mirror of
https://github.com/monero-project/monero.git
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Bulletproof aggregated verification and tests
Also constrains bulletproofs to simple rct, for simplicity
This commit is contained in:
moneromooo-monero
parent
126196b017
commit
2a8fcb421b
@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ namespace boost
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a & x.type;
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if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeNull)
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return;
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if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
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if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
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throw boost::archive::archive_exception(boost::archive::archive_exception::other_exception, "Unsupported rct type");
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// a & x.message; message is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the tx data
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// a & x.mixRing; mixRing is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the offsets
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@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ namespace boost
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a & x.type;
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if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeNull)
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return;
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if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
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if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
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throw boost::archive::archive_exception(boost::archive::archive_exception::other_exception, "Unsupported rct type");
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// a & x.message; message is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the tx data
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// a & x.mixRing; mixRing is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the offsets
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@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ namespace boost
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if (x.p.rangeSigs.empty())
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a & x.p.bulletproofs;
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a & x.p.MGs;
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if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
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if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
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a & x.p.pseudoOuts;
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}
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}
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@ -139,18 +139,26 @@ namespace cryptonote
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if (!base_only)
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{
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const bool bulletproof = rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof;
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const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
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if (bulletproof)
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{
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if (rv.p.bulletproofs.size() != tx.vout.size())
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if (rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs) != tx.vout.size())
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Failed to parse transaction from blob, bad bulletproofs size in tx " << get_transaction_hash(tx));
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return false;
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}
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for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.outPk.size(); ++n)
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size_t idx = 0;
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for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); ++n)
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{
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.resize(1);
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V[0] = rv.outPk[n].mask;
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//rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.resize(1);
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//rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V[0] = rv.outPk[n].mask;
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs[n].L.size() >= 6, false, "Bad bulletproofs L size"); // at least 64 bits
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const size_t n_amounts = rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs[n]);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx + n_amounts <= rv.outPk.size(), false, "Internal error filling out V");
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.resize(n_amounts);
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.clear();
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for (size_t i = 0; i < n_amounts; ++i)
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V[i] = rv.outPk[idx++].mask;
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}
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}
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}
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@ -2597,7 +2597,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_outputs(const transaction& tx, tx_verification_context
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// from v8, allow bulletproofs
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if (hf_version < 8) {
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const bool bulletproof = tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof || tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof;
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const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(tx.rct_signatures.type);
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if (bulletproof || !tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty())
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{
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MERROR("Bulletproofs are not allowed before v8");
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@ -2631,7 +2631,7 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr
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rv.message = rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash);
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// mixRing - full and simple store it in opposite ways
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if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
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if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull)
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{
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!pubkeys.empty() && !pubkeys[0].empty(), false, "empty pubkeys");
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rv.mixRing.resize(pubkeys[0].size());
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@ -2646,7 +2646,7 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr
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}
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}
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}
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else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
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else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
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{
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!pubkeys.empty() && !pubkeys[0].empty(), false, "empty pubkeys");
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rv.mixRing.resize(pubkeys.size());
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@ -2665,14 +2665,14 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr
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}
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// II
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if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
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if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull)
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{
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rv.p.MGs.resize(1);
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rv.p.MGs[0].II.resize(tx.vin.size());
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for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n)
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rv.p.MGs[0].II[n] = rct::ki2rct(boost::get<txin_to_key>(tx.vin[n]).k_image);
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}
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else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
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else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
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{
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == tx.vin.size(), false, "Bad MGs size");
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for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n)
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@ -2938,7 +2938,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
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return false;
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}
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case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
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case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
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case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof:
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{
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// check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not
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{
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@ -2996,7 +2996,6 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
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break;
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}
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case rct::RCTTypeFull:
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case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
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{
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// check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not
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{
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@ -3061,7 +3060,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
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}
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// for bulletproofs, check they're only multi-output after v8
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if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
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if (rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type))
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{
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if (hf_version < 8)
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{
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@ -692,26 +692,142 @@ namespace cryptonote
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return false;
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}
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// resolve outPk references in rct txes
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// outPk aren't the only thing that need resolving for a fully resolved tx,
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// but outPk (1) are needed now to check range proof semantics, and
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// (2) do not need access to the blockchain to find data
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if (tx.version >= 2)
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{
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rct::rctSig &rv = tx.rct_signatures;
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if (rv.outPk.size() != tx.vout.size())
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Bad outPk size in tx " << tx_hash << ", rejected");
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tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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return false;
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}
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for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.rct_signatures.outPk.size(); ++n)
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rv.outPk[n].dest = rct::pk2rct(boost::get<txout_to_key>(tx.vout[n].target).key);
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const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
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if (bulletproof)
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{
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if (rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs) != tx.vout.size())
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Bad bulletproofs size in tx " << tx_hash << ", rejected");
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tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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return false;
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}
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size_t idx = 0;
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for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); ++n)
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{
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs[n].L.size() >= 6, false, "Bad bulletproofs L size"); // at least 64 bits
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const size_t n_amounts = rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs[n]);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx + n_amounts <= rv.outPk.size(), false, "Internal error filling out V");
