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Separate articles and recommendations (#1173)
Co-authored-by: Daniel Gray <dng@disroot.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jonah Aragon
Daniel Gray
parent
4a448189c6
commit
0b70d8689d
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Local RF location backends like DejaVu require that the phone has a working GPS
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If your threat model requires protecting your location or the MAC addresses of nearby devices, rerouting location requests to the OS location API is probably the best option. The benefit brought by microG's custom location backend is minimal at best when compared to Sandboxed Play Services.
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In terms of application compatibility, Sandboxed Google Play outperforms microG due to its support for many services which microG has not yet implemented, like [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames) and [In-app Billing API](https://android-doc.github.io/google/play/billing/api.html). Authentication using [FIDO](security/multi-factor-authentication#fido-fast-identity-online) with online services on Android also relies on Play Services, and the feature is not yet implemented in microG.
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In terms of application compatibility, Sandboxed Google Play outperforms microG due to its support for many services which microG has not yet implemented, like [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames) and [In-app Billing API](https://android-doc.github.io/google/play/billing/api.html). Authentication using [FIDO](basics/multi-factor-authentication#fido-fast-identity-online) with online services on Android also relies on Play Services, and the feature is not yet implemented in microG.
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## Privileged App Extensions
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@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your prov
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You can check [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz) for instructions on deleting the account for a specific service. Some sites will graciously have a "Delete Account" option, while others will go as far as to force you to speak with a support agent. The deletion process can vary from site to site, with account deletion being impossible on some.
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For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](security/multi-factor-authentication) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](/passwords/#local-password-managers) can be useful for this).
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For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](basics/multi-factor-authentication) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](/passwords/#local-password-managers) can be useful for this).
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If you're satisfied that all information you care about is removed, you can safely forget about this account. If not, it might be a good idea to keep the credentials stored with your other passwords and occasionally re-login to reset the password.
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42
docs/basics/email-security.en.md
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42
docs/basics/email-security.en.md
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@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
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---
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title: Email Security
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icon: material/email
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---
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Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add End-to-End Encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications, and some email data can never be encrypted inherently due to how email is designed.
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As a result, email is best used for receiving transactional emails (like notifications, verification emails, password resets, etc.) from the services you sign up for online, not for communicating with others.
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## Email Encryption Overview
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The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
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There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however, it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates). It has support in [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730?hl=en&ref_topic=9061731) and [Outlook for Web or Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/en-us/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).
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Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
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### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
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Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). This can be less secure as you are now relying on email providers to ensure that their encryption implementation works and has not been compromised in anyway.
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### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
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A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
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It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard so as to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
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## Email Metadata Overview
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Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message, and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
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Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.
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### Who Can View Email Metadata?
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Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) protecting it from outside observers, but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
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### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?
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Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as who you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc.
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--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.en.md"
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86
docs/basics/vpn-overview.en.md
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86
docs/basics/vpn-overview.en.md
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---
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title: VPN Overview
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icon: material/vpn
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---
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Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (ie. modem).
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Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](/basics/dns.md/#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
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A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
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## Should I use a VPN?
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**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does 2 things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third party service.
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VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
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However, they do hide your actual IP from a third party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
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## What about encryption?
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Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
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In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
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## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
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Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third party servers will simply add more entities to trust, and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
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A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
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Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit, and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
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## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
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By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefit to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](https://web.archive.org/web/20210116140725/https://write.privacytools.io/my-thoughts-on-security/slicing-onions-part-2-onion-recipes-vpn-not-required).
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## What if I need anonymity?
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VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
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## What about VPN providers that provides Tor nodes?
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Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [http3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
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Thus, this feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay annonymous. For true anonimity, use the Tor Browser Bundle, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
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## When are VPNs useful?
