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---
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description: Privacy-related news stories, product reviews, opinion pieces, and other important articles from Privacy Guides contributors.
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canonical_url: https://www.privacyguides.org/posts/tag/articles/
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hide:
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- footer
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blog/posts/email-security.md
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---
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||||
title: "Email Security: Where We Are and What the Future Holds"
|
||||
date:
|
||||
created: 2025-11-15T22:45:00Z
|
||||
categories:
|
||||
- Explainers
|
||||
authors:
|
||||
- fria
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Email
|
||||
license: BY-SA
|
||||
schema_type: BackgroundNewsArticle
|
||||
description: Email is ubiquitous. If you want to function in modern society, you pretty much have to have an email address. But is it really a good idea to still be relying on the same decades old techology? What can we do about replacing it?
|
||||
preview:
|
||||
cover: blog/assets/images/email-security/cover.png
|
||||
---
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: fria / Privacy Guides</small>
|
||||
|
||||
Email is ubiquitous. If you want to function in modern society, you pretty much have to have an email address. What was originally just a simple protocol to send messages between machines has morphed beyond what it was originally intended for into the *de facto* authentication, identity, and "secure" communication channel for almost all technology users today. It's been updated many times to fix security issues and there are more updates to come, but is it worth trying to fix a decades-old protocol, or should we scrap it all and start over?<!-- more -->
|
||||
|
||||
## Current State of Email Security
|
||||
|
||||
The [**Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP)**](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321.html) is the standard used to send emails.
|
||||
|
||||
Over the years, multiple protocols have been introduced to fix security issues and improve the usability of email, resulting in a complex mess that we're still feeling the consequences of to this day.
|
||||
|
||||
### Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
By default, there's no encryption in SMTP. Not transport encryption or end-to-end encryption, it's just a plaintext protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
To remedy this, several solutions have been created.
|
||||
|
||||
#### STARTTLS
|
||||
|
||||
[STARTTLS](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3207) is a command that allows email clients to negotiate TLS encryption. Importantly, the negotiation phase happens in plaintext which leaves it vulnerable to attackers.
|
||||
|
||||
STARTTLS allows a bit more flexibility at the cost of some security. Since you don't really know if the recipient's email client supports TLS or not, it allows you to continue with the SMTP session anyway if you want to.
|
||||
|
||||
Since it's just using TLS, STARTTLS can't provide E2EE, just transport encryption. The encryption looks something like:
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypted between your email client and your SMTP server → decrypted at your SMTP server → Encrypted between your SMTP server and recipient's SMTP server → decrypted at recipient's SMTP server → encrypted between their SMTP server and their POP3/IMAP server → decrypted at their POP3/IMAP server → encrypted between their POP3/IMAP server and their email client → decrypted by their email client.
|
||||
|
||||
``` mermaid
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
A[Email Client] -->|Optional TLS Encryption| B(SMTP Server)
|
||||
B --> |Optional TLS Encryption| C(Other SMTP Server)
|
||||
C -->|Optional TLS Encryption| D[POP3 or IMAP Server]
|
||||
D -->|Optional TLS Encryption| F[Other Party's Email Client]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
At each point in the process TLS encryption is not guaranteed. Now consider that you can have multiple recipients with their own SMTP servers as well, and you start to see how flimsy this protection can be. And since the initial negotiation is in plaintext, an attacker can simply strip away the STARTTLS command, preventing a secure connection from being established.
|
||||
|
||||
Authentication is left to another protocol to solve, this just handles the transport encryption.
|
||||
|
||||
#### SMTPS
|
||||
|
||||
Also known as "Implicit TLS" (as opposed to the "Explicit TLS" of STARTTLS), SMTPS starts with an encrypted connection, similar to HTTPS, removing the potential for an adversary to downgrade the connection.
|
||||
|
||||
The [current](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8314) recommendations are to use port 465 for SMTPS and port 587 for STARTTLS. Unfortunately, these ports aren't standardized and thus there is disagreement and confusion about what port should be used for SMTPS.
|
||||
|
||||
In the past, ports 25, 465, 587, and 2525 have all been used for SMTP at various points. This lack of a standardized port means that you end up with services using different ports and being unable to establish a secure connection. Particularly, there is still confusion in some email providers whether to use port 465 or port 587 for SMTPS, although the current recommendation is port 465.
|
||||
|
||||
#### POP3S
|
||||
|
||||
[Post Office Protocol version 3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post_Office_Protocol) or POP3 is a protocol for retrieving mail from a mail server. It's one of the ways your email client can show you your mail.
|
||||
|
||||
POP3 also supports implicit TLS over port 995, so it can be encrypted by default as well.
|
||||
|
||||
#### IMAPS
|
||||
|
||||
[Internet Message Access Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Message_Access_Protocol) or IMAP is another protocol for retrieving mail from a mail server.
|
||||
|
||||
Like SMTPS and POP3s, IMAP supports implicit TLS. The implicit TLS port is 993.
|
||||
|
||||
#### OpenPGP
|
||||
|
||||
The above features only protect the email in transit and don't protect against the email providers involved, which is a massive security issue if you don't trust your email provider. On top of that, you as a user have no control over which parts of the chain are encrypted. If you want to be sure that no party in between you and your recipient can read or alter your emails, you need to use end-to-end encryption. Unfortunately, by default, email doesn't support end-to-end encryption.
|
||||
|
||||
[Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)](https://www.openpgp.org/about/) was originally created in 1997 by [Phil Zimmerman](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/05/08/when-code-became-a-weapon/). While originally proprietary software, an open source version of PGP called OpenPGP has been standardized by the [IETF](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9580.html). As you can imagine from software originally conceived in the 90s, the user experience isn't the smoothest.
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike modern messengers like [Signal](https://signal.org), OpenPGP requires you to [manually manage your keys](https://dev.to/adityabhuyan/how-to-generate-your-own-public-and-secret-keys-for-pgp-encryption-1joh). This is a problem not only because it's cumbersome, but the security of E2EE rests on protecting the private key. If the private key is compromised, your messages are compromised.
|
||||
|
||||
PGP also lacks [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), meaning that if your private key is ever exposed, all previous messages you've ever sent using that key are also exposed. All it takes is a slight user error for a catastrophic compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
PGP encryption also usually doesn't encrypt important metadata like `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, and `Subject`, stored in the [email header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header); usually, only the body of the email is encrypted, which can be a major privacy issue. What the email is about, who you are, and who you're messaging can all be revealed even with E2EE. Some email clients use their hidden headers that can reveal more data about you.
|
||||
|
||||
#### S/MIME
|
||||
|
||||
Another common option for email encryption is [S/MIME](https://www.digicert.com/faq/email-trust/what-is-smime-or-encrypted-email), or Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions. S/MIME works a bit like HTTPS, using [X.509 digital certificates](https://www.ssl.com/faqs/what-is-an-x-509-certificate/) and [certificate authorities](https://www.digicert.com/blog/what-is-a-certificate-authority) to encrypt and verify the authenticity of emails.
|
||||
|
||||
While a step up from the manual keys of PGP, S/MIME is still a pain to use, particularly because it usually requires purchasing and managing a certificate from a CA, which can be expensive and annoying. S/MIME also lacks forward secrecy just like PGP, so if there's ever a compromise of your private key, all previously sent messages are also compromised.
|
||||
|
||||
These issues make S/MIME nonviable for most people outside business settings.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Web Key Directory
|
||||
|
||||
A problem with PGP is getting your public key out to people without manually exchanging keys. This problem can be solved with Web Key Directory (WKD), which allows you to upload your public PGP key to a server and clients that want to send E2EE emails to you can ask that server to send you their public key.
|
||||
|
||||
You can read more on our [email security](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/email-security/?h=email#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) page.
|
||||
|
||||
### Authentication
|
||||
|
||||
SMTP by default essentially has no authentication and allows spoofing the `MAIL FROM` header. Your email client will just blindly accept whoever the sender says they are without any authentication. Luckily, there are several solutions for this.
|
||||
|
||||
There are multiple methods that email providers can implement to verify the authenticity of an email sender.
|
||||
|
||||
#### SPF
|
||||
|
||||
The first solution implemented was [Sender Policy Framework (SPF)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7208). SPF uses [DNS TXT records](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/dns-records/dns-txt-record/).
|
||||
|
||||
Just like the name sounds, a DNS TXT record allows you to store text in a [DNS record](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/dns-records/). Here's an example of what a DNS TXT record might look like:
|
||||
|
||||
| example.com | record type | value | TTL |
|
||||
|-------------|--------------|--------|-----|
|
||||
| @ | TXT | "color=blue" |99999|
|
||||
|
||||
SPF lists all the servers that are authorized to send from a specific domain. When an email is received, it checks the sending server against the list of authorized servers for that domain. An SPF record might look like this:
|
||||
|
||||
| example.com | record type | value | TTL |
|
||||
|-------------|--------------|--------|-----|
|
||||
| @ | TXT | "v=spf1 ip4:200.56.78.99 ip4:156.67.109.43 include:_spf.google.com -all" |99999|
|
||||
|
||||
The IP addresses are the ones that are authorized to send email from this domain. The `include:` tag denotes what third-party domains are allowed to send email on behalf of `example.com`. The third-party SPF record will be checked and included in the allowed IP addresses.
