats. +description: A complete list of the privacy tools, services, software, and hardware recommended by the Privacy Guides community. --- If you're looking for a specific solution to something, these are the hardware and software tools we recommend in a variety of categories. Our recommended privacy tools are primarily chosen based on security features, with additional emphasis on decentralized and open-source tools. They are applicable to a variety of threat models ranging from protection against global mass surveillance programs and avoiding big tech companies to mitigating attacks, but only you can determine what will work best for your needs. @@ -37,15 +37,6 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o -
-

Threat Model Labels

- -You may find any of the following icons on some of the recommendation pages: :material-incognito: :material-target-account: :material-package-variant-closed-remove: :material-bug-outline: :material-server-network: :material-eye-outline: :material-account-cash: :material-account-search: :material-close-outline: - -We are testing a new feature that allows readers to better identify and understand the kinds of threats that privacy tools best defend against. Let us know what you think about this feature by replying to this dedicated forum [thread](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/implement-threat-model-labels/18659)! - -
- ## Private Web Browsers
@@ -85,21 +76,21 @@ We are testing a new feature that allows readers to better identify and understa - [Brave Desktop Review :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](desktop-browsers.md#brave) - [Brave Mobile Review :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](mobile-browsers.md#brave) -- ![Mull logo](assets/img/browsers/mull.svg){ .lg .middle .twemoji } **Mull (Android)** +- ![Cromite logo](assets/img/browsers/cromite.svg){ .lg .middle .twemoji } **Cromite (Android)** --- - **Mull** is a Firefox-based browser for Android centered around privacy and removing proprietary components. + **Cromite** is a Chromium-based Android browser with built-in ad-blocking and [privacy enhancements](https://github.com/uazo/cromite/blob/master/docs/FEATURES.md). It is a fork of the popular, now-discontinued Bromite browser. - - [Read Full Review :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](mobile-browsers.md#mull) + - [Read Full Review :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](mobile-browsers.md#cromite-android) - ![Safari logo](assets/img/browsers/safari.svg){ .lg .middle .twemoji } **Safari (iOS)** --- - We recommend **Safari** alongside a tracker-blocker like [AdGuard](browser-extensions.md#adguard) on iOS, because all iOS browsers are forced to be based on Safari anyways. This reduces the number of parties you're required to trust. + We recommend **Safari** due to its [anti-fingerprinting](https://webkit.org/blog/15697/private-browsing-2-0) features and default tracker blocking. It also separates your cookies in private browsing mode to prevent tracking between tabs. - - [Read Full Review :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](mobile-browsers.md#safari) + - [Read Full Review :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](mobile-browsers.md#safari-ios)
@@ -124,7 +115,7 @@ We are testing a new feature that allows readers to better identify and understa
- ![Orbot logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/orbot.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot) -- ![Onion Browser logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/onion_browser.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser) +- ![Onion Browser logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/onion_browser.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -177,13 +168,13 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec --- - - [x] **45+ Countries** + - [x] **49+ Countries** - [x] WireGuard Support - [x] Monero & Cash Payments - [ ] No Port Forwarding - [x] IPv6 Support - [Read Full Review :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](vpn.md#ivpn) + [Read Full Review :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](vpn.md#mullvad) @@ -195,7 +186,7 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec --- - Proton Mail is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since 2013. Proton AG is based in Genève, Switzerland. The Proton Mail Free plan comes with 500MB of Mail storage, which you can increase up to 1GB for free. + Proton Mail is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since 2013. Proton AG is based in Geneva, Switzerland. The Proton Mail Free plan comes with 500 MB of Mail storage, which you can increase up to 1 GB for free. [Read Full Review :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email.md#proton-mail) @@ -203,7 +194,7 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec --- - Mailbox.org is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with up to 2GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed. + Mailbox.org is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with up to 2 GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed. [Read Full Review :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email.md#mailboxorg) @@ -211,7 +202,7 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec --- - Tuta (formerly *Tutanota*) is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since 2011 and is based in Hanover, Germany. Free accounts start with 1GB of storage. + Tuta (formerly *Tutanota*) is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since 2011 and is based in Hanover, Germany. Free accounts start with 1 GB of storage. [Read Full Review :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email.md#tuta) @@ -235,8 +226,9 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec
-- ![mailcow logo](assets/img/email/mailcow.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [mailcow](email.md#self-hosting-email) -- ![Mail-in-a-Box logo](assets/img/email/mail-in-a-box.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mail-in-a-Box](email.md#self-hosting-email) +- ![Stalwart logo](assets/img/email/stalwart.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Stalwart](email.md#stalwart) +- ![Mailcow logo](assets/img/email/mailcow.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mailcow](email.md#mailcow) +- ![Mail-in-a-Box logo](assets/img/email/mail-in-a-box.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mail-in-a-Box](email.md#mail-in-a-box)
@@ -252,7 +244,6 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec - ![Canary Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/canarymail.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Canary Mail (iOS)](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios) - ![FairEmail logo](assets/img/email-clients/fairemail.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [FairEmail (Android)](email-clients.md#fairemail-android) - ![GNOME Evolution logo](assets/img/email-clients/evolution.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [GNOME Evolution (Linux)](email-clients.md#gnome-evolution-gnome) -- ![K-9 Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/k9mail.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [K-9 Mail (Android)](email-clients.md#k-9-mail-android) - ![Kontact logo](assets/img/email-clients/kontact.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Kontact (Linux)](email-clients.md#kontact-kde) - ![Mailvelope logo](assets/img/email-clients/mailvelope.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mailvelope (PGP in standard webmail)](email-clients.md#mailvelope-browser) - ![NeoMutt logo](assets/img/email-clients/mutt.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [NeoMutt (CLI)](email-clients.md#neomutt-cli) @@ -275,6 +266,17 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](cloud.md) +### Data Removal Services + +
+ +- ![EasyOptOuts logo](assets/img/data-broker-removals/easyoptouts.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [EasyOptOuts](data-broker-removals.md#easyoptouts-paid) +- ![Google logo](assets/img/data-broker-removals/google.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Google *Results about you*](data-broker-removals.md#google-results-about-you-free) + +
+ +[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](data-broker-removals.md) + ### DNS #### DNS Providers @@ -355,6 +357,18 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b ## Software +### AI Chat + +
+ +- ![Kobold logo](assets/img/ai-chat/kobold.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Kobold.cpp](ai-chat.md#koboldcpp) +- ![Llamafile logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Llamafile](ai-chat.md#llamafile) +- ![Ollama logo](assets/img/ai-chat/ollama.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Ollama (CLI)](ai-chat.md#ollama-cli) + +
+ +[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](ai-chat.md) + ### Calendar Sync
@@ -382,9 +396,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![MAT2 logo](assets/img/data-redaction/mat2.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [MAT2](data-redaction.md#mat2) - ![ExifEraser logo](assets/img/data-redaction/exiferaser.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [ExifEraser (Android)](data-redaction.md#exiferaser-android) -- ![Metapho logo](assets/img/data-redaction/metapho.jpg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Metapho (iOS)](data-redaction.md#metapho-ios) -- ![PrivacyBlur logo](assets/img/data-redaction/privacyblur.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [PrivacyBlur](data-redaction.md#privacyblur) -- ![ExifTool logo](assets/img/data-redaction/exiftool.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [ExifTool (CLI)](data-redaction.md#exiftool) +- ![ExifTool logo](assets/img/data-redaction/exiftool.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [ExifTool (CLI)](data-redaction.md#exiftool-cli)
@@ -404,14 +416,16 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b ### Encryption Software
-Operating System Disk Encryption +Operating System Encryption -For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichever encryption tool your operating system provides, whether that is **BitLocker** on Windows, **FileVault** on macOS, or **LUKS** on Linux. These tools are included with the operating system and typically use hardware encryption elements such as a TPM that other full-disk encryption software like VeraCrypt do not. VeraCrypt is still suitable for non-operating system disks such as external drives, especially drives that may be accessed from multiple operating systems. +For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool your operating system provides, whether that is **BitLocker** on Windows, **FileVault** on macOS, or **LUKS** on Linux. These tools are included with the operating system and take advantage of hardware encryption elements such as a [secure cryptoprocessor](basics/hardware.md/#tpmsecure-cryptoprocessor). -[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](encryption.md#os-full-disk-encryption) +[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](encryption.md#operating-system-encryption)
+#### Cross-platform Tools +
- ![Cryptomator logo](assets/img/encryption-software/cryptomator.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Cryptomator](encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud) @@ -468,6 +482,21 @@ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichev [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](frontends.md) +### Health and Wellness Apps + +
+ +- ![drip. logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [drip.](health-and-wellness.md#drip) +- ![Euki logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/euki.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Euki](health-and-wellness.md#euki) +- ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy }[Apple Health](health-and-wellness.md#apple-health) +- ![Gadgetbridge logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Gadgetbridge logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Gadgetbridge](health-and-wellness.md#gadgetbridge) +- ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy }[Apple Health Records](health-and-wellness.md#apple-health-records) +- ![CommonHealth logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/commonhealth.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [CommonHealth](health-and-wellness.md#commonhealth) + +
+ +[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](health-and-wellness.md) + ### Language Tools
@@ -478,6 +507,17 @@ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichev [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](language-tools.md) +### Maps and Navigation Apps + +
+ +- ![Organic Maps logo](assets/img/maps/organic-maps.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Organic Maps](maps.md#organic-maps) +- ![OsmAnd logo](assets/img/maps/osmand.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [OsmAnd](maps.md#osmand) + +
+ +[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](maps.md) + ### Multi-Factor Authentication Tools **Note:** [Hardware security keys](#security-keys) have been moved to their own category. @@ -498,7 +538,6 @@ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichev - ![Akregator logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/akregator.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Akregator](news-aggregators.md#akregator) - ![NewsFlash logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/newsflash.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [NewsFlash](news-aggregators.md#newsflash) - ![Feeder logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/feeder.png){ .twemoji} [Feeder (Android)](news-aggregators.md#feeder) -- ![Fluent Reader logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/fluent-reader.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Fluent Reader](news-aggregators.md#fluent-reader) - ![Miniflux logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Miniflux logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Miniflux](news-aggregators.md#miniflux) - ![NetNewsWire logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/netnewswire.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [NetNewsWire](news-aggregators.md#netnewswire) - ![Newsboat logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/newsboat.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Newsboat](news-aggregators.md#newsboat) @@ -542,7 +581,6 @@ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichev - ![Psono logo](assets/img/password-management/psono.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Psono](passwords.md#psono) - ![KeePassXC logo](assets/img/password-management/keepassxc.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [KeePassXC](passwords.md#keepassxc) - ![KeePassDX logo](assets/img/password-management/keepassdx.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [KeePassDX (Android)](passwords.md#keepassdx-android) -- ![Strongbox logo](assets/img/password-management/strongbox.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Strongbox (iOS & macOS)](passwords.md#strongbox-ios-macos) - ![gopass logo](assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [gopass (CLI)](passwords.md#gopass-cli)
@@ -554,6 +592,7 @@ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichev
- ![PrivateBin logo](assets/img/pastebins/privatebin.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [PrivateBin](pastebins.md#privatebin) +- ![Paaster logo](assets/img/pastebins/paaster.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Paaster](pastebins.md#paaster)
@@ -606,7 +645,6 @@ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichev
- ![GrapheneOS logo](assets/img/android/grapheneos.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![GrapheneOS logo](assets/img/android/grapheneos-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [GrapheneOS](android/distributions.md#grapheneos) -- ![DivestOS logo](assets/img/android/divestos.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [DivestOS](android/distributions.md#divestos)
@@ -641,10 +679,10 @@ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichev - ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) - ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) -- ![openSUSE Tumbleweed logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) +- ![openSUSE Tumbleweed logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [openSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) - ![Arch logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) - ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Fedora Atomic Desktops](desktop.md#fedora-atomic-desktops) -- ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) +- ![NixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) - ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) @@ -687,8 +725,6 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional - ![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt.webp){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mobile Verification Toolkit](device-integrity.md#mobile-verification-toolkit) - ![iMazing logo](assets/img/device-integrity/imazing.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [iMazing (iOS)](device-integrity.md#imazing-ios) - ![Auditor logo](assets/img/device-integrity/auditor.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Auditor logo](assets/img/device-integrity/auditor-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Auditor (Android)](device-integrity.md#auditor-android) -- ![Hypatia logo](assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Hypatia logo](assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Hypatia (Android)](device-integrity.md#hypatia-android) -- ![iVerify logo](assets/img/device-integrity/iverify.webp){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [iVerify Basic (iOS)](device-integrity.md#iverify-basic-ios)
diff --git a/docs/tor.md b/docs/tor.md index 81f7f0c5..b18c98fe 100644 --- a/docs/tor.md +++ b/docs/tor.md @@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ schema: **Tor** is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool. -[Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button } +[Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Why You Need Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/02/why-you-need-tor/){ .md-button }

Tip

@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile. -If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against de-anonymization. +If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization. ## Tor Browser @@ -113,21 +114,23 @@ We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference

