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CLSAG optimizations
This commit is contained in:
parent
82ee01699c
commit
641b08c920
@ -168,12 +168,17 @@ namespace rct {
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// Generate a CLSAG signature
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// See paper by Goodell et al. (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/654)
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clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const key & z, const unsigned int l, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, key *mscout, key *mspout) {
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//
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// The keys are set as follows:
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// P[l] == p*G
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// C[l] == z*G
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// C[i] == C_nonzero[i] - C_offset (for hashing purposes) for all i
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clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const key & z, const keyV & C_nonzero, const key & C_offset, const unsigned int l, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, key *mscout, key *mspout) {
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clsag sig;
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size_t n = P.size(); // ring size
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n == C.size(), "Signing and commitment key vector sizes must match!");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n == C_nonzero.size(), "Signing and commitment key vector sizes must match!");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(l < n, "Signing index out of range!");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(scalarmultBase(z) == C[l], "C does not match z!");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((kLRki && mscout) || (!kLRki && !mscout), "Only one of kLRki/mscout is present");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((mscout && mspout) || !kLRki, "Multisig pointers are not all present");
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@ -212,8 +217,8 @@ namespace rct {
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scalarmultKey(aH,H,a);
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// Aggregation hashes
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keyV mu_P_to_hash(2*n+3); // domain, I, D, P, C
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keyV mu_C_to_hash(2*n+3); // domain, I, D, P, C
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keyV mu_P_to_hash(2*n+4); // domain, I, D, P, C, C_offset
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keyV mu_C_to_hash(2*n+4); // domain, I, D, P, C, C_offset
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sc_0(mu_P_to_hash[0].bytes);
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memcpy(mu_P_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_0,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_0)-1);
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sc_0(mu_C_to_hash[0].bytes);
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@ -223,40 +228,43 @@ namespace rct {
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mu_C_to_hash[i] = P[i-1];
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}
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for (size_t i = n+1; i < 2*n+1; ++i) {
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mu_P_to_hash[i] = C[i-n-1];
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mu_C_to_hash[i] = C[i-n-1];
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mu_P_to_hash[i] = C_nonzero[i-n-1];
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mu_C_to_hash[i] = C_nonzero[i-n-1];
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}
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mu_P_to_hash[2*n+1] = sig.I;
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mu_P_to_hash[2*n+2] = sig.D;
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mu_P_to_hash[2*n+3] = C_offset;
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mu_C_to_hash[2*n+1] = sig.I;
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mu_C_to_hash[2*n+2] = sig.D;
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mu_C_to_hash[2*n+3] = C_offset;
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key mu_P, mu_C;
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mu_P = hash_to_scalar(mu_P_to_hash);
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mu_C = hash_to_scalar(mu_C_to_hash);
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// Initial commitment
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keyV c_to_hash(2*n+4); // domain, P, C, message, aG, aH
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keyV c_to_hash(2*n+5); // domain, P, C, C_offset, message, aG, aH
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key c;
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sc_0(c_to_hash[0].bytes);
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memcpy(c_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_ROUND,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_ROUND)-1);
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for (size_t i = 1; i < n+1; ++i)
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{
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c_to_hash[i] = P[i-1];
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c_to_hash[i+n] = C[i-1];
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c_to_hash[i+n] = C_nonzero[i-1];
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}
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c_to_hash[2*n+1] = message;
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c_to_hash[2*n+1] = C_offset;
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c_to_hash[2*n+2] = message;
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// Multisig data is present
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if (kLRki)
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{
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a = kLRki->k;
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c_to_hash[2*n+2] = kLRki->L;
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c_to_hash[2*n+3] = kLRki->R;
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c_to_hash[2*n+3] = kLRki->L;