|
||||
|
||||
While a good start, SPF still has several glaring weaknesses. Since it relies on DNS, an attack on the DNS infrastructure could cause spoofed DNS data to be accepted.
|
||||
|
||||
Since SPF doesn't authenticate individual users, it's still possible for a sender to impersonate another user. SPF does not authenticate the `MAIL FROM` header. If you try to send an email from a gmail.com domain, but the server doesn't match gmail.com, it will fail.
|
||||
|
||||
SPF has a few different modes, allowing for a hard fail, soft fail, or completely ignoring it. `-all` means an email that fails will be rejected, `~all` will mark emails that fail as insecure or spam but still send them, and `+all` will specify that any server is allowed to send emails on behalf of your domain.
|
||||
|
||||
This flexibility, while convenient, allows for the security benefits of SPF to be completely undermined.
|
||||
|
||||
#### DKIM
|
||||
|
||||
[DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/dns-records/dns-dkim-record/) relies on public key cryptography to verify the domain of an email.
|
||||
|
||||
Example of a DKIM DNS TXT record:
|
||||
|
||||
| name | record type | value | TTL |
|
||||
|-------------|--------------|--------|-----|
|
||||
| test-email._domainkey.example.com | TXT | "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAtY+7sGVwvyS8w+3HgJk7EviazH+C4L8gV4gOJzAq9oKJjZ5En7LDEw3FqAh8C0M59c9sBQcC+Kj8VxMBY9y+E0Pm1fPK9V7sI3Gm7yE7Y9yU4uVZr8R3N+5z+qZ+7V76RU4oZ0mtSvw8m3pX1hZyHd7NZfXaFfKfgd18W5T7YQIDAQAB" | 9999 |
|
||||
|
||||
DKIM records are stored under a specific name following the format
|
||||
|
||||
`[selector]_domainkey.[domain]`
|
||||
|
||||
The public and private keys are generated by the email provider, such as gmail.com. The public key is stored in a publicly available DNS TXT record like the one seen above and is used by the receiver to verify messages. The private key is kept secret by the email provider.
|
||||
|
||||
Emails sent from the email provider contain a DKIM header with a signature generated from the private key and the content of the message. If the email message is altered or signed with the wrong key, when the receiver verifies the signature using the public key it will be obvious it was altered.
|
||||
|
||||
An example of a DKIM header:
|
||||
|
||||
`v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.com; s=test-email; h=from:to:subject bh=uMixy0BsCqhbru4fqPZQdeZY5Pq865sNAnOAxNgUS0s=;b=LiIvJeRyqMo0gngiCygwpiKphJjYezb5kXBKCNj8DqRVcCk7obK6OUg4o+EufEbBtRYQfQhgIkx5m70IqA6dP+DBZUcsJyS9C+vm2xRK7qyHi2hUFpYS5pkeiNVoQk/Wk4wZG4tu/g+OA49mS7VX+64FXr79MPwOMRRmJ3lNwJU=`
|
||||
|
||||
`v=` shows the version of DKIM, currently version one is the latest (we'll come back to that later). `a=` shows the algorithm used. `d=` shows the domain of the sender. `s=` denotes the selector that is used in the TXT record. `h=` shows the headers that were used to create the signature. `bh=` shows a hash of the body of the email. `b=` is the signature computed from the listed headers and the hash of the body listed in `bh`.
|
||||
|
||||
In this way, not only does DKIM provide assurance that the email was sent from the correct domain, it also protects the integrity of the message. However, since the keys are controlled by your email provider, it can't stop your email provider from tampering with your messages.
|
||||
|
||||
Note also that this has nothing to do with encryption of the message, only verifying the authenticity and sender. The message is still sent in plaintext unless another component encrypts it.
|
||||
|
||||
#### DMARC
|
||||
|
||||
[Domain-based Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance (DMARC)](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/dns-records/dns-dmarc-record/) is an authentication method that builds on SPF and DKIM. DMARC tells a receiving email server what to do after checking the SPF and DKIM. If the email fails, the DMARC policy tells the receiver whether to mark it as spam, block it, or allow it through.
|
||||
|
||||
DMARC also uses TXT records. An example DMARC policy might look like
|
||||
|
||||
`v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s;`
|
||||
|
||||
The `v=` shows the version of DMARC to use. The `p=` shows what should be done with emails if they fail, in this case `quarantine` means the receiver should put the email in the user's spam folder. `reject` can be specified as well to show that emails that fail should be outright blocked. `adkim=` tells how DKIM should be enforced, with `s` meaning "strict"; for relaxed, `r` is listed instead. Ditto for `aspf=`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### DNSSEC
|
||||
|
||||
You may have noticed that all of these authentication methods rely on DNS. Unfortunately, DNS wasn't designed to be secure when it was invented in the 1980s. Ironically, there's no authentication built into DNS by default, so by attacking DNS, a malicious actor can [poison](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/dns-cache-poisoning/) your DNS cache with false information.
|
||||
|
||||
[Researchers at CMU in 2014](https://www.sei.cmu.edu/blog/probable-cache-poisoning-of-mail-handling-domains/) found that emails that were supposedly to be sent by Gmail, Yahoo!, and Outlook.com were actually being sent by a rogue email server. This is disastrous for security and breaks the entire email authentication system. There are many such cases of attacks on DNS infrastructure and many more [possible attacks](https://www.akamai.com/glossary/what-are-dns-attack-vectors) on DNS.
|
||||
|
||||
The solution? [DNSSEC](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/dnssec/how-dnssec-works/). DNSSEC uses digital signatures to verify the authenticity of the DNS response. Unfortunately, DNSSEC isn't as widely used as it could be so DNS attacks are still a real threat.
|
||||
|
||||
DNSSEC forms a [chain of trust](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_of_trust), with each zone forming a parent/child relationship all the way up to the [root zone](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/glossary/dns-root-server/).
|
||||
|
||||
The public key infrastructure (PKI) that we rely on for things like HTTPS in browsers similarly relies on a chain of trust, but web PKI relies on many trusted entities whereas DNSSEC effectively reduces it to one: the IANA which signs the root zone key in a [root signing ceremony](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/dnssec/root-signing-ceremony/).
|
||||
|
||||
Effectively, DNSSEC is designed so that you can be sure the results of a DNS query are accurate.
|
||||
|
||||
#### DANE
|
||||
|
||||
DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities or DANE applies the security of DNSSEC to email. It forces TLS to be used and binds the TLS certificate to DNS names directly using TLSA, thus allowing email providers to bypass the certificate authority system relied on by HTTPS.
|
||||
|
||||
#### MTA-STS
|
||||
|
||||
[MTA-STS](https://www.mailhardener.com/kb/mta-sts) or Mail Transfer Agent Strict Transport Security is a way to force TLS connections for email and validate that the DNS is correct. Instead of DNSSEC, MTA-STS relies on HTTPS and the web PKI to validate DNS. It's not stored as a DNS record but instead an HTTPS server that serves the file.
|
||||
|
||||
You can think of MTA-STS like HSTS, HTML Strict Transport Security, which forces the use of TLS for websites. It's the same principal, just applied to email.
|
||||
|
||||
The extra reliance on web PKI introduces more trust than with DNSSEC, but it's easier to implement and relies on the already-established infrastructure of the internet.
|
||||
|
||||
Both DANE and MTA-STS can be used together for a multilayered approach to email security.
|
||||
|
||||
### General Security
|
||||
|
||||
#### Email as a Backdoor into Your Accounts
|
||||
|
||||
Something seldom discussed is the fact that email is the default 2FA method for most accounts and also can be used to bypass your password through the password reset function on the login screen of most services. This essentially means the security of all of your accounts rests on the security of your email, which can be very shaky and lacks E2EE usually. It's most comparable to SMS 2FA which is also used a lot of the time as a method for getting into accounts when you forgot your password.
|
||||
|
||||
I touched on this a bit in my [passkey article](toward-a-passwordless-future.md), but we need to stop relying on email for security critical applications and start using proper recovery methods like recovery codes. Email should be used for what it's intended for: sending messages and updates to people, announcements, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Third-Party Clients
|
||||
|
||||
Many email providers such as Gmail provide their own clients for you to view your inbox, send messages, etc. But many people choose to use third-party clients for their email needs.
