Takes about 10 ms, which takes pretty much all of the get_info
RPC, which is called pretty often from wallets.
Also add a new lock so we don't need to lock the blockchain lock,
which will avoid blocking for a long time when calling the getinfo
RPC while syncing. Users of get_difficulty_for_next_block who need
the lock will have locked it already.
This patch allows to filter out sensitive information for queries that rely on the pool state, when running in restricted mode.
This filtering is only applied to data sent back to RPC queries. Results of inline commands typed locally in the daemon are not affected.
In practice, when running with `--restricted-rpc`:
* get_transaction_pool will list relayed transactions with the fields "last relayed time" and "received time" set to zero.
* get_transaction_pool will not list transaction that have do_not_relay set to true, and will not list key images that are used only for such transactions
* get_transaction_pool_hashes.bin will not list such transaction
* get_transaction_pool_stats will not count such transactions in any of the aggregated values that are computed
The implementation does not make filtering the default, so developers should be mindful of this if they add new RPC functionality.
Fixes#2590.
This commit refactors some of the rpc-related functions in the
Blockchain class to be more composable. This change was made
in order to make implementing the new zmq rpc easier without
trampling on the old rpc.
New functions:
Blockchain::get_num_mature_outputs
Blockchain::get_random_outputs
Blockchain::get_output_key
Blockchain::get_output_key_mask_unlocked
Blockchain::find_blockchain_supplement (overload)
functions which previously had this functionality inline now call these
functions as necessary.
If monerod is started with default sync mode, set it to SAFE after
synchronization completes. Set it back to FAST if synchronization
restarts (e.g. because another peer has a longer blockchain).
If monerod is started with an explicit sync mode, none of this
automation takes effect.
We won't even talk to a peer which claims a wrong version
for its top block. This will avoid syncing to known bad
peers in the first place.
Also add IP fails when failing to verify a block.
If the number of blocks to check was not a multiple of the
number of preparation threads, the last few blocks would
not be included in the threaded long hash calculation.
Those would still get calculated when the block gets added
to the chain, however, so this was only a tiny performance
hit, rather than a security bug.
Minimum mixin 4 and enforced ringct is moved from v5 to v6.
v5 is now used for an increased minimum block size (from 60000
to 300000) to cater for larger typical/minimum transaction size.
The fee algorithm is also changed to decrease the base per kB
fee, and add a cheap tier for those transactions which we do
not care if they get delayed (or even included in a block).
