onionshare/docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po

# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE.
# Copyright (C) Micah Lee, et al.
# This file is distributed under the same license as the OnionShare package.
# FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, 2020.
#
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"Project-Id-Version: OnionShare 2.3\n"
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#: ../../source/security.rst:2
msgid "Security Design"
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:4
msgid "Read :ref:`how_it_works` first to get a handle on how OnionShare works."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:6
msgid "Like all software, OnionShare may contain bugs or vulnerabilities."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:9
msgid "What OnionShare protects against"
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:11
msgid ""
"**Third parties don't have access to anything that happens in "
"OnionShare.** Using OnionShare means hosting services directly on your "
"computer. When sharing your files with OnionShare, they are not uploaded "
"to any third-party server. If you make an OnionShare chat room, your "
"computer acts as a server for that too. This avoids the traditional model"
" of having to trust the computers of others."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:17
msgid ""
"**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on anything that happens in OnionShare "
"in transit.** The connection between the Tor onion service and Tor "
"Browser is end-to-end encrypted. This means network attackers can't "
"eavesdrop on anything except encrypted Tor traffic. Even if an "
"eavesdropper is a malicious rendezvous node used to connect the Tor "
"Browser with OnionShare's onion service, the traffic is encrypted using "
"the onion service's private key."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:23
msgid ""
"**Anonymity of OnionShare users are protected by Tor.** OnionShare and "
"Tor Browser protect the anonymity of the users. As long as the OnionShare"
" user anonymously communicates the OnionShare address with the Tor "
"Browser users, the Tor Browser users and eavesdroppers can't learn the "
"identity of the OnionShare user."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:28
msgid ""
"**If an attacker learns about the onion service, they still can't access "
"anything.** Prior attacks against the Tor network to enumerate onion "
"services allowed attackers to discover private ``.onion`` addresses. To "
"access an OnionShare service from its address, the private key used for "
"client authentication must be guessed (unless the service is already made"
" public by turning off the private key -- see "
":ref:`turn_off_private_key`)."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:33
msgid "What OnionShare doesn't protect against"
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:35
msgid ""
"**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be "
"secure.** Communicating the OnionShare address to people is the "
"responsibility of the OnionShare user. If sent insecurely (such as "
"through an e-mail message monitored by an attacker), an eavesdropper can "
"tell that OnionShare is being used. Eavesdroppers can access services "
"that are still up by loading their addresses and/or lost key in the Tor "
"Browser. Avoid this by communicating the address securely, via encrypted "
"text message (probably with disappearing messages enabled), encrypted "
"e-mail, or in person. This isn't necessary when using OnionShare for "
"something that isn't secret."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:42
msgid ""
"**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be "
"anonymous.** Extra precaution must be taken to ensure the OnionShare "
"address is communicated anonymously. A new e-mail or chat account, only "
"accessed over Tor, can be used to share the address. This isn't necessary"
" unless anonymity is a goal."
msgstr ""

#~ msgid "Security design"
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "First read :ref:`how_it_works` to understand"
#~ " the basics of how OnionShare works."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Third parties don't have access to "
#~ "anything that happens in OnionShare.** "
#~ "When you use OnionShare, you host "
#~ "services directly on your computer. For"
#~ " example, when you share files with"
#~ " OnionShare, you don't upload these "
#~ "files to any server, and when you"
#~ " start an OnionShare chat room, your"
#~ " computer is the chat room server "
#~ "itself. Traditional ways of sharing "
#~ "files or setting up websites and "
#~ "chat rooms require trusting a service"
#~ " with access to your data."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on "
#~ "anything that happens in OnionShare in"
#~ " transit.** Because connections between Tor"
#~ " onion services and Tor Browser are"
#~ " end-to-end encrypted, no network "
#~ "attackers can eavesdrop on what happens"
#~ " in an OnionShare service. If the "
#~ "eavesdropper is positioned on the "
#~ "OnionShare user's end, the Tor Browser"
#~ " user's end, or is a malicious "
#~ "Tor node, they will only see Tor"
#~ " traffic. If the eavesdropper is a"
#~ " malicious rendezvous node used to "
#~ "connect Tor Browser with OnionShare's "
#~ "onion service, the traffic will be "
#~ "encrypted using the onion service key."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**If an attacker learns about the "
#~ "onion service, they still can't access"
#~ " anything.** There have been attacks "
#~ "against the Tor network that can "
#~ "enumerate onion services. Even if "
#~ "someone discovers the .onion address of"
#~ " an OnionShare onion service, they "
#~ "can't access it without also knowing "
#~ "the service's random password (unless, "
#~ "of course, the OnionShare users chooses"
#~ " to disable the password and make "
#~ "it public). The password is generated"
#~ " by choosing two random words from"
#~ " a list of 6800 words, meaning "
#~ "there are 6800^2, or about 46 "
#~ "million possible password. But they can"
#~ " only make 20 wrong guesses before"
#~ " OnionShare stops the server, preventing"
#~ " brute force attacks against the "
#~ "password."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might"
#~ " not be secure.** The OnionShare user"
#~ " is responsible for securely communicating"
#~ " the OnionShare address with people. "
#~ "If they send it insecurely (such "
#~ "as through an email message, and "
#~ "their email is being monitored by "
#~ "an attacker), the eavesdropper will "
#~ "learn that they're using OnionShare. If"
#~ " the attacker loads the address in"
#~ " Tor Browser before the legitimate "
#~ "recipient gets to it, they can "
#~ "access the service. If this risk "
#~ "fits the user's threat model, they "
#~ "must find a more secure way to "
#~ "communicate the address, such as in "
#~ "an encrypted email, chat, or voice "
#~ "call. This isn't necessary in cases "
#~ "where OnionShare is being used for "
#~ "something that isn't secret."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might"
#~ " not be anonymous.** While OnionShare "
#~ "and Tor Browser allow for anonymity, "
#~ "if the user wishes to remain "
#~ "anonymous they must take extra steps "
#~ "to ensure this while communicating the"
#~ " OnionShare address. For example, they "
#~ "might need to use Tor to create"
#~ " a new anonymous email or chat "
#~ "account, and only access it over "
#~ "Tor, to use for sharing the "
#~ "address. This isn't necessary in cases"
#~ " where there's no need to protect "
#~ "anonymity, such as co-workers who "
#~ "know each other sharing work documents."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**If an attacker learns about the "
#~ "onion service, it still can't access "
#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the "
#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services"
#~ " allowed the attacker to discover "
#~ "private .onion addresses. If an attack"
#~ " discovers a private OnionShare address,"
#~ " a password will be prevent them "
#~ "from accessing it (unless the OnionShare"
#~ " user chooses to turn it off "
#~ "and make it public).. The password "
#~ "is generated by choosing two random "
#~ "words from a list of 6800 words,"
#~ " making 6800^2, or about 46 million"
#~ " possible passwords. Only 20 wrong "
#~ "guesses can be made before OnionShare"
#~ " stops the server, preventing brute "
#~ "force attacks against the password."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might"
#~ " not be anonymous.** Extra steps must"
#~ " be taken to ensure the OnionShare"
#~ " address is communicated anonymously. A "
#~ "new email or chat account, only "
#~ "accessed over Tor, can be used to"
#~ " share the address. This isn't "
#~ "necessary unless anonymity is a goal."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**If an attacker learns about the "
#~ "onion service, it still can't access "
#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the "
#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services"
#~ " allowed the attacker to discover "
#~ "private .onion addresses. If an attack"
#~ " discovers a private OnionShare address,"
#~ " a password will be prevent them "
#~ "from accessing it (unless the OnionShare"
#~ " user chooses to turn it off "
#~ "and make it public). The password "
#~ "is generated by choosing two random "
#~ "words from a list of 6800 words,"
#~ " making 6800², or about 46 million"
#~ " possible passwords. Only 20 wrong "
#~ "guesses can be made before OnionShare"
#~ " stops the server, preventing brute "
#~ "force attacks against the password."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might"
#~ " not be secure.** Communicating the "
#~ "OnionShare address to people is the "
#~ "responsibility of the OnionShare user. "
#~ "If sent insecurely (such as through "
#~ "an email message monitored by an "
#~ "attacker), an eavesdropper can tell that"
#~ " OnionShare is being used. If the "
#~ "eavesdropper loads the address in Tor"
#~ " Browser while the service is still"
#~ " up, they can access it. To "
#~ "avoid this, the address must be "
#~ "communicateed securely, via encrypted text "
#~ "message (probably with disappearing messages"
#~ " enabled), encrypted email, or in "
#~ "person. This isn't necessary when using"
#~ " OnionShare for something that isn't "