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.clear();
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for (size_t i = 0; i < n_amounts; ++i)
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.push_back(rv.outPk[idx++].mask);
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}
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void core::set_semantics_failed(const crypto::hash &tx_hash)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Failed to check tx " << tx_hash << " semantic, rejected");
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bad_semantics_txes_lock.lock();
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bad_semantics_txes[0].insert(tx_hash);
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if (bad_semantics_txes[0].size() >= BAD_SEMANTICS_TXES_MAX_SIZE)
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{
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std::swap(bad_semantics_txes[0], bad_semantics_txes[1]);
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bad_semantics_txes[0].clear();
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}
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bad_semantics_txes_lock.unlock();
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}
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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bool core::handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> &tx_info, bool keeped_by_block)
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{
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bool ret = true;
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if (keeped_by_block && get_blockchain_storage().is_within_compiled_block_hash_area())
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{
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MTRACE("Skipping semantics check for tx kept by block in embedded hash area");
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}
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else if(!check_tx_semantic(tx, keeped_by_block))
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Failed to check tx " << tx_hash << " semantic, rejected");
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tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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bad_semantics_txes_lock.lock();
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bad_semantics_txes[0].insert(tx_hash);
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if (bad_semantics_txes[0].size() >= BAD_SEMANTICS_TXES_MAX_SIZE)
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{
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std::swap(bad_semantics_txes[0], bad_semantics_txes[1]);
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bad_semantics_txes[0].clear();
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}
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bad_semantics_txes_lock.unlock();
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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return true;
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std::vector<const rct::rctSig*> rvv;
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for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_info.size(); ++n)
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{
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if (!check_tx_semantic(*tx_info[n].tx, keeped_by_block))
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{
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set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
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tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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tx_info[n].result = false;
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continue;
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}
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if (tx_info[n].tx->version < 2)
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continue;
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const rct::rctSig &rv = tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures;
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switch (rv.type) {
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case rct::RCTTypeNull:
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// coinbase should not come here, so we reject for all other types
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MERROR_VER("Unexpected Null rctSig type");
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set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
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tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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tx_info[n].result = false;
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break;
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case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
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if (!rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rv))
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{
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MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
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set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
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tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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tx_info[n].result = false;
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break;
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}
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break;
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case rct::RCTTypeFull:
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if (!rct::verRct(rv, true))
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{
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MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
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set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
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tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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tx_info[n].result = false;
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break;
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}
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break;
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case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof:
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rvv.push_back(&rv); // delayed batch verification
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break;
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default:
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MERROR_VER("Unknown rct type: " << rv.type);
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set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
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tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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tx_info[n].result = false;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (!rvv.empty() && !rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rvv))
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("One transaction among this group has bad semantics, verifying one at a time");
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ret = false;
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const bool assumed_bad = rvv.size() == 1; // if there's only one tx, it must be the bad one
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for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_info.size(); ++n)
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{
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if (!tx_info[n].result)
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continue;
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if (tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
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continue;
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if (assumed_bad || !rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures))
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{
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set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
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tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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tx_info[n].result = false;
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}
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}
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}
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return ret;
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}
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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bool core::handle_incoming_txs(const std::vector<blobdata>& tx_blobs, std::vector<tx_verification_context>& tvc, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay)
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@ -769,6 +885,16 @@ namespace cryptonote
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}
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waiter.wait(&tpool);
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std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> tx_info;
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tx_info.reserve(tx_blobs.size());
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for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_blobs.size(); i++) {
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if (!results[i].res)
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continue;
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tx_info.push_back({&results[i].tx, results[i].hash, tvc[i], results[i].res});
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}
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if (!tx_info.empty())
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handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(tx_info, keeped_by_block);
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bool ok = true;
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it = tx_blobs.begin();
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for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_blobs.size(); i++, ++it) {
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@ -886,36 +1012,6 @@ namespace cryptonote
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return false;
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}
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if (tx.version >= 2)
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{
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const rct::rctSig &rv = tx.rct_signatures;
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switch (rv.type) {
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case rct::RCTTypeNull:
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// coinbase should not come here, so we reject for all other types
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MERROR_VER("Unexpected Null rctSig type");
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return false;
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case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
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case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
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if (!rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rv))
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{
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MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
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return false;
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}
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break;
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case rct::RCTTypeFull:
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case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
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if (!rct::verRct(rv, true))
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{
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MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
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return false;
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}
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break;
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default:
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MERROR_VER("Unknown rct type: " << rv.type);
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@ -864,9 +864,12 @@ namespace cryptonote
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* @return true if all the checks pass, otherwise false
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*/
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bool check_tx_semantic(const transaction& tx, bool keeped_by_block) const;
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void set_semantics_failed(const crypto::hash &tx_hash);
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bool handle_incoming_tx_pre(const blobdata& tx_blob, tx_verification_context& tvc, cryptonote::transaction &tx, crypto::hash &tx_hash, crypto::hash &tx_prefixt_hash, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay);
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bool handle_incoming_tx_post(const blobdata& tx_blob, tx_verification_context& tvc, cryptonote::transaction &tx, crypto::hash &tx_hash, crypto::hash &tx_prefixt_hash, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay);
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struct tx_verification_batch_info { const cryptonote::transaction *tx; crypto::hash tx_hash; tx_verification_context &tvc; bool &result; };
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bool handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> &tx_info, bool keeped_by_block);
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/**
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* @copydoc miner::on_block_chain_update
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@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
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// the non-simple version is slightly smaller, but assumes all real inputs
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// are on the same index, so can only be used if there just one ring.
