From b0e163c4246d15e90a808e4004841e4af46cbd6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Miguel Jacq <mig@mig5.net>
Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 09:04:54 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] Remove ambiguity of 'it' meaning the attacker - per Weblate
 feedback

---
 docs/source/security.rst | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/docs/source/security.rst b/docs/source/security.rst
index 25f4d5cb..adc0fbbe 100644
--- a/docs/source/security.rst
+++ b/docs/source/security.rst
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ OnionShare and Tor Browser protect the anonymity of the users.
 As long as the OnionShare user anonymously communicates the OnionShare address with the Tor Browser users,
 the Tor Browser users and eavesdroppers can't learn the identity of the OnionShare user.
 
-**If an attacker learns about the onion service, it still can't access anything.**
+**If an attacker learns about the onion service, they still can't access anything.**
 Prior attacks against the Tor network to enumerate onion services allowed attackers to discover private ``.onion`` addresses.
 To access an OnionShare service from its address, the private key used for client authentication must be guessed (unless the service is already made public by turning off the private key -- see :ref:`turn_off_private_key`).