Tips for Android

-Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN killswitch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. +Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead. -All versions are signed using the same signature so they should be compatible with each other. +All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-## Onion Browser +On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device. + +## Onion Browser (iOS)
![Onion Browser logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/onion_browser.svg){ align=right } -**Onion Browser** is an open-source browser that lets you browse the web anonymously over the Tor network on iOS devices and is endorsed by the [Tor Project](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/onion-browser). +**Onion Browser** is an open-source browser that lets you browse the web anonymously over the Tor network on iOS devices and is endorsed by the [Tor Project](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/onion-browser). [:material-star-box: Read our latest Onion Browser review.](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2024/09/18/onion-browser-review/) [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionbrowser.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://onionbrowser.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -144,4 +147,8 @@ All versions are signed using the same signature so they should be compatible wi
+Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool. + +[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above). + [^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people. diff --git a/docs/vpn.md b/docs/vpn.md index d86959c2..161f2b32 100644 --- a/docs/vpn.md +++ b/docs/vpn.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ meta_title: "Private VPN Service Recommendations and Comparison, No Sponsors or Ads - Privacy Guides" title: "VPN Services" icon: material/vpn -description: These are the best VPN services for protecting your privacy and security online. Find a provider here that isn’t out to spy on you. +description: The best VPN services for protecting your privacy and security online. Find a provider here that isn't out to spy on you. cover: vpn.webp global: - [randomize-element, "table tbody"] @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Our recommended providers use encryption, support WireGuard & OpenVPN, and have | Provider | Countries | WireGuard | Port Forwarding | IPv6 | Anonymous Payments |---|---|---|---|---|--- -| [Proton](#proton-vpn) | 112+ | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Partial Support | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | Cash +| [Proton](#proton-vpn) | 112+ | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Partial Support | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Limited Support | Cash | [IVPN](#ivpn) | 37+ | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Outgoing Only | Monero, Cash | [Mullvad](#mullvad) | 45+ | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Monero, Cash @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ Our recommended providers use encryption, support WireGuard & OpenVPN, and have - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1437005085) - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases) - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://protonvpn.com/download-windows) +- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://protonvpn.com/download-macos) - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://protonvpn.com/support/linux-vpn-setup)
@@ -85,35 +86,35 @@ Proton VPN, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards, PayPal, and [Bitcoin](a #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } WireGuard Support -Proton VPN mostly supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://wireguard.com/protocol). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant. +Proton VPN supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://wireguard.com/protocol). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant. -Proton VPN [recommends](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wireguard) the use of WireGuard with their service. On Proton VPN's Windows, macOS, iOS, Android, ChromeOS, and Android TV apps, WireGuard is the default protocol; however, [support](https://protonvpn.com/support/how-to-change-vpn-protocols) for the protocol is not present in their Linux app. +Proton VPN [recommends](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wireguard) the use of WireGuard with their service. Proton VPN also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://wireguard.com/install). -#### :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } No IPv6 Support +#### :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Limited IPv6 Support -Proton VPN's servers are only compatible with IPv4. The Proton VPN applications will block all outgoing IPv6 traffic, so you don't have to worry about your IPv6 address being leaked, but you will not be able to connect to any IPv6-only sites, and you will not be able to connect to Proton VPN from an IPv6-only network. +Proton [now supports IPv6](https://protonvpn.com/support/prevent-ipv6-vpn-leaks) in their browser extension and Linux client, but only 80% of their servers are IPv6-compatible. On other platforms, the Proton VPN client will block all outgoing IPv6 traffic, so you don't have to worry about your IPv6 address being leaked, but you will not be able to connect to any IPv6-only sites, nor will you be able to connect to Proton VPN from an IPv6-only network. #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-info } Remote Port Forwarding -Proton VPN currently only supports ephemeral remote [port forwarding](https://protonvpn.com/support/port-forwarding) via NAT-PMP, with 60 second lease times. The Windows app provides an easy to access option for it, while on other operating systems you'll need to run your own [NAT-PMP client](https://protonvpn.com/support/port-forwarding-manual-setup). Torrent applications often support NAT-PMP natively. +Proton VPN currently only supports ephemeral remote [port forwarding](https://protonvpn.com/support/port-forwarding) via NAT-PMP, with 60 second lease times. The official Windows and Linux apps provide an easy-to-access option for it, while on other operating systems you'll need to run your own [NAT-PMP client](https://protonvpn.com/support/port-forwarding-manual-setup). Torrent applications often support NAT-PMP natively. #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Anti-Censorship -Proton VPN has their [Stealth](https://protonvpn.com/blog/stealth-vpn-protocol) protocol which *may* help in situations where VPN protocols like OpenVPN or Wireguard are blocked with various rudimentary techniques. Stealth encapsulates the VPN tunnel in TLS session in order to look like more generic internet traffic. +Proton VPN has their [Stealth](https://protonvpn.com/blog/stealth-vpn-protocol) protocol which *may* help in situations where VPN protocols like OpenVPN or WireGuard are blocked with various rudimentary techniques. Stealth encapsulates the VPN tunnel in TLS session in order to look like more generic internet traffic. Unfortunately, it does not work very well in countries where sophisticated filters that analyze all outgoing traffic in an attempt to discover encrypted tunnels are deployed. Stealth is available on Android, iOS, Windows, and macOS, but it's not yet available on Linux. #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Mobile Clients -In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, Proton VPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1437005085), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers. +Proton VPN has published [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1437005085) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android) clients, both supporting an easy-to-use interface as opposed to requiring you to manually configure your WireGuard connection. The Android client is also available on [GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases). #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Notes -Proton VPN clients support two factor authentication on all platforms. Proton VPN has their own servers and datacenters in Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden. They offer content blocking and known-malware blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) for this purpose. +Proton VPN clients support two-factor authentication on all platforms. Proton VPN has their own servers and datacenters in Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden. They offer content blocking and known-malware blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) for this purpose. -##### :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Killswitch feature is broken on Intel-based Macs +##### :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Kill switch feature is broken on Intel-based Macs -System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-switch) on Intel-based Macs when using the VPN killswitch. If you require this feature, and you are using a Mac with Intel chipset, you should consider using another VPN service. +System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-switch) on Intel-based Macs when using the VPN kill switch. If you require this feature, and you are using a Mac with Intel chipset, you should consider using another VPN service. ### IVPN @@ -153,7 +154,7 @@ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Independently Audited -IVPN has undergone a [no-logging audit from Cure53](https://cure53.de/audit-report_ivpn.pdf) which concluded in agreement with IVPN's no-logging claim. IVPN has also completed a [comprehensive pentest report Cure53](https://cure53.de/summary-report_ivpn_2019.pdf) in January 2020. IVPN has also said they plan to have [annual reports](https://ivpn.net/blog/independent-security-audit-concluded) in the future. A further review was conducted [in April 2022](https://ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-apps-security-audit-2022-concluded) and was produced by Cure53 [on their website](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_IVPN_2022.pdf). +IVPN has had multiple [independent audits](https://ivpn.net/en/blog/tags/audit) since 2019 and has publicly announced their commitment to [annual security audits](https://ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-apps-security-audit-concluded). #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Open-Source Clients @@ -179,15 +180,15 @@ IVPN previously supported port forwarding, but removed the option in [June 2023] #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Anti-Censorship -IVPN has obfuscation modes using the [v2ray](https://v2ray.com/en/index.html) project which helps in situations where VPN protocols like OpenVPN or Wireguard are blocked. Currently this feature is only available on Desktop and [iOS](https://ivpn.net/knowledgebase/ios/v2ray). It has two modes where it can use [VMess](https://guide.v2fly.org/en_US/basics/vmess.html) over QUIC or TCP connections. QUIC is a modern protocol with better congestion control and therefore may be faster with reduced latency. The TCP mode makes your data appear as regular HTTP traffic. +IVPN has obfuscation modes using [V2Ray](https://v2ray.com/en/index.html) which helps in situations where VPN protocols like OpenVPN or WireGuard are blocked. Currently, this feature is only available on Desktop and [iOS](https://ivpn.net/knowledgebase/ios/v2ray). It has two modes where it can use [VMess](https://guide.v2fly.org/en_US/basics/vmess.html) over QUIC or TCP connections. QUIC is a modern protocol with better congestion control and therefore may be faster with reduced latency. The TCP mode makes your data appear as regular HTTP traffic. #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Mobile Clients -In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, IVPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1193122683), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ivpn/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers. +IVPN has published [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1193122683) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client) clients, both supporting an easy-to-use interface as opposed to requiring you to manually configure your WireGuard connection. The Android client is also available on [GitHub](https://github.com/ivpn/android-app/releases). #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Notes -IVPN clients support two factor authentication. IVPN also provides "[AntiTracker](https://ivpn.net/antitracker)" functionality, which blocks advertising networks and trackers from the network level. +IVPN clients support two-factor authentication. IVPN also provides "[AntiTracker](https://ivpn.net/antitracker)" functionality, which blocks advertising networks and trackers from the network level. ### Mullvad @@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ IVPN clients support two factor authentication. IVPN also provides "[AntiTracker ![Mullvad logo](assets/img/vpn/mullvad.svg){ align=right } -**Mullvad** is a fast and inexpensive VPN with a serious focus on transparency and security. They have been in operation since 2009. Mullvad is based in Sweden and does not offer a free trial. +**Mullvad** is a fast and inexpensive VPN with a serious focus on transparency and security. They have been in operation since 2009. Mullvad is based in Sweden and offers a 14-day money-back guarantee for [payment methods](https://mullvad.net/en/help/refunds) that allow it. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mullvad.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -217,26 +218,18 @@ IVPN clients support two factor authentication. IVPN also provides "[AntiTracker -#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } 45 Countries +#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } 49 Countries -Mullvad has [servers in 45 countries](https://mullvad.net/servers).(1) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination. +Mullvad has [servers in 49 countries](https://mullvad.net/servers).(1) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination. { .annotate } -1. Last checked: 2024-08-06 +1. Last checked: 2025-03-10 We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server). #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Independently Audited -Mullvad's VPN clients have been audited by Cure53 and Assured AB in a pentest report [published at cure53.de](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_v2.pdf). The security researchers concluded: - -> Cure53 and Assured AB are happy with the results of the audit and the software leaves an overall positive impression. With security dedication of the in-house team at the Mullvad VPN compound, the testers have no doubts about the project being on the right track from a security standpoint. - -In 2020 a second audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/blog/2020/6/25/results-available-audit-mullvad-app) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2020_v2.