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bool use_simple_rct = sources.size() > 1;
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bool use_simple_rct = sources.size() > 1 || range_proof_type == rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof || range_proof_type == rct::RangeProofBulletproof;
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if (!use_simple_rct)
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{
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@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
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if (use_simple_rct)
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tx.rct_signatures = rct::genRctSimple(rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash), inSk, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, amount_in - amount_out, mixRing, amount_keys, msout ? &kLRki : NULL, msout, index, outSk, range_proof_type, hwdev);
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else
|
||||
tx.rct_signatures = rct::genRct(rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash), inSk, destinations, outamounts, mixRing, amount_keys, msout ? &kLRki[0] : NULL, msout, sources[0].real_output, outSk, range_proof_type, hwdev); // same index assumption
|
||||
tx.rct_signatures = rct::genRct(rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash), inSk, destinations, outamounts, mixRing, amount_keys, msout ? &kLRki[0] : NULL, msout, sources[0].real_output, outSk, hwdev); // same index assumption
|
||||
memwipe(inSk.data(), inSk.size() * sizeof(rct::ctkey));
|
||||
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(tx.vout.size() == outSk.size(), false, "outSk size does not match vout");
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ namespace hw {
|
||||
this->exchange();
|
||||
|
||||
//pseudoOuts
|
||||
if ((type == rct::RCTTypeSimple) || (type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)) {
|
||||
if ((type == rct::RCTTypeSimple) || (type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)) {
|
||||
for ( i = 0; i < inputs_size; i++) {
|
||||
offset = set_command_header(INS_VALIDATE, 0x01, i+2);
|
||||
//options
|
||||
|
||||
@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
hashes.push_back(hash2rct(h));
|
||||
|
||||
keyV kv;
|
||||
if (rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
|
||||
if (rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
kv.reserve((6*2+9) * rv.p.bulletproofs.size());
|
||||
for (const auto &p: rv.p.bulletproofs)
|
||||
@ -651,8 +651,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
// must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
|
||||
// Note: For txn fees, the last index in the amounts vector should contain that
|
||||
// Thus the amounts vector will be "one" longer than the destinations vectort
|
||||
rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev) {
|
||||
const bool bulletproof = range_proof_type != RangeProofBorromean;
|
||||
rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, hw::device &hwdev) {
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amounts.size() == destinations.size() || amounts.size() == destinations.size() + 1, "Different number of amounts/destinations");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amount_keys.size() == destinations.size(), "Different number of amount_keys/destinations");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(index < mixRing.size(), "Bad index into mixRing");
|
||||
@ -662,11 +661,10 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((kLRki && msout) || (!kLRki && !msout), "Only one of kLRki/msout is present");
|
||||
|
||||
rctSig rv;
|
||||
rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeFullBulletproof : RCTTypeFull;
|
||||
rv.type = RCTTypeFull;
|
||||
rv.message = message;
|
||||
rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
if (!bulletproof)
|
||||
rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
|
||||
size_t i = 0;
|
||||
@ -675,46 +673,11 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < destinations.size(); i++) {
|
||||
//add destination to sig
|
||||
rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]);
|
||||
//compute range proof (bulletproofs are done later)
|
||||
if (!bulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]);
|
||||
//compute range proof
|
||||
rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]);
|
||||
#ifdef DBG
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rv.p.bulletproofs.clear();
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
std::vector<uint64_t> proof_amounts;
|
||||
size_t amounts_proved = 0;
|
||||
while (amounts_proved < amounts.size())
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t batch_size = 1;
|
||||
if (range_proof_type == RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof)
|
||||
while (batch_size * 2 + amounts_proved <= amounts.size())
|
||||
batch_size *= 2;
|
||||
rct::keyV C, masks;
|
||||
std::vector<uint64_t> batch_amounts(batch_size);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
|
||||
batch_amounts[i] = amounts[i + amounts_proved];
|
||||
rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts));
|
||||
#ifdef DBG
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
rv.outPk[i + amounts_proved].mask = C[i];
|
||||
outSk[i + amounts_proved].mask = masks[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
amounts_proved += batch_size;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < outSk.size(); ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
//mask amount and mask
|
||||
rv.ecdhInfo[i].mask = copy(outSk[i].mask);
|
||||
rv.ecdhInfo[i].amount = d2h(amounts[i]);
|
||||
@ -744,7 +707,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
ctkeyM mixRing;
|
||||
ctkeyV outSk;
|
||||
tie(mixRing, index) = populateFromBlockchain(inPk, mixin);
|
||||
return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, kLRki, msout, index, outSk, RangeProofBorromean, hwdev);
|
||||
return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, kLRki, msout, index, outSk, hwdev);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//RCT simple
|
||||
@ -766,35 +729,61 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rctSig rv;
|
||||
rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof : RCTTypeSimple;
|
||||
rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeBulletproof : RCTTypeSimple;
|
||||
rv.message = message;
|
||||
rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
rv.p.bulletproofs.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
else
|
||||
if (!bulletproof)
|
||||
rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
|
||||
size_t i;
|
||||
keyV masks(destinations.size()); //sk mask..
|
||||
outSk.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
key sumout = zero();
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < destinations.size(); i++) {
|
||||
|
||||
//add destination to sig
|
||||
rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]);
|
||||
//compute range proof
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
rv.p.bulletproofs[i] = proveRangeBulletproof(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]);
|
||||
else
|
||||
if (!bulletproof)
|
||||
rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]);
|
||||
#ifdef DBG
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
|
||||
else
|
||||
if (!bulletproof)
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rv.p.bulletproofs.clear();
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
std::vector<uint64_t> proof_amounts;
|
||||
size_t n_amounts = outamounts.size();
|
||||
size_t amounts_proved = 0;
|
||||
while (amounts_proved < n_amounts)
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t batch_size = 1;
|
||||
if (range_proof_type == RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof)
|
||||
while (batch_size * 2 + amounts_proved <= n_amounts && batch_size * 2 <= 16)
|
||||
batch_size *= 2;
|
||||
rct::keyV C, masks;
|
||||
std::vector<uint64_t> batch_amounts(batch_size);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
|
||||
batch_amounts[i] = outamounts[i + amounts_proved];
|
||||
rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts));
|
||||
#ifdef DBG
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
rv.outPk[i + amounts_proved].mask = C[i];
|
||||
outSk[i + amounts_proved].mask = masks[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
amounts_proved += batch_size;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
key sumout = zero();
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < outSk.size(); ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
sc_add(sumout.bytes, outSk[i].mask.bytes, sumout.bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
