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monero/src/wallet/message_store.cpp

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// Copyright (c) 2018, The Monero Project
//
// All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
// materials provided with the distribution.
//
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
// prior written permission.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
#include "message_store.h"
#include <boost/archive/portable_binary_oarchive.hpp>
#include <boost/archive/portable_binary_iarchive.hpp>
#include <boost/format.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string.hpp>
#include <fstream>
#include <sstream>
#include "file_io_utils.h"
#include "storages/http_abstract_invoke.h"
#include "wallet_errors.h"
#include "serialization/binary_utils.h"
#include "common/base58.h"
#include "common/util.h"
#include "string_tools.h"
#undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY
#define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "wallet.mms"
namespace mms
{
message_store::message_store()
{
m_active = false;
m_auto_send = false;
m_next_message_id = 1;
m_num_authorized_signers = 0;
m_num_required_signers = 0;
m_nettype = cryptonote::network_type::UNDEFINED;
m_run = true;
}
namespace
{
// MMS options handling mirrors what "wallet2" is doing for its options, on-demand init and all
// It's not very clean to initialize Bitmessage-specific options here, but going one level further
// down still into "message_transporter" for that is a little bit too much
struct options
{
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> bitmessage_address = {"bitmessage-address", mms::message_store::tr("Use PyBitmessage instance at URL <arg>"), "http://localhost:8442/"};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> bitmessage_login = {"bitmessage-login", mms::message_store::tr("Specify <arg> as username:password for PyBitmessage API"), "username:password"};
};
}
void message_store::init_options(boost::program_options::options_description& desc_params)
{
const options opts{};
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.bitmessage_address);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.bitmessage_login);
}
void message_store::init(const multisig_wallet_state &state, const std::string &own_label,
const std::string &own_transport_address, uint32_t num_authorized_signers, uint32_t num_required_signers)
{
m_num_authorized_signers = num_authorized_signers;
m_num_required_signers = num_required_signers;
m_signers.clear();
m_messages.clear();
m_next_message_id = 1;
// The vector "m_signers" gets here once the required number of elements, one for each authorized signer,
// and is never changed again. The rest of the code relies on "size(m_signers) == m_num_authorized_signers"
// without further checks.
authorized_signer signer;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < m_num_authorized_signers; ++i)
{
signer.me = signer.index == 0; // Strict convention: The very first signer is fixed as / must be "me"
m_signers.push_back(signer);
signer.index++;
}
set_signer(state, 0, own_label, own_transport_address, state.address);
m_nettype = state.nettype;
set_active(true);
m_filename = state.mms_file;
save(state);
}
void message_store::set_options(const boost::program_options::variables_map& vm)
{
const options opts{};
std::string bitmessage_address = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.bitmessage_address);
epee::wipeable_string bitmessage_login = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.bitmessage_login);
set_options(bitmessage_address, bitmessage_login);
}
void message_store::set_options(const std::string &bitmessage_address, const epee::wipeable_string &bitmessage_login)
{
m_transporter.set_options(bitmessage_address, bitmessage_login);
}
void message_store::set_signer(const multisig_wallet_state &state,
uint32_t index,
const boost::optional<std::string> &label,
const boost::optional<std::string> &transport_address,
const boost::optional<cryptonote::account_public_address> monero_address)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(index >= m_num_authorized_signers, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid signer index " + std::to_string(index));
authorized_signer &m = m_signers[index];
if (label)
{
m.label = label.get();
}
if (transport_address)
{
m.transport_address = transport_address.get();
}
if (monero_address)
{
m.monero_address_known = true;
m.monero_address = monero_address.get();
}
// Save to minimize the chance to loose that info (at least while in beta)
save(state);
}
const authorized_signer &message_store::get_signer(uint32_t index) const
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(index >= m_num_authorized_signers, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid signer index " + std::to_string(index));
return m_signers[index];
}
bool message_store::signer_config_complete() const
{
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < m_num_authorized_signers; ++i)
{
const authorized_signer &m = m_signers[i];
if (m.label.empty() || m.transport_address.empty() || !m.monero_address_known)
{
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
// Check if all signers have a label set (as it's a requirement for starting auto-config
// by the "manager")
bool message_store::signer_labels_complete() const
{
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < m_num_authorized_signers; ++i)
{
const authorized_signer &m = m_signers[i];
if (m.label.empty())
{
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
void message_store::get_signer_config(std::string &signer_config)
{
std::stringstream oss;
boost::archive::portable_binary_oarchive ar(oss);
ar << m_signers;
signer_config = oss.str();
}
void message_store::unpack_signer_config(const multisig_wallet_state &state, const std::string &signer_config,
std::vector<authorized_signer> &signers)
{
try
{
std::stringstream iss;
iss << signer_config;
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> signers;
}
catch (...)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(true, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid structure of signer config");
}
uint32_t num_signers = (uint32_t)signers.size();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(num_signers != m_num_authorized_signers, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Wrong number of signers in config: " + std::to_string(num_signers));
}
void message_store::process_signer_config(const multisig_wallet_state &state, const std::string &signer_config)
{
// The signers in "signer_config" and the resident wallet signers are matched not by label, but
// by Monero address, and ALL labels will be set from "signer_config", even the "me" label.