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c_to_hash[2*n+4] = kLRki->R;
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}
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else
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{
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c_to_hash[2*n+2] = aG;
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c_to_hash[2*n+3] = aH;
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c_to_hash[2*n+3] = aG;
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c_to_hash[2*n+4] = aH;
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}
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c = hash_to_scalar(c_to_hash);
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@ -295,8 +303,8 @@ namespace rct {
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ge_dsm_precomp(H_precomp.k, &Hi_p3);
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addKeys_aAbBcC(R,sig.s[i],H_precomp.k,c_p,I_precomp.k,c_c,D_precomp.k);
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c_to_hash[2*n+2] = L;
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c_to_hash[2*n+3] = R;
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c_to_hash[2*n+3] = L;
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c_to_hash[2*n+4] = R;
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c_new = hash_to_scalar(c_to_hash);
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copy(c,c_new);
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@ -320,99 +328,8 @@ namespace rct {
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return sig;
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}
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clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const key & z, const unsigned int l) {
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return CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, l, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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}
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// Verify a CLSAG signature
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// See paper by Goodell et al. (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/654)
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bool CLSAG_Ver(const key &message, const keyV & P, const keyV & C, const clsag & sig)
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{
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size_t n = P.size(); // ring size
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(n == C.size(), false, "Signing and commitment key vector sizes must match!");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(n == sig.s.size(), false, "Signature scalar vector is the wrong size!");
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for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i)
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(sig.s[i].bytes) == 0, false, "Bad signature scalar!");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(sig.c1.bytes) == 0, false, "Bad signature commitment!");
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key c = copy(sig.c1);
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key D_8 = scalarmult8(sig.D);
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geDsmp I_precomp;
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geDsmp D_precomp;
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precomp(I_precomp.k,sig.I);
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precomp(D_precomp.k,D_8);
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// Aggregation hashes
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keyV mu_P_to_hash(2*n+3); // domain, I, D, P, C
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keyV mu_C_to_hash(2*n+3); // domain, I, D, P, C
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sc_0(mu_P_to_hash[0].bytes);
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memcpy(mu_P_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_0,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_0)-1);
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sc_0(mu_C_to_hash[0].bytes);
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memcpy(mu_C_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_1,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_1)-1);
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for (size_t i = 1; i < n+1; ++i) {
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mu_P_to_hash[i] = P[i-1];
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mu_C_to_hash[i] = P[i-1];
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}
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for (size_t i = n+1; i < 2*n+1; ++i) {
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mu_P_to_hash[i] = C[i-n-1];
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mu_C_to_hash[i] = C[i-n-1];
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}
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mu_P_to_hash[2*n+1] = sig.I;
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mu_P_to_hash[2*n+2] = sig.D;
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mu_C_to_hash[2*n+1] = sig.I;
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mu_C_to_hash[2*n+2] = sig.D;
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key mu_P, mu_C;
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mu_P = hash_to_scalar(mu_P_to_hash);
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mu_C = hash_to_scalar(mu_C_to_hash);
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keyV c_to_hash(2*n+4); // domain, P, C, message, L, R
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sc_0(c_to_hash[0].bytes);
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memcpy(c_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_ROUND,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_ROUND)-1);
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for (size_t i = 1; i < n+1; ++i)
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{
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c_to_hash[i] = P[i-1];
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c_to_hash[i+n] = C[i-1];
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}
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c_to_hash[2*n+1] = message;
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key c_p; // = c[i]*mu_P
