From fabf394817a20b71499090dcd6f4512668b01e5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "dr. mia von steinkirch, phd"
 <1130416+mvonsteinkirch@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2023 13:03:56 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] The Most Important Problem to Solve in 2023: Exclusive
 Orderflow

---
 MEV_searchers/bots/stat-arbers.md | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/MEV_searchers/bots/stat-arbers.md b/MEV_searchers/bots/stat-arbers.md
index eaed01e..66c6ae3 100644
--- a/MEV_searchers/bots/stat-arbers.md
+++ b/MEV_searchers/bots/stat-arbers.md
@@ -1,4 +1,28 @@
-### statistical arbers
+## statistical arbers
+
+<br>
+
+### tl; dr for a strategy
+
+<br>
+
+* if CEX is greater than the price on chain (DEX), stat arbs can buy on the DEX and hedge on the CEX -> confident that the DEX price will drift towards the CEX price, but not confident that will happen to the CEX price
+* problem: settlement mismatch -> CEX trades are fast but blockchains aren't -> start arbs are unsure if the trade will land or competitors will beat them
+* from the time between trade submission and receipt of the next block, the trade (their exposure to the assets) is uncertain 
+* the greater the uncertainty, the more the profit estimate needs to be marked down
+* while volatility of the token is important, the longer the time period between blocks, the longer tx remains, and the longer it can go without being fully hedged
+* as block time increases, stat arb MEV profit estimates get marked down -> payments made by stat arbers to miners/validators or to users/traders decrease
+* conclusion: the battle between PFOF-style MEV could lead to increase block times for stat arbers, decreasing combined realized MEV
+
+
+
+<br>
+
+---
+
+### resources
+
+<br>
 
 
 * [cointegrator bots](https://github.com/go-outside-labs/blockchain-science-py)