// In the auto-config process as implemented now the auto-config manager is responsible for defining
// the labels, and right at the end of the process ALL wallets use the SAME labels. The idea behind this
// is preventing problems like duplicate labels and confusion (Bob choosing a label "IamAliceHonest").
// (Of course signers are free to re-define any labels they don't like AFTER auto-config.)
//
// Usually this method will be called with only the "me" signer defined in the wallet, and may
// produce unexpected behaviour if that wallet contains additional signers that have nothing to do with
// those arriving in "signer_config".
std::vector<authorized_signer> signers;
unpack_signer_config(state, signer_config, signers);
uint32_t new_index = 1;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < m_num_authorized_signers; ++i)
{
const authorized_signer &m = signers[i];
uint32_t index;
uint32_t take_index;
bool found = get_signer_index_by_monero_address(m.monero_address, index);
if (found)
{
// Redefine existing (probably "me", under usual circumstances)
take_index = index;
}
else
{
// Add new; neglect that we may erroneously overwrite already defined signers
// (but protect "me")
take_index = new_index;
if ((new_index + 1) < m_num_authorized_signers)
{
new_index++;
}
}
authorized_signer &modify = m_signers[take_index];
modify.label = m.label; // ALWAYS set label, see comments above
if (!modify.me)
{
modify.transport_address = m.transport_address;
modify.monero_address_known = m.monero_address_known;
if (m.monero_address_known)
{
modify.monero_address = m.monero_address;
}
}
}
save(state);
}
void message_store::start_auto_config(const multisig_wallet_state &state)
{
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < m_num_authorized_signers; ++i)
{
authorized_signer &m = m_signers[i];
if (!m.me)
{
setup_signer_for_auto_config(i, create_auto_config_token(), true);
}
m.auto_config_running = true;
}
save(state);
}
// Check auto-config token string and convert to standardized form;
// Try to make it as foolproof as possible, with built-in tolerance to make up for
// errors in transmission that still leave the token recognizable.
bool message_store::check_auto_config_token(const std::string &raw_token,
std::string &adjusted_token) const
{
std::string prefix(AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_PREFIX);
uint32_t num_hex_digits = (AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_BYTES + 1) * 2;
uint32_t full_length = num_hex_digits + prefix.length();
uint32_t raw_length = raw_token.length();
std::string hex_digits;
if (raw_length == full_length)
{
// Prefix must be there; accept it in any casing
std::string raw_prefix(raw_token.substr(0, 3));
boost::algorithm::to_lower(raw_prefix);
if (raw_prefix != prefix)
{
return false;
}
hex_digits = raw_token.substr(3);
}
else if (raw_length == num_hex_digits)
{
// Accept the token without the prefix if it's otherwise ok
hex_digits = raw_token;
}
else
{
return false;
}
// Convert to strict lowercase and correct any common misspellings
boost::algorithm::to_lower(hex_digits);
std::replace(hex_digits.begin(), hex_digits.end(), 'o', '0');
std::replace(hex_digits.begin(), hex_digits.end(), 'i', '1');
std::replace(hex_digits.begin(), hex_digits.end(), 'l', '1');
// Now it must be correct hex with correct checksum, no further tolerance possible
std::string token_bytes;
if (!epee::string_tools::parse_hexstr_to_binbuff(hex_digits, token_bytes))
{
return false;
}
const crypto::hash &hash = crypto::cn_fast_hash(token_bytes.data(), token_bytes.size() - 1);
if (token_bytes[AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_BYTES] != hash.data[0])
{
return false;
}
adjusted_token = prefix + hex_digits;
return true;
}
// Create a new auto-config token with prefix, random 8-hex digits plus 2 checksum digits
std::string message_store::create_auto_config_token()
{
unsigned char random[AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_BYTES];
crypto::rand(AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_BYTES, random);
std::string token_bytes;
token_bytes.append((char *)random, AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_BYTES);
// Add a checksum because technically ANY four bytes are a valid token, and without a checksum we would send
// auto-config messages "to nowhere" after the slightest typo without knowing it
const crypto::hash &hash = crypto::cn_fast_hash(token_bytes.data(), token_bytes.size());
token_bytes += hash.data[0];
std::string prefix(AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_PREFIX);
return prefix + epee::string_tools::buff_to_hex_nodelimer(token_bytes);
}
// Add a message for sending "me" address data to the auto-config transport address
// that can be derived from the token and activate auto-config
size_t message_store::add_auto_config_data_message(const multisig_wallet_state &state,
const std::string &auto_config_token)
{
authorized_signer &me = m_signers[0];
me.auto_config_token = auto_config_token;
setup_signer_for_auto_config(0, auto_config_token, false);
me.auto_config_running = true;
auto_config_data data;
data.label = me.label;
data.transport_address = me.transport_address;
data.monero_address = me.monero_address;
std::stringstream oss;
boost::archive::portable_binary_oarchive ar(oss);
ar << data;
return add_message(state, 0, message_type::auto_config_data, message_direction::out, oss.str());
}
// Process a single message with auto-config data, destined for "message.signer_index"
void message_store::process_auto_config_data_message(uint32_t id)
{
// "auto_config_data" contains the label that the auto-config data sender uses for "me", but that's
// more for completeness' sake, and right now it's not used. In general, the auto-config manager
// decides/defines the labels, and right after completing auto-config ALL wallets use the SAME labels.