//mask amount and mask
|
||||
@ -857,14 +846,10 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
// must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
|
||||
bool verRct(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics) {
|
||||
PERF_TIMER(verRct);
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig");
|
||||
const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig");
|
||||
if (semantics)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and bulletproofs");
|
||||
else
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == 1, false, "full rctSig has not one MG");
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -879,14 +864,10 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
if (semantics) {
|
||||
tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance();
|
||||
tools::threadpool::waiter waiter;
|
||||
std::deque<bool> results(bulletproof ? rv.p.bulletproofs.size() : rv.outPk.size(), false);
|
||||
std::deque<bool> results(rv.outPk.size(), false);
|
||||
DP("range proofs verified?");
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); i++)
|
||||
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]); });
|
||||
else
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++)
|
||||
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); });
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++)
|
||||
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); });
|
||||
waiter.wait(&tpool);
|
||||
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) {
|
||||
@ -940,7 +921,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
{
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rvp, false, "rctSig pointer is NULL");
|
||||
const rctSig &rv = *rvp;
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "verRctSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
|
||||
const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -1041,7 +1022,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
{
|
||||
PERF_TIMER(verRctNonSemanticsSimple);
|
||||
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctNonSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "verRctNonSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
|
||||
const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
|
||||
// semantics check is early, and mixRing/MGs aren't resolved yet
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
@ -1101,7 +1082,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
// uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment
|
||||
// must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
|
||||
xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key & mask, hw::device &hwdev) {
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1129,7 +1110,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
xmr_amount decodeRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key &mask, hw::device &hwdev) {
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1157,12 +1138,12 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool signMultisig(rctSig &rv, const std::vector<unsigned int> &indices, const keyV &k, const multisig_out &msout, const key &secret_key) {
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof,
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof,
|
||||
false, "unsupported rct type");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(indices.size() == k.size(), false, "Mismatched k/indices sizes");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == rv.p.MGs.size(), false, "Mismatched k/MGs size");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == msout.c.size(), false, "Mismatched k/msout.c size");
|
||||
if (rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
|
||||
if (rv.type == RCTTypeFull)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == 1, false, "MGs not a single element");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
//decodeRct: (c.f. https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 5.1.1)
|
||||
// uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment
|
||||
// must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
|
||||
rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev);
|
||||
rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, hw::device &hwdev);
|
||||
rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV & inPk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, const int mixin, hw::device &hwdev);
|
||||
rctSig genRctSimple(const key & message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV & inPk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & inamounts, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & outamounts, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<multisig_kLRki> *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, xmr_amount txnFee, unsigned int mixin, hw::device &hwdev);
|
||||
rctSig genRctSimple(const key & message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & inamounts, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<multisig_kLRki> *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, const std::vector<unsigned int> & index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
|
||||
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
|
||||
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
|
||||
#include "misc_log_ex.h"
|
||||
#include "rctTypes.h"
|
||||
using namespace crypto;
|
||||
using namespace std;
|
||||
@ -214,7 +215,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
switch (type)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case RCTTypeSimple:
|
||||
case RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
|
||||
case RCTTypeBulletproof:
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
@ -225,19 +226,29 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch (type)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
|
||||
case RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
|
||||
case RCTTypeBulletproof:
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() >= 6, 0, "Invalid bulletproof L size");
|
||||
return 1 << (proof.L.size() - 6);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t n = 0;
|
||||
for (const Bulletproof &proof: proofs)
|
||||
n += proof.V.size();
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t n2 = n_bulletproof_amounts(proof);
|
||||
if (n2 == 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
n += n2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
END_SERIALIZE()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof);
|
||||
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs);
|
||||
|
||||
//A container to hold all signatures necessary for RingCT
|
||||
@ -226,8 +227,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
RCTTypeNull = 0,
|
||||
RCTTypeFull = 1,
|
||||
RCTTypeSimple = 2,
|
||||
RCTTypeFullBulletproof = 3,
|
||||
RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof = 4,
|
||||
RCTTypeBulletproof = 3,
|
||||
};
|
||||
enum RangeProofType { RangeProofBorromean, RangeProofBulletproof, RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof };
|
||||
struct rctSigBase {
|
||||
@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
FIELD(type)
|
||||
if (type == RCTTypeNull)
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeFullBulletproof && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
|
||||
if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
VARINT_FIELD(txnFee)
|
||||
// inputs/outputs not saved, only here for serialization help
|
||||
@ -307,9 +307,9 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (type == RCTTypeNull)
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeFullBulletproof && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
|
||||
if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
if (type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof || type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
|
||||
if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ar.tag("bp");
|
||||
ar.begin_array();
|
||||
@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
ar.begin_array();
|
||||
// we keep a byte for size of MGs, because we don't know whether this is
|
||||
// a simple or full rct signature, and it's starting to annoy the hell out of me
|
||||
size_t mg_elements = (type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) ? inputs : 1;
|
||||
size_t mg_elements = (type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeBulletproof) ? inputs : 1;
|
||||
PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mg_elements, MGs);
|
||||
if (MGs.size() != mg_elements)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
for (size_t j = 0; j < mixin + 1; ++j)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ar.begin_array();