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key c_c; // = c[i]*mu_C
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key c_new;
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key L;
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key R;
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geDsmp P_precomp;
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geDsmp C_precomp;
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geDsmp H_precomp;
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size_t i = 0;
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ge_p3 hash8_p3;
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geDsmp hash_precomp;
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while (i < n) {
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sc_0(c_new.bytes);
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sc_mul(c_p.bytes,mu_P.bytes,c.bytes);
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sc_mul(c_c.bytes,mu_C.bytes,c.bytes);
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// Precompute points
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precomp(P_precomp.k,P[i]);
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precomp(C_precomp.k,C[i]);
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// Compute L
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addKeys_aGbBcC(L,sig.s[i],c_p,P_precomp.k,c_c,C_precomp.k);
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// Compute R
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hash_to_p3(hash8_p3,P[i]);
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ge_dsm_precomp(hash_precomp.k, &hash8_p3);
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addKeys_aAbBcC(R,sig.s[i],hash_precomp.k,c_p,I_precomp.k,c_c,D_precomp.k);
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c_to_hash[2*n+2] = L;
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c_to_hash[2*n+3] = R;
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c_new = hash_to_scalar(c_to_hash);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(c_new == rct::zero()), false, "Bad signature hash");
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copy(c,c_new);
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i = i + 1;
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}
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sc_sub(c_new.bytes,c.bytes,sig.c1.bytes);
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return sc_isnonzero(c_new.bytes) == 0;
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clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const key & z, const keyV & C_nonzero, const key & C_offset, const unsigned int l) {
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return CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, C_nonzero, C_offset, l, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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}
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// MLSAG signatures
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@ -816,12 +733,14 @@ namespace rct {
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size_t i;
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keyM M(cols, tmp);
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keyV P, C;
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keyV P, C, C_nonzero;
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P.reserve(pubs.size());
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C.reserve(pubs.size());
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C_nonzero.reserve(pubs.size());
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for (const ctkey &k: pubs)
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{
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P.push_back(k.dest);
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C_nonzero.push_back(k.mask);
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rct::key tmp;
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subKeys(tmp, k.mask, Cout);
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C.push_back(tmp);
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@ -829,7 +748,7 @@ namespace rct {
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sk[0] = copy(inSk.dest);
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sc_sub(sk[1].bytes, inSk.mask.bytes, a.bytes);
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clsag result = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, sk[0], C, sk[1], index, kLRki, mscout, mspout);
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clsag result = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, sk[0], C, sk[1], C_nonzero, Cout, index, kLRki, mscout, mspout);
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memwipe(sk.data(), sk.size() * sizeof(key));
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return result;
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}
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@ -913,29 +832,116 @@ namespace rct {
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catch (...) { return false; }
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}
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bool verRctCLSAGSimple(const key &message, const clsag &clsag, const ctkeyV & pubs, const key & C) {
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bool verRctCLSAGSimple(const key &message, const clsag &sig, const ctkeyV & pubs, const key & C_offset) {
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try
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{
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PERF_TIMER(verRctCLSAGSimple);
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//setup vars
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const size_t cols = pubs.size();
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(cols >= 1, false, "Empty pubs");
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keyV Pi(cols), Ci(cols);
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ge_p3 Cp3;
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES_L1(ge_frombytes_vartime(&Cp3, C.bytes) == 0, false, "point conv failed");
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ge_cached Ccached;
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ge_p3_to_cached(&Ccached, &Cp3);
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ge_p1p1 p1;
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//create the matrix to mg sig