const message &m = get_message_ref_by_id(id);
auto_config_data data;
try
{
std::stringstream iss;
iss << m.content;
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> data;
}
catch (...)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(true, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid structure of auto config data");
}
authorized_signer &signer = m_signers[m.signer_index];
// "signer.label" does NOT change, see comment above
signer.transport_address = data.transport_address;
signer.monero_address_known = true;
signer.monero_address = data.monero_address;
signer.auto_config_running = false;
}
void message_store::stop_auto_config()
{
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < m_num_authorized_signers; ++i)
{
authorized_signer &m = m_signers[i];
if (!m.me && !m.auto_config_transport_address.empty())
{
// Try to delete those "unused API" addresses in PyBitmessage, especially since
// it seems it's not possible to delete them interactively, only to "disable" them
m_transporter.delete_transport_address(m.auto_config_transport_address);
}
m.auto_config_token.clear();
m.auto_config_public_key = crypto::null_pkey;
m.auto_config_secret_key = crypto::null_skey;
m.auto_config_transport_address.clear();
m.auto_config_running = false;
}
}
void message_store::setup_signer_for_auto_config(uint32_t index, const std::string token, bool receiving)
{
// It may be a little strange to hash the textual hex digits of the auto config token into
// 32 bytes and turn that into a Monero public/secret key pair, instead of doing something
// much less complicated like directly using the underlying random 40 bits as key for a
// symmetric cipher, but everything is there already for encrypting and decrypting messages
// with such key pairs, and furthermore it would be trivial to use tokens with a different
// number of bytes.
//
// In the wallet of the auto-config manager each signer except "me" gets set its own
// auto-config parameters. In the wallet of somebody using the token to send auto-config
// data the auto-config parameters are stored in the "me" signer and taken from there
// to send that data.
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(index >= m_num_authorized_signers, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid signer index " + std::to_string(index));
authorized_signer &m = m_signers[index];
m.auto_config_token = token;
crypto::hash_to_scalar(token.data(), token.size(), m.auto_config_secret_key);
crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(m.auto_config_secret_key, m.auto_config_public_key);
if (receiving)
{
m.auto_config_transport_address = m_transporter.derive_and_receive_transport_address(m.auto_config_token);
}
else
{
m.auto_config_transport_address = m_transporter.derive_transport_address(m.auto_config_token);
}
}
bool message_store::get_signer_index_by_monero_address(const cryptonote::account_public_address &monero_address, uint32_t &index) const
{
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < m_num_authorized_signers; ++i)
{
const authorized_signer &m = m_signers[i];
if (m.monero_address == monero_address)
{
index = m.index;
return true;
}
}
MWARNING("No authorized signer with Monero address " << account_address_to_string(monero_address));
return false;
}
bool message_store::get_signer_index_by_label(const std::string label, uint32_t &index) const
{
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < m_num_authorized_signers; ++i)
{
const authorized_signer &m = m_signers[i];
if (m.label == label)
{
index = m.index;
return true;
}
}
MWARNING("No authorized signer with label " << label);
return false;
}
void message_store::process_wallet_created_data(const multisig_wallet_state &state, message_type type, const std::string &content)
{
switch(type)
{
case message_type::key_set:
// Result of a "prepare_multisig" command in the wallet
// Send the key set to all other signers
case message_type::additional_key_set:
// Result of a "make_multisig" command or a "exchange_multisig_keys" in the wallet in case of M/N multisig
// Send the additional key set to all other signers
case message_type::multisig_sync_data:
// Result of a "export_multisig_info" command in the wallet
// Send the sync data to all other signers
for (uint32_t i = 1; i < m_num_authorized_signers; ++i)
{
add_message(state, i, type, message_direction::out, content);
}
break;
case message_type::partially_signed_tx:
// Result of a "transfer" command in the wallet, or a "sign_multisig" command
// that did not yet result in the minimum number of signatures required
// Create a message "from me to me" as a container for the tx data
if (m_num_required_signers == 1)
{
// Probably rare, but possible: The 1 signature is already enough, correct the type
// Easier to correct here than asking all callers to detect this rare special case
type = message_type::fully_signed_tx;
}
add_message(state, 0, type, message_direction::in, content);
break;
case message_type::fully_signed_tx:
add_message(state, 0, type, message_direction::in, content);
break;
default:
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Illegal message type " + std::to_string((uint32_t)type));
break;
}
}
size_t message_store::add_message(const multisig_wallet_state &state,
uint32_t signer_index, message_type type, message_direction direction,
const std::string &content)
{
message m;
m.id = m_next_message_id++;
m.type = type;
m.direction = direction;
m.content = content;
m.created = (uint64_t)time(NULL);
m.modified = m.created;
m.sent = 0;
m.signer_index = signer_index;
if (direction == message_direction::out)
{
m.state = message_state::ready_to_send;
}
else
{
m.state = message_state::waiting;
};
m.wallet_height = (uint32_t)state.num_transfer_details;
if (m.type == message_type::additional_key_set)
{
m.round = state.multisig_rounds_passed;
}
else
{
m.round = 0;
}
m.signature_count = 0; // Future expansion for signature counting when signing txs
m.hash = crypto::null_hash;
m_messages.push_back(m);
// Save for every new message right away (at least while in beta)
save(state);
MINFO(boost::format("Added %s message %s for signer %s of type %s")
% message_direction_to_string(direction) % m.id % signer_index % message_type_to_string(type));
return m_messages.size() - 1;
}
// Get the index of the message with id "id", return false if not found
bool message_store::get_message_index_by_id(uint32_t id, size_t &index) const
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_messages.size(); ++i)
{
if (m_messages[i].id == id)
{
index = i;
return true;
}
}
MWARNING("No message found with an id of " << id);
return false;
}
// Get the index of the message with id "id" that must exist
size_t message_store::get_message_index_by_id(uint32_t id) const
{
size_t index;
bool found = get_message_index_by_id(id, index);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!found, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid message id " + std::to_string(id));
return index;
}
// Get the modifiable message with id "id" that must exist; private/internal use!