|
||||
size_t mg_ss2_elements = ((type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) ? 1 : inputs) + 1;
|
||||
size_t mg_ss2_elements = ((type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeBulletproof) ? 1 : inputs) + 1;
|
||||
PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mg_ss2_elements, MGs[i].ss[j]);
|
||||
if (MGs[i].ss[j].size() != mg_ss2_elements)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
ar.delimit_array();
|
||||
}
|
||||
ar.end_array();
|
||||
if (type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
|
||||
if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ar.tag("pseudoOuts");
|
||||
ar.begin_array();
|
||||
@ -416,12 +416,12 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
|
||||
keyV& get_pseudo_outs()
|
||||
{
|
||||
return type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
|
||||
return type == RCTTypeBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
keyV const& get_pseudo_outs() const
|
||||
{
|
||||
return type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
|
||||
return type == RCTTypeBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1142,10 +1142,9 @@ static uint64_t decodeRct(const rct::rctSig & rv, const crypto::key_derivation &
|
||||
switch (rv.type)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
|
||||
case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
|
||||
case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof:
|
||||
return rct::decodeRctSimple(rv, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), i, mask, hwdev);
|
||||
case rct::RCTTypeFull:
|
||||
case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
|
||||
return rct::decodeRct(rv, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), i, mask, hwdev);
|
||||
default:
|
||||
LOG_ERROR("Unsupported rct type: " << rv.type);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ set(core_tests_sources
|
||||
transaction_tests.cpp
|
||||
tx_validation.cpp
|
||||
v2_tests.cpp
|
||||
rct.cpp)
|
||||
rct.cpp
|
||||
bulletproofs.cpp)
|
||||
|
||||
set(core_tests_headers
|
||||
block_reward.h
|
||||
@ -58,7 +59,8 @@ set(core_tests_headers
|
||||
transaction_tests.h
|
||||
tx_validation.h
|
||||
v2_tests.h
|
||||
rct.h)
|
||||
rct.h
|
||||
bulletproofs.h)
|
||||
|
||||
add_executable(core_tests
|
||||
${core_tests_sources}
|
||||
@ -73,6 +75,7 @@ target_link_libraries(core_tests
|
||||
device
|
||||
${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}
|
||||
${EXTRA_LIBRARIES})
|
||||
enable_stack_trace(core_tests)
|
||||
set_property(TARGET core_tests
|
||||
PROPERTY
|
||||
FOLDER "tests")
|
||||
|
||||
339
tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.cpp
Normal file
339
tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.cpp
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) 2014-2018, The Monero Project
|
||||
//
|
||||
// All rights reserved.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
|
||||
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
|
||||
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
|
||||
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
|
||||
// materials provided with the distribution.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
|
||||
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
|
||||
// prior written permission.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
|
||||
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
|
||||
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
|
||||
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
||||
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
|
||||
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
|
||||
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
||||
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
|
||||
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers
|
||||
|
||||
#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
|
||||
#include "ringct/bulletproofs.h"
|
||||
#include "chaingen.h"
|
||||
#include "bulletproofs.h"
|
||||
#include "device/device.hpp"
|
||||
|
||||
using namespace epee;
|
||||
using namespace crypto;
|
||||
using namespace cryptonote;
|
||||
|
||||
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Tests
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_tx_validation_base::generate_with(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events,
|
||||
const int *out_idx, int mixin, size_t n_txes, const uint64_t *amounts_paid, bool valid, const bool *multi_out,
|
||||
const std::function<bool(std::vector<tx_source_entry> &sources, std::vector<tx_destination_entry> &destinations, size_t tx_idx)> &pre_tx,
|
||||
const std::function<bool(transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx)> &post_tx) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint64_t ts_start = 1338224400;
|
||||
|
||||
GENERATE_ACCOUNT(miner_account);
|
||||
MAKE_GENESIS_BLOCK(events, blk_0, miner_account, ts_start);
|
||||
|
||||
// create 8 miner accounts, and have them mine the next 8 blocks
|
||||
cryptonote::account_base miner_accounts[8];
|
||||
const cryptonote::block *prev_block = &blk_0;
|
||||
cryptonote::block blocks[8 + CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW];
|
||||
for (size_t n = 0; n < 8; ++n) {
|
||||
miner_accounts[n].generate();
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(generator.construct_block_manually(blocks[n], *prev_block, miner_accounts[n],
|
||||
test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_hf_version,
|
||||
2, 2, prev_block->timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long
|
||||
crypto::hash(), 0, transaction(), std::vector<crypto::hash>(), 0, 0, 2),
|
||||
false, "Failed to generate block");
|
||||
events.push_back(blocks[n]);
|
||||
prev_block = blocks + n;
|
||||
LOG_PRINT_L0("Initial miner tx " << n << ": " << obj_to_json_str(blocks[n].miner_tx));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// rewind
|
||||
cryptonote::block blk_r, blk_last;
|
||||
{
|
||||
blk_last = blocks[7];
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW; ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(generator.construct_block_manually(blocks[8+i], blk_last, miner_account,
|
||||
test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_hf_version,
|
||||
2, 2, blk_last.timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long
|
||||
crypto::hash(), 0, transaction(), std::vector<crypto::hash>(), 0, 0, 2),
|
||||
false, "Failed to generate block");
|
||||
events.push_back(blocks[8+i]);
|
||||
blk_last = blocks[8+i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
blk_r = blk_last;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// create 4 txes from these miners in another block, to generate some rct outputs
|
||||
std::vector<transaction> rct_txes;
|
||||
cryptonote::block blk_txes;
|
||||
std::vector<crypto::hash> starting_rct_tx_hashes;
|
||||
static const uint64_t input_amounts_available[] = {5000000000000, 30000000000000, 100000000000, 80000000000};
|
||||
for (size_t n = 0; n < n_txes; ++n)
|
||||
{
|
||||
std::vector<tx_source_entry> sources;
|
||||
|
||||
sources.resize(1);
|
||||
tx_source_entry& src = sources.back();
|
||||
|
||||
const uint64_t needed_amount = input_amounts_available[n];
|
||||
src.amount = input_amounts_available[n];
|
||||
size_t real_index_in_tx = 0;
|
||||
for (size_t m = 0; m < 7; ++m) {
|
||||
size_t index_in_tx = 0;
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks[m].miner_tx.vout.size(); ++i)
|
||||
if (blocks[m].miner_tx.vout[i].amount == needed_amount)
|
||||
index_in_tx = i;
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(blocks[m].miner_tx.vout[index_in_tx].amount == needed_amount, false, "Expected amount not found");
|
||||
src.push_output(m, boost::get<txout_to_key>(blocks[m].miner_tx.vout[index_in_tx].target).key, src.amount);
|
||||
if (m == n)
|
||||
real_index_in_tx = index_in_tx;
|
||||
}
|
||||
src.real_out_tx_key = cryptonote::get_tx_pub_key_from_extra(blocks[n].miner_tx);
|
||||
src.real_output = n;
|
||||
src.real_output_in_tx_index = real_index_in_tx;
|
||||
src.mask = rct::identity();
|
||||
src.rct = false;
|
||||
|
||||
//fill outputs entry
|
||||
tx_destination_entry td;
|
||||
td.addr = miner_accounts[n].get_keys().m_account_address;
|
||||
std::vector<tx_destination_entry> destinations;
|
||||
for (int o = 0; amounts_paid[o] != (uint64_t)-1; ++o)
|
||||
{
|
||||
td.amount = amounts_paid[o];
|
||||
destinations.push_back(td);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (pre_tx && !pre_tx(sources, destinations, n))
|
||||
{
|
||||
MDEBUG("pre_tx returned failure");
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
crypto::secret_key tx_key;
|
||||