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A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
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1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
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2. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
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3. Hiding your IP from third party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
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For use cases like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
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## Sources and Further Reading
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1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
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2. [The self-contained networks](self-contained-networks.md) recommended by Privacy Guides are able to replace a VPN that allows access to services on local area network
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3. [Slicing Onions: Part 1 – Myth-busting Tor](https://medium.com/privacyguides/slicing-onions-part-1-myth-busting-tor-9ec188ae1904) by blacklight447
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4. [Slicing Onions: Part 2 – Onion recipes; VPN not required](https://web.archive.org/web/20210116140725/https://write.privacytools.io/my-thoughts-on-security/slicing-onions-part-2-onion-recipes-vpn-not-required) by blacklight447
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5. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
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6. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
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## Related VPN Information
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- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://medium.com/privacyguides/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites-ae9b29eda8fd)
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- [Proxy.sh VPN Provider Sniffed Server Traffic to Catch Hacker](https://torrentfreak.com/proxy-sh-vpn-provider-monitored-traffic-to-catch-hacker-130930/)
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- [blackVPN announced to delete connection logs after disconnection](https://medium.com/@blackVPN/no-logs-6d65d95a3016)
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- [Don't use LT2P IPSec, use other protocols.](https://gist.github.com/kennwhite/1f3bc4d889b02b35d8aa)
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- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
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- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
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- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
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## VPN Security Breaches
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Some examples of why external security auditing is important:
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- ["Zero logs" VPN exposes millions of logs including user passwords, claims data is anonymous](https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/ufo-vpn-data-exposure/) July 2020
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- [NordVPN HTTP POST bug exposed customer information, no authentication required](https://www.zdnet.com/article/nordvpn-http-post-bug-exposed-sensitive-customer-information/) March 2020
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- [Row erupts over who to blame after NordVPN says: One of our servers was hacked via remote management tool](https://www.theregister.com/2019/10/21/nordvpn_security_issue/) October 2019
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- [VPN servers seized by Ukrainian authorities weren't encrypted and allowed authorities to impersonate Windscribe servers and capture and decrypt traffic passing through them](https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2021/07/vpn-servers-seized-by-ukrainian-authorities-werent-encrypted/) July 2021
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--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.en.md"
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encry
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??? Attention "Email does not provide forward secrecy"
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When using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) technology like OpenPGP, email will still have [some metadata](email.md#email-metadata-overview) that is not encrypted in the header of the email.
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OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed: [How do I protect my private keys?](email.md#email-encryption-overview). Consider using a medium that provides forward secrecy:
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OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed: [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md). Consider using a medium that provides forward secrecy:
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[Real-time Communication](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
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@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encry
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[:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.zendesk.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
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??? downloads
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[:fontawesome-brands-app-store:](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954){ .card-link title="Mac App Store" }
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[:fontawesome-brands-app-store-ios:](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954){ .card-link title="App Store" }
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[:fontawesome-brands-windows:](https://canarymail.io/downloads.html){ .card-link title=Windows }
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@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. M
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{ align=right }
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**Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
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[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
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[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
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@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. M
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{ align=right }
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**Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: A mailserver with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
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[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailcow.github.io/mailcow-dockerized-docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
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[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
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@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible.
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- Protect sender's IP address. Filter it from showing in the `Received` header field.
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- Don't require personally identifiable information (PII) besides username and password.
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- Privacy policy that meets the requirements defined by the GDPR
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- Must not be hosted in the US due to [ECPA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Communications_Privacy_Act#Criticism) which has [yet to be reformed](https://epic.org/ecpa/).
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**Best Case:**
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@ -422,59 +423,5 @@ Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
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While not strictly requirements, there are some other convenience or privacy factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend.
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## Email Encryption Overview
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### What is end-to-end encryption (E2EE) in email?
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E2EE is a way of encrypting email contents so that nobody but the recipient(s) can read the email message.
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### How can I encrypt my email?
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The standard way to do email E2EE and have it work between different email providers is with OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
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There is another standard that was popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates). It has support in [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730?hl=en&ref_topic=9061731) and [Outlook for Web or Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/en-us/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).
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### What software can I use to get E2EE?
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Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](email-clients.md). This can be less secure as you are now relying on email providers to ensure that their encryption implementation works and has not been compromised in anyway.
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### How do I protect my private keys?
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A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
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It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard so as to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
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## Email Metadata Overview
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### Who can see the email metadata?
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Email metadata is able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients. Sometimes email servers will also use external parties to protect against spam.
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### What is email metadata?
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Email software will often show some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`.
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### When is email metadata used?
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Client software may use it to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.
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### Where is the email metadata?
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Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message.
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### Why can't email metadata be E2EE?
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Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally and is also optional, therefore, only the message content is protected.
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### How is my metadata protected?
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When emails travel between email providers an encrypted connection is negotiated using [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS). This protects the metadata from outside observers, but as it is not E2EE, server administrators can snoop on the metadata of an email.
