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---
date:
created: 2025-05-19T20:15:00Z
categories:
- Opinion
authors:
- fria
tags:
- AI
- Content Credentials
---
# The Power of Digital Provenance in the Age of AI
![Article cover showing a painterly background with cool colors and the Content Credentials logo](../assets/images/digital-provenance/cover.jpg)
<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Kseniya Lapteva / Pexels | Logo: Content Credentials</small>
With the popularity of generative AI, it's becoming more and more difficult to [distinguish](https://uwaterloo.ca/news/media/can-you-tell-ai-generated-people-real-ones) reality from fiction. Can this problem be solved using cryptography? What are the privacy implications of the currently proposed systems?<!-- more -->
## The Problem
Can you tell which of these images are AI generated?
<div class="grid" markdown>
![Group of geese by some water](../assets/images/digital-provenance/geese1.jpeg)
![Group of geese by some water](../assets/images/digital-provenance/geese2.jpeg)
![Group of geese by some water](../assets/images/digital-provenance/geese3.jpeg)
![Group of geese by some water](../assets/images/digital-provenance/geese4.jpeg)
</div>
...Have a guess?
---
Actually, they're all real. But the fact that you may have believed some of them were AI generated poses a problem: How can we tell where an image came from, if it was AI generated, and whether it was edited?
## Provenance
[Provenance](https://youtu.be/K56EhgfCDjs) is the history of ownership of an object, typically used when referring to antiques or art. Knowing the history of a piece of art can affect the value a lot, but you need a way to prove it's an original piece by the artist instead of a reproduction, or was owned by a famous person.
Provenance can take many [forms](https://artbusiness.com/provwarn.html), from an original receipt or documentation from the artist themselves to stickers from a gallery attached to it. Typically, you want a signed [certificate](https://www.artcertificate.co.uk/?id_article=2267) from an expert on the artist in order to verify its authenticity.
## Hoaxes
It's important for historical preservation as well to know that an object is really from a certain time period. There's no shortage of [historical hoaxes](https://www.history.com/articles/7-historical-hoaxes). These can distort our view of history and make us all a bit dumber.
### Cardiff Giant
One of the most famous hoaxes was that of the [Cardiff Giant](https://www.history.com/articles/the-cardiff-giant-fools-the-nation-145-years-ago).
An atheist named George Hull got into an argument with a preacher. Hull was frustrated with the preacher's literal interpretation of the bible, particularly his belief that giants were real.
Hull devised a plan to trick the religious and make some money at the same time. He would have a statue of a giant man constructed and pass it off as a petrified human.
After securing the materials needed, specifically a soft material called gypsum, he convinced a marble dealer to help him with his scheme. A pair of sculptors carved out the visage of a giant 10-foot man, with Hull posing as a model. They even poured sulfuric acid over it to give it an aged look.
He settled on burying the giant in Cardiff, New York, where he cut a deal with a distant relative and farmer named William "Stub" Newell.
On October 16, 1869, Newell hired an unsuspecting pair of workers to dig a well on his property. After they inevitably uncovered the giant, it wasn't long before the whole town was in a frenzy.
![men surrounding a stone sculpture of a man in a hole in the ground doffing their hats](../assets/images/digital-provenance/cardiff-giant.jpg)
<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Wikimedia Commons (Public Domain)</small>
Speculation that the sculpture was an ancient, petrified man quickly began to spread. Eventually, a syndicate of businessmen offered Newell $30,000 (worth $[705,438.97](https://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/1869?amount=30000) in today's money) for a three-fourths stake, and he took them up on that offer.
P.T. Barnum even tried to buy the sculpture, and after being turned down, he had a replica built and displayed it in a Manhattan museum. Several other copies were made afterward, and soon, there were petrified giants being exhibited all over the country.
In a way that seems familiar to us now, you couldn't even be sure you were looking at the *real* hoax. Misinformation can so easily mutate and spread when left unchecked.
A famed Yale paleontologist named Othniel Charles Marsh declared it "of very recent origin, and a most decided humbug." Unfortunately, as is so often the case, Hull had already cashed in on the fervor by the time experts had properly debunked his hoax.
### AI Hoaxes
Many modern hoaxes tend to make use of social media and focus on getting views and clicks over selling a physical object.
[Miniminuteman](https://youtu.be/Pc2psN0PFTk) is a great YouTube channel covering misinformation on the internet, specifically about archaeology. Misinformation can spread quickly, especially now with the rise of generative AI that can make convincing fake images and videos.
[Here](https://www.mediamatters.org/media/4016186/embed/embed) you can see an example of AI being used to make a fake Joe Rogan podcast clip. Now, whether or not you view Joe Rogan as a reliable source of information is another topic, but as one of the [most popular podcasts](https://podcastcharts.byspotify.com), his reach could be leveraged to spread dangerous misinformation like that a meteor is going to hit earth and kill everyone.
The effort required is low, and the return is high. With TikTok's [Creator Rewards Program](https://www.tiktok.com/creator-academy/en/article/creator-rewards-program), content that's at least 60 seconds long and has high engagement will be rewarded. That means longer videos with alarming content like conspiracy theory videos will do very well since they will have lots of comments from people either fooled by the content posting about how scared they are or people debunking the claims. The insidious thing is the creators get rewarded either way.
[Several](https://youtu.be/E4I6K8OEyho?si=wbWAUcLsjOA7yDnO) [history](https://youtu.be/cqrHmjGD1ds?si=k60RTO9MH177ASTS) [channels](https://youtu.be/HG1324unhcA?si=MuwglKd52FQ7iKU3) on YouTube have expressed their concerns about misinformation being spread about history through AI generated images and videos and how they can distort our view of the past. There's even the possibility that these AI generated images could end up polluting the historical record.
## Content Authenticity Initiative
In 2019, [Adobe announced](https://contentauthenticity.org/blog/test) that it was partnering with the New York Times and Twitter on a project to develop an industry standard for digital content attribution called the Content Authenticity Initiative.
Twitter has since dropped out of the partnership.
## Project Origin
At the same time, [Project Origin](https://www.originproject.info) was designing their system for content transparency. This started as a partnership between Microsoft and the BBC.
## C2PA
The Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, or [C2PA](https://c2pa.org), combines the efforts of Project Origin and the Content Authenticity Initiative. Together, they created the [C2PA standard](https://c2pa.org/specifications/specifications/2.1/specs/C2PA_Specification.html) used to add verifiable provenance data to files, which they dub "Content Credentials."
## Content Credentials
[Content Credentials](https://contentcredentials.org) are the implementation of digital provenance by the C2PA, the culmination of years of research and development by major tech companies, from camera manufacturers to photo editing software and AI companies to social media sites.
The way Content Credentials work draws on concepts both familiar and alien. The standard is designed to be flexible and cover the myriad ways media is used online.
It's important to note that Content Credentials aren't attempting to determine "truth"; that's a much more complex and philosophical topic. Rather, they're trying to show where an image came from, edits made to it, its constituent parts, etc. so that you can decide for yourself if you trust the source. It's trying to show you that an image came from the BBC, rather than whether you should trust the BBC.
### Manifest
Content Credentials are contained in what's called the **manifest**. The manifest consists of the claim, claim signature, and assertions.
![Example of a Manifest, with the Claim, Claim Signature, and Assertions inside](../assets/images/digital-provenance/manifest.svg)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: [C2PA](https://c2pa.org/specifications/specifications/2.1/specs/C2PA_Specification.html)</small>
The manifest is created by hardware or software called a "claim generator."
Files can have multiple manifests, and the set of manifests comprise its provenance data.
#### Assertions
An assertion is labelled data such as the type of camera used, actions performed on the image such as color corrections, a thumbnail image, or other types of data.
#### Claim
The claim gathers together all the assertions and then hashes and cryptographically signs them. The claim is the part that backs up the assertions with cryptography; without it, there wouldn't be a way to verify the authenticity of the data.
### Signatures
The foundation is based around cryptographic signatures, similar to how you'd cryptographically sign software or text with a PGP signature.
The parts of a file that are cryptographically verified are called "hard bindings." This allows programs to detect tampering.
#### Certificate Authorities
There are certificate authorities similar to how HTTPS works, which allow only signatures from trusted sources. Non-trusted signatures will give a warning in whatever C2PA-enabled software you're using.
Content Credentials allow for each application to provide its own *trust lists*: lists of certificate authorities trusted by the application.
The C2PA gives a few examples to illustrate. A news organization might rely on a non-profit organization that verifies the authenticity of sources through real-world due diligence. An insurance company might operate its own internal CA to verify only its own employees handled the images.
### Ingredients
However, what's interesting is Content Credentials can cover multiple assets being [combined](https://contentcredentials.org/verify?source=https%3A%2F%2Fcontentcredentials.org%2F_app%2Fimmutable%2Fassets%2Fhome2.91ab8f2d.jpg) and still be able to verify each element of the image. Each element is called an "ingredient." When the ingredients come together, the result is called a "composed asset," with "asset" referring to a digital media file or data stream.
### Chain of Provenance
It also supports a chain of provenance, showing all steps in the life cycle of the file that change its contents such as edits. These are referred to as "actions."
The specification supports a list of pre-defined actions such as edits, changing the color, translating to a different language, etc. It's really quite flexible, but the flexibility of information that can be provided allows for more opportunities for errors and means you need to trust the entity providing the information more.
An issue I noticed is when making edits using software that doesn't support Content Credentials, they will be corrupted and can't be read by verification programs. This poses a problem for the "unbroken chain of provenance" that the standard promises.
These verification programs tend to offer a way to check against a database of images with Content Credentials, so you can find an image with unbroken provenance data. They use "soft bindings" or a type of fingerprinting of the image in order to find similar images in the database.
I think this problem will be less and less of an issue when more software supports the standard. It will need to be so ubiquitous that image viewing programs don't trust images without provenance data, similar to how browsers don't trust websites without HTTPS. But for now with its very limited availability, that's not the case.
### Privacy
Since Content Credentials are all about attaching extra data to images, concerns about privacy are reasonable.
However, it's important to remember that metadata has always existed in relation to digital files. Just like the metadata we've always had, Content Credentials are optional.
Of course, it'll be up to programs we use to mediate what data is included. In order for the system to work as intended, certain things like "this photo was edited in Adobe Photoshop" will need to be automatically applied. Clear lines between personal data such as names, location, etc. need to be kept up to the user to add.
Privacy was one of the stated goals when the C2PA was designing Content Credentials, and I think they've done a good job giving users control over their information.
## Support
There are several online verification tools you can use to try out Content Credentials. [ContentCredentials.org](https://contentcredentials.org) offers a [verification tool](https://contentcredentials.org/verify) that lets you upload a media file and check its Content Credentials. They have some example images on their site you can try, or you can upload images from elsewhere and see where Content Credentials are supported, for example you can upload any image generated in ChatGPT.
Content Credentials also offers an official [command line tool](https://github.com/contentauth/c2pa-rs/releases?q=c2patool), so you can view exactly what data is being stored in the image. They provide some samples as well that you can play around with. To view the content credentials, just run
```sh
c2patool sample/C.jpg
```
for any image you want to inspect, replacing sample/C.jpg with a path to your image.
### BBC
The BBC is doing a limited trial run of Content Credentials with [BBC Verify](https://www.bbc.com/news/bbcverify). Not all media in these articles have Content Credentials attached. [This article](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-68462851) has Content Credentials for the video at the bottom. They also ask for feedback, so feel free to provide some. I'd like to see more Content Credentials show up in news reporting, so please add your voice.
### OpenAI
OpenAI has embraced Content Credentials, with images generated using ChatGPT identifying themselves using Content Credentials. Try [generating an image](https://chatgpt.com) and upload it to the verification tool. You should see it identify the origin as OpenAI.
### TikTok
[TikTok](https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/partnering-with-our-industry-to-advance-ai-transparency-and-literacy) became the first video sharing platform to support Content Credentials. For now, it's limited to being able to read Content Credentials from certain AI platforms. They say in the future they'll start labeling all content from TikTok with Content Credentials, but it seems they haven't enabled that yet, as if you download a video from TikTok, the C2PA verify tool will say it doesn't have any Content Credentials.
### Leica
Leica's [M11-P camera](https://leica-camera.com/en-US/photography/cameras/m/m11-p-black) is the first camera in the world to support Content Credentials. That's a huge step toward adoption; camera manufacturers need to support Content Credentials if they're going to be included from the creation of the image.
### Nikon
Nikon is planning to release a firmware update for their [Z6III](https://www.nikon.co.uk/en_GB/learn-and-explore/magazine/gear/nikon-z6iii-firmware-update-to-feature-content-verification) camera that will support Content Credentials.
### Adobe
Much of Adobe's [software](https://helpx.adobe.com/creative-cloud/help/content-credentials.html) supports Content Credentials, including Photoshop, Lightroom, and Adobe Camera Raw as well as Adobe's Firefly AI.
### Qualcomm
With the Snapdragon 8 Gen 3 chipset, Qualcomm is embedding Content Credential capabilities into the Trusted Execution Environment, allowing for Content Credentials to be added right as the photo is produced.
## Limitations
### Lack of Support
Content Credentials will need widespread support at every level, from hardware OEMs to photo editing software vendors and AI generators to sites that host and display images. The rollout of Content Credentials will be slow, although more and more companies are starting to support them.
There are still major players missing support like Apple and Android, which is a big problem considering how many images are taken, edited, and shared on smartphones. Once photos taken from your phone can be imbued with Content Credentials in the default camera app, we'll see much wider adoption I think.
### Easy to Remove
In my testing, any edits from a program that doesn't support Content Credentials will render them unreadable after that point. This problem won't be as bad if and when support for Content Credentials becomes widespread, since you can just decide not to trust images without them, sort of like not trusting a website without HTTPS. Platforms could even display a warning.
But for now, removing Content Credentials won't be noticed.
### Reliant on Certificate Authorities
The system shares a flaw with HTTPS in that you need to rely on trusted Certificate Authorities to verify the validity of the information, except that Content Credentials are trying to verify a lot more information than just who originally made the image.
Since anyone can add their own Content Credentials to an image, a warning is displayed similar to a certificate warning in your browser that the Content Credentials come from an untrusted entity.
### Complexity
One of the issues I ran into while researching was just how complex the standard is, since it needs to cover so many use cases and situations. This is pure speculation, but I can imagine the sheer complexity makes it unattractive for platforms to implement and maintain, which could be contributing to the very slow and partial rollout we're seeing on the platforms of even founding members of the project like the BBC.
I think this will be less of an issue as it rolls out however, as platforms will likely be able to use each other's implementations, or at least reference them when implementing it on their platform.
The standard is still in early stages and there's plenty of room to shape it and improve it in the future, so make your voice heard about how you want to see it implemented. I think with more awareness about Content Credentials, platforms will feel more pressure to support them, so if you want to see this feature on your favorite platform, speak up and gather support.