std::vector<crypto::secret_key> additional_tx_keys;
|
||||
std::unordered_map<crypto::public_key, cryptonote::subaddress_index> subaddresses;
|
||||
subaddresses[miner_accounts[n].get_keys().m_account_address.m_spend_public_key] = {0,0};
|
||||
rct_txes.resize(rct_txes.size() + 1);
|
||||
bool r = construct_tx_and_get_tx_key(miner_accounts[n].get_keys(), subaddresses, sources, destinations, cryptonote::account_public_address{}, std::vector<uint8_t>(), rct_txes.back(), 0, tx_key, additional_tx_keys, true, multi_out[n] ? rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof : rct::RangeProofBulletproof);
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "failed to construct transaction");
|
||||
|
||||
if (post_tx && !post_tx(rct_txes.back(), n))
|
||||
{
|
||||
MDEBUG("post_tx returned failure");
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//events.push_back(rct_txes.back());
|
||||
starting_rct_tx_hashes.push_back(get_transaction_hash(rct_txes.back()));
|
||||
LOG_PRINT_L0("Test tx: " << obj_to_json_str(rct_txes.back()));
|
||||
|
||||
for (int o = 0; amounts_paid[o] != (uint64_t)-1; ++o)
|
||||
{
|
||||
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
|
||||
bool r = crypto::generate_key_derivation(destinations[o].addr.m_view_public_key, tx_key, derivation);
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "Failed to generate key derivation");
|
||||
crypto::secret_key amount_key;
|
||||
crypto::derivation_to_scalar(derivation, o, amount_key);
|
||||
rct::key rct_tx_mask;
|
||||
if (rct_txes.back().rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rct_txes.back().rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
|
||||
rct::decodeRctSimple(rct_txes.back().rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_mask, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
else
|
||||
rct::decodeRct(rct_txes.back().rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_mask, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while (amounts_paid[0] != (size_t)-1)
|
||||
++amounts_paid;
|
||||
++amounts_paid;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!valid)
|
||||
DO_CALLBACK(events, "mark_invalid_tx");
|
||||
events.push_back(rct_txes);
|
||||
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(generator.construct_block_manually(blk_txes, blk_last, miner_account,
|
||||
test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_tx_hashes | test_generator::bf_hf_version | test_generator::bf_max_outs,
|
||||
8, 8, blk_last.timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long
|
||||
crypto::hash(), 0, transaction(), starting_rct_tx_hashes, 0, 6, 8),
|
||||
false, "Failed to generate block");
|
||||
if (!valid)
|
||||
DO_CALLBACK(events, "mark_invalid_block");
|
||||
events.push_back(blk_txes);
|
||||
blk_last = blk_txes;
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_tx_validation_base::check_bp(const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx, const size_t *sizes, const char *context) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT(context);
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.version >= 2);
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(rct::is_rct_bulletproof(tx.rct_signatures.type));
|
||||
size_t n_sizes = 0, n_amounts = 0;
|
||||
for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_idx; ++n)
|
||||
{
|
||||
while (sizes[0] != (size_t)-1)
|
||||
++sizes;
|
||||
++sizes;
|
||||
}
|
||||
while (sizes[n_sizes] != (size_t)-1)
|
||||
n_amounts += sizes[n_sizes++];
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.size() == n_sizes);
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs) == n_amounts);
|
||||
for (size_t n = 0; n < n_sizes; ++n)
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[n]) == sizes[n]);
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_tx_valid_1::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
const int mixin = 6;
|
||||
const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
|
||||
const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1};
|
||||
const size_t bp_sizes[] = {1, (size_t)-1};
|
||||
const bool multi_out[] = {false};
|
||||
return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_1"); });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
const int mixin = 6;
|
||||
const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
|
||||
const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5000, 5000, (uint64_t)-1};
|
||||
const size_t bp_sizes[] = {1, 1, (size_t)-1};
|
||||
const bool multi_out[] = {false};
|
||||
return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1"); });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_tx_valid_2::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
const int mixin = 6;
|
||||
const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
|
||||
const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5000, 5000, (uint64_t)-1};
|
||||
const size_t bp_sizes[] = {2, (size_t)-1};
|
||||
const bool multi_out[] = {true};
|
||||
return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_2"); });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
const int mixin = 6;
|
||||
const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
|
||||
const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1};
|
||||
const size_t bp_sizes[] = {4, 2, 1, (size_t)-1};
|
||||
const bool multi_out[] = {true};
|
||||
return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1"); });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
const int mixin = 6;
|
||||
const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
|
||||
const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1};
|
||||
const size_t bp_sizes[] = {16, 16, (size_t)-1};
|
||||
const bool multi_out[] = {true};
|
||||
return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16"); });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
const int mixin = 6;
|
||||
const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
|
||||
const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, (size_t)-1, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1};
|
||||
const size_t bp_sizes[] = {2, (size_t)-1, 2, (size_t)-1};
|
||||
const bool multi_out[] = {true};
|
||||
return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 2, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_txs_valid_2_2"); });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
const int mixin = 6;
|
||||
const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
|
||||
const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1};
|
||||
const bool multi_out[] = {false, true, true};
|
||||
const size_t bp_sizes[] = {1, 1, (size_t)-1, 8, 2, (size_t)-1, 16, 16, 1, (size_t)-1};
|
||||
return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 3, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1"); });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs");
|
||||
const int mixin = 6;
|
||||
const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
|
||||
const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1};
|
||||
const bool multi_out[] = {false};
|
||||
return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, false, multi_out, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof);
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty());
|
||||
tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.pop_back();
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs");
|
||||
const int mixin = 6;
|
||||
const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
|
||||
const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1};
|
||||
const bool multi_out[] = {false};
|
||||
return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, false, multi_out, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof);
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty());
|
||||
tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.push_back(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.back());
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount");
|
||||
const int mixin = 6;
|
||||
const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
|
||||
const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1};
|
||||
const bool multi_out[] = {false};
|
||||
return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, false, multi_out, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof);
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty());
|
||||
tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.back() = rct::bulletproof_PROVE(1000, rct::skGen());
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched");
|
||||
const int mixin = 6;
|
||||
const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
|
||||
