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style: Consistency and formatting fixes on recommendation pages
Signed-off-by: redoomed1 <redoomed1@privacyguides.org>
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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
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- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }
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- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
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These are our recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication**. These come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md).
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These are our recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication**. These come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
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[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why/){ .md-button }
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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
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{ align=right }
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**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
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**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
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[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
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@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material-
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{ align=right }
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**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account.
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**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account.
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[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
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@ -99,17 +99,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr
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Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates.
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There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)).
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There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3]
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All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements.
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Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code.
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All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code.
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### SimpleX Chat
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<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
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{ align=right }
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{ align=right }
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**SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.
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@ -132,7 +130,7 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
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</div>
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SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages.
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SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages.
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To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
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@ -146,13 +144,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/
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{ align=right }
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**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
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**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
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[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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[:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
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[:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
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[:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
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[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" }
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[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
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<details class="downloads" markdown>
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<summary>Downloads</summary>
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@ -168,12 +166,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/
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To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby.
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Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocols.
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The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited.
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Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
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Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
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## Additional Options
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<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
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@ -189,7 +185,7 @@ These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain
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{ align=right }
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**Element** is the flagship client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/chat_basics/matrix-for-im) protocol, an [open standard](https://spec.matrix.org/latest) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
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**Element** is the flagship client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/chat_basics/matrix-for-im) protocol, an [open standard](https://spec.matrix.org/latest) for secure, decentralized, real-time communication.
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Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE, as are one-to-one voice and video calls.
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@ -207,19 +203,17 @@ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are b
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- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://element.io/download)
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- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/download)
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- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/download)
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- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
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- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
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</details>
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</div>
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Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
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With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default. Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
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With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default.
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The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest).
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The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
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The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet).
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The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016.
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### Session
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@ -229,7 +223,7 @@ The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matr
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**Session** is a decentralized messenger with a focus on private, secure, and anonymous communications. Session offers support for direct messages, group chats, and voice calls.
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Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
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One-on-one chats and closed groups (which allow for up to 100 members) are E2EE. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** E2EE between participants.
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[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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[:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
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@ -250,38 +244,37 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to s
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</div>
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Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants.
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Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
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Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
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Session was previously based on the Signal protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. The Session protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1] Session has a [white paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
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Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021:
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> The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.
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Session has a [white paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
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## Criteria
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**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
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### Minimum Requirements
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- Has open-source clients.
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- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
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- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
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- Supports E2EE for all messages.
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- Has been independently audited.
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- Must have open-source clients.
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- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
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- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
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- Must support E2EE for all messages.
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- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third party.
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### Best-Case
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Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
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- Supports forward secrecy[^1]
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- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
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- Has open-source servers.
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- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
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- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
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- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
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- Should support forward secrecy[^1]
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- Should support Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
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- Should have open-source servers.
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- Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
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- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
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- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
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[^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
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[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
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[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy).
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