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website: - -> The results of this May-June 2020 project targeting the Mullvad complex are quite positive. [...] The overall application ecosystem used by Mullvad leaves a sound and structured impression. The overall structure of the application makes it easy to roll out patches and fixes in a structured manner. More than anything, the findings spotted by Cure53 showcase the importance of constantly auditing and re-assessing the current leak vectors, in order to always ensure privacy of the end-users. With that being said, Mullvad does a great job protecting the end-user from common PII leaks and privacy related risks. - -In 2021 an infrastructure audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2021/1/20/no-pii-or-privacy-leaks-found-cure53s-infrastructure-audit) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2021_v1.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website. Another report was commissioned [in June 2022](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2022/6/22/vpn-server-audit-found-no-information-leakage-or-logging-of-customer-data) and is available on [Assured's website](https://assured.se/publications/Assured_Mullvad_relay_server_audit_report_2022.pdf). +Mullvad has had multiple [independent audits](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/tag/audits) and has publicly announced their endeavors to conduct [annual audits](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/no-pii-or-privacy-leaks-found-cure53s-infrastructure-audit) of their apps and infrastructure. #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Open-Source Clients @@ -244,7 +237,7 @@ Mullvad provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [ #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Accepts Cash and Monero -Mullvad, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment. Prepaid cards with redeem codes are also available. Mullvad also accepts Swish and bank wire transfers. +Mullvad, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment. Prepaid cards with redeem codes are also available. Mullvad also accepts Swish and bank wire transfers, as well as a few European payment systems. #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } WireGuard Support @@ -262,7 +255,12 @@ Mullvad previously supported port forwarding, but removed the option in [May 202 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Anti-Censorship -Mullvad has obfuscation an mode using [Shadowsocks with v2ray](https://mullvad.net/en/help/shadowsocks-with-v2ray) which may be useful in situations where VPN protocols like OpenVPN or Wireguard are blocked. +Mullvad offers several features to help bypass censorship and access the internet freely: + +- **Obfuscation modes**: Mullvad has two built-in obfuscation modes: "UDP-over-TCP" and ["WireGuard over Shadowsocks"](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/introducing-shadowsocks-obfuscation-for-wireguard). These modes disguise your VPN traffic as regular web traffic, making it harder for censors to detect and block. Supposedly, China has to use a [new method to disrupt Shadowsocks-routed traffic](https://gfw.report/publications/usenixsecurity23/en). +- **Advanced obfuscation with Shadowsocks and v2ray**: For more advanced users, Mullvad provides a guide on how to use the [Shadowsocks with v2ray](https://mullvad.net/en/help/shadowsocks-with-v2ray) plugin with Mullvad clients. This setup provides an additional layer of obfuscation and encryption. +- **Custom server IPs**: To counter IP-blocking, you can request custom server IPs from Mullvad's support team. Once you receive the custom IPs, you can input the text file in the "Server IP override" settings, which will override the chosen server IP addresses with ones that aren't known to the censor. +- **Bridges and proxies**: Mullvad also allows you to use bridges or proxies to reach their API (needed for authentication), which can help bypass censorship attempts that block access to the API itself. #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Mobile Clients @@ -270,7 +268,7 @@ Mullvad has published [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1488466513) and [ #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Notes -Mullvad is very transparent about which nodes they [own or rent](https://mullvad.net/en/servers). They use [ShadowSocks](https://shadowsocks.org) in their ShadowSocks + OpenVPN configuration, making them more resistant against firewalls with [Deep Packet Inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) trying to block VPNs. Supposedly, [China has to use a different method to block ShadowSocks servers](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/22). +Mullvad is very transparent about which nodes they [own or rent](https://mullvad.net/en/servers). They also provide the option to enable Defense Against AI-guided Traffic Analysis ([DAITA](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/daita-defense-against-ai-guided-traffic-analysis)) in their apps. DAITA protects against the threat of advanced traffic analysis which can be used to connect patterns in VPN traffic with specific websites. ## Criteria @@ -285,22 +283,23 @@ It is important to note that using a VPN provider will not make you anonymous, b ### Technology -We require all our recommended VPN providers to provide OpenVPN configuration files to be used in any client. **If** a VPN provides their own custom client, we require a killswitch to block network data leaks when disconnected. +We require all our recommended VPN providers to provide standard configuration files which can be used in a generic, open-source client. **If** a VPN provides their own custom client, we require a kill switch to block network data leaks when disconnected. **Minimum to Qualify:** -- Support for strong protocols such as WireGuard & OpenVPN. -- Killswitch built in to clients. -- Multihop support. Multihopping is important to keep data private in case of a single node compromise. -- If VPN clients are provided, they should be [open source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), like the VPN software they generally have built into them. We believe that [source code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) availability provides greater transparency about what your device is actually doing. +- Support for strong protocols such as WireGuard. +- Kill switch built in to clients. +- Multi-hop support. Multi-hopping is important to keep data private in case of a single node compromise. +- If VPN clients are provided, they should be [open source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), like the VPN software they generally have built into them. We believe that [source code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) availability provides greater transparency about what the program is actually doing. +- Censorship resistance features designed to bypass firewalls without DPI. **Best Case:** -- Killswitch with highly configurable options (enable/disable on certain networks, on boot, etc.) +- Kill switch with highly configurable options (enable/disable on certain networks, on boot, etc.) - Easy-to-use VPN clients -- Supports [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). We expect that servers will allow incoming connections via IPv6 and allow you to access services hosted on IPv6 addresses. +- [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6) support. We expect that servers will allow incoming connections via IPv6 and allow you to access services hosted on IPv6 addresses. - Capability of [remote port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding#Remote_port_forwarding) assists in creating connections when using P2P ([Peer-to-Peer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer)) file sharing software or hosting a server (e.g., Mumble). -- Obfuscation technology which pads data packets with random data to circumvent internet censorship. +- Obfuscation technology which camouflages the true nature of internet traffic, designed to circumvent advanced internet censorship methods like DPI. ### Privacy @@ -314,24 +313,27 @@ We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible. Not c **Best Case:** - Accepts multiple [anonymous payment options](advanced/payments.md). -- No personal information accepted (autogenerated username, no email required, etc.). +- No personal information accepted (auto-generated username, no email required, etc.). ### Security -A VPN is pointless if it can't even provide adequate security. We require all our recommended providers to abide by current security standards for their OpenVPN connections. Ideally, they would use more future-proof encryption schemes by default. We also require an independent third-party to audit the provider's security, ideally in a very comprehensive manner and on a repeated (yearly) basis. +A VPN is pointless if it can't even provide adequate security. We require all our recommended providers to abide by current security standards. Ideally, they would use more future-proof encryption schemes by default. We also require an independent third-party to audit the provider's security, ideally in a very comprehensive manner and on a repeated (yearly) basis. **Minimum to Qualify:** - Strong Encryption Schemes: OpenVPN with SHA-256 authentication; RSA-2048 or better handshake; AES-256-GCM or AES-256-CBC data encryption. - Forward Secrecy. - Published security audits from a reputable third-party firm. +- VPN servers that use full-disk encryption or are RAM-only. **Best Case:** - Strongest Encryption: RSA-4096. +- Optional quantum-resistant encryption. - Forward Secrecy. - Comprehensive published security audits from a reputable third-party firm. - Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process. +- RAM-only VPN servers. ### Trust @@ -340,6 +342,7 @@ You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust t **Minimum to Qualify:** - Public-facing leadership or ownership. +- Company based in a jurisdiction where it cannot be forced to do secret logging. **Best Case:** @@ -352,7 +355,7 @@ With the VPN providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing. **Minimum to Qualify:** -- Must self-host analytics (i.e., no Google Analytics). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for people who want to opt-out. +- Must self-host analytics (i.e., no Google Analytics). Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible: @@ -371,4 +374,4 @@ Responsible marketing that is both educational and useful to the consumer could ### Additional Functionality -While not strictly requirements, there are some factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend. These include content blocking functionality, warrant canaries, multihop connections, excellent customer support, the number of allowed simultaneous connections, etc. +While not strictly requirements, there are some factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend. These include content blocking functionality, warrant canaries, excellent customer support, the number of allowed simultaneous connections, etc. diff --git a/generate-members.py b/generate-members.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6fbe6577 --- /dev/null +++ b/generate-members.py @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +import requests +import os + +GITHUB_API_URL = "https://api.github.com/graphql" +GITHUB_TOKEN = os.getenv("GH_TOKEN") +ORG_NAME = "privacyguides" + +# Fetch members from the API +members_api_url = "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/g/members/members.json?offset=0&order=added_at&asc=true" +headers = { + "Api-Key": os.getenv("DISCOURSE_API_KEY"), + "Api-Username": "system" +} +members_response = requests.get(members_api_url, headers=headers) +members_data = members_response.json() + +if 'members' not in members_data: + raise KeyError("Response JSON does not contain 'members' key") + +members = members_data['members'] +public_members_count = 0 +private_members_count = 0 + +html_output = "" +for member in members: + flair_name = member.get('flair_name') + title = member.get('title') + if flair_name == "members" or title == "Member": + username = member['username'] + avatar_template = member['avatar_template'] + avatar_url = f"https://discuss.privacyguides.net{avatar_template.replace('{size}', '128')}" + profile_url = f"https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/{username}" + html_output += f'' + public_members_count += 1 + +# print(html_output) + +query = """ +{ + organization(login: "%s") { + sponsorshipsAsMaintainer(first: 100) { + nodes { + sponsorEntity { + ... on User { + login + avatarUrl + url + } + ... on Organization { + login + avatarUrl + url + } + } + createdAt + } + } + } +} +""" % ORG_NAME + +headers = { + "Authorization": f"Bearer {GITHUB_TOKEN}", + "Content-Type": "application/json" +} + +response = requests.post(GITHUB_API_URL, json={'query': query}, headers=headers) +data = response.json() + +if 'errors' in data: + raise Exception(f"GraphQL query failed with errors: {data['errors']}") +if 'data' not in data: + raise KeyError(f"Response JSON does not contain 'data' key: {data}") + +sponsors = data['data']['organization']['sponsorshipsAsMaintainer']['nodes'] + +# Sort sponsors by the date they began their sponsorship +sponsors.sort(key=lambda x: x['createdAt']) + +for sponsor in sponsors: + sponsor_entity = sponsor['sponsorEntity'] + login = sponsor_entity['login'] + avatar_url = sponsor_entity['avatarUrl'] + url = sponsor_entity['url'] + html_output += f'' + +# Fetch the number of active members from the Magic Grants API +magic_grants_url = "https://donate.magicgrants.org/api/active-members?fund=privacyguides" +magic_grants_response = requests.get(magic_grants_url) +magic_grants_data = magic_grants_response.json() + +if 'members_count' not in magic_grants_data: + raise KeyError("Response JSON does not contain 'members_count' key") + +private_members_count += magic_grants_data['members_count'] +private_members_count -= public_members_count + +# Append the count of private members +if private_members_count > 0: + html_output += f'+{private_members_count}' + +print(html_output) diff --git a/generate-topics.sh b/generate-topics.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..38423c20 --- /dev/null +++ b/generate-topics.sh @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +DATE_CMD="date" + +# Check if the script is running on macOS +if [[ "$OSTYPE" == "darwin"* ]]; then + DATE_CMD="gdate" +fi + +# Defaults +source="https://discuss.privacyguides.net/top.json?period=weekly" +tag="top posts" +destination="./site/en/index.html" +count=3 + +for arg in "$@" +do + case $arg in + --source=*) + source="${arg#*=}" + shift + ;; + --tag=*) + tag="${arg#*=}" + shift + ;; + --destination=*) + destination="${arg#*=}" + shift + ;; + --count=*) + count="${arg#*=}" + shift + ;; + esac +done + +# URL of the Discourse top.json +DISCOURSE_URL="$source" + +# Fetch the JSON data +json_data="$(curl -s "$DISCOURSE_URL")" + +# Extract the first 3 topics +topics=$(echo "$json_data" | jq -r ".topic_list.topics[:$count]") + +users=$(echo "$json_data" | jq -r ".users") +# Generate HTML for the first 3 posts +html_output="" +for row in $(echo "${topics}" | jq -r '.[] | @base64'); do + _jq() { + echo "${row}" | base64 --decode | jq -r "${1}" + } + + title="$(_jq '.title')" + id=$(_jq '.id') + like_count=$(_jq '.like_count') + reply_count=$(_jq '.posts_count') + views=$(_jq '.views') + + author_id=$(_jq '.posters[0].user_id') + author_info=$(echo "${users}" | jq -r ".[] | select(.id==$author_id)") + author_username=$(echo "${author_info}" | jq -r ".username") + + html_output+="
  • " + html_output+="

