mev-toolkit/MEV_projects

projects and research

tl; dr

• public discussion around MEV started by pmcgooohan on e/ethereum, and it was formalized by phildaiann et. al's paper flash boys 2. here are the main essays and papers from the last years.

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what's the future of mev rewards?

here are some ideas (and below are some of the projects working on specific problems and solutions):

mev burning

• instead of having to deal with certain centralized actors, the network would put in place mechanism to burn mev (inspired by the burn mechanism found within EIP-1559).
• targets the centralizing potential that mev can have on validators, but removing the economic incentives of mev for validators.
• in this ethresear.ch discussion, domothy recommends implementing an auction for the "right to build a block" on the network (happening at the validator level). network’s slot times would change from 12 seconds to 16 seconds to allow for the period of bidding on block proposal rights.

mev smoothing

• in this ethresear.ch and this, francesco propose "Smoothing MEV means reducing the variance in the MEV that is captured by each validator, with the ultimate goal of getting the distribution of rewards for each validator to be as close as possible to uniform: a staker would then get a share of rewards proportional to their stake, just like with issuance."
• while smoothing is not available as an in-protocol ethereum, the general principle can be seen via smoothing liquid staking pools. rocketpool operates a voluntary smoothing pool see also eigenlayer discussions. mev-share from flashbots has also introduced a proposal for programmable provate orderflow that rewards users (through a matchmaking protocol between users and searchers).

mev sharing

• while MEV smoothing/burning focuses on the end of the MEV supply chain and interactions between block builders and validators, mev sharing is in the beginning of the supply chain, for example with block builders that provide rebates (e.g. wallet-boost from blocknative).

applications-specific sequencing

• the opinionated application, by maven (2024)

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mev-related projects

• espresso
• flashbots
• manifold
• shutter
• dflow
• eden
• jito
• skip
• cow

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resources

• multiple concurrent proposers: why and how, by p. garimidi et al. (2025)
  • approach for mev mitigation from the market structure of a single proposer monopolistic control over tx ordering and inclusion
  • "instead of one leader proposing all the transactions for a slot, multiple proposers each submit a batch of transactions for the same slot" + "a committee of relays mediates between proposers and the consensus leader" + "relays receive shreds, HECC-encoded pieces of batches, and create attestations that certify the timely receipt of shreds and vouch for the availability of the batches to the leader"
  • "the leader can incorporate batches by reference into its block, even before learning the batches’ contents, and with confidence that once consensus is reached, these batches can be reconstructed from the shreds stored at relays. In addition, the relays constrain the leader’s degrees of freedom in choosing which batches to include in the block, by requiring that the leader include attestations from “many” relays to form a valid block, which in turn forces the leader to incorporate the batches of honest proposers"
  • "reclaims 'MCP' (multiple concurrent proposers) from the cursed ai protocol"
• rules and strategies of a protocol, by data always
• quantification of mev sharing designs (ofas), by d. sui
• projects addressing private order flows primitives
• diamonds are forever, lvr is not, by mcmenamin et al.
• mev capturing amm, by josojo
• mev-protected cross-chain swaps, by cashmere
• hot, a new mev aware amm design, by arrakis finance
• • bookmark list for consensus researchers (nice list from flashbots on canonical papers on consensus)
• the engineer's guide to blockchain finality, by b. samuels