message& message_store::get_message_ref_by_id(uint32_t id)
{
return m_messages[get_message_index_by_id(id)];
}
// Get the message with id "id", return false if not found
// This version of the method allows to check whether id is valid without triggering an error
bool message_store::get_message_by_id(uint32_t id, message &m) const
{
size_t index;
bool found = get_message_index_by_id(id, index);
if (found)
{
m = m_messages[index];
}
return found;
}
// Get the message with id "id" that must exist
message message_store::get_message_by_id(uint32_t id) const
{
message m;
bool found = get_message_by_id(id, m);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!found, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid message id " + std::to_string(id));
return m;
}
bool message_store::any_message_of_type(message_type type, message_direction direction) const
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_messages.size(); ++i)
{
if ((m_messages[i].type == type) && (m_messages[i].direction == direction))
{
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool message_store::any_message_with_hash(const crypto::hash &hash) const
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_messages.size(); ++i)
{
if (m_messages[i].hash == hash)
{
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
// Count the ids in the vector that are set i.e. not 0, while ignoring index 0
// Mostly used to check whether we have a message for each authorized signer except me,
// with the signer index used as index into 'ids'; the element at index 0, for me,
// is ignored, to make constant subtractions of 1 for indices when filling the
// vector unnecessary
size_t message_store::get_other_signers_id_count(const std::vector<uint32_t> &ids) const
{
size_t count = 0;
for (size_t i = 1 /* and not 0 */; i < ids.size(); ++i)
{
if (ids[i] != 0)
{
count++;
}
}
return count;
}
// Is in every element of vector 'ids' (except at index 0) a message id i.e. not 0?
bool message_store::message_ids_complete(const std::vector<uint32_t> &ids) const
{
return get_other_signers_id_count(ids) == (ids.size() - 1);
}
void message_store::delete_message(uint32_t id)
{
delete_transport_message(id);
size_t index = get_message_index_by_id(id);
m_messages.erase(m_messages.begin() + index);
}
void message_store::delete_all_messages()
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_messages.size(); ++i)
{
delete_transport_message(m_messages[i].id);
}
m_messages.clear();
}
// Make a message text, which is "attacker controlled data", reasonably safe to display
// This is mostly geared towards the safe display of notes sent by "mms note" with a "mms show" command
void message_store::get_sanitized_message_text(const message &m, std::string &sanitized_text) const
{
sanitized_text.clear();
// Restrict the size to fend of DOS-style attacks with heaps of data
size_t length = std::min(m.content.length(), (size_t)1000);
for (size_t i = 0; i < length; ++i)
{
char c = m.content[i];
if ((int)c < 32)
{
// Strip out any controls, especially ESC for getting rid of potentially dangerous
// ANSI escape sequences that a console window might interpret
c = ' ';
}
else if ((c == '<') || (c == '>'))
{
// Make XML or HTML impossible that e.g. might contain scripts that Qt might execute
// when displayed in the GUI wallet
c = ' ';
}
sanitized_text += c;
}
}
void message_store::write_to_file(const multisig_wallet_state &state, const std::string &filename)
{
std::stringstream oss;
boost::archive::portable_binary_oarchive ar(oss);
ar << *this;
std::string buf = oss.str();
crypto::chacha_key key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(&state.view_secret_key, sizeof(crypto::secret_key), key, 1);
file_data write_file_data = boost::value_initialized<file_data>();
write_file_data.magic_string = "MMS";
write_file_data.file_version = 0;
write_file_data.iv = crypto::rand<crypto::chacha_iv>();
std::string encrypted_data;
encrypted_data.resize(buf.size());
crypto::chacha20(buf.data(), buf.size(), key, write_file_data.iv, &encrypted_data[0]);
write_file_data.encrypted_data = encrypted_data;
std::stringstream file_oss;
boost::archive::portable_binary_oarchive file_ar(file_oss);
file_ar << write_file_data;
bool success = epee::file_io_utils::save_string_to_file(filename, file_oss.str());
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!success, tools::error::file_save_error, filename);
}
void message_store::read_from_file(const multisig_wallet_state &state, const std::string &filename)
{
boost::system::error_code ignored_ec;
bool file_exists = boost::filesystem::exists(filename, ignored_ec);
if (!file_exists)
{
// Simply do nothing if the file is not there; allows e.g. easy recovery
// from problems with the MMS by deleting the file
MERROR("No message store file found: " << filename);
return;
}
std::string buf;
bool success = epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(filename, buf);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!success, tools::error::file_read_error, filename);
file_data read_file_data;
try
{
std::stringstream iss;
iss << buf;
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> read_file_data;
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
MERROR("MMS file " << filename << " has bad structure <iv,encrypted_data>: " << e.what());
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(true, tools::error::file_read_error, filename);
}
crypto::chacha_key key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(&state.view_secret_key, sizeof(crypto::secret_key), key, 1);
std::string decrypted_data;
decrypted_data.resize(read_file_data.encrypted_data.size());
crypto::chacha20(read_file_data.encrypted_data.data(), read_file_data.encrypted_data.size(), key, read_file_data.iv, &decrypted_data[0]);
try
{
std::stringstream iss;
iss << decrypted_data;
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> *this;
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
MERROR("MMS file " << filename << " has bad structure: " << e.what());
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(true, tools::error::file_read_error, filename);
}
m_filename = filename;
}
// Save to the same file this message store was loaded from
// Called after changes deemed "important", to make it less probable to lose messages in case of
// a crash; a better and long-term solution would of course be to use LMDB ...
