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from competition to centralization: the oligopoly in ethereum block building auctions, by wu et al. (2024)

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empirical game theoretic analysis exploring builders' strategic bidding incentives in MEV-Boost auctions, focusing on how advantages in network latency and access to MEV opportunities affect builders' bidding behaviors and auction outcomes.
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MEV_by_chains/MEV_on_Ethereum/block_builders.md
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* [the role of block building in the future of ethereum, by d. der werff](https://frontier.tech/beyond-extraction)
* [running geth within sgx, by flashbots](https://writings.flashbots.net/geth-inside-sgx)
* [rated.network's builders dashboard](https://www.rated.network/builders?network=mainnet&timeWindow=1d&page=1)
* [buildernet, by flashbots, beaverbuild, nethermind](https://buildernet.org/blog/introducing-buildernet)
* [eip-7727, enable meta transactions to order other transactions, by l. johnson](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7727)
* [buildernet, by flashbots, beaverbuild, nethermind (2024)](https://buildernet.org/blog/introducing-buildernet)
* [eip-7727, enable meta transactions to order other transactions, by l. johnson (2024)](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7727)
* [from competition to centralization: the oligopoly in ethereum block building auctions, by wu et al. (2024)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2412.18074)
* empirical game theoretic analysis exploring builders' strategic bidding incentives in MEV-Boost auctions, focusing on how advantages in network latency and access to MEV opportunities affect builders' bidding behaviors and auction outcomes.