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@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ The 26-year-old American who incorrectly identified the Australian girl and shar
### Targeted research, attack, and spyware
For targeted attacks, aggressors will often use simple techniques to find a victim's data from what is already leaked online, or openly shared on social media. For more sophisticated attacks, perpetrators might use criminal methods such as impersonation for [SIM swap attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam). When attackers have more resources, such as a state-backed attackers, more sophisticated processes might be used, like device infection with [NSO Group's spyware](https://citizenlab.ca/tag/nso-group/).
For targeted attacks, aggressors will often use simple techniques to find a victim's data from what is already leaked online or openly shared on social media. For more sophisticated attacks, perpetrators might use criminal methods such as impersonation for [SIM swap attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam). When attackers have more resources, such as state-backed attackers, more sophisticated processes might be used, like device infection with [NSO Group's spyware](https://citizenlab.ca/tag/nso-group).
### Maliciously stolen or negligently leaked

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@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ The World App is an everything app, providing users with a *World ID*, that can
The scan is then filtered and hashed to create a unique identifier that is stored as a so-called "proof of personhood" on the *World Network*, a blockchain-based protocol.
The World App itself contains a collection of "Mini Apps", where users can manage their cryptocurrencies, chat together, play games, receive their pay check even, and ultimately live their whole life within the closed "verified" ecosystem of the app.
The World App itself contains a collection of "Mini Apps", where users can manage their cryptocurrencies, chat together, play games, receive their paychecks even, and ultimately live their whole life within the closed "verified" ecosystem of the app.
For a company constantly praising decentralization, it sure looks like they want to make sure they are the center of it all.
@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ If they succeed in convincing enough people, many of us could soon have little c
## World(coin) isn't new, you might have heard of its unethical practices already
The project [claims](https://techcrunch.com/2025/04/30/sam-altmans-world-unveils-a-mobile-verification-device/) to have onboarded 26 million people already, including 12 millions "users" who are verified (had their biometric data collected).
The project [claims](https://techcrunch.com/2025/04/30/sam-altmans-world-unveils-a-mobile-verification-device/) to have onboarded 26 million people already, including 12 million "users" who are verified (had their biometric data collected).
These "users" are largely located in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This is because the company started testing for its project there a few years ago, in regions where people often have fewer legal protections.
@ -68,15 +68,15 @@ So much so that [Kenya suspended the company's operations](https://techcrunch.co
Some people who signed up never received the promised money. Some officials were bribed to give the impression to participants these operations were official and supported by the government.
As Ruswandi, one of the person targeted by this early campaign [remarked](https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/06/1048981/worldcoin-cryptocurrency-biometrics-web3/): "why did Worldcoin target lower-income communities in the first place, instead of crypto enthusiasts or communities?"
As Ruswandi, one of the persons targeted by this early campaign [remarked](https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/06/1048981/worldcoin-cryptocurrency-biometrics-web3/): "why did Worldcoin target lower-income communities in the first place, instead of crypto enthusiasts or communities?"
Exploiting people in situation of poverty in order to test a biometric identification technology isn't a great way to start a project developed by a company called "Tools for Humanity".
Exploiting people in situations of poverty in order to test a biometric identification technology isn't a great way to start a project developed by a company called "Tools for Humanity".
## Creating the problem, selling the solution
Why developing such a technology in the first place?
Why develop such a technology in the first place?
Sam Altman himself have [expressed concern](https://www.wired.com/story/sam-altman-orb-eyeball-scan-launch-us/) about the problem this alleged solution solves: the avalanche of fake accounts and pretend persons online caused by the new AI tools unleashed everywhere.
Sam Altman himself has [expressed concern](https://www.wired.com/story/sam-altman-orb-eyeball-scan-launch-us/) about the problem this alleged solution solves: the avalanche of fake accounts and pretend persons online caused by the new AI tools unleashed everywhere.
The proposed use of a "proof of personhood" claims to solve this problem by allocating a unique identifier to each human, a personal code supposedly impossible to duplicate or cheat. Of course, this has [already been proven wrong](https://gizmodo.com/worldcoin-black-market-iris-data-identity-orb-1850454037).
@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ If every social media account becomes tied to a unique biometric-based identifie
Further, if only one account is allowed by "verified human", then no one can create separate accounts for their work life and personal life anymore. Creating separate accounts for separate purposes is an excellent privacy-preserving practice.
Even if the identifier isn't tied to a legal name directly, accounts on different platforms using the same identifier could potentially get liked together. To be fair, it does seem Tools for Humanity worked to prevent different platforms from having access to the same code, but how well will this hold the test of time? Will platforms increasingly escalate privacy-invasive requests from this point, like they often do?
Even if the identifier isn't tied to a legal name directly, accounts on different platforms using the same identifier could potentially get linked together. To be fair, it does seem Tools for Humanity worked to prevent different platforms from having access to the same code, but how well will this hold the test of time? Will platforms increasingly escalate privacy-invasive requests from this point, like they often do?
**Pseudonymity saves lives.** It is an essential tool for the safety of the most vulnerable online. Killing pseudonymity by requiring unique biometric identification could endanger millions.
@ -156,13 +156,13 @@ As whistleblower [Edward Snowden rightfully pointed out](https://x.com/Snowden/s
### Questionable reassurance about local data
One of the biggest reassurance relates to the claim that sensitive biometric data (Image Data) is only stored locally. But this isn't completely accurate either, and there seems to be conflicting information about it from the company's own documentation.
One of the biggest reassurances relates to the claim that sensitive biometric data (Image Data) is only stored locally. But this isn't completely accurate either, and there seems to be conflicting information about it from the company's own documentation.
The World [white paper](https://whitepaper.world.org/#enrollment-process) specifies that:
"The Orb verifies that it sees a human, runs local fraud prevention checks, and takes pictures of both irises. The iris images are converted on the Orb hardware into the iris code. Raw biometric data does not leave the device (unless explicitly approved by the user for training purposes)."
However, according to the [Biometric Data Consent Form](https://world.org/legal/biometric-data-consent-form) users have to sign prior to data collection, if a user needs a fully verified World ID, inevitably this sensitive biometric data will be sent to their phone, therefore leaving the Orb.
However, according to the [Biometric Data Consent Form](https://world.org/legal/biometric-data-consent-form) users have to sign prior to data collection, if a user needs a fully verified World ID. Inevitably this sensitive biometric data will be sent to their phone, therefore leaving the Orb.
After a user agrees to the form, they can keep the option for *Data Custody* disabled to have their biometric data deleted from the Orb "later", and have it uploaded to their phone (with all the risk that this entails).
@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ The other option users have is to enable Data Custody (if allowed in the user's
This means the Orb inevitably sends this sensitive data to a mobile device. Then, this data is only as secure as the mobile device is. Which isn't so reassuring.
The documentation does maintain this biometric data is sent as an "end-to-end encrypted data bundle", but this doesn't mean the data never leaves the Orb, it just means it leaves it while encrypted (which is really just the basics), and copies it to the user's device.
The documentation does maintain this biometric data is sent as an "end-to-end encrypted data bundle", but this doesn't mean the data never leaves the Orb. It just means it leaves it while encrypted (which is really just the basics), and copies it to the user's device.
Furthermore, future users are *strongly* incentivized to share their Image Data with Tools for Humanity, for algorithm improvement purposes. Pressure to opt in is even presented as a *convenience* option, because it would be cumbersome to have to come over for another scan after every update.
@ -202,13 +202,13 @@ If this happens, many regretful users might find themselves in [the same shoes a
Additionally, the Face Authentication section of the white paper [describes](https://whitepaper.world.org/#face-authentication) a process where encrypted facial biometrics collected from the Orb are used for authentication in the World App.
Even if this data is stored on-device, it is still biometric data getting collected by the Orb then processed by the phone app. There is no question this is sensitive and personal biometric data, and it is indeed kept outside the orb.
Even if this data is stored on-device, it is still biometric data getting collected by the Orb then processed by the phone app. There is no question this is sensitive and personal biometric data, and it is indeed kept outside the Orb.
Tools for Humanity lacks consistency in the various claims and statements found through its documentation and promotion material. It becomes difficult to know which version to trust, and if it is to be trusted at all.
### No deletion on the blockchain
Tools for Humanity's Privacy Policy declares that the company will delete all account data (when laws allow it) one month after it is closed, this is good. They also state they will delete entirely any inactive account after 2 years, and this is actually a great policy.
Tools for Humanity's Privacy Policy declares that the company will delete all account data (when laws allow it) one month after it is closed (this is good). They also state they will delete entirely any inactive account after 2 years, and this is actually a great policy.
But what happens to the World ID, transactions, and other data stored on the blockchain?
@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ The Orb itself is also an important potential attack surface. With Tools for Hum
Despite all its privacy promotion material, the World project has failed to convince privacy commissioners around the world of their supposedly good intentions. Perhaps in this case actions speak louder than words, and privacy commissioners aren't so gullible.
With the expansion the project plans this year, we can expect even more experts will examine the company's claims and challenge its "privacy-preserving" assumptions
With the expansion the project plans this year, we can expect even more experts will examine the company's claims and challenge its "privacy-preserving" assumptions.
There are many reasons to remain skeptical about these promises of privacy. Indeed, numerous countries have already suspended, fined, or called for investigation on the company's (mal)practices.
@ -266,17 +266,17 @@ The World project tried again to appeal the decision, in vain.
### Kenya and Indonesia suspended its operations
In 2023, Kenya, one of the first country where Worldcoin was available, [suspended](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/02/kenya-suspends-worldcoin-scans-over-security-privacy-and-financial-concerns/) Worldcoin's operations citing concerns over the "authenticity and legality" of its activities related to privacy, security, and financial services.
In 2023, Kenya, one of the first countries where Worldcoin was available, [suspended](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/02/kenya-suspends-worldcoin-scans-over-security-privacy-and-financial-concerns/) Worldcoin's operations citing concerns over the "authenticity and legality" of its activities related to privacy, security, and financial services.
The worse part is, months before the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (ODPC) of the country had ordered Tools for Humanity to stop collecting personal information from its citizens. The company simply [ignored the ODPC order](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/15/worldcoin-in-kenya/) and continued to collect biometric data from Kenyans. It only stopped after Kenya's ministry of interior and administration gave the suspension order later on.
The worse part is that months before, the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (ODPC) of the country had ordered Tools for Humanity to stop collecting personal information from its citizens. The company simply [ignored the ODPC order](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/15/worldcoin-in-kenya/) and continued to collect biometric data from Kenyans. It only stopped after Kenya's ministry of interior and administration gave the suspension order later on.
This again is quite far from the behavior of a company who genuinely values privacy.
More recently on May 4th 2025, Indonesia also [suspended](https://en.antaranews.com/news/353861/indonesia-suspends-worldcoin-world-id-operations-over-public-concerns) the World project's operation in the country over concerns related to user privacy and security. The Ministry of Communication and Digital will be summoning the project's local operators to clarify the operations and determine potential violation of the Indonesia's electronic system regulation.
More recently on May 4th, 2025, Indonesia also [suspended](https://en.antaranews.com/news/353861/indonesia-suspends-worldcoin-world-id-operations-over-public-concerns) the World project's operation in the country over concerns related to user privacy and security. The Ministry of Communication and Digital will be summoning the project's local operators to clarify the operations and determine potential violation of the Indonesia's electronic system regulation.
### German regulator ordered GDPR compliance following investigation
In December 2024, the German regulator, the Bavarian State Office for Data Protection Supervision (BayLDA), [issued an order](https://decrypt.co/298090/german-watchdog-cracks-down-on-worldcoin-over-biometric-data) to obligate proving deletion procedures that comply with the GDPR within one month. Additionally, the BayLDA ordered the complete deletion of certain data records that were previously collected without sufficient legal basis.
In December 2024, the German regulator, the Bavarian State Office for Data Protection Supervision (BayLDA), [issued an order](https://decrypt.co/298090/german-watchdog-cracks-down-on-worldcoin-over-biometric-data) to obligate providing deletion procedures that comply with the GDPR within one month. Additionally, the BayLDA ordered the complete deletion of certain data records that were previously collected without sufficient legal basis.
Again, the World Foundation is fighting the order and will [appeal](https://cointelegraph.com/news/german-watchdog-order-worldcoin-delete-data) the decision. The company tries to argue the data collected was "anonymized", a common strategy to try evading GDPR compliance, which does not regulate anonymized data.
@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ There is no doubt more countries and regions will follow with similar investigat
### In the United States, the app is restricted in some states
Even in the US where the company is headquartered, the app is [restricted](https://www.wired.com/story/sam-altman-orb-eyeball-scan-launch-us/) in some states. The announcement for its event this month carried a warning the World is “not available for distribution via World App to people, companies or organizations who are residents of, or are located or incorporated in the State of New York or other restricted territories.”
Even in the US where the company is headquartered, the app is [restricted](https://www.wired.com/story/sam-altman-orb-eyeball-scan-launch-us/) in some states. The announcement for its event this month carried a warning that the World is “not available for distribution via World App to people, companies or organizations who are residents of, or are located or incorporated in the State of New York or other restricted territories.”
We can also expect the project will encounter roadblocks in states that have passed [regulations specific to the collection of biometric data](https://www.huschblackwell.com/2024-state-biometric-privacy-law-tracker). This includes states like Illinois, Texas, Washington, and Colorado.
@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ The amount of money invested in the project means there will be an incredible pr
The well-known dating app Tinder has already partnered with World ID to verify the age of users in Japan. If this experiment works well, and if users comply without objection, this could be soon mandatory for *all* dating apps.
Let's not stop at dating apps, the World project has already announced last week they will also be working with Razer to verify humanity of online gamers. How far can this go in the age of age verification? Will every online games with mature content soon require a World ID to play?
Let's not stop at dating apps. The World project has already announced last week they will also be working with Razer to verify humanity of online gamers. How far can this go in the age of age verification? Will every online games with mature content soon require a World ID to play?
What about social media? Tools for Humanity's team have insisted the age of AI made us incapable of detecting if we are interacting with bots online. Therefore, they must valiantly come to our rescue to verify our humanity scanning our eyeballs (which bots tragically lack). What if this human verification is expanded to all our social media accounts? Certainly, regulators pushing for authoritarian age verification online would be delighted by such a product.
@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ Then, it comes for our money. The everything app of course offers payment and mo
Imagine a single app, owned by a single for-profit corporation, that collects and processes all the data from all your transactions online, all your communications online, that you absolutely have to continue using for your other social media accounts, your gaming life, and your dating life.
There could soon be no way to escape the grasp of World's everything app. Actually, [some governments](https://www.theregister.com/2025/05/04/sam_altman_startup_world/) (Taiwan and Malesia) have already started using it for official services, because why not.
There could soon be no way to escape the grasp of World's everything app. Actually, [some governments](https://www.theregister.com/2025/05/04/sam_altman_startup_world/) (Taiwan and Malaysia) have already started using it for official services, because why not.
**The ways this could degenerate fast into full dystopia are infinite**, and very real.
@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ Even if this process was perfectly secure and perfectly private (which it is def
This isn't limited to Tools for Humanity, although the way the company tries to advertise itself as a privacy-first organization makes it even more important to scrutinize.
But anyone else with a similar approach to biometric data collection for verifying humanity or age or legal names should be on our radar. Moreover, if it's a for-profit corporation with the power to impose this technology on us everywhere in the world.
But anyone else with a similar approach to biometric data collection for verifying humanity or age or legal names should be on our radar. Moreover if it's a for-profit corporation with the power to impose this technology on us everywhere in the world.
One company should never have such power.
@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ Further, biometric data should never be used for trivial purposes like "proof of
The premise itself is flawed from the start to respect privacy rights.
While the problem of proving identify can still be an important one to solve in *some* context, the solution to this can never be monopolized by for-profit corporations.
While the problem of proving identity can still be an important one to solve in *some* context, the solution to this can never be monopolized by for-profit corporations.
Regardless of Tools for Humanity's intentions and efforts to convince us to trust them, any similar technology is just another step towards a global system of mass surveillance, where ultimately privacy rights and human rights are lost.

