# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE. # Copyright (C) Micah Lee, et al. # This file is distributed under the same license as the OnionShare package. # FIRST AUTHOR , YEAR. # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: OnionShare 2.5\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2023-09-05 11:30-0700\n" "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n" "Last-Translator: Automatically generated\n" "Language-Team: none\n" "Language: ka\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n" #: ../../source/security.rst:2 msgid "Security Design" msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:4 msgid "Read :ref:`how_it_works` first to get a handle on how OnionShare works." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:6 msgid "Like all software, OnionShare may contain bugs or vulnerabilities." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:9 msgid "What OnionShare protects against" msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:11 msgid "" "**Third parties don't have access to anything that happens in OnionShare.** " "Using OnionShare means hosting services directly on your computer. When " "sharing your files with OnionShare, they are not uploaded to any third-party " "server. If you make an OnionShare chat room, your computer acts as a server " "for that too. This avoids the traditional model of having to trust the " "computers of others." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:17 msgid "" "**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on anything that happens in OnionShare in " "transit.** The connection between the Tor onion service and Tor Browser is " "end-to-end encrypted. This means network attackers can't eavesdrop on " "anything except encrypted Tor traffic. Even if an eavesdropper is a " "malicious rendezvous node used to connect the Tor Browser with OnionShare's " "onion service, the traffic is encrypted using the onion service's private " "key." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:23 msgid "" "**Anonymity of OnionShare users are protected by Tor.** OnionShare and Tor " "Browser protect the anonymity of the users. As long as the OnionShare user " "anonymously communicates the OnionShare address with the Tor Browser users, " "the Tor Browser users and eavesdroppers can't learn the identity of the " "OnionShare user." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:28 msgid "" "**If an attacker learns about the onion service, they still can't access " "anything.** Prior attacks against the Tor network to enumerate onion " "services allowed attackers to discover private ``.onion`` addresses. To " "access an OnionShare service from its address, the private key used for " "client authentication must be guessed (unless the service is already made " "public by turning off the private key -- see :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:33 msgid "What OnionShare doesn't protect against" msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:35 msgid "" "**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be secure." "** Communicating the OnionShare address to people is the responsibility of " "the OnionShare user. If sent insecurely (such as through an e-mail message " "monitored by an attacker), an eavesdropper can tell that OnionShare is being " "used. Eavesdroppers can access services that are still up by loading their " "addresses and/or lost key in the Tor Browser. Avoid this by communicating " "the address securely, via encrypted text message (probably with disappearing " "messages enabled), encrypted e-mail, or in person. This isn't necessary when " "using OnionShare for something that isn't secret." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:42 msgid "" "**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be " "anonymous.** Extra precaution must be taken to ensure the OnionShare address " "is communicated anonymously. A new e-mail or chat account, only accessed " "over Tor, can be used to share the address. This isn't necessary unless " "anonymity is a goal." msgstr ""