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for (size_t i = 0; i < cols; i++) {
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Pi[i] = pubs[i].dest;
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ge_p3 p3;
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES_L1(ge_frombytes_vartime(&p3, pubs[i].mask.bytes) == 0, false, "point conv failed");
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ge_sub(&p1, &p3, &Ccached);
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ge_p1p1_to_p3(&p3, &p1);
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ge_p3_tobytes(Ci[i].bytes, &p3);
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const size_t n = pubs.size();
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// Check data
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(n >= 1, false, "Empty pubs");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(n == sig.s.size(), false, "Signature scalar vector is the wrong size!");
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for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i)
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(sig.s[i].bytes) == 0, false, "Bad signature scalar!");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(sig.c1.bytes) == 0, false, "Bad signature commitment!");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(sig.I == rct::identity()), false, "Bad key image!");
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// Cache commitment offset for efficient subtraction later
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ge_p3 C_offset_p3;
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&C_offset_p3, C_offset.bytes) == 0, false, "point conv failed");
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ge_cached C_offset_cached;
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ge_p3_to_cached(&C_offset_cached, &C_offset_p3);
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// Prepare key images
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key c = copy(sig.c1);
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key D_8 = scalarmult8(sig.D);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(D_8 == rct::identity()), false, "Bad auxiliary key image!");
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geDsmp I_precomp;
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geDsmp D_precomp;
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precomp(I_precomp.k,sig.I);
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precomp(D_precomp.k,D_8);
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// Aggregation hashes
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keyV mu_P_to_hash(2*n+4); // domain, I, D, P, C, C_offset
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keyV mu_C_to_hash(2*n+4); // domain, I, D, P, C, C_offset
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sc_0(mu_P_to_hash[0].bytes);
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memcpy(mu_P_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_0,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_0)-1);
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sc_0(mu_C_to_hash[0].bytes);
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memcpy(mu_C_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_1,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_AGG_1)-1);
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for (size_t i = 1; i < n+1; ++i) {
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mu_P_to_hash[i] = pubs[i-1].dest;
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mu_C_to_hash[i] = pubs[i-1].dest;
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}
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return CLSAG_Ver(message, Pi, Ci, clsag);
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for (size_t i = n+1; i < 2*n+1; ++i) {
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mu_P_to_hash[i] = pubs[i-n-1].mask;
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mu_C_to_hash[i] = pubs[i-n-1].mask;
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}
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mu_P_to_hash[2*n+1] = sig.I;
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mu_P_to_hash[2*n+2] = sig.D;
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mu_P_to_hash[2*n+3] = C_offset;
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mu_C_to_hash[2*n+1] = sig.I;
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mu_C_to_hash[2*n+2] = sig.D;
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mu_C_to_hash[2*n+3] = C_offset;
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key mu_P, mu_C;
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mu_P = hash_to_scalar(mu_P_to_hash);
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mu_C = hash_to_scalar(mu_C_to_hash);
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// Set up round hash
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keyV c_to_hash(2*n+5); // domain, P, C, C_offset, message, L, R
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sc_0(c_to_hash[0].bytes);
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memcpy(c_to_hash[0].bytes,config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_ROUND,sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_CLSAG_ROUND)-1);
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for (size_t i = 1; i < n+1; ++i)
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{
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c_to_hash[i] = pubs[i-1].dest;
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c_to_hash[i+n] = pubs[i-1].mask;
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}
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c_to_hash[2*n+1] = C_offset;
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c_to_hash[2*n+2] = message;
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key c_p; // = c[i]*mu_P
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key c_c; // = c[i]*mu_C
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key c_new;
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key L;
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key R;
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geDsmp P_precomp;
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geDsmp C_precomp;
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geDsmp H_precomp;