    ${title}

    " + html_output+="
    " + html_output+="

    " + html_output+="" + html_output+="" + html_output+=" Posted by $author_username" + html_output+="" + html_output+="

    " + html_output+="

    " + html_output+="eye" + html_output+=" ${views} " + html_output+="heart" + html_output+=" ${like_count} " + html_output+="reply" + html_output+=" ${reply_count} " + html_output+="

    " + html_output+="
    • " +done + +tempfile=$(mktemp) +echo "$html_output" > "$tempfile" + +# Insert the HTML output between the comments in index.html +sed -i'.bak' "//,//{//!d;}; //r $tempfile" "$destination" diff --git a/includes/abbreviations.en.txt b/includes/abbreviations.en.txt index 93195bd3..4d2f9ada 100644 --- a/includes/abbreviations.en.txt +++ b/includes/abbreviations.en.txt @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ *[DoQ]: DNS over QUIC *[DoH3]: DNS over HTTP/3 *[DoT]: DNS over TLS +*[DPI]: Deep Packet Inspection identifies and blocks packet with specific payloads *[E2EE]: End-to-End Encryption/Encrypted *[ECS]: EDNS Client Subnet *[EEA]: European Economic Area @@ -48,6 +49,8 @@ *[ISPs]: Internet Service Providers *[JNI]: Java Native Interface *[KYC]: Know Your Customer +*[LLaVA]: Large Language and Vision Assistant (multimodal AI model) +*[LLMs]: Large Language Models (AI models such as ChatGPT) *[LUKS]: Linux Unified Key Setup (Full-Disk Encryption) *[MAC]: Media Access Control *[MDAG]: Microsoft Defender Application Guard @@ -61,6 +64,7 @@ *[OCSP]: Online Certificate Status Protocol *[OEM]: Original Equipment Manufacturer *[OEMs]: Original Equipment Manufacturers +*[open-weights]: An open weights-model is an AI model that anyone can download and use, but for which the underlying training data and/or algorithms are proprietary. *[OS]: Operating System *[OTP]: One-Time Password *[OTPs]: One-Time Passwords @@ -71,6 +75,8 @@ *[PGP]: Pretty Good Privacy (see OpenPGP) *[PII]: Personally Identifiable Information *[QNAME]: Qualified Name +*[QUIC]: A network protocol based on UDP, but aiming to combine the speed of UDP with the reliability of TCP. +*[rate limits]: Rate limits are restrictions that a service imposes on the number of times a user can access their services within a specified period of time. *[rolling release]: Updates which are released frequently rather than set intervals *[RSS]: Really Simple Syndication *[SELinux]: Security-Enhanced Linux @@ -84,6 +90,8 @@ *[SaaS]: Software as a Service (cloud software) *[SoC]: System on Chip *[SSO]: Single sign-on +*[system prompt]: The system prompt of an AI chat is the general instructions given by a human to guide how it should operate. +*[temperature]: AI temperature is a parameter used in AI models to control the level of randomness and creativity in the generated text. *[TCP]: Transmission Control Protocol *[TEE]: Trusted Execution Environment *[TLS]: Transport Layer Security diff --git a/includes/contributors.md b/includes/contributors.md index 3025f46a..70c08289 100644 --- a/includes/contributors.md +++ b/includes/contributors.md @@ -28,409 +28,428 @@
    matchboxbananasynergy
    📖 🔬 🤔 👀 📝 +
    fria
    📖 👀 🔬 💬 🐛 🤔
    GitHub Actions
    🚇 +
    Triplebit
    🚇 +
    MAGIC Grants
    💼 + +
    Netlify
    🚇
    Dependabot
    💻 🚇
    Hetzner Cloud
    🚇 - -
    Cloudflare
    🚇
    Open Collective
    💼 + +
    Safing
    💵
    Dan Arel
    📝 📖 🔬
    Techlore
    💵 - -
    elitejake
    📖
    samsepi0l
    📖 + +
    rollsicecream
    📖 💬 🌍 👀
    Henry Fisher
    📖
    Nate Bartram
    📝 - -
    Sam Howell
    📝
    asddsaz
    📖 + +
    Hugo Costa
    📖
    C-O-M-P-A-R-T-M-E-N-T-A-L-I-Z-A-T-I-O-N
    📖
    Alberto Strappazzon
    📖 +
    Victorhck
    📖 +
    Tai Lam
    📖 🚧 -
    Victorhck
    📖 -
    Tai Lam
    📖
    NinebitX
    📖
    Alexander Antukh
    📖
    Gusted
    📖 - -
    redoomed1
    👀 📖
    Offpics
    📖 + +
    kimg45
    📖
    djoate
    📖
    afighttilldeath
    📖 - -
    Paul Verbeke
    📖 🌍 🐛 🧑‍🏫
    Mitchell Cash
    📖 + +
    NeverDucky
    📖
    efb4f5ff-1298-471a-8973-3d47447115dc
    📖
    Stephen Karl Larroque
    📖 - -
    0rdinant
    📖
    Zenithium
    📖 + +
    Jordan Gwyn
    📖
    Guru
    📖
    datoshkr
    📖 - -
    Kcchouette
    📖
    Jacob Neplokh
    📖 -
    Leonardo Mazzon
    📖 -
    Andrew Chong
    📖 -
    Wok
    📖 +
    Leonardo Mazzon
    📖 🐛 💵 📣 💬 🌍 +
    Andrew Chong
    📖 +
    Wok
    📖
    nopeitsnothing
    📖
    Lynn Stephenson
    📖 + +
    Cory Solovewicz
    📖
    noClaps
    📖
    Brian
    📖 - -
    SkewedZeppelin
    📖 💬
    Arcadius3D
    📖 + +
    vpnarea
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    cYDN48
    📖 - -
    gjhklfdsa
    📖
    Pavel Zolotarevskiy
    📖 + +
    quiddity-wp
    📖
    Nikhil Jha
    📖
    Subatomic Honda Civic
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    ticklemyIP
    📖
    jermanuts
    📖 + +
    conorohiggins
    📖
    TechFanTheo
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    Ryan Taylor
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    Positron832
    📖
    JustLuckNoSkill
    📖 + +
    Arkadiy
    📖
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    ave
    📖 - -
    Boo
    📖
    IDKwhattoputhere
    📖 + +
    idkrn
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    ggg27
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    WalterKlosse
    📖 - -
    Tom Hacohen
    📖
    Paul Feuvraux
    📖 + +
    Scott Bennett
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    Federico Ariel Castagnini
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    jslawler-gh
    📖 - -
    spaceoden
    📖
    xe3
    📖 + +
    Andrew Morgan
    📖
    Caleb King
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    Eduardo
    📖 - -
    NafeezJS
    📖
    Sloofy
    📖 + +
    Sam Schlinkert
    📖
    Gabor Luk
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    📖
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    Mark Cohen
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    📖 - -
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    William Thomas Wilkins
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    wylel
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    Yusuf Daglioglu
    📖
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    📖 + +
    ZH王
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    ansuz
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    archeite
    📖 - -
    asdfghjz
    📖
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    📖 + +
    b-harper
    📖
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    eagerto-learn
    📖
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    📖 + +
    elleybean
    📖
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    pynixis
    📖 - -
    Seirdy
    📖
    Ryan Huang
    📖 + +
    Sascha P.
    📖
    Securified
    📖
    Sergey Musiyenko
    📖 - -
    Spydar007
    📖
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    📖 + +
    Steven Lehn
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    📖 - -
    Tejas Gupta
    📖
    Tebowy Seba
    📖 + +
    Ted Gravlin
    📖
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    📖
    TheNoobWar
    📖 - -
    Thomas Rientjes
    📖
    Tim Vergenz
    📖 + +
    Tom Sullivan
    📖
    Tony Tan
    📖
    TroubleDog54
    📖 - -
    User486375
    📖
    Nicholas Christensen
    📖 + +
    oppressor1761
    📖
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    📖 - -
    Stella Polaris
    📖 🔬 📣 💬 👀
    regaldude
    📖 + +
    rusty-snake
    📖
    sacha
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    📖 - -
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    📖
    szTheory
    📖 + +
    Thunderbolt Digital
    📖
    E. S. Leonesco
    📖
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    📖 - -
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    📖
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    📖 + +
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    📖 - -
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    📖 + +
    ghbjklhv
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    📖
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    📖 - -
    fd1f744993de14178e6c
    📖
    habitualname
    📖 + +
    hook
    📖
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    📖 - -
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    📖
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    📖 + +
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    📖 - -
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    📖 + +
    mat1th
    📖
    MWM
    📖
    Michael Plews
    📖 - -
    moritztk
    📖
    Aaron Horler
    📖 + +
    Commenter
    📖
    Cédric Laubacher
    📖
    Daniel Peukert
    📖 - -
    David Breese
    📖
    Dimitris Apostolou
    📖 + +
    Dyrimon
    📖
    Ikel Atomig
    📖
    Elias Ojala
    📖 - -
    Feni Brian
    📖
    Filip Š
    📖 + +
    Felix Albroscheit
    📖
    GReagle
    📖
    Gamma
    📖 - -
    GetBoz
    📖
    GrimPixel
    📖 + +
    Guillem L. Jara
    📖
    HxxxxxS
    📖
    Himanshu Chandola
    📖 - -
    Issam Maghni
    📖
    ItsDonny
    📖 + +
    Abdullah Atta
    📖
    Adam Sroka
    📖
    criadoperez
    📖 - -
    Alex Amiryan
    📖
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    📖 + +
    Alex Thomassen
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    📖 - -
    Armando Lüscher
    📖
    Ash T
    📖 + +
    Bernd Eichelberger
    📖
    BionicBison05
    📖
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    📖 - -
    Brian Cooper
    📖
    Caboose700
    📖 + +
    Cadel Watson
    📖
    trosel
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    Carl
    📖 - -
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    Chris Barry
    📖 + +
    Júlio Ferraz
    📖
    Jack Hill
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    📖 - -
    Mats Estensen
    📖
    Matt Baer
    📖 + +
    Mehdi Chaouch
    📖
    Mike Perrone
    📖
    Mitch Wilkins
    📖 - -
    Mo
    📖
    Morten Linderud
    📖 + +
    natzim
    📖
    Douglas
    📖
    Nick
    📖 - -
    NielDB
    📖
    Nihal Raj
    📖 + +
    Noah
    📖
    Panagiotis "Ivory" Vasilopoulos
    📖
    Patrick R
    📖 - -
    Fart Attorney
    📖
    Pilou
    📖 + +
    PoorPockets McNewHold
    📖 🌍
    PrinceKael
    📖
    Richard
    📖 - -
    Jaden Site
    📖
    Jake Zeal
    📖 + +
    James Kerrane
    📖
    Sell
    📖
    YMHuang
    📖 - -
    Jonathan Vansina
    📖
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    📖 + +
    Julian
    📖
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    Kevin Brennan
    📖 - -
    Kyle Spearrin
    📖
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    LisaWilbourn
    📖
    Lord Shedy
    📖
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    📖
    MMR
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    Mads Peter Rommedahl
    📖
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    📖
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    📖 - -
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    📖
    skye
    💬 + +
    r2fo
    🌍
    LamTrinh.Dev
    📖 🐛 💬
    frostlike
    💬 - -
    Merlin Scholz
    🌍
    jordan warne
    📖 + +
    Dženan
    🌍
    jx tsai
    🌍
    backstab5983
    📖 - -
    antgig
    📖
    Ákos Nikházy
    📖 + +
    Francois Marier
    📖
    5-tom
    📖
    Ralphie0511
    📖 - -
    aleksejs1
    📖
    Martin
    📖 + +
    Overwatch
    📖
    Kieran Colfer
    📖
    Triple T
    📖 +
    IDON-TEXIST
    📖 +
    Yusuf Daglioglu
    📖 + + +
    Yi Cao
    📖 +
    Sayf Dhū al-Faqār
    📖 +
    eylenburg
    📖 +
    Kieran Colfer
    📖 +
    Justin Ehrenhofer
    📖 💼 🔍 + + +
    Alex Bruch
    🌍 +
    qiyongzheng
    📖 +
    Sam K
    📖 📣 💬 diff --git a/includes/strings.en.env b/includes/strings.en.env index 1eaf8074..5fc84828 100644 --- a/includes/strings.en.env +++ b/includes/strings.en.env @@ -7,14 +7,13 @@ DESCRIPTION_HOMEPAGE="A socially motivated website which provides information ab FOOTER_COPYRIGHT_AUTHOR="Privacy Guides and contributors." FOOTER_INTRO="Privacy Guides is a non-profit, socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy." FOOTER_NOTE="We do not make money from recommending certain products, and we do not use affiliate links." +FOOTER_PRIVACY_NOTICE="Privacy notice." HOMEPAGE_CTA_DESCRIPTION="It's important for a website like Privacy Guides to always stay up-to-date. We need our audience to keep an eye on software updates for the applications listed on our site and follow recent news about providers that we recommend. It's hard to keep up with the fast pace of the internet, but we try our best. If you spot an error, think a provider should not be listed, notice a qualified provider is missing, believe a browser plugin is no longer the best choice, or uncover any other issue, please let us know." HOMEPAGE_DESCRIPTION="A socially motivated website which provides information about protecting your online data privacy and security." HOMEPAGE_RSS_CHANGELOG_LINK="https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/site-development/changelog/9.rss" HOMEPAGE_RSS_CHANGELOG_TITLE="Privacy Guides release changelog" -HOMEPAGE_RSS_BLOG_LINK="https://blog.privacyguides.org/feed_rss_created.xml" +HOMEPAGE_RSS_BLOG_LINK="https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/feed_rss_created.xml" HOMEPAGE_RSS_BLOG_TITLE="Privacy Guides blog feed" -HOMEPAGE_RSS_STORIES_LINK="https://share.privacyguides.org/web-stories/feed/" -HOMEPAGE_RSS_STORIES_TITLE="Privacy Guides web stories feed" HOMEPAGE_RSS_FORUM_LINK="https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest.rss" HOMEPAGE_RSS_FORUM_TITLE="Latest Privacy Guides forum topics" HOMEPAGE_HEADER="The collaborative privacy advocacy community." @@ -24,14 +23,16 @@ HOMEPAGE_BUTTON_GET_STARTED_TITLE="The first step of your privacy journey" HOMEPAGE_BUTTON_TOOLS_NAME="Recommended Tools" HOMEPAGE_BUTTON_TOOLS_TITLE="Recommended privacy tools, services, and knowledge" NAV_ABOUT="About" +NAV_ABOUT_POLICIES="Policies" +NAV_ABOUT_TEAM_MEMBERS="Team Members" NAV_ADVANCED="Advanced" NAV_ADVANCED_TOPICS="Advanced Topics" -NAV_BLOG="Blog" -NAV_CHANGELOG="Changelog" +NAV_BLOG="Articles" NAV_CODE_OF_CONDUCT="Code of Conduct" NAV_COMMUNITY="Community" NAV_CONTRIBUTING="Contributing" NAV_FORUM="Forum" +NAV_FORUM_LINK="https://discuss.privacyguides.net/" NAV_HOME="Home" NAV_INTERNET_BROWSING="Internet Browsing" NAV_KNOWLEDGE_BASE="Knowledge Base" @@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ NAV_SOFTWARE="Software" NAV_HARDWARE="Hardware" NAV_TECHNICAL_GUIDES="Technical Guides" NAV_TECHNOLOGY_ESSENTIALS="Technology Essentials" +NAV_VIDEOS="Videos" NAV_WRITING_GUIDE="Writing Guide" SITE_DESCRIPTION="Privacy Guides is your central privacy and security resource to protect yourself online." SITE_LANGUAGE="English" diff --git a/mkdocs.blog.yml b/mkdocs.blog.