#~ "secret."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might"
#~ " not be anonymous.** Extra precautions "
#~ "must be taken to ensure the "
#~ "OnionShare address is communicated "
#~ "anonymously. A new email or chat "
#~ "account, only accessed over Tor, can "
#~ "be used to share the address. This"
#~ " isn't necessary unless anonymity is "
#~ "a goal."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**If an attacker learns about the "
#~ "onion service, it still can't access "
#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the "
#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services"
#~ " allowed the attacker to discover "
#~ "private .onion addresses. If an attack"
#~ " discovers a private OnionShare address,"
#~ " but not the private key used "
#~ "for Client Authentication, they will be"
#~ " prevented from accessing it (unless "
#~ "the OnionShare user chooses to turn "
#~ "off the private key and make it"
#~ " public - see :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**If an attacker learns about the "
#~ "onion service, it still can't access "
#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the "
#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services"
#~ " allowed the attacker to discover "
#~ "private ``.onion`` addresses. If an "
#~ "attack discovers a private OnionShare "
#~ "address, they will also need to "
#~ "guess the private key used for "
#~ "client authentication in order to access"
#~ " it (unless the OnionShare user "
#~ "chooses make their serivce public by "
#~ "turning off the private key -- see"
#~ " :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address and "
#~ "private key might not be secure.** "
#~ "Communicating the OnionShare address to "
#~ "people is the responsibility of the "
#~ "OnionShare user. If sent insecurely "
#~ "(such as through an email message "
#~ "monitored by an attacker), an "
#~ "eavesdropper can tell that OnionShare is"
#~ " being used. If the eavesdropper "
#~ "loads the address in Tor Browser "
#~ "while the service is still up, "
#~ "they can access it. To avoid this,"
#~ " the address must be communicateed "
#~ "securely, via encrypted text message "
#~ "(probably with disappearing messages enabled),"
#~ " encrypted email, or in person. This"
#~ " isn't necessary when using OnionShare "
#~ "for something that isn't secret."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Third parties don't have access to "
#~ "anything that happens in OnionShare.** "
#~ "Using OnionShare means hosting services "
#~ "directly on your computer. When sharing"
#~ " files with OnionShare, they are not"
#~ " uploaded to any server. If you "
#~ "make an OnionShare chat room, your "
#~ "computer acts as a server for that"
#~ " too. This avoids the traditional "
#~ "model of having to trust the "
#~ "computers of others."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**If an attacker learns about the "
#~ "onion service, it still can't access "
#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the "
#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services"
#~ " allowed the attacker to discover "
#~ "private ``.onion`` addresses. If an "
#~ "attack discovers a private OnionShare "
#~ "address, they will also need to "
#~ "guess the private key used for "
#~ "client authentication in order to access"
#~ " it (unless the OnionShare user "
#~ "chooses make their service public by "
#~ "turning off the private key -- see"
#~ " :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address and "
#~ "private key might not be secure.** "
#~ "Communicating the OnionShare address to "
#~ "people is the responsibility of the "
#~ "OnionShare user. If sent insecurely "
#~ "(such as through an email message "
#~ "monitored by an attacker), an "
#~ "eavesdropper can tell that OnionShare is"
#~ " being used. If the eavesdropper "
#~ "loads the address in Tor Browser "
#~ "while the service is still up, "
#~ "they can access it. To avoid this,"
#~ " the address must be communicated "
#~ "securely, via encrypted text message "
#~ "(probably with disappearing messages enabled),"
#~ " encrypted email, or in person. This"
#~ " isn't necessary when using OnionShare "
#~ "for something that isn't secret."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address and "
#~ "private key might not be anonymous.**"
#~ " Extra precautions must be taken to"
#~ " ensure the OnionShare address is "
#~ "communicated anonymously. A new email or"
#~ " chat account, only accessed over "
#~ "Tor, can be used to share the "
#~ "address. This isn't necessary unless "
#~ "anonymity is a goal."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**If an attacker learns about the "
#~ "onion service, it still can't access "
#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the "
#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services"
#~ " allowed attackers to discover private "
#~ "``.onion`` addresses. To access an "
#~ "OnionShare service from its address, the"
#~ " private key used for client "
#~ "authentication must be guessed (unless "
#~ "the service is already made public "
#~ "by turning off the private key --"
#~ " see :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)."
#~ msgstr ""