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size_t i = 0;
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ge_p3 hash8_p3;
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geDsmp hash_precomp;
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ge_p3 temp_p3;
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ge_p1p1 temp_p1;
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while (i < n) {
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sc_0(c_new.bytes);
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sc_mul(c_p.bytes,mu_P.bytes,c.bytes);
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sc_mul(c_c.bytes,mu_C.bytes,c.bytes);
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// Precompute points for L/R
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precomp(P_precomp.k,pubs[i].dest);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&temp_p3, pubs[i].mask.bytes) == 0, false, "point conv failed");
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ge_sub(&temp_p1,&temp_p3,&C_offset_cached);
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ge_p1p1_to_p3(&temp_p3,&temp_p1);
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ge_dsm_precomp(C_precomp.k,&temp_p3);
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// Compute L
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addKeys_aGbBcC(L,sig.s[i],c_p,P_precomp.k,c_c,C_precomp.k);
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// Compute R
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hash_to_p3(hash8_p3,pubs[i].dest);
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ge_dsm_precomp(hash_precomp.k, &hash8_p3);
|
||||
addKeys_aAbBcC(R,sig.s[i],hash_precomp.k,c_p,I_precomp.k,c_c,D_precomp.k);
|
||||
|
||||
c_to_hash[2*n+3] = L;
|
||||
c_to_hash[2*n+4] = R;
|
||||
c_new = hash_to_scalar(c_to_hash);
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(c_new == rct::zero()), false, "Bad signature hash");
|
||||
copy(c,c_new);
|
||||
|
||||
i = i + 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
sc_sub(c_new.bytes,c.bytes,sig.c1.bytes);
|
||||
return sc_isnonzero(c_new.bytes) == 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
catch (...) { return false; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -77,9 +77,10 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
mgSig MLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyM & pk, const keyV & xx, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, key *mscout, const unsigned int index, size_t dsRows, hw::device &hwdev);
|
||||
bool MLSAG_Ver(const key &message, const keyM &pk, const mgSig &sig, size_t dsRows);
|
||||
|
||||
clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const key & z, const unsigned int l, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, key *mscout, key *mspout);
|
||||
clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const key & z, const unsigned int l);
|
||||
bool CLSAG_Ver(const key &message, const keyV & P, const keyV & C, const clsag & sig);
|
||||
clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const keyV & C_nonzero, const key & C_offset, const key & z, const unsigned int l, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, key *mscout, key *mspout);
|
||||
clsag CLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyV & P, const key & p, const keyV & C, const keyV & C_nonzero, const key & C_offset, const key & z, const unsigned int l);
|
||||
clsag proveRctCLSAGSimple(const key &, const ctkeyV &, const ctkey &, const key &, const key &, const multisig_kLRki *, key *, key *, unsigned int, hw::device &);
|
||||
bool verRctCLSAGSimple(const key &, const clsag &, const ctkeyV &, const key &);
|
||||
|
||||
//proveRange and verRange
|
||||
//proveRange gives C, and mask such that \sumCi = C
|
||||
|
@ -61,7 +61,6 @@
|
||||
#include "crypto_ops.h"
|
||||
#include "multiexp.h"
|
||||
#include "sig_mlsag.h"
|
||||
#include "sig_clsag.h"
|
||||
|
||||
namespace po = boost::program_options;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -216,7 +215,6 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
|
||||
TEST_PERFORMANCE1(filter, p, test_cn_fast_hash, 16384);
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_sig_mlsag, 11, true); // MLSAG verification
|
||||
TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_sig_clsag, 11, true, 0); // CLSAG verification
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 11, false);
|
||||
TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 11, true);
|
||||
|
@ -140,165 +140,163 @@ TEST(ringct, MG_sigs)
|
||||
|
||||
TEST(ringct, CLSAG)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const size_t ring_size = 11;
|
||||
const size_t N = 11;
|
||||
const size_t idx = 5;
|
||||
keyV P, C;
|
||||
key p, z;
|
||||
ctkeyV pubs;
|
||||
key p, t, t2, u;
|
||||
const key message = identity();
|
||||
key backup;
|
||||
ctkey backup;
|
||||
clsag clsag;
|
||||
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < ring_size; ++i)
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < N; ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
key Sk, Pk;
|
||||
skpkGen(Sk, Pk);
|
||||
P.push_back(Pk);
|
||||
skpkGen(Sk, Pk);
|
||||
C.push_back(Pk);
|
||||
}
|
||||
skpkGen(p, P[idx]);
|
||||
skpkGen(z, C[idx]);
|
||||
key sk;
|
||||
ctkey tmp;
|
||||
|
||||
// bad p at creation
|
||||
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(zero(), P, p, C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
|
||||
skpkGen(sk, tmp.dest);
|
||||
skpkGen(sk, tmp.mask);
|
||||
|
||||
pubs.push_back(tmp);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Set P[idx]
|
||||
skpkGen(p, pubs[idx].dest);
|
||||
|
||||
// Set C[idx]
|
||||
t = skGen();
|
||||
u = skGen();
|
||||
addKeys2(pubs[idx].mask,t,u,H);
|
||||
|
||||
// Set commitment offset
|
||||
key Cout;
|
||||
t2 = skGen();
|
||||
addKeys2(Cout,t2,u,H);
|
||||
|
||||
// Prepare generation inputs
|
||||
ctkey insk;
|
||||
insk.dest = p;
|
||||
insk.mask = t;
|
||||
|
||||
// bad message
|
||||
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(zero(),pubs,insk,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,idx,hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
|
||||
// bad index at creation
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, (idx + 1) % ring_size); //, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
|
||||