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
date:
created: 2022-07-07T19:00:00Z
updated: 2025-04-15T04:00:00Z
updated: 2025-05-24T14:00:00Z
authors:
- contributors
- matchboxbananasynergy
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
---
# Signal Configuration and Hardening Guide
[Signal](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication#signal) is a widely regarded instant messaging service that is not only easy to use but is also private and secure. Signal's strong E2EE implementation and metadata protections provide a level of assurance that only you and your intended recipients are able to read communications.<!-- more -->
[Signal](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication#signal) is a widely regarded instant messaging service that is not only easy to use but is also private and secure. Signal's strong end-to-end encryption implementation and metadata protections provide a level of assurance that only you and your intended recipients are able to read communications.<!-- more -->
This guide details actions you can take to configure and harden Signal in accordance with your [threat model](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/threat-modeling/).
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This guide details actions you can take to configure and harden Signal in accord
### Signal PIN
When you register for Signal with your phone number, you will be asked to set up a Signal PIN. This PIN can be used to recover your profile, settings, contacts and who you've blocked in case you ever lose or switch devices.
When you register for Signal with your phone number, you will be asked to set up a Signal PIN. This PIN can be used to recover your profile, settings, contacts, and blocked users in case you ever lose or switch devices.
Additionally, your Signal PIN can also double as a registration lock that prevents others from registering with your number.
@ -34,18 +34,18 @@ Additionally, your Signal PIN can also double as a registration lock that preven
The server will not enforce the registration lock after 7 days of inactivity. After that, someone will be able to reset the PIN at registration and register with your phone number. This will wipe the data stored in your Signal account, as it is encrypted by the PIN, but it won't prevent someone from registering with your number provided that they can receive a text on it.
**Important update**: since this blog post was published, there have been changes to the registration flow for Signal. You should read about this [here](signal-number-registration-update.md).
**Important update**: Since this blog post was published, there have been changes to the registration flow for Signal. You should read about this [here](signal-number-registration-update.md).
If you haven't set up a Signal PIN, or have previously opted out of setting one up, follow these steps on Android/iOS:
- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Account** > **Signal PIN**
- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings****Account** **Signal PIN**
- Select **Create new PIN**
Signal will prompt you to enter a PIN. We suggest using a strong alphanumeric PIN that can be stored in a [password manager](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/).
Signal will prompt you to enter a PIN. We suggest using a strong, alphanumeric PIN that can be stored in a [password manager](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/).
Once you have done that, or if you already have set up a PIN, make sure that **Registration Lock** is also enabled.
- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Account** > **Signal PIN**
- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings****Account** **Signal PIN**
- [x] Turn on **Registration Lock**
!!! Important
@ -65,12 +65,12 @@ It is best practice to always compare safety numbers with your contacts. This ca
!!! Important
In order for safety numbers to also verify that the intended recipient has access to the device you're verifying, you need a secondary communication channel where you can authenticate the person that is holding the device. For example, an in-person meeting or during a video call.
In order for safety numbers to also verify that the intended recipient has access to the device you're verifying, you need a secondary communication channel where you can authenticate the person that is holding the device. For example, an in-person meeting or a video call.
To view the safety number for a particular contact, you need to follow these steps within Signal:
- Go to a chat with a contact.
- Select the chat header or :material-dots-vertical: > **View Safety Number**
- Select the chat header or :material-dots-vertical: **View Safety Number**
Once you've compared the safety numbers on both devices, you can mark that contact as **Verified**.
@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ A checkmark will appear in the chat header by your contact's name when the safet
After doing that, any time the safety number changes, you'll be notified.
If the safety number with one of your contacts changes, we recommend asking the contact what happened (if they switched to a new device or re-installed Signal, for example) and verify the safety numbers again.
If the safety number with one of your contacts changes, we recommend asking the contact what happened (if they switched to a new device or re-installed Signal, for example) and verifying the safety numbers again.
For more demanding threat models, you should agree on a protocol with your contacts in advance on what to do in case the safety number ever changes.
@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ It is good practice to set up disappearing messages in Signal's settings so that
On Android/iOS:
- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** **Privacy**
- Under **Disappearing messages**, select **Default timer for new chats**
- Select the desired amount of time and select **Save**
@ -119,22 +119,20 @@ Your recipient doesn't make any requests unless they open the link on their end.
On Android/iOS:
- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Chats**
- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** **Chats**
- [ ] Turn off **Generate link previews**
### Screen Security
Signal allows you to prevent a preview of the app being shown (i.e., in the app switcher) unless you explicitly open it.
Signal allows you to prevent a preview of the app being shown (i.e., in the app switcher) unless you explicitly open it. This option can be found in :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings****Privacy**.
On Android:
=== "Android"
- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
- [x] Turn on **Screen Security**
- [x] Turn on **Screen Security**
On iOS:
=== "iOS"
- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
- [x] Turn on **Hide Screen in App Switcher**
- [x] Turn on **Hide Screen in App Switcher**
### Screen Lock
@ -144,26 +142,22 @@ To mitigate this, you can leverage the Screen Lock option to require additional
On Android/iOS:
- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** **Privacy**
- [x] Turn on **Screen Lock**
### Notification Privacy
Even when your phone is locked, anyone who can lay eyes on the device can read messages and sender names from your lock screen.
On Signal, you have the ability to hide message content and sender name, or just the message content itself.
On Signal, you have the ability to hide message content and sender name, or just the message content itself. This option can be found in :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings****Notifications****Show**.
On Android:
=== "Android"
- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Notifications**
- Select **Show**
- Select **No name or message** or **Name only** respectively.
- Select **No name or message** or **Name only**, respectively.
On iOS:
=== "iOS"
- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Notifications**
- Select **Show**
- Select **No name or Content** or **Name Only** respectively.
- Select **No name or Content** or **Name Only**, respectively.
### Call Relaying
@ -171,7 +165,7 @@ Signal allows you to relay all calls (including video calls) through the Signal
On Android/iOS:
- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy** > **Advanced**
- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings****Privacy** **Advanced**
- [x] Turn on **Always Relay Calls**
For incoming calls from people who are not in your Contacts app, the call will be relayed through the Signal server regardless of how you've set it up.
@ -193,13 +187,13 @@ Additionally, Signal allows you to set up a proxy to bypass censorship.
You can learn more about Signal's proxy support on their [website](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360056052052-Proxy-Support).
### Disable Signal Call History (iOS)
### Disable Signal Call History (iOS only)
Signal allows you to see your call history from your regular phone app. This allows your iOS device to sync your call history with iCloud, including whom you spoke to, when, and for how long.
If you use iCloud and you dont want to share call history on Signal, confirm its turned off:
- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** **Privacy**
- [ ] Turn off **Show Calls in Recents**
## Signal Hardening
@ -208,13 +202,13 @@ If you use iCloud and you dont want to share call history on Signal, confirm
While it may be tempting to link your Signal account to your desktop device for convenience, keep in mind that this extends your trust to an additional and potentially less secure operating system.
Avoid linking your Signal account to a desktop device to reduce your attack surface, if your threat model calls for protecting against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/common-threats/#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }.
Avoid linking your Signal account to a desktop device to reduce your attack surface if your threat model calls for protecting against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/common-threats/#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }.
### Molly (Android)
If you use [Molly](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#molly-android) on Android to access the Signal network, there are many privacy and security-enhancing features that you may want to explore.
If you use [Molly](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#molly-android) on Android to access the Signal network, below is an overview of the many privacy- and security-enhancing features that you may want to explore. You can find a full list of Molly's [features](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#features) on the project's repository.
#### Privacy and Security Features
#### Data Encryption at Rest
Molly has implemented database encryption at rest, which means that you can encrypt the app's database with a passphrase to ensure that none of its data is accessible without it.
@ -231,14 +225,16 @@ For the database encryption feature to be useful, two conditions must be met:
If both of the above conditions are met, the data within Molly is safe as long as the passphrase is not accessible to the attacker.
#### RAM Wiper
To supplement the database encryption feature, Molly securely wipes your device's RAM once the database is locked to defend against forensic analysis.
While Molly is running, your data is kept in RAM. When any app closes, its data remains in RAM until another app takes the same physical memory pages. That can take seconds or days, depending on many factors. To prevent anyone from dumping the RAM to disk and extracting your data after Molly is locked, the app overrides all free RAM memory with random data when you lock the database.
There is also the ability to configure a SOCKS proxy in Molly to route its traffic through the proxy or [Tor via Orbot](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tor#orbot). When enabled, all traffic is routed through the proxy and there are no known IP or DNS leaks. When using this feature, [call relaying](#call-relaying) will always be enabled, regardless of the setting.
#### Calls and Contacts
There is also the ability to configure a SOCKS proxy in Molly to route its traffic through the proxy or [Tor via Orbot](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/alternative-networks/#orbot). When enabled, all traffic is routed through the proxy and there are no known IP or DNS leaks. When using this feature, [call relaying](#call-relaying) will always be enabled, regardless of the setting.
Signal adds everyone who you have communicated with to its database. Molly allows you to delete those contacts and stop sharing your profile with them.
To supplement the feature above, as well as for additional security and to fight spam, Molly offers the ability to block unknown contacts that you've never been in contact with or those that are not in your contact list without you having to manually block them.
You can find a full list of Molly's [features](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#features) on the project's repository.
To supplement the feature above, as well as for additional security and to fight spam, Molly offers the ability to block unknown contacts whom you've never been in contact with or those who are not in your contact list without you having to manually block them.

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@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
---
date:
created: 2025-05-16T16:00:00Z
categories:
- Opinion
authors:
- em
description: If you, like myself, have been inhabiting the internet for a few decades, you're probably familiar with the old adage IRL (In Real Life). The acronym was used a lot when the distinction between online life and offline life was much greater than it is now. In today's world, can we really keep referring to our digital life as being somehow disconnected from our real life?
schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle
preview:
cover: blog/assets/images/your-online-life-is-irl/irl-cover.webp
---
# Your Online Life Is IRL
![Photo of an illuminated red street sign with the word Internet on it.](../assets/images/your-online-life-is-irl/irl-cover.webp)
<small aria-hidden="true">Leon Seibert / Unsplash</small>
If you, like myself, have been inhabiting the internet for a few decades, you're probably familiar with the old adage IRL: In Real Life.
The acronym was used a lot when the distinction between online life and offline life was much greater than it is now. In today's world, can we really keep referring to our digital life as being somehow disconnected from our "real life"?<!-- more -->
While it's true that pseudo-anonymity online is still alive and well, most people don't hide their real identity online because it's much different from their personality offline, but generally simply as a protection.
Even when using pseudonyms, online life is still part of *real life*.
The proportion of time we spend on the connected world today is also far greater than it was before. We often chat with friends online, work online, communicate with our family online, play games online, assist to events online, go to school online, watch recipe videos online, and so on and so forth.
## Our offline life is happening (and tracked) online too
Another thing that has changed is how much data about what we do offline ends up getting collected and stored *online*.
Maybe it's the places we visit during the day getting [tracked by our phones](https://www.pcmag.com/how-to/how-to-get-google-to-quit-tracking-you) and then stored by Google in our profile.
Maybe it's our [smart speaker recording](https://www.lifewire.com/can-alexa-record-conversations-5205324) an intimate conversation and sending it to Amazon.
Completely outside our control, maybe it's the street cameras, cellular towers, car license readers [tracking our movement](https://www.aclum.org/en/publications/what-you-need-know-about-automatic-license-plate-readers) outside as we go about our day.
Or even more dystopian, maybe it's our [doctor using an AI note-taking app](https://theconversation.com/some-clinicians-are-using-ai-to-write-health-records-what-do-you-need-to-know-237762), sending a copy of our very personal in-person medical consultation to who knows which for-profit company.
## Our digital lives and IRL lives are intertwined
All this data collected on what we do *offline*, can sometimes [get aggregated](https://epic.org/issues/consumer-privacy/data-brokers/) together with the data collected on us *online*, even while using pseudo-anonymity.
The social media account where we use a pseudonym and cat profile picture to stay anonymous can get aggregated from the same IP address we used to log in another account using our legal name.
Our offline data and our online data often get connected and bundled up together. This is especially concerning with the growing practice of [social media monitoring](https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/5337/social-media-monitoring-uk-invisible-surveillance-tool-increasingly-deployed) used by governments and companies.
## What we do online have offline consequences
Taking this into account, there isn't a separation between our *online* life and *offline* life anymore.
What we do online affects what we do offline, and vice versa. All of our life, online and offline, is *In Real Life* now.
Our digital life and communications can affect our employment, our dating life, our family life, our housing situation, and even the capacity we have to visit a country [or not](https://globalnews.ca/news/11090232/french-scientist-denied-us-entry-critical-trump-text-messages/).
## The data collected on us online should be cared for even more
Because there isn't much separation anymore, we should treat all data collected about us online as sensitive data intrinsically attached to our person.
An invasion of online privacy, of our online life, becomes the same as an invasion of our home, our body, our IRL life. Not only because this data can be used to find our IRL location, identify our person, and have important repercussions offline, but also because all data about us is an essential part of who we are.
It's not just data points, it's a part of us.
Considering how the world has evolved in the past decades, and shows no sign of slowing down its greedy appropriation of every single piece of information about us, **we should defend our online lives as fiercely as we would our offline lives**.
We need to fight for a future anchored in human rights, and for this, we need to firmly enforce the principle that **digital rights are fundamental human rights**.

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@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Examples of gifts which are too restrictive include:
- Those which are too difficult for us to administer.
- Those that are for purposes outside our general mission.
An example of an acceptable restriction could be a gift towards funding our [video](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/) production, or hosting our website and forum.
An example of an acceptable restriction could be a gift towards funding our [video](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos) production, or hosting our website and forum.
Final decisions on the restrictive nature of a gift and its acceptance or refusal will be made by our executive committee.

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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: An overview of several network architectures commonly used by insta
There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) when deciding which app to use.
[Recommended Instant Messengers](../real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why/){ .md-button }
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why){ .md-button }
## Centralized Networks