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a9b0f6a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/mkdocs.blog.yml @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon + +# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy +# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to +# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the +# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or +# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is +# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + +# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in +# all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR +# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, +# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER +# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING +# FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS +# IN THE SOFTWARE. + +docs_dir: "blog" +site_url: "https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/" +site_dir: "site/articles" + +site_name: Privacy Guides +site_description: "Privacy Guides is the most popular & trustworthy non-profit privacy resource to find privacy tools and learn about protecting your digital life." +edit_uri_template: blob/main/blog/{path}?plain=1 + +extra: + privacy_guides: + footer: + intro: + !ENV [ + FOOTER_INTRO, + "Privacy Guides is a non-profit, socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.", + ] + note: + !ENV [ + FOOTER_NOTE, + "We do not make money from recommending certain products, and we do not use affiliate links.", + ] + copyright: + author: + !ENV [FOOTER_COPYRIGHT_AUTHOR, "Privacy Guides and contributors."] + date: !ENV [FOOTER_COPYRIGHT_DATE, "2019-2025"] + license: + - fontawesome/brands/creative-commons + - fontawesome/brands/creative-commons-by + - fontawesome/brands/creative-commons-sa + homepage: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/ + generator: false + context: !ENV [BUILD_CONTEXT, "production"] + offline: !ENV [BUILD_OFFLINE, false] + deploy: !ENV DEPLOY_ID + social: + - icon: simple/mastodon + link: https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_MASTODON, "Mastodon"] + - icon: simple/peertube + link: https://neat.tube/c/privacyguides + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_PEERTUBE, "PeerTube"] + - icon: simple/matrix + link: https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_MATRIX, "Matrix"] + - icon: simple/discourse + link: https://discuss.privacyguides.net/ + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_FORUM, "Forum"] + - icon: simple/github + link: https://github.com/privacyguides + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_GITHUB, "GitHub"] + - icon: simple/rss + link: https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/feed_rss_created.xml + name: Articles RSS Feed + +repo_url: + !ENV [BUILD_REPO_URL, "https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org"] +repo_name: "" + +theme: + name: material + language: en + custom_dir: theme + font: + text: Public Sans + code: DM Mono + palette: + - media: "(prefers-color-scheme)" + scheme: default + accent: deep purple + toggle: + icon: material/brightness-auto + name: !ENV [THEME_DARK, "Switch to dark mode"] + - media: "(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" + scheme: slate + accent: amber + toggle: + icon: material/brightness-2 + name: !ENV [THEME_LIGHT, "Switch to light mode"] + - media: "(prefers-color-scheme: light)" + scheme: default + accent: deep purple + toggle: + icon: material/brightness-5 + name: !ENV [THEME_AUTO, "Switch to system theme"] + favicon: assets/brand/logos/png/favicon-32x32.png + icon: + repo: simple/github + features: + - announce.dismiss + - navigation.tracking + - navigation.tabs + - navigation.path + - navigation.indexes + - navigation.footer + - content.action.edit + - content.tabs.link + - content.tooltips + - search.highlight + +extra_css: + - assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=20240829 + +watch: + - theme + - includes + +plugins: + blog: + blog_dir: . + blog_toc: true + post_url_format: "{date}/{file}" + post_excerpt: required + post_excerpt_max_authors: 0 + authors_profiles: true + authors_profiles_toc: true + categories_allowed: + - Announcements + - Opinion + - Tutorials + - News + - Reviews + - Explainers + rss: + match_path: posts/.* + abstract_chars_count: -1 + date_from_meta: + as_creation: date.created + as_update: date.updated + categories: + - categories + - tags + glightbox: {} + tags: {} + search: {} + privacy: + enabled: !ENV [BUILD_PRIVACY, true] + offline: + enabled: !ENV [BUILD_OFFLINE, false] + group: + enabled: !ENV [BUILD_INSIDERS, true] + plugins: + macros: {} + meta: {} + optimize: + enabled: !ENV [OPTIMIZE, PRODUCTION, NETLIFY, false] + typeset: {} + social: + cards: !ENV [CARDS, true] + cards_dir: assets/img/social + cards_layout_dir: theme/layouts + cards_layout: page + +markdown_extensions: + admonition: {} + pymdownx.details: {} + pymdownx.superfences: + custom_fences: + - name: mermaid + class: mermaid + format: !!python/name:pymdownx.superfences.fence_code_format + pymdownx.tabbed: + alternate_style: true + pymdownx.arithmatex: + generic: true + pymdownx.critic: {} + pymdownx.caret: {} + pymdownx.keys: {} + pymdownx.mark: {} + pymdownx.tilde: {} + pymdownx.snippets: + auto_append: + - !ENV [BUILD_ABBREVIATIONS, "includes/abbreviations.en.txt"] + pymdownx.tasklist: + custom_checkbox: true + attr_list: {} + def_list: {} + md_in_html: {} + meta: {} + abbr: {} + pymdownx.emoji: + emoji_index: !!python/name:material.extensions.emoji.twemoji + emoji_generator: !!python/name:material.extensions.emoji.to_svg + tables: {} + footnotes: {} + toc: + toc_depth: 3 + +nav: + - !ENV [NAV_HOME, "Home"]: /en/ + - !ENV [NAV_KNOWLEDGE_BASE, "Knowledge Base"]: /en/basics/why-privacy-matters/ + - !ENV [NAV_RECOMMENDATIONS, "Recommendations"]: /en/tools/ + - !ENV [NAV_BLOG, "Articles"]: + - index.md + - editorial.md + - tags.md + - !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]: /videos/ + - !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/ + - "Donate": /en/about/donate/ + - !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/" + +validation: + nav: + not_found: info diff --git a/mkdocs.net.yml b/mkdocs.net.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c502402 --- /dev/null +++ b/mkdocs.net.yml @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon + +# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy +# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to +# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the +# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or +# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is +# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + +# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in +# all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR +# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, +# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER +# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING +# FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS +# IN THE SOFTWARE. + +docs_dir: "net" +site_url: "https://www.privacyguides.net/" +site_dir: "site/net" + +site_name: Privacy Guides Community +site_description: "Discover privacy tools and resources, ask questions, and stay informed at the biggest digital rights and privacy tech community online." +edit_uri_template: blob/main/net/{path}?plain=1 + +extra: + privacy_guides: + footer: + intro: + !ENV [ + FOOTER_INTRO, + "Privacy Guides is a non-profit, socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.", + ] + note: + !ENV [ + FOOTER_NOTE, + "We do not make money from recommending certain products, and we do not use affiliate links.", + ] + copyright: + author: + !ENV [FOOTER_COPYRIGHT_AUTHOR, "Privacy Guides and contributors."] + date: !ENV [FOOTER_COPYRIGHT_DATE, "2019-2025"] + license: + - fontawesome/brands/creative-commons + - fontawesome/brands/creative-commons-by + - fontawesome/brands/creative-commons-sa + homepage: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/ + generator: false + context: !ENV [BUILD_CONTEXT, "production"] + offline: !ENV [BUILD_OFFLINE, false] + deploy: !ENV DEPLOY_ID + social: + - icon: simple/mastodon + link: https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_MASTODON, "Mastodon"] + - icon: simple/matrix + link: https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_MATRIX, "Matrix"] + - icon: simple/discourse + link: https://discuss.privacyguides.net/ + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_FORUM, "Forum"] + - icon: simple/github + link: https://github.com/privacyguides + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_GITHUB, "GitHub"] + - icon: simple/torbrowser + link: http://www.xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh6wh5jc4up35bqdflu6bkdc5cas5vjqd.onion/ + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_TOR_SITE, "Hidden service"] + +repo_url: + !ENV [BUILD_REPO_URL, "https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org"] +repo_name: "" + +theme: + name: material + language: en + custom_dir: theme + font: + text: Public Sans + code: DM Mono + palette: + - media: "(prefers-color-scheme)" + scheme: default + accent: deep purple + toggle: + icon: material/brightness-auto + name: !ENV [THEME_DARK, "Switch to dark mode"] + - media: "(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" + scheme: slate + accent: amber + toggle: + icon: material/brightness-2 + name: !ENV [THEME_LIGHT, "Switch to light mode"] + - media: "(prefers-color-scheme: light)" + scheme: default + accent: deep purple + toggle: + icon: material/brightness-5 + name: !ENV [THEME_AUTO, "Switch to system theme"] + favicon: assets/brand/logos/png/favicon-32x32.png + icon: + repo: simple/github + features: + - announce.dismiss + - navigation.tracking + - navigation.tabs + - navigation.sections + - navigation.expand + - navigation.path + - navigation.indexes + - navigation.footer + - content.action.edit + - content.tabs.link + - content.tooltips + - search.highlight + +extra_css: + - assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=20240829 + +watch: + - theme + - includes + +plugins: + tags: {} + privacy: + enabled: !ENV [BUILD_PRIVACY, true] + offline: + enabled: !ENV [BUILD_OFFLINE, false] + minify_html: {} + group: + enabled: !ENV [BUILD_INSIDERS, true] + plugins: + macros: {} + meta: {} + optimize: + enabled: !ENV [OPTIMIZE, PRODUCTION, NETLIFY, false] + typeset: {} + social: + cards: !ENV [CARDS, true] + cards_dir: assets/img/social + cards_layout_dir: theme/layouts + cards_layout: page + +markdown_extensions: + admonition: {} + pymdownx.details: {} + pymdownx.superfences: + custom_fences: + - name: mermaid + class: mermaid + format: !!python/name:pymdownx.superfences.fence_code_format + pymdownx.tabbed: + alternate_style: true + pymdownx.arithmatex: + generic: true + pymdownx.critic: {} + pymdownx.caret: {} + pymdownx.keys: {} + pymdownx.mark: {} + pymdownx.tilde: {} + pymdownx.snippets: + auto_append: + - !ENV [BUILD_ABBREVIATIONS, "includes/abbreviations.en.txt"] + pymdownx.tasklist: + custom_checkbox: true + attr_list: {} + def_list: {} + md_in_html: {} + meta: {} + abbr: {} + pymdownx.emoji: + emoji_index: !!python/name:material.extensions.emoji.twemoji + emoji_generator: !!python/name:material.extensions.emoji.to_svg + tables: {} + footnotes: {} + toc: + permalink: true + toc_depth: 4 + +nav: + - !ENV [NAV_HOME, "Home"]: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/ + - !ENV [NAV_KNOWLEDGE_BASE, "Knowledge Base"]: + https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/why-privacy-matters/ + - !ENV [NAV_RECOMMENDATIONS, "Recommendations"]: + https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/ + - !ENV [NAV_BLOG, "Articles"]: https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/ + - !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/ + - "Donate": https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/donate/ + - !ENV [NAV_CHANGELOG, "Changelog"]: + "https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/releases" + - !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/" + +validation: + nav: + not_found: info diff --git a/mkdocs.videos.yml b/mkdocs.videos.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d62c3430 --- /dev/null +++ b/mkdocs.videos.yml @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon + +# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy +# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to +# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the +# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or +# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is +# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + +# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in +# all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR +# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, +# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER +# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING +# FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS +# IN THE SOFTWARE. + +docs_dir: "videos" +site_url: "https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/" +site_dir: "site/videos" + +site_name: Privacy Guides +site_description: "This is our home for the latest video content from the Privacy Guides team. Privacy Guides is the most popular & trustworthy non-profit privacy resource to find privacy tools and learn about protecting your digital life." +edit_uri_template: blob/main/videos/{path}?plain=1 + +extra: + privacy_guides: + footer: + intro: + !ENV [ + FOOTER_INTRO, + "Privacy Guides is a non-profit, socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.", + ] + note: + !ENV [ + FOOTER_NOTE, + "We do not make money from recommending certain products, and we do not use affiliate links.", + ] + copyright: + author: + !ENV [FOOTER_COPYRIGHT_AUTHOR, "Privacy Guides and contributors."] + date: !ENV [FOOTER_COPYRIGHT_DATE, "2019-2025"] + license: + - fontawesome/brands/creative-commons + - fontawesome/brands/creative-commons-by + - fontawesome/brands/creative-commons-sa + homepage: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/ + generator: false + context: !ENV [BUILD_CONTEXT, "production"] + offline: !ENV [BUILD_OFFLINE, false] + deploy: !ENV DEPLOY_ID + social: + - icon: simple/mastodon + link: https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_MASTODON, "Mastodon"] + - icon: simple/peertube + link: https://neat.tube/c/privacyguides + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_PEERTUBE, "PeerTube"] + - icon: simple/matrix + link: https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_MATRIX, "Matrix"] + - icon: simple/discourse + link: https://discuss.privacyguides.net/ + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_FORUM, "Forum"] + - icon: simple/github + link: https://github.com/privacyguides + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_GITHUB, "GitHub"] + - icon: simple/torbrowser + link: http://www.xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh6wh5jc4up35bqdflu6bkdc5cas5vjqd.onion/posts/ + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_TOR_SITE, "Hidden service"] + +repo_url: + !ENV [BUILD_REPO_URL, "https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org"] +repo_name: "" + +theme: + name: material + language: en + custom_dir: theme + font: + text: Public Sans + code: DM Mono + palette: + - media: "(prefers-color-scheme)" + scheme: default + accent: deep purple + toggle: + icon: material/brightness-auto + name: !ENV [THEME_DARK, "Switch to dark mode"] + - media: "(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" + scheme: slate + accent: amber + toggle: + icon: material/brightness-2 + name: !ENV [THEME_LIGHT, "Switch to light mode"] + - media: "(prefers-color-scheme: light)" + scheme: default + accent: deep purple + toggle: + icon: material/brightness-5 + name: !ENV [THEME_AUTO, "Switch to system theme"] + favicon: assets/brand/logos/png/favicon-32x32.png + icon: + repo: simple/github + features: + - announce.dismiss + - navigation.tracking + - navigation.tabs + - navigation.path + - navigation.indexes + - navigation.footer + - content.action.edit + - content.tabs.link + - content.tooltips + - search.highlight + +extra_css: + - assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=20240829 + +watch: + - theme + - includes + +plugins: + blog: + blog_dir: . + blog_toc: true + post_url_format: "{date}/{file}" + post_excerpt_max_authors: 0 + authors_profiles: false + categories: false + rss: + match_path: posts/.