void message_store::save(const multisig_wallet_state &state)
{
if (!m_filename.empty())
{
write_to_file(state, m_filename);
}
}
bool message_store::get_processable_messages(const multisig_wallet_state &state,
bool force_sync, std::vector<processing_data> &data_list, std::string &wait_reason)
{
uint32_t wallet_height = (uint32_t)state.num_transfer_details;
data_list.clear();
wait_reason.clear();
// In all scans over all messages looking for complete sets (1 message for each signer),
// if there are duplicates, the OLDEST of them is taken. This may not play a role with
// any of the current message types, but may with future ones, and it's probably a good
// idea to have a clear and somewhat defensive strategy.
std::vector<uint32_t> auto_config_messages(m_num_authorized_signers, 0);
bool any_auto_config = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_messages.size(); ++i)
{
message &m = m_messages[i];
if ((m.type == message_type::auto_config_data) && (m.state == message_state::waiting))
{
if (auto_config_messages[m.signer_index] == 0)
{
auto_config_messages[m.signer_index] = m.id;
any_auto_config = true;
}
// else duplicate auto config data, ignore
}
}
if (any_auto_config)
{
bool auto_config_complete = message_ids_complete(auto_config_messages);
if (auto_config_complete)
{
processing_data data;
data.processing = message_processing::process_auto_config_data;
data.message_ids = auto_config_messages;
data.message_ids.erase(data.message_ids.begin());
data_list.push_back(data);
return true;
}
else
{
wait_reason = tr("Auto-config cannot proceed because auto config data from other signers is not complete");
return false;
// With ANY auto config data present but not complete refuse to check for any
// other processing. Manually delete those messages to abort such an auto config
// phase if needed.
}
}
// Any signer config that arrived will be processed right away, regardless of other things that may wait
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_messages.size(); ++i)
{
message &m = m_messages[i];
if ((m.type == message_type::signer_config) && (m.state == message_state::waiting))
{
processing_data data;
data.processing = message_processing::process_signer_config;
data.message_ids.push_back(m.id);
data_list.push_back(data);
return true;
}
}
// ALL of the following processings depend on the signer info being complete
if (!signer_config_complete())
{
wait_reason = tr("The signer config is not complete.");
return false;
}
if (!state.multisig)
{
if (!any_message_of_type(message_type::key_set, message_direction::out))
{
// With the own key set not yet ready we must do "prepare_multisig" first;
// Key sets from other signers may be here already, but if we process them now
// the wallet will go multisig too early: we can't produce our own key set any more!
processing_data data;
data.processing = message_processing::prepare_multisig;
data_list.push_back(data);
return true;
}
// Ids of key set messages per signer index, to check completeness
// Naturally, does not care about the order of the messages and is trivial to secure against
// key sets that were received more than once
// With full M/N multisig now possible consider only key sets of the right round, i.e.
// with not yet multisig the only possible round 0
std::vector<uint32_t> key_set_messages(m_num_authorized_signers, 0);
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_messages.size(); ++i)
{
message &m = m_messages[i];
if ((m.type == message_type::key_set) && (m.state == message_state::waiting)
&& (m.round == 0))
{
if (key_set_messages[m.signer_index] == 0)
{
key_set_messages[m.signer_index] = m.id;
}
// else duplicate key set, ignore
}
}
bool key_sets_complete = message_ids_complete(key_set_messages);
if (key_sets_complete)
{
// Nothing else can be ready to process earlier than this, ignore everything else and give back
processing_data data;
data.processing = message_processing::make_multisig;
data.message_ids = key_set_messages;
data.message_ids.erase(data.message_ids.begin());
data_list.push_back(data);
return true;
}
else
{
wait_reason = tr("Wallet can't go multisig because key sets from other signers are missing or not complete.");
return false;
}
}
if (state.multisig && !state.multisig_is_ready)
{
// In the case of M/N multisig the call 'wallet2::multisig' returns already true
// after "make_multisig" but with calls to "exchange_multisig_keys" still needed, and
// sets the parameter 'ready' to false to document this particular "in-between" state.