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@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ description: Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the
[**Tor**](../alternative-networks.md#tor) is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool.
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Why You Need Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/02/why-you-need-tor/){ .md-button }
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Why You Need Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/02/why-you-need-tor){ .md-button }
Tor works by routing your internet traffic through volunteer-operated servers, instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.
Tor works by routing your internet traffic through volunteer-operated servers instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.
[:octicons-home-16:](https://torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
@ -35,13 +35,13 @@ Because we already [generally recommend](../basics/vpn-overview.md) that the vas
Connecting directly to Tor will make your connection stand out to any local network administrators or your ISP. Detecting and correlating this traffic [has been done](https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax) in the past by network administrators to identify and deanonymize specific Tor users on their network. On the other hand, connecting to a VPN is almost always less suspicious, because commercial VPN providers are used by everyday consumers for a variety of mundane tasks like bypassing geo-restrictions, even in countries with heavy internet restrictions.
Therefore, you should make an effort to hide your IP address **before** connecting to the Tor network. You can do this by simply connecting to a VPN (through a client installed on your computer) and then accessing [Tor](../tor.md) as normal, through Tor Browser for example. This creates a connection chain like:
Therefore, you should make an effort to hide your IP address **before** connecting to the Tor network. You can do this by simply connecting to a VPN (through a client installed on your computer) and then accessing [Tor](../tor.md) as normal (e.g., through Tor Browser). This creates a connection chain like so:
- [x] You → VPN → Tor → Internet
From your ISP's perspective, it looks like you're accessing a VPN normally (with the associated cover that provides you). From your VPN's perspective, they can see that you are connecting to the Tor network, but nothing about what websites you're accessing. From Tor's perspective, you're connecting normally, but in the unlikely event of some sort of Tor network compromise, only your VPN's IP would be exposed, and your VPN would *additionally* have to be compromised to deanonymize you.
This is **not** censorship circumvention advice, because if Tor is blocked entirely by your ISP, your VPN likely is as well. Rather, this recommendation aims to make your traffic blend in better with commonplace VPN user traffic, and provide you with some level of plausible deniability by obscuring the fact that you're connecting to Tor from your ISP.
This is **not** censorship circumvention advice because if Tor is blocked entirely by your ISP, your VPN likely is as well. Rather, this recommendation aims to make your traffic blend in better with commonplace VPN user traffic, and provide you with some level of plausible deniability by obscuring the fact that you're connecting to Tor from your ISP.
---
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ We **very strongly discourage** combining Tor with a VPN in any other manner. Do
- You → VPN → Tor → VPN → Internet
- Any other configuration
Some VPN providers and other publications will occasionally recommend these **bad** configurations to evade Tor bans (exit nodes being blocked by websites) in some places. [Normally](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths), Tor frequently changes your circuit path through the network. When you choose a permanent *destination* VPN (connecting to a VPN server *after* Tor), you're eliminating this advantage and drastically harming your anonymity.
Some VPN providers and other publications will occasionally recommend these **bad** configurations to evade Tor bans (i.e., exit nodes being blocked by websites) in some places. [Normally](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths), Tor frequently changes your circuit path through the network. When you choose a permanent *destination* VPN (connecting to a VPN server *after* Tor), you're eliminating this advantage and drastically harming your anonymity.
Setting up bad configurations like these is difficult to do accidentally, because it usually involves either setting up custom proxy settings inside Tor Browser, or setting up custom proxy settings inside your VPN client which routes your VPN traffic through the Tor Browser. As long as you avoid these non-default configurations, you're probably fine.
@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Setting up bad configurations like these is difficult to do accidentally, becaus
<div class="admonition info" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">VPN/SSH Fingerprinting</p>
The Tor Project [notes](https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#vpnssh-fingerprinting) that *theoretically* using a VPN to hide Tor activities from your ISP may not be foolproof. VPNs have been found to be vulnerable to website traffic fingerprinting, where an adversary can still guess what website is being visited, because all websites have specific traffic patterns.
The Tor Project [notes](https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#vpnssh-fingerprinting) that *theoretically* using a VPN to hide Tor activities from your ISP may not be foolproof. VPNs have been found to be vulnerable to website traffic fingerprinting, where an adversary can still guess what website is being visited because all websites have specific traffic patterns.
Therefore, it's not unreasonable to believe that encrypted Tor traffic hidden by a VPN could also be detected via similar methods. There are no research papers on this subject, and we still consider the benefits of using a VPN to far outweigh these risks, but it is something to keep in mind.
@ -68,11 +68,11 @@ If you still believe that pluggable transports (bridges) provide additional prot
</div>
Determining whether you should first use a VPN to connect to the Tor network will require some common sense and knowledge of your own government's and ISP's policies relating to what you're connecting to. However, again in most cases you will be better off being seen as connecting to a commercial VPN network than directly to the Tor network. If VPN providers are censored in your area, then you can also consider using Tor pluggable transports (e.g. Snowflake or meek bridges) as an alternative, but using these bridges may arouse more suspicion than standard WireGuard/OpenVPN tunnels.
Determining whether you should first use a VPN to connect to the Tor network will require some common sense and knowledge of your own government's and ISP's policies relating to what you're connecting to. To reiterate, though, you will be better off being seen as connecting to a commercial VPN network than directly to the Tor network in most cases. If VPN providers are censored in your area, then you can also consider using Tor pluggable transports (e.g., Snowflake or meek bridges) as an alternative, but using these bridges may arouse more suspicion than standard WireGuard/OpenVPN tunnels.
## What Tor is Not
The Tor network is not the perfect privacy protection tool in all cases, and has a number of drawbacks which should be carefully considered. These things should not discourage you from using Tor if it is appropriate for your needs, but they are still things to think about when deciding which solution is most appropriate for you.
The Tor network is not the perfect privacy protection tool in all cases and has a number of drawbacks which should be carefully considered. These things should not discourage you from using Tor if it is appropriate for your needs, but they are still things to think about when deciding which solution is most appropriate for you.
### Tor is not a free VPN
@ -80,26 +80,26 @@ The release of the *Orbot* mobile app has lead many people to describe Tor as a
Unlike Tor exit nodes, VPN providers are usually not *actively* [malicious](#caveats). Because Tor exit nodes can be created by anybody, they are hotspots for network logging and modification. In 2020, many Tor exit nodes were documented to be downgrading HTTPS traffic to HTTP in order to [hijack cryptocurrency transactions](https://therecord.media/thousands-of-tor-exit-nodes-attacked-cryptocurrency-users-over-the-past-year). Other exit node attacks such as replacing downloads via unencrypted channels with malware have also been observed. HTTPS does mitigate these threats to an extent.
As we've alluded to already, Tor is also easily identifiable on the network. Unlike an actual VPN provider, using Tor will make you stick out as a person likely attempting to evade authorities. In a perfect world, Tor would be seen by network administrators and authorities as a tool with many uses (like how VPNs are viewed), but in reality the perception of Tor is still far less legitimate than the perception of commercial VPNs, so using a real VPN provides you with plausible deniability, e.g. "I was just using it to watch Netflix," etc.
As we've alluded to already, Tor is also easily identifiable on the network. Unlike an actual VPN provider, using Tor will make you stick out as a person likely attempting to evade authorities. In a perfect world, Tor would be seen by network administrators and authorities as a tool with many uses (like how VPNs are viewed), but in reality the perception of Tor is still far less legitimate than the perception of commercial VPNs. As such, using a real VPN provides you with plausible deniability, e.g. "I was just using it to watch Netflix," etc.
### Tor usage is not undetectable
**Even if you use bridges and pluggable transports,** the Tor Project provides no tools to hide the fact that you are using Tor from your ISP. Even using obfuscated "pluggable transports" or non-public bridges do not hide the fact that you are using a private communications channel. The most popular pluggable transports like obfs4 (which obfuscates your traffic to "look like nothing") and meek (which uses domain fronting to camouflage your traffic) can be [detected](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/889-Tor-0day-Burning-Bridges.html) with fairly standard traffic analysis techniques. Snowflake has similar issues, and can be [easily detected](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/944-Tor-0day-Snowflake.html) *before* a Tor connection is even established.
**Even if you use bridges and pluggable transports,** the Tor Project doesn't provide any tools to hide the fact that you are using Tor from your ISP. Even using obfuscated "pluggable transports" or non-public bridges do not hide the fact that you are using a private communications channel. The most popular pluggable transports like obfs4 (which obfuscates your traffic to "look like nothing") and meek (which uses domain fronting to camouflage your traffic) can be [detected](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/889-Tor-0day-Burning-Bridges.html) with fairly standard traffic analysis techniques. Snowflake has similar issues, and can be [easily detected](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/944-Tor-0day-Snowflake.html) *before* a Tor connection is even established.
Pluggable transports other than these three do exist, but typically rely on security through obscurity to evade detection. They aren't impossible to detect, they are just used by so few people that it's not worth the effort building detectors for them. They shouldn't be relied upon if you specifically are being monitored.
Pluggable transports other than these three do exist, but typically rely on security through obscurity to evade detection. They aren't impossible to detectthey are just used by so few people that it's not worth the effort building detectors for them. They shouldn't be relied upon if you specifically are being monitored.
It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and evading detection. It is easier to accomplish the former because of the many real-world limitations on what network censors can realistically do en masse, but these techniques do not hide the fact that you—*specifically* you—are using Tor from an interested party monitoring your network.
### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser
Anonymity can often be at odds with security: Tor's anonymity requires every user to be identical, which creates a monoculture (the same bugs are present across all Tor Browser users). As a cybersecurity rule of thumb, monocultures are generally regarded as bad: Security through diversity (which Tor lacks) provides natural segmentation by limiting vulnerabilities to smaller groups, and is therefore usually desirable, but this diversity is also less good for anonymity.
Anonymity can often be at odds with security: Tor's anonymity requires every user to be identical, which creates a monoculture (e.g., the same bugs are present across all Tor Browser users). As a cybersecurity rule of thumb, monocultures are generally regarded as bad: Security through diversity (which Tor lacks) provides natural segmentation by limiting vulnerabilities to smaller groups, and is therefore usually desirable, but this diversity is also less good for anonymity.
Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):
1. Look for new Critical/High vulnerabilities in Firefox nightly or beta builds, then check if they are exploitable in Tor Browser (this vulnerability period can last weeks).
2. Chain *multiple* Medium/Low vulnerabilities together until they get the level of access they're looking for (this vulnerability period can last months or longer).
Those at risk of browser vulnerabilities should consider additional protections to defend against Tor Browser exploits, such as using Whonix in [Qubes](../os/qubes-overview.md) to contain your Tor browsing in a secure VM and protect against leaks.
Those at risk of browser vulnerabilities should consider additional protections to defend against Tor Browser exploits, such as using Whonix in [Qubes](../os/qubes-overview.md) to contain your Tor browsing in a secure virtual machine and protect against leaks.
## Path Building to Clearnet Services
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ The entry node, often called the guard node, is the first node to which your Tor
Unlike the other nodes, the Tor client will randomly select an entry node and stick with it for two to three months to protect you from certain attacks.[^1]
[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2))
[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2))
### The Middle Node
@ -135,13 +135,13 @@ The exit node is the point in which your web traffic leaves the Tor network and
The exit node will be chosen at random from all available Tor nodes ran with an exit relay flag.[^2]
[^2]: Relay flag: a special (dis-)qualification of relays for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), as assigned by the directory authorities and further defined in the directory protocol specification. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html))
[^2]: Relay flag: a special (dis-)qualification of relays for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), as assigned by the directory authorities and further defined in the directory protocol specification. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html#relay-flag))
## Path Building to Onion Services
"Onion Services" (also commonly referred to as "hidden services") are websites which can only be accessed by the Tor browser. These websites have a long randomly generated domain name ending with `.onion`.
Connecting to an Onion Service in Tor works very similarly to connecting to a clearnet service, but your traffic is routed through a total of **six** nodes before reaching the destination server. Just like before however, only three of these nodes are contributing to *your* anonymity, the other three nodes protect *the Onion Service's* anonymity, hiding the website's true IP and location in the same manner that Tor Browser is hiding yours.
Connecting to an Onion Service in Tor works very similarly to connecting to a clearnet service, but your traffic is routed through a total of **six** nodes before reaching the destination server. Just like before, however, only three of these nodes are contributing to *your* anonymity, the other three nodes protect *the Onion Service's* anonymity, hiding the website's true IP and location in the same manner that Tor Browser is hiding yours.
<figure style="width:100%" markdown>
![Tor path showing your traffic being routed through your three Tor nodes plus three additional Tor nodes which hide the website's identity](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-hidden-service.svg#only-light)
@ -151,15 +151,15 @@ Connecting to an Onion Service in Tor works very similarly to connecting to a cl
## Encryption
Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys from the exit, middle, and entry nodein that order.
Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys from the exit, middle, and entry node in that order.
Once Tor has built a circuit, data transmission is done as follows:
1. Firstly: when the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle nodes address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.
1. Firstly: When the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle nodes address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.
2. Secondly: when the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
2. Secondly: When the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
3. Lastly: when the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.
3. Lastly: When the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.
Below is an alternative diagram showing the process. Each node removes its own layer of encryption, and when the destination server returns data, the same process happens entirely in reverse. For example, the exit node does not know who you are, but it does know which node it came from, and so it adds its own layer of encryption and sends it back.
@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official**
Tor bridges are commonly touted as an alternative method to hiding Tor usage from an ISP, instead of a VPN (as we suggest using if possible). Something to consider is that while bridges may provide adequate censorship circumvention, this is only a *transient* benefit. They do not adequately protect you from your ISP discovering you connected to Tor in the *past* with historical traffic log analysis.
To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario: You connect to Tor via a bridge, and your ISP doesnt detect it because they are not doing sophisticated analysis of your traffic, so things are working as intended. Now, 4 months go by, and the IP of your bridge has been made public. This is a very common occurrence with bridges, they are discovered and blocked relatively frequently, just not immediately.
To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario: You connect to Tor via a bridge, and your ISP doesnt detect it because they are not doing sophisticated analysis of your traffic, so things are working as intended. Now, 4 months go by, and the IP of your bridge has been made public. This is a very common occurrence with bridges; they are discovered and blocked relatively frequently, just not immediately.
Your ISP wants to identify Tor users 4 months ago, and with their limited metadata logging they can see that you connected to an IP address which was later revealed to be a Tor bridge. You have virtually no other excuse to be making such a connection, so the ISP can say with very high confidence that you were a Tor user at that time.
@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ Contrast this with our recommended scenario, where you connect to Tor via a VPN.
Because your ISP almost certainly is not capturing all packet-level data and storing it forever, they have no way of determining what you connected to with that VPN *after* the fact with an advanced technique like deep packet inspection, and therefore you have plausible deniability.
Therefore, bridges provide the most benefit when circumventing internet censorship *in the moment*, but they are not an adequate substitute for **all** the benefits that using a VPN alongside Tor can provide. Again, this is not advice *against* using Tor bridges, you should just be aware of these limitations while making your decision. In some cases bridges may be the *only* option (if all VPN providers are blocked, for instance), so you can still use them in those circumstances with this limitation in mind.
Therefore, bridges provide the most benefit when circumventing internet censorship *in the moment*, but they are not an adequate substitute for **all** the benefits that using a VPN alongside Tor can provide. Again, this is not advice *against* using Tor bridgesyou should just be aware of these limitations while making your decision. In some cases bridges may be the *only* option (if all VPN providers are blocked, for instance), so you can still use them in those circumstances with this limitation in mind.
If you think that a bridge can aid in defending against fingerprinting or other advanced network analysis more than a VPN's encrypted tunnel already can, you always have the option to use a bridge in conjunction with a VPN as well. That way you are still protected by the pluggable transport's obfuscation techniques even if an adversary gains some level of visibility into your VPN tunnel. If you decide to go this route, we recommend connecting to an obfs4 bridge behind your VPN for optimal fingerprinting protection, rather than meek or Snowflake.

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@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ To run AI locally, you need both an AI model and an AI client.
There are many permissively licensed models available to download. [Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models) is a platform that lets you browse, research, and download models in common formats like [GGUF](https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/en/gguf). Companies that provide good open-weights models include big names like Mistral, Meta, Microsoft, and Google. However, there are also many community models and [fine-tuned](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuning_(deep_learning)) models available. As mentioned above, quantized models offer the best balance between model quality and performance for those using consumer-grade hardware.
To help you choose a model that fits your needs, you can look at leaderboards and benchmarks. The most widely-used leaderboard is the community-driven [LM Arena](https://lmarena.ai). Additionally, the [OpenLLM Leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/open-llm-leaderboard/open_llm_leaderboard) focuses on the performance of open-weights models on common benchmarks like [MMLU-Pro](https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.01574). There are also specialized benchmarks which measure factors like [emotional intelligence](https://eqbench.com), ["uncensored general intelligence"](https://huggingface.co/spaces/DontPlanToEnd/UGI-Leaderboard), and [many others](https://www.nebuly.com/blog/llm-leaderboards).
To help you choose a model that fits your needs, you can look at leaderboards and benchmarks. The most widely-used leaderboard is the community-driven [LM Arena](https://lmarena.ai). Additionally, the [OpenLLM Leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/open-llm-leaderboard/open_llm_leaderboard) focuses on the performance of open-weights models on common benchmarks like [MMLU-Pro](https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.01574). There are also specialized benchmarks which measure factors like [emotional intelligence](https://eqbench.com), ["uncensored general intelligence"](https://huggingface.co/spaces/DontPlanToEnd/UGI-Leaderboard), and [many others](https://nebuly.com/blog/llm-leaderboards).
## AI Chat Clients
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ To help you choose a model that fits your needs, you can look at leaderboards an
In addition to supporting a large range of text models, Kobold.cpp also supports image generators such as [Stable Diffusion](https://stability.ai/stable-image) and automatic speech recognition tools such as [Whisper](https://github.com/ggerganov/whisper.cpp).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-lock-16:](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp/blob/2f3597c29abea8b6da28f21e714b6b24a5aca79b/SECURITY.md){ .card-link title="Security Policy" }
@ -123,14 +123,14 @@ Ollama simplifies the process of setting up a local AI chat by downloading the A
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Llamafile Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.png){align=right}
![Llamafile Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.webp){align=right}
**Llamafile** is a lightweight, single-file executable that allows users to run LLMs locally on their own computers without any setup involved. It is [backed by Mozilla](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2023/11/introducing-llamafile) and available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
Llamafile also supports LLaVA. However, it doesn't support speech recognition or image generation.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#llamafile){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-lock-16:](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#security){ .card-link title="Security Policy" }

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@ -149,5 +149,6 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.

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@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular) a
**Secure Camera** is a camera app focused on privacy and security which can capture images, videos, and QR codes. CameraX vendor extensions (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch, and Auto) are also supported on available devices.
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/usage#camera){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure
[Content-Security-Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content.
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }

View file

@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
---
title: "Introduction to Passwords"
icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
title: Introduction to Passwords
icon: material/form-textbox-password
description: These are some tips and tricks on how to create the strongest passwords and keep your accounts secure.
---
Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices, and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
## Best Practices
### Use unique passwords for every service
Imagine this; you sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
Imagine this: You sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), and it is one of the most common ways that your accounts can be compromised by bad actors. To avoid this, make sure that you never re-use your passwords.
@ -73,9 +73,9 @@ You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appea
</div>
If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords.
If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords. We recommend setting the generated passphrase length to at least 6 words.
We recommend using [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [word lists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
We also recommend using [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [word lists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
<details class="note" markdown>
<summary>Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases</summary>

View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: Virtual Private Networks shift risk away from your ISP to a third-p
Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world.
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Do you need a VPN?](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2024/12/12/do-you-need-a-vpn/){ .md-button }
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Do you need a VPN?](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2024/12/12/do-you-need-a-vpn){ .md-button }
Normally, an ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem). Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).