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(message,pubs,insk,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,(idx + 1) % N,hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
}
|
||||
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
|
||||
|
||||
// bad z at creation
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, skGen(), idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
|
||||
ctkey insk2;
|
||||
insk2.dest = insk.dest;
|
||||
insk2.mask = skGen();
|
||||
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(message,pubs,insk2,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,idx,hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
}
|
||||
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
|
||||
|
||||
// bad C at creation
|
||||
backup = C[idx];
|
||||
C[idx] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
|
||||
backup = pubs[idx];
|
||||
pubs[idx].mask = scalarmultBase(skGen());
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
|
||||
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(message,pubs,insk,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,idx,hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
}
|
||||
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
|
||||
C[idx] = backup;
|
||||
pubs[idx] = backup;
|
||||
|
||||
// bad p at creation
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, skGen(), C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
|
||||
ctkey insk2;
|
||||
insk2.dest = skGen();
|
||||
insk2.mask = insk.mask;
|
||||
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(message,pubs,insk2,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,idx,hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
}
|
||||
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
|
||||
|
||||
// bad P at creation
|
||||
backup = P[idx];
|
||||
P[idx] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
|
||||
backup = pubs[idx];
|
||||
pubs[idx].dest = scalarmultBase(skGen());
|
||||
try
|
||||
{
|
||||
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
|
||||
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(message,pubs,insk,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,idx,hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
}
|
||||
catch (...) { /* either exception, or failure to verify above */ }
|
||||
P[idx] = backup;
|
||||
pubs[idx] = backup;
|
||||
|
||||
// good
|
||||
clsag = CLSAG_Gen(message, P, p, C, z, idx); //, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
|
||||
|
||||
// bad message at verification
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
|
||||
// bad real P at verification
|
||||
backup = P[idx];
|
||||
P[idx] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
P[idx] = backup;
|
||||
|
||||
// bad fake P at verification
|
||||
backup = P[(idx + 1) % ring_size];
|
||||
P[(idx + 1) % ring_size] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
P[(idx + 1) % ring_size] = backup;
|
||||
|
||||
// bad real C at verification
|
||||
backup = C[idx];
|
||||
C[idx] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
C[idx] = backup;
|
||||
|
||||
// bad fake C at verification
|
||||
backup = C[(idx + 1) % ring_size];
|
||||
C[(idx + 1) % ring_size] = scalarmultBase(skGen());
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(zero(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
C[(idx + 1) % ring_size] = backup;
|
||||
// Test correct signature
|
||||
clsag = rct::proveRctCLSAGSimple(message,pubs,insk,t2,Cout,NULL,NULL,NULL,idx,hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
|
||||
// empty s
|
||||
auto sbackup = clsag.s;
|
||||
clsag.s.clear();
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
clsag.s = sbackup;
|
||||
|
||||
// too few s elements
|
||||
backup = clsag.s.back();
|
||||
key backup_key;
|
||||
backup_key = clsag.s.back();
|
||||
clsag.s.pop_back();
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
clsag.s.push_back(backup);
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
clsag.s.push_back(backup_key);
|
||||
|
||||
// too many s elements
|
||||
clsag.s.push_back(skGen());
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
clsag.s.pop_back();
|
||||
|
||||
// bad s in clsag at verification
|
||||
for (auto &s: clsag.s)
|
||||
{
|
||||
backup = s;
|
||||
backup_key = s;
|
||||
s = skGen();
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
s = backup;
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
s = backup_key;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// bad c1 in clsag at verification
|
||||
backup = clsag.c1;
|
||||
backup_key = clsag.c1;
|
||||
clsag.c1 = skGen();
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
clsag.c1 = backup;
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
clsag.c1 = backup_key;
|
||||
|
||||
// bad I in clsag at verification
|
||||
backup = clsag.I;
|
||||
backup_key = clsag.I;
|
||||
clsag.I = scalarmultBase(skGen());
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
clsag.I = backup;
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
clsag.I = backup_key;
|
||||
|
||||
// bad D in clsag at verification
|
||||
backup = clsag.D;
|
||||
backup_key = clsag.D;
|
||||
clsag.D = scalarmultBase(skGen());
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
clsag.D = backup;
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
clsag.D = backup_key;
|
||||
|
||||
// D not in main subgroup in clsag at verification
|
||||
backup = clsag.D;
|
||||
backup_key = clsag.D;
|
||||
rct::key x;
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(epee::string_tools::hex_to_pod("c7176a703d4dd84fba3c0b760d10670f2a2053fa2c39ccc64ec7fd7792ac03fa", x));
|
||||
clsag.D = rct::addKeys(clsag.D, x);
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
clsag.D = backup;
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
clsag.D = backup_key;
|
||||
|
||||
// swapped I and D in clsag at verification
|
||||
std::swap(clsag.I, clsag.D);
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(CLSAG_Ver(identity(), P, C, clsag));
|
||||
ASSERT_FALSE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
std::swap(clsag.I, clsag.D);
|
||||
|
||||
// check it's still good, in case we failed to restore
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(CLSAG_Ver(message, P, C, clsag));
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::verRctCLSAGSimple(message,clsag,pubs,Cout));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST(ringct, range_proofs)
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user