const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5000, 5000, (uint64_t)-1};
|
||||
const bool multi_out[] = {false};
|
||||
return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, false, multi_out, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof);
|
||||
CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.size() == 2);
|
||||
rct::Bulletproof proof = tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[0];
|
||||
tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[0] = tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[1];
|
||||
tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[1] = proof;
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
170
tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.h
Normal file
170
tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.h
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) 2014-2018, The Monero Project
|
||||
//
|
||||
// All rights reserved.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
|
||||
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
|
||||
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
|
||||
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
|
||||
// materials provided with the distribution.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
|
||||
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
|
||||
// prior written permission.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
|
||||
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
|
||||
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
|
||||
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
||||
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
|
||||
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
|
||||
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
||||
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
|
||||
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers
|
||||
|
||||
#pragma once
|
||||
#include "chaingen.h"
|
||||
|
||||
struct gen_bp_tx_validation_base : public test_chain_unit_base
|
||||
{
|
||||
gen_bp_tx_validation_base()
|
||||
: m_invalid_tx_index(0)
|
||||
, m_invalid_block_index(0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
REGISTER_CALLBACK_METHOD(gen_bp_tx_validation_base, mark_invalid_tx);
|
||||
REGISTER_CALLBACK_METHOD(gen_bp_tx_validation_base, mark_invalid_block);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool check_tx_verification_context(const cryptonote::tx_verification_context& tvc, bool tx_added, size_t event_idx, const cryptonote::transaction& /*tx*/)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (m_invalid_tx_index == event_idx)
|
||||
return tvc.m_verifivation_failed;
|
||||
else
|
||||
return !tvc.m_verifivation_failed && tx_added;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool check_tx_verification_context(const std::vector<cryptonote::tx_verification_context>& tvcs, size_t tx_added, size_t event_idx, const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& /*txs*/)
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t failed = 0;
|
||||
for (const cryptonote::tx_verification_context &tvc: tvcs)
|
||||
if (tvc.m_verifivation_failed)
|
||||
++failed;
|
||||
if (m_invalid_tx_index == event_idx)
|
||||
return failed > 0;
|
||||
else
|
||||
return failed == 0 && tx_added == tvcs.size();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool check_block_verification_context(const cryptonote::block_verification_context& bvc, size_t event_idx, const cryptonote::block& /*block*/)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (m_invalid_block_index == event_idx)
|
||||
return bvc.m_verifivation_failed;
|
||||
else
|
||||
return !bvc.m_verifivation_failed;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool mark_invalid_block(cryptonote::core& /*c*/, size_t ev_index, const std::vector<test_event_entry>& /*events*/)
|
||||
{
|
||||
m_invalid_block_index = ev_index + 1;
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool mark_invalid_tx(cryptonote::core& /*c*/, size_t ev_index, const std::vector<test_event_entry>& /*events*/)
|
||||
{
|
||||
m_invalid_tx_index = ev_index + 1;
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool generate_with(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events, const int *out_idx, int mixin,
|
||||
size_t n_txes, const uint64_t *amounts_paid, bool valid, const bool *multi_out,
|
||||
const std::function<bool(std::vector<cryptonote::tx_source_entry> &sources, std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> &destinations, size_t)> &pre_tx,
|
||||
const std::function<bool(cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t)> &post_tx) const;
|
||||
|
||||
bool check_bp(const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx, const size_t *sizes, const char *context) const;
|
||||
|
||||
private:
|
||||
size_t m_invalid_tx_index;
|
||||
size_t m_invalid_block_index;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
template<>
|
||||
struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {
|
||||
const std::pair<uint8_t, uint64_t> hard_forks[4] = {std::make_pair(1, 0), std::make_pair(2, 1), std::make_pair(8, 69), std::make_pair(0, 0)};
|
||||
const cryptonote::test_options test_options = {
|
||||
hard_forks
|
||||
};
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// valid
|
||||
struct gen_bp_tx_valid_1 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
|
||||
};
|
||||
template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_valid_1>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
|
||||
|
||||
struct gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
|
||||
};
|
||||
template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
|
||||
|
||||
struct gen_bp_tx_valid_2 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
|
||||
};
|
||||
template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_valid_2>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
|
||||
|
||||
struct gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
|
||||
};
|
||||
template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
|
||||
|
||||
struct gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
|
||||
};
|
||||
template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
|
||||
|
||||
struct gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
|
||||
};
|
||||
template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
|
||||
|
||||
struct gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
|
||||
};
|
||||
template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
|
||||
|
||||
struct gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
|
||||
};
|
||||
template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
|
||||
|
||||
struct gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
|
||||
};
|
||||
template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
|
||||
|
||||
struct gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
|
||||
};
|
||||
template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
|
||||
|
||||
struct gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
|
||||
};
|
||||
template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, serialized_block, 0xcd);
|
||||
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, serialized_transaction, 0xce);
|
||||
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, event_visitor_settings, 0xcf);
|
||||
|
||||
typedef boost::variant<cryptonote::block, cryptonote::transaction, cryptonote::account_base, callback_entry, serialized_block, serialized_transaction, event_visitor_settings> test_event_entry;
|
||||
typedef boost::variant<cryptonote::block, cryptonote::transaction, std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>, cryptonote::account_base, callback_entry, serialized_block, serialized_transaction, event_visitor_settings> test_event_entry;
|
||||
typedef std::unordered_map<crypto::hash, const cryptonote::transaction*> map_hash2tx_t;
|
||||
|
||||
class test_chain_unit_base
|
||||
@ -263,6 +263,30 @@ bool check_tx_verification_context(const cryptonote::tx_verification_context& tv
|
||||
}
|
||||
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
template<class t_test_class>
|
||||
auto do_check_tx_verification_context(const std::vector<cryptonote::tx_verification_context>& tvcs, size_t tx_added, size_t event_index, const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& txs, t_test_class& validator, int)
|
||||
-> decltype(validator.check_tx_verification_context(tvcs, tx_added, event_index, txs))
|
||||
{
|
||||
return validator.check_tx_verification_context(tvcs, tx_added, event_index, txs);
|
||||
}
|
||||
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
template<class t_test_class>
|
||||