View file

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Privacy is ultimately about human information, and this is important because we
Many people get the concepts of **privacy**, **security**, and **anonymity** confused. You'll see people criticize various products as "not private" when really they mean it doesn't provide anonymity, for example. On this website, we cover all three of these topics, but it is important you understand the difference between them, and when each one comes into play.
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Stop Confusing Privacy, Anonymity, and Security](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/14/stop-confusing-privacy-anonymity-and-security/){ .md-button }
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Stop Confusing Privacy, Anonymity, and Security](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/14/stop-confusing-privacy-anonymity-and-security){ .md-button }
<!-- markdownlint-disable-next-line -->
**Privacy**
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Take cookie consent forms, for example. You may encounter these dozens of times
Privacy is something we need to have baked into the [software and services](../tools.md) we use by default, you can't bend most apps into being private on your own.
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: 5 Steps to Improve Your Privacy](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/02/14/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online/){ class="md-button" }
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: 5 Steps to Improve Your Privacy](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/02/14/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online){ class="md-button" }
## Sources

View file

@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ cover: cloud.webp
- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
Many **cloud storage providers** require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by implementing secure E2EE.
Many **cloud storage providers** require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by implementing secure end-to-end encryption.
If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into using encryption software like [Cryptomator](encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud) with another cloud provider. Using Cryptomator in conjunction with **any** cloud provider (including these) may be a good idea to reduce the risk of encryption flaws in a provider's native clients.
@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](document-collaboration.md#nextcloud) for
![Proton Drive logo](assets/img/cloud/protondrive.svg){ align=right }
**Proton Drive** is an encrypted cloud storage provider from the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](email.md#proton-mail). The initial free storage is limited to 2 GB, but with the completion of [certain steps](https://proton.me/support/more-free-storage-existing-users), additional storage can be obtained up to 5 GB.
**Proton Drive** is an encrypted cloud storage provider from the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](email.md#proton-mail).
The initial free storage is limited to 2 GB, but with the completion of [certain steps](https://proton.me/support/more-free-storage-existing-users), additional storage can be obtained up to 5 GB.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/drive/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@ -46,9 +48,7 @@ Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](document-collaboration.md#nextcloud) for
</div>
The Proton Drive web application has been independently audited by Securitum in [2021](https://proton.me/community/open-source).
Proton Drive's brand new mobile clients have not yet been publicly audited by a third party.
The Proton Drive web application has been independently audited by Securitum in [2021](https://proton.me/community/open-source), but the brand new mobile clients have not yet been publicly audited by a third party.
## Tresorit
@ -83,7 +83,9 @@ Tresorit has received a number of independent security audits:
- Computest discovered two vulnerabilities which have been resolved.
- [2019](https://tresorit.com/blog/ernst-young-review-verifies-tresorits-security-architecture): Penetration Testing by Ernst & Young.
- This review analyzed the full source code of Tresorit and validated that the implementation matches the concepts described in Tresorit's [white paper](https://prodfrontendcdn.azureedge.net/202208011608/tresorit-encryption-whitepaper.pdf).
- Ernst & Young additionally tested the web, mobile, and desktop clients: "Test results found no deviation from Tresorits data confidentiality claims."
- Ernst & Young additionally tested the web, mobile, and desktop clients. They concluded:
> Test results found no deviation from Tresorits data confidentiality claims.
[^1]: [ISO/IEC 27001](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO/IEC_27001):2013 compliance relates to the company's [information security management system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_security_management) and covers the sales, development, maintenance and support of their cloud services.
@ -131,7 +133,7 @@ Peergos was [audited](https://peergos.org/posts/security-audit-2024) in November
### Minimum Requirements
- Must enforce end-to-end encryption.
- Must enforce E2EE.
- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multifactor authentication, or passkey logins.
- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
@ -142,8 +144,8 @@ Peergos was [audited](https://peergos.org/posts/security-audit-2024) in November
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
- Clients should be open source.
- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third party.
- Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
- These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.
- Should support easy file-sharing with other users.
- Should support easy file sharing with other users.
- Should offer at least basic file preview and editing functionality on the web interface.

View file

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/b
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://pypi.org/project/mat2#metadata-and-privacy)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#requirements-setup-on-macos-os-x-using-homebrew)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#web-interface)
@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/b
**ExifEraser** is a modern, permissionless image metadata erasing application for Android.
It currently supports JPEG, PNG and WebP files.
It currently supports JPEG, PNG, and WebP files.
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#description){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>

View file

@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) ins
Like [Tor Browser](tor.md), Mullvad Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting by making your browser fingerprint identical to all other Mullvad Browser users, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
Therefore, it is imperative that you do not modify the browser at all outside adjusting the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings). When adjusting the security level, you **must** always restart the browser before continuing to use it. Otherwise, [the security settings may not be fully applied](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/05/02/tor-security-slider-flaw/), putting you at a higher risk of fingerprinting and exploits than you may expect based on the setting chosen.
Therefore, it is imperative that you do not modify the browser at all outside adjusting the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings). When adjusting the security level, you **must** always restart the browser before continuing to use it. Otherwise, [the security settings may not be fully applied](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/05/02/tor-security-slider-flaw), putting you at a higher risk of fingerprinting and exploits than you may expect based on the setting chosen.
Modifications other than adjusting this setting would make your fingerprint unique, defeating the purpose of using this browser. If you want to configure your browser more heavily and fingerprinting is not a concern for you, we recommend [Firefox](#firefox) instead.

View file

@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software
**Fedora Linux** is our recommended desktop distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies (e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org) and [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org)) before other distributions. These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://fedoraproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/docs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</details>
@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ Fedora has a semi-rolling release cycle. While some packages like the desktop en
openSUSE Tumbleweed uses [Btrfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Btrfs) and [Snapper](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Snapper_Tutorial) to ensure that snapshots can be rolled back should there be a problem.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.opensuse.org){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://shop.opensuse.org){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.opensuse.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://shop.opensuse.org){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</details>
@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ Tumbleweed follows a rolling release model where each update is released as a sn
**Arch Linux** is a lightweight, do-it-yourself (DIY) distribution, meaning that you only get what you install. For more information see their [FAQ](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Frequently_asked_questions).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://archlinux.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.archlinux.org){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://archlinux.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.archlinux.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://archlinux.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</details>
@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ A large portion of [Arch Linuxs packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org)
**Fedora Atomic Desktops** are variants of Fedora which use the `rpm-ostree` package manager and have a strong focus on containerized workflows and Flatpak for desktop applications. All of these variants follow the same release schedule as Fedora Workstation, benefiting from the same fast updates and staying very close to upstream.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://fedoraproject.org/atomic-desktops){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/emerging){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/emerging){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</details>
@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ As an alternative to Flatpaks, there is the option of [Toolbx](https://docs.fedo
NixOS is an independent distribution based on the Nix package manager with a focus on reproducibility and reliability.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nixos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://nixos.org/learn.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://nixos.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://nixos.org/learn.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://nixos.org/donate.html){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</details>
@ -144,8 +144,8 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if theres no pre-built available in th
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://whonix.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://whonix.org/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://whonix.org/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://whonix.org/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://whonix.org/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</details>
@ -166,8 +166,8 @@ Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Wh
**Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and [:material-incognito: Anonymity](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tails.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.net/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tails.net/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.net/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tails.net/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</details>
@ -203,9 +203,9 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://qubes-os.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://qubes-os.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://qubes-os.org/doc){ .card-link title=Documentation }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://qubes-os.org/doc){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://qubes-os.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://qubes-os.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</details>
@ -246,9 +246,9 @@ While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually ou
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://kicksecure.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</details>

View file

@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ These DNS filtering solutions offer a web dashboard where you can customize the
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://controld.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://controld.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.controld.com/docs/getting-started){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.controld.com/docs/getting-started){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Control-D-Inc/ctrld){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ These DNS filtering solutions offer a web dashboard where you can customize the
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextdns.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextdns.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://help.nextdns.io){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://help.nextdns.io){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextdns/nextdns){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](ad
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.rethinkdns.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.rethinkdns.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
@ -198,10 +198,10 @@ While RethinkDNS takes up the Android VPN slot, you can still use a VPN or Orbot
**DNSCrypt-Proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DoH](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/dnscrypt/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/dnscrypt/contribute){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>

View file

@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_e
![CryptPad logo](assets/img/document-collaboration/cryptpad.svg){ align=right }
**CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily. [:material-star-box: Read our latest CryptPad review.](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/02/07/cryptpad-review/)
**CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily. [:material-star-box: Read our latest CryptPad review.](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/02/07/cryptpad-review)
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptpad.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/GcNjAWmK6YDB3EO2IipRZ0fUe89j43Ryqeb4fjkjehE){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }

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@ -251,61 +251,6 @@ Tuta will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tuta.com/support#inactive-acco
Tuta offers the business version of [Tuta to non-profit organizations](https://tuta.com/blog/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
## Self-Hosting Email
Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable. In addition to the "all-in-one" solutions below, we've picked out a few articles that cover a more manual approach:
- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd) (2019)
- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide) (August 2017)
### Stalwart
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Stalwart logo](assets/img/email/stalwart.svg){ align=right }
**Stalwart** is a newer mail server written in Rust which supports JMAP in addition to the standard IMAP, POP3, and SMTP. It has a wide variety of configuration options, but it also defaults to very reasonable settings (in terms of both security and features) making it easy to use immediately. It has web-based administration with TOTP 2FA support, and it allows you to enter your public PGP key to encrypt **all** incoming messages.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://stalw.art){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://stalw.art/docs/get-started){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/stalwartlabs){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/stalwartlabs){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</div>
Stalwart's [PGP implementation](https://stalw.art/docs/encryption/overview) is unique among our self-hosted recommendations, and allows you to operate your own mail server with zero-knowledge message storage. If you additionally configure Web Key Directory on your domain, and if you use an email client which supports PGP and Web Key Directory for outgoing mail (like Thunderbird), then this is the easiest way to get self-hosted E2EE compatibility with all [Proton Mail](#proton-mail) users.
Stalwart does **not** have an integrated webmail, so you will need to use it with a [dedicated email client](email-clients.md) (or find an open-source webmail to self-host, like Nextcloud's Mail app). We use Stalwart for our own internal email at *Privacy Guides*.
### Mailcow
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Mailcow logo](assets/img/email/mailcow.svg){ align=right }
**Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: a mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.mailcow.email){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</div>
### Mail-in-a-Box
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Mail-in-a-Box logo](assets/img/email/mail-in-a-box.svg){ align=right }
**Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
</div>
## Criteria
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any email provider wishing to be recommended, including implementing industry best practices, modern technology and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an email provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the email provider you choose is the right choice for you.

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@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.
**Picocrypt** is a small and simple encryption tool that provides modern encryption. Picocrypt uses the secure XChaCha20 cipher and the Argon2id key derivation function to provide a high level of security. It uses Go's standard x/crypto modules for its encryption features.
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Picocrypt/Picocrypt){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Picocrypt/Picocrypt#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Picocrypt/Picocrypt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/picocrypt){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ We advise against using your iCloud account for recovery; instead, you should se
**LUKS** is the default FDE method for Linux. It can be used to encrypt full volumes, partitions, or create encrypted containers.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/README.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup#what-the-){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup){ .card-link title="Source Code" }

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
---
meta_title: "Privacy Respecting Health and Wellness apps for Android and iOS - Privacy Guides"
title: "Health and Wellness Apps"
meta_title: "Privacy-Respecting Health and Wellness apps for Android and iOS - Privacy Guides"
title: "Health and Wellness"
icon: material/heart-pulse
description: These applications are what we currently recommend for all health and fitness-related activites on your phone.
description: These applications are what we currently recommend for all health- and fitness-related activites on your phone.
cover: health.webp
---
<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ These general purpose apps can do everything from counting steps and tracking sl
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>
- [:simple-android: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/nodomain.freeyourgadget.gadgetbridge)
- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/nodomain.freeyourgadget.gadgetbridge)
</details>

View file

@ -113,6 +113,6 @@ In the modern age of digital data exploitation, your privacy has never been more
Many people get the concepts of privacy, security, and anonymity confused. You'll see people criticize various products as "not private" when really they mean it doesn't provide anonymity, for example. On this website, we cover all three of these topics, but it is important you understand the difference between them, and when each one comes into play.
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: 5 Steps to Improve Your Privacy](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/02/14/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online/){ class="md-button" }
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: 5 Steps to Improve Your Privacy](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/02/14/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online){ class="md-button" }
</div>
</div>

View file

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ cover: language-tools.webp
- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
Text inputted to grammar, spelling, and style checkers, as well as translation services, can contain sensitive information which may be stored on their servers for an indefinite amount of time and sold to third parties. The language tools listed on this page do not store your submitted text to a server, and can be self-hosted and used offline for maximum control of your data.
Text inputted to grammar, spelling, and style checkers, as well as translation services, can contain sensitive information which may be stored on their servers for an indefinite amount of time and sold to third parties. The language tools listed on this page do not store your submitted text on a server and can be self-hosted and used offline for maximum control of your data.
## LanguageTool
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Text inputted to grammar, spelling, and style checkers, as well as translation s
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://languagetool.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://languagetool.org/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://languagetooler.freshdesk.com/en/support/solutions){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://languagetooler.freshdesk.com/en/support/solutions){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/languagetool-org){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Text inputted to grammar, spelling, and style checkers, as well as translation s
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://languagetool.org/windows-desktop)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://languagetool.org/mac-desktop)
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/languagetool)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/grammar-and-spell-checker/oldceeleldhonbafppcapldpdifcinji)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/oldceeleldhonbafppcapldpdifcinji)
- [:fontawesome-brands-edge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/hfjadhjooeceemgojogkhlppanjkbobc)
- [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1534275760)

View file

@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The recommendations here either do not collect any user data or at least do not
![Organic Maps logo](assets/img/maps/organic-maps.svg){ align=right }
**Organic Maps** is an open source, community-developed map display and satnav-style navigation app for walkers, drivers, and cyclists. The app offers worldwide offline maps based on OpenStreetMap data, and navigation with privacy — no location tracking, no data collection, and no ads. The app can be used completely offline.
**Organic Maps** is an open-source, community-developed map display and satnav-style navigation app for walkers, drivers, and cyclists. The app offers worldwide, offline maps based on OpenStreetMap data, and navigation with privacy — no location tracking, no data collection, and no ads. The app can be used completely offline.
Features include cycling routes, hiking trails and walking paths, turn-by-turn navigation with voice guidance, and public transport route planning (only available in supported regions and cities).
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Please note that Organic Maps is a simple, basic app that lacks certain features
![OsmAnd logo](assets/img/maps/osmand.svg){ align=right }
**OsmAnd** is an offline map and navigation application based on OpenStreetMap, offering turn-by-turn navigation for walking, cycling, driving, as well as public transport. It is open-source and does not collect any user data.
**OsmAnd** is an offline map and navigation application based on OpenStreetMap that offers turn-by-turn navigation for walking, cycling, driving, as well as public transport. It is open source and does not collect any user data.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://osmand.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://osmand.net/docs/legal/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@ -59,13 +59,15 @@ Please note that Organic Maps is a simple, basic app that lacks certain features
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.osmand)
- [:simple-android: Android](https://osmand.net/docs/versions/free-versions)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/osmand-maps-travel-navigate/id934850257)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/id934850257)
</details>
</div>
Compared to Organic Maps, OsmAnd has more [features](https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/OsmAnd#Features) but is also more complicated to use. One noteworthy feature is the ability to overlay or underlay external map data, such as satellite images from Microsoft or [traffic data](https://web.archive.org/web/20211203063453/http://themm.net/public/osmand_traffic) from Google, although the latter is ignored by the automatic route planning. OsmAnd also has an optional integration of street view images provided by [Mapillary](https://mapillary.com).
OsmAnd allows you to overlay or underlay external map data, such as satellite images from Microsoft or [traffic data](https://themm.net/public/osmand_traffic) from Google, although the latter is ignored by the automatic route planning. OsmAnd also has an optional integration of street view images provided by [Mapillary](https://mapillary.com).
You can find a detailed overview of OsmAnd's supported [features](https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/OsmAnd#Features) on the OpenStreet Map Wiki.
## Criteria