// So what may be possible here, with all necessary messages present, is a call to
// "exchange_multisig_keys".
// Consider only messages belonging to the next round to do, which has the number
// "state.multisig_rounds_passed".
std::vector<uint32_t> additional_key_set_messages(m_num_authorized_signers, 0);
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_messages.size(); ++i)
{
message &m = m_messages[i];
if ((m.type == message_type::additional_key_set) && (m.state == message_state::waiting)
&& (m.round == state.multisig_rounds_passed))
{
if (additional_key_set_messages[m.signer_index] == 0)
{
additional_key_set_messages[m.signer_index] = m.id;
}
// else duplicate key set, ignore
}
}
bool key_sets_complete = message_ids_complete(additional_key_set_messages);
if (key_sets_complete)
{
processing_data data;
data.processing = message_processing::exchange_multisig_keys;
data.message_ids = additional_key_set_messages;
data.message_ids.erase(data.message_ids.begin());
data_list.push_back(data);
return true;
}
else
{
wait_reason = tr("Wallet can't start another key exchange round because key sets from other signers are missing or not complete.");
return false;
}
}
// Properly exchanging multisig sync data is easiest and most transparent
// for the user if a wallet sends its own data first and processes any received
// sync data afterwards so that's the order that the MMS enforces here.
// (Technically, it seems to work also the other way round.)
//
// To check whether a NEW round of syncing is necessary the MMS works with a
// "wallet state": new state means new syncing needed.
//
// The MMS monitors the "wallet state" by recording "wallet heights" as
// numbers of transfers present in a wallet at the time of message creation. While
// not watertight, this quite simple scheme should already suffice to trigger
// and orchestrate a sensible exchange of sync data.
if (state.has_multisig_partial_key_images || force_sync)
{
// Sync is necessary and not yet completed: Processing of transactions
// will only be possible again once properly synced
// Check first whether we generated already OUR sync info; take note of
// any processable sync info from other signers on the way in case we need it
bool own_sync_data_created = false;
std::vector<uint32_t> sync_messages(m_num_authorized_signers, 0);
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_messages.size(); ++i)
{
message &m = m_messages[i];
if ((m.type == message_type::multisig_sync_data) && (force_sync || (m.wallet_height == wallet_height)))
// It's data for the same "round" of syncing, on the same "wallet height", therefore relevant
// With "force_sync" take ANY waiting sync data, maybe it will work out
{
if (m.direction == message_direction::out)
{
own_sync_data_created = true;
// Ignore whether sent already or not, and assume as complete if several other signers there
}
else if ((m.direction == message_direction::in) && (m.state == message_state::waiting))
{
if (sync_messages[m.signer_index] == 0)
{
sync_messages[m.signer_index] = m.id;
}
// else duplicate sync message, ignore
}
}
}
if (!own_sync_data_created)
{
// As explained above, creating sync data BEFORE processing such data from
// other signers reliably works, so insist on that here
processing_data data;
data.processing = message_processing::create_sync_data;
data_list.push_back(data);
return true;
}
uint32_t id_count = (uint32_t)get_other_signers_id_count(sync_messages);
// Do we have sync data from ALL other signers?
bool all_sync_data = id_count == (m_num_authorized_signers - 1);
// Do we have just ENOUGH sync data to have a minimal viable sync set?
// In cases like 2/3 multisig we don't need messages from ALL other signers, only
// from enough of them i.e. num_required_signers minus 1 messages
bool enough_sync_data = id_count >= (m_num_required_signers - 1);
bool sync = false;
wait_reason = tr("Syncing not done because multisig sync data from other signers are missing or not complete.");
if (all_sync_data)
{
sync = true;
}
else if (enough_sync_data)
{
if (force_sync)
{
sync = true;
}
else
{
// Don't sync, but give a hint how this minimal set COULD be synced if really wanted
wait_reason += (boost::format("\nUse \"mms next sync\" if you want to sync with just %s out of %s authorized signers and transact just with them")
% (m_num_required_signers - 1) % (m_num_authorized_signers - 1)).str();
}
}
if (sync)
{
processing_data data;
data.processing = message_processing::process_sync_data;
for (size_t i = 0; i < sync_messages.size(); ++i)
{
uint32_t id = sync_messages[i];
if (id != 0)
{
data.message_ids.push_back(id);
}
}
data_list.push_back(data);
return true;
}
else
{
// We can't proceed to any transactions until we have synced; "wait_reason" already set above
return false;
}
}
bool waiting_found = false;
bool note_found = false;
bool sync_data_found = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_messages.size(); ++i)
{
message &m = m_messages[i];
if (m.state == message_state::waiting)
{
waiting_found = true;
switch (m.type)
{
case message_type::fully_signed_tx:
{
// We can either submit it ourselves, or send it to any other signer for submission
processing_data data;
data.processing = message_processing::submit_tx;
data.message_ids.push_back(m.id);
data_list.push_back(data);
data.processing = message_processing::send_tx;
for (uint32_t j = 1; j < m_num_authorized_signers; ++j)
{
data.receiving_signer_index = j;
data_list.push_back(data);
}
return true;
}
case message_type::partially_signed_tx:
{
if (m.signer_index == 0)
{
// We started this ourselves, or signed it but with still signatures missing:
// We can send it to any other signer for signing / further signing
// In principle it does not make sense to send it back to somebody who
// already signed, but the MMS does not / not yet keep track of that,
// because that would be somewhat complicated.