|
||||
|
||||
While it's great that email can support that, it does mean you need to trust another party with your sensitive email and essentially the security of all of your accounts. Not to mention that email clients can have [vulnerabilities](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/known-vulnerabilities/thunderbird/), so you need to be very careful about which one you trust.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Email Attack Surface
|
||||
|
||||
A big part of the reason email clients can be so vulnerable to exploits is the vast attack surface afforded by things like JavaScript support in emails. This puts email clients dangerously close to the same territory as browsers in terms of attack surface but without the same level of scrutiny or hardening effort that goes into browsers.
|
||||
|
||||
Since almost anyone can email you at any time, you have to trust that your email client vendor is able to protect you against [vulnerabilities](https://www.csoonline.com/article/1308164/microsoft-outlook-flaw-opens-door-to-1-click-remote-code-execution-attacks.html) and also has timely patches when they're found.
|
||||
|
||||
Luckily, lots of email clients let you disable JavaScript and HTML if you want, but not all do, and email clients can have lots of other vulnerabilities as well not related to JavaScript.
|
||||
|
||||
## Future of Email Security
|
||||
|
||||
It's been a multi-decade cross-industry effort to bring email up to snuff as a modern communication system, and we still have a long way to go. There's still efforts to improve the state of email security, so look out for these in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
### Improvements to OpenPGP
|
||||
|
||||
The IETF has a [working group](https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/openpgp/about/) for OpenPGP that wants to add many improvements to OpenPGP, including post-quantum encryption, forward secrecy, and usability improvements.
|
||||
|
||||
Key transparency is also a planned feature, similar to what apps like [WhatsApp](https://scontent.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t39.8562-6/379264560_846690136905658_6336040801441930900_n.pdf?_nc_cat=108&ccb=1-7&_nc_sid=e280be&_nc_ohc=gNmDlLkE0DMQ7kNvwEyKONi&_nc_oc=AdmucQjSjoTw2nXUszYeZNStyUHGqvM2pj3oRVV7qI4xmLEJMmY2pUV29WcOnKC1KpA&_nc_zt=14&_nc_ht=scontent.xx&_nc_gid=5lSqV7L5iCqeiMSQDCwN0w&oh=00_AfXoxrF8ukQtSVZM_BCBDbveIDviQPfn0kDEV8pSbxX1SQ&oe=68AB9400) have implemented. Key transparency systems use an append-only, auditable and tamper-evident log of keys that allows you to automatically verify the authenticity of whoever you're messaging with.
|
||||
|
||||
There's even a plan to add the ability to verify keys manually using QR codes, similar to how some messengers let you manually verify keys.
|
||||
|
||||
### Improvements to S/MIME
|
||||
|
||||
The [LAMPS](https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/lamps/about/) working group is looking at adding post-quantum encryption to S/MIME to protect against future quantum computer threats. This would include "dual-signature" schemes combining traditional encryption with PG encryption, similar to how some messengers handle it.
|
||||
|
||||
### DKIM2
|
||||
|
||||
[DKIM2](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gondwana-dkim2-motivation-00.html) is the planned next version of DKIM.
|
||||
|
||||
An issue with the current version of DKIM is a malicious actor taking emails signed with DKIM from a different domain and replaying them, spamming them out to thousands of people and eroding trust in the original domain. The new DKIM2 specification would force each hop the email takes along its path to sign it, so any issues will be the fault of the previous hop.
|
||||
|
||||
DKIM2 aims to simplify the protocol and make it more standardized. For example, in practice, the vast majority of DKIM is singed using relaxed methods, so DKIM2 will only support relaxed.
|
||||
|
||||
The fact that DKIM relies on an explicit list of headers as part of the signature, there is inconsistent signing of headers and some security-critical headers might not be signed. In order to prevent attackers from adding headers that weren't originally part of the email, providers would sign headers with no information in them. DKIM2 would specify a fixed set of headers in alignment with best practices, so there won't be a need to specify headers.
|
||||
|
||||
### DMARCbis
|
||||
|
||||
[DMARCbis](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis/) is a proposed updated version of DMARC.
|
||||
|
||||
The `pct` tag is going away, which was a tag that would only allow a specified percentage of emails, say 50%, to be sent if they failed. Apparently, this wasn't implemented properly so now it's being replaced with the `t` mode that is a binary pass or fail.
|
||||
|
||||
The new `np` tag adds the ability to define what to do with a non-existent subdomain of a real domain. This will prevent cybercriminals from subverting DMARC by using a fake subdomain.
|
||||
|
||||
They are also adding [requirements](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-41#name-conformance-requirements-fo) that mail providers must meet to fully conform to the specification, which should eliminate questions about best practices and how DMARC should be implemented.
|
||||
|
||||
### Deprecation of Cleartext Email
|
||||
|
||||
Since there are now protocols in place to at least allow for transport encryption at every stage of the email process, providers should work on [removing support](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8314#section-4.1) for unencrypted email entirely.
|
||||
|
||||
Transport encryption between servers now should be the minimum expected for email services going into the future.
|
||||
|
||||
### Passkeys
|
||||
|
||||
The adoption of [passkeys](https://fidoalliance.org/passkeys/) will eliminate the need for email as a recovery method, since users won't have to remember passwords. Email can be used for what it was originally intended for: a method of communication and sending updates and announcements, nothing more. This will take a concerted effort from service providers though, and it seems for now most services that support passkeys still require and email for some reason. Here's hoping this changes in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
The adoption of passkeys will also make email services themselves more secure, since at the moment they act as a sort of de facto recovery method for all of our accounts. They should focus on deprecating passwords for improved security.
|
||||
|
||||
### Wider Adoption of DNSSEC
|
||||
|
||||
DNSSEC should be universally adopted to prevent DNS poisoning attacks. This would drastically improve the security of email.
|
||||
|
||||
### Guidance for E2EE
|
||||
|
||||
The usability of E2EE in email is significantly lacking compared to other methods of communication, especially modern messengers like Signal that make the E2EE very seamless and simple. The handling of E2EE by email clients can also vary a lot and leave email users [vulnerable to bypasses](https://efail.de) for the E2EE.
|
||||
|
||||
An [RFC](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance-17.html) to address usability issues and best practices for email clients exists, hopefully it can lead to a future of improved user experience and security in email.
|
||||
|
||||
### SMTP End-to-End Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
The biggest obstacle in the way of email privacy is it's not E2EE by default like most modern messengers we use daily. Some providers like Proton Mail will automatically encrypt emails between [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/support/manage-encryption#:~:text=Proton%20Mail%20encrypts%20all%20emails%20sent%20between%20Proton%20accounts%20with%20end%2Dto%2Dend%20encryption%20(E2EE)) users. The obvious next step is to build E2EE into SMTP itself.
|
||||
|
||||
An [RFC proposal](https://dcrubro.com/files/smtp-ee2esign-latest.txt) exists for just such an idea. I'm hopeful something like this can be standardized and widely adopted, and finally bring email into the 21st century.
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
meta_title: "The Best Android Operating Systems - Privacy Guides"
|
||||
title: "Alternative Distributions"
|
||||
title: Alternative Distributions
|
||||
description: You can replace the operating system on your Android phone with these secure and privacy-respecting alternatives.
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
-
|
||||
|
|
@ -47,15 +47,19 @@ GrapheneOS provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wik
|
|||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://grapheneos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
GrapheneOS supports [sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs Google Play Services fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as push notifications, while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](../os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](../os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
|
||||
|
||||
[Google Pixel phones](../mobile-phones.md#google-pixel) are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices).
|
||||
[Google Pixel phones](../mobile-phones.md#google-pixel) are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices). The Pixel 8 and later support ARM's Memory Tagging Extension (MTE), a hardware security enhancement that drastically lowers the probability of exploits occurring through memory corruption bugs. GrapheneOS greatly expands the coverage of MTE on supported devices. Whereas the stock OS only allows you to opt in to a limited implementation of MTE via a developer option or Google's Advanced Protection Program, GrapheneOS features a more robust implementation of MTE by default in the system kernel, default system components, and their Vanadium web browser and its WebView.
|
||||
|
||||
GrapheneOS also provides a global toggle for enabling MTE on all user-installed apps at :gear: **Settings** → **Security & privacy** → **Exploit protection** → **Memory tagging** → **Enable by default**. The OS also features per-app toggles to opt out of MTE for apps which may crash due to compatibility issues.
|
||||
|
||||
### Connectivity Checks
|
||||
|
||||
By default, Android makes many network connections to Google to perform DNS connectivity checks, to sync with current network time, to check your network connectivity, and for many other background tasks. GrapheneOS replaces these with connections to servers operated by GrapheneOS and subject to their privacy policy. This hides information like your IP address [from Google](../basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers), but means it is trivial for an admin on your network or ISP to see you are making connections to `grapheneos.network`, `grapheneos.org`, etc. and deduce what operating system you are using.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
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|
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|
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 80 KiB After Width: | Height: | Size: 58 KiB |
|
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|
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 64 KiB After Width: | Height: | Size: 47 KiB |
|
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 52 KiB After Width: | Height: | Size: 46 KiB |
|
|
@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
title: "Account Deletion"
|
||||
icon: 'material/account-remove'
|
||||
description: It's easy to accumulate a large number of internet accounts, here are some tips on how to prune your collection.
