description: Vous pouvez remplacer le système d'exploitation de votre téléphone Android par ces alternatives sécurisées et respectueuses de la vie privée.
**Android Open Source Project** est un système d'exploitation mobile open source dirigé par Google qui équipe la majorité des appareils mobiles dans le monde. La plupart des téléphones vendus avec Android sont modifiés pour inclure des intégrations et des applications invasives telles que Google Play Services. Vous pouvez donc améliorer considérablement votre vie privée sur votre appareil mobile en remplaçant l'installation par défaut de votre téléphone par une version d'Android dépourvue de ces fonctionnalités invasives.
Voici les systèmes d'exploitation, les appareils et les applications Android que nous recommandons pour optimiser la sécurité et la confidentialité de votre appareil mobile. Pour en savoir plus sur Android :
[Pourquoi nous recommandons GrapheneOS plutôt que CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/ ""){.md-button}
Nous vous recommandons d'installer l'un de ces systèmes d'exploitation Android personnalisés sur votre appareil, classés par ordre de préférence, en fonction de la compatibilité de votre appareil avec ces systèmes d'exploitation.
!!! note "À noter"
Les appareils en fin de vie (tels que les appareils à "support étendu" de GrapheneOS ou de CalyxOS) ne disposent pas de correctifs de sécurité complets (mises à jour de micrologiciel) en raison de l'arrêt du support par le constructeur. Ces appareils ne peuvent pas être considérés comme totalement sûrs, quel que soit le logiciel installé.
**GrapheneOS** est le meilleur choix en matière de confidentialité et de sécurité.
GrapheneOS apporte des améliorations supplémentaires en matière de [renforcement de la sécurité](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durcissement_%28informatique%29) et de confidentialité. Il dispose d'un [allocateur de mémoire renforcé](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), d'autorisations pour le réseau et les capteurs, et de diverses autres [fonctions de sécurité](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS est également livré avec des mises à jour complètes du micrologiciel et des versions signées, de sorte que le démarrage vérifié est entièrement pris en charge.
GrapheneOS prend en charge [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), qui exécute les [Services Google Play](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Services_Google_Play) entièrement sandboxed comme toute autre application normale. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
**DivestOS** est un léger dérivé de [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/).
DivestOS hérite de nombreux [appareils pris en charge](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) de LineageOS. Il a des versions signées, ce qui permet d'avoir un [démarrage vérifié](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) sur certains appareils non-Pixel.
DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, and a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), and receives out-of-band updates. DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. Normally, we would recommend avoiding F-Droid due to its numerous [security issues](#f-droid). However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
L'[état](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) des mises à jour du micrologiciel DivestOS et le contrôle de la qualité varient selon les appareils qu'il prend en charge. Nous recommandons toujours GrapheneOS en fonction de la compatibilité de votre appareil. Pour les autres appareils, DivestOS est une bonne alternative.
Tous les appareils pris en charge ne disposent pas d'un démarrage vérifié, et certains le font mieux que d'autres.
When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution.
Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen, there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason. Check out our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) to find details!
Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third-party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
Les appareils **Google Pixel** sont connus pour avoir une bonne sécurité et prendre correctement en charge le [Démarrage Vérifié](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), même lors de l'installation de systèmes d'exploitation personnalisés.
À partir des **Pixel 6** et **6 Pro**, les appareils Pixel bénéficient d'un minimum de 5 ans de mises à jour de sécurité garanties, ce qui leur assure une durée de vie bien plus longue que les 2 à 4 ans généralement proposés par les constructeurs concurrents.
Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
- Consider price beating options and specials offered at physical stores.
- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date}-\text{Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality.
**Shelter** est une application qui vous aide à tirer parti de la fonctionnalité Profil de Travail d'Android pour isoler ou dupliquer des applications sur votre appareil.
Shelter prend en charge le blocage de la recherche de contacts entre profils et le partage de fichiers entre profils via le gestionnaire de fichiers par défaut ([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui)).
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.typeblog.shelter)
!!! warning "Avertissement"
Shelter est recommandé par rapport à [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) et [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) car il prend en charge le [blocage de la recherche de contact](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html).
En utilisant Shelter, vous accordez une confiance totale à son développeur, car Shelter agit en tant qu'[Administrateur de l'appareil](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) pour créer le Profil de Travail, et il a un accès étendu aux données stockées dans ce dernier.
**Auditor** est une application qui exploite les fonctions de sécurité matérielle pour assurer le contrôle de l'intégrité des [appareils pris en charge](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Actuellement, il ne fonctionne qu'avec GrapheneOS et le système d'exploitation d'origine de l'appareil.
- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
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**Secure Camera** est une application de caméra axée sur la confidentialité et la sécurité qui peut capturer des images, des vidéos et des QR codes. Les extensions du vendeur CameraX (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch et Auto) sont également prises en charge sur les appareils disponibles.
- Auto removal of [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) metadata (enabled by default)
- Use of the new [Media](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage/shared/media) API, therefore [storage permissions](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage) are not required
- Microphone permission not required unless you want to record sound
Les métadonnées ne sont pour le moment pas supprimées des fichiers vidéo, mais cela est prévu.
Les métadonnées d'orientation de l'image ne sont pas supprimées. Si vous activez la fonction de localisation (dans Secure Camera), elle ne **sera pas** non plus supprimée. Si vous voulez la supprimer ultérieurement, vous devrez utiliser une application externe telle que [ExifEraser](data-redaction.md#exiferaser).
### Secure PDF Viewer
!!! recommendation
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**Secure PDF Viewer** est un visualiseur de PDF basé sur [pdf.js](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF.js) qui ne nécessite aucune autorisation. Le PDF est introduit dans une [webview](https://developer.android.com/guide/webapps/webview) [sandboxed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(software_development)). Cela signifie qu'il n'a pas besoin d'autorisation directe pour accéder au contenu ou aux fichiers.
[Content-Security-Policy](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) est utilisé pour faire en sorte que les propriétés JavaScript et de style dans la WebView soient entièrement statiques.
GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for privacy. You can get around this by using an alternative client, such as Aurora Store.
**Aurora Store** est un client Google Play Store qui ne nécessite pas de compte Google, de services Google Play ou microG pour télécharger des applications.
Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous account feature. You can optionally log in with your Google account with Aurora Store to download apps you have purchased, which does give access to the list of apps you've installed to Google, however you still benefit from not requiring the full Google Play client and Google Play Services or microG on your device.
For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](/news-aggregators) that will help you keep track of new releases.
   
On GitHub, using [Secure Camera](#secure-camera) as an example, you would navigate to its [releases page](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases) and append `.atom` to the URL:
On GitLab, using [Aurora Store](#aurora-store) as an example, you would navigate to its [project repository](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore) and append `/-/tags?format=atom` to the URL:
If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature with the [`apksigner`](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner) tool, which is a part of Android [build-tools](https://developer.android.com/studio/releases/build-tools).
5. Les hachés obtenus peuvent ensuite être comparés avec une autre source. Certains développeurs, comme Signal, [montrent les empreintes numériques](https://signal.org/android/apk/) sur leur site web.
==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
Dans certains cas rares, le développeur d'une application ne la distribue que par le biais de F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) en est un exemple). Si vous avez vraiment besoin d'une telle application, nous vous recommandons d'utiliser [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) au lieu de l'application officielle F-Droid pour l'obtenir.
## Critères
**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
!!! example "Cette section est récente"
Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
