add random notes on VTRPs and POFPs

mev_protocols/README.md

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+## MEV protocol solutions
+
+
+#### private order flow protocols (POFPs)
+
+* rpc-based mev solutions (private order flow) 
+* private orderflows are realized by modifying either the user's rpc or by modifying the protocol's frontend
+* the goal of private order flow protocols (POFPs)
+
+<br>
+
+--- 
+
+### validator transaction reordering protocols (VTRPs)
+
+* private tx reordering
+* two goals: 1) identify valuable user txs, 2) replace the POFP's value-extracted tx with its own value-extractive tx
+* when a VTRP is able to identify a valuable user tx but, due to the tactics of the POFP, is unable to inject its own transaction in place of the POFP's -> VTRP's optimal strategy is to censor the user's transaction from the final block
+
+
+---
+
+<br>
+
+### stat arbs
+
+* if CEX is greater than the price on chain (on theDEX), stat arbs will buy on the DEX and hedge on the CEX -> confident that the DEX price will drift towards the CEX price, but not confident that will happen to the CEX price
+* problem: settlement mismatch -> CEX trades are fast but blockchains aren't -> start arbs are unsure if the trade will land or competitors will beat them
+* from the time between trade submission and receipt of the next block, the trade (their exposure to the assets) is uncertain 
+* the greater the uncertainty, the more the profit estimate needs to be marked down
+* while volatility of the token is important, the longer the time period between blocks, the longer tx remains, and the longer can go without being fully hedged
+* as block time increases, stat arb MEV profit estimates get marked down -> payments made by stat arbers to miners/validators or to users/traders decrease
+* conclusion: the battle between PFOF-style MEV could lead to increase block times for stat arbers, decreasing combined realzied MEV
+
+<br>