|
||||
title: Account Deletion
|
||||
icon: material/account-remove
|
||||
description: It's easy to accumulate a large number of internet accounts. Here are some tips on how to prune your collection.
|
||||
---
|
||||
Over time, it can be easy to accumulate a number of online accounts, many of which you may no longer use. Deleting these unused accounts is an important step in reclaiming your privacy, as dormant accounts are vulnerable to data breaches. A data breach is when a service's security is compromised and protected information is viewed, transmitted, or stolen by unauthorized actors. Data breaches are unfortunately all [too common](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) these days, and so practicing good digital hygiene is the best way to minimize the impact they have on your life. The goal of this guide then is to help navigate you through the irksome process of account deletion, often made difficult by [deceptive design](https://deceptive.design), for the betterment of your online presence.
|
||||
Over time, it can be easy to accumulate a number of online accounts, many of which you may no longer use. Deleting these unused accounts is an important step in reclaiming your privacy, as dormant accounts are vulnerable to data breaches. A data breach occurs when a service's security is compromised and protected information is viewed, transmitted, or stolen by unauthorized actors. Data breaches are unfortunately all [too common](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) these days, and so practicing good digital hygiene is the best way to minimize the impact they have on your life. The goal of this guide then is to help navigate you through the irksome process of account deletion, often made difficult by [deceptive design](https://deceptive.design), for the betterment of your online presence.
|
||||
|
||||
## Finding Old Accounts
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -15,15 +15,13 @@ If you have a password manager that you've used for your entire digital life, th
|
|||

|
||||
</figure>
|
||||
|
||||
Even if you haven't explicitly used a password manager before, there's a chance you've used the one in your browser or your phone without even realizing it. For example: [Firefox Password Manager](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins), [Google Password Manager](https://passwords.google.com/intro)
|
||||
and [Edge Password Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336).
|
||||
Even if you haven't explicitly used a password manager before, there's a chance you've used the one in your browser ([Firefox](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins), [Chrome](https://passwords.google.com/intro), [Edge](https://support.microsoft.com/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336)) or your phone ([Google](https://passwords.google.com/intro) on stock Android, [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/HT211146) on iOS) without even realizing it.
|
||||
|
||||
Desktop platforms also often have a password manager which may help you recover passwords you've forgotten about:
|
||||
|
||||
- Windows [Credential Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/accessing-credential-manager-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
|
||||
- macOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/HT211145)
|
||||
- iOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/HT211146)
|
||||
- Linux, Gnome Keyring, which can be accessed through [Seahorse](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Seahorse) or [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager)
|
||||
- Windows: [Credential Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/accessing-credential-manager-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
|
||||
- macOS: [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/HT211145)
|
||||
- Linux: Gnome Keyring (accessed through [Seahorse](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/seahorse#seahorse)) or [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager)
|
||||
|
||||
### Email
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -110,6 +110,12 @@ The best way to prevent a targeted attack against you before a device is in your
|
|||
|
||||
Make sure your device supports secure boot/verified boot, and you have it enabled. Try to avoid leaving your device unattended whenever possible.
|
||||
|
||||
### Kensington Locks
|
||||
|
||||
Many laptops come equipped with a [Kensington slot](https://www.kensington.com/solutions/product-category/security/?srsltid=AfmBOorQOlRnqRJOAqM-Mvl7wumed0wBdiOgktlvdidpMHNIvGfwj9VI) that can be used to secure your device with a **metal cable** that locks into the slot on your machine. These locks can be combination locks or keyed.
|
||||
|
||||
As with all locks, Kensington locks are vulnerable to [physical attacks](https://youtu.be/vgvCxL7dMJk) so you should mainly use them to deter petty theft. You can secure your laptop at home or even when you're out in public using a table leg or something that won't move easily.
|
||||
|
||||
## Secure your Network
|
||||
|
||||
### Compartmentalization
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -50,14 +50,14 @@ Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality are limited to paid subscr
|
|||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide).
|
||||
**Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via its web or mobile clients. Features include automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide).
|
||||
|
||||
Those on the free tier have access to 3 calendars, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 25 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/calendar/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/calendar){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/orgs/ProtonMail/repositories?q=calendar){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
|
@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Those on the free tier have access to 3 calendars, whereas paid subscribers can
|
|||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Unfortunately, as of August 2024 Proton has [still](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/proton-calendar-is-not-open-source-mobile/14656/8) not released the source code for their mobile Calendar app on Android or iOS, and only the former has been [audited](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps). Proton Calendar's web client is open source, however, and has been [audited](https://proton.me/community/open-source).
|
||||
In 2021, Securitum [audited](https://proton.me/community/open-source#:~:text=Proton%20Calendar) Proton Calendar's web client and provided a [letter of attestation](https://res.cloudinary.com/dbulfrlrz/images/v1714639870/wp-pme/letter-of-attestation-proton-calendar-20211109_3138998f9b/letter-of-attestation-proton-calendar-20211109_3138998f9b.pdf) for the Android app.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -96,11 +96,11 @@ Modifications other than adjusting this setting would make your fingerprint uniq
|
|||
|
||||
### Anti-Fingerprinting
|
||||
|
||||
**Without** using a [VPN](vpn.md), Mullvad Browser provides the same protections against [naive fingerprinting scripts](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.3-Overrides-%5BTo-RFP-or-Not%5D#-fingerprinting) as other private browsers like Firefox+[Arkenfox](#arkenfox-advanced) or [Brave](#brave). Mullvad Browser provides these protections out of the box, at the expense of some flexibility and convenience that other private browsers can provide.
|
||||
**Without** using a [VPN](vpn.md), Mullvad Browser provides protections against [naive fingerprinting scripts](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.3-Overrides-%5BTo-RFP-or-Not%5D#-fingerprinting) similar to other private browsers like Firefox+[Arkenfox](#arkenfox-advanced) or [Brave](#brave). Mullvad Browser provides these protections out of the box, at the expense of some flexibility and convenience that other private browsers can provide.
|
||||
|
||||
==For the strongest anti-fingerprinting protection, we recommend using Mullvad Browser in conjunction **with** a VPN==, whether that is Mullvad or another recommended VPN provider. When using a VPN with Mullvad Browser, you will share a fingerprint and a pool of IP addresses with many other users, giving you a "crowd" to blend in with. This strategy is the only way to thwart advanced tracking scripts, and is the same anti-fingerprinting technique used by Tor Browser.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that while you can use Mullvad Browser with any VPN provider, other people on that VPN must also be using Mullvad Browser for this "crowd" to exist, something which is more likely on Mullvad VPN compared to other providers, particularly this close to the launch of Mullvad Browser. Mullvad Browser does not have built-in VPN connectivity, nor does it check whether you are using a VPN before browsing; your VPN connection has to be configured and managed separately.
|
||||
Note that while you can use Mullvad Browser with any VPN provider, other people on that VPN must also be using Mullvad Browser for this "crowd" to exist, something which is more likely on Mullvad VPN compared to other providers. Mullvad Browser does not have built-in VPN connectivity, nor does it check whether you are using a VPN before browsing; your VPN connection has to be configured and managed separately.
|
||||
|
||||
Mullvad Browser comes with the *uBlock Origin* and *NoScript* browser extensions pre-installed. While we typically discourage adding *additional* [browser extensions](browser-extensions.md), these extensions that come pre-installed with the browser should **not** be removed or configured outside their default values, because doing so would noticeably make your browser fingerprint distinct from other Mullvad Browser users. It also comes pre-installed with the Mullvad Browser Extension, which *can* be safely removed without impacting your browser fingerprint if you would like, but is also safe to keep even if you don't use Mullvad VPN.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -110,12 +110,6 @@ Mullvad Browser operates in permanent private browsing mode, meaning your histor
|
|||
|
||||
This is required to prevent advanced forms of tracking, but does come at the cost of convenience and some Firefox features, such as Multi-Account Containers. Remember you can always use multiple browsers, for example, you could consider using Firefox+Arkenfox for a few sites that you want to stay logged in on or otherwise don't work properly in Mullvad Browser, and Mullvad Browser for general browsing.
|
||||
|
||||
### Mullvad Leta
|
||||
|
||||
Mullvad Browser comes with [**Mullvad Leta**](search-engines.md#mullvad-leta) as the default search engine, which functions as a proxy to either Google or Brave search results (configurable on the Mullvad Leta homepage).
|
||||
|
||||
If you are a Mullvad VPN user, there is some risk in using services like Mullvad Leta which are offered by your VPN provider themselves. This is because Mullvad theoretically has access to your true IP address (via their VPN) and your search activity (via Leta); the latter is information a VPN is typically intended to separate. Even though Mullvad collects very little information about their VPN subscribers or Leta users, you should consider a different [search engine](search-engines.md) if this risk concerns you.