bool do_check_tx_verification_context(const std::vector<cryptonote::tx_verification_context>& tvcs, size_t tx_added, size_t /*event_index*/, const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& /*txs*/, t_test_class&, long)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Default block verification context check
|
||||
for (const cryptonote::tx_verification_context &tvc: tvcs)
|
||||
if (tvc.m_verifivation_failed)
|
||||
throw std::runtime_error("Transaction verification failed");
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
template<class t_test_class>
|
||||
bool check_tx_verification_context(const std::vector<cryptonote::tx_verification_context>& tvcs, size_t tx_added, size_t event_index, const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& txs, t_test_class& validator)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// SFINAE in action
|
||||
return do_check_tx_verification_context(tvcs, tx_added, event_index, txs, validator, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
template<class t_test_class>
|
||||
auto do_check_block_verification_context(const cryptonote::block_verification_context& bvc, size_t event_index, const cryptonote::block& blk, t_test_class& validator, int)
|
||||
-> decltype(validator.check_block_verification_context(bvc, event_index, blk))
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -339,6 +363,26 @@ public:
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool operator()(const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& txs) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
log_event("cryptonote::transaction");
|
||||
|
||||
std::vector<cryptonote::blobdata> tx_blobs;
|
||||
std::vector<cryptonote::tx_verification_context> tvcs;
|
||||
cryptonote::tx_verification_context tvc0 = AUTO_VAL_INIT(tvc0);
|
||||
for (const auto &tx: txs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
tx_blobs.push_back(t_serializable_object_to_blob(tx));
|
||||
tvcs.push_back(tvc0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
size_t pool_size = m_c.get_pool_transactions_count();
|
||||
m_c.handle_incoming_txs(tx_blobs, tvcs, m_txs_keeped_by_block, false, false);
|
||||
size_t tx_added = m_c.get_pool_transactions_count() - pool_size;
|
||||
bool r = check_tx_verification_context(tvcs, tx_added, m_ev_index, txs, m_validator);
|
||||
CHECK_AND_NO_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "tx verification context check failed");
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool operator()(const cryptonote::block& b) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
log_event("cryptonote::block");
|
||||
|
||||
@ -224,6 +224,18 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[])
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_multisig_tx_invalid_33_1_2_no_threshold);
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_multisig_tx_invalid_33_1_3_no_threshold);
|
||||
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_1);
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1);
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_2);
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1);
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16);
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2);
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1);
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs);
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs);
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount);
|
||||
GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched);
|
||||
|
||||
el::Level level = (failed_tests.empty() ? el::Level::Info : el::Level::Error);
|
||||
MLOG(level, "\nREPORT:");
|
||||
MLOG(level, " Test run: " << tests_count);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
|
||||
#include "v2_tests.h"
|
||||
#include "rct.h"
|
||||
#include "multisig.h"
|
||||
#include "bulletproofs.h"
|
||||
/************************************************************************/
|
||||
/* */
|
||||
/************************************************************************/
|
||||
|
||||
@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ bool gen_rct_tx_validation_base::generate_with(std::vector<test_event_entry>& ev
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "Failed to generate key derivation");
|
||||
crypto::secret_key amount_key;
|
||||
crypto::derivation_to_scalar(derivation, o, amount_key);
|
||||
if (rct_txes[n].rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rct_txes[n].rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
|
||||
if (rct_txes[n].rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rct_txes[n].rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
|
||||
rct::decodeRctSimple(rct_txes[n].rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_masks[o+n*4], hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
else
|
||||
rct::decodeRct(rct_txes[n].rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_masks[o+n*4], hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
|
||||
@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ public:
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (rct)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (m_tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || m_tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
|
||||
if (m_tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFull)
|
||||
return rct::verRct(m_tx.rct_signatures);
|
||||
else
|
||||
return rct::verRctSimple(m_tx.rct_signatures);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -78,58 +78,62 @@ TEST(bulletproofs, multi_splitting)
|
||||
{
|
||||
rct::ctkeyV sc, pc;
|
||||
rct::ctkey sctmp, pctmp;
|
||||
std::vector<unsigned int> index;
|
||||
std::vector<uint64_t> inamounts, outamounts;
|
||||
|
||||
std::tie(sctmp, pctmp) = rct::ctskpkGen(6000);
|
||||
sc.push_back(sctmp);
|
||||
pc.push_back(pctmp);
|
||||
inamounts.push_back(6000);
|
||||
index.push_back(1);
|
||||
|
||||
std::tie(sctmp, pctmp) = rct::ctskpkGen(7000);
|
||||
sc.push_back(sctmp);
|
||||
pc.push_back(pctmp);
|
||||
inamounts.push_back(7000);
|
||||
index.push_back(1);
|
||||
|
||||
const int mixin = 3, max_outputs = 16;
|
||||
|
||||
for (int n_outputs = 1; n_outputs <= max_outputs; ++n_outputs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
std::vector<uint64_t> amounts;
|
||||
std::vector<uint64_t> outamounts;
|
||||
rct::keyV amount_keys;
|
||||
rct::keyV destinations;
|
||||
rct::key Sk, Pk;
|
||||
uint64_t available = 6000 + 7000;
|
||||
uint64_t amount;
|
||||
rct::ctkeyM mixRing(mixin+1);
|
||||
rct::ctkeyM mixRing(sc.size());
|
||||
|
||||
//add output
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < n_outputs; ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
amount = rct::randXmrAmount(available);
|
||||
amounts.push_back(amount);
|
||||
outamounts.push_back(amount);
|
||||
amount_keys.push_back(rct::hash_to_scalar(rct::zero()));
|
||||
rct::skpkGen(Sk, Pk);
|
||||
destinations.push_back(Pk);
|
||||
available -= amount;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!amounts.empty())
|
||||
amounts.back() += available;
|
||||
|
||||
for (size_t j = 0; j <= mixin; ++j)
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < sc.size(); ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < sc.size(); ++i)
|
||||
for (size_t j = 0; j <= mixin; ++j)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (j == 1)
|
||||
mixRing[j].push_back(pc[i]);
|
||||
mixRing[i].push_back(pc[i]);
|
||||
else
|
||||
mixRing[j].push_back({rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen()), rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen())});
|
||||
mixRing[i].push_back({rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen()), rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen())});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rct::ctkeyV outSk;
|
||||
rct::rctSig s = rct::genRct(rct::zero(), sc, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, NULL, NULL, 1, outSk, rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::verRct(s));
|
||||
rct::rctSig s = rct::genRctSimple(rct::zero(), sc, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, available, mixRing, amount_keys, NULL, NULL, index, outSk, rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(rct::verRctSimple(s));
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < n_outputs; ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
rct::key mask;
|
||||
rct::decodeRct(s, amount_keys[i], i, mask, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
rct::decodeRctSimple(s, amount_keys[i], i, mask, hw::get_device("default"));
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(mask == outSk[i].mask);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user