Commit Graph

78 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
moneromooo-monero
7e67c52fa2
Add a define for the max number of bulletproof multi-outputs 2018-09-11 13:37:38 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
2a8fcb421b
Bulletproof aggregated verification and tests
Also constrains bulletproofs to simple rct, for simplicity
2018-09-11 13:37:37 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
bacf0a1e2f
bulletproofs: add aggregated verification
Ported from sarang's java code
2018-09-11 13:37:32 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
9ce9f8caf6
bulletproofs: add multi output bulletproofs to rct 2018-09-11 13:37:28 +00:00
stoffu
1f2409e9e2
Do memwipe for critical secret keys copied to rct::key 2018-08-16 22:26:30 +09:00
luigi1111
94ed562148
Merge pull request #4045
7cdd147 Changed URLs to HTTPS (einsteinsfool)
2018-07-19 13:56:38 -05:00
moneromooo-monero
2771a18e85
threadpool: allow leaf functions to run concurrently
Decrease the number of worker threads by one to account
for the fact the calling thread acts as a worker thread now
2018-06-26 22:15:22 +01:00
einsteinsfool
7cdd147da5 Changed URLs to HTTPS 2018-06-23 21:15:29 +02:00
moneromooo-monero
5f19384729
ringct: do not show verification errors with default settings 2018-05-04 08:27:55 +01:00
Riccardo Spagni
cb72b85bbf
Merge pull request #3372
c3e23b2d ringct: 17% improvement in Borromean signature verification (moneromooo-monero)
2018-03-14 16:06:16 +02:00
stoffu
27a196b126
device: untangle cyclic depenency
When #3303 was merged, a cyclic dependency chain was generated:

    libdevice <- libcncrypto <- libringct <- libdevice

This was because libdevice needs access to a set of basic crypto operations
implemented in libringct such as scalarmultBase(), while libringct also needs
access to abstracted crypto operations implemented in libdevice such as
ecdhEncode(). To untangle this cyclic dependency chain, this patch splits libringct
into libringct_basic and libringct, where the basic crypto ops previously in
libringct are moved into libringct_basic. The cyclic dependency is now resolved
thanks to this separation:

    libcncrypto <- libringct_basic <- libdevice <- libcryptonote_basic <- libringct

This eliminates the need for crypto_device.cpp and rctOps_device.cpp.

Also, many abstracted interfaces of hw::device such as encrypt_payment_id() and
get_subaddress_secret_key() were previously implemented in libcryptonote_basic
(cryptonote_format_utils.cpp) and were then called from hw::core::device_default,
which is odd because libdevice is supposed to be independent of libcryptonote_basic.
Therefore, those functions were moved to device_default.cpp.
2018-03-14 21:00:15 +09:00
moneromooo-monero
c3e23b2dce
ringct: 17% improvement in Borromean signature verification 2018-03-08 00:41:54 +00:00
Riccardo Spagni
98acbe83fc
Merge pull request #3348
c95dddd2 remove unused function keyImageV (h908714124)
2018-03-05 19:13:52 +02:00
Riccardo Spagni
5950d356b6
Merge pull request #3301
34a2a085 rctSigs - loop invariant code removed from the loop (Dusan Klinec)
2018-03-05 19:11:35 +02:00
h908714124
c95dddd2d2 remove unused function keyImageV 2018-03-05 09:21:44 +01:00
cslashm
e745c1e38d Code modifications to integrate Ledger HW device into monero-wallet-cli.
The basic approach it to delegate all sensitive data (master key, secret
ephemeral key, key derivation, ....) and related operations to the device.
As device has low memory, it does not keep itself the values
(except for view/spend keys) but once computed there are encrypted (with AES
are equivalent) and return back to monero-wallet-cli. When they need to be
manipulated by the device, they are decrypted on receive.

Moreover, using the client for storing the value in encrypted form limits
the modification in the client code. Those values are transfered from one
C-structure to another one as previously.

The code modification has been done with the wishes to be open to any
other hardware wallet. To achieve that a C++ class hw::Device has been
introduced. Two initial implementations are provided: the "default", which
remaps all calls to initial Monero code, and  the "Ledger", which delegates
all calls to Ledger device.
2018-03-04 12:54:53 +01:00
Dusan Klinec
34a2a08530 rctSigs - loop invariant code removed from the loop 2018-02-21 16:35:06 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
b809058993
ringct: pseudoOuts moved to prunable in the simple bulletproof case
Saves 64 bytes non prunable data per typical tx

This breaks v7 consensus, will require a testnet reorg from v6
2018-01-31 15:56:26 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
ff5626d785
ringct: handle exceptions verifying bulletproofs in worker threads 2018-01-15 11:48:23 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
4c313324b1
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:

    Multisig for RingCT on Monero

    2 of 2

    User A (coordinator):
    Spendkey b,B
    Viewkey a,A (shared)

    User B:
    Spendkey c,C
    Viewkey a,A (shared)

    Public Address: C+B, A

    Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a

    A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)

    A and B watch for incoming outputs

    B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
    I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)

    B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
    and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.

    A also creates "half" key images:
    I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)

    Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D

    Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).

    A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
    to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).

    At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
    which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).

    B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).

    B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
    to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.

    NOTE:
    A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
    Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
    A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
    B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
    The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
    The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).

    2 of 3

    User A (coordinator)
    Shared viewkey a,A
    "spendkey" j,J

    User B
    "spendkey" k,K

    User C
    "spendkey" m,M

    A collects K and M from B and C
    B collects J and M from A and C
    C collects J and K from A and B

    A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
    A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)

    B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
    B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate

    Address: N+O+P, A

    The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
    needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.

    Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
    A gives j to B
    B gives k to C
    C gives m to A

    Address: J+K+M, A

    3 of 3

    Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
    The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
    or send it back to A.

    N-1 of N

    Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
    (using either the secure or insecure method).
    For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
    [4 of 5]
    User: spendkey
    A: a
    B: b
    C: c
    D: d
    E: e

    a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A

    Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
    the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
    Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
    Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
    1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
    2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
    must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.

    You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
    also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
    You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.

The process is somewhat cumbersome:

To create a N/N multisig wallet:

 - each participant creates a normal wallet
 - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
 - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)

As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:

 - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
 - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants

Then, a transaction may be initiated:

 - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
 - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
 - the initiator sends this file to another participant
 - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
 - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
 - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
 - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-12-17 16:11:57 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
46eaaae79b
ringct: always use outPk.mask to decode amounts 2017-12-09 18:02:55 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
8d4469a0ac
ringct: do not include bulletproof commitments in signed message
Those are not serialized, but are restored from the outPk masks,
so depending on what tries to validate the tx, those commitments
may or may not be filled with valid data at the time. The outPk
masks are already hashed as part of the rctSigBase field.
2017-12-09 15:30:15 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
c83d0b3ee2
add bulletproofs from v7 on testnet 2017-12-08 13:50:45 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
d58835b2f6
integrate bulletproofs into monero 2017-12-08 13:48:15 +00:00
Howard Chu
510d0d4753
Use a threadpool
Instead of constantly creating and destroying threads
2017-09-14 21:42:48 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
da18898f0e
ringct: do not require range proof in decodeRct/decodeRctSimple
These fields aren't used, and they'll actually be pruned in
some cases
2017-02-27 22:28:45 +00:00
kenshi84
8027ce0c75 extract some basic code from libcryptonote_core into libcryptonote_basic 2017-02-08 22:45:15 +09:00
moneromooo-monero
6cc7d26140
ringct: reorder a bit to check quicker tests first 2017-01-21 20:29:22 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
5833d66f65
Change logging to easylogging++
This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with
a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity
levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set
by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level
maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also
rotate when reaching 100 MB.

To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment
variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are
supported), with their requested severity level after a colon.
If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in
the configuration string applies. A few examples:

This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors:

MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL

This one is very verbose:

MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE

This one is totally silent (logwise):

MONERO_LOGS=""

This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the
"verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify
category is used for logs about incoming transactions and
blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify,
hence we don't want the spam):

MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL

Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority:
FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE

Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This
example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all
other net* logs only at INFO:

MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE

Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using
a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things)
should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros
for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default")
or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look
and feel for now.

Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log
levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element
as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log
severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be
something we want the user to see, such as an important info).
In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases,
I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is
probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels.

The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept
category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-16 00:25:46 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
ba3968f6ce
rct: split rct checks between semantics and other
Semantics can be checked early
2017-01-14 21:17:32 +00:00
Lee Clagett
e3639f5cc3 Removed unused functions 2016-12-19 14:47:26 -05:00
luigi1111
9d906159c3
Tx verification failing is not an error
And rangeProofs are on outputs...
2016-12-12 17:01:20 -06:00
Riccardo Spagni
e6b05ed95a
Merge pull request #1414
3b005275 ringct: add sc_check calls in MLSAG_Ver for ss and cc (moneromooo-monero)
2f1732a7 ringct: guard against bad data exceptions in worker threads (moneromooo-monero)
2016-12-08 23:44:09 +02:00
moneromooo-monero
3b00527500
ringct: add sc_check calls in MLSAG_Ver for ss and cc
luigi1111's recommendation
2016-12-07 22:41:21 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
2f1732a7e5
ringct: guard against bad data exceptions in worker threads
If purported pubkeys aren't actually valid pubkeys, exceptions
will fly. These will terminate if thrown in a worker thread.
Guard against this.
2016-12-07 22:09:43 +00:00
luigi1111
46a0dcc1d2
ringct: luigi1111's changes to fix and speedup Borromean sigs 2016-12-04 21:54:16 +00:00
Shen Noether
76958fc75a
ringct: switch to Borromean signatures 2016-12-04 21:54:11 +00:00
Lee Clagett
f025198f19 Added task_region - a fork/join task implementation 2016-11-23 14:41:25 -05:00
Lee Clagett
64094e5f4e adding thread_group for managing async tasks 2016-11-02 19:21:55 -04:00
moneromooo-monero
ffd8c41f36
ringct: check the size of amount_keys is the same as destinations 2016-10-29 13:33:48 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
836669d276
ringct: always shutdown the boost io service
Even if no worker threads were started, it needs shutting down
or it will cause an invalid access in the io service thread
2016-10-29 13:31:53 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
3429bfb71d
ringct: thread verRct and verRctSimple 2016-10-15 13:32:13 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
e06a4daf33
ringct: remove unneeded type conversions 2016-10-15 11:58:39 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
afc70df7ea
ringct: reserve space in vectors to avoid excessive reallocation 2016-10-15 11:58:34 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
4038e86527
Add performance timers for ringct tx verification 2016-10-10 21:24:21 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
3126ba7425
ringct: use const refs as parameters where appropriate 2016-10-08 22:16:23 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
7d413f635f
rct: rework serialization to avoid storing vector sizes 2016-09-14 20:23:06 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
b38452bd55
ringct: pass structure by const ref, not value 2016-08-28 21:30:51 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
94fd881f74
rct: early out on failure on verRange 2016-08-28 21:30:38 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
074e602609
ringct: use Cryptonote serialization to hash non prunable data 2016-08-28 21:30:28 +01:00