onionshare/docs/source/locale/nb_NO/LC_MESSAGES/security.po

# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE.
# Copyright (C) Micah Lee, et al.
# This file is distributed under the same license as the OnionShare package.
# FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, 2020.
#
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: OnionShare 2.3\n"
"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: onionshare-dev@lists.riseup.net\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2022-01-17 10:28-0800\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: 2021-05-10 22:38+0000\n"
"Last-Translator: Jonas Matisen <hdsumo@protonmail.ch>\n"
"Language: nb_NO\n"
"Language-Team: none\n"
"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=n != 1\n"
"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n"
"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
"Generated-By: Babel 2.9.1\n"

#: ../../source/security.rst:2
msgid "Security Design"
msgstr "Sikkerhetsdesign"

#: ../../source/security.rst:4
msgid "Read :ref:`how_it_works` first to get a handle on how OnionShare works."
msgstr "Les :ref:`how_it_works` først for å få taket på hvordan OnionShare virker."

#: ../../source/security.rst:6
msgid "Like all software, OnionShare may contain bugs or vulnerabilities."
msgstr "Som all programvare, inneholder OnionShare feil og kanskje sårbarheter."

#: ../../source/security.rst:9
msgid "What OnionShare protects against"
msgstr "Hva OnionShare beskytter mot"

#: ../../source/security.rst:11
msgid ""
"**Third parties don't have access to anything that happens in "
"OnionShare.** Using OnionShare means hosting services directly on your "
"computer. When sharing files with OnionShare, they are not uploaded to "
"any server. If you make an OnionShare chat room, your computer acts as a "
"server for that too. This avoids the traditional model of having to trust"
" the computers of others."
msgstr ""
"**Tredjeparter har ikke tilgang til noe som skjer i OnionShare.** Bruk av"
" OnionShare betyr vertstjening av tjenester direkte på din datamaskin. "
"Når du deler filer med OnionShare, lastes de ikke opp til noen tjener. "
"Hvis du lager et OnionShare-sludrerom, fungerer datamaskinen din som "
"tjener for det også. Dette unngår den tradisjonelle tiltro til andres "
"datamaskiner-modellen."

#: ../../source/security.rst:13
msgid ""
"**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on anything that happens in OnionShare "
"in transit.** The connection between the Tor onion service and Tor "
"Browser is end-to-end encrypted. This means network attackers can't "
"eavesdrop on anything except encrypted Tor traffic. Even if an "
"eavesdropper is a malicious rendezvous node used to connect the Tor "
"Browser with OnionShare's onion service, the traffic is encrypted using "
"the onion service's private key."
msgstr ""
"**Nettverkstyvlyttere kan ikke spionere på noe som skjer i OnionShare "
"under forsendelse.** Tilkoblingen mellom Tor-onion tjenesten og Tor-"
"nettleseren er ende-til-ende -kryptert. Dette betyr at nettverksangripere"
" ikke kan tyvlytte til noe annet enn kryptert Tor-trafikk. Selv om en "
"tyvlytter er en ondsinnet løsrevet node brukt til å koble til Tor-"
"nettlesren med OnionShare sin onion tjeneste, er trafikken kryptert med "
"onion tjenestens private nøkkel."

#: ../../source/security.rst:15
msgid ""
"**Anonymity of OnionShare users are protected by Tor.** OnionShare and "
"Tor Browser protect the anonymity of the users. As long as the OnionShare"
" user anonymously communicates the OnionShare address with the Tor "
"Browser users, the Tor Browser users and eavesdroppers can't learn the "
"identity of the OnionShare user."
msgstr ""
"**Anonymiteten til OnionShare-brukere er beskyttet av Tor.** OnionShare "
"og Tor-nettlesren beskytter anonymiteten til alle brukerne. Så lenge en "
"Onion-bruker kommuniserer OnionShare-adressen anonymt med brukere av Tor-"
"nettleseren, vil Tor-nettleseren og tyvlyttere ikke kunne ta rede på "
"OnionShare-brukerens identitet."