View file

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: Admonitions
description: A guide for website contributors on creating admonitions.
---
**Admonitions** (or "call-outs") are a choice writers can use to include side content in an article without interrupting the document flow.
**Admonitions** (or "call-outs") are tools that writers can use to include side content in an article without interrupting the document flow.
<div class="admonition example" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Example Admonition</p>
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ ENCLOSED TEXT
</details>
```
The `TITLE` must be specified, if you don't want a specific title you can set it to the same text as the `TYPE` (see below) in title case, e.g. `Note`. The `ENCLOSED TEXT` should be Markdown formatted.
The `TITLE` must be specified; if you don't want a specific title you can set it to the same text as the `TYPE` (see below) in title case, e.g. `Note`. The `ENCLOSED TEXT` should be Markdown formatted.
### Regular types
@ -166,11 +166,11 @@ This format is used to generate recommendation cards. Notably it is missing the
![PhotoPrism logo](assets/img/photo-management/photoprism.svg){ align=right }
**PhotoPrism** is a self-hostable platform for managing photos. It supports album syncing and sharing as well as a variety of other [features](https://photoprism.app/features). It does not include E2EE, so it's best hosted on a server that you trust and is under your control.
**PhotoPrism** is a self-hostable platform for managing photos. It supports album syncing and sharing as well as a variety of other [features](https://photoprism.app/features). It does not include end-to-end encryption, so it's best hosted on a server that you trust and is under your control.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://photoprism.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://photoprism.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://photoprism.app/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://photoprism.app/kb){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/photoprism){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
@ -189,11 +189,11 @@ This format is used to generate recommendation cards. Notably it is missing the
![PhotoPrism logo](../assets/img/photo-management/photoprism.svg){ align=right }
**PhotoPrism** is a self-hostable platform for managing photos. It supports album syncing and sharing as well as a variety of other [features](https://photoprism.app/features). It does not include E2EE, so it's best hosted on a server that you trust and is under your control.
**PhotoPrism** is a self-hostable platform for managing photos. It supports album syncing and sharing as well as a variety of other [features](https://photoprism.app/features). It does not include end-to-end encryption, so it's best hosted on a server that you trust and is under your control.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://photoprism.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://photoprism.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://photoprism.app/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://photoprism.app/kb){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/photoprism){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ This format is used to generate recommendation cards. Notably it is missing the
#### `downloads`
This is a special type of collapsible admonition, used to generate the download links section. It is only used within recommendation cards, as shown in the example above.
This is a special type of collapsible admonition which is used to generate sections containing download links. It is only used within recommendation cards, as shown in the example above.
```markdown title="Downloads Section"
<details class="downloads" markdown>
@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ This is a special type of collapsible admonition, used to generate the download
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id979659905)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/android-mail/releases)
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ This is a special type of collapsible admonition, used to generate the download
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id979659905)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/android-mail/releases)
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ This is a special type of collapsible admonition, used to generate the download
## Old Format
Throughout the site, you may see some admonitions formatted similarly to these examples:
Throughout the site, you may see some admonitions formatted like the following examples:
``` markdown title="Admonition"
!!! note
@ -289,6 +289,6 @@ massa, nec semper lorem quam in massa.
</div>
**This format is no longer used going forward,** because it is incompatible with newer versions of our translation software at Crowdin. When adding a new page to the site, only the newer HTML-based format should be used.
**This format is no longer used going forward** because it is incompatible with newer versions of our translation software at Crowdin. When adding a new page to the site, only the newer, HTML-based format should be used.
There is no rush to convert admonitions with the old format to the new format. Pages currently using this formatting should continue to work, but we will be updating them to use the newer HTML-based format above over time as we continue to update the site.
There is no rush to convert admonitions with the old format to the new format. Pages currently using this formatting should continue to work, but we will be updating them to use the newer, HTML-based format above over time as we continue to update the site.

View file

@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n
![NewsFlash logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/newsflash.png){ align=right }
**NewsFlash** is an open-source, modern, and easy-to-use news feed reader for Linux. It can be used offline or used with services like [Nextcloud News](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/news) or [Inoreader](https://inoreader.com). It has a search feature and a pre-defined list of sources that you can add directly.
**NewsFlash** is an open-source, modern, and easy-to-use news feed reader for Linux. It can be used offline or with services like [Inoreader](https://inoreader.com) or [Nextcloud News](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/news). It has a search feature and a pre-defined list of sources that you can add directly.
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/news-flash/news_flash_gtk){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/news-flash/news_flash_gtk#newsflash){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/news-flash/news_flash_gtk){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
@ -61,9 +61,11 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n
![Feeder logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/feeder.png){ align=right }
**Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML), and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
**Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds.
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML), and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://ko-fi.com/spacecowboy){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
@ -84,10 +86,12 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n
![Miniflux logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux.svg#only-light){ align=right }
![Miniflux logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
**Miniflux** is a web-based news aggregator that you can self-host. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML), and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
**Miniflux** is a web-based news aggregator that you can self-host.
It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML), and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://miniflux.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index#user-guide){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/miniflux/v2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://miniflux.app/#donations){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
@ -99,7 +103,9 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n
![NetNewsWire logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/netnewswire.png){ align=right }
**NetNewsWire** is a free and open-source feed reader for macOS and iOS with a focus on a native design and feature set. It supports the typical feed formats alongside built-in support for Reddit feeds.
**NetNewsWire** is a free and open-source feed reader for macOS and iOS with a focus on a native design and feature set.
It supports conventional feed formats and includes built-in support for Reddit feeds.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://netnewswire.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://netnewswire.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@ -125,7 +131,7 @@ A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online n
**Newsboat** is an RSS/Atom feed reader for the text console. It's an actively maintained fork of [Newsbeuter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newsbeuter). It is very lightweight and ideal for use over [Secure Shell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newsboat.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://newsboat.org/releases/2.37/docs/newsboat.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://newsboat.org/releases/2.38/docs/newsboat.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/newsboat/newsboat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
</div>
@ -163,7 +169,7 @@ You can subscribe to YouTube channels without logging in and associating usage i
<div class="admonition example" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Example</p>
To subscribe to a YouTube channel with an RSS client, first look for its [channel code](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6180214). The channel code can be found on the about page of the YouTube channel you wish to subscribe to, under: **About****Share** → **Copy channel ID**. Replace `[CHANNEL ID]` below:
To subscribe to a YouTube channel with an RSS client, first look for its [channel code](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6180214). The channel code can be found in the expanded description (i.e., the "About" section) of the YouTube channel you wish to subscribe to: **About****Share channel** → **Copy channel ID**. Replace `[CHANNEL ID]` below:
```text
https://youtube.com/feeds/videos.xml?channel_id=[CHANNEL ID]

View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: "Notebooks"
icon: material/notebook-edit-outline
description: These encrypted note-taking apps let you keep track of your notes without giving them to a third-party.
description: These encrypted note-taking apps let you keep track of your notes without giving them to a third party.
cover: notebooks.webp
---
<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ cover: notebooks.webp
Keep track of your notes and journals without giving them to a third party.
If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microsoft OneNote, we suggest you pick an alternative here that supports E2EE.
If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microsoft OneNote, we suggest you pick an alternative here that supports end-to-end encryption.
## Cloud-based
@ -20,13 +20,15 @@ If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microso
![Standard Notes logo](assets/img/notebooks/standard-notes.svg){ align=right }
**Standard Notes** is a simple and private notes app that makes your notes easy and available everywhere you are. It features E2EE on every platform, and a powerful desktop experience with themes and custom editors. It has also been [independently audited](https://standardnotes.com/help/2/has-standard-notes-completed-a-third-party-security-audit).
**Standard Notes** is a simple and private notes app that features cross-platform sync for seamless use. It features E2EE on every platform, and a powerful desktop experience with themes and custom editors.
Standard Notes has also undergone multiple [independent audits](https://standardnotes.com/help/2/has-standard-notes-completed-a-third-party-security-audit).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://standardnotes.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://standardnotes.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://standardnotes.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://standardnotes.com/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/standardnotes){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://standardnotes.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://standardnotes.com/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>
@ -37,7 +39,7 @@ If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microso
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://standardnotes.com)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://standardnotes.com)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://standardnotes.com)
- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.standardnotes.com)
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://app.standardnotes.com)
</details>
@ -51,13 +53,15 @@ Standard Notes has [joined Proton AG](https://standardnotes.com/blog/joining-for
![Notesnook logo](assets/img/notebooks/notesnook.svg){ align=right }
**Notesnook** is a free (as in speech) & open-source note-taking app focused on user privacy & ease of use. It features end-to-end encryption on all platforms with a powerful sync to take your notes on the go. You can easily import your notes from Evernote, OneNote & a lot of other apps using their [official importer](https://importer.notesnook.com).
**Notesnook** is a free (as in speech), open-source, and easy-to-use E2EE note-taking app focused on user privacy.
It features sync functionality that allows you to access your notes on multiple platforms. You can easily import your notes from Evernote, OneNote, and other apps using their [official importer](https://importer.notesnook.com).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://notesnook.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://notesnook.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://help.notesnook.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://help.notesnook.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/streetwriters/notesnook){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/streetwriters/notesnook/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/notesnook){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>
@ -68,10 +72,10 @@ Standard Notes has [joined Proton AG](https://standardnotes.com/blog/joining-for
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://notesnook.com/downloads)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://notesnook.com/downloads)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://notesnook.com/downloads)
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://notesnook.com/notesnook-web-clipper)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/notesnook-web-clipper/kljhpemdlcnjohmfmkogahelkcidieaj)
- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.notesnook.com)
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/com.notesnook.Notesnook)
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://notesnook.com/notesnook-web-clipper)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/kljhpemdlcnjohmfmkogahelkcidieaj)
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://app.notesnook.com)
</details>
@ -83,13 +87,15 @@ Standard Notes has [joined Proton AG](https://standardnotes.com/blog/joining-for
![Joplin logo](assets/img/notebooks/joplin.svg){ align=right }
**Joplin** is a free, open-source, and fully-featured note-taking and to-do application which can handle numerous markdown notes organized into notebooks and tags. It offers E2EE and can sync through Nextcloud, Dropbox, and more. It also offers easy import from Evernote and plain-text notes.
**Joplin** is a free, open-source, and fully-featured E2EE note-taking and to-do application which can handle numerous Markdown notes organized into notebooks and tags.
It can sync through Nextcloud, Dropbox, and more. It also offers easy import from Evernote and plain-text notes.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://joplinapp.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://joplinapp.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://joplinapp.org/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://joplinapp.org/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://joplinapp.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://joplinapp.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>
@ -101,14 +107,13 @@ Standard Notes has [joined Proton AG](https://standardnotes.com/blog/joining-for
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/joplin-web-clipper)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/joplin-web-clipper/alofnhikmmkdbbbgpnglcpdollgjjfek)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/alofnhikmmkdbbbgpnglcpdollgjjfek)
</details>
</div>
Joplin does not [support](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/289) password/PIN protection for the application itself or individual notes and notebooks. However, your data is still encrypted in transit and at the sync location using your master key.
Since January 2023, Joplin [supports biometrics](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/commit/f10d9f75b055d84416053fab7e35438f598753e9) app lock for Android and iOS.
Joplin [does not support](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/289) password/PIN protection for the application itself or individual notes and notebooks. However, your data is still encrypted in transit and at the sync location using your master key. Since January 2023, Joplin [supports biometrics app lock](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/commit/f10d9f75b055d84416053fab7e35438f598753e9) for Android and iOS.
### Cryptee
@ -117,23 +122,25 @@ Since January 2023, Joplin [supports biometrics](https://github.com/laurent22/jo
![Cryptee logo](./assets/img/notebooks/cryptee.svg#only-light){ align=right }
![Cryptee logo](./assets/img/notebooks/cryptee-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
**Cryptee** is an open-source, web-based E2EE document editor and photo storage application. Cryptee is a PWA, which means that it works seamlessly across all modern devices without requiring native apps for each respective platform.
**Cryptee** is an open-source, web-based E2EE document editor and photo storage application.
Cryptee offers 100 MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Sign-up doesn't require an e-mail or other personally identifiable information.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://crypt.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://crypt.ee/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://crypt.ee/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://crypt.ee/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>
- [:octicons-globe-16: PWA](https://crypt.ee/download)
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://crypt.ee/download)
</details>
</div>
Cryptee offers 100 MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Sign-up doesn't require an e-mail or other personally identifiable information.
Cryptee is a PWA, which means that it works seamlessly across all modern devices without requiring native apps for each respective platform.
## Local notebooks
@ -143,12 +150,12 @@ Cryptee offers 100 MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more.
![Org-mode logo](assets/img/notebooks/org-mode.svg){ align=right }
**Org-mode** is a [major mode](https://gnu.org/software/emacs/manual/html_node/elisp/Major-Modes.html) for GNU Emacs. Org-mode is for keeping notes, maintaining to-do lists, planning projects, and authoring documents with a fast and effective plain-text system. Synchronization is possible with [file synchronization](file-sharing.md#file-sync) tools.
**Org-mode** is a [major mode](https://gnu.org/software/emacs/manual/html_node/elisp/Major-Modes.html) for GNU Emacs. Org-mode is for keeping notes, maintaining to-do lists, planning projects, and authoring documents with a fast and effective plain-text system. File synchronization is possible with tools like [Syncthing](file-sharing.md#syncthing-p2p).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orgmode.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://orgmode.org/manuals.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://orgmode.org/manuals.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/bzg){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/bzg){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</details>