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## Additional Reading
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|
||||
- [An NFC PGP SmartCard For Android](https://www.grepular.com/An_NFC_PGP_SmartCard_For_Android)
|
||||
- [Aging 'Privacy' Law Leaves Cloud E-Mail Open to Cops (2011)](https://www.wired.com/2011/10/ecpa-turns-twenty-five/)
|
||||
- [The Government Can (Still) Read Most Of Your Emails Without A Warrant (2013)](https://thinkprogress.org/the-government-can-still-read-most-of-your-emails-without-a-warrant-322fe6defc7b/)
|
||||
|
||||
--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.en.md"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Find a no-logging VPN operator who isn’t out to sell or read your web traffic.
|
||||
|
||||
If you're looking for additional **privacy** from your ISP, on a public Wi-Fi network, or while torrenting files, a VPN may be the solution for you as long as you understand the risks involved.
|
||||
|
||||
[More Info](#vpn-overview){ .md-button }
|
||||
[More Info](technology/vpn-overview.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
## Recommended Providers
|
||||
|
||||
@ -300,78 +300,4 @@ Responsible marketing that is both educational and useful to the consumer could
|
||||
|
||||
While not strictly requirements, there are some factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend. These include adblocking/tracker-blocking functionality, warrant canaries, multihop connections, excellent customer support, the number of allowed simultaneous connections, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
## VPN Overview
|
||||
|
||||
### Should I use a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does 2 things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third party service.
|
||||
|
||||
VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
|
||||
|
||||
However, they do hide your actual IP from a third party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
|
||||
|
||||
### What about encryption?
|
||||
|
||||
Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
|
||||
|
||||
In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
### Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third party servers will simply add more entities to trust, and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
|
||||
|
||||
A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
|
||||
|
||||
Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit, and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
|
||||
|
||||
### Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefit to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](https://web.archive.org/web/20210116140725/https://write.privacytools.io/my-thoughts-on-security/slicing-onions-part-2-onion-recipes-vpn-not-required).
|
||||
|
||||
### What if I need anonymity?
|
||||
|
||||
VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
|
||||
|
||||
### What about VPN providers that provides Tor nodes?
|
||||
|
||||
Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [http3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [Proton VPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
|
||||
|
||||
Thus, this feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay annonymous. For true anonimity, use the Tor Browser Bundle, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
|
||||
|
||||
### When are VPNs useful?
|
||||
|
||||
A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
|
||||
2. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
|
||||
3. Hiding your IP from third party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
|
||||
|
||||
For use cases like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
|
||||
|
||||
### Sources and Further Reading
|
||||
|
||||
1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
|
||||
2. [The self-contained networks](self-contained-networks.md) recommended by Privacy Guides are able to replace a VPN that allows access to services on local area network
|
||||
3. [Slicing Onions: Part 1 – Myth-busting Tor](https://medium.com/privacyguides/slicing-onions-part-1-myth-busting-tor-9ec188ae1904) by blacklight447
|
||||
4. [Slicing Onions: Part 2 – Onion recipes; VPN not required](https://web.archive.org/web/20210116140725/https://write.privacytools.io/my-thoughts-on-security/slicing-onions-part-2-onion-recipes-vpn-not-required) by blacklight447
|
||||
5. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
|
||||
6. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
|
||||
|
||||
## Related VPN information
|
||||
|
||||
- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://medium.com/privacyguides/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites-ae9b29eda8fd)
|
||||
- [Proxy.sh VPN Provider Sniffed Server Traffic to Catch Hacker](https://torrentfreak.com/proxy-sh-vpn-provider-monitored-traffic-to-catch-hacker-130930/)
|
||||
- [blackVPN announced to delete connection logs after disconnection](https://medium.com/@blackVPN/no-logs-6d65d95a3016)
|
||||
- [Don't use LT2P IPSec, use other protocols.](https://gist.github.com/kennwhite/1f3bc4d889b02b35d8aa)
|
||||
- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
|
||||
- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
|
||||
- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
|
||||
|
||||
## VPN Related breaches - why external auditing is important
|
||||
|
||||
- ["Zero logs" VPN exposes millions of logs including user passwords, claims data is anonymous](https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/ufo-vpn-data-exposure/) July 2020
|
||||
- [NordVPN HTTP POST bug exposed customer information, no authentication required](https://www.zdnet.com/article/nordvpn-http-post-bug-exposed-sensitive-customer-information/) March 2020
|
||||
- [Row erupts over who to blame after NordVPN says: One of our servers was hacked via remote management tool](https://www.theregister.com/2019/10/21/nordvpn_security_issue/) October 2019
|
||||
- [VPN servers seized by Ukrainian authorities weren't encrypted and allowed authorities to impersonate Windscribe servers and capture and decrypt traffic passing through them](https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2021/07/vpn-servers-seized-by-ukrainian-authorities-werent-encrypted/) July 2021
|
||||
|
||||
--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.en.md"
|
||||
|
||||
@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'basics/multi-factor-authentication.md'
|
||||
- 'basics/dns.md'
|
||||
- 'basics/erasing-data.md'
|
||||
- 'basics/email-security.md'
|
||||
- 'basics/vpn-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'Android':
|
||||
- 'android/overview.md'
|
||||
- 'android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.md'
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user