processing_data data;
data.processing = message_processing::send_tx;
data.message_ids.push_back(m.id);
for (uint32_t j = 1; j < m_num_authorized_signers; ++j)
{
data.receiving_signer_index = j;
data_list.push_back(data);
}
return true;
}
else
{
// Somebody else sent this to us: We can sign it
// It would be possible to just pass it on, but that's not directly supported here
processing_data data;
data.processing = message_processing::sign_tx;
data.message_ids.push_back(m.id);
data_list.push_back(data);
return true;
}
}
case message_type::note:
note_found = true;
break;
case message_type::multisig_sync_data:
sync_data_found = true;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
if (waiting_found)
{
wait_reason = tr("There are waiting messages, but nothing is ready to process under normal circumstances");
if (sync_data_found)
{
wait_reason += tr("\nUse \"mms next sync\" if you want to force processing of the waiting sync data");
}
if (note_found)
{
wait_reason += tr("\nUse \"mms note\" to display the waiting notes");
}
}
else
{
wait_reason = tr("There are no messages waiting to be processed.");
}
return false;
}
void message_store::set_messages_processed(const processing_data &data)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < data.message_ids.size(); ++i)
{
set_message_processed_or_sent(data.message_ids[i]);
}
}
void message_store::set_message_processed_or_sent(uint32_t id)
{
message &m = get_message_ref_by_id(id);
if (m.state == message_state::waiting)
{
// So far a fairly cautious and conservative strategy: Only delete from Bitmessage
// when fully processed (and e.g. not already after reception and writing into
// the message store file)
delete_transport_message(id);
m.state = message_state::processed;
}
else if (m.state == message_state::ready_to_send)
{
m.state = message_state::sent;
}
m.modified = (uint64_t)time(NULL);
}
void message_store::encrypt(crypto::public_key public_key, const std::string &plaintext,
std::string &ciphertext, crypto::public_key &encryption_public_key, crypto::chacha_iv &iv)
{
crypto::secret_key encryption_secret_key;
crypto::generate_keys(encryption_public_key, encryption_secret_key);
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
bool success = crypto::generate_key_derivation(public_key, encryption_secret_key, derivation);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!success, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key derivation for message encryption");
crypto::chacha_key chacha_key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(&derivation, sizeof(derivation), chacha_key, 1);
iv = crypto::rand<crypto::chacha_iv>();
ciphertext.resize(plaintext.size());
crypto::chacha20(plaintext.data(), plaintext.size(), chacha_key, iv, &ciphertext[0]);
}
void message_store::decrypt(const std::string &ciphertext, const crypto::public_key &encryption_public_key, const crypto::chacha_iv &iv,
const crypto::secret_key &view_secret_key, std::string &plaintext)
{
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
bool success = crypto::generate_key_derivation(encryption_public_key, view_secret_key, derivation);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!success, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key derivation for message decryption");
crypto::chacha_key chacha_key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(&derivation, sizeof(derivation), chacha_key, 1);
plaintext.resize(ciphertext.size());
crypto::chacha20(ciphertext.data(), ciphertext.size(), chacha_key, iv, &plaintext[0]);
}
void message_store::send_message(const multisig_wallet_state &state, uint32_t id)
{
message &m = get_message_ref_by_id(id);
const authorized_signer &me = m_signers[0];
const authorized_signer &receiver = m_signers[m.signer_index];
transport_message dm;
crypto::public_key public_key;
dm.timestamp = (uint64_t)time(NULL);
dm.subject = "MMS V0 " + tools::get_human_readable_timestamp(dm.timestamp);
dm.source_transport_address = me.transport_address;
dm.source_monero_address = me.monero_address;
if (m.type == message_type::auto_config_data)
{
// Encrypt with the public key derived from the auto-config token, and send to the
// transport address likewise derived from that token
public_key = me.auto_config_public_key;
dm.destination_transport_address = me.auto_config_transport_address;
// The destination Monero address is not yet known
memset(&dm.destination_monero_address, 0, sizeof(cryptonote::account_public_address));
}
else
{
// Encrypt with the receiver's view public key
public_key = receiver.monero_address.m_view_public_key;
const authorized_signer &receiver = m_signers[m.signer_index];
dm.destination_monero_address = receiver.monero_address;
dm.destination_transport_address = receiver.transport_address;
}
encrypt(public_key, m.content, dm.content, dm.encryption_public_key, dm.iv);
dm.type = (uint32_t)m.type;
dm.hash = crypto::cn_fast_hash(dm.content.data(), dm.content.size());
dm.round = m.round;
crypto::generate_signature(dm.hash, me.monero_address.m_view_public_key, state.view_secret_key, dm.signature);
m_transporter.send_message(dm);
m.state=message_state::sent;
m.sent= (uint64_t)time(NULL);
}
bool message_store::check_for_messages(const multisig_wallet_state &state, std::vector<message> &messages)
{
m_run.store(true, std::memory_order_relaxed);
const authorized_signer &me = m_signers[0];
std::vector<std::string> destinations;
destinations.push_back(me.transport_address);
for (uint32_t i = 1; i < m_num_authorized_signers; ++i)
{
const authorized_signer &m = m_signers[i];
if (m.auto_config_running)
{
destinations.push_back(m.auto_config_transport_address);
}
}
std::vector<transport_message> transport_messages;
bool r = m_transporter.receive_messages(destinations, transport_messages);
if (!m_run.load(std::memory_order_relaxed))
{
// Stop was called, don't waste time processing the messages
// (but once started processing them, don't react to stop request anymore, avoid receiving them "partially)"
return false;
}
bool new_messages = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < transport_messages.size(); ++i)
{
transport_message &rm = transport_messages[i];
if (any_message_with_hash(rm.hash))
{
// Already seen, do not take again
}
else
{
uint32_t sender_index;
bool take = false;
message_type type = static_cast<message_type>(rm.type);
crypto::secret_key decrypt_key = state.view_secret_key;
if (type == message_type::auto_config_data)
{
// Find out which signer sent it by checking which auto config transport address
// the message was sent to
for (uint32_t i = 1; i < m_num_authorized_signers; ++i)
{
const authorized_signer &m = m_signers[i];
if (m.auto_config_transport_address == rm.destination_transport_address)
{
take = true;
sender_index = i;
decrypt_key = m.auto_config_secret_key;
break;
}
}
}
else if (type == message_type::signer_config)
{
// Typically we can't check yet whether we know the sender, so take from any
// and pretend it's from "me" because we might have nothing else yet
take = true;
sender_index = 0;
}
else
{
// Only accept from senders that are known as signer here, otherwise just ignore
take = get_signer_index_by_monero_address(rm.source_monero_address, sender_index);
}
if (take && (type != message_type::auto_config_data))
{
// If the destination address is known, check it as well; this additional filter
// allows using the same transport address for multiple signers
take = rm.destination_monero_address == me.monero_address;
}
if (take)
{
crypto::hash actual_hash = crypto::cn_fast_hash(rm.content.data(), rm.content.size());
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(actual_hash != rm.hash, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Message hash mismatch");
bool signature_valid = crypto::check_signature(actual_hash, rm.source_monero_address.m_view_public_key, rm.signature);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!signature_valid, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Message signature not valid");
std::string plaintext;
decrypt(rm.content, rm.encryption_public_key, rm.iv, decrypt_key, plaintext);
size_t index = add_message(state, sender_index, (message_type)rm.type, message_direction::in, plaintext);
message &m = m_messages[index];
m.hash = rm.hash;
m.transport_id = rm.transport_id;
m.sent = rm.timestamp;
m.round = rm.round;
m.signature_count = rm.signature_count;
messages.push_back(m);
new_messages = true;
}
}
}
return new_messages;
}
void message_store::delete_transport_message(uint32_t id)
{
const message &m = get_message_by_id(id);
if (!m.transport_id.empty())
{
m_transporter.delete_message(m.transport_id);
}
}
std::string message_store::account_address_to_string(const cryptonote::account_public_address &account_address) const
{
return get_account_address_as_str(m_nettype, false, account_address);
}
const char* message_store::message_type_to_string(message_type type)
{
switch (type)
{
case message_type::key_set:
return tr("key set");
case message_type::additional_key_set:
return tr("additional key set");
case message_type::multisig_sync_data:
return tr("multisig sync data");
case message_type::partially_signed_tx:
return tr("partially signed tx");
case message_type::fully_signed_tx:
return tr("fully signed tx");
case message_type::note:
return tr("note");
case message_type::signer_config:
return tr("signer config");
case message_type::auto_config_data:
return tr("auto-config data");
default:
return tr("unknown message type");
}
}
const char* message_store::message_direction_to_string(message_direction direction)
{
switch (direction)
{
case message_direction::in:
return tr("in");
case message_direction::out:
return tr("out");
default:
return tr("unknown message direction");
}
}
const char* message_store::message_state_to_string(message_state state)
{
switch (state)
{
case message_state::ready_to_send:
return tr("ready to send");
case message_state::sent:
return tr("sent");
case message_state::waiting:
return tr("waiting");
case message_state::processed:
return tr("processed");
case message_state::cancelled:
return tr("cancelled");
default:
return tr("unknown message state");
}
}
// Convert a signer to string suitable for a column in a list, with 'max_width'
// Format: label: transport_address
std::string message_store::signer_to_string(const authorized_signer &signer, uint32_t max_width)
{
std::string s = "";
s.reserve(max_width);
uint32_t avail = max_width;
uint32_t label_len = signer.label.length();
if (label_len > avail)
{
s.append(signer.label.substr(0, avail - 2));
s.append("..");
return s;
}
s.append(signer.label);
avail -= label_len;
uint32_t transport_addr_len = signer.transport_address.length();
if ((transport_addr_len > 0) && (avail > 10))
{
s.append(": ");
avail -= 2;
if (transport_addr_len <= avail)
{
s.append(signer.transport_address);
}
else
{
s.append(signer.transport_address.substr(0, avail-2));
s.append("..");
}
}
return s;
}
}
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