#: ../../source/security.rst:17
msgid ""
"**If an attacker learns about the onion service, it still can't access "
"anything.** Prior attacks against the Tor network to enumerate onion "
"services allowed the attacker to discover private ``.onion`` addresses. "
"If an attack discovers a private OnionShare address, they will also need "
"to guess the private key used for client authentication in order to "
"access it (unless the OnionShare user chooses make their service public "
"by turning off the private key -- see :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:20
msgid "What OnionShare doesn't protect against"
msgstr "Hva OnionShare ikke beskytter mot"

#: ../../source/security.rst:22
#, fuzzy
msgid ""
"**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be "
"secure.** Communicating the OnionShare address to people is the "
"responsibility of the OnionShare user. If sent insecurely (such as "
"through an email message monitored by an attacker), an eavesdropper can "
"tell that OnionShare is being used. If the eavesdropper loads the address"
" in Tor Browser while the service is still up, they can access it. To "
"avoid this, the address must be communicated securely, via encrypted text"
" message (probably with disappearing messages enabled), encrypted email, "
"or in person. This isn't necessary when using OnionShare for something "
"that isn't secret."
msgstr ""
"**Å kommunisere OnionShare-adressen er ikke nødvendigvis sikkert.** Å "
"dele OnionShare-adressen til folk er OnionShare-brukerens ansvar. Hvis "
"den sendes usikkert (som gjennom en e-postmelding som holdes oppsyn med "
"av en angriper), kan en tyvlytter ta rede på at OnionShare blir brukt. "
"Hvis tyvlytteren laster inn adressen i Tor-nettleseren mens tjenesten "
"fremdeles er oppe, kan vedkommende få tilgang til den. For å unngå dette,"
" må adressen kommuniseres sikkert, via en kryptert tekstmelding "
"(antagelig med automatisk sletting av meldinger påskrudd), kryptert "
"e-post, eller på tomannshånd. Dette er ikke nødvendig når OnionSHare "
"brukes for noe som ikke er hemmelig."

#: ../../source/security.rst:24
#, fuzzy
msgid ""
"**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be "
"anonymous.** Extra precautions must be taken to ensure the OnionShare "
"address is communicated anonymously. A new email or chat account, only "
"accessed over Tor, can be used to share the address. This isn't necessary"
" unless anonymity is a goal."
msgstr ""
"** Kommunikasjon av OnionShare-adressen er kanskje ikke anonym. ** Ekstra"
" forholdsregler må tas for å sikre at OnionShare-adressen kommuniseres "
"anonymt. En ny e-post eller chat-konto, kun tilgjengelig via Tor, kan "
"brukes til å dele adressen. Dette er ikke nødvendig med mindre anonymitet"
" er et mål."

#~ msgid "Security design"
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "First read :ref:`how_it_works` to understand"
#~ " the basics of how OnionShare works."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Third parties don't have access to "
#~ "anything that happens in OnionShare.** "
#~ "When you use OnionShare, you host "
#~ "services directly on your computer. For"
#~ " example, when you share files with"
#~ " OnionShare, you don't upload these "
#~ "files to any server, and when you"
#~ " start an OnionShare chat room, your"
#~ " computer is the chat room server "
#~ "itself. Traditional ways of sharing "
#~ "files or setting up websites and "
#~ "chat rooms require trusting a service"
#~ " with access to your data."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on "
#~ "anything that happens in OnionShare in"
#~ " transit.** Because connections between Tor"
#~ " onion services and Tor Browser are"
#~ " end-to-end encrypted, no network "
#~ "attackers can eavesdrop on what happens"
#~ " in an OnionShare service. If the "
#~ "eavesdropper is positioned on the "
#~ "OnionShare user's end, the Tor Browser"
#~ " user's end, or is a malicious "
#~ "Tor node, they will only see Tor"
#~ " traffic. If the eavesdropper is a"
#~ " malicious rendezvous node used to "
#~ "connect Tor Browser with OnionShare's "
#~ "onion service, the traffic will be "
#~ "encrypted using the onion service key."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**If an attacker learns about the "
#~ "onion service, they still can't access"
#~ " anything.** There have been attacks "
#~ "against the Tor network that can "
#~ "enumerate onion services. Even if "
#~ "someone discovers the .onion address of"
#~ " an OnionShare onion service, they "
#~ "can't access it without also knowing "
#~ "the service's random password (unless, "
#~ "of course, the OnionShare users chooses"
#~ " to disable the password and make "
#~ "it public). The password is generated"
#~ " by choosing two random words from"
#~ " a list of 6800 words, meaning "
#~ "there are 6800^2, or about 46 "
#~ "million possible password. But they can"
#~ " only make 20 wrong guesses before"
#~ " OnionShare stops the server, preventing"
#~ " brute force attacks against the "
#~ "password."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might"
#~ " not be secure.** The OnionShare user"
#~ " is responsible for securely communicating"
#~ " the OnionShare address with people. "
#~ "If they send it insecurely (such "
#~ "as through an email message, and "
#~ "their email is being monitored by "
#~ "an attacker), the eavesdropper will "
#~ "learn that they're using OnionShare. If"
#~ " the attacker loads the address in"
#~ " Tor Browser before the legitimate "
#~ "recipient gets to it, they can "
#~ "access the service. If this risk "
#~ "fits the user's threat model, they "
#~ "must find a more secure way to "
#~ "communicate the address, such as in "
#~ "an encrypted email, chat, or voice "
#~ "call. This isn't necessary in cases "
#~ "where OnionShare is being used for "
#~ "something that isn't secret."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might"
#~ " not be anonymous.** While OnionShare "
#~ "and Tor Browser allow for anonymity, "
#~ "if the user wishes to remain "
#~ "anonymous they must take extra steps "
#~ "to ensure this while communicating the"
#~ " OnionShare address. For example, they "
#~ "might need to use Tor to create"
#~ " a new anonymous email or chat "
#~ "account, and only access it over "
#~ "Tor, to use for sharing the "
#~ "address. This isn't necessary in cases"
#~ " where there's no need to protect "
#~ "anonymity, such as co-workers who "
#~ "know each other sharing work documents."
#~ msgstr ""

#~ msgid ""
#~ "**If an attacker learns about the "
#~ "onion service, it still can't access "
#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the "
#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services"
#~ " allowed the attacker to discover "
#~ "private .onion addresses. If an attack"
#~ " discovers a private OnionShare address,"
#~ " a password will be prevent them "
#~ "from accessing it (unless the OnionShare"
#~ " user chooses to turn it off "
#~ "and make it public). The password "
#~ "is generated by choosing two random "
#~ "words from a list of 6800 words,"
#~ " making 6800², or about 46 million"
#~ " possible passwords. Only 20 wrong "
#~ "guesses can be made before OnionShare"
#~ " stops the server, preventing brute "
#~ "force attacks against the password."
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "**Hvis en angriper lærer om "
#~ "løketjenesten, kan den fremdeles ikke få"
#~ " tilgang til noe. ** Tidligere angrep"
#~ " mot Tor-nettverket for å oppregne"
#~ " løketjenester tillot angriperen å oppdage"
#~ " private .onion-adresser. Hvis et "
#~ "angrep oppdager en privat OnionShare-"
#~ "adresse, vil et passord hindre dem "
#~ "i å få tilgang til den (med "
#~ "mindre OnionShare-brukeren velger å slå"
#~ " den av og gjøre den offentlig). "
#~ "Passordet genereres ved å velge to "
#~ "tilfeldige ord fra en liste på "
#~ "6800 ord, noe som gir 6800², eller"
#~ " omtrent 46 millioner mulige passord. "
#~ "Bare 20 feil gjetninger kan gjøres "
#~ "før OnionShare stopper serveren, og "
#~ "forhindrer brute force-angrep mot "
#~ "passordet."