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docs/advanced/browser-fingerprinting.md
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@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these approaches, and generall
[Firefox](../desktop-browsers.md#firefox) out of the box takes the first approach, which is to simply block third-party requests to "companies that are known to participate in fingerprinting." This is the *safest* approach, because it results in almost no website breakage, but it also provides the least protection, because it relies on identifying trackers in advance. It also does little to block first-party tracking. You can generally achieve similar results in any browser with an extension that blocks known trackers, like [uBlock Origin](../browser-extensions.md#ublock-origin).
Firefox is *capable* of much stronger fingerprinting protections, although those settings are typically not easily accessible and are not enabled by default. You can use a tool like [Arkenfox](../desktop-browsers.md#arkenfox-advanced) to increase your protections closer to what is provided by Tor Browser (explained below), but it requires more technical effort on your end.
[Brave](../desktop-browsers.md#brave) largely takes the **randomization** approach, by changing fingerprintable metrics in ways which are imperceptible to the person using the browser, but confusing for machines on the other end. This approach gives your browser a completely unique fingerprint, **but** that fingerprint *changes* for each website you visit, so those metrics can't be used to track you across different sites. The benefit of this approach is that website breakage is minimized, because the browser can keep a lot of features enabled and simply randomize their outputs a bit.
However, randomizing your fingerprint does not provide complete protection. Artificial randomization can be detected by websites, and the original entropy from the raw source data still exists. In some cases the randomization implementation has been reversible in practice. Brave's Web Audio API's randomization was at one point [reversible](https://fingerprint.com/blog/audio-fingerprinting/#reverting-brave-standard-farbling) for example. There may also be other indirect ways of learning about the original non-randomized data. Bypassing or de-randomizing these randomized outputs are all techniques which could be utilized by *advanced* tracking scripts.