|
||||
|
||||
## Firefox
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
|
@ -228,7 +222,7 @@ Max Protection enforces the use of DNS over HTTPS, and a security warning will s
|
|||
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Use Mullvad Browser for advanced anti-fingerprinting</p>
|
||||
|
||||
[Mullvad Browser](#mullvad-browser) provides the same anti-fingerprinting protections as Arkenfox out of the box, and does not require the use of Mullvad's VPN to benefit from these protections. Coupled with a VPN, Mullvad Browser can thwart more advanced tracking scripts which Arkenfox cannot. Arkenfox still has the advantage of being much more flexible, and allowing per-site exceptions for websites which you need to stay logged in to.
|
||||
[Mullvad Browser](#mullvad-browser) provides stronger anti-fingerprinting protections out of the box than Firefox, and does not require the use of Mullvad's VPN to benefit from these protections. Coupled with a VPN, Mullvad Browser can thwart more advanced tracking scripts which Arkenfox cannot. Firefox still has the advantage of being much more flexible, and allowing per-site exceptions for websites which you need to stay logged in to.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -140,11 +140,11 @@ Apple Mail has the ability to load remote content in the background or block it
|
|||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Evolution** is a personal information management application that provides integrated mail, calendaring and address book functionality. Evolution has extensive [documentation](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable) to help you get started.
|
||||
**Evolution** is a personal information management application that provides integrated mail, calendaring, and address book functionality. Evolution has extensive [documentation](https://gnome.pages.gitlab.gnome.org/evolution/help) to help you get started.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution/PrivacyPolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/-/wikis/home){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/-/wikis/Privacy-Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://gnome.pages.gitlab.gnome.org/evolution/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://gnome.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustaina
|
|||
|
||||
| Provider | OpenPGP / WKD | IMAP / SMTP | Zero-Access Encryption | Anonymous Payment Methods |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| [Proton Mail](#proton-mail) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Paid plans only | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Cash |
|
||||
| [Proton Mail](#proton-mail) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Paid plans only | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Cash <br>Monero via third party |
|
||||
| [Mailbox Mail](#mailbox-mail) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Mail only | Cash |
|
||||
| [Tuta](#tuta) | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Monero <br>Cash via third party |
|
||||
| [Tuta](#tuta) | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Monero via third party <br>Cash via third party |
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to (or instead of) an email provider recommended here, you may wish to consider a dedicated [email aliasing service](email-aliasing.md#recommended-providers) to protect your privacy. Among other things, these services can help protect your real inbox from spam, prevent marketers from correlating your accounts, and encrypt all incoming messages with PGP.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -82,11 +82,25 @@ The Proton Free plan comes with 500 MB of Mail storage, which you can increase u
|
|||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g., Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. If you have the Proton Unlimited plan or any multi-user Proton plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin) Premium for free.
|
||||
Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) such as Thunderbird. Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. The Proton Unlimited plan or any multi-user Proton plan includes access to [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin) Premium.
|
||||
|
||||
A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
|
||||
A [letter of attestation](https://res.cloudinary.com/dbulfrlrz/images/v1714639878/wp-pme/letter-of-attestation-proton-mail-20211109_3138714c61/letter-of-attestation-proton-mail-20211109_3138714c61.pdf) was provided for Proton Mail's apps in November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
|
||||
|
||||
Proton Mail has internal crash reports that are **not** shared with third parties. This can be disabled in the web app: :gear: → **All Settings** → **Account** → **Security and privacy** → **Privacy and data collection**.
|
||||
Proton Mail has internal crash reports that are **not** shared with third parties and can be disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
=== "Web"
|
||||
|
||||
From your inbox, select :gear: → **All Settings** → **Account** → **Security and privacy** → **Privacy and data collection**.
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Disable **Collect usage dignostics**
|
||||
- [ ] Disable **Send crash reports**
|
||||
|
||||
=== "Mobile"
|
||||
|
||||
From your inbox, select :material-menu: → :gear: **Settings** → select your username.
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Disable **Send crash reports**
|
||||
- [ ] Disable **Collect usage dignostics**
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Custom Domains and Aliases
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -94,7 +108,7 @@ Paid Proton Mail subscribers can use their own domain with the service or a [cat
|
|||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Private Payment Methods
|
||||
|
||||
Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) **cash** by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card, [Bitcoin](advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), and PayPal payments.
|
||||
Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) **cash** by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card, [Bitcoin](advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), and PayPal payments. Additionally, you can use [**Monero**](cryptocurrency.md#monero) to purchase vouchers for Proton Mail Plus or Proton Unlimited via their [official](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/add-monero-as-an-anonymous-payment-method-for-proton-services/31058/15) reseller [ProxyStore](https://dys2p.com/en/2025-09-09-proton.html).
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -126,7 +140,7 @@ Proton Mail's [Unlimited](https://proton.me/support/proton-plans#proton-unlimite
|
|||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Mailbox Mail** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox Mail is based in Berlin, Germany.
|
||||
**Mailbox Mail** (formerly *Mailbox.org*) is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox Mail is based in Berlin, Germany.
|
||||
|
||||
Accounts start with up to 2 GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -229,7 +243,7 @@ Paid Tuta accounts can use either 15 or 30 aliases depending on their plan and u
|
|||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Private Payment Methods
|
||||
|
||||
Tuta only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however [**cryptocurrency**](cryptocurrency.md) can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tuta.com/support/#cryptocurrency) with ProxyStore.
|
||||
Tuta only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however you can use [**cryptocurrency**](cryptocurrency.md) to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tuta.com/support/#cryptocurrency) with ProxyStore.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
title: "Mobile Phones"
|
||||
title: Mobile Phones
|
||||
icon: material/cellphone-check
|
||||
description: These mobile devices provide the best hardware security support for custom Android operating systems.
|
||||
cover: android.webp
|
||||
|
|
@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ End-of-life devices (such as GrapheneOS's "extended support" devices) do not hav
|
|||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
## Purchasing Advice
|
||||
## General Purchasing Advice
|
||||
|
||||
When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -73,11 +73,15 @@ Beginning with the **Pixel 8** and **8 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of
|
|||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
|
||||
### Hardware Security
|
||||
|
||||
Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
|
||||
|
||||
Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
|
||||
|
||||
The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://nitrokey.com/about) company.
|
||||
The Pixel 8 series and later supports ARM's Memory Tagging Extension ([MTE](https://developer.arm.com/documentation/108035/0100/Introduction-to-the-Memory-Tagging-Extension)), a hardware security enhancement that drastically lowers the probability of exploits occurring through memory corruption bugs. The stock Pixel OS allows you to enable MTE for supported apps through Google's Advanced Protection Program or via a developer option, but its usability is quite limited. [GrapheneOS](android/distributions.md#grapheneos), an alternative Android OS we recommend, greatly improves the usability and coverage of MTE in its implementation of the feature.
|
||||
|
||||
### Buying a Google Pixel
|
||||
|
||||
A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -98,6 +102,8 @@ A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
|
|||
, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
|
||||
- If the Pixel is unavailable in your region, the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) can be shipped globally.
|
||||
|
||||
The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://nitrokey.com/about) company.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
title: "Multifactor Authentication"
|
||||
icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
|
||||
description: These tools assist you with securing your internet accounts with Multifactor Authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party.
|
||||
title: Multifactor Authentication
|
||||
icon: material/two-factor-authentication
|
||||
description: These tools assist you with securing your internet accounts with multifactor authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party.
|
||||
cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
|
||||
|
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
|
|||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
**Multifactor Authentication Apps** implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called **Time-based One-time Passwords**, or **TOTP**. This is a method where websites share a secret with you which is used by your authenticator app to generate a six (usually) digit code based on the current time, which you enter while logging in for the website to check. Typically, these codes are regenerated every 30 seconds, and once a new code is generated the old one becomes useless. Even if a hacker gets one six-digit code, there is no way for them to reverse that code to get the original secret or otherwise be able to predict what any future codes might be.
|
||||
**Multifactor authentication apps** implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called **Time-based One-time Passwords**, or **TOTP**. This is a method where websites share a secret with you which is used by your authenticator app to generate a six (usually) digit code based on the current time, which you enter while logging in for the website to check. Typically, these codes are regenerated every 30 seconds, and once a new code is generated the old one becomes useless. Even if a hacker gets one six-digit code, there is no way for them to reverse that code to get the original secret or otherwise be able to predict what any future codes might be.
|
||||
|
||||
We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternatives as Android and iOS have better security and app isolation than most desktop operating systems.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
|
|||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://ente.io/auth){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://ente.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://help.ente.io/auth){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://help.ente.io/auth){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ente-io/ente/tree/main/auth#readme){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
|
|
@ -38,12 +38,14 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
|
|||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.ente.auth)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id6444121398)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ente-io/ente/releases?q=auth)
|
||||
- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://auth.ente.io)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://auth.ente.io)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
The server-side source code and infrastructure which underpins Ente Auth (if used with an online account) underwent an audit by [Cure53](https://ente.io/blog/cern-audit) in October 2025.
|
||||
|
||||
## Aegis Authenticator (Android)
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
|
@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
|
|||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getaegis.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://getaegis.app/aegis/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://buymeacoffee.com/beemdevelopment){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://buymeacoffee.com/beemdevelopment){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
|
@ -68,11 +70,10 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
|
|||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- markdownlint-disable-next-line -->
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
|
||||
|
||||
- Source code must be publicly available.
|
||||
- Must not require internet connectivity.
|
||||
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.
|
||||
- Cloud syncing must be optional; sync functionality, if available, must be E2EE.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
|
|||
- Not allowing app installation outside the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
|
||||
- Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
|
||||
- Warning you about unverified applications
|
||||
- Enabling ARM's hardware-based [Memory Tagging Extension (MTE)](https://developer.arm.com/documentation/108035/0100/Introduction-to-the-Memory-Tagging-Extension) for supported apps, which lowers the likelihood of device exploits happening through memory corruption bugs
|
||||
|
||||
### Google Play System Updates
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -98,11 +98,9 @@ Note that Bluetooth is automatically turned on after every system update.
|
|||
|
||||
Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** → **Name** and enter the device name you prefer.
|
||||
|
||||
It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** → **Automatic Updates**:
|
||||
It is important to install software updates frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable automatic updates to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** → **Automatic Updates**:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates**
|
||||
- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates**
|
||||
- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files**
|
||||
- [x] Turn on **Automatically Install**
|
||||
|
||||
**AirDrop** is commonly used to easily share files, but it represents a significant privacy risk. The AirDrop protocol constantly broadcasts your personal information to your surroundings, with [very weak](https://usenix.org/system/files/sec21-heinrich.pdf) security protections. Your identity can easily be discovered by attackers even with limited resources, and the Chinese government has [openly acknowledged](https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/01/hackers-can-id-unique-apple-airdrop-users-chinese-authorities-claim-to-do-just-that) using such techniques to identify AirDrop users in public since 2022.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -116,7 +114,19 @@ It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest sec
|
|||
|
||||
Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Siri & Search
|
||||
#### Apple Intelligence & Siri
|
||||
|
||||
This is available if your device supports **[Apple Intelligence](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/apple-intelligence-and-privacy-iphe3f499e0e/ios)**. Apple Intelligence uses a combination of on-device processing and their **[Private Cloud Compute](https://security.apple.com/blog/private-cloud-compute)** for things that take more processing power than your device can provide.
|
||||
|
||||
To see a report of all the requests made to Apple's servers, you can navigate to **Privacy & Security** → **Apple Intelligence Report** and press **Export Activity** to see activity from the either the last 15 minutes or 7 days, depending on what you set it for. Similar to the **App Privacy Report** which shows you the recent permissions accessed by the apps on your phone, the Apple Intelligence Report likewise shows what is being sent to Apple's servers while using Apple Intelligence.
|
||||
|
||||
Apple Intelligence can integrate with [ChatGPT](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/use-chatgpt-with-apple-intelligence-iph00fd3c8c2/ios). If you want ChatGPT integration, you can navigate to **ChatGPT** and press **Set Up**. If you want to disable it, go to the same place:
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Use ChatGPT**
|
||||
|
||||
You can also have it ask for confirmation every time if you leave ChatGPT integration on:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Turn on **Confirm Requests**
|
||||
|
||||
If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -130,28 +140,17 @@ Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** → **Passcode Options** →
|
|||
|
||||
If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode.
|
||||
|
||||
If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts.
|
||||
If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the [side button](https://support.apple.com/en-us/105103) and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will be required after your device restarts.
|
||||
|
||||
On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID, you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance, so you know which method works for your device.
|
||||
You can similarly disable biometrics by pressing the side button five times, or for devices with Touch ID, you can hold down the side button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance, so you know which method works for your device.
|
||||
|
||||
**Stolen Device Protection** adds additional security intended to protect your personal data if your device is stolen while unlocked. If you use biometrics and the Find My Device feature in your Apple Account settings, we recommend enabling this new protection:
|
||||
**Stolen Device Protection** adds additional security intended to protect your personal data if your device is stolen while unlocked. If you enable both biometric authentication and the [Find My](#find-my) iPhone feature, we recommend enabling this protection:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Select **Turn On Protection**
|
||||
- [x] Turn on **Stolen Device Protection**
|
||||
|
||||
After enabling Stolen Device Protection, [certain actions](https://support.apple.com/HT212510) will require biometric authentication without a password fallback (in the event that a shoulder surfer has obtained your PIN), such as using password autofill, accessing payment information, and disabling Lost Mode. It also adds a security delay to certain actions performed away from your home or another "familiar location," such as requiring a 1-hour timer to reset your Apple Account password or sign out of your Apple Account. This delay is intended to give you time to enable Lost Mode and secure your account before a thief can reset your device.
|
||||
|
||||
**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone.
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Control Center**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Siri**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Home Control**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Wallet**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories**
|
||||
**Allow Access When Locked** presents options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. Pick and choose which feature you want to disable to prevent unauthorized access if someone gets their hands on your phone. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you.
|
||||
|
||||
iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -186,17 +185,9 @@ You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to partic
|
|||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection**
|
||||
|
||||
**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources. You can also **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources.
|
||||
**[Safety Check](https://support.apple.com/guide/personal-safety/safety-check-iphone-ios-16-ips2aad835e1/1.0/web/1.0)** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here, you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources. You can also **Manage Sharing & Access**, which allows you to review and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. If you're in an abusive situation, read Apple's [Personal Safety User Guide](https://support.apple.com/guide/personal-safety/welcome/web) for guidance on what you should do.
|
||||
|
||||
You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**:
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Assistive Voice Features**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Improve AR Location Accuracy**
|
||||
You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send usage data to Apple. Select **Analytics & Improvements** and unselect the type(s) of analytics that you don't want to send to Apple.
|
||||
|
||||
Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising**:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -206,7 +197,11 @@ Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Adve
|
|||
|
||||
- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report**
|
||||
|
||||
[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/HT212650) as they do normally.
|
||||
Set wired accessories to ask for permission when you connect them. Select **Wired Accessories**:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Select **Always Ask** or **Ask for New Accessories**
|
||||
|
||||
**[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode)** is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/HT212650) as they do normally.
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode**
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -220,7 +215,13 @@ Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Bo
|
|||
|
||||
The [color of the message bubble](https://support.apple.com/en-us/104972) in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates the other party is using either the outdated SMS and MMS protocols or RCS. RCS on iOS is **not** E2EE. Currently, the only way to have E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices.
|
||||
|
||||
If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations like Signal's (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications.
|
||||
If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages.
|
||||
|
||||
By default, you trust Apple's identity servers that you're messaging the right person. To defend yourself from a potentially malicious server, you can enable **[Contact Key Verification](https://support.apple.com/en-us/118246)**. At the top of the **Settings** app where your name is, select it, then go to **Contact Key Verification**.
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Turn on **Verification in iMessage**
|
||||
|
||||
Both you and your contacts need to enable Contact Key Verification and follow Apple's [instructions](https://support.apple.com/en-us/118246#verify) for the security assurances mentioned above to take effect.
|
||||
|
||||
### Photo Permissions
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -250,23 +251,40 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th
|
|||
|
||||
You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability.
|
||||
|
||||
### Guided Access
|
||||
|
||||
Sometimes you might want to hand your phone to someone to make a call or do a specific task, but you don't want them to have full access to your phone. In these cases, you can quickly enable **[Guided Access](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/lock-iphone-to-one-app-iph7fad0d10/ios)** to lock the phone to one specific app until you authenticate.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Guided Access isn't foolproof, as it's possible you could leak data unintentionally or the feature could be bypassed. You should only use Guided Access for situations where you casually hand your phone to someone to use. You should not use it as a tool to protect against advanced adversaries.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
### Redacting Elements in Images
|
||||
|
||||
If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so.
|
||||
|
||||
If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images.
|
||||
You can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature on supported devices to pixelate faces or remove objects from images.
|
||||
|
||||
- Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction
|
||||
- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen)
|
||||
- Tap the :material-tune:
|
||||
- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up**
|
||||
- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated, and it will attempt to delete anything else.
|
||||
|
||||
Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="annotate" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- Tap the image you have selected for redaction
|
||||
- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right
|
||||
- Tap the :material-tune: → :material-dots-horizontal: (1) → Markup → :material-plus:
|
||||
- Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle
|
||||
- On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit.
|
||||
- On the toolbar, tap the circle and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
1. This may not appear on certain iPhone models.
|
||||
|
||||
**Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, as its opacity is not quite 100%.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -283,3 +301,11 @@ Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to h
|
|||
### Before First Unlock
|
||||
|
||||
If your threat model includes [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } that involve forensic tools, and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.