* + abstract_chars_count: -1 + date_from_meta: + as_creation: date.created + as_update: date.updated + categories: + - categories + - tags + glightbox: {} + tags: {} + search: {} + privacy: + enabled: !ENV [BUILD_PRIVACY, true] + offline: + enabled: !ENV [BUILD_OFFLINE, false] + group: + enabled: !ENV [BUILD_INSIDERS, true] + plugins: + macros: {} + meta: {} + optimize: + enabled: !ENV [OPTIMIZE, PRODUCTION, NETLIFY, false] + typeset: {} + social: + cards: !ENV [CARDS, true] + cards_dir: assets/img/social + cards_layout_dir: theme/layouts + cards_layout: page + +markdown_extensions: + admonition: {} + pymdownx.details: {} + pymdownx.superfences: + custom_fences: + - name: mermaid + class: mermaid + format: !!python/name:pymdownx.superfences.fence_code_format + pymdownx.tabbed: + alternate_style: true + pymdownx.arithmatex: + generic: true + pymdownx.critic: {} + pymdownx.caret: {} + pymdownx.keys: {} + pymdownx.mark: {} + pymdownx.tilde: {} + pymdownx.snippets: + auto_append: + - !ENV [BUILD_ABBREVIATIONS, "includes/abbreviations.en.txt"] + pymdownx.tasklist: + custom_checkbox: true + attr_list: {} + def_list: {} + md_in_html: {} + meta: {} + abbr: {} + pymdownx.emoji: + emoji_index: !!python/name:material.extensions.emoji.twemoji + emoji_generator: !!python/name:material.extensions.emoji.to_svg + tables: {} + footnotes: {} + toc: + toc_depth: 4 + +nav: + - !ENV [NAV_HOME, "Home"]: /en/ + - !ENV [NAV_KNOWLEDGE_BASE, "Knowledge Base"]: /en/basics/why-privacy-matters/ + - !ENV [NAV_RECOMMENDATIONS, "Recommendations"]: /en/tools/ + - !ENV [NAV_BLOG, "Articles"]: /articles/ + - !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]: + - index.md + - !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/ + - "Donate": /en/about/donate/ + - !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/" + +validation: + nav: + not_found: info diff --git a/mkdocs.yml b/mkdocs.yml index 5634364b..44bd0d6a 100644 --- a/mkdocs.yml +++ b/mkdocs.yml @@ -51,11 +51,14 @@ extra: copyright: author: !ENV [FOOTER_COPYRIGHT_AUTHOR, "Privacy Guides and contributors."] - date: !ENV [FOOTER_COPYRIGHT_DATE, "2019-2024"] + date: !ENV [FOOTER_COPYRIGHT_DATE, "2019-2025"] license: - fontawesome/brands/creative-commons - fontawesome/brands/creative-commons-by - fontawesome/brands/creative-commons-sa + links: + - name: !ENV [FOOTER_PRIVACY_NOTICE, "Privacy notice."] + url: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/privacy/ homepage: description: !ENV [ @@ -129,28 +132,11 @@ extra: "If you spot an error, think a provider should not be listed, notice a qualified provider is missing, believe a browser plugin is no longer the best choice, or uncover any other issue, please let us know.", ] rss: - - title: - !ENV [ - HOMEPAGE_RSS_CHANGELOG_TITLE, - "Privacy Guides release changelog", - ] - link: - !ENV [ - HOMEPAGE_RSS_CHANGELOG_LINK, - "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/site-development/changelog/9.rss", - ] - title: !ENV [HOMEPAGE_RSS_BLOG_TITLE, "Privacy Guides blog feed"] link: !ENV [ HOMEPAGE_RSS_BLOG_LINK, - "https://blog.privacyguides.org/feed_rss_created.xml", - ] - - title: - !ENV [HOMEPAGE_RSS_STORIES_TITLE, "Privacy Guides Web Stories feed"] - link: - !ENV [ - HOMEPAGE_RSS_STORIES_LINK, - "https://share.privacyguides.org/web-stories/feed/", + "https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/feed_rss_created.xml", ] - title: !ENV [ @@ -162,6 +148,16 @@ extra: HOMEPAGE_RSS_FORUM_LINK, "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest.rss", ] + - title: + !ENV [ + HOMEPAGE_RSS_CHANGELOG_TITLE, + "Privacy Guides release changelog", + ] + link: + !ENV [ + HOMEPAGE_RSS_CHANGELOG_LINK, + "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/site-development/changelog/9.rss", + ] translation_notice: notice: !ENV TRANSLATION_NOTICE cta: !ENV [TRANSLATION_NOTICE_CTA, "Visit Crowdin"] @@ -171,6 +167,9 @@ extra: - icon: simple/mastodon link: https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides name: !ENV [SOCIAL_MASTODON, "Mastodon"] + - icon: simple/peertube + link: https://neat.tube/c/privacyguides + name: !ENV [SOCIAL_PEERTUBE, "PeerTube"] - icon: simple/matrix link: https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org name: !ENV [SOCIAL_MATRIX, "Matrix"] @@ -212,7 +211,7 @@ extra: link: /zh-hant/ lang: zh-Hant icon: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/twitter/twemoji/master/assets/svg/1f1ed-1f1f0.svg - - name: русский + - name: Русский link: /ru/ lang: ru icon: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/twitter/twemoji/master/assets/svg/1f1f7-1f1fa.svg @@ -282,10 +281,12 @@ theme: - search.highlight extra_css: - - assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=20240802 + - assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=20250306 extra_javascript: - - assets/javascripts/randomize-element.js?v=20240801 - - assets/javascripts/feedback.js?v=20240801 + - path: assets/javascripts/randomize-element.js?v=20250306 + defer: true + - path: assets/javascripts/feedback.js?v=20250306 + defer: true watch: - theme @@ -358,7 +359,6 @@ markdown_extensions: tables: {} footnotes: {} toc: - permalink: true toc_depth: 4 nav: @@ -400,6 +400,7 @@ nav: - "browser-extensions.md" - !ENV [NAV_PROVIDERS, "Providers"]: - "cloud.md" + - "data-broker-removals.md" - "dns.md" - "email-aliasing.md" - "email.md" @@ -408,6 +409,7 @@ nav: - "search-engines.md" - "vpn.md" - !ENV [NAV_SOFTWARE, "Software"]: + - "ai-chat.md" - "calendar.md" - "cryptocurrency.md" - "data-redaction.md" @@ -416,7 +418,9 @@ nav: - "encryption.md" - "file-sharing.md" - "frontends.md" + - "health-and-wellness.md" - "language-tools.md" + - "maps.md" - "multi-factor-authentication.md" - "news-aggregators.md" - "notebooks.md" @@ -438,18 +442,27 @@ nav: - !ENV [NAV_ADVANCED, "Advanced"]: - "alternative-networks.md" - "device-integrity.md" + - !ENV [NAV_BLOG, "Articles"]: "/articles/" + - !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]: /videos/ + - !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: + !ENV [NAV_FORUM_LINK, "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/"] - !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: - "about.md" - "about/donate.md" - - "about/contributors.md" - - "about/criteria.md" - - "about/notices.md" - - "about/privacy-policy.md" + - !ENV [NAV_ABOUT_TEAM_MEMBERS, "Team Members"]: + https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u?group=team&order=solutions&period=all + - !ENV [NAV_ABOUT_POLICIES, "Policies"]: + - "about/criteria.md" + - "about/donation-acceptance-policy.md" + - "about/executive-policy.md" + - "privacy.md" + - "about/notices.md" - !ENV [NAV_COMMUNITY, "Community"]: + - "about/jobs.md" + - "about/contributors.md" - !ENV [NAV_ONLINE_SERVICES, "Online Services"]: "about/services.md" - !ENV [NAV_CODE_OF_CONDUCT, "Code of Conduct"]: "CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md" - "about/statistics.md" - - "about/privacytools.md" - !ENV [NAV_CONTRIBUTING, "Contributing"]: - !ENV [NAV_WRITING_GUIDE, "Writing Guide"]: - "meta/writing-style.md" @@ -460,12 +473,9 @@ nav: - "meta/uploading-images.md" - "meta/git-recommendations.md" - "meta/commit-messages.md" - - "about/donate.md" - - !ENV [NAV_CHANGELOG, "Changelog"]: - "https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/releases" - - !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/" - - !ENV [NAV_BLOG, "Blog"]: "https://blog.privacyguides.org/" validation: nav: not_found: info + omitted_files: ignore + absolute_links: ignore diff --git a/modules/mkdocs-material b/modules/mkdocs-material index edd5029d..573ea60d 160000 --- a/modules/mkdocs-material +++ b/modules/mkdocs-material @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit edd5029dd86077d595a3591faed6b21a73062bc8 +Subproject commit 573ea60dc618719bff3897a4fdae22ab2cd725e8 diff --git a/net/index.md b/net/index.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..24e271ab --- /dev/null +++ b/net/index.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +--- +title: Weekly Discussions +meta_title: Privacy Guides Community +hide: + - footer + - toc + - navigation +schema: + - + "@context": https://schema.org + "@type": Organization + "@id": https://www.privacyguides.org/ + name: Privacy Guides + url: https://www.privacyguides.org/ + logo: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/assets/brand/logos/png/square/pg-yellow.png + sameAs: + - https://twitter.com/privacy_guides + - https://github.com/privacyguides + - https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q111710163 + - https://www.youtube.com/@privacyguides + - https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides + - + "@context": https://schema.org + "@type": WebSite + name: Privacy Guides + alternateName: ["Privacy Guides Community", "Privacy Guides Forum", "Privacy & Security Forum", "Privacy Discussions", "Privacy Community", "PG Community"] + url: "https://www.privacyguides.net/" + isPartOf: "https://www.privacyguides.org/" +--- + +Discover privacy tools and resources, ask questions, and stay informed at the biggest digital rights and privacy tech community online. + +[Open Forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net){.md-button .md-button--primary} +[View Resources](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/){.md-button} + +
    +
      + + + +
    +
    diff --git a/run.sh b/run.sh index 25988376..24702732 100755 --- a/run.sh +++ b/run.sh @@ -131,6 +131,8 @@ markdown_extensions: exclude: - index.md - tools.md + - about.md + - about/* targets: exclude: - about/contributors.md diff --git a/theme/assets/brand b/theme/assets/brand index 872a38c6..e567eb3f 160000 --- a/theme/assets/brand +++ b/theme/assets/brand @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit 872a38c628780050bb3217a8c7fea9922b059717 +Subproject commit e567eb3f0e6cb54242a809661d78d884caa05b72 diff --git a/theme/assets/img/ai-chat/kobold.png b/theme/assets/img/ai-chat/kobold.png new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b20a1c42 Binary files /dev/null and b/theme/assets/img/ai-chat/kobold.png differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.svg b/theme/assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cbbe7827 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.svg @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ + + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/ai-chat/ollama.png b/theme/assets/img/ai-chat/ollama.png new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85dd87b7 Binary files /dev/null and b/theme/assets/img/ai-chat/ollama.png differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/android/divestos.svg b/theme/assets/img/android/divestos.svg deleted file mode 100644 index 38d8520c..00000000 --- a/theme/assets/img/android/divestos.svg +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ - diff --git a/theme/assets/img/browsers/cromite.svg b/theme/assets/img/browsers/cromite.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c49bb2bd --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/browsers/cromite.svg @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/browsers/mull.svg b/theme/assets/img/browsers/mull.svg deleted file mode 100644 index 485adc39..00000000 --- a/theme/assets/img/browsers/mull.svg +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ - diff --git a/theme/assets/img/cover/ai-chatbots.webp b/theme/assets/img/cover/ai-chatbots.webp new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cdba241c Binary files /dev/null and b/theme/assets/img/cover/ai-chatbots.webp differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/cover/data-broker-removals.webp b/theme/assets/img/cover/data-broker-removals.webp new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7a7a7f31 Binary files /dev/null and b/theme/assets/img/cover/data-broker-removals.webp differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/cover/health-cover.webp b/theme/assets/img/cover/health-cover.webp new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ebbba4bd Binary files /dev/null and b/theme/assets/img/cover/health-cover.webp differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/cover/maps.webp b/theme/assets/img/cover/maps.webp new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5425cf47 Binary files /dev/null and b/theme/assets/img/cover/maps.webp differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/cryptocurrency/proton-wallet.svg b/theme/assets/img/cryptocurrency/proton-wallet.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c1180d59 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/cryptocurrency/proton-wallet.svg @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/data-broker-removals/easyoptouts.svg b/theme/assets/img/data-broker-removals/easyoptouts.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a98e5df8 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/data-broker-removals/easyoptouts.svg @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/data-broker-removals/google.svg b/theme/assets/img/data-broker-removals/google.