View file

@ -127,14 +127,14 @@ schema:
**Password managers** allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials with the use of a master password.
[Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./basics/passwords-overview.md)
[Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](basics/passwords-overview.md)
<div class="admonition info" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Info</p>
Built-in password managers in software like browsers and operating systems are sometimes not as good as dedicated password manager software. The advantage of a built-in password manager is good integration with the software, but it can often be very simple and lack privacy and security features that standalone offerings have.
For example, the password manager in Microsoft Edge doesn't offer E2EE at all. Google's password manager has [optional](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/11350823) E2EE, and [Apple's](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) offers E2EE by default.
For example, the password manager in Microsoft Edge doesn't offer end-to-end encryption at all. Google's password manager has [optional](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/11350823) E2EE, and [Apple's](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) offers E2EE by default.
</div>
@ -166,15 +166,15 @@ These password managers sync your passwords to a cloud server for easy accessibi
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://bitwarden.com/download)
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.bitwarden.desktop)
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/bitwarden-password-manager)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bitwarden-free-password-m/nngceckbapebfimnlniiiahkandclblb)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/nngceckbapebfimnlniiiahkandclblb)
- [:fontawesome-brands-edge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/jbkfoedolllekgbhcbcoahefnbanhhlh)
- [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/bitwarden/id1352778147)
- [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1352778147)
</details>
</div>
Bitwarden uses [PBKDF2](https://bitwarden.com/help/kdf-algorithms/#pbkdf2) as its key derivation function (KDF) algorithm by default. It also offers [Argon2](https://bitwarden.com/help/kdf-algorithms/#argon2id), which is more secure, as an alternative. You can change your account's KDF algorithm in the web vault.
Bitwarden uses [PBKDF2](https://bitwarden.com/help/kdf-algorithms/#pbkdf2) as its key derivation function (KDF) algorithm by default. It also offers [Argon2](https://bitwarden.com/help/kdf-algorithms/#argon2id), which is more secure, as an alternative. You can change your account's KDF algorithm in the web vault:
- [x] Select **Settings > Security > Keys > KDF algorithm > Argon2id**
@ -204,11 +204,11 @@ Bitwarden's server-side code is [open source](https://github.com/bitwarden/serve
<summary>Downloads</summary>
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=proton.android.pass)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/proton-pass-password-manager/id6443490629)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id6443490629)
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://proton.me/pass/download)
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/proton-pass)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/proton-pass-free-password/ghmbeldphafepmbegfdlkpapadhbakde)
- [:fontawesome-brands-edge: Edge](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/proton-pass-free-password/ghmbeldphafepmbegfdlkpapadhbakde)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/ghmbeldphafepmbegfdlkpapadhbakde)
- [:fontawesome-brands-edge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/gcllgfdnfnllodcaambdaknbipemelie)
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://pass.proton.me)
</details>
@ -229,7 +229,9 @@ All issues were addressed and fixed shortly after the [report](https://res.cloud
![1Password logo](assets/img/password-management/1password.svg){ align=right }
**1Password** is a password manager with a strong focus on security and ease-of-use that allows you to store passwords, passkeys, credit cards, software licenses, and any other sensitive information in a secure digital vault. Your vault is hosted on 1Password's servers for a [monthly fee](https://1password.com/sign-up). 1Password is [audited](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments) on a regular basis and provides exceptional customer support. 1Password is closed source; however, the security of the product is thoroughly documented in their [security white paper](https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf).
**1Password** is a password manager with a strong focus on security and ease-of-use that allows you to store passwords, passkeys, credit cards, software licenses, and any other sensitive information in a secure digital vault. Your vault is hosted on 1Password's servers for a [monthly fee](https://1password.com/sign-up).
1Password is [audited](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments) on a regular basis and provides exceptional customer support. 1Password is closed source; however, the security of the product is thoroughly documented in their [security white paper](https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://1password.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://1password.com/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@ -244,16 +246,16 @@ All issues were addressed and fixed shortly after the [report](https://res.cloud
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://1password.com/downloads/mac)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://1password.com/downloads/linux)
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/1password-x-password-manager)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/1password-%E2%80%93-password-mana/aeblfdkhhhdcdjpifhhbdiojplfjncoa)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/aeblfdkhhhdcdjpifhhbdiojplfjncoa)
- [:fontawesome-brands-edge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/dppgmdbiimibapkepcbdbmkaabgiofem)
- [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/1password-for-safari/id1569813296)
- [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1569813296)
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://my.1password.com/signin)
</details>
</div>
Traditionally, 1Password has offered the best password manager user experience for people using macOS and iOS; however, it has now achieved feature parity across all platforms. 1Password's clients boast many features geared towards families and less technical people, such as an intuitive UI for ease of use and navigation, as well as advanced functionality. Notably, nearly every feature of 1Password is available within its native mobile or desktop clients.
Traditionally, 1Password has offered the best password manager user experience for people using macOS and iOS; however, it has now achieved feature parity across all platforms. 1Password's clients boast many features geared towards families and less technical people, such as an intuitive UI for ease-of-use and navigation, as well as advanced functionality. Notably, nearly every feature of 1Password is available within its native mobile or desktop clients.
Your 1Password vault is secured with both your master password and a randomized 34-character security key to encrypt your data on their servers. This security key adds a layer of protection to your data because your data is secured with high entropy regardless of your master password. Many other password manager solutions are entirely reliant on the strength of your master password to secure your data.
@ -276,7 +278,7 @@ Your 1Password vault is secured with both your master password and a randomized
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.psono.psono)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1545581224)
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/psono-pw-password-manager)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/psonopw-password-manager/eljmjmgjkbmpmfljlmklcfineebidmlo)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/eljmjmgjkbmpmfljlmklcfineebidmlo)
- [:simple-docker: Docker Hub](https://hub.docker.com/r/psono/psono-client)
</details>
@ -330,9 +332,9 @@ These options allow you to manage an encrypted password database locally.
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://keepassxc.org/download/#windows)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://keepassxc.org/download/#mac)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://keepassxc.org/download/#linux)
- [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.keepassxc.KeePassXC)
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.keepassxc.KeePassXC)
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/keepassxc-browser)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepassxc-browser/oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk)
</details>
@ -346,7 +348,7 @@ KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-se
![KeePassDX logo](assets/img/password-management/keepassdx.svg){ align=right }
**KeePassDX** is a lightweight password manager for Android; it allows for editing encrypted data in a single file in KeePass format and can fill in forms securely. The [pro version](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) of the app allows you to unlock cosmetic content and non-standard protocol features, but more importantly, it helps and encourages development.
**KeePassDX** is a lightweight password manager for Android; it allows for editing encrypted data in a single file in KeePass format and can fill in forms securely.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://keepassdx.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
@ -363,6 +365,8 @@ KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-se
</div>
The [pro version](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) of the app allows you to unlock cosmetic content and non-standard protocol features, but more importantly, it helps and encourages development.
### Gopass (CLI)
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>

View file

@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ cover: pastebins.webp
![PrivateBin logo](assets/img/pastebins/privatebin.svg){ align=right }
**PrivateBin** is a minimalist, open-source online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Data is encrypted/decrypted in the browser using 256-bit AES. It is the improved version of ZeroBin.
**PrivateBin** is a minimalist, open-source, online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Data is encrypted/decrypted in the browser using 256-bit AES. It is the improved version of ZeroBin.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privatebin.info){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-server-16:](https://privatebin.info/directory){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/wiki/FAQ){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/wiki/FAQ){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
</div>
@ -48,11 +48,11 @@ cover: pastebins.webp
### Minimum Requirements
- Must be open source.
- Must implement "zero-trust" end-to-end encryption.
- Must implement "zero-trust" E2EE.
- Must support password-protected files.
### Best-Case
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
- Should have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party.
- Should have a published audit from a reputable, independent third party.

View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: "Photo Management"
icon: material/image
description: Photo management tools to keep your personal photos safe from the prying eyes of cloud storage providers and other unauthorized access.
description: These photo management tools keep your personal photos safe from the prying eyes of cloud storage providers and other unauthorized parties.
cover: photo-management.webp
---
<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
@ -17,24 +17,26 @@ Most cloud **photo management solutions** like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon
![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg){ align=right }
**Ente Photos** is an end-to-end encrypted photo backup service which supports automatic backups on iOS and Android. Their code is fully open-source, both on the client side and on the server side. It is also [self-hostable](https://github.com/ente-io/ente/tree/main/server#self-hosting). The free plan offers 10 GB of storage as long as you use the service at least once a year.
**Ente Photos** is an end-to-end encrypted photo backup service which supports automatic backups on iOS and Android. Their code is fully open source, both on the client side and on the server side. It is also [self-hostable](https://github.com/ente-io/ente/tree/main/server#self-hosting).
The free plan offers 5 GB of storage as long as you use the service at least once a year.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://ente.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://ente.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://ente.io/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://ente.io/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ente-io/ente){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.ente.photos)
- [:simple-android: Android](https://ente.io/download)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1542026904)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ente-io/ente/releases?q=photos)
- [:simple-android: Android](https://ente.io/download)
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://ente.io/download)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://ente.io/download)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://ente.io/download)
- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://web.ente.io)
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://web.ente.io)
</details>
@ -49,18 +51,19 @@ Ente Photos underwent an [audit by Cure53](https://ente.io/blog/cryptography-aud
![Stingle logo](assets/img/photo-management/stingle.png#only-light){ align=right }
![Stingle logo](assets/img/photo-management/stingle-dark.png#only-dark){ align=right }
**Stingle** is a gallery and camera application with built-in, end-to-end encrypted backup and sync functionality for your photos and videos. Storage starts at 1 GB for free accounts on their cloud, or you can host your own Stingle API server for total independence.
**Stingle** is a gallery and camera application with built-in, E2EE backup and sync functionality for your photos and videos.
Storage starts at 1 GB for free accounts on their cloud, or you can host your own Stingle API server for total independence.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://stingle.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://stingle.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://stingle.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://stingle.org/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/stingle){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.stingle.photos)
- [:simple-android: Android](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.stingle.photos)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1582535448)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/stingle/stingle-photos-android/releases)
@ -96,7 +99,7 @@ Ente Photos underwent an [audit by Cure53](https://ente.io/blog/cryptography-aud
### Minimum Requirements
- Cloud-hosted providers must enforce end-to-end encryption.
- Cloud-hosted providers must enforce E2EE.
- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multifactor authentication, or passkey logins.
- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
@ -105,4 +108,4 @@ Ente Photos underwent an [audit by Cure53](https://ente.io/blog/cryptography-aud
### Best Case
- Should have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party.
- Should have a published audit from a reputable, independent third party.

View file

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: We do not sell or share your data with any third-parties.
---
## What is Privacy Guides?
Privacy Guides is a community project operated by a number of active contributors. The public list of team members [can be found on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u?group=team&order=solutions&period=all). Privacy Guides is legally administered by [MAGIC Grants](https://magicgrants.org/), a 501(c)(3) public charity acting as our fiscal host.
Privacy Guides is a community project operated by a number of active contributors. The public list of team members [can be found on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u?group=team&order=solutions&period=all). Privacy Guides is legally administered by [MAGIC Grants](https://magicgrants.org), a 501(c)(3) public charity acting as our fiscal host.
As a project, we make available to the public:
@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ Privacy Guides does not respond to the (now deprecated) [Do Not Track HTTP heade
## Where does Privacy Guides store data about me?
Most data is hosted by [Triplebit](https://www.triplebit.org/) web services in the United States.
Most data is hosted by [Triplebit](https://www.triplebit.org) web services in the United States.
Some publicly accessible data may be hosted by Content Delivery Networks with servers in other jurisdictions. For example, your profile picture may be stored on multiple servers around the world in order to improve the performance for visitors to our website.
@ -288,16 +288,16 @@ Privacy Guides uses the following subprocessors, and may share personal data wit
| Subprocessor | Service | Function | Processing | Links |
| ------------ | ------- | -------- | ---------- | ----- |
| [Bunny.net](https://bunny.net/) (Slovenia) | [Bunny CDN](https://bunny.net/cdn/) | Content Delivery Network services for distributing images and other static assets. | Slovenia, Global | [Privacy Notice](https://bunny.net/privacy/), [GDPR Center](https://bunny.net/gdpr/) |
| [Cloudflare](https://www.cloudflare.com/) (USA) | [Authoritative DNS](https://www.cloudflare.com/application-services/products/dns/) | Authoritative DNS services for our domain names. | USA, Global | [Privacy Notice](https://www.cloudflare.com/privacypolicy/), [GDPR Center](https://www.cloudflare.com/trust-hub/gdpr/) |
| [Bunny.net](https://bunny.net) (Slovenia) | [Bunny CDN](https://bunny.net/cdn) | Content Delivery Network services for distributing images and other static assets. | Slovenia, Global | [Privacy Notice](https://bunny.net/privacy), [GDPR Center](https://bunny.net/gdpr) |
| [Cloudflare](https://cloudflare.com) (USA) | [Authoritative DNS](https://cloudflare.com/application-services/products/dns) | Authoritative DNS services for our domain names. | USA, Global | [Privacy Notice](https://cloudflare.com/privacypolicy), [GDPR Center](https://cloudflare.com/trust-hub/gdpr) |
| [Fediverse Communications LLC](https://fediverse.us) (USA) | PeerTube | For hosting public videos produced by Privacy Guides which are shared or embedded on this website. | USA | [More information](https://neat.tube/about/instance) |
| [GitHub](https://github.com/) (USA) | Git Repositories | *For visitors to this website*: sharing information with our visitors about the current release, repo star count, etc. | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/privacy-policies/github-general-privacy-statement) |
| [GitHub](https://github.com/) (USA) | Git Repositories, Issues, Pull Requests | *For contributors to this website*: hosting our source code and communications platforms such as our issues tracker. | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/privacy-policies/github-general-privacy-statement) |
| [GitHub](https://github.com/) (USA) | [Sponsors](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides) | For collecting payments for gifts to Privacy Guides | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/privacy-policies/github-general-privacy-statement) |
| [GitHub](https://github.com) (USA) | Git Repositories | *For visitors to this website*: sharing information with our visitors about the current release, repo star count, etc. | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/privacy-policies/github-general-privacy-statement) |
| [GitHub](https://github.com) (USA) | Git Repositories, Issues, Pull Requests | *For contributors to this website*: hosting our source code and communications platforms such as our issues tracker. | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/privacy-policies/github-general-privacy-statement) |
| [GitHub](https://github.com) (USA) | [Sponsors](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides) | For collecting payments for gifts to Privacy Guides | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/privacy-policies/github-general-privacy-statement) |
| [Stripe](https://stripe.com) (USA) | Connect | *For certain donations via GitHub Sponsors*: payment processing for donations | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://stripe.com/privacy), [GDPR Center](https://stripe.com/legal/privacy-center) |
| [Triplebit](https://www.triplebit.org/) (USA) | Object Storage | For hosting static websites and static media content, and distributing static content | USA, Poland | [Privacy Notice](https://www.triplebit.org/privacy/) |
| [Triplebit](https://www.triplebit.org/) (USA) | [Umami Statistics](https://stats.triplebit.net/share/S80jBc50hxr5TquS/www.privacyguides.org) | For compiling aggregated statistics of our website visitor data based on server-side visitor info submissions | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://www.triplebit.org/privacy/) |
| [Triplebit](https://www.triplebit.org/) (USA) | Virtual Private Servers | For hosting our dynamic websites, storing and processing personal data. | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://www.triplebit.org/privacy/) |
| [Triplebit](https://www.triplebit.org) (USA) | Object Storage | For hosting static websites and static media content, and distributing static content | USA, Poland | [Privacy Notice](https://www.triplebit.org/privacy) |
| [Triplebit](https://www.triplebit.org) (USA) | [Umami Statistics](https://stats.triplebit.net/share/S80jBc50hxr5TquS/www.privacyguides.org) | For compiling aggregated statistics of our website visitor data based on server-side visitor info submissions | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://www.triplebit.org/privacy) |
| [Triplebit](https://www.triplebit.org) (USA) | Virtual Private Servers | For hosting our dynamic websites, storing and processing personal data. | USA | [Privacy Notice](https://www.triplebit.org/privacy) |
## Does Privacy Guides delete inactive accounts?

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
meta_title: "The Best Private Instant Messengers - Privacy Guides"
title: "Real-Time Communication"
title: Real-Time Communication
icon: material/chat-processing
description: Encrypted messengers like Signal and SimpleX keep your sensitive communications secure from prying eyes.
cover: real-time-communication.webp
@ -12,21 +12,17 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }
- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
These are our recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication**. These come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md).
These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why/){ .md-button }
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why){ .md-button }
## Encrypted Messengers
These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
### Signal
## Signal
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right }
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@ -53,22 +49,23 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters).
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters).
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
5. Select **Phone Number**
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs).
5. Select **Phone Number**.
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**.
7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username
We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation:
[Signal Configuration and Hardening :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening)
#### Molly (Android)
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs).
### Molly (Android)
If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } you may consider using this alternative app, which features a number of security and usability improvements, to access the Signal network.
@ -76,7 +73,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material-
![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right }
**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account.
**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@ -99,17 +96,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr
Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates.
There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)).
**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3]
All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements.
Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code.
Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code.
### SimpleX Chat
## SimpleX Chat
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right }
![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right }
**SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.
@ -132,27 +127,27 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
</div>
SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages.
SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages.
To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository.
You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository.
SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website).
### Briar
## Briar
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right }
**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briars local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briars local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>
@ -168,82 +163,33 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/
To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contacts QR code if they are nearby.
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited.
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
## Additional Options
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
</div>
### Session
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Session logo](assets/img/messengers/session.svg){ align=right }
**Session** is a decentralized messenger with a focus on private, secure, and anonymous communications. Session offers support for direct messages, group chats, and voice calls.
Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
</details>
</div>
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants.
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021:
> The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.
Session has a [white paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
## Criteria
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
### Minimum Requirements
- Has open-source clients.
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
- Has been independently audited.
- Must have open-source clients.
- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts.
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
- Must support forward secrecy[^1]
- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third party.
### Best-Case
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
- Supports forward secrecy[^1]
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
- Has open-source servers.
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
- Should support future secrecy (post-compromise security)[^2]
- Should have open-source servers.
- Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
[^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
[^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy).

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@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
---
title: Email Servers
meta_title: "Self-Hosted Email - Privacy Guides"
icon: material/email
description: For our more technical readers, self-hosting your own email can provide additional privacy assurances by having maximum control over your data.
cover: email.webp
---
<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](../basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable. In addition to the "all-in-one" solutions below, we've picked out a few articles that cover a more manual approach:
- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd) (2019)
- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide) (August 2017)
## Stalwart
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Stalwart logo](../assets/img/self-hosting/stalwart.svg){ align=right }
**Stalwart** is a newer mail server written in Rust which supports JMAP in addition to the standard IMAP, POP3, and SMTP. It has a wide variety of configuration options, but also defaults to very reasonable settings in terms of both security and features, making it easy to use immediately. It has web-based administration with TOTP 2FA support and allows you to enter your public PGP key to encrypt **all** incoming messages.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://stalw.art){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://stalw.art/docs/get-started){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/stalwartlabs){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/stalwartlabs){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</div>
Stalwart's [PGP implementation](https://stalw.art/docs/encryption/overview) is unique among our self-hosted recommendations and allows you to operate your own mail server with zero-knowledge message storage. If you additionally configure Web Key Directory (WKD) on your domain, and if you use an email client which supports PGP and WKD for outgoing mail (like Thunderbird), then this is the easiest way to get self-hosted E2EE compatibility with all [Proton Mail](../email.md#proton-mail) users.
Stalwart does **not** have an integrated webmail, so you will need to use it with a [dedicated email client](../email-clients.md) or find an open-source webmail to self-host, like Nextcloud's Mail app.
We use Stalwart for our own internal email at *Privacy Guides*.
## Mailcow
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Mailcow logo](../assets/img/self-hosting/mailcow.svg){ align=right }
**Mailcow** is an advanced mail server perfect for those with Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: a mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.mailcow.email){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
</div>
## Mail-in-a-Box
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Mail-in-a-Box logo](../assets/img/self-hosting/mail-in-a-box.svg){ align=right }
**Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
</div>

169
docs/self-hosting/index.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
---
title: Self-Hosting
meta_title: "Self-Hosted Software and Services - Privacy Guides"
description: For our more technical readers, self-hosted software and services can provide additional privacy assurances since you have maximum control over your data.
cover: router.webp
---
<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](../basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
Using **self-hosted software and services** can be a way to achieve a higher level of privacy through digital sovereignty, particularly independence from cloud servers controlled by product developers or vendors. By self-hosting, we mean hosting applications and data on your own hardware.
Self-hosting your own solutions requires advanced technical knowledge and a deep understanding of the associated risks. By becoming the host for yourself and possibly others, you take on responsibilities you might not otherwise have. Self-hosting privacy software improperly can leave you worse off than using e.g. an end-to-end encrypted service provider, so it is best avoided if you are not already comfortable doing so.
## :material-email: Email Servers
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
- ![Stalwart logo](../assets/img/self-hosting/stalwart.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Stalwart](email-servers.md#stalwart)
- ![Mailcow logo](../assets/img/self-hosting/mailcow.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mailcow](email-servers.md#mailcow)
- ![Mail-in-a-Box logo](../assets/img/self-hosting/mail-in-a-box.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mail-in-a-Box](email-servers.md#mail-in-a-box)
</div>
[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email-servers.md)
## :material-account-supervisor-circle-outline: Social Networks
Self-hosting your own instance of a social network software can help circumvent potential [censorship on a server level](../social-networks.md#censorship-resistance) by a public server's administrator or admin team.
### Mastodon
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Mastodon logo](../assets/img/social-networks/mastodon.svg){ align=right }
**Mastodon** is a social network based on open web protocols and free, open-source software. It uses the decentralized **:simple-activitypub: ActivityPub** protocol.
[:octicons-home-16:](https://joinmastodon.org){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/admin/prerequisites){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
</div>
Mastodon [integrates with the Tor network](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/admin/optional/tor) for more extreme scenarios where even your underlying hosting provider is subject to censorship, but this may limit who can access your content to only other servers which integrate with Tor (like most other hidden services).
Mastodon benefits greatly from a large and active self-hosting community, and its administration is comprehensively documented. While many other ActivityPub platforms can require extensive technical knowledge to run and troubleshoot, Mastodon has very stable and tested releases, and it can generally be run securely without issue by anyone who can use the Linux command line and follow step-by-step instructions.
### Element
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Element logo](../assets/img/social-networks/element.svg){ align=right }
**Element** is the flagship client for the **:simple-matrix: Matrix** protocol, an open standard that enables decentralized communication by way of federated chat rooms.
[:octicons-home-16:](https://element.io){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://element-hq.github.io/synapse/latest){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/element-hq){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
</div>
## :material-flip-to-front: Frontends
Self-hosting your own instance of a web-based frontend can help you circumvent rate limits that you may encounter on high-traffic, public instances. It is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
- ![Redlib logo](../assets/img/frontends/redlib.svg){ .lg .middle .twemoji } [**Redlib (Reddit)**](../frontends.md#redlib)
---
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/redlib-org/redlib#deployment){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/redlib-org/redlib){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
- ![ProxiTok logo](../assets/img/frontends/proxitok.svg){ .lg .middle .twemoji } [**ProxiTok (TikTok)**](../frontends.md#proxitok)
---
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Self-hosting){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
- ![Invidious logo](../assets/img/frontends/invidious.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Invidious logo](../assets/img/frontends/invidious-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [**Invidious (YouTube)**](../frontends.md#invidious)
---
[:octicons-home-16:](https://invidious.io){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io/installation){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
- ![Piped logo](../assets/img/frontends/piped.svg){ .twemoji } [**Piped (YouTube)**](../frontends.md#piped)
---
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.piped.video/docs/self-hosting){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
</div>
## More Tools...
Tool recommendations in other categories of the website also provide a self-hosted option, so you could consider this if you are confident in your ability to host the software after reading their documentation.
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
- ![Addy.io logo](../assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ .twemoji } [**Addy.io**](../email-aliasing.md#addyio)
---
[:octicons-home-16:](https://addy.io){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://addy.io/self-hosting){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
- ![SimpleLogin logo](../assets/img/email-aliasing/simplelogin.svg){ .twemoji } [**SimpleLogin**](../email-aliasing.md#simplelogin)
---
[:octicons-home-16:](https://addy.io){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/simple-login/app#prerequisites){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
- ![CryptPad logo](../assets/img/document-collaboration/cryptpad.svg){ .twemoji } [**CryptPad**](../document-collaboration.md#cryptpad)
---
[:octicons-home-16:](https://cryptpad.fr){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptpad.org/en/admin_guide/index.html){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/xwiki-labs/cryptpad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
- ![Miniflux logo](../assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Miniflux logo](../assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [**Miniflux**](../news-aggregators.md#miniflux)
---
[:octicons-home-16:](https://miniflux.app){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index.html#administration-guide){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/miniflux/v2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
- ![Standard Notes logo](../assets/img/notebooks/standard-notes.svg){ .twemoji } [**Standard Notes**](../notebooks.md#standard-notes)
---
[:octicons-home-16:](https://standardnotes.com){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://standardnotes.com/help/47/can-i-self-host-standard-notes){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/standardnotes){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
- ![PrivateBin logo](../assets/img/pastebins/privatebin.svg){ .twemoji } [**PrivateBin**](../pastebins.md#privatebin)
---
[:octicons-home-16:](https://privatebin.info){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/blob/master/doc/Installation.md){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
- ![Paaster logo](../assets/img/pastebins/paaster.svg){ .twemoji } [**Paaster**](../pastebins.md#paaster)
---
[:octicons-home-16:](https://paaster.io){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/WardPearce/paaster#deployment){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/WardPearce/paaster){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
- ![SimpleX Chat logo](../assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ .twemoji } [**SimpleX Chat**](../real-time-communication.md#simplex-chat)
---
[:octicons-home-16:](https://simplex.chat){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://simplex.chat/docs/server.html){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
</div>

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@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ description: A complete list of the privacy tools, services, software, and hardw
If you're looking for a specific solution to something, these are the hardware and software tools we recommend in a variety of categories. Our recommended privacy tools are primarily chosen based on security features, with additional emphasis on decentralized and open-source tools. They are applicable to a variety of threat models ranging from protection against global mass surveillance programs and avoiding big tech companies to mitigating attacks, but only you can determine what will work best for your needs.
<div class="grid" markdown>
<div markdown>
[VPN Providers](vpn.md){ .md-button }
[Password Managers](passwords.md){ .md-button }
[Email Providers](email.md){ .md-button }
@ -16,6 +19,19 @@ If you're looking for a specific solution to something, these are the hardware a
[DNS Servers](dns.md){ .md-button }
[Email Aliasing Services](email-aliasing.md){ .md-button }
[Photo Organization Tools](photo-management.md){ .md-button }
</div>
</div>
<div markdown>
<div class="admonition info" markdown>
[Self-hosting recommendations](self-hosting/index.md) have been moved to their own category.
</div>
</div>
If you want assistance figuring out the best privacy tools and alternative programs for your needs, start a discussion on our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net) or our [Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org) community!
@ -217,19 +233,8 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec
- ![Addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Addy.io](email-aliasing.md#addyio)
- ![SimpleLogin logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/simplelogin.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin)
</div>
</div>
<div markdown>
### Self-Hosting Email
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
- ![Stalwart logo](assets/img/email/stalwart.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Stalwart](email.md#stalwart)
- ![Mailcow logo](assets/img/email/mailcow.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mailcow](email.md#mailcow)
- ![Mail-in-a-Box logo](assets/img/email/mail-in-a-box.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mail-in-a-Box](email.md#mail-in-a-box)
</div>
</div>
</div>
@ -360,7 +365,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
- ![Kobold logo](assets/img/ai-chat/kobold.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Kobold.cpp](ai-chat.md#koboldcpp)
- ![Llamafile logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Llamafile](ai-chat.md#llamafile)
- ![Llamafile logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.webp){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Llamafile](ai-chat.md#llamafile)
- ![Ollama logo](assets/img/ai-chat/ollama.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Ollama (CLI)](ai-chat.md#ollama-cli)
</div>
@ -422,7 +427,7 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
</details>
#### Cross-platform Tools
#### Cross-Platform Tools
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
@ -486,9 +491,9 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
- ![Drip logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Drip](health-and-wellness.md#drip)
- ![Euki logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/euki.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Euki](health-and-wellness.md#euki)
- ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy }[Apple Health](health-and-wellness.md#apple-health)
- ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Apple Health](health-and-wellness.md#apple-health)
- ![Gadgetbridge logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Gadgetbridge logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Gadgetbridge](health-and-wellness.md#gadgetbridge)
- ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy }[Apple Health Records](health-and-wellness.md#apple-health-records)
- ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Apple Health Records](health-and-wellness.md#apple-health-records)
- ![CommonHealth logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/commonhealth.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [CommonHealth](health-and-wellness.md#commonhealth)
</div>
@ -603,7 +608,6 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
- ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Signal](real-time-communication.md#signal)
- ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Briar](real-time-communication.md#briar)
- ![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [SimpleX Chat](real-time-communication.md#simplex-chat)
- ![Session logo](assets/img/messengers/session.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Session](real-time-communication.md#session)
</div>

View file

@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ schema:
**Tor** is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool.
[Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Why You Need Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/02/why-you-need-tor/){ .md-button }
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Why You Need Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/02/why-you-need-tor){ .md-button }
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } browsing for desktop computers and Android.
Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
Some of these apps are better than others; making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@ -52,13 +52,13 @@ If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** b
![Tor Browser logo](assets/img/browsers/tor.svg){ align=right }
**Tor Browser** is the choice if you need anonymity, as it provides you with access to the Tor network and bridges, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
**Tor Browser** is the top choice if you need anonymity, as it provides you with access to the Tor network and bridges, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://torproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Documentation }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ You should **never** install any additional extensions on Tor Browser or edit `a
</div>
The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings). When modifying the security level setting, you **must** always restart the browser before continuing to use it. Otherwise, [the security settings may not be fully applied](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/05/02/tor-security-slider-flaw/), putting you at a higher risk of fingerprinting and exploits than you may expect based on the setting chosen.
The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings). When modifying the security level setting, you **must** always restart the browser before continuing to use it. Otherwise, [the security settings may not be fully applied](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/05/02/tor-security-slider-flaw), putting you at a higher risk of fingerprinting and exploits than you may expect based on the setting chosen.
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
@ -90,13 +90,15 @@ In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also
![Onion Browser logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/onion_browser.svg){ align=right }
**Onion Browser** is an open-source browser that lets you browse the web anonymously over the Tor network on iOS devices and is endorsed by the [Tor Project](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/onion-browser). [:material-star-box: Read our latest Onion Browser review.](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2024/09/18/onion-browser-review/)
**Onion Browser** is an open-source browser that lets you browse the web anonymously over the Tor network on iOS devices and is endorsed by the [Tor Project](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/onion-browser).
[:material-star-box: Read our latest Onion Browser review.](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2024/09/18/onion-browser-review)
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionbrowser.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://onionbrowser.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-info-16:](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/OnionBrowser/OnionBrowser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://onionbrowser.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://onionbrowser.com/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>

View file

@ -142,8 +142,9 @@ System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-swit
<summary>Downloads</summary>
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client)
- [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/net.ivpn.client)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1193122683)
- [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/net.ivpn.client)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ivpn/android-app/releases)
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://ivpn.net/apps-windows)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://ivpn.net/apps-macos)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://ivpn.net/apps-linux)

View file

@ -215,9 +215,13 @@ nav:
- editorial.md
- tags.md
- !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]: /videos/
- !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/
- "Donate": /en/about/donate/
- !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/"
- !ENV [NAV_WIKI, "Wiki"]:
!ENV [
NAV_WIKI_LINK,
"https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/community-wiki/9411/none",
]
- !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/
validation:
nav:

View file

@ -205,9 +205,13 @@ nav:
- !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]:
- index.md
- playlists.md
- !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/
- "Donate": /en/about/donate/
- !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/"
- !ENV [NAV_WIKI, "Wiki"]:
!ENV [
NAV_WIKI_LINK,
"https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/community-wiki/9411/none",
]
- !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/
validation:
nav:

View file

@ -393,6 +393,9 @@ nav:
- "os/windows/group-policies.md"
- !ENV [NAV_RECOMMENDATIONS, "Recommendations"]:
- "tools.md"
- !ENV [NAV_SELF_HOSTING, "Self-Hosting"]:
- "self-hosting/index.md"
- "self-hosting/email-servers.md"
- !ENV [NAV_INTERNET_BROWSING, "Internet Browsing"]:
- "tor.md"
- "desktop-browsers.md"
@ -447,6 +450,11 @@ nav:
- !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]: /videos/
- !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]:
!ENV [NAV_FORUM_LINK, "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/"]
- !ENV [NAV_WIKI, "Wiki"]:
!ENV [
NAV_WIKI_LINK,
"https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/community-wiki/9411/none",
]
- !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]:
- "about.md"
- "about/donate.md"

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@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
---
title: |
Recall Is Back, But You Still Shouldnt Use It
date:
created: 2025-05-22T22:00:00Z
authors:
- jordan
description: |
Microsoft is rolling out its controversial Recall feature to Windows users with Copilot+ PCs. However, there are still many privacy and security concerns that remain, even after its reworking.
readtime: 6
thumbnail: https://neat.tube/lazy-static/previews/54ba6b19-122f-47b6-8f48-8ed651748fd6.jpg
embed: https://neat.tube/videos/embed/pAAK8bzb6saZfQSqZLW7eU
peertube: https://neat.tube/w/pAAK8bzb6saZfQSqZLW7eU
youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AzLsJ-4_fhU
---
Microsoft is rolling out its controversial Recall feature to Windows users with Copilot+ PCs. However, there are still many privacy and security concerns that remain, even after its reworking.
## Sources
- Introducing Copilot+ PC's Full Keynote - Microsoft: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aZbHd4suAnQ>
- Introducing Windows 11 - Microsoft: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uh9643c2P6k>
- Introducing Copilot - Microsoft: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rEZGSFgZVY>
- Introducing a new Copilot key for Windows 11 PCs - Microsoft: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S1R08Qx6Fvs>