mirror of
https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org.git
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Update the Linux pages (#1307)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dng@disroot.org>
This commit is contained in:
Tommy
Daniel Gray
parent
f7a55480fb
commit
631b2d2e14
@ -126,62 +126,4 @@ Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qube
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By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypted [persistent storage](https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/persistence/index.en.html) can be configured to store some data.
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## General Recommendations
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### Drive Encryption
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Most Linux distributions have an installer option for enabling LUKS FDE upon installation.
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If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to backup your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted.
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When securely erasing storage devices such as a Solid-state drive (SSD) you should use the [ATA Secure Erase](https://ata.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/ATA_Secure_Erase) command. This command can be issued from your UEFI setup. If the storage device is a regular hard drive (HDD), consider using [`nwipe`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nwipe).
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### Swap
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Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Swap#zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
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### Wayland
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We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
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Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
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We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3.
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### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates)
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Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
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We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
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## Privacy Tweaks
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### MAC Address Randomization
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Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
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It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
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We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as suggested in the [article](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/).
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If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
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There isn’t much point in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
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### Other Identifiers
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There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md):
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- **Hostnames:** Your system's hostname is shared with the networks you connect to. You should avoid including identifying terms like your name or operating system in your hostname, instead sticking to generic terms or random strings.
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- **Usernames:** Similarly, your username is used in a variety of ways across your system. Consider using generic terms like "user" rather than your actual name.
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- **Machine ID:**: During installation a unique machine ID is generated and stored on your device. Consider [setting it to a generic ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id).
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### System Counting
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The Fedora Project [counts](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) how many unique systems access its mirrors by using a [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) variable instead of a unique ID. Fedora does this to determine load and provision better servers for updates where necessary.
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This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) is currently off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the countme option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems/) timer.
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openSUSE also uses a [unique ID](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Statistics) to count systems, which can be disabled by deleting the `/var/lib/zypp/AnonymousUniqueId` file.
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--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.en.md"
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@ -28,19 +28,29 @@ There are some additional kernel hardening options such as configuring [sysctl](
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- [Recommended boot parameters](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#boot-parameters)
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- [Additional recommendations to reduce the kernel's attack surface](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#kernel-attack-surface-reduction)
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Note that setting `kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0` will stop Flatpak, Snap (that depend on browser-sandbox), Electron based AppImages, Podman, Docker, and LXC containers from working. Do **not** set this flag if you are using container products.
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Do **not** disable unprivileged user namespaces if you use software that relies on it, like: Podman, Docker and LXC containers. The option will prevent this software from working.
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## Linux-Hardened
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Some distributions like Arch Linux have the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened), kernel package. It includes [hardening patches](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/security#Kernel_hardening) and more security-conscious defaults. Linux-Hardened has `kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0` disabled by default. See the [warning above](#kernel-hardening) about how this might impact you.
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## Linux Kernel Runtime Guard (LKRG)
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LKRG is a kernel module that performs runtime integrity check on the kernel to help detect detect exploits against the kernel. LKRG works in a *post*-detect fashion, meaning that it attempts to respond to unauthorized modifications to the running Linux kernel. The intention is that it will defeat many pre-existing exploits as well as undiscovered vulnerabilities. Some hardened distributions, such as [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Linux_Kernel_Runtime_Guard_LKRG), have documentation.
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## GRSecurity
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GRSecurity is a set of kernel patches that attempt to improve security of the Linux kernel. Open source access, however, requires [subscription to a paid model](https://grsecurity.net/passing_the_baton).
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## Simultaneous multithreading (SMT)
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[SMT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simultaneous_multithreading) has been the cause of numerous hardware vulnerabilities, and subsequent patches for those vulnerabilities often come with performance penalties that negate most of the performance gain given by SMT. If you followed the “kernel hardening” section above, some kernel parameters already disable SMT. If the option is available to you, we recommend that you disable it in your firmware as well.
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## Hardened memory allocator
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The [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) from [GrapheneOS](https://grapheneos.org) can be used on Linux distributions. It is available by default on Whonix and is available as an [AUR package](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Security#Hardened_malloc) on Arch based distributions. If you are using the AUR package, consider setting up `LD_PRELOAD` as described in the [Arch Wiki](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Security#Hardened_malloc).
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The [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) from [GrapheneOS](https://grapheneos.org) can also be used on general Linux distributions. It is available as an [AUR package](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Security#Hardened_malloc) on Arch based distributions, and (though not enabled by default) on Whonix and Kicksecure.
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If you are using Whonix, Kicksecure or the AUR package, consider setting up `LD_PRELOAD` as described in the [Kicksecure Documentation](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Hardened_Malloc) or [Arch Wiki](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Security#Hardened_malloc).
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## Umask
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@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop GNU/Linux di
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[Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right:](../linux-desktop.md){ .md-button }
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## Release cycle
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## Choosing your distribution
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Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use.
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### Release cycle
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We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates.
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@ -32,7 +36,7 @@ We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good
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<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/i8c0mg_mS7U" title="Regular Releases are Wrong, Roll for your life" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>
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</div>
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## Traditional vs Atomic updates
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### Traditional vs Atomic updates
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Traditionally, Linux distributions update by sequentially updating the desired packages. Traditional updates such as those used in Fedora, Arch Linux, and Debian based distributions can be less reliable if an error occurs while updating.
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@ -46,11 +50,11 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu
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<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/-hpV5l-gJnQ" title="Let's try Fedora Silverblue — an immutable desktop OS! - Adam Šamalik" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>
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</div>
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## “Security-focused” distributions
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### “Security-focused” distributions
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There is often some confusion about “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
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## Arch-based distributions
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### Arch-based distributions
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Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, regardless of the distribution. Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
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@ -63,8 +67,64 @@ If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we
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- **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories.
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- **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks.
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## Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions
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### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions
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We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
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## General Recommendations
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### Drive Encryption
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Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS](/encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE. If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to backup your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted. We also suggest securely erasing your storage device:
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- [Secure Data Erasure :material-arrow-right:](../basics/erasing-data.md)
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### Swap
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Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Swap#zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
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### Wayland
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We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
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Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
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We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3.
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### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates)
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Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
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We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
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## Privacy Tweaks
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### MAC Address Randomization
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Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
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It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
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We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as suggested in the [article](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/).
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If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
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There isn’t much point in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
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### Other Identifiers
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There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md):
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- **Hostnames:** Your system's hostname is shared with the networks you connect to. You should avoid including identifying terms like your name or operating system in your hostname, instead sticking to generic terms or random strings.
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- **Usernames:** Similarly, your username is used in a variety of ways across your system. Consider using generic terms like "user" rather than your actual name.
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- **Machine ID:**: During installation a unique machine ID is generated and stored on your device. Consider [setting it to a generic ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id).
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### System Counting
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The Fedora Project [counts](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) how many unique systems access its mirrors by using a [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) variable instead of a unique ID. Fedora does this to determine load and provision better servers for updates where necessary.
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This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) is currently off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the countme option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems/) timer.
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openSUSE also uses a [unique ID](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Statistics) to count systems, which can be disabled by deleting the `/var/lib/zypp/AnonymousUniqueId` file.
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--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.en.md"
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@ -61,6 +61,6 @@ Red Hat develops [Podman](https://docs.podman.io/en/latest/) and secures it with
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Another option is [Kata containers](https://katacontainers.io/), where virtual machines masquerade as containers. Each Kata container has its own Linux kernel and is isolated from the host.
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These container technologies can be useful for those who may want to run certain web app software on their local area network (LAN) such as [Vaultwarden](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden) or images provided by [linuxserver.io](https://www.linuxserver.io) to increase privacy by decreasing dependence on various web services.
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The above container technologies can be useful if you want to run certain web app software on your local network, such as [Vaultwarden](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden) or images provided by [LinuxServer.io](https://www.linuxserver.io), to increase privacy by decreasing dependence on various web services. A guide on [hardening Docker and OCI](https://wonderfall.dev/docker-hardening) has been written by the author "Wonderfall."
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--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.en.md"
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@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
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*[2FA]: 2-Factor Authentication
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*[ADB]: Android Debug Bridge
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*[AOSP]: Android Open Source Project
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*[ATA]: Advanced Technology Attachment
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*[AVB]: Android Verified Boot
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*[CLI]: Command Line Interface
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*[CSV]: Comma-Separated Values
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@ -22,6 +23,7 @@
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*[GPS]: Global Positioning System
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*[GUI]: Graphical User Interface
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*[GnuPG]: GNU Privacy Guard (PGP implementation)
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*[HDD]: Hard Disk Drive
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*[HOTP]: HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) based One-Time Password
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*[HTTPS]: Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
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*[HTTP]: Hypertext Transfer Protocol
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@ -40,6 +42,8 @@
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*[MAC]: Media Access Control
|
||||
*[MEID]: Mobile Equipment Identifier
|
||||
*[MFA]: Multi-Factor Authentication
|
||||
*[NVMe]: Nonvolatile Memory Express
|
||||
*[OCI]: Open Container Initiative
|
||||
*[OCSP]: Online Certificate Status Protocol
|
||||
*[OEM]: Original Equipment Manufacturer
|
||||
*[OEMs]: Original Equipment Manufacturers
|
||||
@ -57,6 +61,7 @@
|
||||
*[SMS]: Short Message Service (standard text messaging)
|
||||
*[SMTP]: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
|
||||
*[SNI]: Server Name Indication
|
||||
*[SSD]: Solid-State Drive
|
||||
*[SSH]: Secure Shell
|
||||
*[SaaS]: Software as a Service (cloud software)
|
||||
*[SoC]: System on Chip
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user