From d45bee51190e747c5f6b6e1c37deed69b39e19ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Dr. Mia von Steinkirch"
 <1130416+F4DELEGATECALL@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 15 Oct 2022 17:42:47 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=8D=A6=20add=20some=20basic=20shit=20on?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20liquidations?=
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 liquidations/README.md | 13 +++++++++++++
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 * If liquidated, the borrower usually has to pay a hefty liquidation fee, some of which goes to the liquidator (where the MEV opportunity comes in).
 
 * Searchers compete to parse blockchain data as fast as possible to determine which borrowers can be liquidated and be the first to submit a liquidation transaction and collect the liquidation fee.
+
+<br>
+
+### strategy 1
+
+* A detects a liquidation opportuniy at block B (after the execution of B). Then, A issues a liquidation transaction T, which is expected to be mined in the next block, B+1.
+* A attempts to destructively front-run other competing liquidators by setting high transactions fees for their liquidation transaction T.
+
+<br>
+
+### strategy 2
+
+* A observes a transaction T, which will create a liquidation opportunity (e.g., an oracle price update transaction which will render a collaterized debit liquidatable). A then back-runs T with a liquidation transaction Ti to avoid the transation fee bidding competition.