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a4eb4c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/data-broker-removals/google.svg @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/data-redaction/metapho.jpg b/theme/assets/img/data-redaction/metapho.jpg deleted file mode 100644 index 522691bb..00000000 Binary files a/theme/assets/img/data-redaction/metapho.jpg and /dev/null differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/data-redaction/privacyblur.svg b/theme/assets/img/data-redaction/privacyblur.svg deleted file mode 100644 index a1b2e2e9..00000000 --- a/theme/assets/img/data-redaction/privacyblur.svg +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/theme/assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia-dark.svg b/theme/assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia-dark.svg deleted file mode 100644 index f18d66a2..00000000 --- a/theme/assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia-dark.svg +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/theme/assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia.svg b/theme/assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia.svg deleted file mode 100644 index 99c06be6..00000000 --- a/theme/assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia.svg +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/theme/assets/img/device-integrity/iverify.webp b/theme/assets/img/device-integrity/iverify.webp deleted file mode 100644 index aa3e15af..00000000 Binary files a/theme/assets/img/device-integrity/iverify.webp and /dev/null differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/donors/deleteme.webp b/theme/assets/img/donors/deleteme.webp new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fca9227a Binary files /dev/null and b/theme/assets/img/donors/deleteme.webp differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/donors/power-up-privacy.webp b/theme/assets/img/donors/power-up-privacy.webp new file mode 100644 index 00000000..97c0ceb4 Binary files /dev/null and b/theme/assets/img/donors/power-up-privacy.webp differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/email-clients/k9mail.svg b/theme/assets/img/email-clients/k9mail.svg deleted file mode 100644 index 4af99058..00000000 --- a/theme/assets/img/email-clients/k9mail.svg +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/theme/assets/img/email-clients/thunderbird.svg b/theme/assets/img/email-clients/thunderbird.svg index ea153881..63a86b83 100644 --- a/theme/assets/img/email-clients/thunderbird.svg +++ b/theme/assets/img/email-clients/thunderbird.svg @@ -1 +1 @@ - \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/email/stalwart.svg b/theme/assets/img/email/stalwart.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a956e54a --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/email/stalwart.svg @@ -0,0 +1 @@ + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bcd6ac0f --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg @@ -0,0 +1 @@ + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4f96b2f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg @@ -0,0 +1 @@ + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/commonhealth.png b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/commonhealth.png new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2f60466 Binary files /dev/null and b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/commonhealth.png differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png new file mode 100644 index 00000000..50cb4ada Binary files /dev/null and b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/euki.svg b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/euki.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d880e744 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/euki.svg @@ -0,0 +1 @@ + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge-dark.svg b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge-dark.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..325522de --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge-dark.svg @@ -0,0 +1 @@ + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge.svg b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85331599 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge.svg @@ -0,0 +1 @@ + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/layout/signal-contact-qr.png b/theme/assets/img/layout/signal-contact-qr.png new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e420194d Binary files /dev/null and b/theme/assets/img/layout/signal-contact-qr.png differ diff --git a/theme/assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg b/theme/assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg index 0a739f3b..710a4271 100644 --- a/theme/assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg +++ b/theme/assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg @@ -1 +1,5 @@ - \ No newline at end of file + + + + + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/maps/organic-maps.svg b/theme/assets/img/maps/organic-maps.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5d55ff0d --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/maps/organic-maps.svg @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ + + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/maps/osmand.svg b/theme/assets/img/maps/osmand.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2b271358 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/maps/osmand.svg @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ + + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/messengers/molly.svg b/theme/assets/img/messengers/molly.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..724943b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/messengers/molly.svg @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/messengers/signal.svg b/theme/assets/img/messengers/signal.svg index 46a1625b..914c4f84 100644 --- a/theme/assets/img/messengers/signal.svg +++ b/theme/assets/img/messengers/signal.svg @@ -1 +1 @@ - \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/news-aggregators/fluent-reader.svg b/theme/assets/img/news-aggregators/fluent-reader.svg deleted file mode 100644 index 2ab38b3a..00000000 --- a/theme/assets/img/news-aggregators/fluent-reader.svg +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -F \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/theme/assets/img/password-management/strongbox.svg b/theme/assets/img/password-management/strongbox.svg deleted file mode 100644 index 11bec9ad..00000000 --- a/theme/assets/img/password-management/strongbox.svg +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/theme/assets/img/pastebins/paaster.svg b/theme/assets/img/pastebins/paaster.svg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aa512eb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/assets/img/pastebins/paaster.svg @@ -0,0 +1 @@ + diff --git a/theme/assets/img/router/opnsense.svg b/theme/assets/img/router/opnsense.svg index a50b6ae9..63e449d8 100644 --- a/theme/assets/img/router/opnsense.svg +++ b/theme/assets/img/router/opnsense.svg @@ -1 +1 @@ - \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/theme/assets/javascripts/discourse-topics.js b/theme/assets/javascripts/discourse-topics.js deleted file mode 100644 index 1a070aef..00000000 --- a/theme/assets/javascripts/discourse-topics.js +++ /dev/null @@ -1,167 +0,0 @@ -/** - * @overview Generates a list of topics on a Discourse forum. - * @author Jonah Aragon - * @version 3.1.0 - * @license - * Copyright (c) 2023 - 2024 Jonah Aragon - * - * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy - * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal - * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights - * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell - * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is - * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: - * - * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all - * copies or substantial portions of the Software. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, - * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE - * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE - * SOFTWARE. - */ - -async function getData(url) { - const response = await fetch(url); - return response.json() -} - -async function main() { - const elements = document.querySelectorAll("ul[data-forum]"); - - for (let j = 0; j < elements.length; j++) { - - var topics = elements[j]; - var dataset = topics.dataset; - - console.log("Fetching data from " + dataset.feed) - const data = await getData(dataset.feed); - var list = data['topic_list']['topics']; - var profiles = data['users']; - var count = dataset.count; - - for (var i = 0; i < count; i++) { - - if (list[i]['pinned'] == true) { - count++; - continue; - } - - var title = list[i]['title']; - var id = list[i]['id']; - - var topic = document.createElement("li"); - topic.className = "discourse-topic"; - - var h3 = document.createElement('p'); - h3.className = "discourse-title"; - var a1 = document.createElement('a'); - - a1.href = dataset.forum + '/t/' + id; - - var boldTitle = document.createElement('strong'); - boldTitle.innerText = title; - a1.appendChild(boldTitle); - h3.appendChild(a1); - - var authorinfo = document.createElement('p'); - authorinfo.className = "discourse-author"; - - var author_id = list[i]['posters'][0]['user_id']; - var author_data = profiles.find(profile => profile['id'] == author_id); - var author = document.createElement('span'); - author.className = "discourse-author"; - var avatar = document.createElement('img'); - avatar.src = dataset.forum + author_data['avatar_template'].replace("{size}", "40"); - avatar.width = 20; - avatar.height = 20; - avatar.className = "middle"; - author.appendChild(avatar); - var namespan = document.createElement('span'); - namespan.innerText = " Posted by " + author_data['username']; - author.appendChild(namespan); - authorinfo.appendChild(author); - - var postinfo = document.createElement('p'); - postinfo.className = "discourse-data"; - - var dateIcon = document.createElement('span'); - dateIcon.className = "twemoji"; - dateIcon.innerHTML = ''; - - var date = document.createElement('span'); - date.className = "discourse-date"; - var datestring = list[i]['bumped_at']; - var dateobject = new Date(datestring); - var now = new Date(); - var diff = now - dateobject; - var minutes = Math.floor(diff / 60000); - var hours = Math.floor(minutes / 60); - var days = Math.floor(hours / 24); - if (days > 0) { - if (days == 1) { - date.innerText = " 1 day ago "; - } - else { - date.innerText = " " + days + " days ago "; - } - } - else if (hours > 0){ - if (hours == 1) { - date.innerText = " 1 hour ago "; - } - else { - date.innerText = " " + hours + " hours ago "; - } - } - else { - if (minutes == 1) { - date.innerText = " 1 minute ago "; - } - else { - date.innerText = " " + minutes + " minutes ago "; - } - } - postinfo.appendChild(dateIcon); - postinfo.appendChild(date); - - var likesicon = document.createElement('span'); - likesicon.classList = "twemoji pg-red"; - likesicon.innerHTML = ''; - - var likes = document.createElement('span'); - likes.className = "discourse-likes"; - likes.innerText = " " + list[i]['like_count'] + " "; - postinfo.appendChild(likesicon); - postinfo.appendChild(likes); - - var replyIcon = document.createElement('span'); - replyIcon.classList = "twemoji"; - replyIcon.innerHTML = ''; - - var replies = document.createElement('span'); - replies.className = "discourse-replies"; - - var reply_count = list[i]['posts_count'] - 1; - if (reply_count == 1) { - replies.innerText = "1 Reply" - } - else { - replies.innerText = " " + reply_count - } - postinfo.appendChild(replyIcon); - postinfo.appendChild(replies); - - topic.appendChild(h3); - topic.appendChild(document.createElement('hr')); - topic.appendChild(authorinfo); - topic.appendChild(postinfo); - topics.appendChild(topic); - } - } -} - -main(); diff --git a/theme/assets/javascripts/feedback.js b/theme/assets/javascripts/feedback.js index 7a1f9eef..ba968b0c 100644 --- a/theme/assets/javascripts/feedback.js +++ b/theme/assets/javascripts/feedback.js @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ feedback.addEventListener("submit", function(ev) { referrer: document.referrer, screen: `${window.screen.width}x${window.screen.height}`, url: window.location.pathname, - website: '30b92047-7cbb-4800-9815-2e075a293e0a', + website: '246e357e-0764-4674-9314-7676724b3a88', name: umamiEventName, }, type: 'event', @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ feedback.addEventListener("submit", function(ev) { console.log(umamiEvent) - fetch("https://stats.jonaharagon.net/api/send", { + fetch("https://stats.triplebit.net/api/send", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(umamiEvent), headers: { diff --git a/theme/assets/stylesheets/extra.css b/theme/assets/stylesheets/extra.css index 68b294dc..2faf2e00 100644 --- a/theme/assets/stylesheets/extra.css +++ b/theme/assets/stylesheets/extra.css @@ -522,3 +522,80 @@ path[d="M20.71 7.04c.39-.39.39-1.04 0-1.41l-2.34-2.34c-.37-.39-1.02-.39-1.41 0l- width: 100%; padding: 1em !important; } + +.pg-proconlist { + list-style-type: disc; + padding-inline-start: 1em; +} + +/* Donations */ +.md-typeset .mdx-specialthanks p { + margin:2em 0; + text-align:center +} +.md-typeset .mdx-specialthanks img { + height:3.25rem +} +.md-typeset .mdx-specialthanks p:last-child { + display:flex; + flex-wrap:wrap; + justify-content:center +} +.md-typeset .mdx-specialthanks p:last-child>a { + display:block; + flex-shrink:0 +} +.md-typeset .mdx-donors__list { + margin:2em 0 +} +.md-typeset .mdx-donors__list:after { + clear:both; + content:""; + display:block +} +[dir=ltr] .md-typeset .mdx-donors__item { + float:left +} +[dir=rtl] .md-typeset .mdx-donors__item { + float:right +} +.md-typeset .mdx-donors__item { + border-radius:100%; + display:block; + height:3rem; + margin:.2rem; + overflow:hidden; + transform:scale(1); + transition:color 125ms,transform 125ms; + width:3rem +} +.md-typeset .mdx-donors__item:focus, +.md-typeset .mdx-donors__item:hover { + transform:scale(1.1) +} +.md-typeset .mdx-donors__item:focus img, +.md-typeset .mdx-donors__item:hover img { + filter:grayscale(0) +} +.md-typeset .mdx-donors__item--private { + background:var(--md-default-fg-color--lightest); + color:var(--md-default-fg-color--lighter); + font-size:.8rem; + font-weight:700; + line-height:2.9rem; + text-align:center +} +.md-typeset .mdx-donors__item img { + display:block; + filter:grayscale(100%) opacity(75%); + height:auto; + transition:filter 125ms; + width:100% +} +.md-typeset .mdx-donors-button { + font-weight:400 +} +.md-typeset .mdx-donors-count, +.md-typeset .mdx-donors-total { + font-weight:700 +} diff --git a/theme/blog-post.html b/theme/blog-post.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f40a3932 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/blog-post.html @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ + + +{% extends "main.html" %} + +{% import "partials/nav-item.html" as item with context %} + + +{% block container %} +
    + + + + {% if config.theme.language == "en" %} + + {% endif %} + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
    +
    +
    + + + + {% if "toc.integrate" in features %} + {% include "partials/toc.html" %} + {% endif %} +
    +
    +
    + + +
    + {% set postyear = page.config.date.created.strftime('%s') | int %} + {% set currentyear = build_date_utc.strftime('%s') | int %} + {% set difference = (currentyear / 2628000) - (postyear / 2628000) %} + {% if difference > 18 %} + {% set yearsdifference = ((difference - 1) / 12) | int %} +
    +
    +