|
||||
|
||||
iPhones [automatically reboot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/protecting-user-data-in-the-face-of-attack-secf5549a4f5/1/web/1#:~:text=On%20an%20iPhone%20or%20iPad%20with%20iOS%2018%20and%20iPadOS%2018%20or%20later%2C%20a%20new%20security%20protection%20will%20restart%20devices%20if%20they%20remain%20locked%20for%20a%20prolonged%20period%20of%20time.) if they're not unlocked after a period of time.
|
||||
|
||||
### MTE
|
||||
|
||||
The iPhone 17 line and later offer a security enhancement called [Memory Tagging Extension](https://developer.arm.com/documentation/108035/0100/Introduction-to-the-Memory-Tagging-Extension) (MTE), which makes it significantly harder for an attacker to exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities. This always-on protection depends on hardware support, so it's not available for older devices.
|
||||
|
||||
For more details on Apple's implementation of MTE, read the [blog post](https://security.apple.com/blog/memory-integrity-enforcement) published by Apple Security Research. We also cover Apple's implementation of MTE and how it compares to Android's implementation in the Google Pixel 8 series and later in our [own article](https://www.privacyguides.org/posts/2025/09/20/memory-integrity-enforcement-changes-the-game-on-ios).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -118,19 +118,9 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall
|
|||
|
||||
### Permission Controls
|
||||
|
||||
Desktop environments (DEs) that support the [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org) display protocol are [more secure](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147) than those that only support X11. However, not all DEs take full advantage of Wayland's architectural security improvements.
|
||||
Desktop environments that support the [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org) display protocol are [more secure](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147) than those that only support X11. Moreover, we *generally* recommend installing and using applications which are sandboxed such as those obtained via **Flatpak**. Flatpak supports the [`security-context-v1`](https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/pull/4920) protocol and the ability to filter D-Bus protocols, which allow Flatpak to properly identify apps for the purpose of sandboxing them through permission controls.[^1] Conversely, applications outside sandboxes are free to perform privileged actions such as capturing your screen, either by [overwriting the portal permission store](https://invent.kde.org/plasma/xdg-desktop-portal-kde/-/issues/7#note_1112260), or [making use of privileged Wayland protocols](https://github.com/swaywm/sway/pull/7648#issuecomment-2507730794).
|
||||
|
||||
For example, GNOME has a notable edge in security compared to other DEs by implementing permission controls for third-party software that tries to [capture your screen](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-shell/-/issues/3943). That is, when a third-party application attempts to capture your screen, you are prompted for your permission to share your screen with the app.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure markdown>
|
||||
{ width="450" }
|
||||
<figcaption>GNOME's screenshot permission dialog</figcaption>
|
||||
</figure>
|
||||
|
||||
Many alternatives don't provide these same permission controls yet,[^1] while some are waiting for Wayland to implement these controls upstream.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: KDE currently has an open proposal to add controls for screen captures: <https://invent.kde.org/plasma/xdg-desktop-portal-kde/-/issues/7>
|
||||
[^2]: Sway is waiting to add specific security controls until they "know how security as a whole is going to play out" in Wayland: <https://github.com/swaywm/sway/issues/5118#issuecomment-600054496>
|
||||
[^1]: This exposes a reliable way for Wayland compositors to get identifying information about a client. Compositors can then apply security policies if desirable. [https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/f0e626a4b60439f211f06d35df74b675a9ef42f4](https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/f0e626a4b60439f211f06d35df74b675a9ef42f4)
|
||||
|
||||
## Privacy Tweaks
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ The free plan offers 10 GB of storage as long as you use the service at least o
|
|||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Ente Photos underwent an audit by [Cure53](https://ente.io/blog/cryptography-audit) in March 2023 and by [Fallible](https://ente.io/reports/Fallible-Audit-Report-19-04-2023.pdf) in April 2023.
|
||||
The server-side source code and infrastructure which underpins Ente Photos underwent an audit by [Cure53](https://ente.io/blog/cern-audit) in October 2025. Previous audits were completed by [Cure53](https://ente.io/blog/cryptography-audit) in March 2023 and by [Fallible](https://ente.io/reports/Fallible-Audit-Report-19-04-2023.pdf) in April 2023.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -23,8 +23,7 @@ Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your threat model requires hi
|
|||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| [Brave Search](#brave-search) | [Independent](https://brave.com/search-independence) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Anonymized[^1] | United States |
|
||||
| [DuckDuckGo](#duckduckgo) | [Bing](https://help.duckduckgo.com/results/sources) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Anonymized[^2] | United States |
|
||||
| [Mullvad Leta](#mullvad-leta) | [Brave and Google](https://leta.mullvad.net/faq#what-can-leta-do) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Anonymized[^3] | Sweden |
|
||||
| [Startpage](#startpage) | [Google and Bing](https://support.startpage.com/hc/articles/4522435533844-What-is-the-relationship-between-Startpage-and-your-search-partners-like-Google-and-Microsoft-Bing) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Anonymized[^4] | Netherlands |
|
||||
| [Startpage](#startpage) | [Google and Bing](https://support.startpage.com/hc/articles/4522435533844-What-is-the-relationship-between-Startpage-and-your-search-partners-like-Google-and-Microsoft-Bing) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Anonymized[^3] | Netherlands |
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]:
|
||||
Brave Search collects aggregated usage metrics, which includes the OS and the user agent. However, they do not collect PII. To serve [anonymous local results](https://search.brave.com/help/anonymous-local-results), IP addresses are temporarily processed, but are not retained.
|
||||
|
|
@ -35,10 +34,6 @@ Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your threat model requires hi
|
|||
|
||||
DuckDuckGo Privacy Policy: [*We don't track you.*](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy)
|
||||
[^3]:
|
||||
Mullvad Leta logs your searches and stores them hashed with a secret in a RAM-based cache. The cache is removed after it reaches 30 days in age, or when the server-side Leta application is restarted. They do not collect any PII.
|
||||
|
||||
Terms of Service: [*Service Usage*](https://leta.mullvad.net/terms-of-service)
|
||||
[^4]:
|
||||
Startpage logs details such as operating system, user agent, and language. They do not log your IP address, search queries, or other PII.
|
||||
|
||||
Our Privacy Policy: [*How we have implemented truly anonymous analytics*](https://startpage.com/en/privacy-policy#section-4)
|
||||
|
|
@ -83,32 +78,6 @@ DuckDuckGo is the default search engine for the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser
|
|||
|
||||
DuckDuckGo offers two [other versions](https://help.duckduckgo.com/features/non-javascript) of their search engine, both of which do not require JavaScript. These versions do lack features, however. These versions can also be used in conjunction with their Tor hidden address by appending [/lite](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/lite) or [/html](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/html) for the respective version.
|
||||
|
||||
### Mullvad Leta
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Mullvad Leta** is a search engine developed by Mullvad. It uses a [shared cache](https://leta.mullvad.net/faq#what-is-cached-search) to fetch search results and limit calls to the search APIs it uses.
|
||||
|
||||
Mullvad Leta currently only provides text search results. It is the default search engine for the [Mullvad Browser](desktop-browsers.md#mullvad-browser).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://leta.mullvad.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://uxngojcovdcyrmwkmkltyy2q7enzzvgv7vlqac64f2vl6hcrrqtlskqd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://leta.mullvad.net/terms-of-service){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://leta.mullvad.net/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Mullvad Leta is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Mullvad Browser](desktop-browsers.md#mullvad-browser) on the Safest security level.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Mullvad Leta was [audited](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/security-audit-of-our-letamullvadnet-search-service) by Assured AB in March 2023. All issues were addressed and fixed shortly after the [report](https://assured.se/publications/Assured_Mullvad_Leta_pentest_report_2023.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
### Startpage
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ If you used our recommended configuration settings above, you should be posting
|
|||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1083446067)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/element-hq/element-android/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.element.android.x)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1631335820)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/element-hq/element-x-android/releases)
|
||||
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://element.io/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/download)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec
|
|||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Mailbox Mail is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox Mail is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with up to 2 GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
|
||||
Mailbox Mail (formerly *Mailbox.org*) is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox Mail is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with up to 2 GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
|
||||
|
||||
[Read Full Review :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email.md#mailbox-mail)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -338,7 +338,6 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
|||
|
||||
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Brave Search](search-engines.md#brave-search)
|
||||
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [DuckDuckGo](search-engines.md#duckduckgo)
|
||||
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mullvad Leta](search-engines.md#mullvad-leta)
|
||||
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [SearXNG](search-engines.md#searxng)
|
||||
- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Startpage](search-engines.md#startpage)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
51
docs/vpn.md
|
|
@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
meta_title: "Private VPN Service Recommendations and Comparison, No Sponsors or Ads - Privacy Guides"
|
||||
title: "VPN Services"
|
||||
title: VPN Services
|
||||
icon: material/vpn
|
||||
description: The best VPN services for protecting your privacy and security online. Find a provider here that isn't out to spy on you.
|
||||
cover: vpn.webp
|
||||
global:
|
||||
- [randomize-element, "table tbody"]
|
||||
- [randomize-element, "table tbody"]
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
|
||||
|
|
@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add ad
|
|||
|
||||
If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser. If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
|
||||
|
||||
[Download Tor](https://torproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Tor Myths & FAQ](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
[Introduction to the Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Tor Myths & FAQ](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -30,11 +31,11 @@ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser. If you're
|
|||
|
||||
Our recommended providers use encryption, support WireGuard & OpenVPN, and have a no logging policy. Read our [full list of criteria](#criteria) for more information.
|
||||
|
||||
| Provider | Countries | WireGuard | Port Forwarding | IPv6 | Anonymous Payments
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---
|
||||
| [Proton](#proton-vpn) | 112+ | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Partial Support | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Limited Support | Cash
|
||||
| [IVPN](#ivpn) | 37+ | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Outgoing Only | Monero, Cash
|
||||
| [Mullvad](#mullvad) | 49+ | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Monero, Cash
|
||||
| Provider | Countries | WireGuard | Port Forwarding | IPv6 | Anonymous Payments |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| [Proton](#proton-vpn) | 127+ | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Partial Support | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Limited Support | Cash Monero via third party |
|
||||
| [IVPN](#ivpn) | 41+ | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Outgoing Only | Monero Cash |
|
||||
| [Mullvad](#mullvad) | 49+ | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Monero Cash |
|
||||
|
||||
### Proton VPN
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ Our recommended providers use encryption, support WireGuard & OpenVPN, and have
|
|||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://protonvpn.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://protonvpn.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://protonvpn.com/support){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://protonvpn.com/support){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonVPN){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
|
|
@ -63,18 +64,21 @@ Our recommended providers use encryption, support WireGuard & OpenVPN, and have
|
|||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } 112 Countries
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } 127 Countries
|
||||
|
||||
Proton VPN has [servers in 112 countries](https://protonvpn.com/vpn-servers) or [5](https://protonvpn.com/support/how-to-create-free-vpn-account) if you use their [free plan](https://protonvpn.com/free-vpn/server).(1) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
|
||||
Proton VPN has [servers in 127 countries](https://protonvpn.com/vpn-servers)(1) or [10](https://protonvpn.com/support/how-to-create-free-vpn-account) if you use their [free plan](https://protonvpn.com/blog/product-roadmap-winter-2025-2026).(2) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
|
||||
{ .annotate }
|
||||
|
||||
1. Last checked: 2024-08-06
|
||||
1. Of which at least 71 are virtual servers, meaning your IP will appear from the country but the server is in another. 12 more locations have both hardware and virtual servers. [Source](https://protonvpn.com/support/how-smart-routing-works)
|
||||
2. Last checked: 2025-10-28
|
||||
|
||||
We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Independently Audited
|
||||
|
||||
As of January 2020, Proton VPN has undergone an independent audit by SEC Consult. SEC Consult found some medium and low risk vulnerabilities in Proton VPN's Windows, Android, and iOS applications, all of which were "properly fixed" by Proton VPN before the reports were published. None of the issues identified would have provided an attacker remote access to your device or traffic. You can view individual reports for each platform at [protonvpn.com](https://protonvpn.com/blog/open-source). In April 2022 Proton VPN underwent [another audit](https://protonvpn.com/blog/no-logs-audit). A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton VPN's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
|
||||
Independent security researcher Ruben Santamarta conducted audits for Proton VPN's [browser extensions](https://drive.proton.me/urls/RWDD2SHT98#v7ZrwNcafkG8) and [apps](https://drive.proton.me/urls/RVW8TXG484#uTXX5Fc9GADo) in September 2024 and January 2025, respectively. Proton VPN's infrastrcture has undergone [annual audits](https://protonvpn.com/blog/no-logs-audit) by Securitum since 2022.
|
||||
|
||||
Previously, Proton VPN underwent an independent audit by SEC Consult in January 2020. SEC Consult found some medium and low risk vulnerabilities in Proton VPN's Windows, Android, and iOS applications, all of which were "properly fixed" by Proton VPN before the reports were published. None of the issues identified would have provided an attacker remote access to your device or traffic. You can view individual reports for each platform in their dedicated [blog post](https://web.archive.org/web/20250307041036/https://protonvpn.com/blog/open-source) on the audit.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Open-Source Clients
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -82,7 +86,7 @@ Proton VPN provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in thei
|
|||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Accepts Cash
|
||||
|
||||
Proton VPN, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards, PayPal, and [Bitcoin](advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), also accepts **cash/local currency** as an anonymous form of payment.
|
||||
Proton VPN, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards, PayPal, and [Bitcoin](advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), also accepts **cash/local currency** as an anonymous form of payment. You can also use [**Monero**](cryptocurrency.md#monero) to purchase vouchers for Proton VPN Plus and Proton Unlimited via their [official](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/add-monero-as-an-anonymous-payment-method-for-proton-services/31058/15) reseller [ProxyStore](https://dys2p.com/en/2025-09-09-proton.html).
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } WireGuard Support
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -135,7 +139,7 @@ System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-swit
|
|||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://ivpn.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://ivpn.net/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ivpn){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
|
|
@ -153,12 +157,12 @@ System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-swit
|
|||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } 37 Countries
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } 41 Countries
|
||||
|
||||
IVPN has [servers in 37 countries](https://ivpn.net/status).(1) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
|
||||
IVPN has [servers in 41 countries](https://ivpn.net/status).(1) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
|
||||
{ .annotate }
|
||||
|
||||
1. Last checked: 2024-08-06
|
||||
1. Last checked: 2025-10-28
|
||||
|
||||
We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -172,7 +176,7 @@ As of February 2020 [IVPN applications are now open source](https://ivpn.net/blo
|
|||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Accepts Cash and Monero
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, IVPN accepts Bitcoin, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** (on annual plans) as anonymous forms of payment. Prepaid cards with redeem codes are [also available](https://ivpn.net/knowledgebase/billing/voucher-cards-faq).
|
||||
In addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, IVPN accepts Bitcoin, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** (on annual plans) as anonymous forms of payment. You can also purchase [prepaid cards](https://ivpn.net/knowledgebase/billing/voucher-cards-faq) with redeem codes.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } WireGuard Support
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -211,7 +215,7 @@ IVPN clients support two-factor authentication. IVPN also provides "[AntiTracker
|
|||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mullvad.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mullvad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
|
|
@ -233,7 +237,7 @@ IVPN clients support two-factor authentication. IVPN also provides "[AntiTracker
|
|||
Mullvad has [servers in 49 countries](https://mullvad.net/servers).(1) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
|
||||
{ .annotate }
|
||||
|
||||
1. Last checked: 2025-03-10
|
||||
1. Last checked: 2025-10-28
|
||||
|
||||
We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -247,13 +251,14 @@ Mullvad provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [
|
|||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Accepts Cash and Monero
|
||||
|
||||
Mullvad, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment. Prepaid cards with redeem codes are also available. Mullvad also accepts Swish and bank wire transfers, as well as a few European payment systems.
|
||||
Mullvad, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment. You can also purchase [prepaid cards](https://mullvad.net/en/help/partnerships-and-resellers) with redeem codes. Mullvad also accepts Swish and bank wire transfers, as well as a few European payment systems.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } WireGuard Support
|
||||
|
||||
Mullvad supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://wireguard.com/protocol). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
|
||||
|
||||
Mullvad [recommends](https://mullvad.net/en/help/why-wireguard) the use of WireGuard with their service. It is the default or only protocol on Mullvad's Android, iOS, macOS, and Linux apps, but on Windows you have to [manually enable](https://mullvad.net/en/help/how-turn-wireguard-mullvad-app) WireGuard. Mullvad also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://wireguard.com/install).
|
||||
Mullvad [recommends](https://mullvad.net/en/help/why-wireguard) the use of WireGuard with their service. It is the only protocol supported on their mobile apps, and their desktop apps will [lose OpenVPN support](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/reminder-that-openvpn-is-being-removed) in 2025. Additionally, their servers will stop accepting OpenVPN connections by January 15, 2026.
|
||||
Mullvad also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://wireguard.com/install).
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } IPv6 Support
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -34,7 +34,9 @@
|
|||
{% elif config.site_author %}
|
||||
<meta name="author" content="{{ config.site_author }}">
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
{% if page.canonical_url %}
|
||||
{% if page.meta and page.meta.canonical_url %}
|
||||
<link rel="canonical" href="{{ page.meta.canonical_url }}">
|
||||
{% elif page.canonical_url %}
|
||||
<link rel="canonical" href="{{ page.canonical_url }}">
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
{% if page.previous_page %}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||