    + This article is more than {{ yearsdifference }} + {% if yearsdifference == 1 %} + year + {% else %} + years + {% endif %} + old +

    +
    +
    + {% endif %} + + {% block content %} + {% include "partials/content.html" %} + {% endblock %} +
    +
    +

    + + + Join our forum + + to comment on this article.

    +

    Thank you for reading, and please consider sharing this post with your friends. + Privacy Guides is an independent, nonprofit media outlet. We don't have ads or sponsors, so if you liked this work your donation would be greatly appreciated. + Have a question, comment, or tip for us? You can securely contact us at @privacyguides.01 on Signal.

    +
    +
    +
    +{% endblock %} diff --git a/theme/home.html b/theme/home.html index 018d9345..b42e782a 100644 --- a/theme/home.html +++ b/theme/home.html @@ -52,11 +52,10 @@ {% if config.theme.language == "en" %}

    Top discussions this week

    -
      +
        + + +
    @@ -79,8 +78,8 @@

    Ask questions and get advice from our community of privacy advocates.

    - - + + Join the forum @@ -103,11 +102,10 @@

    Latest discussions

    -
      +
        + + +
    {% endif %} {% endblock %} -{% block scripts %} - - {{ super() }} -{% endblock %} diff --git a/theme/layouts/blog.yml b/theme/layouts/blog.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..929c5146 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/layouts/blog.yml @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +definitions: + - &site_name >- + {{ config.site_name }} + + - &page_title >- + {{ page.meta.get("title", page.title) }} + + - &page_description >- + {{ page.meta.get("description", config.site_description) or "" }} + + - &page_logo >- + {% if page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.logo %} + {{- page.meta.preview.logo -}} + {% endif %} + + - &page_icon >- + {%- if page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.icon -%} + {{- page.meta.preview.icon -}} + {%- elif page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.logo -%} + {%- else -%} + material/book-open-page-variant + {%- endif -%} + + - &page_color >- + {%- if page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.color -%} + {{- page.meta.preview.color -}} + {%- else -%} + #FFD06F + {%- endif -%} + + - &text_color >- + {%- if page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.text_color -%} + {{- page.meta.preview.text_color -}} + {%- else -%} + #2d2d2d + {%- endif -%} + + - &background_transparency >- + {%- if page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.color -%} + {{- page.meta.preview.color -}}99 + {%- else -%} + #FFD06F99 + {%- endif -%} + + - &icon_transparency >- + {%- if page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.text_color -%} + {{- page.meta.preview.text_color -}}33 + {%- else -%} + #00000033 + {%- endif -%} + + - &logo >- + {%- if page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.site_logo -%} + theme/assets/brand/logos/svg/logo/{{- page.meta.preview.site_logo -}} + {%- else -%} + theme/assets/brand/logos/svg/logo/privacy-guides-logo-notext-colorbg.svg + {%- endif -%} + + - &updated_time >- + {% if page.config.date.updated %} + {{- page.config.date.updated.strftime('%Y-%m-%d') -}} + {% else %} + {{- page.config.date.created.strftime('%Y-%m-%d') -}} + {% endif %} + + - &author_mastodon >- + {%- if page.authors[0].mastodon -%} + @{{- page.authors[0].mastodon.username -}}@{{- page.authors[0].mastodon.instance -}} + {%- else -%} + {{- "@privacyguides@neat.computer" -}} + {%- endif -%} + + - &author_twitter >- + {%- if page.authors[0].twitter -%} + @{{- page.authors[0].twitter -}} + {%- else -%} + {{- "@privacy_guides" -}} + {%- endif -%} + + - &replacement_image >- + {%- if page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.cover -%} + {{- page.meta.preview.cover -}} + {%- endif -%} + +# Meta tags +tags: + # Open Graph + og:type: article + og:title: *page_title + og:description: *page_description + og:image: "{{ image.url }}" + og:image:type: "{{ image.type }}" + og:image:width: "{{ image.width }}" + og:image:height: "{{ image.height }}" + og:url: "{{ page.canonical_url }}" + + # Blog + article:published_time: "{{ page.config.date.created.strftime('%Y-%m-%d') }}" + article:modified_time: *updated_time + article:section: "{{ page.categories[0].title }}" + article:author: "https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/{{ page.authors[0].url }}" + + # Mastodon + fediverse:creator: *author_mastodon + + # Twitter + twitter:site: "@privacy_guides" + twitter:creator: *author_twitter + twitter:card: summary_large_image + twitter:title: *page_title + twitter:description: *page_description + twitter:image: "{{ image.url }}" + +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Specification +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +# Card size and layers +size: { width: 1200, height: 630 } +layers: + # Background + - background: + color: *page_color + + - size: { width: 512, height: 512 } + offset: { x: 600, y: 59 } + background: + image: *page_logo + + - background: + color: *background_transparency + + # Page icon + - size: { width: 630, height: 630 } + offset: { x: 570, y: 0 } + icon: + value: *page_icon + color: *icon_transparency + + # Logo + - size: { width: 64, height: 64 } + offset: { x: 64, y: 64 } + background: + image: *logo + + # Site name + - size: { width: 768, height: 42 } + offset: { x: 160, y: 78 } + typography: + content: *site_name + color: *text_color + font: + family: Bagnard + style: Bold + + # Page title + - size: { width: 864, height: 360 } + offset: { x: 62, y: 192 } + typography: + content: *page_title + align: start + color: *text_color + line: + amount: 4 + height: 1.5 + font: + family: Bagnard + style: Bold + + - background: + image: *replacement_image diff --git a/theme/layouts/home.yml b/theme/layouts/home.yml index d0e29bf9..ab2223fa 100644 --- a/theme/layouts/home.yml +++ b/theme/layouts/home.yml @@ -44,9 +44,12 @@ tags: og:image:height: "{{ image.height }}" og:url: "{{ page.canonical_url }}" + # Mastodon + fediverse:creator: "@privacyguides@neat.computer" + # Twitter twitter:card: summary_large_image - twitter.title: *page_title_with_site_name + twitter:title: *page_title_with_site_name twitter:description: *page_description twitter:image: "{{ image.url }}" diff --git a/theme/layouts/page.yml b/theme/layouts/page.yml index 627bb3c5..a59198bf 100644 --- a/theme/layouts/page.yml +++ b/theme/layouts/page.yml @@ -79,9 +79,13 @@ tags: og:image:height: "{{ image.height }}" og:url: "{{ page.canonical_url }}" + # Mastodon + fediverse:creator: "@privacyguides@neat.computer" + # Twitter + twitter:site: "@privacy_guides" twitter:card: summary_large_image - twitter.title: *page_title_with_site_name + twitter:title: *page_title_with_site_name twitter:description: *page_description twitter:image: "{{ image.url }}" diff --git a/theme/layouts/pride.yml b/theme/layouts/pride.yml index abe8e3b7..461c0140 100644 --- a/theme/layouts/pride.yml +++ b/theme/layouts/pride.yml @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ tags: # Twitter twitter:card: summary_large_image - twitter.title: *page_title_with_site_name + twitter:title: *page_title_with_site_name twitter:description: *page_description twitter:image: "{{ image.url }}" diff --git a/theme/layouts/video.yml b/theme/layouts/video.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a7e46698 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/layouts/video.yml @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +definitions: + - &site_name >- + {{ config.site_name }} + + - &page_title >- + {{ page.meta.get("title", page.title) }} + + - &page_description >- + {{ page.meta.get("description", config.site_description) or "" }} + + - &page_logo >- + {% if page.meta.preview and page.meta.preview.logo %} + {{- page.meta.preview.logo -}} + {% endif %} + + - &page_icon >- + {%- if not page.meta.preview or not page.meta.preview.logo -%} + material/video-box + {%- endif -%} + + - &logo >- + theme/assets/brand/logos/svg/logo/privacy-guides-logo-notext-colorbg.svg + + - &thumbnail >- + {%- if page.meta.get("thumbnail") -%} + {{ config.site_url }}{{ page.meta.get("thumbnail") | replace("https://", "assets/external/") }} + {%- else -%} + {{ image.url }} + {%- endif -%} + +# Meta tags +tags: + # Open Graph + og:type: video.other + og:title: *page_title + og:description: *page_description + og:image: *thumbnail + og:url: "{{ page.canonical_url }}" + + # Video + og:video: "{{ page.meta.embed }}" + og:video:url: "{{ page.meta.embed }}" + og:video:secure_url: "{{ page.meta.embed }}" + og:video:type: "text/html" + og:video:width: "560" + og:video:height: "315" + + # Mastodon + fediverse:creator: "@privacyguides@neat.computer" + + # Twitter + twitter:site: "@privacy_guides" + twitter:creator: "@privacy_guides" + twitter:card: summary_large_image + twitter:title: *page_title + twitter:description: *page_description + twitter:image: *thumbnail + +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Specification +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +# Card size and layers +size: { width: 1200, height: 630 } +layers: + # Background + - background: + color: "#FFD06F" + + - size: { width: 512, height: 512 } + offset: { x: 600, y: 59 } + background: + image: *page_logo + + - background: + color: "#FFD06F99" + + # Page icon + - size: { width: 630, height: 630 } + offset: { x: 570, y: 0 } + icon: + value: *page_icon + color: "#00000033" + + # Logo + - size: { width: 64, height: 64 } + offset: { x: 64, y: 64 } + background: + image: *logo + + # Site name + - size: { width: 768, height: 42 } + offset: { x: 160, y: 78 } + typography: + content: *site_name + color: "#2d2d2d" + font: + family: Bagnard + style: Bold + + # Page title + - size: { width: 864, height: 256 } + offset: { x: 62, y: 192 } + typography: + content: *page_title + align: start + color: "#2d2d2d" + line: + amount: 3 + height: 1.5 + font: + family: Bagnard + style: Bold diff --git a/theme/main.html b/theme/main.html index 6db476d9..f3090eee 100644 --- a/theme/main.html +++ b/theme/main.html @@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ {% if page.meta and page.meta.description %} - {% elif config.site_description %} - {% endif %} {% if page.meta and page.meta.author %} + {% elif page.authors %} + {% elif config.site_author %} {% endif %} @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ {% endif %} {% if config.extra.alternate is iterable %} + {% for alt in config.extra.alternate %} {% endfor %} @@ -71,19 +72,19 @@ {% endblock %} {% block extrahead %} - {% if config.extra.privacy_guides.translation_stylesheet %} {% endif %} - - + {% if page and page.meta and page.meta.robots %} + + {% else %} + + {% endif %} {% if config.extra.context == "production" %} - - {% elif config.extra.deploy %} - + {% endif %} {% if page and page.meta and page.meta.schema %} + +{% endblock %} + + +{% block container %} +
    + + +
    +
    +
    + + + + {% if "toc.integrate" in features %} + {% include "partials/toc.html" %} + {% endif %} +
    +
    +
    + + +
    + {% block content %} + + {% include "partials/tags.html" %} + + + {% include "partials/actions.html" %} + + {% if "\x3ch1" not in page.content and not page.meta.cover %} +

    {{ page.title | d(config.site_name, true)}}

    + {% endif %} + +
    +
    + +
    +
    + +

    + + + + + Watch on YouTube + + + + + Watch on PeerTube +

    + + +
    + {{ page.content }} +
    + + + {% include "partials/source-file.html" %} + + + {% include "partials/feedback.html" %} + {% endblock %} +
    +
    +{% endblock %} diff --git a/theme/video.html b/theme/video.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..12003212 --- /dev/null +++ b/theme/video.html @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +{% extends "main.html" %} + + +{% block container %} +
    +
    + + +
    + {{ page.content }} +
    + + + {% for post in posts %} + {% include "partials/video.html" %} + {% endfor %} + + + {% if pagination %} + {% block pagination %} + {% include "partials/pagination.html" %} + {% endblock %} + {% endif %} +
    +
    +{% endblock %} diff --git a/videos/.authors.yml b/videos/.authors.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..edde9036 --- /dev/null +++ b/videos/.authors.yml @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +authors: + jordan: + name: Jordan Warne + description: Video Producer + avatar: https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/jordan/288/7793_2.png + mastodon: + username: jw + instance: social.lol + jonah: + name: Jonah Aragon + description: Project Director + avatar: https://github.com/jonaharagon.png + mastodon: + username: jonah + instance: neat.computer + twitter: jonaharagon + bluesky: jonaharagon.com diff --git a/videos/index.md b/videos/index.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..892caa85 --- /dev/null +++ b/videos/index.md @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +--- +description: >- + This is our home for the latest video content from the Privacy Guides team. Be sure you are subscribed to find out about our latest uploads, and share these videos with your family and friends if you find them helpful! +template: video.html +hide: + - footer +--- + +# Latest Videos + +This is our home for the latest video content from the Privacy Guides team. Be sure you are subscribed to find out about our latest uploads, and share these videos with your family and friends if you find them helpful! + +[:simple-youtube: Subscribe on YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/@privacyguides){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:simple-peertube: Subscribe on PeerTube](https://neat.tube/c/privacyguides){ .md-button .md-button--primary } diff --git a/videos/posts/.meta.yml b/videos/posts/.meta.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f394e5a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/videos/posts/.meta.yml @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +template: video-post.html +hide: + - toc +social: + cards_layout: video diff --git a/videos/posts/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online.md b/videos/posts/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..df0e0949 --- /dev/null +++ b/videos/posts/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +--- +title: 5 Easy Steps to Protect Yourself Online +date: + created: 2025-02-14T17:00:00Z +authors: + - jordan +description: Worried about hackers and data breaches? You're not alone. In this video we outline 5 simple yet crucial steps you can take today to dramatically improve your online security and protect your personal information. +readtime: 8 +thumbnail: https://neat.tube/lazy-static/previews/59e10e27-2bc4-4cd4-8cb7-605b101baf4e.jpg +embed: https://neat.tube/videos/embed/059b71a5-a1aa-44d5-b410-14a69e3082da +peertube: https://neat.tube/w/1GaeNH2GyUark4kNXCcL6Q +youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x5bKUA2sVFM +links: + - Password Managers: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/ + - Multifactor Authentication: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/multi-factor-authentication/ + - Desktop Browsers: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop-browsers/ + - Browser Extensions: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/browser-extensions/ + - Recommendation Criteria: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/criteria/ +--- + +Worried about hackers and data breaches? You're not alone. In this video we outline 5 simple yet crucial steps you can take today to dramatically improve your online security and protect your personal information. + +## Sources + +- The biggest data breaches in 2024: +- Bitwarden Password Strength Tester: +- Proton Pass Showcase video: +- Bitwarden Showcase video: +- Google Incognito Lawsuit: +- Google ad for GIMP was malicious: +- Cops were allowed to force a suspect to use thumbprint to unlock phone, says court: diff --git a/videos/posts/do-you-need-a-vpn.md b/videos/posts/do-you-need-a-vpn.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1cf129d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/videos/posts/do-you-need-a-vpn.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +--- +title: Do you need a VPN? +date: + created: 2024-12-12T20:00:00Z +authors: + - jordan +description: Commercial Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. This can have substantial privacy benefits, but not all VPNs are created equal. +readtime: 6 +thumbnail: https://neat.tube/lazy-static/previews/3f9c497c-d0f1-4fe8-8ac5-539f0f5e40ed.jpg +embed: https://neat.tube/videos/embed/2e4e81e8-f59e-4eab-be4d-8464a4a83328 +peertube: https://neat.tube/w/6HDQH1wnTACKFHh2u1CRQ5 +youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XByp-F8FXtg +links: + - VPN Recommendations: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/ + - VPN Overview: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/vpn-overview/ +--- + +Commercial Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. This can have substantial privacy benefits, but not all VPNs are created equal. More information about VPNs can be found on our website: + +## Sources + +- VPN Sponsorship Study: +- VPNs Questionable Security Practices: +- VPN Relationship Map: diff --git a/videos/posts/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why.md b/videos/posts/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..98a162cc --- /dev/null +++ b/videos/posts/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +--- +title: It's time to stop using SMS, here's why! +date: + created: 2025-01-24T20:00:00Z +authors: + - jordan +description: Text messaging has been a staple of communication for decades, but it's time to move on. In this video, we'll explore why SMS is an outdated and insecure technology and discuss better alternatives. +readtime: 7 +thumbnail: https://neat.tube/lazy-static/previews/f3b63055-e1b3-4691-8687-4a838738141b.jpg +embed: https://neat.tube/videos/embed/7887f661-541c-4bff-9f69-2b7dd81622ca +peertube: https://neat.tube/w/fTfKp1tatNnGTtfP3SwbXu +youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9BWXvn-rB4s +links: + - Instant Messengers: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/ +--- + +Text messaging has been a staple of communication for decades, but it's time to move on. In this video, we'll explore why SMS is an outdated and insecure technology and discuss better alternatives. + +## Sources + +- +- +- +- +- +- +- +- +- (Page 12) +- +- diff --git a/videos/posts/stop-confusing-privacy-anonymity-and-security.md b/videos/posts/stop-confusing-privacy-anonymity-and-security.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a795091d --- /dev/null +++ b/videos/posts/stop-confusing-privacy-anonymity-and-security.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +--- +title: | + Stop Confusing Privacy, Anonymity, and Security +date: + created: 2025-03-14T02:00:00Z +authors: + - jordan +description: | + Are you mixing up privacy, security, and anonymity? Don't worry, it's more common than you might think! In this week's video we break down each term, so you can make educated decisions on what tools are best for you. +readtime: 7 +thumbnail: https://neat.tube/lazy-static/previews/35388c84-1dc5-4e09-867e-0badf6ea75fa.jpg +embed: https://neat.tube/videos/embed/1f5361c6-2230-4466-9390-659e0a0692ad +peertube: https://neat.tube/w/4SmJxn7Q2XRp7ZGDCxvNUV +youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRt08MvK4tE +links: + - Common Threats: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/common-threats/#security-and-privacy + - Recommended Tools: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/ + - Why Privacy Matters: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/why-privacy-matters/ + - VPN Overview: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/vpn-overview/ + - Do You Need a VPN?: https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2024/12/12/do-you-need-a-vpn/ +--- +Are you mixing up privacy, security, and anonymity? Don't worry, it's more common than you might think! In this week's video we break down each term, so you can make educated decisions on what [privacy tools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) are best for you. + +## Sources + +- +- diff --git a/videos/posts/why-you-need-tor.md b/videos/posts/why-you-need-tor.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..322a7de1 --- /dev/null +++ b/videos/posts/why-you-need-tor.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +--- +title: | + Anonymity for Everyone: Why You Need Tor +date: + created: 2025-03-02T18:00:00Z +authors: + - jordan +description: Tor is an invaluable tool for bypassing censorship and browsing privately, in this week's video we dive into the details and explain how it works. Plus we cover some things you should avoid when using Tor to make sure you maintain your anonymity. +readtime: 7 +thumbnail: https://neat.tube/lazy-static/previews/c47cf1e6-c0ba-4d80-82fb-fde27e1569c5.jpg +embed: https://neat.tube/videos/embed/725431de-407d-4d36-a4a0-f01e169e0cad +peertube: https://neat.tube/w/f7QkKGe5TJaPi6Y4S61Uoi +youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R7vECGYUhyg +links: + - Tor Overview: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/ + - Tor Browser: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tor/ +--- +Tor is an invaluable tool for bypassing censorship and browsing privately, in this week's video we dive into the details and explain how it works. Plus we cover some things you should avoid when using Tor to make sure you maintain your anonymity. + +## Sources + +- Tor support documentation: